https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/0c41efddeab478d770a055ec2e742ff4.pdf 6bda1767eb4cc7c9b1ad5682d176b1b2 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act* -v Document divulgue ^A^tt\l4^\»io(suyFac<e^^Fih^^mal^n BEST AVAILABLE COPY T O P '"OE S E C R E T j^.t ' ^ O^ Washingt on, u. c , A p r i l 1 5 , 1955. JGKsr A Dear v X) SECRET; Study of National Security Policy "* - With your letter of March 28, addressed to . Arnold Heeney, you sent the papers on the Study of National Security Policy. He and I have both read these with a good deal of interest and, as he had left for Ottawa before he had an opportunity of replying, and as you said there was some urgency about receiving our comments, I am putting down below the points which occurred to Arnold and myself. In general, we were both impressed by the value of the papers and, with the exception of a few queries, have no comments to make on what appears to us to be a clear and satisfactory analysis of the questions involved. I shall, therefore, only draw your attention to a few points of detail, none of which are differences of opinion, but suggestions for possible further thoughts i*or rephrasing. The references below are to the pages in the papers you sent us. Page 5, paragraph 12 The word "rather" seems a little strong here. Pei"haps "before" might convey the meaning better. J, Leger, Esquire, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Ontario. / f.f, *7(os) ...2 000061 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu ae ittWiifrk'acces a I'information BEST AVAILABLE COPY m - 2 - Page 6, paragraph 5 ± Without having sufficient knowledge here to express any opinion, we both wondered whether the situation envisaged here might not occur before the interval of ten years. Prom what we have heard of Soviet capabilities in nuclear weapons and regular aircraft, it might be argued that this situation could to a considerable degree at least exist at almost any time-. Page 6,,paragraph 7 There seems to be some rethinking publicly and otherwise of the reality of the distinction made recently by Mr. Dulles between what he called "precision" atomic bombing and the use of nuclear weapons strategically. We cannot pretend to have any expert views on this but we have found a little unconvincing the distinction drawn between precision and other bombing. * Page 7, paragraph 1 * Without s u g g e s t i n g a . c h a n g e , we wondered whether "now" i n the l a s t l i n e might be " s o o n " . Page 7, paragraph 5 * Could Communist China be an exception to the statement made in the last sentence? Page 8, paragraph 6 We do not quite see the significance of the word "moreover" in the second sentence. Page 9, paragraph 10, first sentence Is it clear that at the time of Mr. Dulles' speech of January 1954 the capacity of the Soviet Union to retaliate with nuclear weapons was not known? « •. o 000062 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act . Document divulgue en vertu de 15QSi sSrWa^k^a I'information BEST AVAILABLE COPY - 3 - Page 15,, paragraph 19 The last line of the paragraph seems a little general. Page 16. paragraph 25, third sentence We do not quite follow this argument. Is not the maintenance of Canadian and United States forces in Europe now a question of concern to NATO as a whole?. Page 16, paragraph 25, fourth sentence It might be useful to insert "and will" after the word "unity". Page 18, paragraph 28, last three lines Would these installations be only for the Strategic Air Command? Would there not be a possible requirement for interceptors? Page 19, paragraph 52 It occurred to us that the points in this paragraph might be overstated or perhaps oversimplified. Page 50, paragraph 54 Similarly, we would be inclined to question the statements in the second and third sentences. Page 27, paragraph 55 The Ambassador has made two notes here which I will quote. With respect to the last part of the first sentence his comment is, "and yet without such participation it is difficult to urge this course". Again for the fifth sentence he has made this note - "and hence the distinction between 'immediate' and 'ultimate' interests tends to have progressively less validity". He also queried the last sentence of the paragraph. • *..->. 000063 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a I'information BEST AVAILABLE COPY TOP SECRET - 4 - Page 29, paragraph 57, second sentence Do not all other countries argue about present burdens? .1 have, as I said, simply drawn to your attention a number of detailed points which occurred to us and these notes may or may not be of some value when the paper is reexamined. Thank you for giving us an opportunity of reading this very interesting document. Yours slncerel y, G-. de T. G-lazebrook, 000064 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00058 Title A name given to the resource Letter, G. de T. Glazebrook to J. Leger, "Study of National Security Policy" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955-04-15 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Study on Canadian National Security Policy, RG25, file 50333-40, LAC. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Early Cold War, Canadian National Security Description An account of the resource Department of External Affairs, Ottawa Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en