https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/1116def69e6f89ce7cf5e01ad5089a64.pdf e7e47725e4ecde372b62fc1ba1050ede PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information DRAFT SECRET CANADIAN POLICY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS Canadian p o l i c y must t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t the g e n e r a l p i c t u r e , which i n c l u d e s t h e f o r e s e e a b l e A^<rf <*^l napor-t of technology on the development of Western and Communist military systems, the policies which other powers are likely to pursue, and the degree of freedom of choice Canada can have in deciding its own policies; and the Canadian picture, which must include an assessment of our own international objectives and the extent of our resources. The General Picture The most important single factor is the likely deployment in the near future of the "pure" deterrent which will replace or at least overshadow the present "impure" deterrent. The "pure" deterrent is characterized by its unvulnerability to destruction by pre-emptive attack. The United States will have this deterrent in the form of Polaris submarines, of which the first, it is reported, will be operational this month and about twenty by late 1963. (The assumption throughout is that the nuclear submarine is for all practical purposes, invulnerable to detection and destruction). We must assume that the Soviet Union will achieve a similar weapons system about the same time or a little later. The development of the invulnerable deterrent will improve the general security position by creating �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 - SECRET a condition of stability we do not now have. The present deterrent situation is unstable because the vulnerability to an unknown degree of the retaliatory forces constitutes a temptation to pre-emptive attack and because this vulnerability demands as its conse- quence the maintenanceof an excessively large delivery system at a dangerously high level of alertness. The situation can be described as "nervous", and with the decrease in warning time occasioned by the advent of long-range missiles the problem is made much worse. The invulnerable deterrent which ensures a capability for retaliation despite any action the enemy can take reestablishes stability, but this stability will be of a high order only if two cdnditions aremet. First of all, the old unstable elements of deterrence (strategic aircraft, ICBM.'s and IRBM's) should be dismantled lest they provoke a strategic exchange, through miscalculation or misunderstanding of intentions, which might or might not involve the use of the Polaris-type weapons as well as the older strategic weapons. Secondly, both sides must accept that the invulnerable deterrent is valid to prevent strategic attack only; to threaten its use in any situation less than a major attack against thehomeland of the country that possesses it would not have any credibility, because the country making the threat is totally deterred from using it by the certain knowledge that it cannot knock out its enemy's strategic force and that it will suffere retaliation. , The invulnerable deterrent is a perfect deterrent against the deliberate use of an enemy's strategic force against the homeland of the possessor; it &s not useful as a deterrent against any lesser attack nor against attack by error or miscalculation. It is obvious, ... 3 000173 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 3 SECRET however, that if the older deterrent weapons are dismantled miscalculation will be extremely unlikely because each country will know that if it miscalculates it is certain to be Retaliated against. In this situation the command of the Polaris pAA$Zzsi^^ •sAJtua^i-etr. should remain solely with the United States and not with NATO, for the defence of any area but the United States cannot be assured by the system. At the same time, this -situation may, while protecting the USSR and the United States in a condition of mutual deterrence, tend to increase the likelihood of war elsewhere; both the USSR and the United States may feel secure enough to follow more provocative policies than they do now in promoting their international interests, while at the same time each will know that the other cannot use its major strategic forces to protect its allies. The future of NATO and the defence of Western Europe in the years ahead appears therefore in a different light. It is likely that the present concept of a J[^£iAAyscAsY$i shield in Europe backed by a strategic o-fratomont in the hands of the United States will -fe©*e its validity. what should it be replaced? With If the new deterrent situation has the effect of removing Europe from the strategic protectionof America^, then the defence of Europe must be achieved in Europe, with or without United States assistance. The problem for Europe will be to devise a system of security which will reduce the danger of a European war or,lacking this, at least minimize its effects. The central question is whether Europe should in this situation have nuclear weapons. Such a decision must be made by the Europeans themselves, but the wiser course would surely he for them to renounce nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union would not likely be willing to see a nuclear �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 4 SECRET deterrent created in Europe, particularly since Germany would be pre-eminent on the continent once United States powert had been removed; the Soviet Union would be strongly inclined to attack Western strong deterrent could be created. Europe before a And the adoption of tactical nuclear weapons would only have the effect of calling forth the use of similar weapons by the Soviet aUnion in any war in Europe, with the result that greater destruction would be caused. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that in the foreseeable strategic situation Western Europe will be essentially indefensible against the Soviet Union, if the latter should choose to attack, unless Western Europe can create a "pure" deterrent force of its own before the Soviet Union achieves one and effectively removes Western Europe from the strategic protection of the United States. Since political union in Europe would be necessary to make the deterrent power of nuclear strategic force credible, it seems doubly unlikely that there is time for Western Europe to achieve this position. In the circumstances, the best defence policy for Western Europe would seem to be a large conventional force which would protect it from threats elsewhere than from the Soviet Union and would tend to minimize the damage in any war with the Soviet Union. It is likely that in the future the United States will consider itself secure from China because of its possession of an invulnerable strategic force, although the United States may, of course, think it necessary to provide other types of forces for the protection of its interests overseas which may be jeopardized by China. is questionable whether China will feel itself deterred It �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 5- SECRET by United States strategic power, although it is hard to believe that the Chinese would,on -biological grounds , | seriously risk nuclear bombardment of their country. They might feel, however, that they would be free from all -e-thffr attack from the United States so long as they took aggressive action short of an attack on the United States itself. It is likely that the Chinese will con- tinue to work towards the development of nuclear weapons, both stratetic and tactical, but will not achieve a "pure" deterrent situation in the foreseeable future. Canadian Policy The questions are: 1. Is it useful to contribute Canadian defence forces with nuclear weapons in Europe, given the situation there that is likely to develop/within years? the next few- If it is not, what are the possibilities of disengaging ourselves from the commitments to provide these weapons if other members of NATO do not see the future in the same light as we do? If we do not provide nuclear weapons in Europe, how long should 2. our forces remain there? In the period before the development by bothjUnited States and the USSR of. invulnerable strategic forces, or even after this period if old deterrent forces continue to /exist and therefore provide some risk of attack on North America, will nuclear weapons in conjunction with any foreseeable air defence carrier system (Bomarc's, aircraft) reduce the effects of an attack on Canada to a worthwhile degree? This can only be decided" as the result of a military of scientific judgment 000176 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 6SECRET om the prospects of defence against bomber or ICBM attacks with nuclear weapons. Is the probable acquisition by China in the period, say, 1963-19^0, of a nuclear bomber strategic force, as distinct from a missile force, likely to provide a sufficient threat to Canada to justify the maintenance of an air defence system to meet it? 3. Istthere likely to be a period in the future in which ICBM will represent the only significant threat, that is a period after the bomber has gone out of use and before development of a situation of "pure" deterrence renders an attack on the United States very unlikely; in such a period is it likely that Canada would have an immunity from attack because any strategic attack on the UnitedStates with missiles would over-fly Canada? Should we seek to create such a situation of immunity by refusing to have the United States and the United Kingdom strategic retaliatory forces stationed in Canada? 4. What is likely to be the position of Canada when the Soviet Union and the United States, both having acquired invulnerable strategic forces, are immune from attack by each other and incapable of defending their allies by the threat of using strategic power? There is some question whether in this situation the United States would consider even a nuclear attack the on Canada sufficient justification for/launching of a strategic assault on the Soviet Union, but if the ... 7 if •» 000177 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 7 SECRET attack on Canada were from China, who did not have a invulnerable strategic force, the United States would almost certainly retaliate. If the attack on Canada took the form of an invasion on our territory by any major power including the Soviet Union, the United States could be expected to assist in ©spelling the invasion without launching a major attack on the Soviet Union. It is questionable in any case whether Canada is likely to come under major attack from any country except as part of an attack on the United States; if the United States possesses an invulnerable strategic force, a strategic attack of this form on us is most unlikely, and as long as the United States and ourselves maintained adequate defences of the conventional un kind against invasion, the/likelihood of an attack of this kind on the continent is likely to continue even if in the future the physical possibilities of intercontinental invasion increase. 000178 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01623 Title A name given to the resource Draft: Canadian Policy on Nuclear Weapons Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource n.d. 1960