https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/91ea12f96a3796b7ef063184b53ef2e8.pdf 8fd2a49ecd9de78017d2b387346bfc22 PDF Text Text fJP? ?ff ^f^fiMfflfiJ1* disclosed under the Access to Information Act **W t ' t / a t ^ a i M r j B I / u I l t r a eC^Wlv4eJU/o/sur Faeces a Finformation M JU -( r d* W DRAFT D: 26 March, 1955. 7^ ,223* The Strategic Concept of the Nuclear Deterrent CONCLUSIONS The above subject has been studied with particular reference to Its implications for Canada and its allies and.certain tentative conclusions reached are set out below. 1. The main aim of Canada and its allies, as set out in the North Atlantic Treaty, isi to preserve peace without sacrificing any vital interests. The chief means of doing this is by building and maintaining deterrent strength, particularly the capacity to retaliate instantly against aggression with nuclear weapons, but in view of the Soviet nuclear capability and the devastating consequences of mutual retaliation, we cannot afford to use the nuclear deterrent except when the interests threatened are truly vital. 2. (Paras. 1-7).* Threats of "massive™ retaliation, and perhaps to a lesser extent, of "measured™ retaliation applied to local and limited Communist threats, carry the risk of turning local hostilities into general war. (paras. 8-1^-). 3° The strategy of the nuclear deterrent has been incorporated into NATO defence planning and preparations by the approval of M.C. ^85 thereby a restraint has been placed upon the Soviet Union by the knowledge that if .'• armed attack occurs, nuclear weapons will be used in the ensuing war. *K (paras, 16-20). Considering the horrible consequences if nuclear and thermonuclear warfare were to occur, it is in the interest of all NATO governments to explore all possible means of limiting wars that cannot be avoided; to this end 000109 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a I'information TOP SECRET - 2they must be in a position to distinguish between aggressions of less directness and magnitude from all-out threats and they must also be in a position to control the putting into action of NATO plans and preparations, 5. (paras. 21-22). Because of the vital importance of the nuclear deterrent to NATO defence planning, the defence of the deterrent power in North America should be treated as « an integral part of the problem of defending the NATO area, (paras. 23-25). 6. Because of Canadafs geographical location between the USA and the USSR and athwart the trans-polar air routes, Canada is in a position to contribute to the deterrent power of the allies by providing facilities for the Strategic Air Command and through continental defence 5 the latter involves joint planning and preparations which proceed on the assumption that the air defence of Canada and the United States constitutes one problem. 7« (paras. 26-30). If the effective air defence of North America requires the integration of air defence including a joint Command rather than the present arrangements for cooperations the adequacy of the existing Canada-United States agreement governing defence cooperation as a framework for such arrangements require examination; consideration might also be given to constituting a new air defence Command under NATO (including possibly the United Kingdom as the other power with responsibilities for the nuclear deterrent under NATO), (paras. 31-35)8. The interdependence of Canada and the United States in air defence, makes any United States policy which ' may lead to general war a matter of special concern to Canada*, whether or not that policy involves a Canadian commitment„ (paras. 36-37). 000110 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET - 39. The advent of the intercontinental ballistic missile, against which there is no defence would increase Canada's dependence upon the nuclear deterrent for the prevention of war. 10. (paras. 38-^3). An essential part of the policy of the nuclear deterrent should be to assess in each case of threat, the importance of the interests of the free world involved in order that the Western Powers should not incur the risks of all-out war unless the threat to their interests justifies it; Canada should have the opportunity to participate in such an assessment and to express its views on the course of action to be taken in view of the inescapable consequential effects on Ganada if general war occurs, 11. (paras. Mf-^9). If, in any given case, the risks of all-out or nuclear war are not justified, and yet important interests of the free world are involved,, it is essential that the Western Powers should be prepared to deal with limited wars with limited means and within limited objectives, Canada itself would not participate in such limited or local wars unless by a decision of the United Nations which it had accepted. 12o (paras. ^9-53). The Communist threat and methods vary from area to area according to available resources and the weaknesses and contradictions which they can exploit; allied strategy must therefore combine political and economic rather than military measures to deter the indirect threats which may be posed by the Communists in an effort to outflank the nuclear deterrent. 13. (paras. 5*+-56). As the use of military force is risky under the conditions of "mutual deterrence1*', the Communists may increasingly use diplomacy, economic competition and subversion to pursue their aims; this may justify a reexamination of Canada's contribution to the non-military 000111 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation TOP SECRET ways of dealing with the Communist threat, (paras. 57-58). 1>+. Because of allied dependence upon nuclear weapons for the deterrent, and considering the probability of the major powers with a nuclear capability possessing concealed stockpiles, plans for disarmament incorporating as an essential feature the control and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons should be reconsidered, (paras. 59-71 )<> 15. The discussion in the accompanying memorandum is concerned with the consideration of the implications of the nuclear deterrent in relation to the policies of Canada and its allies; how these policies are to be carried out in the planning of Canadian national security and in defence preparations, remains to be dealt with within the context of the more comprehensive study of National Security Policy which is projected. 16. Pending the completion of this study, moreover, no recommendations for action are attempted on the basis of this tentative and preliminary analysis. 17. It should be emphasized that this paper is nothing more than a rough first draft of ideas that have not yet been discussed with other Departments, or even with all the Divisions concerned within the Department„ It is intended merely to help clarify the various important > implications of the strategy of the nuclear deterrent. 000112 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation • TOP SECRET - 5The Strategic Concept of the Nuclear Deterrent . Assumptions It has been necessary to make certain assumptions on which the reasoning in the accompanying . memorandum is based. Military 1. The United States provides most of the nuclear capability on the allied side in the form of the Strategic Air Command which has nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and aircraft to carry them to Soviet targets; the United Kingdom capability in weapons and carriers is very small„ . 2. Although the United States capability in relation to the Soviet Union's capability is at present believed to be larger in magnitude and explosive power of stockpiles, more effective in means of delivery and superior in defence against Soviet retaliation, the Soviet Union's capability is growing; the limiting factor in Soviet nuclear capability has been in aircraft, but the Soviet Union is believed to have aircraft now in service capable of delivering a crippling weight of nuclear weapons on North America. 3. Megaton thermonuclear weapons have already been developed on both sides of the Iron Curtain of such devastating power that their effective use might imperil the ability of even the greatest nation to recover quickly and carry on the war effectively. ha Within a few years the Soviet Union is expected to have a sufficient number of intercontinental bombers to deliver an attack of catastrophic force against this Continent, although at the grave risk of exposing itself to a retaliatory blow of equal or greater force, unless it develops a defensive capacity beyond the degree now foreseen. 000113 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation TOP SECRET - 6-5. ..Within ten years, as a result of the develop- ment of intercontinental ballistic missiles, it is probable that neither side will be able reasonably to expect that by striking the first blow it could eliminate the power of the other to inflict mortal damage. Political 6. The United States and the United Kingdom govern- ments will be restrained by moral and spiritual conviction brought to bear by their public opinion from initiating a nuclear or any other kind of war, except in retaliation; nevertheless, they will remain resolute to retaliate all-out with nuclear weapons instantly, if faced with an all-out Soviet attack. 7« The United States will be prepared to use the threat of nuclear retaliation of less than total force to deter local or limited Communist military aggression. 8. The Soviet Union has every reason to avoid embarking on general war in the near future both because it can have no prospect of escaping nuclear retaliation and because war is not essential to the pursuit of its basic aims; the most dangerous possibility is that the use of force in a local and limited conflict might lead to general war by accident or miscalculation. 000114 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a Finformation TOP SECRET 7 - The Strategic Concept of the Nuclear Deterrent MEMORANDUM The Strategy of the nuclear deterrent in relation to the aims of Allied defence policy 1* The United States and the Soviet Union now confront one another with the prospect of mutual devastation by thermonuclear and nuclear weapons0 It is this prospect and not the mere existence of weapons of such destructive power, which is the deterrent of war. With the capability of the Soviet Union to retaliate in kind growing both in terms of weapons and the means of delivering them, this deterrent works both ways; it is now a case of mutual deterrence. S* It is also true that at present the United States enjoys superiority in numbers and types of weapons as well as in the means of delivering them, and even though the Soviet Union has built up deterrents of its own, it cannot be sure that if it were to make a surprise atomic attack upon the United States or any of its allies, it could prevent an immediate nuclear retaliation on a far larger scale. This, mainly in the form of the Strategic Air Command, is the deterrent power on the allied side, .3, Because of the scale of. devastation that may be expected from thermonuclear or nuclear attacks, it is almost certain that a general war would only be fought against an actual or apparent threat to a nation's vital interests or those of its allies. As a corollary, It is probable that a potential enemy will hesitate to start a war, even when further political or non-warlike action is not open to him for the pursuit of his aims, unless he apprehends a direct threat to his own security, 4a Thus if the strategy of the nuclear deterrent works, it is because it strikes fear and uncertainty in the 000115 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation i _ S - TOP SECRET calculations of a potential aggressor about the possible outcome and consequences of his aggression. Because of this fear, it provides a kind of psychological fence to reinforce other deterrents against the use of general war as an instrument iof policy. The strategy of the nuclear deterrent, as its name I implies, makes sense as a strategy for the prevention of war, | not as a strategy for fighting one. If the deterrent fails i to prevent general war, the ensuing damage from nuclear and I thermonuclear weapons is bound to be catastrophic, 5, If the prospect of devastation from thermonuclear or nuclear war may act in this way as a deterrent of general war, it may not act as a deterrent against the threat of other kinds of hostile action, where the consequences apprehended may not include thermonuclear or nuclear devastation. On the other hand, the threat of the use of nuclear retaliation against the Soviet Union or one of its allies where vital allied interests are not affected, runs the risk of precipitating war, since such a threat might be interpreted by the Soviet f Union as an actual or an apparent threat to its vital interests„ I The use. of such threats by one of the members of NATO, there/ fore, is a matter of lively concern to the other allies. 6, It is of particular concern to Canada because of her special geographical location and neighbourhood with the United States, which possessA'the principal nuclear retaliatory power on the side of the Western Powers -e The United States, moreover, has so far reserved the right to determine by the authority of its President, when and in what circumstances it may use or threaten to use its power of nuclear retaliation,, 7,, The emphasis is upon retaliation, for the Western Powers will not deliberately start a ma^or war, which by its very nature cannot serve the aims proclaimed in the North Atlantic Treaty "to live in peace with all peoples and governments and to safeguard the freedom, eomraon heritage 000116 <^ �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation L f - 9 - TOP SECRET : and civilization of their peoples", But the allies have made it clear that they are maintaining preparations for instant nuclear retaliation against the event of Soviet all-out attack, 8, The fact that the United States has been prepared to use the threat of nuciear retaliation to deter the threat of Communist attacks, other than the threat of an outright attack against the security of the United States and its allies, has posed difficult questions affecting the relationship of the United States to its allies generally and with Canada in particular, 9, Mr, Dulles' speech on massive retaliation in January of last year is a case in point. The Minister, in commenting on this speech in the House of Commons on March 25, did not question the proposition that the capacity to retaliate with nuclear weapons could be a valuable deterrent against aggression, but he sought clarification at the same time on the applicability of this strategy to various forms of Communist threat and on the manner in which decisions would be made, i,e„ with or without prior consultation with the allies, 10o The danger of this doctrine -ars- that it apparently assumed that the other side would not have the capacity nor the intention to retaliate with nuclear weapons, an assumption which now we know is invalid, at least in so far as the capacity of the Soviet Union is concerned. Thus in trying to restrain any form of military action on the Communist side by the threat of all-out attack, such threats of "massive" nuclear attack run the risk that if the Soviet Union intervenes, hostilities which begin as a local or limited war might turn into a thermonuclear one. There is also the danger that this type of threat risks becoming a boomerang as Soviet nuclear capability grows. For it cannot be overlooked that the Soviet Union (and Communist China) may likewise exploit the �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation . 10 _ TOP SECRET * threat of nuclear retaliation in weakening the will of the Western Powers to risk war In the protection of their essential interests, 11, Considerations such as these have evidently been taken into account in Washington, for "massive" retaliation has given place to "measured" retaliation. The idea now apparently is that instead of threatening the use of the full force of nuclear destructive power to deter local Communist military threats where vital allied interests are not involved, the use of nuclear weapons of a limited destructive nuclear power only is threatened. This change is based not only on considerations of policy, but also on the fact that the United States has developed a variety of nuclear weapons ranging from a destructive power of the equivalent of 500 tons of T^N^T,;, upwards to the equivalent of a million tons and more, 12, The possibility that this concept of "measured retaliation" might be applied in Asia, was brought out by Mr1, Dulles in reporting on the military arrangements of the Manila Treaty on March 8, He said that the allies now Is" possess plenty of power ©e this treaty area and that this power includes sea and air forces equipped with "new and powerful weapons of precision which can utterly destroy military targets without endangering unrelated civilian centres"* The President in backing Mr. Dulles up, gave the impression that these smaller nuclear weapons could be used like conventional weapons. "On strictly military targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn't be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else"j, he said, 13, While making "the punishment fit the crime" seems a step In the right direction in dealing with the variety of Communist encroachments, it is still to be seen whether this distinction drawn between tactical and strategic uses �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation „ 11 - TOP SECRET of nuclear weapons can be maintained in practice. Once military operations start, it is reasonable to expect that military necessity will come into play and as much force will tend to be used as may be necessary to attain the objective. If the military requirement calls for increasing applications of nuclear force, more and more destructive weapons may be used and their damaging effects might not be capable of being limited to military targets. 14 0 Moreover, the intention to limit hostilities might be clear enough to the United States, but particularly with the use of nuclear weapons, this intention may be misinterpreted by the enemy* Thus the reaction to this "measured" retaliation may be of a different measure to that which is foreseen. Hostilities may spread and Involve the vital interests of the Soviet Union and thus lead to general war, 15« It is therefore essential to clarify the applica- bility of this strategy and its implications. In the paragraphs which follow, consideration is given in greater detail to how this strategy applies to various forms of Communist threat and its implications for Canada with particular reference to: NATO, Continental Defence, Limited or Local Wars, and Indirect Aggression. Finally, the implications of allied dependence on the new weapons necessary for the deterrent are briefly examined in relation to disarmament policy. NATO, 16, At its last Ministerial meeting the North Atlantic Council approved a report of the Military Committee on the most effective pattern of NATO military strength (Document MC 48 (Final) of November 22, 1954) over the next few years, which in effect incorporated the strategy of the nuclear deterrent, in future NATO defence planning and preparation. The relevant conclusion in this report was as follows: "It is militarily �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation - 12 - TOP SECRET — * essential that NATO forces should be able to use atomic and thermonuclear weapons in their defence and that the NATO . military authorities should be authorized to plan and make preparations-on the assumption that atomic and thermonuclear weapons will be used in defence from the outset", 17, The approval of the Council was for planning purposes only and reserved to governments the right of decision with respect to putting such plans and preparations into action. The relevant Council resolution read as followss "The Council approves the report M.C, 48 as a basis for defence planning and preparations by the NATO military authorities, noting that this approval does not involve delegation of the responsibility of governments for putting plans into action in the event of hostilities". 18, In approving this resolution on behalf of the United States (which of course provides most of the nuclear capability on the Allied side), Mr, Dulles explained what he understood to be the effect of this approval on the right of decision of governments. remarks An examination of Mr, Dulles' reveals that there are two particular ways in which, in his view, governments have retained the freedom of power and exercise of their political responsibilities: (a) responsibility for deciding on belligerent action, and (b) responsibility for evaluating the nature of the threat posed (i.e. determining whether it is a threat that should be dealt with by a "limited" or by an "all-out" defence), General Gruenther also, in the course of the discussion of the Military Committee's report, made an explanatory comment which is not out of line with Mr, Dulles' understanding. General Gruenther*s comment was summarized in the record as follows: "It is unquestionably a political decision to decide 000120 �* Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation TOP SECRET 13 - whether or not there is an act of war, and there is no thought in our headquarters (SHAPE) that there should be a military decision - and certainly not one that our headquarters should make0 But it having been decided that there was an act of war, and that it was an all-out act of war, and not simply a local wars he felt it was not feasible to go to this or that strategy,," 19. The Council's approval of MC 48, which raises the stakes involved in the East-West conflict, would seem to have two main political implications for the NATO alliance. One is to impose a restriction on the freedom of Soviet action* and thus to strengthen the position of the West, by issuing a clear warning that, if an armed attack does occur involving the commitments of member governments under Article V and VI of the North Atlantic Treaty, the ensuing war will be a nuclear war., Judging from the reactions of Soviet propaganda on the theme that NATO is preparing an atomic war, this implication has not been lost on the Soviet leaders. Indeed the risks, military and political, that nuclear warfare would involve for the Soviet Government may well exclude direct aggression in Europe as a likely measure of Soviet policy, particularly since war is not essential to the pursuit of basic Communist aims. 20. This is turn increases the prababllrty that 1vhe Soviet Union will use other methods of pursuing their aims which will not provoke nuclear retaliation: well-known Communist methods of diplomatic manoeuvre and political warfare designed to weaken the unity and effectiveness of the Western Goalition0 Against such methods reliance on nuclear weapons will not be of much avail, and it becomes all the more necessary to take other measures in NATO, including the provision of conventional �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a I'information TOP SECRET - 14 - forces and measures of political and economic cooperation, which will strengthen the unity and morale of the coalition. 21, The other political implication is to restrict our own freedom of action, or rather to place a devastating price on any miscalculation. It becomes of prime importance to /- - • Canada and the rest of NATO countries to be able to judge quickly and accurately, in the event the deterrent is not effective, whether a given hostile action is such as to merit all-out defence, involving nuclear retaliation, or just limited defence, involving measures short of nuclear retaliation. This question is, of course, vital to Canada in particular, not only because we are a member of NATO but also because, in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack, Canada would probably be the scene of the air battle. In this connection, it may be open to question whether or not any distinction could in practice be maintained between the tactical use of atomic weapons, such as atomic shells, against military targets in the field and the strategic use of atomic and thermonuclear bombs against industrial and communications targets. It is likely that as much force in terms of nuclear weapons will be used as is deemed necessary by the military commanders to attain their objective. 22, Under these circumstances the exercise of effective control by governments over all stages of "alerts procedures" is particularly important. The ability of governments to make an evaluation of the facts which give rise to apprehension of the imminence of war, obviously depends on having access to intelligence reports on indications of enemy mobilization measures. This consideration would be relevant if the outbreak of war were preceded by a period of increasing international tension. In the event of a sudden all-out attack the problem 000122 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET - 15 of evaluating the facts would not, of course, arise, 23. There is also an important military implication. The nuclear deterrent has for a long time been implicit in the NATO strategic concept but with the approval of MC 48 it has now been explicitly adopted as an integral part of NATO defence planning and preparations. It consequently becomes all the more important that there should be effective co-ordination of defence planning in NATO as between North America and the rest of the NATO area and that the organization of the defence of the nuclear deterrent in North America should be integrated with NATO defence planning as a whole. This may mean some re- organization of CUSRPG, particularly with respect to air defence. The present situation, in which joint military planning between Canada and the United States is done in effect not in CUSRPG but in the MCC, outside the framework of NATO, can hardly be considered satisfactory from this point of view, 24. In practice the only real co-ordination and balancing of priorities as between the defence of Europe and the defence of North". America that is now being carried out is being done on a purely national basis, as for instance in Washington, As far as we can judge, present United States policy in this respect is to continue to develop their nuelear deterrent power, to maintain substantially their present forces in Europe, to scale down where possible commitments in other parts of the world (e.g. in Korea) and to build up in North America a strategic mobile reserve and continental air defences against the Soviet nuclear threat. The NATO sector of this policy was defined in the recent declaration by the United States President, in which he confirmed that, �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation TOP SECRET - 16 - when the Paris Agreements have come into force, it will be United States policy "to continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defence of the North Atlantic area while a threat to that area exists, and to continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defence of this area", 25, Related to this question of co-ordination of defence planning is the question of measures to strengthen the unity of the coalition, to which reference was made earlier. If our allies are to appreciate the importance of North American defence as part of the defence of the NATO area, it is surely necessary that it should be a subject of multilateral concern and not exclusively of bilateral consultation. Moreover, the maintenance of Canadian and United States forces in Europe should be recognized as a question of concern to NATO as a whole and not merely of individual national concern. The presence of these forces in Europe has an important political effect, as a token of trans-Atlantic solidarity, in addition to its military effect, and any substantial withdrawal might seriously affect the unity of the alliance. Any withdrawals which might become necessary for the purpose of North American defence, therefore, must not only be in the interest of NATO as a whole but must be seen by our allies as such. This factor is likely to be of particular importance if, as may be expected, the Communist side puts increasing emphasis on measures short of military aggression to weaken the West and especially to isolate North America from its European allies. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a Finformation TOP SECRET ' — - 17 - Continental Defence 26. The prevention of war, except in the defence of vital interests, is the main aim of Canadian national policy as it is of our allies. A strategy designed to achieve this objective therefore is of prime importance to Canadian national interests. Canada's geographical location, between the USA and USSR and athwart the trans-polar routes, puts Canada in a position to contribute to the nuclear deterrent power of the allies in two ways: by the provision of facil- ities on or over Canadian territory and through continental defence. The core of the nuclear retaliatory power on the side of the allies, is in the Strategic Air Command of the United States, and the protection of that deterrent power therefore is one of the principal objectives of NATO defence. 27. Continental defence also involves the protection of the population and other resources of North America, upon which the ability of Canada and the United States - and indeed of the Western Coalition - to sustain a war in the long run depends. The defence of North America and its war potential in the broadest sense and the defence of the . nuclear retaliatory power of the United States are to some extent indistinguishable. Both require a common defence structure including the early warning system, interception, the dispersal of targets, and civil defence. Accordingly, for the purposes of planning and preparing these defences, it has been assumed that the air defences of Canada and the United States must be considered as one problem. This has been agreed to at the Chiefs of Staff level. 28. Coupled with the defence of North America and the defence of the nuclear deterrent power, so far as Canada is concerned, is the provision of facilities which may be sought by the United States on Canadian territory for the effective 000125 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a I'information TOP SECRET - 18 - development of the deterrent power, that is SAC operating bases. It may be expected that an increasingly significant proportion of the installations which are likely to be constructed in Canada in the next five to ten years will be for the Strategic Air Command and that an increasing number of United States personnel will be sent to Canada to man thenu 29, In determining the share which Canada should bear in these defence activities, it is clear at least that Canada cannot assume exclusive responsibility for that portion which is operated directly by or for the Strategic Air Command, On the other hand, unless Canada assumes its share of responsibility for continental defence activities, which are more likely to involve combat operations over Canada than are SAC operations, there is a risk of losing effective control of these activities on Canadian territory. 30. To judge the extent of Canadian participation which is necessary or desirable, it is necessary to strike a balance between the demands of Western European defence and North American defence on Canadian resources. Both are vulnerable to Soviet nuclear retaliation, but both come under the umbrella of United States nuclear deterrent power. This balance depends upon political and military considerations. The military considerations involve an assessment of the comparative degree of threat against North America and Western Europe; but since it must be assumed that one of the aims of the Soviet Union is to isolate North America.from its Western European partners and thus disrupt NATO, the military threat cannot be divorced from the important political consideration of maintaining the unity of the Alliance which is itself an important element of the deterrent. It is presumably because of considerations such as these, that the present United States policy envisages the maintenance of United States forces substantially at present levels in 000126 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation f TOP SECRET - 19 - Europe, while building up the deterrent and means of defending it in North America. 31. The degree of control exercised over continental defence by Canada, moreover, depends not only on the extent of its participation in these activities, but also upon the form of the air defence command structure. The current concept of a coordinated rather than an integrated air defence system for North America stems from the joint declaration of 1947 on the principles of defence cooperation between the two countries, and in particular on the statement that "as an underlying principle all cooperative arrangements will be without impairment of the control of either country over all activities in its own territory.7 32. The adequacy of these existing arrangements as a framework for continental air defence is open to serious question. In the first place, the policy of imposing a "command boundary" along the border between the two countries may have been politically justifiable thus far, but may not be for much longer. It is militarily unsound and makes necessary the disposition of forces on the basis of national rather than military factors; it invites the USAF air defence commanders to treat the populated parts of Canada as the scene of the air battle, rather than as an integral part of the region to be defended. This situation will become increasingly serious with the advent in the near future of air-to-air and ground-to-air missiles armed with atomic warheads, 33. Secondly, enough information is now available about United States plans for air defence installations to be established in Canada between now and 1960, to make it clear that the numbers of air defence personnel in the populated part of Ganada will be greatly increased, including sections �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgueenvertudela Loi sur Faeces a Finformation TOP SECRET - 20 - of the country where the Canadian air defence organization is at present, to all intents and purposes, non-existent, 34. Thirdly, the deficiencies in the existing command arrangements, organization, and plans for the deployment of AAHJtf forces and weapons mould have primarily an adverse effect on air operations over Canada, rather than the United States, The system is probably sufficiently effective for the protection of the United States alone, that, because of a reluctance to appear to be forcing Canada into an integrated organization and because of internal interservice difference^the United States authorities are not likely to take the initiative in trying "to change it. Iii other words, if Canada considers that the situation is developing in a manner detrimental to its interests, then the Canadian Government should take the lead in pressing for a change. 35. The implications of the situation now developing are of the greatest importance to Canada and require urgent study. Consideration should be given to the possible necessity of negotiating a new comprehensive bilateral agreement between the two countries, or alternatively the establishment of a North American Air Defence Command under NATO, perhaps with a broader multilateral control. Consideration might also be given to the relationship of the United Kingdom to such a Command, as the other power which will presumably assume increasing responsibilities for the nuclear deterrent under NATO. 36. Quite apart from the planning and preparation for the contingencies of general war, including defences against the possibility of nuclear attack on North America, the strategy of the deterrent has important political and military implications in a period of international tension characteristic of the cold war. Even in anticipation of 000128 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation TOP SECRET - 20-A the possible imminence of general war, the United States may wish to carry out certain precautionary deployments of their strategic aircraft and weapons and to alert continental air defence0 This may involve requests for permission for air- craft to overfly Canadian territory to the bases used by the Strategic Air Command in order to be prepared for instant action and requests to make precautionary alerts of the continental air defence system. If war were to seem imminent, the United States Government could be expected to approach the Canadian Government with the request for permission not only to deploy the Strategic Air Command, but also to carry out air strikes from bases in Canadian territory and to mobilize fully the continental air defence system. 37. Thus the interdependence, of Canada and the United States in Air Defence and the inter-related continental Defence arrangements which stem from this, make any United States policy which may lead to general war a matter of special concern to Canada, whether or not that policy involves a Canadian Commitment, 000129 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation TOP SECRET - 21 - The Prospects of Intercontinental Warfare with the Advent of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 38, So far we have been considering the implications of the strategy of the nuclear deterrent in terms of the nuclear capability which is now assumed to exist. This capability includes nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and piloted or pilotless aircraft. But in addition to the rapid developments in the power of the weapons, revolutionary developments in the means of delivery of nuclear weapons must also be reckoned with. 39. Technical developments with far-reaching consequences for Canada are foreseen in the art of the long range of intercontinental missile. One of the assumptions of the present study is that "within ten years, as a result particularly of the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, it is probable that neither side will be able reasonably to expect that by striking the first blow it could eliminate the power of the other to inflict mortal damage". ^0. The reason why it is assumed that the advent of the IBM will produce this expectation that neither side "could eliminate the power of the other to inflict mortal damage" is that as yet there is no known defence against this type of missile. Counter-action can be prepared against guided missiles by interference with their electronic guidance systems. The IBM, howevers is not a guided missile, but is aimed and fired like a bullet or a shell. These missiles are apparently to be propelled on an intercontinental journey by a rocket propellent and in the final stages of their journey through space they will depend on gravity to bring them to their targets. Existing methods of continental defence would presumably be obsolete in relation to this type of warfare. ^1. According to Information released by the United States Air Force, the United States is working on an intercontinental missile referred to as Atlas. The range of this missile is said to be in order of five thousand miles and its speed as it 000130 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a Finformation V» - 22 - TOP SECRET approaches i t s t a r g e t to be of t h e order of ten thousand miles per hour. If the IBM Is used in conjuction with a thermonuclear warhead, i t would not r e q u i r e too high a degree of accuracy to have devastating effects on l a r g e t a r g e t areas such as c i t i e s or a i r bases. Under these circumstances, deterrence of war w i l l be more e s s e n t i a l than ever to n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . ^2, The shape of things to come i n warfare which now seem to be approaching t h e stage of r e a l i t y and not jus t a nightmare, may have important p o l i t i c a l as well as m i l i t a r y consequences for Canada. Canada's geographical l o c a t i o n , as we have seen, makes i t highly l i k e l y that Canada w i l l occupy a most s t r a g e t i c p o s i t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to t h e s e developments. In a d d i t i o n to the problem of dealing with requests from t h e United S t a t e s for overf l i g h t and a i r base f a c i l i t i e s and cooperating i n t h e defence of the United States nuclear d e t e r r e n t power, t h e r e may well be the a d d i t i o n a l problem of granting r i g h t s to t h e United S t a t e s to e s t a b l i s h f i r i n g platforms on Canadian t e r r i t o r y , or, a l t e r n a t i v e l y , developing and maintaining such platforms under exclusively Canadian or j o i n t c o n t r o l . Thus Canada i s l i k e l y to be involved w i l l y - n i l l y in i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l push-button warfare which seems l i k e l y to be upon us in the next decade. ^3. This and the other revolutionary developments In methods of warfare, point to the urgent necessity of considering how best Canada i t s e l f should be armed under conditions where the avoidance of the horrors of push-button nuclear war w i l l depend more than ever upon d e t e r r e n c e , and war, i f i t cannot be avoided, i s l i k e l y to be fought with nuclear weapons used t a c t i c a l l y and strategically. This needs to be considered not only as a m i l i t a r y and economic problem in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e 1 Ml'OCft'tlo'jft of Canadian resources t o defence. aspect. I t has a most important p o l i t i c a l For whether or not Canada decides to develop nuclear weapons i n some form i t s e l f and to p a r t i c i p a t e i n an i n t e r c o n t i n ental m i s s i l e programme, w i l l obviously have a considerable bearing on the influence which Canada can bring to bear In i n t ^ r - �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation V» TOP SECRET - 23 - national councils in the protection of her own interests„ Limited or Local Wars hh0 In examining the applicability of the nuclear deterrent to local or limited wars and its implications, it is necessary to start from the fact that while the Communists Powers have been restrained from posing an all-out challenge to the free world so far, they have been successful in making gradual encroachments on the free world, which have advanced Communist control over large areas on the periphery of the Soviet orbit. In the absence of local strength to resist these encroachments, this form of Communist threat has had to be dealt; with, either by collective security measures under the United Nations as in Korea, or by the forces of one of the Great Powers with global interests and globally deployed resources, such as France in Indochina, the United Kingdom in Malaya, or the United States in Formosa, h$e Reliance upon nuclear retaliation has been chosen by the United States as a strategy to deter local Communist military aggression, as an alternative to committing United States ground forces to shore up the various weak spots of strategic importance in the defences of the free world. The position taken by the United States Government in regard to the fulfilment of its commitments under the South-EastjAsia Collective Defence Treaty presents an important current illustration of this strategy. 1+6. Mr, Dulles, in his speech on the results of the Bangkok meeting of the Manila Treaty Powers on March 8, included a warning that the nuclear retaliatory power of the United States may be used to deter Communist China from further military encroachments in Asia. He said: "For military defence'we shall rely largely upon mobile allied power which can strike an aggressor wherever the case may demand. That capacity will, we believe, deter aggression. We shall not need to build up large static forces at all points and the United States contribution will be primarily in terms of sea and air power". Then he went on to say: "The Allied nations possess together plenty of power 000132 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation - 2>+ - TOP SECRET " . in the area. The United States in particular has sea and air forces now equipped with new and powerful weapons of precision, which can utterly destroy military targets without endangering unrelated civilian centers,". V7. Mr, Dulles1 warning to Communist China implied not only the threat of the use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent; he also implied the risk of spreading the war. On this aspect of the deterrent, Mr. Dulles said: "I pointed out at Bangkok that, for military purposes^ the Chinese Communist front should be regarded as an entirety because if the Chinese Communists engage in open armed aggression this would probably mean that they have decided on general war in Asia. They would then have to take into account the mutual defence treaties of the United States with the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China and the forces maintained under them. Thus, general war would confront the Chinese Communists with tasks at the south, centre and north; tasks which would strain their inadequate means of transportation." hSe This kind of warning undoubtedly is calculated to make the undertaking of a local or limited attack by the Communists a risky business. But it also carries a risk for the side that issues such a warning, in the event the deterrent fails to work. For even with the threat of "measured retaliation", there is the danger of a local or limited war becoming general and total. For while a distinction can be drawn between the tactical and strategic uses of nuclear weapons at the commencement of hostilities, there are justifiable doubts as to whether this distinction would be maintained once the dictates of military necessity come into play. Military commanders are apt to use the amount of force necessary to accomplish their objective, and once they are permitted to use nuclear weapons of a lower range of power it would be difficult to know exactly where to draw the line in the upper ranges, especially if their use was thought to make the difference between victory or defeat. Anyway, this 000133 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a I'information TOP SECRET - 2? "measured retaliation'*; has not yet been put to the test, except as a threat. The threat, however, because of Soviet nuclear retaliatory power, at least opens up possibilities among which Soviet intervention, if it judged its vital interests threatened, cannot be excluded. h$. Considering the prospects of nuclear devastation which the allies risk to a larger or lesser degree should this kind of deterrent fail, it must be.an essential part of the exercise of this strategy to assess In each case of local or limited threat, the importance of the allied Interests affected. The allies also should be given an opportunity through diplomatic consultation to participate in such an assessment and to express their views on the action to be taken. Moreover, if hostilities cannot be avoided every effort should be made to fight limited wars with limited means and limited objectives on the Korean model. This involves not only the choice of weapons and the choice of objectives, but also giving the other side adequate opportunities to understand the intentions of those governments which have undertaken to resist aggression, and an adequate opportunity for negotiations on reasonable terms to bring hostilities to. an end. 50. The choice of weapons not only has an important bear- ing on whether hostilities, if they cannot be avoided, can at least be limited; the choice of weapons also may be a determining factor in deciding whether the resistance is effective or not. It may be just impracticable, for instance, to atomize the "free Thais" or the "Pathet Lao", even If there may be some Communist Chinese behind'them. This is of course realized by some observers in the United States. For Instance, William Kaufmann of Princeton University, in his book "The Requirements of Deterrence" says: Kit is probably hopeless to expect that a single deterrent will cover the entire range of contihgenices and still satisfy the criteria of credibility. The attempt to devise such a deterrent is likely to result in either a sparrow hunt with a cannon or an elephant shoot with a popgun." 000134 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information A'ct - Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation TOP SECRET - 26 - * This points to the necessity of maintaining conventional armed forces and conventional weapons as a supplementary means of deterrence, as well as for the purpose of fighting local or limited wars if hostilities cannot be avoided. 51. As the alternative to the United States.relying primarily on its mobile and nuclear retaliatory power, there is of course the collective approach to local security. Such a collective approach might be through the United Nations, through regional defence organizations, or through the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth, as a special political association with worldwide links of loyalty and tradition rather than common security interests, does not offer a suitable framework for the organization of regional defence. Where Britain, however, has assumed responsibilities for resistance to Communist encroachments in a colonial territory which is adjacent to another Commonwealth member whose national security Interests are directly Involved, special- arrangements for defence cooperation may follow as in Anzam. ^2. However, responsibilities, for building up local defen- sive strength must obviously, devolve primarily on the governments and peoples of each region; organizations which may be built up. on the initiative of outsiders will lack firm foundations. For the foundations of any defence structure must be the recognition of mutual security interests, the determination to join together in self defence-arid an adequate measure of political stability. To the extent that these factors have been lacking for a variety of reasons in the areas of South-East Asia and the Middle East, progress towards regional organizations, despite the existence of a Communist threat has been slow. However, the South-East Asian Defence Pact and the new Turkish-Iraqi Treaty, which the United Kingdom and the United States are expected to join, may provide the framework for' the build-up of regional defence to counter the Communist threat In South-East Asia and the Middle East respectively. The contributions of countries from outside the region 000135 �BEST AVAILABLE COPY t Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformatio TOP SECRET •- 2 7 - threatened must of necessit y be l i m i t e d , for i f the m i l i t a r y .. resources of the free world are scattere d a l l over the place, they r i s k being too t h i n l y scattered and i n e f f e c t i v e l y applied i n any given p l a c e . The mobile sea ,and a i r forces of the United S t a t e s , and to a l e s s e r extent, those of the United Kingdom, are notable exceptions. 53- With considerations such as these i n mind, i t i s i n Canada'^s i n t e r e s t to see t h a t effective regional defence organizations are b u i l t up, but not n e c e s s a r i l y with Canada's direct participation. Canada's own security I n t e r e s t s l i e primarily In North America and the North Atlantic. Treaty area, where I t s commitments are already heavy. Canada's i n t e r e s t s would not.be Involved d i r e c t l y i n the holding of any p a r t i c u l a r area around the Soviet periphery i n the Ffer East or the Middle East, except i n so far as Canada may share with other members of the free world the general i n t e r e s t of r e s i s t i n g Communist expansion. But even though/Canada may not be d i r e c t l y involved i n such peripheral and l o c a l wars, she cannot escape c e r t a i n consequences i f the United States were involved e s p e c i a l l y v^ . because of the Interdependence of the two countries i n a i r (Wt *>^^\A defence; such l o c a l and limited wars are therefore of concern ur Canada n a t u r a l l y has an i n t e r e s t i n upholding the * A* ^ *^ to Canada. AA^^V^.' r^. *' universa l p r i n c i p l e of r e s i s t a n c e to the use of force and the (/rh/ \j Other o b j e c t i v es of the United Nations. I t i s reasonable ***»' / *%^-^ to deduce, therefore J that Canada would not p a r t i c i p a t e i n i^ <uy^^} l o c a l o r limited wars, unless by a decision of the United IVu i ^ > V J v f ^ v N a t i o n s which i t had accepted. Kv v KA I ^ i r e c t A g r e s s i o n * 5^« I t i s a truism to say that the Communist t h r e a t by no means poses a s t r a i g h t m i l i t a r y problem. of Communist strategy has been I t s . opportunism. A characteristic The Communists have employed a v a r i e t y of ways of extending t h e i r c o n t r o l , adapting t h e i r methods according to the resources, 'psychological 000136 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation TOP SECRET - 28 - as well as material, available to them in any particular area. In places where political, instability and economic discontent provide opportunities for seizing the control of governments by subversion, political rather than military methods have been employed. 55- This is what is meant by "indirect aggression". Communist strategy has already had a large measure of success. The free world as a result of Communist-advances i _ is being confronted with the peril of about eight hundred million Communists now within the Soviet orbit consolidating the Eurasian land mass into one economic and politico-military power system. The Soviet orbit has been growing apace, (particularly by the inclusion of China) without general war and without the soviet Union being itself openly involved in hostilities. It cannot be assumed that this bloc is solid yet. Indeed it is to be hoped that Russian and Chinese policies and interests may diverge, and it is obviously In the interests of Canada and its allies to encourage any such fissile tendencies. The consolidation of this bloc under monolithic control would represent a concentration of power political, military and economic - that would obviously affect the world balance of power. 56. The powers of attraction and the economic competition of the Communist orbit, as well as its military power serve the Communists in their policy of expansion. The pretensions of the Communists that through the "dictatorship of the proletariat" they are in a position to offer a millenlum of blessings in the future at the price of losing political freedom In the present, can best be matched by a demonstration of performance by the free world that through international cooperation, a steady improvement in conditions of welfare and prosperity may be obtained in the present without the loss of freedom. Thus the way of life offered by the free world must be shown to be superior to that offered by the 000137 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation TOP SECRET -29 totalitarlans, as well as defensible. In particular, it must ... ....... r be shown to be superior by measures of political cooperation and economic assistance to the nations of Asia and Africa which are striving to have their share of the benefits of material civilization. Canada has already assumed responsibilities both in 57* terms of increased diplomatic effort as well as economic assistance in cooperating with measures against Communist indirect aggression. Considering the heavy burdens borne by Canada already in the defence of the free world through its responsibilities for continental defence and in NATO, it could be argued that Canada should not be expected to increase Its contribution in this field. And yet if under the condition of "mutual deterrence", the use of military force becomes increasingly risky, the Communist threat may increasingly assume the form of covert activities to gain Communist control- of territory by1 subversion, economic competition to win over converts and diplomacy to split up the opposition in the free world. 58. This may justify a further reconsideration of the proportion of Canadian resources which should be devoted to such non-military efforts in the cold, war as increased diplomatic representation in threatened areas, increased contributions to United Nations activities In the non-military sphere as well as to Commonwealth cooperative enterprises such as the Colombo Plan. * 000138 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation - 30 - TOP SECRET A NEW LOOK' AT DISARMAMENT? 59. The Stassen appointment dramatizes the problem which all members ^of the Disarmament Sub Committee will face when the London talks come to an end. In all' five countries there must be a deepening realization, not only among Officials but increasingly among the public, that our present positions on disarmament represent an inadequate response to the new weapons and the challenge of the risk of mutual annihilation, particularly when the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile against which there is no defence, may have been perfected. Even now, before the advent of push-button warfare, many of the premises • on which our present,disarmament proposals are based, have been overtaken by events and have become obsolete. 60. Among the array of uncomfortable facts that must now be taken into account are the following: a) the prospect of the possibility of reciprocal nuclear destruction; b) nuclear armaments have been integrated with the conventional armaments of the United States (and possibly Soviet) forces; c) the United States atomic monopoly (on which the United Nations Majority Plan was premised) has long since ceased to exist and the stockpiles of thermonuclear weapons in both the United States and the U.S.S.R. are now so large that it would be technically impossible to back check on past production under the most favourable conditions of complete inspection within more than 90J5 accuracy at best; d) the advent of the hydrogen bomb makes an undisclosed aid virtually undiscoverable atomic molehill into a thermo-nuclear mountain, in terms of destructive power; e1) some authorities nOw believe that it may be possible to dispense with the uranium-plutonlum detonator of an 000139 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a Finformation TOP SECRET - .31 - * "H - bomb" - and, as the lighter elements are relatively plentiful and require less elaborate processing, the f) control problem may be made still more difficult; a certain amount of mutual trust is a prerequisite of disarmament - and it ddes not exist; g) hot only Its concept of national sovereignty but! the very foundations of the Soviet state would be so deeply undermined by the acceptance Of the type of International control Organization proposed' by the Western.Powers that it is hardly conceivable their leaders would ever agree to it. 61. Without attempting t6 provide answers to questions that are perhaps unanswerable, it may be useful to attempt to clear some of the ground in preparation for any serious "new look" at disarmament that may be undertaken, either the conjunction with. Mr. Stassenfs re-examination of the problem, or separately, (it should be emphasized again, however, that this section like others of this paper, is nothing more than a rough first draft . of ideas that have not yet been discussed with other Departments or even with all the Divisions concerned within the Department.) 62. Disarmament negotiations during the past nine years have invariably come to a standstill on the question of control. If, as some experts say there is no way of ensuring the complete elimination of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons by any method of control, a way around the control problem may be sought in three directions; a) in place of a comprehensive disarmament programme embracing all aspects of the question, certain fields might be isolated. As a short-cut of this type, the U.S.S.R. has been harping for years on a series of propaganda themes isolating the atomic side of the problem ("ban the bomb", "ban the use of the bomb", 000140 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformatio TOP SECRET / - 32 and now "destroy atomic stockpiles"); b) on our side, for logical strategic reasons the inverse of this proposition might 'be--suggested; that an attempt be made to control armed forces and armaments, and in particular all means of delivering atomic weapons, while accepting the continuation of nuclear and thermo-nuclear stockpiles on both sides at or near the point of saturation; c) both sides have also proposed, in connection with large programs, a freeze of armed forces and armaments as a first step on the road towards disarmament. 63. Of these three propositions, perhaps may be feasible. only the third The first has been repeatedly rejected by the Western Powers for the same strategic reasons as the second is not likely to interest the Soviet Union. The atomic and conventional sides of the problem are now inseparable. A freeze might have real attractions for the U.S.S.R., particularly if, as they have proposed in London, it were subject to more or less nominal control. But unless such a scheme were implemented as part of a comprehensive program, it could lull Western public opinion into a quite unreal sense of security that could be more dangerous than the present stalemate. 64, While it might be desirable to examine possible; short-cuts from a technical standpoint, it might be more fruitful to consider what reduction might be acceptable in the safeguards to be applied to the whole field of disarmament. If control is the barrier, and we cannot get around it by reducing the categories to be controlled, we might examine once again whether we must Insist on such stringent, control measures as in the past. For we can now bring to the re-examination the reali000141 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation TOP SECRET _ 33 zation that since we do not have, and cannot hope to have absolute security, or anything approaching it, we are compelled to consider whether relatively greater security might be attainable through disarmament. Could we, in short, have less control rather than"less to control? Aad could adjustments be made inrthe timetable for the establishment and gradual build up of the control organization;in such a way as to provide a better balance of risks and safeguards on both sides at each stage? .65. The main argument in support of such an approach arises from the control problem itself. To control con- ventional weapons or to control atomic weapons would require such wide powers, at least of inspection, that interference in national affairs and the opportunities for uncovering state secrets in uncontrolled fields, would be approximately as great as if the whole range of armaments and armed forces were subject to control. The inspectors would still have to have power to go wherever they chose in order to discover undisclosed activities in violation of the agreement. For this reason the control might as well be comprehensive in its coverage of war-making potential. The only room left for man- oeuver would therefore appear to be as regards the phasing of control and the rights, functions and powers of the control organ itself. 66. Yet for years the Western Powers have maintained that no dilution of safeguards could be acceptable. This position has tended to harden, at least in the United States, with the new complications presented by Soviet stockpiling and by thermo-nuclear weapons which,..in logic, must require more effective, rather than less effective, forms of international control. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation TOP SECRET - 3*v 67. From this bleak and tentative assessment of the problem, it may be that we are thrown back upon reliance on mutual deterrence as the only realistic policy. The. capacity - present or future - of each side to destroy the other is unquestionably of the greatest importance in preventing war. If it makes war too horrible to contemplate, the deterrent may even lead to disarmament, or at least to serious negotiations. But the risks and limitations of relying on mutual deterrence have already been examined in this paper; at best it can only be a policy faute de mieux. 68. If our policy may be described as "deterrence if necessary but disarmament if possible*1, the search for a new approach to disarmament might not only embrace an effort to rethink the control problem but some consideration of the following factors which may be listed on the move hopeful side of the ledger; a) the problems posed by the new weapons are unprecedented; we must therefore not discards on the basis of past performance alone, solutions which seem to be required by the facts; for example, we should not abandon altogether our attempts to negotiate a control system because any real control appears contrary to the Soviet system; their leaders face an unprecedented situation too; b) we have at present reached an approximate balance of military forces and this balance is likely to be maintained at least until the saturation point is reached when each side would have the capacity to deal the other a mortal blow at any time and no surprise attack would succeed in warding off retaliation in kind; c) there are some who believe that when the saturation 000143 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation ^ TOP SECRET - 35 - W _ _ — point is reached, thermo-nuclear weapons will, in all probability, never be used, at least against centers of mass population, even in the event of a major war; this expectation Is not officialiy shared in NATO, and Could not be entertained without greatly weakening the value of the deterrent; this does not means, however, that some tacit self-denying ordinance of this kind is out of the question, now or in the future. d) although a completely effective back checking of past nuclear production is no longer possible, and we must assume that any control system would fail to discover significant quantities of fissile material and weapons, It should be possible to control the means of delivery; as part of a comprehensive system of disarmament, forces on both sides would be so far reduced as to minimize the temptation to make use of hidden stocks for a surprise attack; moreover, each side would suspect that the other would have retained secretly at least some capacity to retaliate in kind, so that the deterrent would continue to operate, with far less international tension to induce an explosion* e) looking at the record of disarmament negotiations since 1946 as impartially as possible, there seems to have been some progress, at least in words, and probably in substance. The gap, though still immense, has been narrowed no doubt because neither side could afford to ignore the strength of public opinion on this issue. ,69. If the present talks in London end in failure, as we must expect, it Is most important that public opinion should not turn sour* The gradual momentum of disarmament negotiations could be brought to a complete standstill by public and official �^*^ r a *" Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation V" A TOP SECRET - 3o / acceptance of an indefinite break in these negotiations* Illusions should be dispelled but;:-hope must be kept alive; and it must be based on something real. President Eisenhower's appointment of Mr. Stassen will help to counteract the mood of frustatlon and despair which the failure of another round of disarmament talks will induce. TO. The end of the talks should be interpreted- not as a final rupture in disarmament negotiations but as the end of another roundof a series which will continue after both sides have had a chance to- take stock of the situation and the other members of the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly have reviewed the record of the Sub Committee, The termination of the Sub Committee would not only sacrifice the best opportunity available for private (or temporarily private) talks, but it would also-mean a public free-for*a11 in the Disarmament Commission and the Assembly led by the Asians and Arabs. 71 • It would "help - to regain some -moment am if other powers would join-theifnited States in- trying -to work out a genuine new approach to disarmament in the light of the new weapons possessed by both"sides. Among possible directions which such a re-examination might explore ares a) lowerlng-our -safeguaTds as part of ~a -comprehensive disarmament program, since "security" these days is a highly relative termy with or without disarmament* b) the possibility ©f banning further test explosions of thermo-nuclear weapons; c) the possibility of relating disarmament to the other main roots of international tension, such as the rearming of Germany and Japan, on the principle that it would be unnecessary to proceed very far along this road if, by means of a disarmament agreement, some reduction In the levels of forces of all major countries was actually achieved* 000145 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00041 Title A name given to the resource Draft memorandum, "The Strategic Concept of the Nuclear Deterrent, Conclusions" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955-03-26 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Study on Canadian National Security Policy, RG25, file 50333-40, LAC. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Early Cold War, Canadian National Security Description An account of the resource Department of External Affairs, Ottawa Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en