https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/07d0bdfd958da5590465d32a15a93a8e.pdf b7a76a3e2a01653dcb2eed247fe87d83 PDF Text Text TOP SECRET ARMY HEADQUARTERS OTTAWA, 3 Sep 52 The Minister Comments on the UK Strategic Concept Presented by Sir John Slessor 1 The United Kingdom strategic concept presented by Sir John Slessor is not new and was discussed frequently between Commandants and Directing Staff at the Imperial Defence College during the tenures of command of both Field Marshal Sir William Slim and Sir John Slessor. The main point of departure from the strategic concept accepted until recently is the case for United Kingdom participation in the strategic bombing counter-offensive. Since the cost of this form of warfare cannot be borne by the United Kingdom in addition to the build-up previously planned, it is proposed that it should be effected at the cost of reducing the buildup in other directions. 2 Before examining the UK views on their participation in the strategic counter-offensive with atom bombs, it is desirable to review the factors upon which the whole conception of the atomic counter-offensive is based. Basic Factors Affecting the Concept of Atomic Counter-Offensive Action 3 Theoretically, atomic attack directed against the industrial heart of a country can destroy the war-making power of that country, providing five conditions are fulfilled: (a) The attacker must possess sufficient atom bombs to ensure destruction of a vital target system, making full allowance for wastage and the inaccuracies, uncertainties and hazards inherent in war as opposed to theoretical assessment of capabilities. (b) The attacker must have developed aircraft and bases, techniques of navigation, and ability to penetrate the defence to ensure delivery of the bombs upon the targets. .../2 000078 �TOP SECRET - 2 - (c) The attacker must be able to determine and select a target system, the destruction of which will paralyze the capacity of the enemy to wage war. (d) The attacker must know the geographical location of the individual units which together comprise the target system mentioned above. (e) The individual targets must be susceptible to destruction by aerial attack. 4 In regard to (a), there is little doubt that for some time the United States has possessed enough atom bombs to destroy every important city in the USSR. 5 As regards (b), there is less certainty that the aircraft at present available to the USAF can penetrate the defence and accurately navigate to the target areas. Better aircraft are shortly becoming available, but as the means of attack improves, so does the means of defence. It was certainly a lesson of bombing operations in the last war, that it is not the range over which bombers have to operate which determines the loss rate but the depth to which they must penetrate to reach their targets after bombers have entered the zone of hostile interception and are exposed to the various forms of air defence. The long ranges which bombers must cover to reach all the important cities in the USSR will probably result in a very high loss rate with existing means of delivery. Nevertheless, this is a factor for which allowance can be made and there is little doubt that the USAF would be prepared to accept a very high loss rate in order to effectively deliver their atom bombs in the pre-selected target areas. 6 It is in respect to (c), (d) and (e) that real doubts are raised as to the ability of an atomic offensive to paralyze the war-making capacity of the USSR. In 1942 when the German invasion of Russia reached its greatest depth, between 60 and 70$ of the industrial capacity of the USSR as it was known in 1939 and 1940 was in German hands and completely denied to the Russians. Nevertheless, with the addition of mutual aid, the Russians were able to withstand the German blows and build up their strength to retaliate with a series of crushing defeats of the German armies and tactical air forces disposed in the east. To my knowledge we know very little .../3 000079 �TOP SECRET _ 3 _ of the actual location of the plants in the Urals which provided the main components of the war equipment to the Russian armies and tactical air forces. We have an exact accounting of what was delivered to the USSR in terms of mutual aid and the total is surprisingly small. It is known that much of the equipment delivered as mutual aid to the Russians was still stacked on sidings on the railways leading from Murmansk and the Persian Gulf when the war ended. Where mutual aid was decisive was in providing critically important items at a time when the Russians were operating under the greatest stress. I have not seen the latest US target intelligence. Generally speaking, I think the UK Intelligence Services have been both more complete and more accurate in their military assessments than similar reports emanating from Washington, and certainly the lack of really accurate target intelligence has been regarded with serious misgivings by UK Intelligence Staffs. Even assuming that every city in the USSR is obliterated, with the limited intelligence at our disposal what assurance can we have that this, in fact, has destroyed the war waging capacity of the USSR? Russia's post-war industries have been built in the atomic age and the "Iron Curtain", which has denied us accurate information of her modern industrial lay-out, is probably one of the most effective measures of defence against strategic bombing that could have been devised. Destruction of oil installations appears to be one of the most promising target systems, but the latest joint intelligence study concludes that the USSR already has stockpiled sufficient finished oil products to carry her through many months of war, 7 Since the USSR will hold the initiative in the decision as to whether or not World War III is to be launched and is fully aware of the potentialities of atomic warfare, it is more than likely that she will have stockpiled all the materials which she considers necessary to the successful prosecution of her plans. In fact, the build-up of her material for her army and air force give clear indication that that is her intention. & Even assuming the atomic attack to be 100$ successful in destroying all Russian cities of any consequence and the loss of war potential to represent a critical proportion of her war-waging capacity, there will be left deployed upon the outer borders of Russia and the satellite states large, well-equipped and undefeated armies and tactical and bombing air forces. The destruction of Russian cities and plants might have the effect of completely paralyzing a further Russian war effort after twelve months, ...A 000080 �TOP SECRET - 4but it will certainly have no immediate effect. The bombing of German industrial cities in World War II certainly did NOT achieve the predicted results. Germany reached the peak of her war production in the autumn of 1944. The United Kingdom Strategic Concept 9 It is a combination of these considerations which led to the conclusion on the part of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff that participation in the atom counter-offensive should play a major part in British strategy. They envisaged the United Kingdom, with her sea lines of communication severed, subjected to atomic bombing in retaliation and probably reduced to destruction long before the effects of the destruction of Russian cities would paralyze the military power of the USSR's forces in being. The United Kingdom felt the need for a means of counter-attacking Russian strategic air bases and submarine bases which would give some immediate alleviation to attack on the UK and Western Europe. If the UK had no participation in the strategic bombing effort their views would be unlikely to carry any weight with the United States who might well be inclined to the view that the important thing was to ensure Russian defeat at some time rather than immediately countering the Russian offensive power. I offer the opinion that the UK's general endorsement of the US strategic bombing policy is influenced less by any overwhelming confidence in its immediate effect upon Russia's war-making capacity than the simplest argument with which to support their own participation in the atomic offensive. 10 When this concept was discussed four or five years ago, there were two real factors legislating against its adoption. Firstly, the UK had not the atomic bomb, and, secondly, they had not in sight at that time a vehicle in the form of a high performance aircraft which they were confident could deliver the expensive atom bomb accurately on a target in the face of likely air opposition. They were dependent upon agreement on the part of the US to provide them with a number of atom bombs. They considered their prospects of successfully persuading the United States to allot them a proportion of atom bombs extremely slender unless they had developed a vehicle conspicuously advanced In performance. They had hoped to persuade the US to give assistance in developing the atomic bomb in the UK and some progress had been made when the Fuchs incident led to a complete shut-down of any further information on atomic .../5 000081 �TOP SECRET _ 5energy. The two conditions which limited the previous adoption of this British strategic policy are now removed. The UK has developed the atom bomb and in the Valiant bomber they feel that they have a bomb carrier far exceeding in performance anything that is likely to be in service at the time at which the Valiant can be operating with squadrons. 11 I consider that the argument produced in the new strategic concept in respect to a diminution of the danger of war is a little spurious. Ever since 1945, the point of highest danger is no more than a matter of .speculation, for Intelligence, in attempting such an assessment, is trying to read the minds of the men in the Kremlin. I have personally been of opinion that the programme outlined for the two Five Year Plans following the war was a better guide than any other of Russian intentions in respect to timing. Planning is the whole basis of the Communist Russian political theory and they are unlikely to deviate from long range plans except as events or opportunity may lead them. The real danger rests in the fact that with any authoritarian political system such as that operative in the USSR, the survival of the regime transcends any other consideration of humanity or national welfare and it is a system which cannot stand still. 12 I am in wholehearted agreement with the arguments of the UK Chiefs of Staff in regard to the urgency of global planning, but I think their appreciation is a little inconsistent in this respect. In effect, their argument is that as they consider the atomic counter-offensive will be decisive, and a decision is likely to be reached in the first few weeks of war, the UK should contribute to strengthening the atomic offensive at the expense of building up forces which could not be deployed in the first few vital weeks. I consider this argument over-simplifies all the imponderables and hazards of war. It seems to me that the argument that second line build up formations are of lesser importance is inconsistent with the argument regarding the global nature of the cold war and the emphasis placed upon the importance of the Near East, Asia and the Far East in relation to Western Europe. If the British concept is accepted, new "Koreas" outside of Europe can only be met by detracting from the minimum front line strength regarded as essential for the defence of Western Europe and failure to build up a second line will leave nothing to fill in behind land forces or tactical air forces which would have to be moved from the defence of Western Europe to meet the threats envisaged elsewhere. 000082 .../6 �TOP SECRET - 613 I have made no attempt in this paper to examine the wider implications of seeking victory by atomic attack against the centre of civilian population of an enemy. In our present circumstances it is academic to discuss the subject - allied strategy in World War II which regarded victory as an end in itself instead of as a step to establishing a better peace, has left us with no alternative as a make weight in the military balance of power. 14 I hold the strong conviction that the threat of atomic attack is a greater deterrent to war than actual atomic attack will prove to be a weapon of absolute decision in war. The threat of massed bomber raids against inadequate air defence paved the road to Munich and Godesburg. The actual blitz on England did more to strengthen the determination of the English people to fight to a finish than any other single factor, and in its actual execution, proved far less terrible than even the objective calculations of cold-blooded planners had expected. (signed) G. G. Simonds (GG Simonds) Lieutenant-General Chief of the General Staff � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Global Strategy / 3 SEPTEMBER 1952 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952-09-03 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00094 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Comments on the UK Strategic Concept," 3 Sept. 1952, LAC, RG 2, vol. 223, file no. I-60-1. atomic weapons Brooke Claxton Global Strategy paper Guy Granville Simonds Sir John Slessor strategic bombing