https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/17f463dc60428b8374f783ce6051c1d8.pdf e4c726cdb6deb3e9cf2cfcc436c9e421 PDF Text Text * ». BEST AVAILABLE COPY SECRET NUCLEAR VEAP( In of State Washington 1 wished t; tain nuo, Car means vided fc. views th«80 L3M9 he Department xn Embassy in ^ates authorities •eby oar* b« pro*. r re* to 2. i&) *je~ itsrcspto? air** iratio trt (b) marine •oes of opera toer, (c) faoii store 3. Rtor Bav iplles Fosalblt for Cam site (a) Vai ^iter)i * {He iu^ sq arrive at-^-— ths i flow vale so whole will be mately Januar; first •d to ^ s r - r - ' - , T f • - , • • • - 1 be a inter)ivision M a >nal by approxi* •«• 21 000083 �t BEST AVAILABLE COPY y (o) Warh< 'or the HOKEST JOHN (tb© 3 expeoted onal with the xa )l U) la, if the Qovernmont J, but not related to lal carrierBy >hment of stock--* \ Also so the wo pilesj (1) Tensive air-to-air weapons for interceptors in Canada, if interceptors to replace the CP-100 aro required (li) for anti \rine weapons P Mariti tiJ* ^ j t dropp UIIB " \ ! * WV1JCH «=—-—• * \1 ment of 4. this oonr shown National \ the comabove are base tds ponents of ie will be i ates, itwarheads ,1 agreewill bo noc nont BU completion of the roquii ntary agreenents and other detailed arrangements oonoerning provision, storage and support« I, United Stt mts A. Storage a5. 'abim principle to the oi defensive \ to the oom Notes. The flra given to tbo Sta a second draft, revie States comments, was appr oonveyed to the State Dep rj its approval in air-to-air ? locations, subject ;ory ExcY sh an axons in October 19591 i light of United by Cabinet, and mt in March i960. • • • 3« �3» It the Hon, ; of tbe CanadaUnited State* Ministerial Committee on Joint Defenoe in July i960, Mr* Nerohant said that the United Statee was prepared to aaoept the second Canadian draft provided two points •ould be met 1 (l) that provision be made to ensure that the weapons oould be re! to the United States at any time at the request of the United States Government) (11) that more formal status be given the Informal explanatory notes provided the State Department by the Canadian Emb&aay relating to those paragraphs of the draft dealing with the proposed arrangements to oover joint responsibility for storage, for release from storage and for use of the weapons and their caovement in Canada, $• Theat its have not been considered by the Cabinet! however, it will be recalled that on Pact o the Cabinet decided that the Exchange of Notes en this subject "should not be oonoluded until after discussions with tbe United States en other matters had been concluded", i # e», until the poi »ct to the acquisition of nuclear warheads for the use of Canadian foroes has been re e United St uthorities were informed January I96I meeting of th ci Defence* They poir *ey still regarded the conoluo' this a& t as a matter of urgency as its absence places a limitation on NORAD'e present defence capability. 7. The three most important principles underlying the draft as It stands arei (i) an th :-nts for storage will be ullity of the (11) (ill) vai from reap' be shared for th B» Storage a 8» Th with the United Sta jono• otla 'mal negotiations ing this matter. �4. It was, however, discussed in a general way at both the Camp David meotlng of the Ministerial Coimnittoe on Joint Defence in November 1959 and at the Montebello meeting of the same Committee last July, 9» Camp David, the discussion centred mainly around i sstion of controls. The United States' side expressed tho viov lear weapons carried on board Ur; uld not bo regarded an 7ed from land Storage sites. n side pointed out that, s, the Canadian Government would not o exercise control over release apons stored i; hich the Canadian Gov it Bt' importance. The United St at an attempt be made to avoid conditions ao would render ti of the weap re difficult. a left the question of controls would have to be further explored, 10, At Montebello, the discussion covered somewh- the samo ground. It was generally agreed tnat rlnoiplos embodied In the proposed agreement on i>ooge Bay and Harmon could be applied to stern-: 1 at Argentla, but that the manner in which Canncu could exorcise Joint control over the nuclear weapons once they hadleft Canadian territorial waters would also require further study. C. Storage at Goose hay for SAO 11. As is the case with storage at Argentia, there have been no formal negotiations regarding this question. It was, 1 .liscussed a the Camp David mooting of the Ministerial Cc mlttee, on which ocoasicn the atea' side stressed the vO storage at Goose Bay of nuolear weapons for use by the Strategic Air nd on "reflox-fltrlke" missions. The formal as part of the ^ing E 3 and SAC weapons, a in the United States' view, is becoi Soviet missile threat g The C. 1 side expressed the view that ' in Canada would present groat difi tloally and made it cleir - be taken at this time. •• • 3« �5. IX, Possible Establishment of Stockpiles for Canadian Armed fto'roes 12. There have as yet been no formal negotiations with the United States regarding stockpiles in Canada and in Europe for Canadian foroes. Some time ago, with tho approval of the Cabinet, a preliminary draft agreement was discussed informally between the Canadian and United States Services, This draft was subsequently reviewed and extensively revised by officials of tho Department of National Defence and External Affairs. This draft has not yet been considered by the Cabinet nor has its substance been discussed with United States authorities. However, at tho Montebollo meeting of the Ministerial Committee there was a general discussion of tho kind of detailed arrangementa which would be required for which provision would have to be made. Thus, for BOIIARC the United States appeared to envisage arrangements similar to those worked out with the United Kingdom for the THOU missiles stationed in tho United Kingdom, where, because the warheads have to be "stored" on the missile in order to be ready for instant use, the "double key" formula has been applied, 13, The draft agreement referred to above as it stands covers stockpiles for Canadian use in Europe as well as in Canada, As drafted, it is an agreement on general principles only. If and when conoluded, it would establish only a basis for negotiating fu: detailed intergovernmental i ents governing the particular types of warheads to bo provided. Completion of this agreement would not, therefore, of itself provide Canadian forces with certain nuolear weapons. At Montebollo, the United States' side stated that United States' authorities would be prepared to out a single t covering both Europe and Canada or separate for each, whichever the Canadian Go nt preferred . I**. It will be recalled t Cabinet dec t die States Go :nt "cone I Dooember 6, -h the United ts for the ,3 of nuolear y tho oced assoon as they can usefully bo undert;: e of Joint controls to be a basic principle". �6, It also deolded that "preparations ahould continue to enable the Canadian forces to have the vehicles, missiles, bases, training and other requirements to enable then to be able to use nuclear weapons to be acquired from the United States under joint control arrangements if and when the adoption of these weapons is considered necessary", 15, At the meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence referred to above, the United States authorities were informed, with the approval of the Seoretary of State for External Affairs, of this decision in general terms. Any initiative with regard to the negotiation of a general agreement on stockpiling llherefora rests with Canada. ORIGINAL DAMAGED The Department of External Affairs, February Ik, 1961. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00266 Title A name given to the resource CDNW00266 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Acquisition And Storage Of Nuclear Weapons For Canadian Forces In Canada And Europe," RG24-B-1, vol 21439, file CSC 1888:9, part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en