https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/fe35f8a49668871456e267e0ab1e3731.pdf a4816c54bbde56061eb37b071ebe3aff PDF Text Text CSC l8&~8-9 S E C R E T Secret: rivy Council (2) Exec.Asst t o Mln. of ? i n . m C e (]_) Sxec.Asst. -'in. of D e f . P r o d u c t i o n ! 1) Exec.Asst• t o Secy of S t a t e (1) 9 Dec 59 I hare been directed by the Deputy Minister of the Department of National Defence to forward a copy of a working draft of a Proposed Agreement with the United States on the Acquisition of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian Forces to the Secretary, Privy Council, The Secretary of State for External Affairs, The Minister of Finance and the Minister of Defence Production, for their personal information. Id you please to your 1-inister. • attached c (^Crires'tonT Air Commodore, for Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, BEST AVAILABLE COPY 000127 �ll <_I>vVv— - t/^sss* ('. - _ / . , . _. -_--. -* _.JU,~ S E C R E T OTTAWA, December 7, 1959 DRAFT OF PROPOSED AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES ON THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR CANADIAN FORCES Sir : I have the honour to refer to Articles 20 and 21 of the communique issued by the North Atlantic Council on 19 December, 1957, and to discussions which have taken place in the Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence and between the Canadian and United States Chiefs of Staff, regarding the general principles under which nuclear warheads will be provided to and accepted by the Government of Canada for Canadian forces in Canada and Europe. It is the understanding of tfhe Canadian Govern-' ment that agreement in principle has been reached in these discussions as to the terms on which nuclear warheads will be made available by the United States for Canadian forces in Canada and Europe. These terms recognize that it is important to limit the spread of nuclear To X-f*- weapons at the independent disposal of national governments and that, for this reason, ownership and custody of warheads provided for the use of Canadian forces should remain with the United States. / Without prejudice to the requirement for separate agreements relating to the different types of weapons to be provided in various circumstances, and the storage facilities related thereto, the Canadian Government now proposes that the general principles set out in DESAFT Of V 17 , 97 �S E C R E T - 2 - the Annex to this Note should apply. If the United States Government concurs, I propose that this Note and your reply shall constitute an agreement effective from the date of your reply <, Accept, Sir, etc „ �ANNEX SEC RET GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACQUISITION BY CANADA OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR,CANADIAN FORCES IN CANADA AND EUROPE Definitions lo In this Annex, unless the context otherwise requires : "Canada" means the Government of Canada, and "United States" means the Government of the United States of America; the term "warhead" includes "weapons" where the two cannot practically be considered as physically separate components; "NATO" means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; "Allied Government" means any Government, which is allied to Canada and the United States by its membership in NATO; "Allied Commander" means the Commander of a NATO Allied Command; "SACLANT" means the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, of NATO; "NORAD" means the North American Air Defence Command established by Canada and the United States in an Exchange of Notes dated 12 May, 1953. "CINCNORAD" means the Commander in Chief of NORAD. �SECRET General 2. Ownership of any stocks of nuclear warheads will remain with the United States and their custody will be the responsibility of the United States, United States personnel will be provided for this purpose in the minimum numbers required. 3o The procedures under which_the nuclear war- GAT yevo£<tH<*J <fot heads will be released a»4=eapias3£©d will vary depending on the types of weapons and the operational theatres in which they are to be employed. These pro- J> cedures will be the subject of separate governmental agreements and will be based on the principles of joint responsibility 4. The United States will be physically and fin- ancially responsible for the provision, maintenance, modification and assembly of the nuclear warheads, including the provision of technical equipment, and of personnel in the minimum numbers required, for these functions. 5. Safeguards in the design of the nuclear war- heads will be the responsibility of the United States, The procedure for handling the nuclear warheads to afford the maximum protection of lives and property will be subject to the agreement of Canada. Safety iiwii-«»muiwi—w procedures for maintenance, transport, loading, storage and salvage will be equivalent to United States standards and will be the subject of arrangements between the appropriate military authorities of the two Governments* 000131 �S E C R E T - 3 Oi 1 Acquisition of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian Forces Stationed in Canada 6. The location of the stocks to be held in Canada will be determined by Canada in consultation with United States military authorities and CINCNORAD or SACLANT as appropriate. 7. The United States will be responsible for the movement, in accordance with agreed procedures and in conformity with applicable Canadian laws and regulations, of the nuclear warheads to and from Canada. &„ Except as otherwise agreed, Canada will be responsible for and bear the cost of : (a) provision of the land required for the storage sites and associated facilities; (b) construction of the storage sites and associated facilities which, except for those specified in paragraph 3(c) below, will conform with standards and criteria prevailing in NATO, and also their operation and maintenance; (c) construction, in accordance with normal Canadian standards, of the increments to Canadian administrative installations and facilities (housing, messing, offices, etc.) necessary to accommodate United States custodial and support personnel, as well as the operation and maintenance of these facilities; (d) transportation of nuclear warheads within Canada, subject always to the provision of paragraph 2 above? (e) external security for all nuclear warheads in storage or during movement within Canada, and 000132 �S E C R E T - Velsewhere as may be agreed, the detailed arrangements to be made by the appropriate CT .. , IIIIIII.JL HI II military authorities of the two Governments; (f) a reliable means of signal communication, where necessary, to meet the purposes of this agreement as shall be agreed by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments. 9. Canada will be responsible for arranging for reasonable administrative and logistic support, including that for United States personnel required to implement this agreement. Details of the support for United States personnel will be a matter to be mutually agreed between the appropriate agencies of the two Governments. Each Government shall bear the cost of the pay and allowances of its own personnel. 10. The status of United States personnel in Canada in accordance with the terms of this agreement will be governed by the provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may - in M in i ___ H U L ^ I I I in. iM—i-1 ~" be agreed upon. D: Acquisition of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian Forces Stationed in Europe 11. The location of the stocks to be held in Europe will be determined by the appropriate Allied Commander in agreement with authorities of Canada, United States and the Allied Governments concerned. 12. United States forces will be responsible for the movement of the nuclear warheads into and from the Allied Command Europe Area. Responsibility for movement 000133 �S E C R E T <__ *} within this area will be as agreed between the appropriate Canadian, United States and Allied authorities. 13. Storage sites and associated facilities included in NATO infrastructure programmes and allocated for the use of Canadian forces will be subject to NATO infrastructure funding and procedures. Canada will be respons- ible, in accordance with the terms of Part C of this Annex, for arranging for the provision of facilities in Europe which it is mutually agreed are required for Canadian force and United States personnel and which are not provided under common infrastructure. 14. Where Canada is the sole user of storage facil- ities in Europe, the responsibility for operation and maintenance of the facilities and administrative and logistic support for United States personnel will be in accordance with the provisions of Part C of this Annex, subject to agreement with Allied host governments where appropriate. 15. Where Canada is a joint user, with other members of NATO, of storage facilities in Europe, constructed as part of an infrastructure programme, the final determination of the division of responsibilities for the support and external security of the site or sites will be as agreed between the Governments concerned. 16. Canada will be responsible for and bear the cost of a reliable means of signal communication, where necessary, to meet the purposes of this Agreement as shall be agreed by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments. �S E C R E T - 6E-: Supplementary Arrangements 17. Supplementary arrangements between the appro- priate authorities of the United States and Canada and between these authorities and Allied Commanders shall be negotiated as required for the purpose of implementing this agreement. 000135 �ENCE TOP SECRET THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CA MEMORANDUM FOR CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE Acquisition and Storage of Defensive Nuclear Weapons and Warheads for Canadian Forces 1. It will be recalled that on 15 October, 195$, Cabinet considered the question of provision of nuclear weapons for the follow^ ing purposes: a) nuclear warheads for BOMARC mi statione b) nuclear warheads for weapons Group stationed in Europe; A <?* ' c) storage of MB1 nuclear air-1 States use/a't Goose Bay; Lr rockety for United d) storage of MB1 nuclear air-to-air rockets for use of the RCAF in Canada; and e) storage of nuclear anti-submarine weapons for Canadian and United States use from Canadian bases. r—"— --• — ... 2. It was agreed that)senior officers should initiate negotiat- . ions wi£h*'US~aut"horrETe1s in regard to acquisition and storage of V i i ^ ^ defensive nuclear weapons in Canada. These negotiations have b&efi A t__&^5g~place and^a suggested procedure for the acquisition and storage of defensivevnuclear weapons for the use of Canadian forces has been developed and is outlined belowo V 3. In addition to the negotiations approved on 15 October, 195$, ) -f it will be recalled that^the US Government requested certain agree- lAf ments with Canada involving nuclear weapons. This included extension! ',v and revision of the Strategic Air Command Overflight Agreement, exI'jJ^ tension of the^MBl Overflight Agreement, Storage of Defensive Anti- \?) Submarine Nuclear Weapons at the US leased base at Argentia, NewI .(Jy foundland< Storage of Defensive Air Defense Weapons at the US leased J if A bases at"Harmon, Newfoundland and Goose Bay, Labrador, and Storage / of J3AC Weapons at Goose Bay, Labrador. A summary of the status of / 9JY± such agreements is attached. 4. As a first step in the suggested procedure for the acquisition and storage of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces, it will be necessary to complete a general agreement with the US Government covering the broad principles under which nuclear warheads will be provided to and accepted by Canada for Canadian forces in Canada and Europe. A draft note to initiate such an agreement, prepared in consultation with interested Government departments, has been examined by the Panel on the Economic Aspects of Defence and is now submitted as a basis for further discussion with US authorities through diplomatic channels. 5. It should be understood that the attached draft note does not represent a specific agreement for the acquis ition, control and use of particular types of weapons and does n ot in any way cornmit the Canadian Government to acceptance of such weapons but only to broad principles under which weapons would be accepted should the Government decide to obtain them. In express ing the broad principles under which Canada is willing to accept defensive nuclear warheads for the use of Canadian forces, it opens the way to further individual negotiations on the necessary detailed agreements for a o o �- 2 -. TOP SECRET the specific storage, use and operation of particular types of weapons. Such agreements would be negotiated between appropriate Canadian and US authorities, Allied Commanders, and where necessary, with other Allied Governments. 6. The attached draft note reflects the principles expressed by the Prime Minister in his announcement, on 20 February, 1959, of Government policy on the acquisition of\ defensive nuclear weapons for Canadian forces. 7» The annex to the draft note is divided into three operative parts. Those aspects which are applicable regardless of location are included in the "General" section and those aspects which depend on location are divided into two sections, namely "in Canada" and "in Europe". This difference reflects the Canadian Government's decision not to have infrastructure projects in Canada and the fact that negotiations for facilities outside Canada would have to include host countries. It is assumed, however, that the storage facilities in Europe will be commonly financed to NATO Infrastructure standards and are therefore subject to certain accepted NATO regulations. S. There are certain aspects which, although not important in the negotiations of the present draft, must be considered before specific arrangements can be agreed to. For example, the fact that there will be a change from the type of weapon now being used by Canadian forces in Europe dictates that the existing agreements with the host countries will have to be re-negotiated. Also, the acceptance of nuclear weapons for the Canadian forces in Europe may require the stationing of US personnel at Canadian bases and would in that case necessitate supplementary agreements with the host countries. 9» It will be noted that Canada is responsible, regardless of „ location, for the provision of a "reliable means of signal communication". The nature of such means of communication will vary, depending upon the location and type of weapon, and therefore provision of these communications will be a factor for consideration in negotiating each separate agreement. To fulfil the Canadian requirement for control over use of the weapons, it will be appreciated that a positive system of communications between the Canadian Government and the Commander concerned, whether in Europe or North America, will be necessary, as well as that required between the US authorities and the storage site./ The nature and extent of such systems, and thus the costs involved, cannot be ascertained until the exact locations and numbers of sites are known as well as the Government's requirements as to the nature of these systems. 10. For similar reasons, the total cost of fulfilling Canada's other responsibilities regarding acquisition of land, construction of facilities, transportation, and logistic support, cannot be estimated at this time. 11. However, in order that negotiations to acquire the necessary weapons through specific agreements can proceed, I recommend that approval be granted for further discussions with US Government authorities through diplomatic channels based on the attached draft note with a view to finalizing a note which would be acceptable for presentation to the Governments of both countries. 2 December, 1959. Minister. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00251 Title A name given to the resource CDNW00251 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Acquisition And Storage Of Nuclear Weapons For Canadian Forces In Canada And Europe," RG24-B-1, vol 21439, file CSC 1888:9, part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en