https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f378afa16e0425b1525413776145532c.pdf d27d8d8741cf403f6719fc55b988da88 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information s / / TOP SECRET (Unless otherwise classified) 23 COPY NO. CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE Minutes of the 541st meeting held on 23 June, 1953 in the Office of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, »AM Building. National Defence Headquarters. PRESENT JtPV-S'A The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff (Lieutenant-General Foulkes) The Chief of the General Staff (Lieutenant-General Simonds) The Chief of the Naval Staff (Vice Admiral Mainguy) The Chief of the Air Staff (Air Marshal Slemon) The Chaiman, Defence Research Board (Dr. Solandt) o a o »X<.* ALSO PRESENT C M . Drury, Esq., Deputy Minister of National Defence. L.D. Wilgress, Esq., Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, i R.A.J* Phillips, Esq., representing Secretary to the Cabinet. Air Commodore Rutledge, Co-ordinator, Joint Staff. Secretary, Chiefs of Staff (Lieutenant-Colonel Kingstone) Assistant Secretary, Chiefs of Staff (Wing Commander Bell) (TOP SECRET) I.MINUTES OF THE 5/>OTH MEETING 1. The Chairman. Chiefs of Staff referring to Item IV said that the Canadian Joint Staffs in London and Washington had been asked to ascertain from SHAPE and SACLANT their requirements for co-ordination and implementation of the Simple Alert and for details of those measures for which SACEUR and SACLANT proposed to request delegation of national authority. SHAPE had replied that they were unable to state in detail what delegation of national authority was required in the case of Canada as the information is available at the subordinate command level and could only be obtained by discussing the detailed warbook measures with subordinate commands. SACLANT had replied that they had not yet considered the problem. TOP SECRET 000681 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET - 2 As Simple Alerts affected the Air Division more intimately than the 27th Brigade, it was suggested that the Commander of the Air Division and the Assistant Canadian National Military Representative be authorized to approach informally the appropriate officers in AAFCE to ascertain those meastares which require advance delegation of authority by the Canadian Government. , . 2. to Item Mission Japan". deleted The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, referring III, paragraph 9, requested that the words "before the Canadian became an Enbassy1' be changed to "before the peace treaty with It was also suggested that the last sentence of paragraph 9 be and the following substituted: "There was a case for retaining their present position vis-a-vis the Embassy and foregoing diplomatic status. As accredited attaches, the Service Representatives might not enjoy their present ease of entry to the United Nations Command." Referring to Item X, it was pointed out that the External Affairs Representative at the 540th meeting had very short notice in which to prepare for discussion of this subject. As the matter had been discussed subsequently by the Advisory Committee on Northern Development, it was requested that Item X be deleted frcm the minutes. 3. The Committee agreeds (a) to authorize the Air Officer Commanding No. 1 Air Division and the Assistant Canadian National Military Representative to approach the appropriate officers at AAFCE informally in order to find out iihose measures which required the delegation of Canadian Government authority to enable SACEUR to call a Simple Alert| and (b) to approve the minutes of the 540th meeting as amended by the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. PROVISION OF OCCUPATION FORCES IN KOREA (TOP SECRET) 4. The Committee had for consideration a.memorandum outlining the views of the Chiefs of Staff after reviewing their previous comments on this subject. (CSC 7-10-12 of 18 June, 1953) 5. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff said that it was desirable to bring the Chiefs of Staff views up to date in case they were required at short notice. At the recent meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, Lord Alexander said that forces of other Commonwealth countries now in Korea should be retained and possibly increased after an armistice in order to ease the burden of the United Kingdom forces in the Far East. The Canadian High Commissioner in London should be made aware that the Canadian case had been made quite clear. It was understood that the United Kingdom had been considering a rundown of the Commonwealth Division to a brigade and had suggested that the Canadian contribution be one battalion and one destroyer. When this matter was previously considered by the Chiefs of Staff, it had been agreed that the Canadian contribution should be one battalion only. TOP SECRET �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -\ TOP SECRET - 3- 6. The Chief of the General Staff said that the probable sequence of events following an armistice might fall into two phasesj the first phase consisting of a parallel reduction of forces on both sides and the second phase would probably take the fonn of political deliberations for the unification of Korea, when, in order to demonstrate interest in a permanent solution, United Nations forces would be held in readiness close to Korea. The best that Canada could hope for during the first phase was a proportionate reduction of forces. During the second phase, however, it would be preferable to withdraw the Army contribution and replace it by a naval contribution of three destroyers. This view had been eaqpressed to the Canadian Ambassador in Tokyo who thought that the United Nations Command might agree to such an arrangement. From conversations with General Clark, it appeared that his main interest was in maintaining the United Nations aspect of any undertaking after an armistice was signed. A Canadian Naval contribution during the second phase had the following advantages: (a) it would cost very little more to maintain naval forces operating in Far Eastern waters than if they were based at Esquimaltj (b) the destroyers would be able to show the flag throughout the Far East and in doing so could carry the impression of continued Canadian interest to better advantage than a small land force which would necessarily be staticj (c) while showing the flag in Far Eastern stations, the crews of the destroyers could obtain valuable intelligence regarding the trend of affairs in the Far East as a whole| and (d) should incidents occur between North and South Korea while attempts were being made to reach a permanent settlement, forces on the ground might become directly involved, whereas with naval forces there would be far less danger of involvement in this way. 7. The Chief of the Naval Staff agreed that in many respects this suggestion was sound. However, the destroyers in Far Eastern waters were kept up to full complement and in order to derive the maximum benefit from those experienced personnel, the RCN would prefer that no naval forces be committed. Should it be considered desirable that Canada's post-armistice contribution be one of naval forces, it was suggested that this be kept to a minimum of one destroyer or frigate. 8. The Chief of the Air Staff said that the RCAF would like to be relieved of the Korean airlift as soon as possible because of their increased commitment to Europe. It was understood that the Canadian Pacific Airlines were most anxious to take over this commitment. 9. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs said that Canada' s commitment would depend largely on the outcome of political discussions. After the withdrawal of United Nations and Chinese Communist forces from Korea, it was doubtful whether the Japanese Government would welcome the basing of an Army contingent on Japanese soil for UN purposes. An alternative which the Government would be reluctant to accept would be to base Canadian forces in Hong .Kong where they would be subject to Commonwealth pressure to serve in other Far, Eastern trouble spots. It appeared that the most favourable solution would be the proportionate reduction of forces during the first phase and the substitution if possible of naval forces for ground forces in the second phase. TOP SECRET 000683 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information \ ft ^ TOP SECRET on /« <3to 10. It was agreed, after further discussion, that the military view on the provision of occupation forces in Korea should be: (a) to accept a proportionate reduction of all armed forces during the first phasej and (b) that during the second phase the Army contribution should be reduced to nil as early as possible. If continued Canadian military representation was considered advisable at this stage the Chiefs of Staff would recommend naval representation in lieu of ground forces. III. THE CURRENT RISKS OF GENERAL WAR (TOP SECRET) 11. The Committee had for consideration a draft memorandum for the Cabinet Defence Committee prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee on the above subject, which concluded that: (a) it is unlikely that the Soviet Union will deliberately precipitate a war by attacking the West during 1953, although such a possibility can not be entirely excludedj and (b) the main risk of general war during 1953 will arise from actions taken by the Soviet Union which are known to entail risks of general war. or from genuine miscalculations or errors of conduct on either side, or from accidental occurrences. (CSC 1571-1 of 15 June, 1953) 12. The Chajjman, Chiefs of Staff said that as there was little possibility of the Cabinet Defence Committee meeting for some time there was no object in passing the memorandum forward. It was suggested that the matter be passed back to the Joint Intelligence Committee who should be instructed to keep the matter under review. 13. The Deputy Minister, referring to the second sentence of paragraph 2, suggested that the words "our paper" be substituted by the words "The Canadian view". 14. The Committee agreed that the memorandum should be returned to the Joint Intelligence Committee with instructions that it be kept under review until it was considered appropriate to forward it to the Cabinet Defence Committee. IV. APPOINTMENT OF NAVAL ADVISER, MILITARY ADVISER AND AIR ADVISER TO THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER IN OTTAWA (RESTRICTED) 15. The Committee had for consideration a memorandum from the Acting Under-Secretary of State for .External Affairs requesting views on the appointment of Service Advisers to the Australian High Commissioner at Ottawa. (CSC 9-4-3 of 18 June, 1953) 16. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff said that there were two disadvantages to the accreditation of Australian Service Advisers. The first was the obvious desire on' the part of the Australians to obtain information through Canadian sources which might jeopardize Canada's favourable position with the United States with regard to the exchange of information. The TOP SECRET 000684 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information v „•' .<• e» TOP SECRET «, 5 - second objection was the possible necessity of having to reciprocate by accrediting Service Advisers to the Canadian High Commissioner in Australia* For Canada to do so would be uneconomical and unnecessary, particularly if it entailed transferring an attache position from a country which was more valuable from an intelligence point of view. 17. The Chairman, Defence Research Board said that great credit should be given to the Australians for the improvements they had made in their security. Their standing, in this regard had greatly improved in the United States where they now had a limited but effective,.agreement on the exchange of guided weapons information. 18* The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs said that it would be very difficult to turn down this request, particularly as other , Commonwealth countries had their Service Attaches in Washington accredited as Advisers to their High Commissioners in Ottawa. Acceptance of the request did not mean that Canada had to reciprocate and this could be made quite clear to the Australians. With regard to the security aspect, the services would have to take the necessary precautions to ensure that United States information was not made available. 19. It was agreed, after further discussion, to advise the Minister that while the Chiefs of Staff did not see any advantage to the accreditation of Australian Service Advisers, it would be considered inadvisable to turn down the request. However, it should be made quite clear to them that Canada was not in a position to reciprocate at this time. V. TRANSMITTER REQUIREMENTS CHURCHILL (CHESNAYE) (CONFIDENT^) 20. The Committee had for consideration a memorandum from the Principal Supply Officers Committee requesting that the Chiefs of Staff detejmine which service would be responsible for the care and maintenance of the Chesnaye site. (CSC 5-l-4(VCS) of 17 June, 1953) 21. The Chief of the Naval Staff said that the senior Naval officer at Churchill had been instructed to accept the keys for the Chesnaye site. Although the building had been constructed as a tri-service project, the RCN initiated the requirement and were, therefore, willing to accept responsibility for careand maintenance. Due, however, to the limited number of RCN personnel in Churchill they would have to seek the assistance of the Army if building repairs become necessary. 22. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff said that the 25 KVA diesel generators and the domestic equipment should be removed. The site would then only require occassional visits to ensure that it was in reasonable state of repair. 23. It was agreed that the RCN would be responsible for removing the 25 KVA diesel generators and the domestic equipment out of Chesnaye and be responsible for the care and maintenance of the site. VI. TEBMS OF REFERENCE FOR SCIENTIFIC STUDY GROUP (SECRET) 24. The Chairman, Defence Research Board said that it was his belief that the Scientific Study Group would not require terms of reference beyond a broad directive that they assist the Canada-US Military Study Group. TOP SECRET 000685 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information o TOP SECRET - 6 - The Chairman of the Canadian Section of the Military Study Group felt, however, that the group should have independent terms of reference and in consequence, draft terms of reference had been prepared. 25. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff said that a copy of the United States terms of reference for the Military Study Group had been received. These, however, were written to cover the United States Section only. Air Vice Marshal Miller had been asked to enquire informally if the United States would agree to terms of. reference covering the entire group. Possibly the Military Study Group would give consideration to its terms of reference at an early meeting. It was suggested that Air Vice Marshal Miller be present when the terms of reference of the Military Study Group were next discussed. 26. The Committee noted the remarks of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman, Defence Research Board. VII. REQUIREMENTS PLANNING (SECRET) 27. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff said that during a meeting on Requirements Planning, the Secretary of State for External Affairs had agreed that it was necessary to anticipate United States requirements and in order to do so, some relaxation of the present restrictions was necessary. The Minister of National Defence did not wish to relax his restrictions at this time and therefore no further steps could be taken for the present. General McNaughton would make this clear at the next meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence* General McNaughton had suggested that it would be desirable for him to meet With the Chiefs of Staff to discuss any military problems before Permanent Joint Board on Defence meetings. 28. The Committee noted the remarks of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff. VIII. UNITED KINGDOM ATOMIC ENERGY PLANS (TOP SECRET) 29. The Chairman,. Defence Research Board said that at a recent meeting Sir John Cockroft had reviewed UK atomic energy plans and indicated that the UK were contemplating asking Canada to duplicate some of their facilities. In anticipation of such a request, it was suggested that Canada review its atomic energy programme and decide its future requirements in both the scientific and military fields. There would be no object in backing up the UK programme if it entailed work in fields that would not benefit Canada's future programme. 30. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff said that it was likely that the UK request would be in line with the programme Canada should follow. It would be advisable that the Chiefs of Staff discuss this matter when putting forward a Canadian programme. 31. The Committee noted the remarks of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman,flefeneeResearch Board. IX. RESIGNATION OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE (CONFIDENTIAL) 32. The Chairman, Defence Research Board said that the present Director of Scientific Intelligence was resigning and suggested that until a suitable replacement is found, the Director, Joint Intelligence Bureau also act as Director of Scientific Intelligence. 33. The Committee agreed with the suggestion of the Chairman, Defence Research Board. TOP SECRET 000686 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information \ TOP SECRET 4 X. - 7- TRAINING OF BELGIAN CADETS IN CANADA (CONFIDENTIAL) 34. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff said that the Cabinet Defence Committee had agreed that if vacancies could be made available to foreign countries at the Canadian Services Colleges, India and Pakistan should be given first preference. In the absence of Asiatic nominations, Belgian candidates should be allocated available accommodation. This decision would possibly stir up requests from other countries, the rejection of which would place Canada in an embarrassing position. 35. The Chief of the General Staff said that applications for entry into Canadian Services Colleges had greatly increased and as there was no question of not being able to fill available vacancies from Canadian applicants and in view of the services' requirements for graduates, it would not be desirable to offer vacancies to other countries. The Army could allot an additional vacancy to India and Pakistan at the Canadian Army Staff College which they would probably prefer to vacancies at the Services Colleges. 36. The Chief of the Naval Staff said that underlying the Belgian request for vacancies at the Canadian Services Colleges was their desire to have the Crown Prince trained up to watchkeeping certificate standard. By having Belgian cadets in training at a service college, the precedence which the Belgians required to send the Crown Prince to Canada for training would have been set. 37. It was agreed, after further discussion, that the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff would review the applications of the Governments of India and Pakistan for Canadian assistance in training with a view to offering alternative suggestions to that of sending cadets to the Canadian Services Colleges. 7 (R.G. Kingstone) Lieutenant-Colonel, Secretary. DISTRIBUTION No. Nos. Nos. Nos. Nos. 1 2 9 12 15 to 8 to 11 to 14 & 16 No. 17 Nos. 18 & 19 Nos. 20 & 21 Nos. 22 to 24 Nos. 25 & 26 No. 27 No. 28 Nos. 29 & 30 No. 31 No. 32 No. 33 Chairman, Chiefs of Staff CGS CNS CAS CDRB Defence Secretary Deputy•Minister Secretary to the Cabinet Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Secretary, Canadian Joint Staff, London Secretary, Canadian Joint Staff, Washington Commandant, National Defence College CJS Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee Secretary, Joint Planning Committee CSC file TOP SECRET 000687 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIM02655 Title A name given to the resource Minutes, Chiefs of Staff Committee, "Meeting of the 541st meeting held on 23 June, 1953 in the Office of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, 'A' Building, National Defence Headquarters" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953-06-23 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Nuclear Vulnerability Study, RG25, Vol. 4563, File 50041-A-40, Part 2, LAC. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Early Cold War, Atomic Vulnerability Description An account of the resource Chiefs of Staff Committee, Department of National Defence, Ottawa Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en