https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/7a51668ae92ae363ba7c8a81da09eda1.pdf d0c5bdeb7ecf05e61e2ae39725d61ca4 PDF Text Text I- i IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE NOCSC ©epartment of JJaticmal ©efence CANADA JOINT STAFF 1888.9 S E C R E I1 ^ ADDRESS REPLY TO CHAIRMAN CHIEFS OF STAFF, OTTAWA. 14 Sept 1959 Arrangement for the Provision of Atomic Warheads to Canada 1. Reference CSC 1888.9 dated 8 September 1959. 2. Attached herewith is a copy of the letter which was forwarded to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff on this date, in reply to his request for a JSWPC review of the draft note put forward by the United States pn 24 August 1959 with respect to acquisition of nuclear warheads for Canadian forces. (J'N. Donaldson) LCDR Executive Secretary Joint Special Weapons Policy Committee Distributions Chairman, JSWPC ARMY Member « RCAF Member" V DRB Member " ccs Chairman, JSWC RCN Member « RCAF Member » DRB Member *• JAG End. 1 000190 �CW^WYXO^ v^> *_ - e-fe.. -fa ftf* ' <*«-v |/* CSC.1894*2 SECRET ~ m w > 14 September 1959 V > CO V CCOS Arrangements for the Provision of Atomic Warheads to Canada m o O •o -< �J • IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE NO CSC 18®8.9 SECRET department of Jfjattonal Befente CANADA JOINT STAFF ADDRESS REPLY TO CHAIRMAN CHIEFS OF STAFF, OTTAWA. 14 Sept 1959 CCOS Arrangements for the Provision of Atomic Warheads to Canada 1. The JSWPC, as directed, has reviewed the U.S. draft and considers that the U.S. proposal represents a departure from the type of agreement originally contemplated, in that it relates solely to stockpiling of nuclear warheads in Canada. It makes no express provision for supplying warheads from the stockpiles to Canadian forces in Canada and overseas, nor to any other NATO forces, and implies, in effect, that the warheads to be stockpiled are for United States use in support of Canadian forces and United States forces. 2. It is considered most important that arrangements be made with the "U.S. for the supply of atomic warheads to Canadian forces in Europe, since the U.S. draft appears to be restricted in its application to Canada. It is"recommended that satisfactory assurances be obtained regarding provision of atomic warheads to Canadian forces in Europe before the agreement at hand is signed. 3. It is noted that the word "weapons" is employed throughout the agreement, whereas the word "warheads" would eeem to be the more appropriate term. 4. ' "The implications of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the U.S. draft are that U.S. custody may involve the carriage and employment of U.S. civilian or military personnel in Canadian ships and aircraft carrying nuclear warheads. This would be difficult for Canadian Forces to accept, and should, perhaps, be clarified. 5. With the above general observations in mind, the U.S. proposal, if viewed in the sense that it is solely an agreement for the stockpiling of nuclear warheads in Canada, should be read in conjunction with the following particular observations; PREAMBLE It would appear, in the second sentence of the preamble, and as referred to in para 1 above, that this U.S. draft is meant to be a strictly bilateral agreement between Unlted'States and Canada, without any provision being made for the warheads being available to other NATO forces in the event of hostilities. PARA 2 This paragraph i s b a s i c a l l y acceptable, although we would prefer l a s t sentence be amended to read as follows % " I n s t a l l a t i o n s and f a c i l i t i e s for normal l o g i s t i c support (housing", messing, o f f i c e s , etc) w i l l be provided as mutually agreed 11 . SECRET ..,/2 000192 �- 2- PARA 3 This paragraph contains the usual provision for the NATO Status of Forces Agreement to apply to U.S. forces in Canada. It is considered reasonable that this apply to U.S. forces stationed in Canada. It is noted that Article VIII of the NATO SOFA distributes the liability on a 25#/75# basis under normal circumstances, but, if this agreement is intended to include any stockpile sites specifically for the support of U.S. forces, it is considered that the United States might be willing to assume 10Q£ liability in such cases. PARA 4 This paragraph considered satisfactory, provided that "procedures" applies to tactical employment of the warheads (See para 4 above). PARA 5 This paragraph seems t o be all-embracing in i t s application t o control r i g h t up to the point of f i r i n g . While t h i s imposition may be required under U.S. law, nevertheless i t i s considered t h a t Canadian forces have a very d e f i n i t e requirement t o be able t o conduct Render-Safe Procedures. PARA 6 Strict interpretation of the first sentence of this paragraph "would require Canada to provide personnel to guard all sites, including those which might be required for U.S. use only. PARA 7 Despite the comment raised by CJS(W) on the "points of entry", it is considered that this provision is acceptable. PARA 8 While t h i s paragraph i s not as s p e c i f i c as others in the n o t e , i t i s f e l t t h a t d e t a i l s might properly be l e f t t o the s e r v i c e - t o - s e r v i c e arrangements contemplated i n paragraph 10. PARA 9 The expression nat no expense to the United States ..Government is considered too restrictive. Inasmuch as some"Items' of support, mentioned in the second sentence of this paragraph, may not be provided at Canadian expense, it is recommended that the first sentence be amended to read "Canada will, in general, provide administrative and logistical support for United States forces and dependents stationed in Canada in support of Canadian units under the terms of this ^reement". 11 0 Commodore RC Chairman Joint Special Weapons Policy Committee 000193 �Ii / ] / (JU _ ECRE T AIDE-MEMOIRE ^ CSC/JS REVIEW OF U . S . DRAFT NOTE FOR THE PROVISION OF ATOMIC WARHEADS TO CANADA 1. 6 ,f AM iQ ' % > ^ REFERRED TO . & £ &) /* & OCT 9 na u FILE Is the draft note too restrictive? M Afl'JZk, " ""ir^- v—-- Yes. Particularly so in the control (custody) and cost of logistic support. The arrangements for operational control by "allied commanders" appear to be sufficiently general. Atomic Energy Act 1954 (as amended) and U.S. political implications of'cost may dictate these restrictions. Re commendation % U.S. views be sought on the extent of "control11 envisaged i.e. surveillance of U.S. personnel in practice, and the proportion of logistic support which they would be willing to pay, in view of inferred use of storage facilities by U.S. forces. 2. (a) Is this agreement in furtherance of NATO declaration? Yes. In both U.S. and Canadian draft notes. This fact is evident. However, in U.S. note, no specific mention is made of use by NATO forces other than Canadian and U.S. (b) If Stockpiles for purely Canadian/U.S. use„ is USA willing to state a user requirement on which to apportion the cost? Recommendationg U.S. views be sought on their user requirement on number of weapons and whether they would be willing to apportion the cost of storage sites on the basis of this user requirement in relation to the Canadian requirement. 3. Sites "I" and ^J" - Infrastructure refused? - withdrawn as a result of discussion between CCOS and MND. Telegram to Canadian NATO Delegation attached. 4. U.S. definition of "Administrative Logistic Support" = U.S. note fairly specific in calling for standards comparable to U.S. standards in administrative facilities, transportation and housing of dependents with leeway for such other support as may be mutually agreed. Recommendat ion - U.S. requirements for logistic support be sought to provide S E C R E T . 000194 �SECRET - 2 - a basis for size and cost of the programme and their views be obtained on a Canadian offer of a number of unfurnished living units comparable ,to and within the area allocated to equivalent ranks. 5. RCAF view on U.S. personnel living in married quarters, under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. This group may be fairly large, work as a relatively independent unit and thus present a situation which has not been encountered in Canadian establishments before. 6. Communic at ions - what does this mean? Recommendation; U.S. views be sought on the extent and type of communications required. 7. Interpretation of Para 10; Does this mean AEC civilians , per se, in ships and aircraft? Specific reference to surveillance by U.S. personnel has a particular bearing on the interpretation of this paragraph. Recommendat ion i U.S. views be sought on the extent of surveillance under peacetime training conditions and after President has released weapons for NATO use. In particular their views on presence and type of U.S. personnel in delivery vehicles. 80 Render-Safe Procedures? Although Canadian draft specifically mentioned Canadian desire to possess the capability to render-safe all weapons allocated to Canadian forces in the event of an accident, the U.S., who must be aware of the Canadian views on this important aspect, has avoided any reference to this capability in their draft. Recommendation; That DND views be obtained as to whether weapons would be acceptable without this Canadian capability but with a U.S. guarantee that they would ensure "rendering safe" in time of emergency. 9. Bilateral Funding - There is no existing agreement between U.S. and Canada SECRET .. ./3 000195 �SECRET - 3 - which sets forth a basic formula for the sharing of costs on B i l a t e r a l defence p r o j e c t s . Each project i s treated as a separate e n t i t y . Recommendat ion; See 2(b) above. 000196 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00231 Title A name given to the resource CDNW00231 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Acquisition And Storage Of Nuclear Weapons For Canadian Forces In Canada And Europe," RG24-B-1, vol 21439, file CSC 1888:9, part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en