https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/956424e2257554d02ce693ecf740ec19.pdf 38fe58cc17f63f453ad8f5c2d71a1b7b PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information J 5-00 m-A - v* c c DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE TOP SECRET Ottawa, Canada, 1st November,19^9* MEMORANDUM TO: CHAIBMAN, nnmtvwKV JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE. ^ ' \'L • ' . t As Military representative on the Joint (=,'; y intelligent S e /proceeded to Waahlngton ana inter-...-,. viewed the members of both the J.I.C. and J.I.G. ?• « ,lVln^fjRTl7 « n t h f f a a e ? 2 S % £ S S T A . ' X* J F S l F i E " i S t i S i J ; h2S proceeded with a paper which all . ; /\ SL.tl!i nSTcSSiiiSr will no? be of sufficient scope to meet ,, the national requirements. 1 The oblect of this paper is to estimate the effects ht the Sovie? atomic explosio? Spon the security of the United States and upon the probabilities of direct soviet military action. 4 Ix will be noted from the attached statement of the Problem that this study considers only the effects of direct e «£ ,l r Psychological effect and collateral a W v ^ r Shysieal Physical destruction. JJJ such a / c a r e ^ h o u s l n g of injured ahd "vf^ homeless population, dislocation of labour forces, repair and reconstruction of plant facilities, etc., are reserved for a further study. c At present it is intended that the G.I*A. will proceed with this study under the administration of an Ad Hoc Committee which will consist of members of the three Armed Forces, the C.I.A., the Atomic Energy Commission and State Department, utilizing the wide authority invested in the C.I*A. Under this Ad Hoc Committee, Sub-Committees are at present studying the A-bomb effect. In addition they have called upon various departments of the government to produce the necessary material for a much wider and all encompassing study which they hope will produce the date by which the Soviets intend to go to war and the effects such a war might have on the North American Continent, United Kingdom and North Atlantic Pact Powers. 6. As it will be seen, it ls a terrific project and they do not expect to have a completed paper before June of 1950, although they have set a deadline for their Sub-Committees to report on the atomic side by November 15th and for a draft paper to be written by the J.I.S. by December 15th and hope to be able to submit this paper to Canadians and British by January 15th, 1950* �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information J TOP SECRET »2*» 7* However, from discussions lt was quite obvious that these were merely target dates and that the J.I.C. do not really expect to have any concrete proposals before early 1950. It is also obvious that further tri-partite discussions would not take place but the U.S. suggested that when we have our paper completed and they have theirs, that a meeting either in Canada or Washington would be quite agreeable and when we have agreed upon the paper between us that this finished produet would be taken over by their team to the U.K. and we would then be provided with a copy of the finished product. 8. With regards to ABCI 15, Part 2, this whole paper has been suppressed and there are only three copies in existence in Washington which are held by the three Heads of Intelligence and are not to be used for any planning or other purposes as they consider this paper to be too unreliable and unrealistic. 9. criticism only and they are planning With regards to Part 1 of the same paper, the same has been made but as they feel it is for a short term will probably be rewritten before the end of 1950 quite prepared to accept it for North Atlantic and purposes* 10. They intend in all future papers to produce a new format and were very definite In how the intelligence is to be presented, stating that all new papers will only take intell*igence up to the point of contact and that from there on it will be a matter for the-planners with a final meeting uniting the planning and intelligence papers into a sound and realistic plan. They are very definite that intelligence must get out of war gaming and give up trying to time and phase campaigns as was done in ABCI 15, Part 1* 11* We have been posed certain questions which were handed to me to avoid passing through the normal post as they felt we might consider them embarrassing and might not want to ~ — — — - answer. Copies of these questions are attached. Similar questions i*tx<aUw h a v e b e e n p0secL to the U.K* which consist of:« mi^r ® How many A-bombs will be required to (1) prevent immediate A-bomb retaliation from United Kingdom bases; (2.) retard U.K, mobilization potential by at least six months; (3) to make the U.K. unsuitable as a base for limited operations (largely air and naval) for at least six months; C^) to make the U.K. unsuitable as a base for general operations on a large scale. 000440 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information J TOP SECRET These questions they considered might be embarrassing but they did hope that our replies would Include other collateral, physical and psychological effects. They would like them set forth separately or get some statement as to their weight in the overall picture* 12* To sum up it would appear that the U.S. J,I.G. feel that their first study under the 0*1.A. directive will not be surricient to meet the J»I*C. requirements and that further long and detailed studies will be required. These studies are not to be weasel-worded but are to state clearly for the planners that where w£ do not know the answer to a question that we do not leave lt out but make a plain statement of fact to this effect. /s/ L.L. ATWOOD (L. L. Atwood) Commander, R.C*N., Director of Naval Intelligence. 000441 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act DlocLment diiulguelen vertu deJpl<§jiirl'acc$ffirinformation J TOP SECRET STATEMENT OP THE PROBLEM To estimate the effects of the Soviet atomic explosion upon the security of the United States and upon the probabilities of direct Soviet military action. 1. Questions to be answered. A* What are the estimated facts regarding Soviet atomic potential? 1. What is it that the USSR has now? 2. At what rate can the USSR be expected to produce and stock-pile bombs? 3. What is the critical number of bombs? (1) In terms of a decisive attack on the United Kingdom? (2) In terms of a decisive attack on the United States and Canada? 4* When will these numbers be achieved respectively? 5« What are the prospects with respect to means of delivery? fe. What information does the USSR probably have on United States atomic potential? B. Assuming that the USSR has the atomic bomb and the means of delivering it, what will be the reaction to these apparent Soviet capabilities in the following areas? 1. In Western Europe? 2. In the United Kingdom and Canada? 3» In Eastern Europe? h. In the Near and Middle East? 5. In the Par East? fe. In Latin America? 7* On International Communism? S. In the United States? B2. C. Effect on NAP-MAP and ERP and UN What will be the effect upon the policy of the USSR? 1. Will it genuinely seek agreement effectively to outlaw and control the bomb? 2. Will the USSR attempt to neutralize the United States stock pile by inhibiting United States initiative in the use of this weapon (of gas in the last war, with particular reference to the British attitude). An equal or superior capability is not required for this purpose. 000442 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET * * 2« 3* Will it use lt for political intimidation and blackmail? If so, how and with what success in zhe following area: (1) Western Europe? (2) The United Kingdom and Canada? (3) The United States? (4) The Near and Middle East? (5) The Par East? (6) Latin America? 4. Will it deliberately resort to war whenever any critical number of bombs is achieved? II. Conclusions with respect to the effect upon the United States security position. What will be the effect upon the balance of military power between the USSR and the Western Powers. III. Conclusions with respect to the probability of war* Will it become more moderate and conciliatory in its international relations in consequence of the elimination of a presumed inferiority complex. 000443 �Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information I! A TOP SECRET 2. To the Canadianst These questions are not so obviously slanted as those above, being the same as some of those we have posed to ourselves. But they are, again, only fragmentary in scope. a. How many A-Bombs (20 KT equiv,), effectively placed on selected targets in Canada, would be required to: (1) Retard Canadian mobilization potential by at leastfemonths: (a) Prevent major Canadian forces from being assembled and shipped overseas* (b) Disrupt vital governmental and military communications in Canada. (c) Effectively reduce the main east~west rail traffic. (2) Reduce the capacity of the Canadian munitions industry (broad interpretation) by at least 30-50^. In this respect an estimate as to the time required to regain the preattack capacity is desired* (3) Reduce by at least 20# the over-all Canadian industrial capacity, with again an estimate of time required to regain preattack capacity. 000444 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIM02600 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum to Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee from L.L. Atwood, Director of Naval Intelligence Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1949-11-01 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Nuclear Vulnerability Study, RG25, Vol. 4563, File 50041-A-40, Part 1, LAC. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Early Cold War, Atomic Vulnerability Description An account of the resource Department of National Defence, Ottawa Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en