https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/976ff9e6dc16e5b43aad67cbd78062f9.pdf 9455566fde13569d10f8f24c098d522c PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informatk TOP SECRET COPY NO r*»Hi-A c • DUM FOR THE J O I N T INTSLIIGMCS CCfcMITTEE m « With reference to Join t I n t e l l i g e n c e Con 1. CSC 14-8-11-2 dated 7 October 1949, J o i n j g y b e l l i g e n c e Dir Iv-inute No. 78 (210th Meeting), and p u r s j ^ ^ F t o the Comm t r u c t i o n s of the Chairman, J o i n t I n t e l l i g e n c e verba Commit-^ of 20 October 1949, the J o i nt I n t e l l i g e n c e Staff ned the problem of i n i t i a t i n g a s^^Hrof the has re'nada s u i t a b le for atomic a t t a c k J ^ H r n e Soviet targets I effect of t h e i r d e s t r u c t i on u g ^ phe a b i l i t y Union and ^ g e war. of Canada 2. I n ^ ^ L s re-examination we hev died the m a t e r i al made available^^wn. the V i t a l Points C ee and the Join t Planning Cammil^^kPaper JPC 1 9 / 1 . We reached the conclusion t h a t , ^ ^ ^ c e the major part hese studies has been which we are at directed along I n different from present following] they w i l l not se Pur present purpose. 3. Furtherm.ol.^^e have pay tention to advice received regarding s t l ^ ^ s at pr^ being i n i t i a t e d in London and Washington. While tJ s t u d i e s d i f f e r somewhat in method of approach i^^Mpeaj^Bfiat the .United S t a t e s I n t e l l i g e n c e Agencies a r l ^ n r u j ^ H i n g the production of a study and expect, upon i t s completion, to exchange i t with the Canadian study outlined above. 4. I t i s also appafrent jLrom the advice received t h a t designed t o f i t i n t o other cieiJ^^ine u l t i m a t e l y the s t r a t e g i c fk of l ^ ^ ^ o v i e t Union on a long-term s t u d i e ^ ^ t h o u g h different in urpose ir the United States paper studies whose purpose i intentions and capabil basis. The United Ki, approach, have the s 5. Consequ^^Rr, we f e e l th. e i n i t i a t i o n and production of a study of t h i s nature p e r t a i n s t o Canada should be unde •r. We a l s o eons id § • that the complexity and nature of T i i t i a l s t u d i e s n e c e l ^ ^ ^ t o approach the problem a r ch t h a t t h e i r a u t h o r i ^ ^ ^ e compilation i s beyond our sq^ Approval of higher a u t h o r i t y w i l l therefore have t o be in order t h a t other Gove^ ^ n t Departments and Agencie. ncerned can make t h e i r nece; contributions. existing this regard we are not aware oj 6. .meet" interde ental committees that are designee it Appendix the re ments of this study. We have attacl including "A", rected, a possible approach to the pre a st 'nt of some of these requirements which vfl ,heve t o be £ lied. We recommend that the approval of the ( Committee be obtained in order to initiate thi: A Waft submission is attached at Appendix "B» for y< ^ K s i deration© >er. Ottawa, Canada, 1st November,1949. 1000445 �Document disclosed under the Access to InformationAcm Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a l'informati\ TOP SECRET COPY NO : \u OUTLINE OF THE PR03IEM OBJECT 1, Union migl e s t i m a t e thi by atomic be wage war. ^ermine the targets in Canada whi Lsider suitable for atomic atta "ect which the elimination of i/ould have on the ability o e Soviet hi to targets a to SCOPE 2. This obj< proportions. Limi^ order to delineate and to lay some foi .stulates factors .early ?n for a study of considerable must be introduced in : - ossible its scope its production, 3. These limiting factors fall into two categories: those governing the abi^^^of the Soviet Union to deliver atomic attacks: and those which ar# virtually -unpredictable as they will be the resull^^^jfl ^seeable changes in the Canadian economy,, 4, It will also be nee destructive effects for e^M (i.e. air, ground and water) in of the destruction of ta.fl Ws to assume definite of atomic explosion er to arrive at an analysis roduced by the Vital e mate From a study 5. st of priorities as Points Committee', it ars that conditioned by a il 1949 stated in V.P. 5 of h do not apply to and factors series of consider uirements which nsideraticn. the study now. und list of points the acceptance o follow are based therefrom) U.tary points exc •.(together with '•A'1 to the submi the Cabinet contained in Aji ist of points Defence Committee' of 28 September,1949 country. in Canada esa^^^-al t o the war potenti REQUIREMENTS is considered that further information on the 6„ e requirements stated below will have 1 1 U ^ lines The list of examples given is not nc sarily obtaij but. covers some major aspects of the stu5 M i d exclj s the nature of the problems involved. refi These requirements are: determination of what centres of populat! teential to the war potential in priority of importance,' determination would have to include estimates regarding 'relative importance of areas within major cities, ich (b) The determination of any further administrative centres (federal, provincial, comraei oial or military) which ate essential to the war potential.*unci their priority, of importance.. 1000446 ,/2. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a finformati TOP * SECRET COPY NO ' -2- (c) The determination of priority of importance .each (i) each essential point within its own fun group, (E.g.: electric power, steel in administrative centres, ets.) (ii) each individual functional group. From the determination of the above, an overall ts by functional grouping which are essential to tial will be required, with prioriJ^Kf importance. list o the war (e ]M determination of the physical sj^ K * the area and genera3^^»e of construction predominating in each essential point in the list mentioned in si^^Hrra. (d), The purpose of th^^^equirement is to enable a computation to be made of the number of atomic bombs tha_M Puld be required for the destruc^^^. of each point. (f) For e mentioned in sub- ential point i (d) a determi (i) the e ^ V ^ o f i t s < terms where possib or f u n c l H ^ g l grou^ overall l i s t h of: PTction, in q u a n t i t a t i v e pon i t s own industry (ii) the effect of the (destruction of each point 1 terms upoi pon the war potential of in general the countryJ In tIthe case of centres of population and admninistration, consideration to the diversion would have t o bejgiven A erials and labour that will be of effort r ^ H temporary shelter, necessary itios etc. for the population medical ts habitation and services. deprive (iii) simi w i l l ta.l^ |g substitute adequate into account such acilities, ioactivity. as duration (iv) i j | w n e r a l terms, the ai^Bkimat e time i t w i l l takjp for the removal of i t M B o n t r i b u t i on t o be Brt unon the Canadian w a i ^ ^ f c e n t i a l . te? of the remq functiona remova. potenl ermination of the effect up ^he war potential 'by simultaneous atomic bombih individual 'ups in the list mentioned in su ira, (d). En indication of the approximate tim each group will make itself felt upon which the war [i) A determination as to whether there is ar [tion, or series of combinations, of these es; 1 irrespective of function, whose simultaneous dc uction have a catastrophic effect upon the war potential (k) An indication as to at what approximate time .struction of such combinations of points would produce 'his effect. 1000447 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informatioi TOP SECRET COPY NO. APPENDIX •'.B5 0? SUBMISSION K Chie II « Staff Committee, madian ecent United S t a t e s - United Kingdq. 1. the Conference in Washington concluded Intelli nnouncement regarding Soviet p o s ^ rion l i g h t of jpomb, t h a t a complete re-exami n of the of t h e a t a " l i t i e s and i n t e n t i o n s of t h let Union strategic c ng-term planning would hav^ be initiated, as a b a s i s s considered jrft£ojm&iiy a ntimber of To t h i s end, uld have t o be undert by the appropriate separate stud agencies in t h e ^ H e d States, the Unit gdom and Canada. 2, The first of these studies is ed with the determination of t^^^ts within Can a the Soviet Union would oonsider suitable for attack omic bombs, and the determination of the effect c5f the Pfruction of these targets, It is hoped that thisl K - be int ed with a similar United States study, and the integration exchanged with the United Kingdom &rs would thus have as their objective a contribution ermination of hov; the Soviet, Union might decide to dis s atomic bombs in a war with the Allied Powers. 3, The United States version of the study an preliminary surveys pri both these countries t conclusion of such a departmental organiz establishments; £dy proceeding with thgi?£ d Kingdom is also conducting faking tiis-ir version. In $[ study necessary for the elim carried out by international defence outsid X a survey of t J ^ ^ r o b l e m by the J o i n t 4. As a resu ;e, i t i s c l e a r t h a t ,\hile the a p p r e c i a t i o n Intelligence Co. r e l a t i n g , t o the choice of t a r g e t s for of Soviet inten latomic bombs i Ltelligence function, the complexity land nature of s t u d i e s necessary t o approach the problem •are such thai leir a u t h o r i t a t i v e compila i s beyond the Iscope of thi >mmitteee 5. Vital to en. Iso considered t h a t the composition of the Committee i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y c o M ^ h e n s i v e em t o undertake the necesssary wori sequently the J o i n t I n t e l l i g e n c e Comm ir\z the need for a study of t h i s n a t u r e , pmmends (e ) the undertaking of this study be approve the necessary steps be taken to ensure the establishment of an interdepartmental commli provide the basic information required, of reference of the study and the requirement! be fulfilled would be outlined by the Joint Intelligence Committee, \ Secretary, 000448 COMMITTEE. JOINT INTELLIGENCE I � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIM02599 Title A name given to the resource "Memorandum for the Joint Intelligence Committee" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1949-11-01 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Nuclear Vulnerability Study, RG25, Vol. 4563, File 50041-A-40, Part 1, LAC. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Early Cold War, Atomic Vulnerability Description An account of the resource Joint Intelligence Staff, Ottawa Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en