https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/592e9604fc9907bd6d9bd282382a63d1.pdf 06732b7bc54bb3f6feeb3bfb857366c7 PDF Text Text OTT.AW FILE C7- P,. -~ No •......•..•.•.•....•.. t.l ~reflections invitation provokin~ . I have read with great interest_tr • .Reid's on current events, and I am grateful for the of commenting personally upon this thoup;htexpose of the ·situation. ~- 3. Reduced to its simplest expression, the problem can be stated in a few words: Bow to foil those who menace wa2. If the threat is remote, it is likely that the peace-lovin~ nAtions will succeed, over a period of years a~rl provided the~ start preparin~ now, in buildinc sufficient strenri:th to discourar:e would-be f'0'f!ressors. However, if the Soviet take advart'10'e o.f our present rteakness and ber;in hostilities before '"-'e are readv to neet their onslauc.[ht, we shal 1 have to choose bet1;-,~en two courses: last-ditch resistance or strate,..,.ic withdrawal coupled with astute diplomacy. 'l'o sacrifice our trumps in a doomed stand would be playin~ into the adversary's hands; to retreat te1-:iporarily might prevent useless destruction and force the attacker to disperse his armies on vast, almost indefensible fronts, while holding precarious sway over restless populations who will be prone to oppose Com__munist occupation by under;:i:round movements. .1e should not accept to wage a new 1i!orld \Jar until we haJUL.§.___f_gj.r cnance ol' winninr:. No. of Enclosures Post File No............... I 2. Althou~h I find myself in sympathy with most of the ideas expounded in these papers with respect to our long-term policy, I feel that we should envisar;e nore realistically what steps must be taken if the days of 3'.race are counted. The memorand 1.lm, while recop;nizinp; that ' 1 time is of the essence", fails to sur-;gest a clear course of action for the immediate and the ffiore distant future. Copies Referred To.............. c/c:J . D 4. There is a growin~ awareness amon~ the peoples of i£urope and of the \'Jester•n hemisphere that they are members of each other. They have assumed definite obligations to come to the rescue should.-a'ny part of the Atlantic community be in peril. They must all feel confident that these promises, made in good faith although without the proper means to back ther.~ up at the time, shall be fulfilled. Still I do not think tl1at any Russian trespass on '.ifestern European territory should automaticall;sr start a general conflict. 000341 �.,._ ..,. Document disclosed under the Access to InformationAct Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acces ii /'information .• .- ' • - 2 ' I realize, however, that we could not afford to let the match go by default, even though our first parry mir:;ht be 11 but a parade. may have to face yet another repli strater:i;ique" and re-rrroupinr; of forces, but since we must accept such an eventuality as a consequence of our solemn undertakin~s, it would appear wise for our allies and ourselves to nip in the bud any fifth-column activity liable to provoke uprisings behind us while we yield to the pressure of superior numbers. 5. The interests at stake are too great for the West to play a nonchalant game. Perhaps it would appear less candid to the Russians if it did not lay all its cards on the table. It might be advisable to revert to closed-doors diplomacy. There is no need to discuss affairs of state in the open, or to advertise intentions and plans in the press. As much harm has been done in recent months by irresponsible declarations and communiques as by military errors of judgment and diplomatic faux-pas. 6. While gainin~ a respite, let us and our allies increase our armies. In the meantime, however, political leaders should keep a tight hand over the military elements, and seek provisional solutions at the conference table. Until the United Nations Or!!anization can implement its decisions, it may serve a useful purpose by providing a talkin~ place. F'ar from opposinp: the admission of any of our avowed or potential enemies to this assembly, we should facilitate it. Nothinr~ would be r,:ained by nursing feelinp;s of isolation and resentment, whereas the airing of grievances might lead to discussion and nerrotiation. 7. Durin.n: this period of bargainini?,, al though it may become necessary for us to bluff, we should cease declaiming; about principles we are unable to uphold. Up to now, the ~estern world has been content with playing knif.,hts-errant en pantoufles, promisinr assistance to all and sundry, butdoin~ 11ttle in a practical way to secure the means of carryin~ out its engagements in case of need. It is not easy to ride a mount which is half Peg:asus and half draught-horse. ile should now try at least to keep pace with developments and o:et into our stride. '.-Jhen we have assembled enou~h troops and m8.terial to command respect, we may indul·o in the luxury of makinri; new committrnents. ',-,hile we Canadians should continue to set an example of morality in our outside dealin~s, it does not follow that we should allow ourselves to be drawn blindly in a crusade. It is elementary prudence not to pluni:i;e headlon~ in profitless or fatal adventures. 8. ~Hea:r.while, let us search our conscience for positive reasons of defendin~ democracy. In the last conflict, it was thriught preferable not to define our war aims. Appeals to patriotism were effective against such an inexportable theory as German national soc:talism. \;e are now faced with a more pervasive and dynamic doctrine, which aims to destroy the very foundations of our way of life. To its dramatic battle cry "Arise, ye damned of the earthn, we ought to oppose a more appealing watchword than ~1hat we have, we hold 11 • It is not by spreadino; sentimental delusions about the possibility of livin~ in amity with the Cominform that we will inspire determination to our people, but b:v persuadina them thnt there can be no perrrn.nent compromise with Stalinism, except under the ~guarant·ee of'rhilitary power .and diplomatic vip;ilance. 000344 ) �- ', .. -- -- - ----------., Document disclosed under the Access to InformationAct Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acces ii /'information - 3 - Law-abidinp: citizens cannot hope to share the world amicably with bandits, whose admitted objective is to rule alone. To foresee any friendly cohabitation with the Soviet is wishful thinking. '.ie OU[;ht to adopt immediately the measures necessary to assure our survival and to contain Soviet impe ~'i alism. Our only hope is "armed peace". 9. I am not advocati np; 11preven ti ve war 11 , but preventive preparation for war. If we are satisfied that nothin~, s~ve a show of force, will deter the Cominform from marchin~ against us, the only loGical step is to mobilize men and resources immediately, and as rapidly as our economies will permit. 10. I am sure the ~estern peoples will not enter the comin~ struggle for the love of better refri~erators or better plumbin~. The only slogans that can inspire them with a will to conquer have been inherited from Christianity: liberty and the dignity of the human person. As a Christian country, Cm ada would be remiss in givinp; in to the areligious and atheistic attitude prevailing in some international circles, such as UN"SSCOand the Human Rights Commission, where appeals are made, not to men I s souls, but to vapue and cold ideologies. 11. It does not matter thqt our slogans have not the same rallying power·fo;r> Arabs, Hindus, t:>hintoists and Brahmins. So long as the vJest is united by the ideals that mqde it great, it can conclude alliances on different planes with those who fear the same enemies. 12. It behoves democratic state sm.en to convince their constituents that to protect their freedoms, they will have to p.;ive some of them up for a time. Our people must be told that if they do not sacrifice part of their liberty willino;ly now, they will lose it completely sooner or later, together with their own personal welfare. 000345 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Warm War / 4 JANUARY 1951 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951-01-04 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00090 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Canadian Ambassador for Italy to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs 2, 4 January 1951, RG 25, 50069-D-40, LAC. Italy Jean Désy