https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/93c6a2a4e7e56dfffd1fa9bb65219911.pdf 405a40d65b48b8708af9bc0b8f8efada PDF Text Text ..... ___ ; D~!!!Jl~~~ tq tnfqrmqtion Act - Doc~me~~ulgue en vertea7. r i, /'information -...:::- Ext. No......... Letter c1-ff ................ . ~~,..~.9.~?: .... . Date ........ TOP SECRET FROM:The High Commissioner for Canada, Pretoria, TO: South Africa. THEUNDER-SECRETARY OF STATEFOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA Your despatch US-336 of December 11, 1950 Reference ...•.•........•••.•..•..•.•....•...............•..................................... Subject: ............•.••.•.•...•..•. I enclose a few lines by way of immediate comment or reflection prompted by the two papers of December 8 prepared by the Deputy Under-Secretary. At this distance and away from the activist realism of the East Block, I do not expect to be able to add anything very useful to what is being thought and written there: hence I have not put this in despatch form. ;'fuat I have written is more by way of satisfying rriy own local sense of urgency than as a contribution of any great moment. Copies ne £erred To .............. '. •....................................................... . 7,;.._~~~o. High Commissioner No. of Enclosures ONE Post File No... ~:,1-~ ........ . ·. 0003 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la ~o:ttag~dfl:E!'Tmation enclosing Notes on US.336 of December 11 two papers presented to the Minister on December 9 These two memoranda state the terms of the world crisis in very stark - not to say Toynbeeian - terms. They also call for an immediate semimobilization of the entire resources of the anti-Russian world as the only way of preventing the recurrence of one more, and perhaps the last, failure to produce a response to the challenge on time. 2. It seems to me that a disproportionate emphasis is laid on the inadequacy of the ¥larshall Plan, the North Atlantic Union, the Colombo Plan and the united action in Korea. It is true that the first could not stop the Czechoslovakian coup, the second is still preoccupied with blueprints and plans, the third is still hatching and the fourth has met defeat because of a bad guess. But it is in the nature of policies which are based on co-operation between autonomous sovereignties and designed to inspire democratic allegiancies as well as to resolve immense, deeply rooted and excessively complex social and economic problems, that they take months to elaborate and years to mature. We may appear to have lagged behind Communist enterprise at each step. At the same time we may have gained more than our present strategic and reconstruction position on the surface shows. Economic recovery in Europe is well under way. The constructive intentions of the West for the Far East and for undeveloped areas are now established; and so far as it can be done, the will of the western world to refrain from large-scale war is already explicit, even if it is not yet universally convincing. 3. I would suggest that we have now reached a new phase in the post war world revolution. It is a phase that moves at a quicker pace and therefore requires a radical re-organization of western authority to cope with a Communist strategy which looks as though it was being pushed rather faster than it had expected to be. 4. In these circumstances, as the memoranda point out, the slowmoving but massive operations of the past three or four years can no longer be our model. The machinery of Committees, Councils, Assemblies and Governments must somehow be augmented by a more centralized and expeditious medium of decision, and equipped with material, co-ordinated transportation, manpower and armament, and pooled intelligence which can respond with the utmost celerity to the tactical and strategic moves of the enemy. In short, alliances must become answerable to a Supreme Headquarters and commit themselves to carrying out its demands. As described in the second memoranda, they are too brittle and amorphous to divert the centrally controlled missiles of the Kremlin. 5. Some such outline might emerge from the meetings of N.A.T.O., the Prime Ministers' Conference, the proposed conference of the Organization of American States, and the Assembly meeting in March. Its purpose should be made transparently clear, namely, the closing of the ranks of all those who reject the Communist order of things and in consequence have united their strength to repel its attacks wherever they may fall. In some way, too, such an organization must clear itself of any possible imputation that it is dominated by any one Great Power. This, I realize, will be a delicate and difficult affeir, especially when the bulk of the load will be borntby that Power. But while we cannot and would not wish to have the monolithic consolidation of authority enjoyed by Moscow, we should strive for the utmost·unity of purpose, and the basis for that is the principle of real collaboration. 6. In the same context it has occurred to me, while reading the long range exchanges of view between East and Vlest during the past few months, that while there is truculence, bisotry and inflexible hostility in the utterances of Vishinsky, Wu and the rest, there is on our side an unrealistic kind of superiority, an assumption of rightness and righteousness which I cannot help feeling sets up a very difficult barrier. We seem to have failed to realize, for example, how the invasion of North Korea would appear to China - though Britain went to war in 1914 for almost the same reason, when Belgium was invaded. We also seem to think there is virtue and force in announcing our objectives before our plans are fully formulated, perhaps in the belief that we are dealing with opponents who reason as we do. The latest example of this is the announcement by a ranking American General of the three headed attack or reply which the western ••.• 2 000352 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information . •·· 2 world will make to a Russian invasion of Western Europe • . 7. This is another variation of the deliberate planning technique of the cold war, whereas as I have tried to suggest, we have passed into the more executive necessities of a warm war. 8. There is one aspect of combined western action which is omitted in the memorandum, and that is the employment of the armoury of persuasion, explanation and conversion to carry to all th_at can be reached the civilized and co-operative intentions and aims of the free world. If the objective named that is, a modus vivendi for the two opposed groups - is to be realized, the defensive operations of the West must be supported with their own message of good willJ reconstruction and peaceful intent, and for this, a "College of Propaganda" in its original sense, equipped as fully as the echelons and formations of defence, will be necessary. Its function will be equally to win support and to re-assure the enemy that we can occupy the same planet contemporaneously even if uneasily. High Commissioner 000353 �I ~----------------------;:Do=cum::':'en:::-:t d7'.'""isc':""""lose-:"'d -und:-e,"".""the-Ac-ces-sto-/nJ-orm-at-ion-A J;;;:.\ . (,o C HIGH r- t.ll.. coMM1ss1ONER FOR ,:t cAN~o~- '=~ -- I:) I.) I:, OF THE~ OFFOCE Loisur /'accf!si, l'informatio;· Document divulgue en vertu de la '1.•J::!.. ~c ti-Z ,2..--< r£ ~_..,;(::,_ ,jt~c.£?1-. 14--..--i '-7---- 1 .t::) ,- __, 41~ •L~'(_ / ~....-,,~"--- '"'J ,he-, ,...:. furf-,;... 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Ft---- U<.M..- 7--~000359 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Warm War / 28 DECEMBER 1950 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1950-12-28 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00089 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived High Commissioner for Canada, Pretoria to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs no. 599," 28 Dec. 1950, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4758, file no. 50069-D-40, part 1; MacDermot to Reid, 15 Jan. 1951, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4758, file no. 50069-D-40, part 1. Pretoria Reid South Africa Terence MacDermot