https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/056c78a2d42d441eafd65e6ac03e3216.pdf 6c367546c1e59c0247bb4fd117310514 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ORIGINAL Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information 32 COPIES 1 OF Cv FY Nu. LvND(.;N,ENGLAND AFFAIRS, ,~ .~ ti CYPHER - AUTO --- ~i• if . ,-.•· 1 .... ...,.-. Ji:,,}_ 71 Brussels, b LONDUN, December. 23, 19~0. (Rec'd Dec. ?.4, 195,)) 1 1(,Jl.~i,./tD Aai' L,,[l /1.,., ~: Top Secret. December , lbth Your telegI'ams reached an9_ Mr·. Claxton I fully 2. agree would ·have little cf the . that should seems to me to provide to the need for and points greatest urgency, Atlantic area. up to date increased You will in .the light might oe done towards -again highlight clearly.the defeat the strength, no doubt of the sessions. general lines No.1971. It and accurate·picture, up, as a matter military str~ngth in the North the memorandum wish to bring Brussels of' the discussions. 'l'his t.he end of the memorandum and would. increased need for in war. building I ·time, ·and I telegram a comprehensive ~J..1,-1,.1 of our present end to the in your ; -~-~~~~:~:':i~~-:~_:: ..:..:J at these be made at this to add from this <"'frO . ':-iC have reported Heeney will an appreciation memorandum given . draft military and }'Ir. r3 -r,,!\o. I~ r.,,~'l!'I . from Council and proceedings and prospects situation za. If and No., l'fo. ~-'.) me on return on the atmosphere fully ----- ~~!;v{~,<.>•I~. ,~)1-f~ f-+- J 'r r. r . mami. lo? -])- ::o~=~ t. \ 'I'(; P SECHE'r t II . 2 TJNDR/SEQ /; () e1, Wflh ~, _,.~, ¥"" _}J .cI~v.?531 ~INISTE!ff ,,,,,,.. (/l1Ti\WA danger a more rapid tn order Something of war and indicate build-up to deter of economic aggression along the following and or to prevent lines might be appropriate: . 'i'he new defence undertook to make in August ab.out a very North Atlantic increases efforts large increase· Treaty in defence which this the year North have not yet :Ln the .-military countrtes. of strength Atlantic The greater strength part has beert diverted countries brought of the 6f the t6 Korea I 000387 ,J �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - ?. - and in Western Europe there in our ability Atlantic to resist aggression. The action of the North a Supreme Commander tor Western Council in appointing Europe and the decision increase has been no significant to include German forces .in the in~egrated roree under the Supreme Commander could be considered belli by the Soviet possible Treaty that \·lhether this bloc. quickly to deter Soviet that up s'uft''icient to build Imperialism, world attaining Imperialism the position the threat by Events of the last willing · might be to prevent the could check Soviet force. few months indicate to rv.n the risk advance our·est1mar in order of effective 1t ·t's forces and as such it where it cafi•H the North Atlantic .. tempted to wage war in the near future free is so or not, the USSR may well believe Powers ai~e determined as a the Soviet Union is world war, and we must now of a third of the period of maximum danger from the previous planning {~r~ of 1953-54 to 1951-52, and .the North Atlantic Treaty must take immediate action countries defence production particularly 3. staff up their I realize you will be checking Committee the military estimate I think if' the .have anything nationality value 30 divisions like or the strength and of these and are located in para of a single equipped, geographic position of one commander.. Of the of questional:>le morale and some are low establishment far from the North.German trained, effectivel~, I 6 of you1-- tele~ram 30 divisions The one Norwegian ana one Danish division cirgartized, to ask them to or. the number of formations. some 15 are Italian quality, of shown in your paper. strengths ment:loned under 1::he control. 36 divisions, divisions forces,· with the Chiefs might be advisable· it ·the effective fighting military in Western Europe. In addition, doubt and build to expand plain. are not fully' and are not in a suitable 'c;o intervene in resisting an 000388 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de_la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information 3 attack on Western Europeo two-thirds One and one-third Netherlands divisions position was probaoly The present Belgian and one and are not yet equip~ed and trained. fairly accura:tely ..given by Marshal Montgomery in August when he stated Field 10 divisions available two were fit to f;ight. 4. for the defence of Western Europe, only On the other appreciation or the. th~t aspects it- may be that in view of the character 3 too grea~c emphasis in paragraph has been given to ·the particular .of your position of Canada in co_ns1~er1ng . .. the differences in a general which separate appreciation make 1t clear paragraph that are shared the specific kind, by a great 11 countries. for Canadian Gc>vernment policy,' these in a sup1-lementary Canadian position from the to date to the defence maintaining stability concerned; security stability point in the other the effectiveness and to participate of the other or re-armament should also peripheral and ll of the ~raft areas measures - areas ( which areas in which we are to North Atlantic measures referred affecting the to in your· the emphasis_ on t}?,e need and should be paramount, due weight effort be questioned wh-1ch reduced to such countries wculd be advantageous 1.s recognized in paragraphs 9 memorandum). It might reasonably 1n the military available area and to which Canada should now take in concerted while contribution (l).Our of our contribution critical the be given to the imp·ortance of economic assistance to the 5. critical steps I)'le~orandum. In such a paper, urgency of view of: to and to include memorandu·massessing of the North Atlantic and (2) The further to increase to extract memorandum referring the implications references to As a it would be advisable in the general references . to Canada in this many other perhaps . and that 1t might be preferable the views attributed of·presentation matter us from the United $tates, of this . ' as India, whether an increase the economi~a,ss~stance Pakistan even from the military and Yugos;l.ayia point of vlew. 000389 �.. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Do.cument divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information . "· ' - 4 Within limits, the e~pansion in defence effort presumably be at the expense of restricted consumption and investment ~hemselves. should 1n the wes~ern countries To the extent,. however, that economic ai.d to· .the cr1t:tca1 rearmament and .. balance between the tor· a · two •. The modest Colombo Plan., which was designed insufficient event, less_.dynam:lc than the p~esent, rather it even if it get· ahead with aid. along the possibility from all the In any points of·. view to · of _that plan.· lines or Canadian aid to Yugoslavia in the form·or available may_prov.e is implemented in full.· would seem essen·t1al bread grains and other basic Similarly,. (particularly supplies from-Canada) should be re-examined and more dangerous in the new in which we now find situation ··· are _compet1t1·ve, · thought areas should be given to the most effective situation of standards ourselves .• 60 A point which might well be emphasized in any current consideration of th.e relative armament and economic aid. is that we. may exert increased . in this ourselves, it defence effort connection that importan~e no mat.ter h'?w energetically time for• any is. going to take to make itself felt. para 4 of Washington WA-3315 o-r December 19th does not anticipate_ progress in any event to convert train plants manpower for priority is given to war production It would se~m.desirable to p1 ovide countries a larger 1 tq part substantial. It will and military take aid,. which our resources _of civilian takeadvantage a 11:tgh p:roportion in the form of civilian teletype. time and -Even if' the h;ghest adapted to the contribution . period during (We note and ·to mobilize the new tasks. bound to be an interval better before mid-1951) to re-armament of r_e-. there will 1s be, type$ of aid. . of· this of our help supplies. _ transiti~nal t·o other Lat.er w~en of our economy has l:>een turned. over to 000390 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 5 defence preparations~ we may not be in as good a pos1tio~ to make _oµr economic weight fe).t in such places Yugoslavia and Asia. c~ncentrate attention . While it ls probably at this ot friendly desirable to stage on the need for increased t~at _·for the· immediate ·er our high proportion as there :w:oulo seem to be much merit_. in defence prepa~ations, recognizing . countries future -contribution at least- a fairly to the strengthening or can probably ·oest take the form economic aid. 7. 11 capacity Although 11 the importance analysis to of the oe undertaken from the point make our plans of view sufficiently those :European countries their feet in that early exercise. effort or Paris Working Group. a useful stimulus or effective timing. to avo.id giving to comfort inclined to to drag If' we intend to match our efforts situation the United States for us to make our intentions Working 1t would seem whi,:h may be rather with the needs of the present impressive :i.mpact" and by the Paris Group of NATOshould not be exaggerated, desirable, 11 clear - and with tl)e - it might be well :ln our submission to the In that. way we may be able to provide to the NATOcountries in Europe. HIGH CONMISSIONER. ..... ::J �i I i Ex~ OTTAWA 43 Letter No ............................. . FILE No.~~~ .l~.~. :-.)).•.":-/"I SECURITY CLA SSI F !CAT ION TOP SECRET. FROM: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON. TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATEFOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA :J5.~t.errne;J... :i..~t.t.~;r:. P:~$.~3~.4 5..9.f'..P.~9.~IJlJ:l~r.. ;l).th, . .+9.59.• ......... .. r,nm.n~~n n fi"Gr1;:;-. 'i?fi'\ 1· 1 ~~r.::--~ ........................ The Intern~tional C""iSiS. @@. r,·f ·.'-,Ji :J.'IJJL _,v\ ... ,.l. !\\\\ I, ...l;',,,.:·~.Y ....•. ,..... ,v i!,,/J •• ,_.( ,~lJ\L.:::: . r:- .,.G'I~ TT~~;,~ §t '017;' l.<1-1•.. ~. L'. ":\:, •iv,~~ n Reference ...... . Su bJect '"'I ••••••••••• ,.._ •••••••• •• t' t.fth·,01.::-;,.. L s i:.: 1 0 1 ":. -.r:1 0b1...~Ltlt:.:iU I am sorry not to have had an earlier opportunity of replying to your letter u.s.3845 of December 11th, with which you sent us copies of two Departmental memoranda dealing with "The International Crisis - Some Basic Considerations" and "The Defeat in Korea". The draft memorandumfor Cabinet, contained in your telegram No. 1971 of December 18th, on which I commented in my telegram No. 2531 of December 23rd appeared to me to be based upon these earlier papers forwarded with your letter under reference. Copies Referred To.............. . 2. I should like, however, to add one or two comments which, even at this date, may be of some value in any subsequent revisions of these papers. 3. With respect to the first paper dealing with the international crisis, our comments are as follows: Paragraph 3: You would probably wish to include a reference to the Brussels Treaty as part of the response to the first challenge. No. of Enclosures Post File Paragraph 4: It might be more accurate to refer to the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia as demonstrating not solely the inadequacy of the Marshall Plan, but also the inadequacy of the military strength of the Western Powers. Paragraph~: If I am correct in assuming that paragraph applies to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization during 1949, I doubt if the North Atlantic Treaty Powers increased their military strength between August and December, 1949, sufficiently to be noted. The real increase in strength, of course, dates from the Communist aggression in Korea. Paragraph 18: While it is true that it is important to increase the number of our allies, and our allianc·e·: potential, additional commitments should not be undertaken until we are in a position to implement them. 4. With respect _to the second memorandum, we have had an opportunity of a recent discussion on a wholly informal basis with D.P. Reilly, Foreign Office Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and his comments will be of interest to you. #~' / ,, . I, :.J ~, i.1 5) 000339 �- 2 - 5. . With regard to the first paragraph, Reilly thought that the second sentence reading: "It is possible that these two Powers have now decided to precipitate that war during the next twelve months" was too pessimistic an estimate. The last United Kingdom appreciation was that the deliberate precipitation of a world war by the Soviet Union in 1951 was unlikely. Reilly agreed, however, that recent events in Korea and the recent decision to re-arm Western Germany considerably increased the possible dangers in the immediate future. Another danger, he thought, lay in the fact that the Soviet Union might be tempted to act on the assumption that the Western Powers would not use the atomic bomb. His view was that our supremacy in this weapon is still the major deterrent to Soviet aggression, and that we should not deprive ourselves of the deterrent power of this weapon by · suggesting that it would not, under any circUII}.stances, be used. 6. With reference to paragraph 2 Reilly said that he doubted whether United Kingdom Service authorities would accept the estimate that in the event of Soviet aggression all of South East Asia would fall within three months, and the whole of the Middle East within six months. With reference to South East Asia, he stressed the great importance of our present sea and air supremacy, and thought that the defence of Malaya was a practic.al task. On the question of the defence of the Middle East, he said that it was hoped at the forthcoming meeting of Prime Ministers to develop plans for participation of Commonwealth countries in this area. He stated that the United States regarded the defence of the Middle East area as a United Kingdom and Commonwealth responsibility, although adding that he believed there was a possibility that the United States view might gradually be modified. CANADAH 000343 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Warm War / 23 DECEMBER 1950 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1950-12-23 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00087 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived High Commissioner for Canada, London to Secretary of State for External Affairs no. 2531, 23 Dec. 1950, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4758, file no. 50069-D-40, part 1. Dana Wilgress Reid western Europe