https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/fe236d446f691bf79157b72def748b0b.pdf bfd45c4135d9251b411968c8c3d1a9c7 PDF Text Text c-; ¡--in FOREIGN OFFICE, Y:11/10/G el* . VAN .,I, S.'.7.1. July 23, 1964. c-v..- hleaee refer to my letter FOB/172/E4 of Hay 13 about the need to ,resolve questions of conflicting priorities for tho uric of trans- :Lt :Lcantic tcic ¿;raph cable channels under . breakdown conditions, 2. We have now given some thought to this question in as oc.iution with the United Kingdom departments concerned and the following are the lines on which we are thinking. . At the outset, I should say that we hope, and believe, that the Post Office and C.O.T.C. would do everything possible to help uS meet our urgent commitments. As you will be aware, the risk of multiple lass of channels has been minimised by routing tì>cni in different systems clac: Ld ramons; tue three tansAtlantic cable, terminated in this country. In addition the routine of channels via L.T.C. and O.T.C. will provide much needed flexibility in the event. of cable breakdowns. However, notwithstanding any arrangements ;;filch the carriers may make for restoring service, it is to n ree procedures for dealings with periods of reduced chsnnei .working. 3. T We arc firmly of the opinion that it is not possible to 4. lay clown an immutable set of priorities to meet all possible contingencies in brec.,.kciov,n conditions.. Aa you know, with the re-arrangement, of the 1.:OD London/British ïhbcacsy .1::;:%iington cable channel there will be three Government-rented channels terminated at LTC arad OTC. ïiirrildition to carrying Canadian, Forci rjn Of'f'ice, 1.:ini:.try of Defence London and SCH and Tripartite Alert traffic, these el uinrlels have to ,rovidc, on Call, a teleconference link L<,twc:çi>, 1;o. 10 Dc,vrninrr Street and the aili. te IIou.e Discussions are In l'ro<;I'C;::i:: with the Nneric: Cls vrit:a a View to finding othcz. gays and means of providing the Wo. 10 Do,rninr Streot/;lhitc Itous,e teleconference facility In an cmori;cncy. In the meanwhile we must regard a request for a teleconierence between No. 10 Downing Street and the White Louse as being of par::.lount importance, all other requirements being considered on their merits at the time, h:.ving rei;:ard to such factors a3:-. , (a) the relative urgency and the extent of the requirement; (b) the availability of alternative forms of communication to meet any of the requirements; (c) the estimated period of reduced channel working. We think it is quite inul:l)ropriate to place the önus for deciding how best to use the remaining, channels on the duty en;inecrin ¿: staff at L.T.C. c,nd O.T.C., since these staffs cannot be expected to know all the implications, IIowever, it is important that L.T.C. and O.T.C. should know to whom they should 3. Colonel P. D. Smith, :.13.E., C.U., Director, î?oyal Canadian Corms of Signals, Ottawa, 1. , /report �4 report the loss of a channel and from whom they can Cet instructions how to deal with 'the situation. The solution we have in mind, so far as the United Kingdom is concerned, is for any loss of channels to be reported by L.T.C. to the Ile:.ad of Shift of the Foreign Office' Signal Offlc :c. This -officer, acting within the framework of. (previously agnecd oper;ltion_al guidance, would then consult eu:ickly with the Duty :,í11u1 Officer at the I.i.O.1J., Cabinet Office and G.C.II.. Communication Centres to ascertain the current rind ont ici zlted rentiareracntr and the state- of alternative communications. These officers would, of .có.ursc, male use of their normal Departmental consultative machinery, as necessary, or as laid down in the operational guidance. Having decided how the remaining channels should be used the Ileacl of Shift, Foreign Office Signal Office, mould advise the D.S.O.s and the duty engineer at L.T.C. accordingly. As to the nature of the operational guidance, our present thoughts arc that this should be limited to stipulating that 7O Downing Street/ hite House teleconferences, when called for, will have overriding priority and that the No. 10 and the Joint Intelligence Committee duty officers must alwayo be consulted before any chnn;_eo in the normal channel switch'inr, arranç event pire to th nt May the INIo..10 Do'rirr.Lng Street/White House or the Tripartite. Alert regtlirementrl,. An to other traffic, the Duty Lgn:,.l Officers nhotll.a be well aware or the amount and nature of the traffic on hand, and of the availability of altcrnutivc routes, und should normally be well able, without consulting their operational staffs, to aeree revised schedules such that all .Departments concerned could clear their traffic having-regard to its precedence.. The duty Signai Officer at Canada (louse would be consulted as necessary. ' arced The arrangements outlined ut paragraph 5 could not, of course, be introduced and operated without th& full agreement and co- operation from all concerned at your end. AU We see it, what in required is l'or unx officer to be nominated at your ern with .whom the Head of Shift, L'oral n Office áignul Office, could clettl au necessary, ana who, in turn, would iann sri:l agreed instruction to the engineering staff-at O.T.C. arid to anyone Bloc; concerned. It is clearly imperative that the engineer° ut L.T.C. and 0.T.C. should be working to the name switching schedules. 6. ç I should be most grateful to receive your informal opinion on the arrangements outlined above and, in particular, your views on how we can ensure the necessary collaboration on the traff'.:.c side in the event of trans -Atlantic cable breakdowns. The arrangements outlined in this letter, including the r. o :»osecl operational gnliclance, will probably have to be submitted for agreement on our side to the Cabinet Oftice 'Combined Communicat.ionrElectronics Committee. It would, o .course, be made clear in the C.C.C. paper that the proposed arrangements wort subject to formal agreement by your sido. 7. . `", 1 / `i (í-- (:'.. nouticdLe) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Hydra Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context HY00392 Title A name given to the resource [Transatlantic Telegraph Cable Channels Under Breakdown Conditions] Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 07/23/1964 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Hydra Communications - Policy, RG24, 1250-36 Vol. 3, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of National Defence Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource LTC, OTC, transatlantic cables, White House, 10 Downing Street, emergency planning, emergency communications, tripartite alerts Description An account of the resource Duplicate material in <a href="https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/items/show/10680" target="_blank" rel="noopener">HY00382</a>. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en