https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/dc8ce40ebf56e522a879c9b5bf2fc316.pdf f409bec32a4536f1ddde90cbf57f55a9 PDF Text Text ,C.E. PEJ ..F~SON 1. was, until a few months ago, assumed to begin in late and 1954 was the date set for the achievement The reason for selecting unlikely to possess Thus the basic this date was that an adequate It may be that Union about three false one, and that have a large gravely the estimate that years longer to build in would deter the it would take the Soviet up its atomic armament was a the Soviet Union may now, or in the near future, enough stock of bombs to feel the other hand, Soviet fears of their capacity and other Western countries. in their capacity atomic weapons; we know that have been working energetically On may have declined, capable of destroying and they also may have a new confidence bombers carrying confident of atomic warfare atomic bomb may not be considered authorities delivery then. so long as it lasted. to damage the United States strategic the Soviet Union was the great U.S. superiority atomic weapons and in the means for their 2. of the medium-term plan. stock of atomic weapons until assumption was that Soviet Union from open warfare 1953 or 1954, on their Soviet the strength, to intercept the Soviet radar network and other measures of air defence. Whatever the causes, period military of maximum danger, we must now advance our estimate expand our targets manpower, and increase of the in defence production our capabiHties and to engage in war, 000383 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ... - 2 - without counting on any period the imminent possibility at all danger has already undertaken begun. is that the period The new defence efforts by the United States and certainly men and equipment tied of 1951 that down in Korea. of available By that since actually to compensate for the It will not be before enlargement and equipment will be achieved. should be stronger which have been in the defences not enough increase a substantial of greatest and many other Western cotmtries June have not yet brought about much increase in readiness, be free from of war. The only safe assumption 4. in which we shall forces the middle in being time the democratic countries in the West than they would have been if there been no Korean war, even if considerable forces are still tied had down in the Far East. The Russians relatively may, therefore, in a better position hence or thereafter. supports German forces the view that they could use or refrain is still great War is, the behaviour popular be six months towards of Western Europe a casus belli appeal among the satellites, which and which from using at thelr_discretion. of course, not inevitable. for the We$tern countries economic superiority they are now of the Russians in the defences they may be manufacturing would have considerable 6. for war than they will Furthermore, the plans to include have decided that and their The greatest to meet the threat resources deterrent by employing their of skilled manpower in 000384 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 3 - such a way that them. the prospect This has been their Atlantic is slender purpose, Treaty came into effect, at any rate than in the other North Atlantic hearted associates, and especially countries. recrimination with the United States, is based and on the general peoples for greater efforts have in the United States stout- are to get on with between friendly agreement governments concerned on the assumptions planning since the North If they and their such as Turkey and Australia, the job and avoid unpleasant over danger. The sense of acute urgency is greater 7. victory but the accomplishments not matched the surge of increased their of eventual is essential on which their countries, by the defence grounds on which to appeal to and sacrifices. 000386 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - 1 Dgc~me?rdiv~lgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces a /'information Copy ot 23 copies. 1 N0° THE CANJ\DI AN f\MB!;_SS,~DOR TO THE UNITED ST !,T:~S Candel No o' 99 o New York Follo~ing; for V!r•., Reio a.nd Nr·o Pear$on, Begins: Your mess.ages EX-2592 2593 reached me just ·a note I had completed· draft on t:he name general product - wh:lle- 1t takes di:f'f'erento that ~nd · covers is briefer the less sa.me gem?.ral ground line, the .tt ls very important of war emphasis My o and tha.n yours, 0 It was prompted psrt:1.cu~arly as your subject memo.randum for the C;:1.t,inet on the danger after is somewhat by my impression that- the Governments whi~h can make 1 ;;, matern11 a substantial. Soviet Union should seek to reach agreement atta.ched are to defence ccntl'•ibut.1.on to their now atta.ching effort, a.nd that a lower degree 'The memorandum reads Stateso lo In North Atlnnti.c most, o.n the· urgency to be not all of urgency as follow3. pla_rlning 1953 or 1954, and 195~ was the ~~te than pl?-.U'io. The reason of atomic weapons until ·theric the great United superiority me.ans for open warf~re 2 .. 'rt> , I ;;.i,• 7( j :; ) It of them the Uni~ed Text_ beg:1.ns: the ·pex·iod of greatest s~t for ro~ the achieve~ent ~el.ec-ting tha.t the- S-.cv1et Union was u,~111<:ely to ponsess the the a few months ago, assumeu to begin _in late danger was, until t'he medium-te:rm if against States t.hetr <tielivery so long as it may be that Tnus the bns1e in atomic woulf.1 deter this· date an adequaJe assumption er wa.a stock · ~m.s that, weapons and in tM -sou:tet U111ionfrom lasted. the estimate that it would take th~ 000402 j .! �. der the Access to Information Act Document_ d1sclo:ed un d I Loi sur /'acces a /'informatio Document d1vulgue en vertu r - 2 - Union about Soviet hav.e a le.rge or in the nea.r future, confident United States atomic of their and other hand, Soviet fears to build up its enough etoek capacity of borr&bs to damage thV2 gravely weste~n qountries~ -On the other may have declined. of atomic warfare bomb ma.!r not be considered capa.ble - ca.nae 1 ty to intercept we knoN that the Sovtet energetically . on- their . . Soviet in their ' s trateg:t_e th~ oi.' destroying s_nd they .also may have a new confldence strength, atoml<; one, and tha.t the sov:tet Union may now, armament was a false to feel ~rears longer three bomber~ carrying atomic weapons; have been working a.uth.orities ra.dn.r nett1orl: and otner mea.sures of air defence., 3., of the.period production of rn;:;v:imwndnntrer, all mtn:ta:r:r and eapab1Jlities at the eauses.11 we must Whatever· to engage in which we shall .u our estin1ate advance expa.nd_ou~targets manpower, in war t'lOW ' a.nd increase wi thou.t be free eountln.g from. the in det·enee our on any period lmm.1JDtmt possibility of war. The only· safe 1~0 greatest a.s;':um:,?tion danger has already 1s that beguno the peziioo The new defence of ef'fort3 have been undertakefll,b.y the United States an;n. many other western June 'have not yet br~ugilt. countries sine.a about which much .. ·. inerease in the· defene.ee not ~nougl'i increase df.?Wnin Kot•ea. that n substantial I coun.tries been if foreeS should there It will be strcmger ha,d been a.re still tied for~es-i~ ln the west than no Korea.n war, . even· if dOW!'rl of 1951 being time the democratic. By that they would have coaniderable in the Far East. The .Russian3 may,, therefore, a:re now rela.tively tl1e middle ~f available be ·8.chteved. ,. ·and ce:rta inly- the men ,ind equipment not be before ~nlargem~nt and eemipment will in readi!'ll~ss to com:peru:iate fitr '. tied actua,lly 'in a bet;er posi tiC® ha-ve decided·that for war than they they will 000403 I �Document disclosed under the Access to tnf?r~a~'.on Act -. Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces a I ,nformatton . ' ' - .. ·-:, .) - '1 be six months hence or thereafter. of the Russians the _defences towards of Western be mimufacturing popular appeal or refrain 6~ of skilled at any rat;e 7., victory since· !l.ustra.lian· recrimination J The greatest countries to meet the superiority economic over them. the acute of in the other stout-hearted are North and their the prospect This has been their Atlantic Treaty c-~ into have not matched the surge between North friendly agreement and on the gener2l efforts countries" such If as Turkey Job and avoid countries, is ess.ential ~n which their grounds in the United is greater 1\tlantic on with. the on the assum1tions peo~Jles f'or greater urgency associates, to get the Un:l_ted Staten» concerned they may .1anger. The. sense than and their based great .bu"t the accomplishments of increased· States not inevitable. manpower ln such a way that is s~ender of eventual effect, the view that .in and which they could use for the western their German forces discretiono of course., by employing the behaviour which would. have .considerabl.:) among the· satellites, ·war is~ resources to include Europe supports a ca::ms. belll is still purpose,_ plans frorn using at their deterrent threa.t the Furthermore, • unpleasant with Governments defence plartnin~ on which 'to appeal to their and sacrlfices.o . and and especially by the they is Text ends. C I\NADIAN AMBP,SSll.DOH 000404 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Warm War / 19 DECEMBER 1950, WA-3315 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1950-12-19 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00085 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Canadian Ambassador to the United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs WA-3315, 19 Dec. 1950, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4758, file no. 50069-D-40, part 1. atomic development atomic warfare Hume Wrong Soviet capabilities