https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/25ff3cf9b3d6aaeae1089adedf65d195.pdf 059b558570b650c260b4190dbfa1942b PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a {'information SECRET v A F T OUTLINE PAPER NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR NATO FORCES BACKGROUND 1. The 1954 and 1956 NATO Ministerial Meetings and the 1957 NATO Heads of Government Meeting resulted in agreement to: (a) adopt a nuclear defence strategy to offset the numerical superiority of Soviet bloc forces, (b) stockpile nuclear weapons in Europe, and (c) place intermediate range ballistic.missiles at SACEUR's disposal. 2. These agreements gave rise to the following requirements for tactical nuclear weapons in NATOi (a) nuclear armed air strike forces to counter-attack the enemy's atomic capability and to retard the advance of his land forces, (b) nuclear missiles and artillery for direct support of land forces, (c) nuclear missiles for air defence, and (d) nuclear depth charges for anti-submarine defence* Planning has proceeded on the basis that all NATO countries, except Portugal, Luxemburg and Iceland, will participate in the programme to meet these requirements. 3« / / *~~^ * Z A ^ ^ J L . - . C ^ T ^ L ^ *~i^ - In addition, the following US proposals are expected to be put forward at the forthcoming NATO Ministerial Meeting:. (a) a US undertaking to maintain NATO nuclear weapons stockpiles at the level of NATO military requirements, (b) a plan for the USA to commit to NATO five POLARIS intermediate range missile launching submarines by the end of 1963 which would be assigned on the same basis as the 6th Fleet and which, within NATO, would operate under US control, and ' ../2 000976 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a {'information - 2 - SECRET a proposal that NATO should establish a multilateral force of (c) 100 POLARIS mid-range ballistic missiles and launching platforms (preferably seaborne), operating on the basis of joint control by the NATO powers and international staffing. ^Hi7xJ^C> It is hoped that existing THOR and JUPITER missiles established bilaterally in % UK, Turkey and Italy could eventually be assimilated in this A integrated NATO nuclear force. C&fyr* THE PRESENT CANADIAN POSITION 4* The Canadian Government has accepted: (a) the 1954, 1956 and 1957 NATO decisions on nuclear strategy and weapons referred to in para 1 above, (b) a commitment to supply CF 104 aircraft to Allied Command ^ Europe in a(nuclear^strike/reconnaissance role, and (c) a commitment to supply HONEST JOHN rockets to provide nuclear support to the Canadian Infantry Brigade in Europe. 5« Negotiations with the US Government for the acquisition of nuclear warheads, to arm the CF 104 aircraft and HONEST JOHN rockets now being procured, have not been authorized. 6. Ifliile Canada has undertaken these commitments, she has on the other hand taken a strong stand in favour of international disarmament. In particular, Canada has drawn attention to the dangers attaching to the nuclear arms race. In addition to calling for negotiations aimed at reductions in nuclear arms under appropriate international control and inspection, Canada specifically opposes the resumption of nuclear weapons testing, and is anxious to restrict the spreading of nuclear weapons to countries not now possessing them. CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 7. To date, arrangements to provide nuclear weapons to NATO conform with present US laws and give the US President the main and determining decision as to when the weapons should beTused. At the same time, it is generally accepted that, if time permits, SACEUR has a responsibility to consult all NATO governments through their Council representatives regarding the use of nuclear weapons. NATO control of nuclear warheads in the hands of its forces would involve in effect fifteen possible vetoes over a decision to use them. In addition, the time required to consult the fifteen governments /000977 • 9»/7 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a {'information - 3 - SECRET might involve serious and unacceptable military risks. However, to leave the final decision almost exclusively in the hands of SACEUR would be equally objectionable from the political viewpoint in that the NATO governments would have effectively relinquished to the Supreme Allied Commander the decision to invoke the first use of nuclear weapons. Although the majority of the NATO governments appear to be prepared to live with the present situation for the time being, it is generally recognized that some more acceptable arrangement is desirable in the interests of NATOfs future political cohesion and solidarity. ACTION REQUIRED 8. It is necessary to establish a position for the Canadian delegation to the forthcoming NATO Ministerial Meeting in relation to:: (a) the US proposals outlined in para 3 above, and (b) the acquisition of nuclear warheads for the CF 104 aircraft and HONEST JOHNi rockets committed to Allied Gomraand Europe. DISCUSSION 9« For the purpose of establishing the Canadian position, the military requirements for tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear mid-range ballistic missiles may be assumed to be valid, subject to normal scrutiny and study* 10» The Canadian position on disarmament inevitably comes into conflict with Canada's position as a member of NATO which is committed to nuclear strategy. On the one hand, there is our national desire to pursue disarmament unfettered by the commitments we have made to NATO. On the other hand, this places in doubt our position as a full partner in NATO which provides the collective defence alliance vital to our national security in the absence of effective disarmament. The issue clearly lies between the independent national pursuit of disarmament and the collective pursuit of security within NATO* Failure to resolve this conflict, as it affects Canada and the other smaller NATO powers, can only lead to both inhibited disarmament efforts and a weakened defence alliance, .../4 000978 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a {'information - 4 11. SECRET The solution lies iri a collective approach to both disarmament and defence, the objectives of which are basically the same. The one cannot be pursued unilaterally and the other collectively without impairing both. Consequently, Canada should press within NATO for a more vigorous collective approach to disarmament in order to avoid the erosion of the strength of the alliance by unilateral national disarmament activities. Effective disarmament negotiations must be conducted from a position of strength, and an effective NATO collective defence alliance provides Canada and the Western nations with that position. NATO should be made to realize that only by setting up the machinery to pursue disarmament on a coordinated basis, rather than from the individual viewpoints of the member nations, can the coherence of the alliance be maintained and perhaps strengthened, in the interests of both disarmament and collective defence. 12• The anticipated US proposal for integrated NATO control of nuclear weapons offers a novel method of restricting the unilateral spread of nuclear weapons while at the same time meeting the requirements of NATO European countries for a nuclear deterrent force under NATO control. It could result in the eventual renouncement by France and the UK of their need for independent nuclear deterrent forces. To this extent, the US proposal meets NATO political and military requirements and is consistent with Canadian wishes to prevent the unilateral spread of nuclear weapons. 13* The authorized procurement by Canadian forces of the CF 104 aircraft and the HONEST JOHN rocket presupposes the acquisition of nuclear warheads to arm these nuclear carriers. To do otherwise would result in redundancy of these carriers with consequent political embarrassment — both international and domestic. PROPOSED POSITION 14* It is recommended that Canada: (a) pursue vigorously within NATO a collective approach to defence and disarmament, both of which have the common objective of ensuring our national security, <J\nJLo<J-*Jn-*-' k> t*r—>-Z-JU s7J^-ritJ^JiX7i^y~Q^* (b) support the anticipated US proposal for an integrated NATO deterrent missile force based in Europe, i<^AA^' kt^Jh v*Xtw^ \ [ ^° 'uvuw- AJZT \b~r ? p*"—-v wj-^Ytir rX~A~-J&^Az*J7j 000979 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a {'information ' - 5 - SECRET (c) support the concept of integrated NATO control of nuclear weapons, and (d) reaffirm her intention to honour her NATO commitments, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons for the CF 104 and HONEST JOHN rockets, unless there is substantial and timely progress in the field of disarmament, and subject to the negotiation of acceptable measures for control of the use of these weapons* 000980 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW02473 Title A name given to the resource Outline Paper (With Comments) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource n.d. 1960 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived �NATO - Stockpiling of atomic weapons in NATO countries,� RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5958, 50219-AL-1-40, pt. 2.2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource atomic cooperation, NATO, nuclear weapons Description An account of the resource Nuclear Weapons for NATO Forces Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en