https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a970201953add226c5abd5780eeb1c73.pdf b0ad88e558497c39e95ade5a8dd658c2 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a {'information BEST AVAILABLE COPY I ^f^Sfo^M^xA c-p^J 1 FM NATOPARIS JUN26/59 SECRET 3-0//T-yt? TO EXTERNAL 1314 OPIMMED INFO WASHDC OPIMMED REF YOUR DL49S TO WASHDC J UN IS 1ftMr rf *£\ NATO ARRANGEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FRENCH POSITION 3 3 6 7 8 to = I CALLED ON MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE.DE LEUSSE,TO DISCUSS THE POSI2BOWJN 1959 OF HIS GOVT ON ATOMIC WEAPONS GENERALLY.I TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE NOW CONSIDERING THE MATTER IN ITS BROADER ASPECTS,THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION MOSTLY AS A RES'JLT OF THE STAND TAKEN BY GEN DE GAULLE ON THE QUESTION OF STOCKPILES,AND THAT WE WOULD APPRECIATE SOME CLARIFICATION PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THE CONTROL ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM,I ENQUIRED WHETHER ANY CONTROL FORMULA WAS NOW BEING CONSIDERED THAT WOULD PROVE SATISFACTORY TO THE FRENCH GOVTo 28DE DEUSSE REPLIED THAT WHILE HE WAS GLAD TO GIVE IE THE VIEWS OF THE FRENCH GOVT ON A PERSONAL BASIS HE COULD NOT RPT NOT SPELL THEM OUT IN COUNCILoON THE WHOLE THEREFORE AT THIS STAGE HE DID NOT RPT NOT THINK IT WOULD BE WISE THAT THE MATTER 3E RAISED IN COUNCIL AND HE BELIEVED THAT M SPAAX HAD NOW REACHED THE SAME CONCLUSION. 3. IN ESSENCE GEN DE GAULLE IS MOT RPT NOT INTERESTED IN ANY OF THE TYPES OF CONTROLS THAT HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT BETWEEN WASHDC ON THE ONE HAND AND ANY ,OTHER NATO COUNTRY,INCLUDING THE UK,ON THE OTHER* HIS INTEREST IS TO OBTAIN A VOICE-WHICH MIGHT AMOUNT TO A VETO-IN THE USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS BY THE USA AND THE UK IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD,MOT RPT NOT ONLY IN THE ATLANTIC AREA BUT ALSO IN FORMOSA, KOREA,OR FOR THAT MATTER THE NORTH POLE,UNTIL THE GENERAL HAS BEEN GIVEN SUCH A VOICE IN THE GLOBAL STRATEGY OF THE USA AND THE UK WE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT EXPECT ANY PROGRESS ON SUCH ISSUES AS THE STOCKPILING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CN FRENCH TERRITORY.ONCE THESE ASSURANCES HAVE BEEN OBTAINED HOWEVER AND MACHINERY HAS BEEN SET UP TO DISCUSS GLOBAL STRATEGY THEN THE SITUATION WOULD BE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT AND THE FRENCH GOVT WOULD SEE NO RPT NO OBJECTION IF THE 001042 c0o 2 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information •> **•BEST AVAILABLE COPY PAGE TWO 1314 AMERICANS WERE T0"RE?AIN TTE ONLY KEY TO THE FR 6ID,'./ IE IN ORDER TO DUST THE WARHEADS STOCKPILED IN FRANCE",THE C O N T R O L S SEEN BY THE FRENCH,WOULD BE AT A HIGHER LEVAL AND CW A TRIPARTITE B A S I S , 4.I ENQUIRED OF DE LEUSSE VHETHER THE MACHINERY THEY IAD IN MIND WOULD BE WITHIN THE NATO ORGANIZATION OR CUTL'IDL OF I * ALTOGETHER, HE REPLIED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RPT NO. DIRECT RTLAT CONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO,NOR RPT NOR FOR THAT MATTER WOULD IT DE NECESSARY TO SET UP ANY NEW TRIPARTITE MACHINERY.HE THOUGHT TKA-* DISCUSSIONS COULD CONTINUE TO BE HELD AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL \t) WASHDC.I REJOINED BY SAYING THAT THIS WOULD BE BY-PASSIN3 MATO ALTOGETHER AND THAT WERE THE FRENCH TO MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION USELESS TO THINK THAT THE PROBLEM COULD BE SOLVT.D I F J ? WAS RATHER .'RYIHG TO REACH"AN ATLANTIC SOLUTION". 5 . 1 THEN POINTED OUT THAT FOR A COUNTRY LIKE CDA OUR IAIN CONCERN WAS NATURALLY TO TRY AND DEVELOP AS SATISFACTORY A HA-TO SOLUTION TO THAT PROBLEM AS POSSIBLE AND THAT THE FRENCH VIEWS WERE SO D I F F ERENT THAT I T WOULD SEEM QUITE USELESS TO TRY AND RECONCILE THEM. I ADDED THAT SPEAKING PERSONALLY I THOUGHT THERE WAS 30CM FOR CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT WITHIN THE NATO CONTEXT SINC2 I T WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE A NATO PATTERN EMERGING FROM THE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS NOW BEING REACHED BETWEEN WASHDC AND OTHE-1 NATO COUNTRIES. I ALSO SAID THAT POSSIBLY THE FRENCH THESIS WOULD P R O ' S MORE ACCEPTABLE I F INSTEAD OF INSISTING ON BEING CONSULTED ON ALI ATOMIC ISSUES THEY WOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE EUROPEAN THEATRE AND POSSIBLY IN NORTHAFRICA.DE LEUSSE REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD NOT ?PT NOT PROVE SATISFACTORY TO GEN DE GAULLE. 6.WE THEN SPECULATED AS TO WHETHER PROGRESS MIGHT BE JADE IN TRYING TO REACH A MORE COORDINATED ATLANTIC POLICY I F A DISTINCTIOr WERE MADE BETWEEN IRBMS AND STRATEGIC WEAPONS GENERALLY ON THE ONE HAND, AND TACTICAL ATOMIC WEAPONS ON TH OTHER.POSSIBLY THE -OKMER TYPES OF WEAPONS COULD FALL IN THE CONCEPT OF GLOBAL STRATEGY WHILE A NATO FORMULA MIGHT BE DEVISED FOR THE LATTER.DE LSUSSI DID NOT RPT �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act * Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a {'informatio BEST AVAILABLE COPY PAGE THREE 1314 NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS DISTINCTION WOULD MEET WITH THE GENERAL'S APPROVAL. 7.AT ONE POINT DURING THE CONVERSATION' DE LEUSSE SAID THAT HE FULLY REALIZED THAT THE ATTITUDE TAKEN BY GEN DE GAULLE ON THE STOCKPILING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS ON FRENCH TERRITORY AS WELL AS OTHER DECISIONS RELATED TO INFRASTRUCTURE ASPECTS OF IRMB'S WERE BOUND TO BE IRRITATING TO MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE.HE HOPED HOWEVER THAT ENOUGH PROGRESS COULD BE MADE IN THE TRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS NOWGOING ON IN"WASHDC FOR THE MORE GENERAL ISSUE TO BE SOLVED IN THE NOT RPT NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE.ACCORDING TO HIS INFO THE STATE DEPT HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT MORE FORTHCOMING DURING THE LAST FEW WEEKS * AND THE PRESS IN THE USA WAS SHOWING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE FRENCH POINT OF VIEW.THE PENTAGON. WAS STILL STUBBORN HOWEVER AND HE DID NOT RPT NOT KNOW WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR PRSSa EISENHOWER IN THE END TO FORCE THE HAND OF HIS MILITARY ADVISERS. IN ACY EVENT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE PROBLEM BE THRASHED OUT AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL AND THAT THERE BE A MEETING BETWEEN EISENHOWER AND GEN DE GAULLE IN THE NOT RPT NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE.THIS COULD BE EITHER IMMEDIATLY PRECEDING OR PARALLEL WITH A SUMMIT MEETING OR,FAILING THIS,NOT RPT NOT TOO LATE IN THE FALL. 8.IT IS DIFFICULT TO SPECULATE ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS IN WASHDC BUT I SHOULD THINK THAT IT IS LIKELY GEN DE GAULLE WILL STICK TO HIS PRESENT POSITION ABOUT STOCKPILING,AT LEAST UNTIL HE MEETS WITH EISENHOWER AND IITHEREFORE WONDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE FRUITFUL TO FORCE THE ISSUE BEFORE THAT TIME AND INSIST THAT THERE BE A FULL-FLEDGED DISCUSSION IN COUNCIL. THIS SHOULD NOT RPT NOT PREVENT US HOWEVER AND SOME OF OUR PARTNERS BILATERALLY TO CLEAR OUR OWN WINDS-NOT RPT NOT ONLY ON THE MAIM ISSUE RAISED BY THE SETTING UP OF A POSSIBLE "ATOMIC TRIUMVIRATE"BUT ALSO ON THE RELATED AND STILL IMPORTANT ISSUE OF THE ATOMIC POLICY OF NATO.IF THE GENERAL FAILS IN HIS ENDEAVOUR TO CREATE AN ...4 001044 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information BEST AVAILABLE COPY PAGE FOUR 1314 "ATOMIC TRIUMVIRATE",THE ALLIANCE WILL BE FACED WI~4 A FIRST CLASS CRISIS? I F HE WINS HIS P0"NT IT I S LIKELY THAT THT '.» ;DLE FRAMEWORK OF NATO,POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY,WILL HAVZ BEEN WEAKENED CONSIDERABLY LEGER0 001045 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW02444 Title A name given to the resource NATOParis to External 1314 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 26-Jun-59 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived �NATO - Stockpiling of atomic weapons in NATO countries,� RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5958, 50219-AL-1-40, pt. 2.2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource atomic cooperation, NATO, nuclear weapons Description An account of the resource NATO Arrangements for Nuclear Weapons - French Position Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en