https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/95e4abe997026c1f863563280055ecd2.pdf 38709d0b100839e2d0a0f50ef7133d4f PDF Text Text nformation·Act - Doc D~ ' - .... P>-W u;fflU~Rllt~m:ri.J n c+ ..... t?<>·~ _.,,.~ SOC) n TOP SECRET Economic Division. A.F.W. Plumptre/eck~. /J b9-D·"-/~ _ \ai1 I~ December 12, 1950. _ 1 MEMORANDIDI ~- V BEID: r,~!SR.4!Jfl) 1l ... Ri}J!Jil .DStJ]fl£r ~=-~:::~::::~~-~:::~: A SfCil£r . I have read with the greatest interest your two papers on the international crisis. You invite my comments.<ff.I am in very full agreement with the 8 points which come at tlie end of the first memorandum (paragraph 15 to 22). 2. I am not quite so happy about the general analysis and argument leading up to these points. To begin with - and this is purely formal I find myself feeling that Toynbee's analysis of uche.llilenge and Response" is a little artificial; perhaps this is because your analysis is of necessity so very brief. My worries seem to centre on the word "inadequate" which appears so frequently. In what sense for instance was the Marshall Plan inadequate? In a sense it has proved to be not only adequate but extremely successful; the economic reconstruction of Europe has been phenomenal. It does not seem to me fair to say that the loss of Czechoslovakia proved the· Marshall Plan inadequate nor does it seem quite fair to criticize the length of time taken to put it into effect; a plan that was put into effect hastily would have been far more open to cha,i'ges of American imperialism and probably less effective both economically and (in a limited sense) politically. 3. Of course the Marshall Plan was devised for Europe and not the Far East. It was an economic plan and not a military plan 1but the use of the word''inadequate'' does not seem to descrioe it although it may well describe the overall policy of which the Marshall Plan was a successfu.l part. • • • 2 000425 �a- . Document disclosed under the Access to tnformatio Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information .. _ - 2 - :...,,,, 4. The real inadequacies of the pre-Korea period were, I think, insufficient attention to the Far . East and insufficient maintenance of military power in the "" rs"'"'<~ - West. I am not sure that your analysis really emphasize~ J these two points sufficiently. 5. Turning to your second paper I find myself again in very full agreement. There are one or two comments, however, that may be worth making. 6. I was most interested in your bold suggestion {paragraph 6) that the medium-term N•.A.T. plan should be completed in 1952 instead of 1954. 'No doubt both the military people and the economic people will say this is impossible and perhaps it is. However, this sort of bold suggestion is probably the right way to get people to set their sights substantially higher. In paragraphs 8 to 11 you sketch a series of meetings at which the bold proposals should be put forward. This is desirable but it carries the danger that people will be deluded into thinking that,merely by . means of meetings, actual mobilizatj.on is being brought about. In paragraph 14 you say that democratic nations (I think you mean democratic governments) should make clear their war aims and build up morale at home and abroad. I have a feeling, however, that you have jumped over one or two essential steps•. Perhaps you are concerned about motes in the eyes of people abroad without worrying about the beams in certain eyes at home. l 7. I have been constantly impressed during recent weeks by the gulf which seems to separate our Department and senior officials in National Defence and the Forces from the'rest of the people in Ottawa, Ministers and officials alike. Ari even greater gulf probably separates the bulk of senior officials in Ottawa from members and leaders of the public. Despite war news and war headlines in the papers since last June I do not get a feeling that Ottawa in partifular or Canada in general is possessed of the dangers of the present situation. / / 8. I do not me.an that your proposals regarding international discussions should be left undone but I think that the~ 'may be things that ought to be done at home$ 1 ( /29/< ... /~' //0{/?/V/~ ~/p,:f '~~? /~ / ~f? /:.7'. ~' ~•2::,_ � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Warm War / 12 DECEMBER 1950 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1950-12-12 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00082 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Memorandum to Mr. Reid, "The International Crisis," 12 Dec. 1950, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4758, file no. 50069-D-40, part 1. Arthur Plumptre economic division International Crisis Reid