https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/31419240371ec503e920394322a68240.pdf 49a593e293d08fc4a1e130ca8aa8176b PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act DocuE':iteui'aitt'rtu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information FILE COPY ire @@r:J~,~~DEfiJ ro bUJq;i 1 1JSEC&ln · Letter No ....... ·.: ...... ·............... Dooomber 111 19~. Date ................................... . OTTAWA FILE No. -~~.6. 9..~.D.-:"'.~~ '-'' SECURITY ~--u CLASSIFICATION . i .FROM: THE UNDER- SECRET•ARY OF S'11ATE.FOR EXTERNAL AFF·AI HS, TO: HEADS OF MISSION LISTED BELOW Reference: .... -................................... . SubJect: ... CANADA ·........................................... crisis 8'18lq out ?f ·the doteat u.n.intoir-nat1ofMll ·lerooe -lB· Korotb· .......... ·,....................................... i~ . ot th$ . No. of Fil.closures . a 4. I now attach tot' ,our conf1dentln11Dtormnt1on tffl'> .ot the popes which tvoro·proac:u1led to tb& Uin1s ta on Doconber ,. 'fbaoe are by the Dep11ty Under-s0oretar7 and arc dnto4 1>oCG£1ber 8. fha first is ont.l.tled ttfl» Post File No..•.••..•.....•• 1ntornat1onG1 or-J.sls t sQi:lebaaio consldoratioaa• and tbe oecond le ent1tlec.l ~he aoroat in rc.o:r-oa,so:no nqsestions on bow tbo domoCJtaoioam:lnnt rospond ln tloo to tho chnUerase 11• 1. Tho views expressed 1h th.Goetwo t10120rand:a, as the other mei:ioranda g1von to the tltnistor on Pooe1:1bel"9, are not final ,rtew1 by CU'.11' mtu.msno:r ore tb.e7 the con1n oertod viowa ot tho Dopartaout, 000428 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information •2• 6., Tb, VletnJ expressed 1n those two 0000rmuta snoul.4 be troato4: aith great aecroqy,. . 11011otlld neloome 10ur oommontson thane · v1owo tU:14,our. sQG:gestiona tor royiaioa of the · momoi-anda1t 1t 1c aonsidored '1100 to re-nt1btd.t them later to the U1n1ate:r 1n rov1aed form. 7• - . I I 000429 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information 9 :'i,~.,,;~TM1!;;~ ..O '1' ',A , ·---.. EXTERNAL ..,-; AFFAIRS CANADA TOP SECRET THE Some Basic Considerations lo During the three and a half years between the spring of 1947 and the autumn of 1950 0 the democratic world was subjeoted to four major shooks or disasterso Each shock or disaster constituted a challenge; and each challenge brought forth a response. Each response in turn was demonstrated by subsequent events to have been inadequate. It was either too li_t.tle or came too late. 2o The defeat in Korea is the fifth major shook or disaster in this series. If the response -to the challenge of this disaster is likewise inadequate~ the result may be defeat in a third world waro \ First challenge and response 3. The first disaster was the bleak winter of 1946-47 in Europe which weakened an economy already debilitated by the war. The response to this challenge was the Marshall Plan. It was conceived :f.n June, 1947, but was not brought to birth till twelve months latero Second challenge and response •4o The inadequacy of the Marshall Plan was demonstrated by the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in February, 19480 The response was the North Atlantic Treatyo It was conceived in March, 1948, but did not come into effect until August, l949Q The period of gestation was seventeen monthso 5o Under the North Atlantic Treaty, the Atlantia powers began slowly to increase their military forces and their capacity for combined actiono Third challenge and response 60 The inadequacy of the combination ot Marshall Plan and North Atlantic Treaty was demonstrated by the crumbling of the Nationalist regime in China during 1949~ culminating in the establishment on October 1 of a central Communist government for China. The Western powers were shocked to discover that while they had been holding the line against Russian expansion in Europe, the totalitarian communist bloc had secured mastery over the four hundred million people of China and was pressing against IndoChina » Malaya, Indonesia» and the rest of South-East Asia, thereby endangering the security of the whole Western world. 000430 �, . Document disclosed under the Access to tnJ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acce .,. - 2 - 7o After waiting for some of the dust to settle, the Western powers began early in 1950 to re-examine their policies in Asia in an effort to discover what they could usefully do to contain totalitarian communismin Asiao One such re-examination was made at the Colombo meeting of CommonweaithForeign Ministers in January, 1g500 Another re-examination took place in Washingtono So The result by the spring of 1950 was general aoceptanoe in principle by the Western demooraoies of the thesis: ("a) that their safety would be gravely endangered by the further spread of Chinese or Russian communismin South and South~East Asia; (b) that to prevent such an advance the West must ally itself with the dominant local forces of national liberation and social reform; and (c) that the West must in its own interests give more economic assistance to South and South-East Asiao The Colombo Plan was conceived in Ceylon in January» 1960 5 but eleven months later it was still 'in process of gestationo Fourth challenge and response 9o The Colombo Plan and other similar plans for South and South-East Asia were based on the same philosophy as the Marshall Plan for Europe: in order to strengthen weak national societies against the virus of communism, it was necessary to strengthen their economieso Before the Marshall Plan came into effectp the Cominform seizure of power in Czechoslovakia demonstrated that it was inadequateo Similarly before the Colombo and other similar plans oame into effeot, the Cominform attack on Korea demonstrated that they were likewise inadequate responses to the challenge posed by the victory of oo.rrmunismin China, even though they were buttressed by the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty. · 10. The respo~se to the challenge of the invasion of Korea on June 25, 1950 was two-fold: in the first place, the North Atlantic powers doubled their estimates of defence expenditures, and pressed on more vigorously with the task of co-ordinating their defence efforts and their armed forces. In the second place, the North Atlantic powers took the first steps to organize the General Assembly of the United Nations as an agency for rallying and organizing the whole democratic world against Cominform aggression. Fifth challenge: the defeat in Korea 11. The defeat in Korea has demonstrated the inadequacy of all the previous responses. They have been proved to be either too little or to have come too lateo Fifth response , l2o The question now is: In the light of the proved inadequacy of past responses, what response is the democratic world now to make to the latest and gravest challenge? The previous challenges have suooeeded eaoh other at briefer and briefer intervals. The next challenge may be ·made soon; if the response to it is as inadequate as the responses to previous challenges the result may be defeat in war. 000431 �Document disclosed under the Access to tnJ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acce ,t • - 3 - Not only were the previous responses inadequate but the interval between the conception of a response and its birth was in retrospect unduly long: twelve months for the Marshall Plan, seventeen months for the North Atlantic Treaty. The march of events is now so fast that we cannot safely contemplate this kind of delayo If the response to the defeat in Korea is to be effective it must be immediate. 130 The following are some of the considerations which seem to be important in determining what the response of the democratic world ,should be to the challenge posed by the defeat in Korea. In general the considerations are those whj.ch would naturally be taken into account in framing policy in war. Much of our present difficulty and danger has its source in our inability to act as if the thi.rd world war had broken out • : 140 15. First. The new response must be based on global considerations - political, economic, military and moral. We must keep the whole world in view and see the world as a whole. The Russians can strike at any point on the circumference of their empire. We must therefore plan a global strategy for a global war, which is no longer cold, not yet hot, but which is warm, and which is being waged around the world in the borderlands between the Russian empire and the democratic world, wherever the frontiers of the two worlds touch or border on a buffer zone o 160 Second, In framing the global strategy for the warm war, we must weigh carefully against each other the competing claims on limited resources from the various sections or the frontier between the two worlds - Western Europe, Middle East, the Indian sub-continent, South-East Asia, the Far East, North America. 17. Third. We must take immediate and adequate steps to inorease the resources available to us both for the immediate defence of the frontier and to hold in reserve. Half measures will be worse than useless: they will constitute a heavy burden on our economies but they will not give us any tolerable degree of security. Fourth, We must take into acoount all the relevant faotors: the military, especially beoause a third world war may be upon us in a few weeks or a few months; the economic, because we may be in for a long period of warm war or hot war and, unless the war oomes soon and we are defeated quickly, economic strength is essential; the political because we need to increase the number of our allies and our alliance potential; the moral because we.need the full support or public opinion within the allianoe, among potential allies and in the buffer zones, and we need to create as large a fifth column as possible within the empire of our enemies - Russia and its satellites. 180 1g. Fifth. We must balance longer-term against shorterterm considerationso This also is a problem always present in war: thus in the last war the United Kingdom had to balance the short-run advantage of throwing its . home air force into the defence of France or holding it in reserve for a later defence of Britain if France tell; ministries of munitions had to decide whether to concentrate on getting maximumproduction in the next twelve months or maximum production over a three-year period 000432 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 4 = even though this monthso meant less production in the first twelve 200 Sixtho Since we are weak now in relation to the Russian empire we must play for time in which to get relatively stronger and we must use that time for all it is worth to get stronger as rapidly as possible - stronger politically, militarily» economically and morallyo 210 Seventh. We must bear constantly in mind that an alliance is a precarious creation: it has almost to be created anew every day. It can only continue to be strong and to increase in strength if all its members realize how fragile a thing it is; if they defer to the sensi ti vi ties of their fellow allies; if they bear their . fair share of the commonburden willingly and without complaint; if each member from the strongest to the weakest realizes that it is seldom, if ever, wise for him to s,eoure the reluctant acquiescence of his allies .fn the whole programme of action which he has put forward; that an alliance needs leadership but that its motto must always be consiliation and compromise. 220 Eiihth. We must constantly remember that warm .wars ii e liot wars a re merely .a means to an end o The purpose of waging war is not to win the war but to attain certain objectives. •The objective of the present warm war is not the subjugation of the Cominform empire or i.ts unconditional surrender but the creation of a world in which the Cominform empire and the free democracies can live side by side in peace - not peace without friction but peace without the ~hreat of waro (Sgd.) Escott Reid 000433 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information 1-.Q P EXTERNAL S E CRE T AFFAIRS CANADA December 8, 1950 m .... n...E,...FEA......,.. .... T ....IN_._..,KO ....REA..........., Some suggestions on how the democracies might respo~d in time to the ohallengeo lo Recent events in Korea have demonstrated that Russia and China are now prepared to run grave risks of precipitating a third world waro rt is possible that these two powers have by now decided to precipitate that war during the next twelve monthso The effect of Western rearmament will become increasingly important after 1951; ti'me is beginning to be on our side; if therefo,re the Cominform 1·eaders-are convinced that war with the West iS inevitable, they' may well consider that their best opportunity will be in the twelve ·months aheado 2o The defeat in Korea has also demonstrated once again the military weakness of the Western powerso If a third world·war should break out within the next three months or-so, the only strong weapon which the Western powers would possess fs · the atomic weapono Even a successful U$e of. 'the atomic weapon would not prevent Russia and its allies from occupying within three months all of continent.al Europe t_o the. Pyrenees and the whole of South-East Asia» and after' another thr_ee months or so, the whole of the Middle Easto 3o Much of this information is by now public property both in the West and in the bomintorm worldo The grave risk· of war in 1951 has· been str'essed publicly by spokesmen tor various governments; in Canada by Mro Pear~o'ri in his address to the federal-l?rovincial conference on December 4o The present situation is therefore comparaQle to that after Dunkerque in June 19400 The answer·at that time was total mobilization in the Commonwealth and partial mobilization in the United Stateso "The motto was: time is ot the essence of the problemo ' 4o 5o We are now t~ying to buy time by making a deal with the Chinese .Communists and probably by re-opening negotiations with Russia through the four-power Council of 1oreign Ministerso This time will be bought at the expense of sacrifices ot prestige and of compromises with prinoipleso These sacrifioes will be made in vain if the time is not wisely spento Moreover, if the time is not wisely spent, the consequence may be the conquest by R.ussia of a ruined Western worldo Not to spend the time wisely would therefore be an unforgivable sino 60 T,b.epresent date set for the accomplishment of the North Atlantic. medium-tar& plf41 is July l 8 l954q Even the accomplishment of this plan will give us no guarantee 000434 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ... .. ,·. .; = 2 = that Russia could not defeat us in war~ Because of the urgency of the present, situation» it would seem wise to change the date for the accomplishment of the plan.from July 1, .1954, to July 1, 1952 o 7o In a hot third world war, at least five out of every ten members of the working force would be engaged on war work either as members of the armed forces or in armaments productiono During the cold war less than one in ten has been engaged in cold war work in the Atlantic countrieso The appropriate figure for the present warm war would probably be about half way between these figures, that is, three men in.ten~ Setting the _date of July 1, 1g52, for the accomplishment of.the medium-term plan would probably require a semi-mobilization. of this .order of magnitudeo In order to save time, proposals along these lines should be referred as quickly as possible to the Nor·th . Atlantic Council Deputies and they should, in consultation with the appropriate military bodies,· have a report ready for the Couno_il when it meets at thEf E3nd· of this month or early .in January o Pending consideration by the Councils ~aoh North Atlantic country should take immediate· ~teps to increase its defence·forces and its production of armaments • · So 9. Similar proposals should likewise be put before the CommonwealthPrime Ministers at their meeting in London on January 4o . . .. 10, and or should States Following the meetings of the North Atlantic Council the oonunonwealthPrime Ministers, the United States oall a meeting of the Organization of American 1n order to try to secure from the Latin Amer1oan republics the utmost possible assistance 1n the task ot preparing the demooratic world against the possibility ot a world war 1n 1951, ll, Similarly the North Atlantic powers wh1oh are members of the Council ot Europe should call a special meeting of the qouncil in order to try to bring in SWeden, Ireland, Switzerland, Greeoe and Turkey, Yugoslavia should also be invited to this meeting and possibly Israel and the members of the Arab League. This series of meetings should be followed by meetings of the Oolleotive Measures, Committee of the General Assembly of the U,No in an effort to rally and organize the ·whole of the democratic membership of the U,No against the imminent threat of war•. The Committee should prepare recommendations to be presented to the General Assembly in Maroh, 1951. Maroh may be a partioularly dangerous month and it might be wise to have the Assembly in session at that time. 1·2.. 13, At the same time as ~hese preparations are going forwardp a renewed effort should be made ('a) to bring into effeotive operation the various plans for eoonomio assistance to under-developed countriesp especially the ColomboPlan, (b) to relieve the plight of the Arab refugees, thus diminishing a source of friction in the 000435 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information . ,,'. = 3 = Middle East and (o) to remove all the major sources friction between India and Pak:istano 9 of 140 In order to secure the utmost moral support for their cause 9 the democratic nations should also make clear their warm=war aimso They should do their best to convince their own people and as many people as possible in the Cominform empire that the warm war has been forced on them 9 that they consider the warm war not as an end in itself but as a means to an ends and that that end is not the subjugation of the Cominform empire or its unconditional surrender but the creation of a world in which the Cominform empire and the free democracies can live side by side in peace - not peace without friction but peace without the threat of waro 150 It is not only a matter of warm-war aims but also of aims ln peace and in waro It is necessary to form a strong anti-0om.inform world alliance but this alliance cannot safely be based on mere negationo It must be protestant in that it protests and repudiates the abhorrent doctrines and practices of the Cominform empireo It must be catholic in that it re-affirms its living faith in the beliefs, the virtues 9 the values of the great civilizations of which we are heirs and defenders-~ Western Christendom 9 Orthodox Christendom~ Islam, Hinduisms Buddhism~ Confucianism and Taoismo . Escott Reid 000436 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Warm War / 11 DECEMBER 1950 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1950-12-11 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00081 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Heads of Mission, "The international crisis arising out of the defeat of the U.N. forces in Korea," 11 Dec. 1950, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4758, file no. 50069-D-40, part 1. Korean War Reid UN forces