https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/49a649e776339832f8d08411fe2921bc.pdf 11ae242bfca80027bc92a438c1e49d0a PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the 15'Jii~ t'ciInformation Act D\ment divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information E. Reid/mp TOP SECRET f December 8, 1950 The International 2 Crisis In order to try to clear my own mind on some of the problems which are likely to emerge as the result of the defeat of the United Nations forces in Korea,! have hastily prepared two memoranda of today's date. I attach a copy of each. The first sets forth some basic considerations. The second sets forth some suggestions on how the democracies might respond in time to the challenge imposed by the defeat in Korea. The first might, after revision, a public speech by the Prime Minister provide a basis or the Minister. for A third memorandum is being prepared in the Department on some of the more immediate questions of policy. I should~ two attached papers appreciate your comments on the and your suggestions for revision. E. R. c.c.l. E.R. •. Mr. Heeney o.Mr~Norman Robertson *Mr:; Pickersgill 6.Mr. Ritchie 14.:Mr. Le Pan -,.Mr. MacKay <iMr. E.H. Norman q_Mr. Flu.mitre 1 o spare .t' 000437 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information JI.Reid/a SECRET ! 0 p ., DRAFT .SOB BA.BIOOOJfSIDERATIOl'S 1. During the three a halt &nd years between the •pring ot 1947 and the autumn of 1950, the democra~io world was aubj·eoted to tour major shocks or disasters. or disaster demonstrated It •• a. a response. forth brought too little The deteat Pirat 3. The to have_ been inadequate. major ahock or It the response le likelfiee inadequate, t.o the ohallenge the result m1t7 world war. in a third challenge 1n turn was or came too late. series. · ot th1e disaster be defeat events in Korea is the fifth in this and each challenge Ea.ch response by subsequent either disaster a challenge; constituted Each shock and response disaster first was the bleak winter of 1946...47 in Europe which weakened an economy already debilitated the war• The response to birth till twelve months later. Second challenge by to th1a cbJi.llenge was the Kar shall .It was conoeived 1n June, ~947, but was not brought Plan. 4. by and response The !nadequ•cy ot this larsha 11 Plan was demons tra. ted the Communist seizure ot power in Czechoalovakia in P~bruary, 1948. It n.e conceived etteot until '?he response in Jlarch, Aug11.st, 1949. was the Borth Atlantic 1948, but did not come into The period ot gestation••• seventeen months. • ••• .a Treaty. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 2 - ; .. Under the· North Atlantic began slowly to increase capacity Treaty, their the Atlantic military forces powers and their for combined action. Third challenge and response The inadequacy of the combination 6. of :Marshall Plan and North Atlantic Treaty was demonstrated of the Nationalist regime in China during 1949, clllminating on October l of a central in the establishment government tor China. to discover against by the crumbling Communist The Western powers were snocked that while they had been holding Russian expansion the line in Europe, the totalitarian communist bloc had secured mastery over the four hundred million china, people of China and was pressing Malaya, Indonesia thereby 7. endangering and the rest the security Alter waiting in Asia in an effort in 1950 to re-examine further by by their.safety would be gravely acceptance of the thesis: endangered by the spread of Chinese or Russian communism in South of µational i in January 1950. Another the Western democracies the West must ally / policies One such the spring of 1950 was general and _South-East Asia; (b) that /· their took place in Washington. The result (a) that the was made at the Colombo meeting of re-examination in principle Asia, what they could usefully communism in Asia. Commonwealth Foreign Ministers 8. of South-East of the whole Western world. to discover totalitarian re-examination Indo- for some of the dust to settle, Western powers began early do to contain against itself liberation to prevent such an advance with the dominant local and social reform; forces and (c) that •• 3 I I I 000439 \ �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 3 - the West ·must .in 1 t,. own· interests give· more economic aseis:tance. Asia. Plan ·•• to :South end. South-Eaat conoe1 ved 1n Ceylon in January, months l&ter Fourth 9. it was at1ll in process The. Colombo 1950, but eleven of gestation. ·cb.UleMt.and_responso . The Oolotnbo ·Pl.an-and other sild.lar plans t_or 8011th and aou th-Eaist Asia were baaed on the same philosophy •• the a&xtshall' Plan tor Europe, . in order weak national it wasnecess~J the :larsha11 to: strengthen .Plan cGe into economies. the1r eff'ect, Similarly s1m1;t.ar plans responses that 1 t wa.s. the Colombo and othe~ before ef:t:~et,, the Cominform attack on ca.me into ltorea demonstrated Before . the Ccmintorm seµsure ot. ,power 1n Caechoaloveld a delll()nstr•ted inadequate. or communism, again, t the virus -societies to strengthen that they 'Wt;t:tte likel't!fSe inadequate to. the challenge posecl by the victpry of, communism in China, .even though th~y were. buttressed the 1l&rsba.ll Plan md the Borth Atlantic 10. · The response to .the che.llenge Xore• on June 15, 1950_-,aa two~toldt detenee· expenditures., w1th the t'a sk their o:t the invas;ion of 1n the first place, an.d pressed ot on .more v1gorouly ot co-ordina t1ng ·their detenoe efforts and tn the aeeQnd p1-.ce., the Worth armed. forces. Atlantic Treaty. powers doubled tll,e1r ~st1mates the Borth Atlantic by powers took the .first to organise steps . the .. .General Aaaembly of the lTn1ted Jrat1ona •• an agency tor rallying ani organizing the whole democratic world &S$,1nat Oominfornt. aggression. P1tth challenge\ 11.. ~he defeat &11 of/the previous the defS!&t in Xorea _. in Eorea ht\a. d$lllonstrated responses. the S.nadequacy They- hav~ been proved to be •••• 4 000440 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 4 - . I either or to have come too late. too little t P1tth response ia. now 1a't The question In the light inadequacy ot past responses, world now to ake The previous the responses am gravest challenge! have s'ucceeded each other challenges be made aoon; it 1• the democr•tic what response to the latest and briefer brietez- of the proved intervals. The next challenge the response to previous at ma7 to 1t 1• a.a inadequate challenges a.s the reaul t ma7 be deteat 1n war. lot only were the previous 13. but the interval its between the conception Atlantic Plan, 1eventeen and twel-ve months monthe tor -.the Borth The, march of events ia now lo c,ast that Treaty. we cannot aately this contemplate kind or d~lq. If the to th& defeat in Korea ia to be eftective•it response be immediate. 14. The following aeem to be important the democratic are aome policy the cona1derat1ons world should be to the ch&llenge In general those which would naturally framing or in war. posed by the considerations be taken into.-- account •ueh of our present di:t'ticulty and danger has 1 ta source in our inability the third which 1n detel"Dl1n1ng what the reaponae of 1n Jtorea. the defeat 15. inadequate ot a response waa in :r:-etroapect unduly long\ birth tor the •arshall mst reaponses are in to act aa it world war had broken out. First. The new response considerations - political, must be based on global economic, military and moral. We must keep the whole world in view and see the world as a whole. The Russians can atrlke at any point on the •••• s 000441 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 5- ot their -circumference strategy a global empire. but which is warl!l,and which is being waged around the world 1n the borderlands ,. . . 6f thlt~ frontiers between the I empire '3-nd the democratic · Russian plan a. global war:. which is no longer for ·cold, not yet· hot, We must therefore world, wherever the worlds touch or border on a buffer zone. 16. Second. In framing the global strategy ·against warm war, we must weigh carefully . the competing claims sections various South-East 17, of the ·frontier between the two worlds - the Indian We ~t to increase sub-continent, North America. Asia, the Far East, Third. each other res·ourc·es from the on limited. \Vestern Europe, Middle East, take immediate and adequate the resources available to hold in reserve. Half measures will be worse than useless: Fourth. ~8,. '> or security. degree We must take into acco~t fa_qtorsa. the military, ; • they will economies but they a heavy burden'on.our ···will not give us any tolet-able • • I all the relevant especially > ' ! because •, '' steps to us both for the immediate defence of the frontier.and constitute for the 1 4 I a third ' , •, world ; , , war may be upon us in .a few weeks or a tew months; the • • •. • ' f ' ', , ·, ' : ' • • ' ec,o:r;iomic,.becam~e we may, be in tor .a long period , ., I , • , , I , { • , , .. warm• war. or hot. war. and, unless •• ' , '• • ,, we are defeated ' I • ' quickly, • ' , ot ., , I the war comes soon and - • economic strength 1s essential; : . the .poli tioal ' because we need : to.-in.orease the number of our·allies and our alliance w~ need the' full. alliance, potentia+f support of public among potent11!3,l allies the .moral because opin:ton w1 thin. the and in the buffer zones, ••• 6 000442 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document d_ivulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 6 ... and we need tQ create within ~s large a f1:t'th column as possible the empire of- our enemies - Russia and its· satellites. · 19. -fifth. We must balance term considerations. present 'in wart longer-term shorter- agains·t This also is a problem always thus in the iast war the United Kingdom had to balance the short-run home air force into the defence of France or holding it in reserve for a later . ministries had to decide whether to concen- maximum.production months or maximumprodµction even though this it France fell; defence of Britain of munitions on getting trate . advantage of throwing its meant less in the next twelve . over_ a three-year production period in the first twelve months. Sixth. 20. weare Since weak now in relation to the Russian empire we must play for time in which to get relatively stronger and we must use that is worth to get stronger politically, an a~liancf We must creations ~s ~-precarious "! realize how fragile sensitivities fair . in· strength if a thing it is; all realizes its to be members if they deter of thei~ fellow allies; to it has almost to the if they bear their share of the common burden. willingly complaint; secure in mind that It can only continue ' strong and to increase - stronger and moral~y~ bearconstantly be createdl anew eveiy·aay. • as possible economically militarily.;-, Seventh. 21. a~ rapidly it time for all and without if each member trom the strongest to the weakest that it is seldom, if ever, wise for him to_ the reluctant acquiescence whole programme· of action an alliance which he has put forward; needs leadership always be conciliation of his allies -in the but that its that motto must and compromise. . ••• 7 000443 j j �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 7- 22. Eighth. wars like remember that warm a means to an end. The 'We- must constantly hot wars are merely purpose of waging war is not to win the war but to attain .. .· objectives. ', certain ' ' war is not. the subjugation unconditional surrender ,/ . of Xhe ~~jectiver~ of the Com1nform ·empire friction of a but the creation ; warm ,or_its world in ' whioh the Comi~orm empire and the free can live ·the present democracies side by side in peaoe - not peace wl tho·ut . . but peace without the threat of war. ' 000444 �· Document disclo ed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgu en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information E.Re1d/RB December a, 19;0. TOPSEGRE! DRAFT THE DEFEATIN lCOREA Some suggestions on how the democracies might respond 1n time to the challen,ae. 1. Recent events in Korea have demonstrated that Russia and China are now prepared to run grave risks of precipitating a third world war. It is that these two powers have by now decided to possible precipitate The effect that war during the next twelve months. of Western rearmament will become increasingly importlnt atter 1951; time 1~ beginning to be on our side; it therefore the Cominform leaders that war with the West 1s inevitable, consider that their best opportunity are convinced they may well will be in the twelve months ahead. The defeat 1n Ko~ea has also demonstrated once again the military . powers. w1thin It a third weakness of the w·estern world war should break out the next three months or so, the only strong weapon which the Western powers would possess is the atomic weapon. Even a successful use of the atomic weapon would not prevent Russia and its allies from occupying within three months all of eontinental Em-ope to the P,renees and after East and the whole ot South/Asia, another three monthS or s:o, the whole ot the W.ddle East. Jluch of this property information 1s by now public both in the West and in the Cominform world. The grave risk ot war in 19,1 has been stressed by s:po,kesmentor various governments; publicly 1n Canada b1 ••• 2 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information r ; Mr. Pearson in his. _address to the federal-provincial conference on December 4. 4. The present situation-is- parable to that answer at that therefore com- a:tter Dunkerque in June 1940. time was total mobilization The in the Commonwealth and partial mobilization States. time 1s ot the essence ot The motto was: in the United the problem. ;. W'e are now trying to buy time by making a deal with the Chinese Communists and probably by reopening negotiations with Rus~ia through the tour- power Council ot Foreign Ministers. be bought at the expense of sacrifices and ot compromises with pr1nc1ples. This time will of prestige These sacrifices will be made in vain it the time is not wisely spent. Moreover• .it the time ~snot wisely spent, the con- sequence may be the conquest py Russia ot a ruined Western world. theretore 6. Not .to spend the time wisely would. be an 'llilforgivable fhe'present of the North Atlantic 195'4. sin. date set tor the accomplishment medium-term plan 1s July Even the accomplishment of this give us no guarantee us in war. situation, 1, plan will that Russia could not defeat Because 0£ the urgency of the present it would seem wise to change the date tor the accomplishment of the plan from July 1, 1954, to July 1, 195'2. • •• 3 000446 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 3 ... .... , ·. In· a hot third world war, at least 7. five out ot every ten members or the working torce be engaged on war work either as members of the armed 1'oroes or 1n armaments production. tha~ one war less tor the present about half During. the cold in ten has been engaged in cold war work. in the Atlantic figure The appropriate countries. warm war would probably be way between these figures, men in ten. would Setting that is, three the date of July 1, 19;2, for the accomplishment of the medium-term plan would. probably require a semi-mobilization of this order of magnitude. 8. In order to save time, proposals these lines should be referred to the North Atlantic 1n consultation along as quick~y as possible Council Deputies with the appropriate and they Should, military bodies, have a report ready for the Council when it meets at the end of this consideration month or early by the aouncil, in January. Pending each North Atlantic country should take immediate steps to increase defence forces 9. and its · Similar production proposals its of armaments. should .li_kewise be put before the Commonwealth Prime Ministers at their meeting in London on January . 4.'' 10. . .Following the meetings ot the North Atlantic Council and of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, United States should call of American States the a meeting of the Organisation in order to try to secure trom the Latin American republics(the utmost possible assistance •• • 4 000447 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 4 - in the task of preparing of a world war in 195'1. the possibility 11. the democratic world against Similarly the North Atlantia powers which are members of the Council of Europe should call special a meeting of the Council in order to try to bring 1n Sweden, Ireland, Turkey. Greece and Switzerland, Yugoslavia should also be invited meeting and possibly Israel to this and the members of the Ar ab League. 12. fhis series of meetings should be followed by meetings of the Collective Measures Committee ot the General Assembly of the U.N. in an effort and organize to rally the whole of the democratic membership of the U.N. against the imminent threat of war. The Committee should prepare recommendations to be presented to the General Assembly in March 195'1. a particularly March may be dangerous month and it might be wise to have the Assembly in session at that time. 13. At the same time as these preparations going forward, a renewed effort bring into effective economic assistance especially the various plans for to under-developed thus diminishing countries, the plight a souroe of 1n the Middle East, and (o) to remove all the major sources of friction Pakistan. should be made ·ca) to the Colombo Plan, (b) to relieve of the Arab refugees, friction operation are between India and ..., 000448 �•• o d under the Acces Document di~ulgue n vertu de la Loi su -,~ ,. 14. In order to secure "' cause, the democratic ,, for their make clear their as possible nations warm-war aims. best to convince their should also They should do their own people and as many people in the Cominform empire that the warmwar on them, that they consider has been forced war not as an end in itself and that the utmost moral sup.port but as a means to an end, that end is not the subjugation Cominform empire or 1ts unconditional the creation of • world the warm of the surrender but in which the Cominform empire and the free demJ,oracies can live peace - not peac;-e without side by side 1n friction but peace without tbrea t of war. It is not only a matter of warm-war aims but also of aims in peace and in war. to form a strong anti-Cominform world alliance this a1i1ance cannot safely empire. values doctrines and practi~es It must be catholic 1 ts living lfa,1 th be based·on in that 1 t protests It mu.st be protestant the abhorrent in that in the belief's, of the great civilizations and defenders:· Christendom, It is necessary Hinduism, mere negation. and repudiates pf the Cominform it r~-attirms the.· virtues, the of whiQh •e are heirs Western Christendom, Islam, but <>rthodox Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism. ... � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Warm War / 8 DECEMBER 1950 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1950-12-08 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00080 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "The International Crisis and The Defeat in Korea," 8 Dec. 1950, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 25, vol. 4758, file no. 50069-D-40, part 1. anti-communist International Crisis Korean War Reid