1 20 6 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/02fbe241fc9235538222bcd7e0d580bd.pdf b2adb9cab9b6d37ee0f61ebc01a09e04 PDF Text Text uSSR^ Document disclosed utittnte Ac&^mlmH^ioif&m.\^ [&cy|»efi&di\tutaue en vertuSlerla Lorstfflatttttrljinformation MESSAGE FORK- F i l e No. % OUTGOING FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEAD OF POST, TO: WASHINGTON Date Message To Be Sent No. AIR CYPHER EN CLAIR CODE CYPHER £££ XX 2 I . - AF" .» Si i L AFF/< AFFAIRS, ffilAL & CANADA ^0rT^s^' :7°: „{._..JfeJ^ For Communications Section Only December 16, 1954 SENT- DEC 16 1954 REFERENCE: My Letter No. D-1483 of December 9, 1954, paragraph 3. SUBJECT: White Paper on the History of Tripartite Co-operation concerning Atomic Energy. Priority ORIGINATOR , (Signature) giving further thought to the proposed White Paper. __. C. Brown Ee suggested that we should not push the Americans (Name Typed) Di- P..L,.(1./Xb. Local Tel Bennett called us to say that he had been on the subject of publication at this time.• He feels that he would not want any action taken which .".509 . . . . APPROVED BY might have an adverse affect on the negotiation of the bilateral agreements now under discussion. (Signature) (Name Typed) Internal Distribution: S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A. Secretary of State for External Affairs AM./IM .. Copies Referred "Yo:S Mr. Bennetty/^ President c/f Atomic Energy .of/Canada, /td. q• nkH 000340 Ext. 97 (Rev. 1/52) ! � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft history / revisions / 16 DECEMBER 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-12-16 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00058 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Secretary of State for External Affairs to Head of Post, Washington, "White Paper on the History of Tripartite Co-operation concerning Atomic Energy," 16 Dec. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 5957, file no. 50219-AF-40, part 1. atomic energy Lester Pearson tripartite https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c0892783335a3559a33c0f57577885eb.pdf 21a77e130664861342540631bb2fbe93 PDF Text Text Defence Liaison (1) £ E H 8 . DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, ^ m CANADA. xcess to Information Act .oi sur I'acces a I'information (FILE COPY) NUMBERED LETTER TO Security:. ^ p . BE0-RE5? The" Cana*d______' Bmbass y, No: Washington,' "l)'."6V" FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR' EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA. Reference 1954. Your' ietter'No'.' 'i'495'of * August' 15', Subject Atomic'Energy: .Dw ... JM &.<y.... %^e^)ecBmtrer • -9,- •19641 • Air^r Surface Mail; Post File No: Ottawa File No. White'Paper on"the History'of Tripartite' Co-operation References / (with oopy of "B" a t t a c h e d ) t ^ e p . t p Cabine !#fes. ,/AECB E P €S . iA.E.of Canlida,Ltd. KG.0LS.{2) #liaii«man,DRB .C.Batemapi {&odm 572, SuA L i f e Bldlg., L -mAF' H6 F> (6 copies of "A" (attached) enclosed with this letter to Washington) Attached are six copies of our suggestions for amendments to the draft paper on Tripartite collaboration in the field of atomic energy. Will you please transmit these suggestions to the appropriate U.S. authorities. You may also wish to give a copy to Sir Roger Makins. Ism. 2. Our suggested amendment No. 16 perhaps requires some explanation. The two reasons given in the draft Montreal)' j, paper for the failure of the Combined Polioy Committee jA'.A to agree on arrangements for "full and effective oooperation" are unsatisfactory, and the simplest method V^ 1 of dealing with them appeared to be to delete them altogether. The first reason - that the Combined Policy Committee was not able to agree on arrangements whloh the United States could regard as consistent with the support of an international control system - is somewhat misleading. In fact, the failure to agree appears to have been caused by the unwillingness of the U.S. to exchange information on industrial "know-how"; in particular, the U.S. did not want to give the U.K. the technical information necessary for the construction of atomic energy plants in the U.K. The second reason, Internal concerning agreements contrary to Article 102 of the Gradation/" £, \A U.N. Charter, is ambiguous. Who would not agree, the SSEA [ZYJIfanol. " Combined Policy Committee or the United States? In any to naejky: t o ^ case, why suggest that any of the three nations might mister) have ignored the U.N. Charter? Info. Div; • Commonwealth M v . 3 > When the question of publication comes up, you American Div. can take the position that the Canadian Government is in D.L.(2) Div. A favour of publication, but does not insist upon it. If r'V it is decided that the paper should be published, the Canadian Government would prefer that this should be done (above w i t h ^ on a Tripartite basis. (The U.S. authorities have already copj/kf "B" agreed to this, as reported in your letter No. 389 of attached) March 2, 1954.) We would wish to release the paper simultaneously with the U.S. and the U.K. If they each publish a separate White Paper, we would probably do Distribution likewise. In any discussion of possible publication to Posts dates, it should be borne in mind that we would require (with encl. a minimum of three weeks to produce a White Paper here »$" attached) after receiving the final text. v#6ndon (2) o * Ext. 181B (Rev. 2/52) • • a • £J 000342 �Document disclosed under the Access to In) Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 - 4. Incidentally, we should appreciate it if the final text which you send us oould Include the Appendices in the form In which they are to be published. We are not sure that we have them all, and we think that the final text should be complete In all respects so that there can be no possibility of a mistake. R.A.MacKftt of State \hUnder-Secretary for External Affairs 000343 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - O Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'&kes a I'information >y. % „/., TOP SECRET C a n a d i a n suggestions f o r amendments to the first draft of the paper entitled "The United States - United Kingdom C a n a d i a n C o l l a b o r a t i o n i n the Field of Atomic Energyo 19IfO-195)+'* Present versions ifft^ik/li'flT il < "From 19^6 t o 191+8 cooperatio n b e t w e e n the three governments i n the field ,of atomic 'energy w a s brought t o a v i r t u a l standstill,, However, b y the' modus" v i v e n d i of January 191+8," cooperation b e t w e e n the three governments wa;s revived I n limited areas consistent w i t h t h e existing legislative authority." Suggested amended versions "From 19^6 t o 1 9 ^ 8 cooperation of the United Kingdom and Canada w i t h the United States i n the field o f atomic energy w a s curtailed, a l t h o u g h cooperatio n b e t w e e n t h e United" Kingdom and Canada continued o n a n intimate and complete b a s i s . By the modus v i v e n d i of January 1 9 ^ 8 , cooperation of the United Kingdom and Canada w i t h the United States w a s revived i n ' limited areas consistent w i t h the existing legislative a u t h o r i t y . " (2) Page 1. footnote 1/ Present versions "Canadian Information Service Statement, "Canada's Role in Atomic Bomb Drama", August 13, 19^5<> Suggested amended versions "Caiiada's Role in Atomic Bomb Drama" - Press Statement issued b^: the Hon. C.D0 Howe, Minister of Reconstruction, August 13, 19M-5"c (3) Page 4 Between'the Section entitled "The United States Manhattan Engineer" District - 19lf2" and the Section entitled ^Discussion Between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill", ihsert the following Section; "The Joint British-Canadian Project In September 19^2 negotiations were completed between the United Kingdom and Canada, with the signing of a memorandum, for the establishment of a joint BritishCanadian research establishment in Montreal under the general direction of the National Research Council of Canada. The laboratory was opened in December 19*+2 and was in full operation before the signing of the Quebec Agreement in August 19^3." Present versions "Whereas Canada was not signatory to the Agreement, Canadian participation in the joint effort was recognized by 000344 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 the appointment of C D . Howe, a Canadian, as the sixth member of the Committee0" Suggested amended versions "While Canada was not signatory to the Agreement, she concurred informally as a participant in the joint effort. . The Hon. C D . Howe, Canadian Minister of Munitions and Supply, was appointed as the sixth member of the Committee." (5) Page 5a para. 2 a sentence 1 In place of "Dean C.J. Mackenzie", insert "Dr. C.J. Mackenzie, President of the National Research Council of Canada". Comments Throughout the paper the titles of many of the persons named are omitted. The inclusion of titles' in'all' cases would be helpful to'people unfamiliar with the subject".' This would apply particularly if the paper is to be published. (6) Page 5 a para. 3 „ sentence 1 Present versions "Early in 19*+3 a large Canadian-British research establishment had been set up in Montreal under the general direction of the National Research Council of Canada." Suggested amended versions "In December 19*+2, as mentioned above, a large Canadian-British research establishment had been set up in Montreal." * (7) Page 5 . para. 5 „ sentence 2 After "was at that time moved", insert "to Montreal". (8) Page 5, para. 5, commencing with sentence 5 Present versions "In May and June 19M+, General Groves, Sir James Tlhadwick and Dean Mackenzie met to discuss the contributions tT$£ U.S. would'make In the project. The primary results of these meetings were the final drafting of the agreement delineating the role of the U.S. in the joint project and the establishment of the U.S. Evergreen Area Office in Montreal to handle interchange matters. Exchange of information with Canada was limited, the latter having access to information developed at the Metallurgical Laboratory and the Clinton Laboratories, but not at Los Alamos and Hanford." Suggested amended versions "In May and June 1 9 ^ , General Groves, Sir James Chadwick and Dr. Mackenzie met to discuss the contributions the U.S. would make to the project. The primary result of these meetings was the final drafting of the agreement delineating the role of the U.S. in the joint project. The United States established a scientific liaison office, known, as the Evergreen Area Office, in Montreal. Exchange: of information with Canada was limited, the latter having access to some of the information developed at the Metallurgical Laboratory and the Clinton Laboratories, but not at Los Alamos and Hanford." 000345 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 3(9) Page & At the end of the Section entitled'"Canadian Role in Cooperation", insert the following paragraph; "At the outbreak-of the war, Canada possessed the "" only available source of uranium and the"only plant capable of refining uranium on the North American continent". Early "in 19^-2 uranium refined in Canada was made available for the ' research and development programme then underway in the United States. With the establishment of the Manhattan Engineer "'District, Canada agreed to make available ail Cahadian "production of uranium for the weapon programme and also"agreed to make every endeavour to expand uranium production. This arrangement continued throughout the war years and is still in effect." (10) Page fra Section entitled "The Combined Development Agency". last sentence s For "Mr. G,C. Bateman from Canada", read "Mr. G.C, Bateman of the Canadian Ministry of Munitions and Supply". (11) Page G* Section entitled "Development of the First Weapon." In sentence 1- delete "and Canada"; delete also, "and Montreal". (12) Page 7} P^^o- A , ^c^M^~<^ / For "and the existence of", read "and of the existence of". (13) Page 7 / m<^m7C^. 3 Present version; "Prior to the release of these statements and in view of the agreement at Quebec not to reveal information concerning the project to third parties without mutual consent, the three statements had been sent to the other countries for comment. The British approach to the U.S. releases was' considerably more" cautious'than the American, and the former indicated concern that such full disclosures regarding the technical processes for the production of weapons was contemplated. Although agreement on both the press release and the Smyth Report was finally obtained, the final outcome of this discussion on the release of information was the establishment of a U.S.-U.K. subcommittee to draw up the principles and conditions which would govern the further release of scientific information concerning the atomic project." Suggested amended versions "Prior to the release of these statements, in view of the agreement at Quebec not to reveal Information concerning the project to third parties without mutual consent, each of the three statements had been sent to the other two countries for comment. The British approach to the releases proposed by the U,S. was considerably more cautious than the American, and the British indicated concern that such full disclosures regarding the technical processes for the production of weapons was contemplated. - Although agreement on both the press release and the Smyth Report was finally obtained, the final outcome of this discussion on the release of information was the establishment of a U.S.-U.K.-Canada subcommittee to 000346 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -If - draw up the principles and conditions which"Would govern the " further release of scientific information concerning the atomic project." JL. "For "President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee met", read "President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee and Prime Minister King met". (15) Page <f tt para. 3u . sentence 1 Present versions "On November 16, another statement, which was not made public, was signed by the Chiefs of State of the United" States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, which declared ....". Suggested amended version? "On November 16, another statement, which was not made public, was signed by President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee and Prime Minister King, which declared ....". Comment % The President of the United States is Chief of State, but the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and of Canada are not. (16) Page £\ para. <Sk . sentence 3 Present versions "The Combined Policy Committee was not able to agree on arrangements which the United States could regard as consistent with the support of an international control system, and would not agree to agreements which would be contrary to Article 102 of the U.N. Charter". Suggested amended versions "The Combined Policy Committee was, however, not able to agree on arrangements which were acceptable to all three governments." (17) Page f. ^&*~ut . /. -£»-_/ s^>s3L~~-^ Delete the word "had". (18) Page f Between the Section entitled "The Organization of British Atomic Energy Efforts; The Ministry of Supply" and the Section entitled "The Establishment of the United States Atomic Energy Commission", insert the following Sections "The Organization of the Canadian Atomic Energy Program In June 19^6 £'he Canadian Parliament passed the Atomic Energy Control Act which, among other provisions, established the Atomic Energy Control Board to exercise policy-making and regulatory responsibility under the Privy Council Committee on Scientific and Industrial Research, 000347 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information The Control Board asked the National Research Council to continue the management and operation of the Chalk River establishment. In 1952, because of the increasing industrial aspects of atomic energy, a Crown company, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, was incorporated to take over these responsibilities from the National Research Council," (19) Page /o. Section entitled "Co-Operation Under the Modus Vivendi" (a) In sentence 1 = after "United Kingdom", insert "and Canada". (b) In sentence 2 - after "British", insert "and Canadian". (c) In sentence h - in place of "Atomic Energy Act", insert "U.S, Atomic Energy Act of 19^6*!. m (20) Page // Present version; "This objective assumed greater urgency with the discovery by the British of the Fuchs espionage case in February 1950 ' • ' •• (App.K), and of the cases of Bruno Pontecorvo in September 1950 and Donald MacLean in May 1951«." Suggested amended versions "This objective assumed greater urgency with the discovery of espionage^ committed by a number of persons entrusted with important secret information." Notes This amendment would have the effect of deleting Appendix K. (21) Page // . last sentences Present versions "The atomic energy personnel in the three countries, including personnel that may have access to classlfied'atomic energy information but are not workingiMrectly on atomic energy projects," are given full background "investigations"" comparable to the system adopted by the United States since 19^7. (App, L ) " . Suggested amended versions "The atomic energy personnel In the three countries, including personnel that may have access to classified atomic energy information but are- not working directly on atomic energy projects, are given full background investigations by comparable systems in the three countries." Notes This amendment would have the effect of deleting Appendix L, (22) Final page, entitled "WHITE PAPER APPENDICES" Present version of Section Fs "F. Canadian Information Service Statement, August 13, 19*+5 (To be found as App, 8 of the Smyth Report)". Suggested amended version of. Section F; "F. Canadian-Statement a issued by the-Hon. C D . Howe, August 13, 1945 (To be found as App. 8 of the Smyth Report)". 000348 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information IP SECRET ri * '* mmmm no SECRET SI A SECRET THE UNITED STATES-UNITED KINGDOM-CANADIAN COLLABORATION IN THE FIELD OF ATOMIC ENERGY 1940 - 1954 rap SECRET 000381 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information y -. DRAFT TOF SliCRET Canadian suggestions f o r amendments to tho f i r s t d r a f t of t h e paper e n t i t l e d "The United S t a t e s - United Kingdom Canadian Collaboration in the Field of Atomic Energy. 1940-1954" (1) Pafie 1, p a r a , } ^ f| | *i t $7-.*F* Present Torsion8 "From 1946 to 194# cooperation between tho three govorataents in the field of atomic energy was ^ ^3 v.~ brought to a virtual standstill. However, by the modus vivondl of January 1946, cooperation between j-v\ the throe governments was revived in limited areas ^ , «-•• consistent with tho agisting legislative authority." Suggested amended versions ^ ^ '..-v r. '- . "^ "From 1946 to 1943 cooperation of the United Kingdom and Canada with the United States in tho field of atoaie ©nor&p was curtailed, although cooperation between the Ifaited Kingdom and Canada continued on an Intinato and complete basis. By tho modus vivendi of January 194#, cooperation of tho United Kingdom and Canada with the United States wao revived in limited areas consistent with tbo existing legislative authority." (2) Page 1. footnote 1/ Present version: "Canadian Information Service Statement, "Canada*o Role in Atomic Bomb Drama", August 13, 1945. Suggested amended version t "Conada,s Role in Atomic Bomb Drama" - Press Statement issued by th© Hon. C D . How©, Hinietor of Reconstruction, August 13, 1945". O) Pa^e 5 Dottrecn the Section entitled "Tho United Statos - Ilanhattan Engineer District - 1942" and the Section entitled "Discussion Between Prosident Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill", insert the following Sections 000356 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 "The Joint British-Canadian Project In September 1942 negotiations wore completed between tbo United Kingdom and Canada, with the signing of a meaorondiei, for tho establishment of a joint Britieh-Canadian research establishment in Hontreal under the general direction of the national Research Council of Canada. The laboratory wao opened in December 1942 and was in full operation before the signing of the Quebec Agreement in August 1943*" M Paae 6 . sentence 1 Present version: "Jhereas Canada was not signatory to the Agreement, Canadian participation In the joint effort was recognised by the appointment of C D . Howe, a Canadian, as tho sixth member of the Committee*" SurtP.ested amended version I "Uhorcas Canada was not signatory to tho Agreement, sho concurred informally as a participant in the joint effort. The Hon. C D . Howe, Canadian Hinistor of Munitions and Supply, was appointed as the sixthraooberof the Committee." (5) Paige 6 . para. 1 . sentence 1 In place of "Dean C.J. Mackenzie", insert ^Qr* C.J. Hackcnaie, Preoident of the national Research Council of Canada". Comment: Throughout the paper the tltlos of many of the persons named are omitted. The Inclusion of titles in all cases would bo helpful to people unfamiliar with the subject. This would apply particularly if the paper is to be published. (6) Page 6 . para. 2 . oontence 1 Prosent vorsioni "Early in 1943 a largo Canidian-Britieh research establishment had boen set up in Montreal under the general direction of tho national Research Council of Canada." 000357 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 3 Suggested amended version: "In Jteceabor 1942, ae Qontioned above, a a largo Ganadian-Dritieh research cotabliefcaont had been set up in Montreal." P ^ e 6 i, para., 2, ti nentcnce.a,,, After "Wao at that time moved", Insert "to Hontrcal*. Pace 7» commencing with sentence 1 Present version: "In IZay and Juno 1944» General Groves, Jtr James Chadwiofc and Dean Jlackenale mot to discuss the contributions the U.S. would make in tho project. s *ho prienry results of thoso meetings were th© final drafting of the agreement delineating tho r»le of tho U.S. in tho julnt project and the establlohmsnt of the C O . tYergrcen Area Office in flontroal to handle interchange matters. Exchange of information with Canada was limited, the latter having access to information developed at the Metallurgical Laboratory and the Clinton laboratories, but not at Los Alamos and HanfonU" Surestcd aawn ded version: "In Kay and Juno 1944, General tfrovco, Sir J?mcs Chadwicfc and Br. KGCkensi© met to dlscuso the contributions the C O . would make to the i.roject. The primary result of theoe meotinge wao the final drafting of tho agreement delineating the role of tho U.S. in the Joint project. Th© United States established a scientific Uaison office, known ao the Cverjreen Area Office, in Kontreal. exchange of information with Canadn wao limitod, the latter having occeao to some of the information developed at the Metallurgical Laboratory and tho Clinton Laboratories, but not at Loo Alamos ond Hanford." At the end of tbo Section entitled "Canadian Role in Cooperation", insert tho following paragraph! 000358 • * «k �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 4"At the outbreak of tbe war, Canada possessed the only available source of uranium and the only plant capable of refining uranium on tho Rorth American continent. Early in 1942 uranium refined in Canada was made available for the research and development progrmme then underway in the United States, With the establishment of the Manhattan &iginecr District, Canada agreed to make available all Canadian production of uranium for the weapon programme and also agreed to make every endeavour to expand uranium production. This arrangement continued throughout tho war years and is still in effect." (10) Page 8, Section entitled "fhe Combined Development Agency*., last sentence? For "I4r. C C Bateman from Canada", read "Mr, G . C Bateman of the Canadian Ministry of Munitions and Supply". (11) Page 8 .Section entitled "Development of the First Weapon." In sentence 1* delete "and Canada"j delete also, "and Montreal". (12) Page -9, lfartT-la For "and the existence of", read "and of the existence of". (13) Parte 9? commencing with line 7 Present version: "Prior to tbe releaoe of these statements and in view of the agreement at Quebec not to reveal information concerning the project to third parties without mutual consent, the three statements had been sent to the other countries for comment. The British approach to th© U.S. releases was considerably more cautious than the American, and the former indicated concern that such full 000359 . . .5 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 5discloouroQ regarding the technical processes for th© production of weapons was contemplated. Althou#i agreement on both tho press release and the Smyth Report wae finally obtained, the final outcome of this discussion on tho releaso of information wao the establishment of a U.S.-U.K. subcommittee to draw up the principles and conditions which would govern tho further release of scientific information concerning the atomic project." Subtest ed amended version; "Prior to the release of these statements, in view of the agreement at Quebec not to reveal information concerning the project to third parties without mutual consent, each of the three statements had been sent to the other two countries for coament. The British approach t-> the releases proposed by the U.S. was considerably more cautious than the American, and the British indicated concern that such full disclosures regarding tho technical procosseo for the production of weapons was contemplated. Although agreement on both the press release and the Smyth Report was finally obtained, the final outcome of this discussion on the release of information xfas tho establishment of a U.S.-U.K.-Canada subcommittee to draw up tho principles and conditions which would govern tho further release of scientific information concerning tho atomic project." (14) Page 9. last sentence. "For "President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee met", read "President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee and Prime Minister King met".. • •• 6 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 6 - (15) Page 1 0 . para 1 . sentence 3 Present version: "The Combined Policy Cor^mittee was not ablo to agree on arrangements which the United Statos could regard as consistent with the support of an international control system, end would not agree to agreements *$iich would be contrary to Article 102 of the C C Charter". Suggested amended version: "The Combined Policy Committee was, however, not able to agree on arrangements which were acceptable to all three governments." (1^) Page 11, line 13 Delote the word "had". <17) Pago ll Between the Section entitled "The Organisation of British Atomic Shergy Efforts: The Ministry of Supply" ond the Section entitled "The Establishment of tho United States Atomic Energy Cocsraiseion", insert the following Section: "Tho Organisation of the Canadian Atomic ianer/or Program In June 1946 the Canadian Parliament passed tho Atomic Energy Control Act which, among othor provisions, established tho Atomic Energy Control Board to exercise policy-making and regulatory responsibility under the Privy Council Committee on Scientific and Industrial Research. The Control Board asked the Rational Research Council to continuo the management and operation of the Chalk Rivor establishment, In 1952, because of the increasing industrial aspects of atomic energy, a Crown company, Atomic &iergy of Canada Limited, was incorporated to take ovor these reponsibilitieo from . . .7 000361 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information the National Research Council." (10) Page 12 » Section entitled "Co-Operation Under the Modus Vivendi" (a) In sentence 1 - after "United Kingdom", insert "and Canada". (b) In sentence 2 - after "British", insert "and Canadian". (c) In sentence 4 » in place of "Atomic 2nergy Act", insert "U.S. Atomic Gncrgy Act of 1946", (19) Page is. Section entitled "Security", sentence 2 Present version: "This objectivo assumed greater urgency with the discovery by the British of the Fuchs espionage case in February 1950 (App.K), and of the cases of Bruno Pontecorvo in September 1950 and Donald KacLoan in May 1951." Suggested amended version: "This objective asoumed greater urgency with the discovery of espionage committed by a number of persons entrusted with important secret information." Note; This amendment would have the effect of deleting Appendix K. (20) Page 15. last sentence: Present version: "The atomic energy personnel in the three countries, including personnel that may have access to classified atomic energy information but aJ?e not working directly on atomic energy projects, are given full background investigations comparable to the system adopted by the United States since 1947. (App. L ) " . Suggested amended version: "The atomic energy personnel in the throe countries, Including personnel that may have access to classified atomic energy information but are not working directly • • • # 000362 �' '* Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 0 - on atomic energy projects, are given full background investigations by comparable systems in the three countries." Hotoi This amendment would have the effect of deleting Appendix L. (21) Final page, entitled "KHITK PAPER APPENDICES" Present version of Section F: "F. Canadian Information Service Statement, August 13, 1945 (To be found as App. C of the Smyth Report)". Suggested amended version of Section F: "F. Canadian Statement, issued by the Hon. C D . Howe, August 13, 1945 (To be found as App. & of the Smyth Report)*. 000363 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information y -. DRAFT TOF SliCRET Canadian suggestions f o r amendments to tho f i r s t d r a f t of t h e paper e n t i t l e d "The United S t a t e s - United Kingdom Canadian Collaboration in the Field of Atomic Energy. 1940-1954" (1) Pafie 1, p a r a , } ^ f| | *i t $7-.*F* Present Torsion8 "From 1946 to 194# cooperation between tho three govorataents in the field of atomic energy was ^ ^3 v.~ brought to a virtual standstill. However, by the modus vivondl of January 1946, cooperation between j-v\ the throe governments was revived in limited areas ^ , «-•• consistent with tho agisting legislative authority." Suggested amended versions ^ ^ '..-v r. '- . "^ "From 1946 to 1943 cooperation of the United Kingdom and Canada with the United States in tho field of atoaie ©nor&p was curtailed, although cooperation between the Ifaited Kingdom and Canada continued on an Intinato and complete basis. By tho modus vivendi of January 194#, cooperation of tho United Kingdom and Canada with the United States wao revived in limited areas consistent with tbo existing legislative authority." (2) Page 1. footnote 1/ Present version: "Canadian Information Service Statement, "Canada*o Role in Atomic Bomb Drama", August 13, 1945. Suggested amended version t "Conada,s Role in Atomic Bomb Drama" - Press Statement issued by th© Hon. C D . How©, Hinietor of Reconstruction, August 13, 1945". O) Pa^e 5 Dottrecn the Section entitled "Tho United Statos - Ilanhattan Engineer District - 1942" and the Section entitled "Discussion Between Prosident Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill", insert the following Sections 000356 �*>' . N- TOP SECRET 4s*Z.&>» Draft Numbered Letter to the Canadian Embassy, Washington, D. C Referencet Your letter Ho* 1495 of August 19, 1954 Atomic Ener^r: White Paper on the History of Tripartite Co-operation Attached are six copies of our suggestions for amendments to the draft paper on Tripartite collaboration in the field of atomic energy. 17111 you please transmit these suggestions to the appropriate U.S. authorities. Tou may also wish to give a oopy to Sir Roger Makins. 2. Our suggested amendment Ho. 15 perhaps requires some explanation. The two reasons given In the draft paper for the failure of the Combined Policy Committee to agree on arrangements for "full and effective cooperation" are unsatisfactory, and the simplest method of dealing with them appeared to be to delete them altogether. The first reason - that the Combined Policy Committee was not able to agree on arrangements whioh the Baited States oould regard as consistent with the support of an international control system - is somewhat misleading. In fact, the paused by failure to agree appears to have been/the unwlllihgness of the U.S. to exchange information on Industrial "know-how* $ .... 2 000364 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 - in particular, the U.S. did not *«ant to give the U.K. the teohnloal Information necessary for the construction of atomic energy plants In the U.K. The second reason, concerning agreements contrary to Article 102 of the C N . Charter, Is ambiguous. V/ho would not agree, the Combined Policy Committee or the United States? In any case, why suggest that any of the three nations might have ignored the U.N. Charter? 3. When the question of publication comes up, you can take the position that the Canadian Gevarnmsnt is In favour of publication, but does not insist upon it. If it is decided that the paper should be published, the would prefer Canadian Government ^oawOcelot that this should be done on a Tripartite basis. (The U.S. authorities have already agreed to this, as reported in your letter No. 339 of March 2, 1954,) V/e would wish to release the paper simultaneously with the U.S. and the U.K. If they each publish a separate YJhite Paper, ws would probably do likewise. In any discussion of possible publication dates, it should be borne In mind that we would require a minimum of three weeks to produce a tfhlte Paper hers after receiving the final text. 4. Incidentally, we should appreciate lt if the final text which you send us could Include the Appendices in the form in which they are to be published. We are and not sure that wa have them all, Xaxaayxsasa wa think that the final text should be complete in all respects so that there can be no possibility of a mistake. Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs 000365 �i de,,hMm!,to, m, M Defence l i a i s o n (1) C.DocnrfreMniffnlgifPSh'TCrtu * a™ t o Hfg *«' * ' K. de \a Loi sur I'acces I'information \,.' S - TOP SECRET jif Our f i l e : 50219-AF-40 J% ot,tawa > November 22,1954. «fKj> <JW Thei PPrreessiiddeenntt,, Atomic Energy of Canada, Limited, Room 474, No. 4 Building, Ottawa. " / - / / a i d A P ~ */<> \ 5 ° *• • ' " " j y i C Atomic Energy Co-operation Thank you for your letter of September 17 containing your suggestionsfor amendments to the draft of the proposed history of atomic energy cooperation, which was prepared by the United States authorities.. 2. The Canadian suggestions for amendments to the paper have been prepared in draft form in the light of the comments made by you and other interested people. I am enclosing a copy of the suggestions, together with a copy in draft form of a letter to the Canadian Embassy in Washington, under cover of which I propose to send the suggestions to the Embassy for transmittal to the U.S. authorities. 3. I hope that the suggestions and the covering letter to the Embassy take care of the points raised in your letter of September 17. I should be grateful to have your confirmation that this is so, or any changes which you may care to suggest. -AW&Under-Secretery of State l ' for External Affairs 000366 �"M O T A" '—" IN YOUR REPLY PLEASE QUOTE B y H a n d * & % % * Z ^ ^ J F " ^ A T O $ T ^ g | p : R G Y OF CANADA LIMITED «» OFFICE TOP OF THE PRESIDENT ?> X d SECRET 5gL Wh ' D e a r Bill i r " " • • 3 ? ^ C / y - iff A ^/C* 73 .. ^ 1 OTTAWA % ^ * ^ i s4tefn^^Mi#1954. ™ , S D OCUMENT.^^18^6C. r . CONSISTS OF Copy NO .5. / . , pf., ^ / PAGES Cooiss, ^ r l e s . y ^ . . '"""""""" *""J"""""^"•'•'m.Djm. With r e f e r e n c e to the United States draft of the proposed h i s t o r y of atomic energy c o - o p e r a t i o n , I have d i s cussed t h e draft with D r . G. C . L a u r e n c e of the Chalk R i v e r P r o j e c t , who, as you know, was a s s o c i a t e d with our work f r o m i t s inception. I a m enclosing a copy of a m e m o r a n d u m which D r . L a u r e n c e h a s written m e in comment on the United States draft. I s h a r e D r . L a u r e n c e ' s views as to the inadvis ability of s t r e s s i n g s e c u r i t y violations in the United Kingdom (page 13), if no mention i s to be made of s i m i l a r violations in the United S t a t e s , It would s e e m p r e f e r a b l e to avoid specific r e f e r e n c e to individuals and to substitute the g e n e r a l language which D r . L a u r e n c e has s u g g e s t e d . The section on the Canadian r o l e in c o - o p e r a t i o n m a k e s no mention of our contribution of r a w m a t e r i a l s . It m a y be that this is a d e l i b e r a t e omission s i n c e , if r e f e r e n c e is m a d e 000367 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 - to Canada's contribution of u r a n i u m , some mention shovild a l s o be m a d e of the Belgian contribution. In any c a s e , it is m y view that Canada should be given c r e d i t for its r o l e in this p a r t of the p r o g r a m m e . I s u g g e s t , t h e r e f o r e , that the following be i n s e r t e d as the final p a r a g r a p h of the section 'Canadian Role in C o - o p e r a t i o n ' : "At the outbreak of the w a r , Canada p o s s e s s e d the only available s o u r c e of u r a n i u m and the only plant capable of refining u r a n i u m o n the North A m e r i c a n continent. E a r l y in 1942 u r a n i u m refined in Canada was m a d e available for the r e s e a r c h and development p r o g r a m m e then underway in the United States,. With the establishment of the Manhattan Engineer D i s t r i c t , Canada a g r e e d to m a k e available all Canadian p r o d u c tion of u r a n i u m for the weapon p r o g r a m m e and also a g r e e d to m a k e e v e ry endeavour to expand u r a n i u m p r o d u c t i o n. This a r r a n g e m e n t continued throughout the war y e a r s and is still in effect." If it is the intention of the United States to r e l e a s e a White P a p e r on " G o - o p e r a t i o n " , I believe that a . s i m i l a r paper 000368 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information mm - should be r e l e a s e d in Canada. 3 - However, I do not think that we should p r e s s for such a r e l e a s e u n l e s s a document can be produced t h a t is entirely acceptable to the t h r e e p a r t i e s . The section on s e c u r i t y in the proposed draft, as now w r i t t e n , will undoubtedly give offence to the United K i n g d o m . If a g r e e m e n t cannot be r e a c h e d on a satisfactory wording, the r e l e a s e of the paper might do m o r e h a r m than good at this p a r t i c u l a r stage in.our r e l a t i o n s . Yours s i n c e r e l y M r . W. H . B a r t o n , D e p a r t m e n t of E x t e r n a l Affa i rs , Ottawa, Ontario. Encl. 000369 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft history / revisions / 9 DECEMBER 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-12-09 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00055 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "The United States-United Kingdom-Canadian Collaboration in the Field of Atomic Energy, 1940 - 1954," n.d. [1954], LAC, RG 25, vol. 5957, file no. 50219-AF-40, part 1. atomic energy C.D. Howe C.J. Mackenzie Combined Policy Committee Manhattan Engineer District National Research Council tripartite UN Charter https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f5b8bbff69e53d06a50a380c9292fc23.pdf 8d19ad36be01e2994ea8a99b2649fc1b PDF Text Text Icument disclosed under the Actess to Information Ac^^^ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information > VJ March 11, 1954 MEMORANDUM TO THE MMISIFER You may recall that last January we raised with London and Washington the possibility of securing United Kingdom and United States agreement to a tripartite sponsorship of the proposed record of the history of co-operation in the development of atomic energy. The United Kingdom agreed to this some time ago, 2. We have now been advised by our Embassy in Washington that the American authorities agree that Canada shall be one of the sponsors of the proposed history if and when the history is released. The Embassy says that the Atomic Energy Commission draft is about ready to be shown to other U.S. Departments and will be made available to us within two or three weeks. It has not yet been decided whether or not the history will be publicly released. R. A. M. //m-J j£ m.JjyJSj'-'-* I. 000410 J7 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft history / gentle push / 11 MARCH 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-03-11 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00054 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Memorandum to the Minister, 11 Mar. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 5957, file no. 50219-AF-40, part 1. Lester Pearson R.A. MacKay tripartite https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/d284f09bd7e857dfb2a716e54570af24.pdf 14bf88107016536f1fcde6441ad624d4 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -s i MINISTER OF DEFENCE PRODUCTION CANADA SECRET -«j.-.«C?, 1 <* OTTAWA < £ -<*** 4y^ January 15th, 1954. My dear Cof^epgue, Thanks for your letter of January 13th, referring to a history of Anglo-American co-operation in the field of atomic energy since the period of the last war. I fully agree that the history should be published under tripartite sponsorship. I believe that Canada had a greater part than had the United Kingdom in developing the use of atomic energy in the earlier stages. Therefore, I concur in your suggestion that the Canadian Ambassador be now instructed to make informal representations with a view to obtaining the agreement of the D-\ \ <*r 5 6 7 United States. s 2 In any event, we should see the text before t „. | J: receives sufficient recognition. a 9 10 21 publication to make sure that the Canadian part in development i Yours sincerely, JAN19£>4~ Honourable L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, OTTAWA. 000416 1% - /- S-^r^S) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft history / gentle push / 15 JANURARY 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-01-15 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00053 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Howe to Pearson, 15 Jan. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 5957, file no. 50219-AF-40, part 1. Anglo-American C.D. Howe Lester Pearson tripartite https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/711e0421d8da53f9f3cbf72a1933dbba.pdf 18f1389ea52d060beb2bdea960d80bbb PDF Text Text TO EXTERNAL 2361 PRIORITY ~~ INFO CCOS EMBPARIS LDN WASHDC_2.1,n.,RU YOURTEL DLUJ7 OCT9. :t p~]\ vrc~~~BERLIN CONTINIIENCYPLAIIN1N13 t:,L . .( ,,,, .. t,µr""' / ;J-r;y;f'/ -~,,,,, . --:1-,/ ~ (¼,~ .'fl'--= /f , --- COUNCILS DISCUSSICN IN RESTD SESSION OCT18 TOOK ACCOUNTO - 5 -,--· . ~;AS ~-- . UNFORTUNATE tHlS USEFUL SµMMARY OF TKE C -~ ---. . D ACCUMULATION'6 PAPER ON THIS SUBJECT HAD NOT RPT NOT BEK~--c-I-ffG.-IJLA TEO EARLIER.AS IT IS,DISCUSSION REMAINS.CONFUSED.NO RPT Nn--1DEe-t-.tU - HAVEBEENTAKEN.AFURTHERMTGWILL BE HILD OCT12,12. THE STANDING QROUPHAD NO RPf; NO REPLY TO OUR QUESTION ABOUT NUCLEARWEAPONS.THEREFOREI GAVETHE STATDIINT I SENT YOO IN MYTEL ~07 ocr,, INCORPORATINGBOTHTHE AMEND,MENTS YOU Sl:J'18ESTEDIN PARA! YOURRUTEL. THIS PRECIPITATED CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION.WE RECEIVED SUPPORTFROMNORWEGIANSAND BELGIA~S,BUT A NUMBEROF OTHERSARE OPPOSED.THEIR CHIEF OBJECTION IS TKATTO REQUEST THE EXCLUSIONOF THENUCLEARCONTINGENCY PLAN AT THIS,STAGEWOULD RE OPENA QUESTION WHICH VAS DEBATED PAINFULLYA_NDAT LENGTHA YEAR AGO IN COUNCIL.OTHERS UNDERSTAND OUROBJECTIONS VERYWELL;THE DIFFICULTY IS THEYDONOTRPT NOTSHAREOUR.VIEW.THEY POINT OUTTHATUSEOF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,LIKE ALL CONTINGENCY PLANS,WOULDBE SUBJECT TO A POLITICAL DECISION BY GOVTS AT THE TIME AND IF COUNCIL AGREED TO PULLOUTONEPLAN OF THIS CAiA~OQIJE,INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIONS COULD BE RAISEDTO ALLTHE OTHERSoFROM PRIVATECONVERSATIONS WITHA NUMBEROF MYCOLLEAGUES,l BELIEVE TH.ISv,I[W TO BE STRONGLYHELDBY SOMEDELS,NOTABLYFRENCH.ITIS TOOEARLYTO SAYWHAT WILL EMERGE FROMTHE DISCUSSION, BUTVE MAY HAVEA TOUGH FIGHT. 3o THE OTHER I"PORTANT POINT DEALT, VlTK OCT1~ WASTHEONERAISEDIN PARA•OF YOURREFTEL.HERIAGAIN,THERE IS A DEEPDIV OF OPINIONa AT ONEEXTREME IS BOYESEN,NORWEGIAN PERMREP,WHOSE PERSONAL VIEWIS THATWHOLE IDEAOF APPROVALIS MISCONCEIVED.HE LOOKSONCONTINGENCY •oo2 000741 �.: ...-: PAGE TWO 2360 PlANNING AS A CONTINUOUSPROCESS, IN WHICH IDEAS WILL 8£ SUBJECT TO CONSTANT REVIEWoHE FEARSTHAT APPROVAL OF PLANSIN SON£FOMIALSENSE WILL TEND TO FREEZE FLANNINGoTHIS HE THINKS WOUJ..D BE DANGEROUSBE• CAUSE THE WHOLESERIES OF PLANS IS BUILT UP ON A SERIES Of ASSUMPTIONS ABOUTSOVIET REACTIONS WHICH COULDWILL BE FALSIFIED BY EVENTS,, AT THE SAME TIME,HE EMPHASIZES THAT NORWEGIANAUTHORITIES ARI FIRtlLY CONVINCEDOF THE NEEi) FOR CONTINGENCYPLANNING,SO LONG AS IT DOES NOT RPT NOTLEADTO CLOS£DMINDSANDOVER-FORMAL RESULTS. 4. NO RPT NO OTHER PERMREP GOES THIS FAR.EVEN DANE,WHOGENERALLY SUPPORTS NORWEGIAN,ANNOUNCED THATHIS AUTHORITIES APPROVED PLANS QUOTE IN PRINCIPLE UNQOOTEolTALIANUS£D A SIMILARFOJIHLAoTHIS WAS DESPITE CLEARINDICATIONS THATBOTHITALIANANDDANFSHAUTHORITIES HAVESERIOUSRESERVATIONS ABOUTTH£ PLANSANO.THER!:FORE LNDERSTAND APPROVAL IN PRIN CI PLE IN A BROAD AND LOOSE SENSE.DANES OBJECT TO APPROVAL BY GOVTSOF PLANSWHICH INCLUDE ACTS CONTRARY TO INTER• NATIONAL LAW.( AS LEGAL ADVISOR SUGGESTS IN P0/62/637 SOME OF THE MARCON PLANSWOULD BE>.ITALIANSHAVESERIOUS DIFFICULTIESABOUT ALERTS, A.~D LIKE US ARE ST ILL WORRIEDOVER THE QUESTION OF TRANSFER OF CONTROL FROM TRIPARTITE TO NATO COMMANDo 5o DI SCUSSION OF TH IS POINT WILL HAVE TO BE PURSUED TOO.SOME DEl..S HAVENOTRPT NOTRECEIVEDINSTRUCTICNS YEToATTHE MOl'tINT,HOWEVER9 IT SEEMS THAT AT LEAST SEVEN Dr.LS-THE FOUR PLUS BELGILM,ITAlY AND to ,. DENMARK-WOULD PROBABLYBE PREPARED TO SUBSCRIBE SOME FOR4 ULA APPROVINGTHE PLANS IN PRINCIPLEFOR PLANNING PURPOSES AS A CATALOGUE, THE EXECUTION OF ANY ONE PLAN110R ANY COMB INATION, TO BE SUBJECTTO A SPECIFIC POLITICALDECISIONBY GOVTSAT THE TIME.] BOYESEN$ VIEW IS PERSONAL;HE IS NOT RPT NOT CERTAIN HIS GOVT WOULD SHARE IT4MY OWN VIEW IS THAT,WHILE A N'UMBtR Of HIS COMMENTSARE WELL TAKEN!)IT IS REALLY GOING TOO FAR TO EXPECT THAT TKE COUNCIL,HAVING DIRECTED A YEAR AGO THAT PLANS BE PREPAREO,WOULDNOT RPT NOT REACT IN SOMEFORMULA OR ANOTHER TO THE PLANSNOWTHEYHAVEBEENPRESENTEDo ••• 3 000742 �-PAGETkREE 2360 6.THIS DEALSWITH PARASl,2 AND4 OF YOURINSfRUCTIONS;?ARA3RAISES DIFFERENTPROBLEMS.YOU MENTIONALERTS.I WILL BE REPORTINGON THIS A~PECT~EPAkATELY.YOUR SECONDPOINT WASABOUTOURQUESTIONON THE THANSfEROF CONTROL.ON THIS,I UNDERSTAND FROMPRIVATETALKSTHAT TRIPAHTITEPLANNERS ARE RELUCTANT TO BUDGEF~OMANSWER THEYGAVE US EAKLIEReHOWEVER,NO RPT NO ANSWER TO OURSECONDPRESSINGOF THIS POINT HAS liEEN RETURNED.CHAIRMAN RECOGNIZED AT OCTlO MTGTHATA NUMBER OF DELS COULDNOT RPT NOT BE EXPECTED TO MOVEFORWARD UNTIL STANDINGGROUPHADREPLIED TO QUESTIONSDELS HADASKED.HEPRESSED STANDINGGROUPREP STRONGLY TO GET THE ANSWERS QUICKLY.ATTHE MOMENT, THE BALL IS IN THE Pl.ANNE RS COURTON THIS POINTo 7.FINALLY,YOURPARA3MENTIONSECONOMIC COUNTERMEASURES.IN A FORMALSENSE,THIS QUESTIONIS SEPARATEFROMAPPROVAL OF BERCOM/MARCON PLANS.THETHREEHAVENOWMADECLEARTHATECONOMIC COUNTERMEASURES WOULD BELONGLARGELYTO PHASEII OF A CRISIS.ALL THE BERCOM/MARCON PLANSBELONGTO PHASEIII.THUS IT WOULD BE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE TO APPROVETHEMWITHOUT NECESSARILYACCEPTINGFURTHERDECISIONS ON ECONOMIC COUNTERMEASURES.HOWEVER THE TWOFORMSOF RESPONSEARE LIN~ED IN POSSIBLE PROGRESSION OF MEASURES.IFWETAKETHE INITIATIVE TO RAISE THIS QUESTION,THERESULTWILL BE IMMEDIATE PRESSUREON CDA, SINCE COAHAS THE MOSTRESERVEDPOSITION ON THE WHOLE QUESTIONOF ECONOMIC COUNTERMEASURES.EVEN IF WEDO NOT RPT NOT RAISE THE QUESTION OURSELVES,ITCANNOT RPT NOT BE AVOIDEDMUCHLONGER;YOU WILL NOTICEPARA17OF P0/62/641 SAYS THE SUBJECTWILL BE PLACEDON THE AGENDA AT AN EARLYDATE IGNATIEFf0 ~' 9 ' 000743 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Berlin Crisis / 11 OCTOBER 1962 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1962-10-11 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00044 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived NATO Paris to External Affairs, "Berlin Contingency Planning,’’ 11 Oct. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 2. BERCON plans Berlin contingency Denmark econmic countermeasures tripartite https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f9036ac1f7fda539aef724c26c84dbf3.pdf cb725707504ea57901fd0ca326afc8d4 PDF Text Text CO~y - FM NATOPARIS SEP29/61 TO EXTER-4AL 2486 REGl'STRY OPIMMED INFO LDN WASHDCEMBPARIS CCOS PRIORITY DM/lliD PRIORITY FM CCOS REF OURTEL 2458 SEP28 BERLIN-CON TIN GENCY PLANNING OFOLLOWING IS A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF GEN NORSTADS ATLANTIC COUNCIL THIS MORNING ON LIVE-OAK PLANNING.NORSTAD BEGAN BY POINTING OUT THAT HE HAD REVEALED MUCH OF LIVE-OAK PLANNING BEFORE WITHOUT REFERRING TO IT BY THAT NAME AND WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION TO DO SO.HE SAID THAT ANNEX A TO P0/61/765(PARA4 OF OUR REFTEL)COVERED LIVE-OAK RATHER WELL.LIVE-OAK HAD NOT RPT NOT EXTENDED TO PLANNING OF OPERATIONS WHICH COULD BE SAID TO BE OF A MAJOR MILITARY SCOPE ON THE BASIS OF THE SIZE INVOLVED.WIDER PLANNING,IE OR NUMBER OF FORCES PLANNING WITH A MAJOR MILITARY SCOPE, TOOK PLACE ON A NATO,NOT RPT NOT A TRIPARTITE,BASIS.IT IS TO THE WIDER PLANNING THAT ANNEX B(PARA5 OUR REFTEL)REFERS. 2.THE LIVE-OAK ORGANIZATION STARTED IN THE WINTER OF 1958-59 THE 1958 CRISIS OVER BERLIN,ON A TRIPARTITE WEST GERMANOBSERVER HAD PARTICIPATED.THE AFTER BASIS.MORE RECENTLY,A TERMS OF REF FOR LIVE-OAK, AS DESCRIBED ON A CHART DISPLAYED AT THE NEET ING, WERE: ( 1 )RECOMMEND QUIET PRECAUTIONARY MILITARY MEASURES;(2)ASSIST IN BClJN IN AIRLIFT PLANNING:(3)PLAN INITIAL TIOOS IF ACCESS TO BERLIN WAS DENIED; (4)PLAN THE THREE E~!BASSIES PROBE OF SOVIET INTENFOR SUPPLEMENTARY MILITARY EFFORTS. 3.IN AN AMPLIFICATION,NORSTAD SAID THAT INCLUDED IN ITEM(l)IN THESE TERMS OF REF WAS INTENSIFICATION MAINTAINING SUPPLIES OF NATO PRACTICE ALERTS; FOR THE BERLIN GARRISON AT A TWELVE-MONTHLEVEL; INCREASE PATROLLING OF EAST GERMANBORDERS BY UK AND USA;/-,$ 8,:43-- SE IN AUTOBAHNTRAFF IC. 4.RE ITEM(3),NORSTAD SAID THAT LIVE-OAK HAD DEVELOPED PLANS TO DETER- MINE WITHOUT QUESTION WHETHER THE ENEMY INTENDED TO USE FORCE TO 000206 �DOWNGRA~D T9S~CREl ·,.JDUIT A SECRET . .~).J l p.) PAGE TWO 2486 FEB2 7 1985 PREVENTACCESSTO BERLIN.THECHARTTHATNORSTADDISPLAYEDAT THIS POINT UNDERTHE HEADINGQUOTEPROBEOF SOVIET INTENTIONSUNQUOTE PROVIDETDIN THE AIR FOR A PROBEBY ONE MILITARYTRANSPORT FROMEACH OF THE THREENATIONSANDFOR CIVILIAN TRANSPORTS TO BE MANNED BY MILITARYCREWS;a-J THE GROUND THEREWERETO BE SMALLTRIPARTITE CONVOYS.THE QUOTEGUIDINGPRINCIPLE UNQUOTE SHOWNON THE BOTTOMOF THE CHARTFOR THESE PROBESWASGIVENAS QUOTEWILL NOT RPT NOT FIRE WNLESS FIRED UPONANDTHEN ONLYAS NECESSARYTO EXTRICATEITSELF UNQUOTE. SPEAKINGOF THESE PROBES,NORSTAD SAID QUOTENONEOF THESE PROBESHAVEENVISAGEDSUSTAINEDCOMBATUNQUOTE.HE THENWENTON, HOWEVE~TOWARNTHE COUNCILAS HE HADDONEIN THE PAST THAT,WHILE FORCE WASIN CONTACTWITHFORCE,THEREWASALWAYS DANGEROF LARGER INVOLVEMENT EVENTHOUGHINSTRUCTIONSSOUGHTTO MINIMIZE THIS DANGER. THE DANGERREMAINED NO RPT NO MATTERHOWSMALLTHE FORCE.WHILELIVEOAKPLANS HADNOT RPT NOT BEENCOORDINATED IN A TECHNICAL SENSE WITHNATOPLANS,THEYHADBEEN DEVELOPED TO BE CONSISTENTWITH THEM:THEFACT THATNORSTADHADLIVE-OAK UNDERHIS CONTROLWASA GUARANTY OF THIS. 5.TUR-JING NEXT TO ITEM(4),SUPPLEivJENTARY MILITARYEFFORTS,NORSTAD POINTED OUT THATTHIS WASBASEDON RATHERLARGERFORCES.HIS CHART SAID THATTHE PURPOSEWOULD BE TO QUOTETEST THE RANGEOF FORCE THE USSR WASREADYTO APPLY UNQUOTE,AND STATEDTHATTHE OBJECTIVEWAS QUOTETO DEMONSTRATE DETERMINATION TO REACTWITHFORCE OR TO TEST THE RANGEOF FORCE THE SOVIETS ARE READYTO APPLY UNQUOTE.FOR THIS PURPOSE,IN THE AIR NORSTADENVISAGEDTHE USE OF FIGHTERS TO SUPPORT AIR PROBESANDTHE USE OF FIGHTERS TO SUPPORTGROUND OPERATIONS.CN LAND,ATRIPARTITE BATTALIONPROBEWOULD BE INVOLVED.STUDY HADTAKEN PLACE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF EMPLOYING A TRIPARTITE DIV.NORSTADALSO SAID THATCONSIDERATION HADBEEN GIVEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPANDINGTHE NUMBEROF COUNTRIESINVOLVEDBEYONDTHREE,BUTHE THOUGHT THIS PROBLEMFELL UNDERANNEXB.NORSTADREMARKED THATHE THOUGHT ••• 3 000207 �DOWNGRAO~D TOSECRET REBUIT AjECRET _lliltt~i~) PAGE THREE2486 FEB2 7 1985 THERE WASA BASIS FOR MAINTAININGTHE LIVE-OAK GROUP:THEREWERE LEGAL AND OTHERREASONSWHYTHERE MUSTBE A BASIS FOR A TRIPARTITE EFFORT.HE DREWATTENTIONTO THE FACT THAT ON THE PROBE LEVEL PLANNINGWAS NOT RPT NOT ON A NATIONALBASIS BUT TRIPARTITE,GIVING IT AN QUOTEALLIED FLAVOURUNQUOTE. 6.TURNING TO AIRLIFT OPERATIONSCITEM 2 IN HIS TERMS OF REF)NORSTADS CHART SHOWEDA NUMBEROF ALTERNATIVES:Cl)A GARRISONAIRLIFT;(2)A CIVILIAN AIRLIFTCSUBSTITUTINGMILITARY FOR CIVILIAN TRANSPORT); (3)QUOTE TRIPLE PLAY UNQUOTE<THE AIR EVACUATIONOF ALLIED NONCOMBATTANTS AND OTHERSFROMWEST BERLIN IN 36 HOURS);(4)QUOTE Q-BALL UNQUOTE<FULL ALLIED AIRLIFT IN SUPPORTOF WEST BERLIN).NORSTADSAID THAT THE THREE AMBASSADORS IN BONNHADSPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY RELATING TO AIRLIFT PLANNING,BUTOBVIOUSLYIT WASTHE MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTUREWHICHWOULDHAVETO CARRYOUT THE OPERATION. 7.CONTINUING WITH HIS ORAL PRESENTATION,NORSTAD SAID THAT IN RECENT WEEKS HE HAD TAKENSTEPS TO INCREASEPREPAREDNESS,FOREXAMPLEBY . ESTABLISHING A LIVE-OAK OPERATIONSAND INFO CENTREWHICHCOLLECTED INFO CONCERNINGINCIDENTS AND OTHERMATTERSOF INTEREST TO THE LIVEOAK PLANNERS,FOLLOWED TRENDSAND COULDMAKERECOMMENDATIONS.IF NECESSARY,THEOPERATIONSAND INFO CENTRECOULDASSUMESOMEOPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OR AT LEAST ASSIST WITH IT.NORSTAD EMPHASIZEDIT AS HIS PERSONALVIEW THAT IF A PROBE WERENEEDEDIT WOULDBE BETTER TO CONTROLIT THROUGHNATOCOMMAND CHANNELS.HEHAD ALSO ACTIVATEDAN AIR COMMAND POST,SITUATED AT RAMSTEIN,ANDSTAFFED BY TRIPARTITE REPS, WITH THE DUTYOF EVALUATINGTRAFFIC IN THE AIR CORRIDORSAND ASSESSING INCIDENTS.IT TOO WASCAPABLEOF EXERCISING OPERATIONAL CONTROL.AFEW TRANSPORTANDFIGHTER AIRCRAFT WEREKEPT ON THE ALERT TO REACT QUICKLYTO ANYRELOCKINGOF AIR TRANSPORTARRANGEMENTS. THERE WASA CAPABILITY TO USE MILITARY OR CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT WITH OR WITHOUTFIGHTER ESCORT IN SUCH A REACTION.HESPOKE OF THE INTRODUCTION RECENTLYOF A NEWFIGHTER AIRCRAFTWHICHWOULDBE QUOTEUSEF'UL•••• 4• 000208 �DOWKGRAD£D TOSECRET . IDUIT ASECRET ) ·_lbW\~Pt FEB2 7 1985 PAGEF'OL:R2486 IN THIS OPERATIONUNQUOTE.THE EXACTIMPLICATIONOF THIS TERMWAS NOT RPT NOT CLEAR;BUTSIGNIFICANCEMIGHTBE ATTACHED TO IT BECAUSE HIS REF WASSO POINTEDBUT AT THE SAMETIME SO VAGUE.THESEAIRCRAFT ARE KEPT ON CONSTANTALERT,SOMREOF THEMON FIFTEEN-MINUTENOTICE, SOME ON THIRTY-MINUTE,SOME ON ONE-HOURANDSOMEON SIX-HOUR.THEY WEREREADYTO MEETA SITUATION QUICKLYANDEFFECTIVELY. 8.LIVE-OAK IS CONSIDERINGANDREVIEWINGEAST GERMAN MEANSOF INTERFERENCEWITH GROUND ANDAAIR TRAFFIC ANDMEANSOF REACTINGPROMPTLY TO SUCH INTERFERENCE.NORSTAD SAID THAT EXPERIENCETHIS SUMMER HAD CONVINCEDHIM THAT IT WASPOSSIBLE TO REACTAT ONCEMORESAFELYAND ON A SMALLERSCALE THANAFTER A DELAY.HEWASTHEREFOREKEEPING FORCES IN POSITION FOR RAPID RESPONSEHO ANYACTIONBY THE OTHER SIDE.REFERRING TO THE RELATIONSHIPOF LIVE-OAK TO NATOPLANNING, NORSTADASSUREDTHE COUNCILTHAT IN HIS DUALCAPACITYHE HAD ALWAYS MADESURE ANDWOULDALWAYS MAKESURE THAT LIVE-OAK PLANS WOULDCOMPLEMENT ANDSUPPLEMENT NATOPLANS,NOTRPT NOT CONFLICT WITH THEM.NATOMUSTBECOMEFULLY INVOLVEDIN°ANY LARGERPLANS FROM THE FIRST MINUTE. 9.THE DISCUSSION WHICHFOLLOWED THIS PRESENTATIONANDNORSTADS QUESTIONOF A NEWEXERCISE TO FOLLOWUP QUOTEOPERATIONLONGTHRUST UNQUOTEWHICHWASCANCELLED LAST MAYARE THE SUBJECT OF SEPARATETELS.• 000209 �s c~~.fv .·s (!/,· ,. ----~R,.:;;E~G:,.,!l~S~T~R!.Y!_j FM NATOPARISSEP29/61 SECRET . TO EXTEFtlAL2483 OPIMMEDCLIMITED DISTTRIBUTION~ INFO CCOS OPIMMED LDN WASHDC EMBPARIS DM/rn D FM CCOS C '- . . i !, ·010\,_ - C-vo 1> ,.~,JJ /U ,s,'1'7 n~co¼v ;J\ ~) r (./ ~v ,.rr v ~v r , ·O, REF OURTEL2458 SEP28 BERLINCONTINGENCY PLANNING '1. COUNCILGAVEPRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION TO DOCUP0/61/765 AT A R STD ,..../ MEETING CH SEP29. GEN NORSTAD WAS PRESENT.HE BRIEFED THE COUNCIL ~Ji/ ON THE SCOPE AND PRESENT STATUS OF LIVE OAK PLANNING.FOR SAKE OF ,J_, / COOVENIENCE WEARE REPORTINGHIS FORMALBRIEFING IN A SEPARATEMSG. 2.IN INTRODUCING THE DISCUSSIONSECGENSAID THATHE REGARDED TODAYS SESSIOOAS ONEDSIGNEDPRIMARILYTO ELICIT FURTHERINFO.HE THEN SET OUTHIS OWNINTERPRETATION OF THE TWOANNEXES TO THE DOCU.ANNEX A,THE REPORTOF THE THREEGOVTS,WAS NOT RPT NOT IN HIS ESTIMATION 00 E WHICHCOUNCILCOMMENT WASNECESSARILYREQUIRED. IT WAS REPORTING ACTIONOF THE THREEGOVTSTO PLANFOR THE DEFENCEOF THEIR OCCUPATION FORCESIF ATTACKED IN BERLIN.HETHOUGHT THE THREEGOVTS, AS ANYOTHERINDIVIDUALGOVTREPRESENTED IN NATO,HADTHE RIGHTAND THE DUTYTO PLANFOR THE DEFENCEOF THEIR OWNFORCESIF ATTACKED. \ ANNEXB, IE INSTRUCTIONS TO NATOMILITARYAUTHORITIESWASDIFFERiNT \\ \ ; J IN NATURE. IT WASSECGENSUNDERSTAND.nm THT IF IT OR SOMEVERSIONOF ! IT WEREADOPTEDBY COUNCILALL EARLIERINSTRUCTIONS TO NATOCOMMANDERSWITH.RESPECTTO BERLINWOULD BE WITHDRAWN ANDTHEREAFTER ANY CHANGESWHICHMIGHTBE DESIREDIN LIVE OAKPLANNINGWOULD BE DEVELOPEDIN NATONO RPT NO MATTERFROMWHERETHE INITIATIVE FOR CHANGE MIGHTCOME.IF THIS WASTHE CASE WECOULDFORGETTHE PROBLEM WHICH I HADBEENPOSEDBY THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AMBASSADORIAL STEERINGGROUP IN WASHOC.HE MADETWOFURTHERGENERALPOINTS.POLITICALDIRECT:VEAND STRATEGICCONCEPTWERETHE GUIDINGDOCUSFOR NATOMILITARYPLANNING ANDNO RPT NO PLANSINVOLVING NATOFORCESSHOULDBE MADEWHICHDID NOT RPT NOT COMEWITHINTHE AMBITOF THESETWODOCUS.HEDID NOT RPT NOT THINKTHATTHE PLANNINGTOUCHED ON IN EITHER ANNEXA ORB HAD ••• 2 000210 / / :~ \ �N PA GE TWO 2483 IN FACT OF THESE BASIC GONE BEYOND THE LIMITS BELIEVED THAT THE MILITARY PLANS SEEMED NECESSARY TICAL DIRECTIVE AUTHORITIES CONCEPT.NO CRISIS PRIMARILY FOR PLANS TO DEFEND THE ALLIANCE THE MILITARY RPI NO MATTER WHAT COlvJMANDERS WERE RESPONSIBLE WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE DOCUS. 3.AFTER THIS ARISE, TO MAKE WHATEVER THE BROAD CONCEPT OF THE POLI- IMMEDIATE BASIC MIGHT HAD THE RIGHT TO THEM WITHIN AND THE STRATEGIC DOCUS.SECONDLY,HE NORSTADS POINT,A WHICH MIGHT BRIEFING SERIES ON LIVE OAK PLANNING OF QUESTIONS BETTER WERE RAISED BE REPORTED IN WHICH TOOK PLACE AT BY COUNCIL MEMBERS SEQUENCE RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING TO GROUP THEM UNDER GENERAL HEADINGS. 4.ITALIAN MILITARY ACTION CONSULTATION WOULD IN THE THREE .POWERS VIEW WITH NATO. DID THE IDEA FOR EXAMPLE, THE SMALL SCALE REPLY WAS TO THE EFFECT OF PLANS OF PREVIOUS THAT THE QUESTION PREVIOUS CONSULTATION HE DID ON THIS SUBJECT INVOLVED HIS THE IMPLEMENTATION SCOPE OF RESPO.'J HE WOULD CERTAINLY ANY PLAN OF MILITARY NOT RPT NOT KNOW OF ANY DECISION BY ANY POLITICAL HOPE THAT ACTION IF GOVERN PARA 3 .N ORSTADS HAD BEEN CHARGED ONLY WITH DRAWING UP PLANS.HE TO SAY HOWEVER THAT BEEN TAKEN REQUIRE PROBES REFERRED TO IN WHICH WAS NOT RPT NOT PROPERLY WITHIN SIBILITIES.HE MIND OF REP REFERRED TO PARA 8 OF ANNEX A AND ASKED WHAT SIZE AUTHORITIES. HE WAS REQUIRiD HE COULD BE EMPOWERED TO IN WENT ON THAT HIS HAD OWN TU IMPLEMENT DO SO THROUGH NATO COMMAND CHANNELS AND NOT RPI NOT THROUGH SOME OTHER CHANNELS. SEC GEN SAID PLANS 1 THAT IT AT THE POINT WAS HIS VIEW THAT AT WHICH THEY MIGHT PARA 8 WAS MEANT TO COVER ALL HAVE TO BE HiPLEMENTED.USA, FRENCH AND UK REPS AGREED. 5.SECGEN THEN ASKED WHETHER IT POSSIBLE USE OF CORPS FORMATIONS AT THE MOMENT.NORSTAD THAN A DIV WAS BEING SAID THAT WAS TRUE THAT PLANNING WAS BEING THE DONE ONLY ON A USA BASIS ANY PLANNING DONE ON A NATO BASISCAS INVOLVING INVOLVING DISTINCT,WE UNITS LARGER PRESUME, ••• 3 000211 �PAGE THREE2483 FROMLIVE OAKOR TRIPARTITE BASIS). 6.1 PUT MYFIRST QUESTIONSIN THE CONTEXTOF A FEW GENERALREMARKS EMPHASISINGIN THE FIRST INSTANCETHAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLEFOR MY AUTHORITIESTO CONSIDERTHE ISSUES INVOLVEDANDBE IN A POSITia~ TO GIVE DECISIVE COMMENTS UNDERTHE PROPOSEDTIMETABLE,IE BY NEXT WEEK.THEPLANS REFERREDTO IN THESE PAPERS HADBEEN IN GESTATION FOR SOMEMONTHS. OURAUTHORITIESWOULD REQUIREMORETHANA FEW DAYS TO DIGEST THEM.TURNING THENTO PARA8 OF ANNEXA I SAID THAT SINCE IT WASA REPORTBY THE THREE POWERSWE WOULD NOT RPI NOT PROBABLY BE EXPECTEDTO CONSIDERREDRAFTINGIT.WE MIGHTHOWEVER EXPRESS OUR VIEWS 00 ITS SUBSTANCE. IT STRUCKt'iE,FOR EXAMPLE, THATTHE FIRST SENTENCEOF PARASHOULDBE PUT IN MUCHMOREPOSITIVE TERMS.THETHREE GOVTSWOULD RECOGNIZETHATTHE IMPLEMENTATION OF LIVE OAKPLANS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVEPOLITICAL AS WELLAS MILITARY IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO.INDEEDTHE PROBINGHADALREADYSTARTEDWHENUSA GARRISOO IN BERLIN WASINCREASED.THISPROE HADALREADYHAD ITS POLITICAL EFFECT ON THE SITUATION.WEMIGHTASK AS WELLWHAT· WASTHE SIGNIFICANCEOF QUOTETIME PERMITTINGUNQUOTE IN THE SECOND.SENTENCEOF THE PARA.TIMEWASALWAYS A FACTORWITH RESPECTTO MILITARYACTIVITIES. NOOEOF US WOULD WISH TO PREVENTNECESSARYACTIONSBUT WE MUST CLARIFY AS MUCHAS POSSIBLE WHATTHE INTENTIONOF ALL CONCERNED WAS. WASIT SATISFACTORY,FOR EXAMPLE,TOALL MEMBERS OF ThE COUNCILTHAT THIS ESCAPECLAUSESHOULDEXIST.WOULDIT NOT RPI NOT BE BETTERTHAT COUNCILMEMBERS SPOULDBE BETTERINFORMED CONCERNING THE ~UOTECATALOGUEOF PLANS UNQUOTE REFERREDTO IN ANNEXBIN ORDERTHATTHEIR GOVTSCOULDPERHAPSTAKEDECISIONS IN ADVANCE WITH RESPECTTO SOME OF THESE PLANS.IT WOULD NOT RPT NOT OF COURSEBE PROPERFOR ME TO RESERVE THE C DN GOVTS POSIT ION WITH HESP ECT TO A REPORT CONTA IN ING THE VIEWS OF THE THREE GOVTS.I COULDHOWEVER WARNTHE COUNCILTHAT THEREWERECOMPLICATIONS AHEADIF IT WASINTENDEDTHAT TH£ ••• 4 000212 \ \ �PAGE FOUR 2483 IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS WHICHCOULDAFFECT THE ALLIANCEDEEPLY WASTO TAKEPLACEWITHOUTTHERE HAVINGBEENCONSULTATION ANDCONSENT IN THE COUNCIL. 6.SECGEN ANDREPS OF USA ANDUK TOGETHERGAVEA FAIRLY SATISFACTORY ANSWERTO THIS LAST QUESTION.THEY ALL AGREEDTHATTHE INTENTIONOF THE PHRASEWASTO PROVIDEFOR THE ABILITY SITUATIONSWHEREIMMEDIATE ACTIONWASFORCEDUPONA MILITARYCOMMANDER BY EVENTS.FOREXAMPLE,IF AN AIRCRAFTWASFIRED ON PLANNINGWOULD HAVETO PROVIDEFOR THE ABILITY TO RESPONDIMMEDIATELY.USA REP EXPLAINEDHIS THINKINGIN THIS REGARDBY REFERRINGTO A PEARL HARBOUR TYPE OF SITUATIONWHERE NECESSARYDEFENSIVEACTIONHADTO BE TAKENIMMEDIATELY.PARA 8 WAS NOT RPT NOT INTENDEDTO LEAVETHE IMPRESSIONTHAT THEREWOULD BE TWO KINDS OF CONSULTATION, a'J E BETWEEN THE THREEPOWERSANDTHE OTHER WITH THE COUNCILAS A WHOLE.THISLAST COMMENT MADEBY USA REP WAS IN DIRECT RESPONSETO BELGIANREPS POINT THAT IF THEREWASTIME FOR THE THREE GOVTSTO CONSULTTHERE WASTIME FOR THE COUNCILTO BE CCNSULTED. ?.NETHERLANDSREP LED OFF THE QUESTIONINGWITH RESPECTTO ANNEXB IN ASKINGWHETHER IN NORSJADSVIEW THE THREECIRCUMSTANCES OUTLINED IN PARA6 D FITTED WITHIN THE POLITICAL DIRECTIVE ANDTHE STRATEGIC CONCEPT.NORSTAD SAID THAT BEFOREREPLYINGTO THIS PARTICULARQUESTION HE WOULD LIKE TO FIT THE DOCUIN SOMEPERSPECTIVE.HEHADHEARD ABOUTTWOMONTHSAGOOF A POSSIBLE DIRECTIVE WHICHMIGHTBE PREPARED ANDHADTAKENTHE VIEW THAT HE DID NOT RPI NOT NEED A NEWDIRECTIVE SO FAR AS HIS MILITARYRESPONSIBILITIES WERECONCERNED AT LEAST.HE UNDERSTOOD THATOTHERFACTORSHOWEVER HADMADESUCHA DIRECTIVE NECESSARY.HEHADSEEN A DRAFTDIRECTIVE SOMETWOWEEKSAGOAND COULDSAY THATTHE PRESENTDRAFTWASA VAST IMPROVEMENT OVERTHAT ORIGINALDOCUEVENTHOUGHHE WOULD HAVEWRITTENIT DIFFERENTLY .THE IMPORTANT THING IN HIS MIND WASTHAT DOCUAS DRAFTERPERMITTEDA ••• 5 000213 �PAGE FIVE WRIE BROADRANGEOF INTERPRETATIONANDHE WOULDBE THE ONE WHOWOULD HAVETO INTERPRET IT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.HECOULDASSURE COUNCILTHAT ANY INTERPRETATIONHE WOULDGIVE IT WOULDBE FULLY WITHIN THE TERMSOF THE POLITICAL DIRECTIVE ANDWOULJSE CONSISTENT WITH ESTABLISHEDSTRATEGICDOCTRINE.HEWOULDOF COURSEGO FURTHER IN HIS MILITARY PLANNING.FOREXAMILE,MEASURES OUTLINEDIN PARA 10 WEREIN HIS VIEW ONLYSOMEOF THE MEASURESWHICHHADTO BE CONSIDEREDTO PUT NATOFORCES IN A POSITION TO COPE WITH A MILITARY EMERGENCY.HE HADALREADYDIRECTEDHIS SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS TO PREPARESUCH PLANS AS THEY THOUGHT WERENECESSARYFOR A MILITARY EMERGENCY ANDWHILE THEY INCLUDEDTHE MEASURESOUTLINED N!PARA 10 THEY WERENOT RPT NOT LIMITED TO THEM.HEMADEIT CLEARTHAT HE WAS SPEAKING IN TERMSOF PLANS WITH A NATO-WIDEAPPLICATIONANDNOT RPI NOT IN TERMSOF LIVE OAKPLANNING.SOFAR AS THE SPECIFIC QUESTION PUT BY NELHERLANDS REP WASCONNERNED,HE COULDONLYSAY THAT AN INCONSISTENCY WITH NATODIRECTIVES AS HE UNDERSTOOD THEMWOULDONLYEXIST IF PARA 6D WEREREADAS BEING RESTRICTIVE IN • THE PLANNEDRECOURSE TO NUCLEARWEAPONS.INOTHERWORDSIF THE SUBPARAMEANTTHAT ONLYUNDER THESE THREE CONDITIONSCOULDNUCLEARWEAPONSBE USED HE WOULDTHINK SUCH AN INTERPRETATIONRESTRICTIVE AND INCONSISTENTWITH THE STRATEGIC CONCEPTAS HE UNDERSTOOD IT. 8.I FOLLOWED UP WITH THE QUESTIONSPECIFICALLY CONCERNING SUBPARA 6DEMDIDTHIS IN GEN NORSTADSMINDSPECIFICALLY FALL WITHIN THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT.I WASTHINKINGIN TERMSOF POSSIBLE EFFECT OF USE OF A QUOTENUCLEARSHOT ACROSSTHE BOWUNQUOTE.ONE POSSIBLE OUTCOME WAS THE RAPID ESCALATIONSUGGESTEDEARLIER IN THE PAPER INTO A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE.THISWASA RESULTWE DID NOT RPT NOT WANT.ONEOTHER POSSIBLE RESULTWASTHAT THE"OTHERSIDE WOULDNOT RPT NOT RESPOND ANDTHEN THE WESTWOULDBEARTHE ODIUMBEFOREWORLDOPINION OF THE FIRST USE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS. : MMY,T.JT T ' ' • 000214 �PAGE SIX 2483 9. GENNORSTADSAID THAT HE THOUGHT FIRST OF ALL THATTHE ACTION COVEREDIN SUBPARA6 D3 WASCONSISTENTWITH NATODIRECTIVES.HE WENT ON THENTO TRY TO ADDSOMEPERSPECTIVE.IT WASHIS VIEW THATUSE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS EVENSELECTIVELYCOULDBE CONSIDEREDONLYWHEN EVERYTHING ELSE HADFAILED,WHENPOLITICAL NEGOTIATIONSHADBROKEN DOWN, WHENECONOMIC PRESSURESHADFAILED,WHENMINORPROBESHAD FAILED TO CHANGETHE SITUATIONANDWHENFORCES HADACTUALLY BEEN FI RED ON.NO RPI NO MATTERHOWf1UCHWASSAID ABOUTTH:C::SE PROBLEMS EVENTUALLY WECAf'1EBACKTO THE SAMEROOTPROBLEl'<l, WHENGOV TS WOULD BE FACEDWITH A DECISION TO ACCEPTDEFEATOR TO TAKENUCLEARACTION. HE HOPEDTHEREFORETHATWHENCOUNCILWASCONSIDERINGTHIS PARTICULAR ASPECT THEYWOULD CONSIDERIT IN THIS LIGHT,NAMELY THATALL OTHER CONCEIVABLE STEPS HADBEEN TAKENTO REMEDYTHE SITUATIONAND HAD FAILED TO HAVETHEIR EFFECT ON THE OTHERSIDE. 10.I FOLLOWED UP WITHTHE QUESTIONSET OUT IN PARA 12 OF YOURTEL DL1223,IE WASIT INTENDEDTHATTHERE SHOULDBE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICHA POLITUCALDECISION WOULD BE REQUIRED. NORSTADSAID HE ACCEPTEDTHIS PARAAS A GENERALFRAMEWORK FOR \ ; PLANNINGAS HE WOULDINDEEDACCEPTTHE WHOLEDIRECTIVE IF IT CAME TO HIM.HE DID NOT RPT NOT REGARDTHE DIRECTIVEAS GIVING HIIvlANY OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE;THAT WOULD HAVETO COMEFROMHIGHERAUTHORITY. SECGL~CONCURRED ANDDREWCOUNCILSATTENTIONTO THE GENERALPROVISO MADEIN PARA8 OF ANNEXB THATALL PLANS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DECISICNS BY GOVTS. 11.ITALIAN REP SOUGHTFURTHERCLARIFICATIONAS TO WHENPOLITICAL DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKENANDBY WHOM.SECGEN ADMITTEDTHAT U GOOD DEALMORECLARIFICATIONWASREQUIREDON THIS POINT.REVERTINGAGAIN TOXTHEISSUE DEALTWITH IN PARA6D SECGENSAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT BY SELECTIVEUSE WASMEANTUSE OF A SMALLWARHEAD WITH GREATPRECISION ANDNOT RPT NOT,FOR EXAMPLE, THE USE OF THE STRATEGICAIR ••• 7 000215 �PAGE SEVEN2483 COMMAND.NORSTAD AGREED.FURTHERMORE SECGENTHOUGHT THAT SO FAR AS POLITICAL DECISIONS WERECONCERNED CONSIDERATION HADTO BE GIVEN TO THE FACT THAT BILATERALAGREEMENTS WEREINVOLVED,!£ BETWEENUSA AND OTHERINDIVIDUALGOVTS.COUNCIL HADNOT RPI NOT MADEMUCHPROGRESS IN ITS STUDYOF THE CONTROLANDUSE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS.AGREATDEAL OF FURTHERCLARIFICATIONWASREQUIRED.UNTILTHAT ISSUE WASCLARIFIED THE PRESENTSYSTEMOF CONTROLWOULD CONTINUETO EXIST.CSECGEN WASREFERRINGIN THIS INSTANCETO USA CONTROLOF WARHEADS>. 12.BELGIAN REP,REFERRINGTO PARAS9 AND 10 OF ANNEXB,ASKEDWHETHER WE WEREJUST BEGINNINGTHE PROCESSOF PLANNINGOR HAOTH£ MEASURES OUTLINEDALREADYBEENCONSIDEREDIN THE TRIPARTITE CONTEXT.NORSTAD RPTEDWHATHE HADSAID EARLIER TO THE EFFECT THAT HE HADALREADY ISSUED INSTRUCTIONSTO HIS COMMANDERS TO PREPAREPLANS ON THESE MEASURESANDON OTHERS.NATO-WIDE PLANNINGTHEREFOREWASBEING UNDERTAKENcx,;J A NATO-WIDEBASIS ANDNOT RPT NOT ON A TRIPARTITE BASIS EXCEPTFOR THOSESPECIFIC CONTINGENCY PLANS WHICHHADHERETOFORE COMEUNDERTHE LIVE OAKLABEL. 13.THERE FOLLOWED SOMERATHERCONFUSEJDISCUSSION ON WHATWASMEANT IN PARA6 B BY TERMQUOTEPOLITICAL AUTHORITIESUNQUOT£.FRENCH REP SAID THATTHEYWERETHE COMPETENT POLITICAL AUTHORITIES,WHICH WAS NOT RPI NOT PARTICULARLY ENLIGHTENING.USA REP SAID THATTHE TERMUSED IN PARA6 B HADTHE SAMEMEANINGAS THE TERMINOLOGY OF PARA8.NORSTAD WASAS USUALSTRAIGHTFORWARD ON THE SUBJECT.IT WASCLEAR,HE SAID, THATSOMEBODY HADTO DIRECT HIM TO IMPLEMENT PLANS WHICHHE HAD DRAWN UP. UNTIL HE WASTOLDDIFFERNTLYPOLITICAL AUTHORITESNEANT TO HIM COUNCIL.HEWISHEDEVERYONE TO UNDERSTAND HIS POSITION CLEARLY. IF AN EMERGENCY WERETO ARISE TOMORROW HE WOULD SEEK COUNCILDIRECTICN. IN INTERPOSEDTO SUGGESTTHATFOR CDN AUTHORITIESIT WAS DIFFICULT AT SUCHA DISTANCETO SEE GENNORSTADSUSCINCEURHAT.FOR THEMANDFOR THE CDN PUBLIC GENNORSTADWASCOMMANDER OF NATOTROOPS • • ••8 000216 �PAGE EIGHT 2483 NORSTADACCEPTEDTHE POINT WITH GOODGRACEBUT DID SUGGESTTHAT INSOFARAS ANNEXA WASCONCERNED ANOTHERAUTHORITYDID EXIST.S£CGEN ONCEAGAINAGAINMADETHE POINT THAT IN HIS MINDTHE THREE GOVTS HAD THE RIGHT ANDTHE RESPONSIBILITY TO TAKEACTIONTO DEFENDTHEIR FOR:;ES IN BERLIN AGAINSTATTACKJUST AS EACH GOVTOF THE ALLIANCE HAJ THAT RIGHT.I THOUGHTIT WISE TO LEAVENO RPT NO DOUBTON THIS POINT IN THE MINDS OF THE COUNCILAND I INDICATEDTHEREFORETHAT I WASSURE MY AUTHORITIESWOULDHOLDTHE VIEW THAT IF ANDWHENNORSTAD ORDEREDFORCES INTO ACTIONHE WASSACEURANDNOBODYELSE.THAT HE MIGHTPLAN WITH DIFFERENTHATS WASONE THING,BUTFOR PUBLIC OPINION, CNCEHE ENGAGEDIN MILITARYACTION IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO MAKE LEGALDISTINCTIONS.FINLETTERSAID HE DID NOT RPI NOT WISH AT THIS POINT TO COMMENT FURTHERON PROBLEMANDNORWEGIAN REP URGEDTHAT FURTHERDISCUSSIONSSHOULDBE RESTOTO A MUCHMORELIMITED GROUP. DISCUSSIONTHEREFOREBROKEOFF FAIRLY ABRUPTLYANDWILL BE RENEWED ON TUES OCT3. 14.IT IS FULLY RECOC¾JIZED THAT NO RPT NO DECISIONS CAN BE REACHED NEXT WEEKANDTHAT WE SHALLCONTINUETO ATTEMPTTO CLARIFY THE MEANINGOF PAPERS BEFOREUS.THE ANSWERSTO SOMEOF THE QUESTIONS POSED IN YOURTELDL1223 WILL BE APPARENTFROMTHE BRIEFING GIVEN BY NORSTADON LIVE OAKPLANNING.I SHALLPURSUETHE OTHERQUESTIONS AS COUNCILDISCUSSIONCONTINUES LEGER 000217 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Berlin Crisis / 29 SEPTEMBER 1961 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1961-09-29 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00032 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived NATO Paris to External Affairs, ‘‘Berlin-Contingency Planning,’’ 29 Sept. 1961, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-1-40, part 1. air lift Berlin contingency Lauris Norstad Live Oak tripartite