1 20 1 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/bc697ad832d5f8fdab6d135aabbd72d4.pdf 5a058b66637c386468e147dc8b961a12 PDF Text Text orJJ✓~b) ¥ / ~\9~~, ' ·"~ \--· f( -1ot ::;/t(/.-?..~ "7;,Y. j.~f.' ...... SECURI?:LASS~~ATION ~~sr~·~ l'-sS\:, !'li>, ;; -. ,· 'I ~• '• En. l No••• Despatch r-----=D.aa..at..e. '··.March . .22., .195-4 •.. · ...... FROM: ~--_-_ TO: ~~~ -~ ere nee •.•. a:.-::~-~lject: ..... W'-- ~!'.~ ~ • D _-:-\ , . -:------ _ \ ~/ . C:anad,i.an ·/4_¥'!,' ~~ S E C R E T '\}~ "'.~ .-ft."J . Ambassador, Canadi~ Embassy, WASHINGTON,D. C. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA Our. . Ue spa;t. ch. . ~.o•.. ll.? ..Q f ...JM WH'Y.. A?,.. ~.9.? It , ................. Iloite.d . .States ~ ✓4 ~ \l.. D~.f.enc~.. f.cfl-;l<;Y.• ...................................... . ,✓ :-----1 _rr. ___ , Copies Re £erred To .............. . No. of Enclosures \..: '5 ...:J........... . Post File No ............... Public interest in the United States has been focused more sharply on the country's new defence strategy in the past two weeks than~ any time since the new Administration took office. On the domestic political front Mr. Stevenson and Vice President Nixon debated the merits of the "new look"; within the Administration there were evidences of disagreement between Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, and General Ridgway, the Army Chief of Staff, on the role assigned to the Army under the new strategy; last but by no means least the international implications of the new strategy were underlined by Mr. Pearson's timely remarks to the National Press Club in Washington on March 15. Mr. Dulles, who, because of the demands on his time, has not been in Washington for any length of time in the past two months, was therefore faced at his press conference on March 16 with a number of searching questions on the~ new defence strategy of the United States. You will ~ remember that it was Mr. Dulles speaking on behalf of the President and the Administration, who described for the public's benefit the principles underlying the new defence strategy in his address to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on January 12. Mr. Dulles' answers to the questions asked at the press conference (copies of the transcript of which are attached) taken together with his article in the forthcoming issue of Foreign Affairs (our despatch No. 503 of March 18) go a long way towards clarifying the Secretary's remarks of January 12 and might even be considered to restate the policy outlined by Mr. Dulles at that time. ~ 2. While we do not wish in this l·etter simply to repeat the words of Mr. Dulles which are contained in the attached transcript, we do think that more than usual attention should be devoted to this press conference. From what I .ir. Pearson told us of his private conversations with Mr. Dulles last week it seems that Mr. Dulles made many of the points at this press conference whi~h he made in those talks. We believe that it might also be useful to relate the views of Mr. Dulles·as revealed in the attached transcript to the comments which we made on the new United States strategy in our despatch under reference. 11 . • •• 2 I I 000065 ( �c.. 195tiHAR2~-- ntl 11· 3 2 . ~-. ., 11) l ,, ,-·' J '000066 �-2- 3. Much of the domestic criticism which has been made of the "new look" has centered on the apparent decision of the Administration, as revealed in Mr. Dulles speech of January 12, to depend to a larger extent on the massive retaliatory power of the United States and less on the traditional method of meeting aggression on the ground where it occurs. It seems to us that in his most recent reply to questions from the press, Mr. Dulles has shifted his emphasis, if not his ground. He asserted that he had not meant to suggest in his January 12 tspeech that the United States would in every circumstance /retaliate instantly with its massive retaliatory power, i.e. atomic and thermonuclear weapons, but that what the United States had to build up was its capacity to retaliate instantly. The questi9n of whether or not the United States chose to use that capacity was a matter, he said, which would have to be dealt with in accordance with the facts of each situation. While Mr. Dulles' analysis of what he meant to convey in his earlier speech is valid, if one looks closely at the text of that speech, he must certainly be aware that it was not unreasonable that those who did not have access to his innermost thoughts might miss this fine distinction. With this latest explanation of the point a major element of the United States "new look" assumes much less novel proportions. According to Mr. Dulles, the Administration is simply determined to keep United States defence capacity in constant readiness so that if it is necessary to meet major aggression the United States will not require two or three years to get ready to retaliate. This is a reasonable decision for the Administration to take since in fact on two occasions the United States has been unprepared to shoulder its responsibility immediately in the face of major world conflicts; but when explained in these terms it seems to be a much less startling decision than Mr. Dulles' earlier speech would have led observers to believe had been made by the Administration. If observers are still left with some doubt in their minds on the question made famous by the New Yorker, "which paper do you read", !',tr. Dulles excuses himself from further clarification again by the eminently reasonable argument that one should not tell the enemy in advance exactly where, how and when one plans to retaliate. t 4. Mr. Dulles did go on to assure his questioners that the new United States strategy was not confined in the event of an act of aggression to the two channels of an all-out war or no resistance at all. He said that in indicating that there would be less emphasis. on local defence power, the Administration had simply made clear its intention not to be forced to meet aggression at the particular place and by the particular means which the aggressor selected. There were areas of importance to the aggressor--which were not necessarily either the front line of aggression or the capitals of Peking or Moscow~~where United States retaliation might be effective. What Mr. Dulles seems to be saying indirectly is what Admiral Radford referred to in our recent meeting of consultation as the "deep tactical offensive" use of United States atomic weapons (c.f. para. 35 of our report) ••• 3 000067 • �l -3Admiral Radford at that time explained his terms to mean the use of new weapons in a fashion which was something short of strategic bombing and something more than tactical bombing in front of one's own troops. We would surmise that what is in the minds of both Mr. Dulles and Admiral Radford is the sober realization that United States ground troops (and possibly even the ground troops of all the Western allies) can never match the potential enemy, Russian or Chinese, in numbers and that it is fatal therefore to plan to meet the potential enemy man for man on the ground. The United States aim seems to be to convince its potential enemies that their commitment of ground forces in any act of aggression will not necessarily lead to a United States response in kind. Mr. Dulles freely admitted the element of bluff in this strategy (although, of course, he does not use that word) when he told his questioners that the capacity to retaliate is in itself the great deterrent to aggress~on. "1 believe that the original Korean attack would not have occurred if it had not been assumed either that we would not react at all or if we did react would react only at the places and by the means that the aggressors chose." r 5. Another set of questions to 1~1r. Dulles were directly related by the questioners to Mr. Pearson's speech of March 15, and concerned United States consultation with its allies before a decision was taken to retaliate in any particular circumstance. Mr. Dulles replied in forthright terms that there would certainly be consultation in most of the cases that he could conceive of, for it was impli~it in the security system which has been built up among the Western allies that it operates only with the consent and acquiescence of all the partners who have helped to provide the facilities "which create a sort of international police system". We understood from Mr. Pearson that Mr. Dulles assured him privately that in his own mind a most important element of the United States capacity to retaliate was the whole-hearted co-operation of the allies of the United States and especially of those upon whose territory important United States bases existed. I think we can be certain that in Mr. Dulles mind at least, and probably too in the mind of the President, there is no lack of understanding ef tne need fo~0 ~~Il§tant and intimate consultation/ijith ~t~n~~~~r ti!!I§s on matters which concern the possible use of atomic weapons and the consequent likelihood of the outbreak of a major war. 6. Finally Mr. Dulles dealt directly and in the circumstances, we believe, quite courageously, with questions concerning the President's ability to_order instant retaliation without prior consultation with Congress. At his press conference on March 17- the President himself said that he had no intention of violating the Constitution in any action he might have to take with respect to the outbreak of war and that he thought "it was implicit in the Constitution that the President had to act against sudden unexpected aggression" (and by inference without prior consultation with Con:.;ress) • • • • •4 000068 �./e / · __ -4If one bears in mind that the Bricker controversy on the issue of the limitations on the President's power is very much in the minds of Congress, Mr. Dulles' replies on this occasion can only be taken as stemming from a strongly held conviction on the part of the Administration. Mr. Dulles gave it as his opinion that in any instance of aggression against members of NATOor against allies covered by the Rio Pact the President would have the authority to order instant retaliation even though in every circumstance he might not choie to exercise that authority without consulting Congress. Mr. Dulles admitted that the Indo-China situation would not be covered by French membership in NATO, but he said that he did not wish to imply that the United States should do nothing if the Chinese Communists with regular forces should cross the frontier into Indo-China. He was of the further opinion that the President did not have similar discretion in situations which would be covered only by the United Nations Charters. He refused to be drawn into a discussion of what he called the "twilight zonen of the President's power under the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief to take military action without a declaration of war by Congress. 7. The publication of Mr. Dulles' opinions dealt with in this letter constitutes an important bench-mark in the development of the new United States strategy. We have the impression that the events mentioned in paragraph 1 above have led to the necessity for a clearer thinking out of the Administration's broad objective, in this field. While Mr. Dulles' press conference will serve to clarify the issues further the subject is by no means finished with, and we expect to hear a good deal more of the "new look" both in and out of Congress before this year is over. r \ l 000069 �.. ~ ... >: . ·, _..., __ MARCH16, 1954 fID~rP/i\0011'i~~IJ ®rF~ifIM~ .'l?®IBl ii'COrn rPOOrn~~ PRESS ANJ?.RADIO NEWSCONFERENCE,TUESDAY,MARCH" 16, 1954 SECRETARYDULLES: I am glad to be back in Washingon,. aga:tn after quite· a considerable period of absences. ·L.have .two or three· statements which I would like to make before I subject myself to questio~s. I might say I ~ave just.come from the meeting of the Canadian Foreign Minis.ters and Ministe~s of Economic~, et detera. There is a meeting going on, We will have a com~unique i~sued this aft~rnoori sp l ~ill not want t6.discuss this at this ·particular.press conference. (See Press Release No. 140 ~ statement of the Secretary on the death of Harold B. Hinton). · ' I .have a· statement to make about the Caracas Conference, which ~ill be available at the close -0f this pres~ conference in mimeographed forni. · ( See Press Re lease No. 13'8) · · ·r will _be glad to answer any questioris. Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please give us'.the recon6il1ation of, one, the concept of instant retaliatioh; two, the concept of consultation with our allies; and, three, the concept of. involvement in war-ortly by ~n Act of Cong~ess? · A. I assum~ your reference· to "inst 9 nt retaliation" posedly ta_ken from ·an address of mine. . · · Q. And one. by the Vice~Presid~rit Saturday night. of the United . ' States is sup~ en ' '· A. I cannot. oomment on what the .Vice-President saidJ but I will be glad to comment 0n w~at I said~ If you will read my address of January 12, you will see what I advocated the~e was a "ca pad i ty" to retaliate fns ta ntly. In ;no pla·ce did I say : we would ~~~talia·te instantly, although we might indeed retali• ·atci ihstaritly under cortditions that call .for that. The e~~entia1 thing is to have the capacity to. retaliate fnstantly. It is lack of that capacity which 1ri ~Y opinibn ·accounted for such disasters. as Pearl· Harbor. · If we .had had the capacity to. ret~liate instantly~ ih my.opinion, there would have been no Pearl Harpor .. But:it· to0k about.four years to retaliate against Tokyo .... I believe we should have that-capacity ·to retaliate instantly. N~w, the question of whether or net you retaliate instantly and whefe y6u retaliate is a matter to be dealt with in accordance with the facts of each situation. I take it few would have any question but what if there were an attack upon the United States there would be instant retaliation. You have questions 000070 �' . • • NOo 14~ e~erit questions of retaliation in the ,bi:a violation Ot' a~.. attack upon·a member of the North Atlantic Treaty and upon other count1~1es with whom we have. treaty relationships!' ~ - ... The que~tion of circumstances under which you retaliate, where· ~{OU retaliate,/ how quickly ~rou retaliate, is a · matter which has to be dealt with in the. light of the facts of each particula_r case. One• thing I want to make clear beyond.the.possibility of doubt is that I don 1 t believe you should tell the enemy in advance just where, how, and when you plan to retaliate~ The whole essence of the program is that the action should be an action of our choosing and he is not' to lmow in .advance what it is,j and that uncer~ tainty on his part is a lrny to the success of the policy. Q. Sir# if I may pursue thato You mentioned in the event of an attack upon a member of the North Atlantic Treaty_ Alliance ...-you say what would then be instant retaliationg Does that mean :1.n the event the concept of 1nvolvement.1n war only by Act of Cong1•ess does not apply where there is an attack either upon the United States or upon a member of the alliance of wh~ch we are a part? Ae It means in all respects the United States acts in accordande wit~ its constitutional processes. ·There is no way in the world in which we can get away, or want to get away 9 or intend to get away from our constitutional processes~ How long that will take 6 I dontt know. It did not take very long after Pearl Harbo.r to get a declaration of war. The trouble is it did not do any immediate good to get a declaration of war because we did not have the capacity to do any~ thing with it. I have never advocated~ and nobody else in the Administration has advocated any departure from constitutional processes •. ·Jhe North Atlantic Treaty has provided that an attack against; one of those states shall be deemed the same as an attack against the United States~ We have other treaties with language which is not precisely the same as that. Just what action by the Congress is required is a matter to be decided in each case 8 as it always has been a matter to be decided in each case. The fact that you advocate having a capacity for instant retaliatio~ does not change your constitutional processeso It means we don 1 t have to wait for four .yea:r-s;after somebody attacks us before we are 1n a position effectively to h1t back. · Q,, Sir• 000071 �PR 142 Sir,.~q9es:.th.~ f~(>td>hat:·;the··Senate;;t>:f' the .Urtited;States has rat+fJ~4··.tl1~.t:N<;>r>1;11 ··A.ti.l-~nt!c Alliance mean in the: event of an attack on an ·Ally''we, .could,: within constitutional procedures, retaliate against that attack without further action in the Congress? :; · · ·" · Q. A. '.Pn~ti::Ls,:a:matter :which, 'as you,know,.iwas de'bated>ve-x•y: thorQi+.tshlY.·.in ·the Congres.s and· in ·the ·s-er.:ate ~ At the time · that ·Treaty was: .tatif:ted:··I was ..in ·the ~s:enate ~: :rt is my- • opinion that trie provisions of the Treaty, which state that an attack upon one of the Allies is :the :s.:ame· as· an:;attack'- ·. upon all -- or in other words that an attack upon one of our Allies is the same as an :.attack -up•ori the· Uni t-ed states\ That is also, I ma.y say, in the Rio Fact. That gives the Pr:e.eJd·ent:.:of:.•,:the.United ~-s:tates·, :tne· same:.authorit"y ;t'o '.react·' as he would have if the United States were attacked. . -~ - .:Thank ,-.you,;,:_sir;·: ;c •:,-·• > . ·:: -: Q. A. ':w:e:the~/~~- ·wo~ld~Se' ,..~tl~;t:_~~u:th~;·i:ty .._1~..eve;; ·cas~. ~:s: a ; · ;'.:. rqc3:tJ:;er, :for h,is '.-df.s:·cr.e.ti.on.,::.ilnsmy· 0p'inion; he' has· ·it'?· ..., < :. < • Q. He has the right? A.,,.,.-cln rnY,.'OP.ini-on:.:'he;·Jiaa.the '.right,.;.•i'•Thatr dc.e.s,:no:t··'nec·e:ss'aii1ly .-:, mean in all cases he would use the right witnout; co:nsult;atkin :': by Congress~ It would depend on the gravity of the attack, whethe.~- Jt, •Wa$.:rob.::v;i0:u:s.<the a.t;ta~h;··me_an:t:ral.'1.;,:o:ut.: w:ar_;,wti1ch > inev.;i.tably ,,.,,o.u'l:d:, i.nvoJve ..un:'.' Many ,mat.te·rs ::W01.(Ld.:ha'vei·.to ·:be>·;.··• considei'.e;d .:and:;dou:btle:ss.: .:wou,ld;:be ~·011sider.ed. '.by, the: Pr-e,sid'ent .'. : in ..qe:t.~r.m:i.n~ng,~:w:ne::t;liev·co:ri no,t>.·tcLuse ...his'.•di scre·t1onary ·-.•· · ··, · · authority. 1 Mr. Secret.ar.y:;\ qi±ght;-1' r.:ai.se ·a.-._question·.on- anbth~r- word. in the reference to capacity to retaliate. The sentence ends: 11 by means and at places of our choosing. 11 Now, Mb:. -Pear:s:ori raised the question whether the word 11our 11 meant'the United Sta,te:s., or.'::wne:t.her d:-t.:meant _;the. f.re~' c·orrimun,ity :o:c. natfons'.". ''. Q. ... ' ·:·: ::.... : 'Cl > ,••, ,,; .., ;:·. ••,•:- '\ A•\ •:.•1·. think {that, the sentence ;_iff",reas-ortably: ·.c:lear.:·,) ;Wou:1a:,; _. you .read_: the ,who;le seht.ence :if'>you: ..have ·±t: :before yoi:.i~ · :•.· , ··:·: ...... ~-- .. - ... , • ! , ; ; ••• .~_; :: :.-·. : ; :_;_::•,: -;--··.- •· :: ,., .. ::.__ ,-':.·: '<: .• '/• ·:::., , •:<; Ji,: .:;__ ~_ :::.: .. ·.?.:::(: ,.=, _, :.:. "·\·.1..,:··:_-,_·~ ,::. ·,•... ,1., -~_:,.~:·.:.::-!··.·: __ •; :.:~:.·. ;_: ~.:.- ~ •• ; . ·-..' '· . •.. . ~;- '. -~ <:..r_; .! --=· :·. ;:_.i'. . ~; )_ .. ... ..-:. :.·- . !~~:-· :·r ·_"·;:·~ ..~: -_....;··..: : .. , ··.1 · ' .-;:,,·-,': : ·: !~: ,. :. •' . . ~- . . .. ,",:,· ', <i ·-' ',•·-_; ·:·.,::,_:.' ~ ~_:'' .....:, . ';' -::·~ '·/:'.t .! ; ;,_-_; ~:;· , • .j . • '} ... : ••.• : .•-.. : ~- ·~ :· : i_: .•, :· '·' ~ ·::. ·.. · .' ~--· :. .~ . ' . . ,.' , :<,.·. ·: : Q~ ·.·Yes,•:,, ,_:·. _:;: , , :~ :-:.-~'.:-~L::·. ::· 1·- • .,. ,. • •• 'i : ,:.i... .'- - _.... ;, ••• • .' ••• ·,· __:_·_ ·.:.:_- _;_· •..... .. · : ' • ..·: •'•,: ,•;,-•,•,·. . J•.' ·.. 000072 �. "" 4 , PR 142 ··. ' ,,. .r Yes. ,,(reading):. IIThe. basic .. decision was to depend· primarily upon a great capac{i ~y ~o .retaliate, instantly, by means; ::and at pla.ces of our. 'choosing O" Q. A. _ .Do-es':.1t use the word· If free world".? Q. .There were two· sentences~ One is: "The basic decision -.::" was to depe:nd •p1.;imar11y.tipon a great. capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing .."·· ·. · A. Is that the whole.sentence? Q. That is the end of th~ senterice" A. Yes. I would like to have the first part of the sentence. first part is: · 1iBut : beforJ ~iJ..:1t.~ry planning could ... be :Chang.ea~~·-the Preside __nt a·na. hia .iidv~l3er.s,as represented by the .National Security Council, J-iad ,tO t·alr_e..some basic policy decisidns~. This has been· done~: T6~ ~a£ic.decision was to · depend primarilY upo1~-•' a:"tt1~~at p·apacity >k·o:, ~etaliate:, instantl:/, by means and at places'- \>f'. our. choos.+ng/ 1 ·, There was another ': · sentence. ·· · '· · · ··· · · · · · Q.. 0 The I think there was a ..senterc~::L iµ.: tl;:le.itex.t there about· the free world·. · : ··· · · A. whi-cih spoke·. -~~t ,in tnat particular Paragr~ph., There is an earlier·· .... sentence -to this part which says~ "The way to·,deter aggre's.;;.: ·::: sion is ,,for. the free community to be will;i.ng and able to , respond vigorously at places and .with means of its own ~hocis--~ i Dg II . . . . ,. ·, ' Q~ "' ~ A. I thought that Q. Which is it? was what you wei-•e reading from., A, Well, it would depend a good deal upon the circumstances. 'If there were an attack upon the United States and if we had the capacity to respond from our own bases, we would certainly do that It is .:1 I think.~ we 11 mown that the bases which we have in foreign countries are in general not usable as a matter of law and as a practical matter are not usable except with the consent of the countries where the bases are. For example, the bases which are available to our Strategic Air Force in Great Britain are not usable as a base of attack except with the consent of the British Governmento The same is true in general with all our foreign bases. Therefore, it is implicit in our security sy~tem that it operates with the consent and acquiescence of the other partners who have helped to provide the facilities which create a sort of international police system. · · Q. If I 6 000073 �. . -5- PR 142 Q. ·rf I might go on. There were two other worps which . Mr. Pearson raised. a· question to in relation :to the point · which' you have just made, the one being "instantly" and the · other be.ing 11means. 11 . · Does this mean the choosing of means would lie with the free community or only with the United States? w.ould there: be consultation? · A. Yes, there would certainly be consultation in most of the cases .that I can conceive of. ·I might say that I wrote, some weeks ago, an article for Foreign Affairs, which is in substance a. somewhat more pollsFiecf,;-Y-hope",;'"'"restate.ment of my spEH;1chwhich was .made before the Council of Foreign Relations, whioh publishes Foreign Affairs. That l did while I was flying back from BerlTn~---Y-under~"'"tand that is being released for publication tomorrow ipNew York by the magazine B orei!?a£ Af..fai:rs., That will elabo:;."'ate to so;ne extent the thesis which I expr·essed in my address of January 12. 1 Q~ I would like to ask another question on this subject. There has been some discussion and speculation to the effect that reliance on the capacity to retaliate instantly as a ma;Jor part of your defensive system would mean 11 in the case of a limited challenge in some remote area.., you would have the choice either of an all-out war 'or> no resistance .at all •. A.· That is not a correct analyi:is of the thesis at all. ··Let us ta.ke, for example.s the declaration which was made by the 16 powers in relation to Korea; which is one of the ill~strations I made in my spe~chi It has been stated there that if aggression should be resumed that·the reaction would not necessarily be confined to Korea. Now what does that mean? That .does not mean necessarily that there will be an effort made. to. drop· atomic bombs on Peiping or upon Moscow. It does mean that thsre are areas of importance to the aggressors in that vicinity which may have an industrial or strategic relationship to the operation which would no longer be wl.1.atGeneral MacArthur called a "privileged sanctuary". I :cannot imagine any policy more futile or more apt to create war than to adopt the policy that you will only react at the particular place, and by the means the aggressor selects. If anything would ever put a premium onaggression,· it would .be that. We want to' take away that premium on aggress~on. ·· · Q. Mr •. $ecretary 000074 �. 6 ":"" - ..:. :PR 142 , . -·.:. ,.· .. ' ' '·· Q •.. Mr. Secretary that speech,; there 1 while. we a;re annotating.' was a reference :tn there to a ;l;es$er reliance ..:on local. defense, and some at:estion has been raised-as-to whether:that meant-· less reliance on. defense. by local,: :i,.ndigenous. forces which , i we might aid~ for example, or less reliance on local actions by jmerican forces, in local sectora,of,tt~ long ~rontt .· -, . . say A ... What I meant there~ when. I say. rir•1 ; L m:tght. ihat tha~ spe?ch wa~ -not jtist a .personal speech 9: ,.-was-that, 1-f you .. have the capacity to. str.il{e-. an. aggressor at ,-the; points _which wil;J: h~rt him,. _the dete:r.re.nt power of, that is .sufficient so : that you clo not. need. 'bo have loc·a1 · defens-e ~a-ll aromid. · the : :, .. 2Q.,__ OOO-miJ.e ,perlm~ter of. the ..orbit of the _Soviet World· 'bacau-se your oe-terrent- power.i, to ·a large extent.,o,reinforces. your: · -· · local power- so that you .do- not. h_ave to depencLup_oh .havirig;'fn·. place forces in being sufficient to stop an attack in its tracl}s anywhere •where ..it. c.ould · occur because you rely .pr:LmarllY upon deterring that attack,. not necess.arily upon .being able to stop ·1 tJI. · -· . ., ' . ·,: , With, the Soviet-Chinese. Commun:is·tWor-la.~..:.with .:its ; . 8QQ.,·OOO" 00Q :Pe-Qpl:e occupying .a ,central_ :location., .with ·±ta vast land armies--it would be utterly impossible to have local .oe:fenses 'all ·.around ,that -.20,.000-mi.le orbit. suffic.i.ent. ,_ to stop .any ·blow that. might come at whereve.r they might -c::.7'-i,::roa'e to rr)ake i.t o., :So that YOU: have got ,t-0 f:i.nd some· way whereby . that _type of :local ground defense -:can be supplemented o And: ,.the wc;1yto suppl~_me_nt 1t ·~Lsto· have:, a. capa:city t.o .re.tali.ate •at,_: . times, pla,ce~; and witp me·thods .:of yo1...1r.ownc,ho:Qsing. • • . .., Now. tr;i_a.t doesn - ··'· • ' ., • ·• ~ ~ . -. • .. i. • •. • . • t. mean ..tha_t' you. El.l.iminate wholly,· by ,any .· means,. l.9nd forces·e -It means you, d:0 not nece;1;:1sari1y mal-~e them. y_our pr:irnaPy reliance because., as. ·against the ~ind .of . , . danger ~hich ,:;;o;,:(•f-Jatens.,:l,t if:; :impos·sible t.o match your potential enemy gt ,all points on :a -bases of man-for~-man; gun-fo:rgun and tank-for-tank. If we try to do that, we are -go:ing to go "bust". ~ I '- ' . qecretary., if· I may go back. to one point of yours, .yoµ said that in Europe the Pre.side.nt had the same qU1;;11or-ityunder the NATOa.nd. Rio Treaties ·to retaliate if the United States. was at-tack~clo; Well:i,.·.last WGdnesda.y he seemed to give a pledge that he would not use that because he said that there would be no involvement in war without Congressional approval. . , ·Q_. Mr. A. But if a different the. Senate matter. has given approval in advance., that is Q~ Well, 000075 �. . ·, , ... 7 ,_ PR 142 · Q. Well, the specific case ·was Indochina. what some of us were wondering about. , . . . - :t-think that was A •. Yes, .there has been no ·congressional approval given in· advance of ·a war in Indcichina to which the United Statea would be a pa1~ty o , He certainly did not me·an,' I think, to 'imply that if the United States was attacked, and if Congress was not in session~ that he would wait unt11·congress was called back into session and make a declaration of war bef·ore we would react to a bombing attack on New York City or Detroit or Washington. I think if any President waited under those circumstances, he would certainly not be carrying out the will of either the Congress 01 the American people. 1 Qa S11;'.!fI'm a little dense on this matter of Indochina_. Would you clarify this for me? France is our ally in tbe No1th Atlantic Alliance.. French tI•oops are fighting in Indochina.. If the :Chinese Communists,· with the r·egular forces· fr.om Chtna, ·should cross the f1"ontie1"' into Indochina 'and .. attack the armed· foi ces of our. all:\,, France» would our responsibilities or obligations unde1" the NATO allianc·e come into force? If not~' why? 1 1 A.· No, they will not because the NATOalliance does not apply to any- part of the·, world: except .the North Atlantic area as it 1s defined· in the :ti~eaty That definition in the. nipin i's confined_ to Europe/ al thou'gl) it does cover a portion of French North Africa-·;;..I ·think Algeria is cov~red by it. _ But in the main 8 it -covers ·oi1lythe- Eutiopean area, including a slight bit of North Africa:;·and, of course, the Asiatic portion of Turkey. : .•: : · · · ., · <I .... : f'f : Q. Mr. Secretary, ·: .., : _:_. ' . ~ inthe·co11text-::.. A. Now, I don I t mean to,· imply -that if the event you spoke of happened, we should -do nothing. I myself have sa•io that I believed that if that happened 1-'le should do something. But that doesn 1 t mean we- should- db it without Congressional app:toval or consultation. In the context of the 'ans·wer you just gave abo1:1t Detroit 1 or. Chi'cago ih referring to ·an- earlier answer gave, would it be fair to say that the.President has power to react in Europe in the case of a bombing of or Paris? Q. A. Yes, New York., you : · the same London, sir. Q. Sir, would it be accurate then to say that instant retaliation in effect is recognition of the restraining effect of the possession of atomic weapons--the deterrent power? Is there a distinction between instant retaliation and deterrent? It is a deterrent. A. Yes., 000076 �PR 14~ - -8- A. Yes, I have said that the capacity to retaliate powerfully and instantly is, in my opinion, the great deterrent, and that when you are faced with the kind of potential enemy, or. With the assets that this potential enemy has, I believe that a deterrent of that sort is the most effective way there is of preventing a war. Now I can imagine a 'different world condition where reliance might properly be placed upon other methods, and other means, but, as far as the present world condition·is concerned, that capacity to retaliate powerfully at places of our choosing 1s. in my opinion, what will serve as a powerful deterrent to war. I believe that the original Korean attack would not have occurred if it had not been asswood either that we would not react at all, or if we did react would react only at the place and by the means that the aggressors chose. I believe .. that the Allied Sixteen-Powei" Decla.ration, which now operates in the case of Korea, will probably pre~ent ~ny rene0al of Communist aggression there~ Mr. Se~•retary, in order to clarify something~ in my own mind at least, is it your understanding that the President's right to order instant retaliation applies only in the c~se of an attack either on the United States or another North Atlantic Treaty power because of the understanding that Congress has given? Q. A. The United States has two treaties that I referred to: One is the so-called Rio Treatt of Reciprocal Assistance, which contains the provision that an attack upon one is the same as an attack upon all; that same provision is found in the North Atlantic Treaty. In my opinion -- whatever it is worth as a lawyer, and as one who was in• the Senate when the North Atlantic Treaty was adopte.d -- I believe that that authorizes, is a consent in advance to the President reacting against an attack upon one of our allies named in those _· treaties in the same way that he would be authorized to react in the event of an attack upon the United states itself. I repeat, however, that the fact that the President has that Constitutional ·authority as the result of those tr(~aties in my opinion does not necessarily mean that he wou:Ld use it. He would use his discretion, I think, as to wh~ther or not to react instantlj, or whether to get eithe~ a formal-declaration of war by the Congress, or whether to have consultations which satisfied himself that that was the will of the Congress. That would be discretionary with the President. Mr. Secretary, doesn't the President under the United Nations Charter itself? Q. have that same power A. In 000077 �. . -9- .. Ao • ....~• . In my· opin.ion, ' , PR 142 rio (>· Does he not have the power under st:ttution as Commander in Chief? the United Q., A. . •:, Stat~$ C.on:-- To do ·:what? ' ' .. . To take military Congres~? Qe a decla1.,a.tion without action of war by \ ..• WellJ now you are raising the question which hae be~n debated ·ever since our nation was formedc There are certain~. ly areae \'lithj_n which a Pres:tdent can' act .:... c~;r•tainly are~s in which it has been cuatomar;v for Presidents act -without any formal action by the Congress,c There is a twilight zone thereo Nobody has ever attempted t<f defj_ne accurately that twilight zone, a~d I, snal,1 p.qt attempt :I:.t.i herea , , . .. :· .•. · - .. :,.·:;_., ,'.· /,'. '•";" ., A,. ·to at .one po:tn'tth~i"'k_-~r~u·· s~ia ::it1~ connect,ion witb con~~ltation t6 cbnstilt iri'.mo~t ias~i that-~ou -0an con~ ceive: of. II Would you 'c·onsideri ~ay~ an' attack 'upon the northe;r'n part of Cap.aqa _an ~ttacl{. upon the ...Uni,ted,., States$ and; ·would you cons\,i:t-t wt.th bth_e':i-•NATO·cfr.nintries '.l:iefor,e-·you· reacted to that at'tack?' '· .r ;:·,;:::-·:·'· ,. Q., Mr. Secretary, ;. ;_ ..• • ~. • ' .,. • I • ,:··, ' . l A. I do not think that: it· 1s wis'e . or· appropriate to try .to·. answer a hypothetical question of that sort. In the first . place, it is impossible to determine .in adyance what.all of the su..rrounding circumstances. are,.·and .it would certainly · .. also not be advisable to give any forel{nowledge to a potential_ enemy as to whether or not he would have any time between. his attack and having to suffer the consequences it. of Mr. Secretary, ference? Q. how are plans coming for the Geneva Con- A. The tnformation I got when I got.back to.my desk yesterday was that there is some evidence ,in .Moscow of_ delaying. tact:,-cs with respect to the practical arrangements for ,se.tting up the conference. There s,eenis -t;o )?e, ,an:.,i111pr'es_s.~on _t;~a:t the. Chinese C'ommunists are riot 'eptireTy' happy',.over, ...the:.:ar_range~ ments which were made for them be:Caus(f -they·h~d e~pected, hoped to be able to come to the conference·a:s cine.of the socalled Big Five. r.t'hat, of c.0J1rse_,. Wq.S: de:qied :to the,m and i:t. would see1n<as though the .{36Jiet ':pEf, ..... h'aps havef- got some expla:ining to do. :·And· the result iff.·at. leas;t :the:re .are some present de lays • ' · ·· · · "· · · · ' 1 1 ,._ ..., 000078 �PR 142 Sir, have you reached a conclusion John P. Davies? Q. yet in the case of A. No* The situation in tpe Davie$ case is this: I went over the very full summary of the evidence consisting of about 200 rather closely-t-y;ped pages before I went to Caracaa. It seemed that there were some points which called for explanation, and the lt;1,wyerin.the Security Office formulated a request for e~lanationa. Those were given to Mr.. Davies, and his counsel. They have now made a reply. The reply 1~ being studied in the Security Office, and I am waiting for their recommendations to me, or report to me, on the basis of those questions an,d the responses made by Mr. Davies. Mr. Secretary, ha.s . · the Soviet Foreign Off ic_e formally. informed you of the·dissatistaction of the Chinese Communist$, with the arrangements? Q. A. No, that is inference, Mr. Secretary, twenty-three Japanese fishermen suffered radio-active burns as a result of the latest explosion? And today the Japanese Foreign Minister said that Japan might ask compensation from the United States. I was wondering if you have any comment on the incident and upon his statement. Q. A. No, I have no comments to make. I only heard of it today·. We had a report from our Embassy in Tokyo, which I got this morning~ But I have no information as to how this unfortunate accident came about --assuming that the facts are as reported. Mr. Secretary, a report was published in London last week-end to the effect that the United States has told France that this country would offer economic inducements to Red ... China to end the Indochina war. Is that correct? Q. A. It is not correct. Mr. Secretary~ does the October 8 decision our final postion with respect to a. settlement Q. still r~present in Trieste? A. You have caught me a little bit unprepared on that· question. I have not had the opportunity to check up-I'm bound to say- ...with the developments in the Trieste matter since I got back from Caracas. So you will have to Just excuse me on that one. Mr. Secretary, Senator Dirksen said he would discuss. with you immediately upon your re:turn from C~acas'the matter of freeing German confiscated property. Would you te.JJ.__u_a .. wa..t..~.QPl,p.1on is? Should it be returned soon? -· Q. ' A. I 000079 �. . -11- PR 142 A. I don't care to express an opinion on that. I have an appointment with Senator Dirksen, and I expect to go over the matter with him, and until I have done that I do"''t care to express any opinion. Q. Mr. secretary, are the delaying tactics on the preparations for Geneva such that they might delay the conference itself? A. That is conceivable, Q. Thank you, sir. yes. Henry Suydam * * * State--PB, Wash., D.C. 000080 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 22 MARCH 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-03-22 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00025 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Message from Canadian Ambassador to the United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 22 Mar. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. Indo-China John Foster Dulles Korea NATO Nixon Stevenson