1 20 5 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/d3e6924796f199aa1c09051274e9569f.pdf 7ca43d853e6411b92cbc818f33a4851b PDF Text Text TOP SECRET September 5, 1952. Visit of the Secretary of State for External Affairs to Washington September Zi.-5. 1952 Summary of Conversation at Dinner at the Embassy Residence. September 5 The following were present at the dinner: Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Pearson Acheson Wrong Freeman Matthews Perkins Ignatieff The following subjects were discussed: 1. 2. 3. NATO problems; British economic problems; Question of the postponement of the general debate at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. 1. NATO Problems: Mr. Pearson explained that one of the purposes of his forthcoming visit to Europe was to turn over the Chairmanship of the North Atlantic Council at the end of his tenure of this office for a calendar year to the Foreign Minister of Denmark. He said that since he was a candidate for election to the presidency of the forthcoming General Assembly of the U.N. he thought that it was particularly important that he should turn over his office now, rather than wait until the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting on December 15. Mr. Acheson readily agreed that this was desirable. Mr. Pearson said that he also wished to discuss current NATO problems with Lord Ismay, with particular reference to preparations for the annual review and the decisions which would have to be taken at the Ministerial meeting on force targets. He hoped that it would be possible this time to avoid the kind of controversy which arose before and after the Lisbon Council meeting as a result of statements which appeared in the press comparing the alleged performances of the respective signatories in meeting the recommendations of the Temporary Council Committee; and to avoid as well the issue of ambiguous announcements of military objectives. While he recognized that decisions would have to be taken by the Ministers to complete the Lisbon 1952 programme as quickly as possible and to continue the military buildup, balancing military, economic and political considerations, he hoped that it would not be necessary to confront governments with specific qualitative targets which they would be urged publicly to fulfil in 1953. This was not meant to imply that firm figures might not be set for 1953, but we should avoid public debate on the subject prior to NATO agreement, and also avoid as far as possible the projection of figures beyond 1953 in such a way that we appear to accept them as agreed. He also wished to examine, while he was in Europe, the implications of the announced cutback in the British defence programme with particular reference to the thesis which had been put forward in justifying it. He was worried about the effect 000074 �- 2 of this and recent French statements on NATO objectives and NATO morale. This thesis assumed a revision of the strategic concept governing North Atlantic military planning by assuming a greater reliance upon the strategic and tactical use of new weapons and of air power. This thesis, while it had certain superficial attractions, as it seemed to justify reductions in overall military expenditures and particularly the reduction of ground forces which would have to be made available after the first 60 to 90-day period following D-Day, had serious political implications, particularly in respect of probable reactions in continental Europe where once again they might think they were being considered as expendable. Mr. Acheson made it clear that he had no sympathy for the British thesis. It seemed to him that it was a rationalization advanced to justify the decision taken by the British Government for political reasons to cut back its defence programme. The British argument, he said, could not be justified by the facts. The strategic use of atomic weapons would not materially affect the campaign which would have to be fought to stop the advance of the Soviet forces in Europe. The strategic counter-offensive which would be launched from the United States would only have longer-term effects upon the Soviet war potential. In the meantime, it was essential that there should be sufficient ground forces with tactical air support to stop the Soviet advance. No one had suggested that these forces should be of a magnitude which would permit them to mount a counter-offensive to drive the Soviet forces into the Soviet Union. The assumption was that, initially, the Soviet forces would advance a considerable distance into Western Europe and it would be necessary to launch at least an initial counter-offensive in order to stop the momentum of the Soviet advance. This explains the necessity of having covering forces immediately available for combat, with forces in reserve which would be made available within 30, 60, or 90 days of the beginning of the battle. Mr. Acheson said that the British thesis also seemed to assume the existence of new types of special weapons which could be used tactically in the land battle to compensate for the numerical superiority of the Soviet ground forces. Mr. Acheson said that while it was true that the United States was experimenting with the development of a number of what he called "Buck Rogers" gadgets, none of these could be counted upon for use in the field until about 1956. Mr. Acheson said that the British thesis also seemed to assume that the Soviet Union has no intention of launching a general war in the next two or three years. If by this it was meant that the Soviet leaders were not likely to decide to go to war on the calculation that Western military power now being built up might later place them at a greater military disadvantage, he was inclined to agree. This, however, he suggested, was not the real danger. The risks of general war were more likely, in his opinion, to arise from a different set of circumstances. There were certain circumstances, he particularly mentioned Korea and Berlin, in which the national security interests of the Soviet Union and the United States and other powers were so directly engaged that some unforeseen development might unloose a chain of events (none of which by themselves might be decisive), but which, taken together, might precipitate a general war. For instance, a serious air offensive launched against the U.N. forces in Korea from across the Yalu River would represent a most serious challenge to the security of U.S. forces in Korea that might well precipitate a chain of events. In Berlin, Mr. Acheson thought it was unthinkable that Western Powers could give up a position which the Soviet Government had in its power to make untenable from a military point of view. ip^Q 000075 �> - 3 The second type of situation which Mr. Acheson regarded as inherently containing the risks of general war was a local conflict in which the interests of the United States, as well as the Soviet Union, became increasingly and directly involved. He cited as an example the present situation in Indo-China and in the Middle East. Neither in Indo-China nor in the Middle East had the United States sufficient resources to take preventive action in advance. The United States, therefore, had to improvise with the military resources available such action as was necessary to impede the fulfilment of Communist designs. Returning to the question of the NATO force targets, Mr. Acheson said that the main object of NATO military planning at present was to build up the minimum forces necessary to stop the initial Soviet attack. In order to provide the basis for the necessary request to Parliaments for the authorization of funds, force targets seemed to him essential. Mr. Pearson then said it was the process of establishing them and the publicity given to that process which worried him. Mr. Acheson suggested that a distinction might be made between the tactics employed in the presentation of such targets to the public and their use by governments for supporting defence appropriations. He did not see, however, how it was possible to avoid establishing firm force targets for 1953; otherwise, the United States, for example, would not have any firm basis on which to request Congress for foreign military aid in support of the NATO defence programme. He implied that it might be possible to reduce to some extent NATO targets insofar as the military requirements recommended by the Standing Group proved to be beyond the economic capabilities of the respective NATO members. It was necessary, however, in his view, to continue the buildup of forces to the extent that the economic resources of the member nations would permit. The possibility of using new atomic weapons, tactical and strategic, could not affect NATO military planning in the next two or three years. 2. British Economic Problems: Mr. Pearson outlined as a matter bearing on NATO defence questions the plans for the Commonwealth economic conference to be held in London at the beginning of November, and the preparatory official talks which were to precede this conference. He also Indicated in general terms the approach of the Canadian Government to the problems raised at this conference, emphasizing that it was the Canadian view that the conference would have to examine both external and domestic policies of the members, in order to find remedies rather than palliatives. Canada's attitude would, he thought, be constructive, co-operative but realistic. Mr. Acheson expressed very gloomy views about British economic prospects. He suggested that there were two main problems involved (a) the domestic decisions which confront the members of the sterling bloc, particularly the United Kingdom; and (b) the question of the sterling debt. He was not optimistic about the prospects of the United Kingdom Government taking the necessary domestic decisions which would serve to establish British solvency. The sharp division within the country between those who were firmly committed to Socialist doctrine and those who sought to maintain Capitalist free enterprise resulted in an unstable political situation in which no government could maintain itself in power for a time „ ^. r, • • 000076 sufficit„_ �- 4sufficient to permit either doctrine to be applied effectively. He thought that it was most improbable that Mr. Churchill's administration could, in fact, take the kind of actions which, were necessary to stem the inflationary trend in Britain. Cuts in the food subsidies and social services, for example, would affect approximately 80% of the population that were benefiting from the subsidized prive level and would almost certainly lose the next election for the Conservatives. He suggested that the British Government had missed its best opportunity to revise its economic policy immediately after the last election. As regards the question of the sterling debt, it was his understanding that the remedy would have to depend on the co-operation of governments such as India, Pakistan and Egypt in agreeing to the refunding of this debt, and he doubted whether these agreements would be forthcoming. 3. Question of the Postponement of the General Debate at the forthcoming Session of the General Assembly: Mr. Pearson said that he was rather concerned about the insistence of Messrs. Eden and Schuman that the general debate, which was usually held at the beginning of the session of the General Assembly, should be postponed until after the U.S. Presidential elections. He thought it was most undesirable that the U.S. general elections should be advanced as the reason for changing the plans of the General Assembly. He doubted whether such an argument would be acceptable to a majority at the General Assembly. Mr. Acheson said that he agreed that it was undesirable that such a reason should be advanced for a postponement of the general debate. However, he suggested that the problem might be approached from a pragmatic point of view. He suggested that it should be quite feasible to arrange consideration of the various items on the agenda so that it would not be necessary for Messrs. Eden and Schuman to come to New York until after the elections. He said that he was definitely sympathetic to the request of Messrs. Eden and Schuman. If the roles were reversed and he had to attend a conference in either the United Kingdom or France while elections were proceeding there, he would hesitate about attending the conference for fear that he would inevitably, by some remark, become Involved in a political controversy. He suggested that it was unnecessary to make any a priori decision on the question of postponement. Mr. Pearson suggested a compromise might be found in beginning the general debate, allowing it to go on for a couple of days, then postponing it for a couple of weeks, on the ground that some delegations have stated they are not ready to proceed; then go ahead with Committee work until Eden and Schuman arrive. 000077 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Global Strategy / 5 SEPTEMBER 1952 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952-09-05 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00095 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Pearson, Acheson, et al. memorandum of conversation, "Summary of Conversation at Dinner at the Embassy Residence, September 5," 5 Sept. 1952, LAC, RG 2, vol. 223, file no. I-60-1. Acheson British defence Global Strategy paper Pearson https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/1aea31bbfe8200a9efb212ea3d2ec41a.pdf e3edb18ad679eefc4d6bb4168759fdba PDF Text Text '/ London, September 82, 1952 TOP SECRET ^ S " MEMORANDUM BY MR. PEAHSON REG-AR51H5 TALKS IK LONDON AHD <L ^ PARIS OH NATO DEFENCE PHOPftAMMBS AHD STRATEGY. The first discussion of these matters was during my conference with Mr. Eden on Friday morning, September 12, but it was general In character. He did, however, express emphatic appreciation of the Importance of the permanent NATO Council and of the desirability of using it for political discussions* Xn this connection he referred with satisfaction to the discussion which had recently been held on Germany. This surprised both Mr. Robertson and myself because of the attitude that the foreign Office had taken ••towards such discussions, an attitude vfaich had apparently been expressed in Instructions to Hoyer-Hlllar, which were almost rudely negative In character. Incidentally, Mr. Eden repeated this favourable view of Council political discussions at his luncheon on that day. The opposition to these seems to come from officials In the Foreign Office, a fact which was confirmed by the Intervention of PiersonDlxon at the luncheon In question. At this luncheon, which was attended, among others, by Lord Alexander, Sir Ian Jacob, the United States Ambassador and William Draper, there was a general conversation over a number of NATO military and political subjects. Draper Indeed made quite a speech in v&lch he emphasized the Importance of the United Kingdom pushing ahead with their defence programme and completing their review of this programs in time to have the NATO Annual Heview completed by December IS. The United Kingdom persons present, however, were doubtful whether this would be possible, and were also inclined to emphasize economic and financial difficulties* While Draper emphasized the need for speed In this matter, ho took the opposite view in respect of the strategic reassessment which was underway by the Standing Group and which was to take account of "new weapons*. H© did not think that this would be completed in time to affect NATO firm planning for 1953. In fact he added - to the obvious disappointment of the other guests * that Washington would need from six to nine months more for this re-assessment (a view which incidentally he reaffirmed In Paris). The United Kingdom obviously found this news discouraging and somewhat mystifying and felt that they have not been given the real reasons which would Justify such a delay. At tho luncheon Mr. Eden repeated what he had said to Mr. Robertson and to me earlier, that the current "recasting" of the United Kingdom defence programme would not likely save them much money, but it would make possible the more efficient use of the funds to be appropriated. This view was later confirmed by Lord Alexander and Sir Ian Jacob. It was agreed, however, though not with any enthusiasm, by both Mr. Eden and Lord Alexander that Draper was correct In assessing that the curve of NATO defence effort must still continue to move upward. I have my own doubts, however, whether the United Kingdom really accept this so far as their own effort Is concerned, and these ftoubts were strengthened by the discussion Mr. Heeney and I had with Lord Alexander and sir Ian Jacob after lunch the same afternoon. • • •2 000044 �— a * This was an Interesting discussion at which both Lord Alexander and Sir Ian Jacob, who did a good deal of the talking, argued that it would not be possible to agree on any realistic NATO programme for 1953 until the re-assessment referred to above had been received; any planning would be largely artificial which did not take into account the new weapons and strategy. Lord Alexander emphasized several times his conviction that "quality, not quantity'* should be the objective In NATO planning for the defence of the West. He and Jacob both felt that it would be better to concentrate on having the SO divisions for 1952 properly equipped, trained and supported, than to agree or plan for a larger number of which a proportion would only be "cardboard divisions"* - c\ There was a good deal of talk In this connection about the inadequacy of the equipment and logistic support for the existing divisions and about the importance of hew weapons in NATO strategy and tactics. Both Lord Alexander and Jacob were pretty optimistic about the effectiveness of the strategic atomic counter-attack in the early stages of the battle for Europe and argued that this was an element In planning which had to be taken into account. They recognised, however, the American difficulty arising out of the MaoHahon Act, and indeed out of other circumstances which made it impossible to have a satisfactory NATO appreciation made at the present time with all existing atomic information made available for that purpose* In speaking of the technical advances being made and supporting his argument in favour of "quality", Lord Alexander indicated that the U.K. Government regarded heavy anti-aircraft weapons as obsolescent and spoke of the early effectiveness to be expected of the guided missile. We should rely on these for passive defence* I brought up the question of the minimum NATO force required for the defence of Western Europe* Jacob indicated, without any qualification, that 50 divisions effectively armed and supported was the maximum which the Western European economy (leaving Germany out) could support at the present time but that such a force plus the German divisions would be adequate for the purpose. That purpose was to hold off the attack while the air counteroffensive was operating. This seems to ma to be a most important statement of United Kingdom policy and It will be interesting to discover whether they maintain it in NATO discussions when the Americans put forward, as they are bound to do, larger totals of divisions and aircraft for 1953. I brought up the question of the advisability of the United kingdom engaging in strategio atom bombing. Would It not be hotter for this country, now that it had actually manufactured a bomb, to divert its energy and resources to the development of atomic energy in other fields leaving the military side entirely to the United States? certainly it would be difficult to understand the United Kingdom plea for economy In defence if thay now began to undertake this most expensive form of military operation, Jacob however stated that the United Kingdom authorities felt that unless the United Kingdom participated In atomic air bombing, they would be unable to influence the usetoi be made of this weapon and the United States would neglect targets of vital Importance to Britain, such as submarine bases, etc. It was a matter of national safety and not . , . 3 000045 �- 3 - national prestige. The answer to this Is, though I did not give it; why not approach the Americans to see whether agreement could not be reached on targets, e t c , which would satisfy the special United Kingdom defence needs* I mentioned to Lord Alexander and Jacob and. Indeed, to others both in London and Paris our worries about a minis* terial meeting of NATO in December in relation to the stage which the annual review was likely to reach by that time-* the danger of "spotlighting the gaps"— and not having sufficient time to complete the process of reconciliation. I am not sure that this danger is fully appreciated by the U.K. Ministers. They are anxious to have a revision of the Lisbon planning goals based on a new appreciation, but it Is difficult to sea how this can be expected by December 15* The determining factor, however, seems to be United States political exigencies. In Paris the subjects of NATO strategy and defenc© planning were discussed In a very interesting and frank manner at the informal" NATO Council meeting on Tuesday, September 16, about which a separate report has been made, I also had the benefit of informal discussions on the same subjects with General Ridgway, General Bradley and General Greunther at a luncheon given by Lord Ismay, though there was not time for anything more than casual exchanges of views. It seemed quite clear on my visit to London and Paris that there is a very real difference of opinion between the United States representatives, especially the military representatives, on the one hand, and the European members of NATO on the other, as to the need for an even greater defence buildup in 1953 and the desirability at the next meeting of NATO Ministers of establishing firm goals for that year wall in excess of the present 1952 figures. Reflecting this difference of opinion there is naturally a difference of opinion over the risk of war, whether it is now less than before. As was pointed out by Aiphand in our NATO informal meeting unless there con bo a general agreement on the assessment of this risk, there is not likely to be agreement on requirements to meet it. At the same time it is quite obvious that the approach to the problem of risk is Influenced to a very considerable extent by economic factors; especially in European countries and by their own national position in collective strategic planning; that is whether they are likely to be immediate victims of an attaok from land or from air and whether they are considered in Washington to be expendable, 1 found in my discussion with the NATO members a strong and growing reluctance to support or even discuss NATO defence plans without much more Information than has up to the present been made available regarding the strategy of the Pentagon both in regard to atomic warfare and European defenoe. It is impossible not to have some sympathy with this viewpoint. At the same time one should appreciate not only the normal reluctance of the military planners to put all their cards on a political table, but also thoir special reluctance to disclose their secret plans to governments whose security reputations vary. There is a real and an Increasingly important dilemma here and it cam© into the open in our NATO discussions on Tuesday and Thursday; especially I should think, in the remarks of the Netherlands , , . 4 000046 �- 4 mombor. It was because the Secretary-General's paper on NATO strategy emphasized not only economic factors but the Importance of giving tho NATO Council all possible strategic information, that it was so heartily welcomed b^ the members of tho Council other than the United states representative who obviously found himself In a difficult position. There is also an increasing and an intelligent reluctance to agree, largely for American political consumption, on programmes and goals which are not likely to be reached, except in a very artificial way, In the time set. Surely it would be much bettor to take for our 1953 programme, as the first essential thing to do, the achievement of the 1952 objective; not achievement merely on paper but in fact. Once this has been done then additional firm goals could, if necessary, be decided and mode public. This, of oourse, would not remove the necessity of planning farther in advance than 12 months, but it would remove public attention from that necessity and relieve Governments from the duty of explaining and defending the gaps between promises and performances. I argued this thesis with everyboSy I encountered over here and found a very general acceptance of it except in United States quarters. It Is felt In such quarters that this courso would be, too dangerous because it would give the impression la tho United States that we were abandoning goals which we had previously agreed oh and indeed would encourage Europeans to relax rather than maintain the defence effort. There is, of oourse, something in this. Yet I feel that the two points of view can be reconciled. That, however, will not be done if wo accept under Amerioan pressure at the December meeting paper figures as a substitute for what wa really think can be done In the economic and politloal circumstances of 1953. We will hove to face this matter soon and more frankly than we have done in the past. 1 hope that defence planning can proceed steadily and effectively without slavish adherence to unrealistic and publicly declared totals even though they are said to be "for planning purposes only". In this way wo can getaway from our dangerous practice of concentrating in public on gaps and comparative performances. I think we should explore this whole matter very carefully so that at the December mooting, while a great deal of time will have to be devoted to the Annua! Review and there will havo to be confidential discussion of foroe totals, e t c , we might be able to eonflne our publio announcement to tho fact that v.e are pushing ahead with tho Lisbon 1952 totals until they are completed end making certain that thia completion is IQOfS effective; also that when this goal has been fully achieved further announcements will be made on sub sequent programmes. Among other things, this would mean that by the time such further announcement, etxxxtonxm^cxDnxmitmn^ntiiit is made we would have some necessary Information from the United States on the "new strategy" and "new weapons"* So far as the risk of war is concerned, my visit confirmed my feeling that there is a general disposition ia European quarters to feel that it has lessened during the last year or so; a feeling strengthened in the Council by Lord Ismay*s paper's reference to this subject. There is recognition however that the situation has worsened In the Far Seat, though this does not convey the same feeling of immediate crisis to Europeans. There is a danger in tnis feeling of easement being oarrlod too far; especially as It fits Into the desire to reduce defence expenditures because of economic considerations. So the Americans - through their representatives at N; TO and e ioe where in Europe and their steady stream of visitors from Washington, especially from the Pentagon keep pounding away at tho thesis that the danger is just as great and as immediate as ever. They make socio Impression 000047 �and it is well that these things should be said - but at times th© Americans say them In a way which strengthens the European feeling that there is just about as much to be feared from U.S. rashness as from Soviet aggression. Her© the development of consultation and frank discussion in the Council; tho strenthening of the prestige and authority of that body, can do much to help. For this reason - and because of the growing importance of the Council in the planning of defence and broad strategy - It was encouraging to learn that this central Agency of NATO after a shaky and somewhat discouraging start, Is becoming stronger, better organized and more effective. r* � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Global Strategy / 22 SEPTEMBER 1952 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952-09-22 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00097 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Memorandum by Mr. Pearson Regarding Talks in London and Paris on NATO Defence Programmes and Strategy," 22 Sept. 1952, LAC, RG 2, vol. 223, file no. I-60-1. London NATO Defence Programmes and Strategy Paris Pearson William Draper https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a6b6766e0505de5abf85ed8f2715662b.pdf 0de2f6b5b40a7621c14cd2419904c550 PDF Text Text ��� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Global Strategy / 13 JANUARY 1953 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953-01-13 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00101 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Permanent Representative of Canada to the North Atlantic Council and the OEEC, Paris to Secretary of State for External Affairs, "NATO and Global Planning," 13 Jan. 1953, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. Heeney North Atlantic Council OEEC Paris Pearson https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/41b378e8644b04a3418ac67dd42eb180.pdf 745f5178378f39fb3c84f4a22eb05368 PDF Text Text ����� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Global Strategy / JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1953 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953-01 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00102 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Representative of Canada at the North Atlantic Council, Paris, "NATO and Global Defence Problems," 2 Feb. 1953, and Wilgress memorandum for the Minister, "NATO and Global Planning," 24 Jan. 1953, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. global planning Heeney NATO North Atlantic Council Paris Pearson Wilgress https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/bad6e7902f9136e2ac9a67b78641f283.pdf d72115633fa08cd2fa7528ec02f30085 PDF Text Text ��� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Global Strategy / 9 JUNE 1953 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953-06-09 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00107 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Canadian Delegation to the North Atlantic Council and the OEEC, Paris to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, "United States Global Strategy and NATO," 9 Jun. 1953, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. Heeney NATO North Atlantic Council OEEC Pearson