1 20 1 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/743875c7283403d455cf524ec5164a37.pdf 89d9e3e164a595d0a1f70fdcda1a78f8 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information REFERRED TO: Mr. Robertson Dr. Clark Mr. Allen Secretary,c.s.c. Washington London # Exto. 182A L Letter No........ Cf/ -~- ...•...... Copy No. 1 of 14 Copies .jJ. - 7r3 - #5 #6 #4 OTT.AWA FILE #? -/!8 European Di V. Date ...... FROM: The Canadian Reference ..... --1 --1·-- CLASSIFICATION 2 - #11 TOP SECRET The Hague. f/ v ~ ~, Yo.u:r..1.et.ter .. N.Q,..US.-:6.Q? ••..•....•.•..•..•..•..•.....•................... Inte.rnat.ional Nations .c.r.i.eiis.. a.r.i:3.ing;..Ql.l.t. P.t:. •tb..El.Aef.e~.t. P.f ..Uni t~.d .. forces in Korea. 1. I have read with great interest the two memoranda which you were kind enough to send me -. and agree with your general line of thinking. ---· ~ '---- ~ -------1 i II . :' -<:--~-___ ; 9 l~ 2. However, I would prefer, instead of commenting on each point, to write on the possibilities of the international situation as seen from The Hague and after discussion with my Canadian associates here. t I ---•------,_ Ambassador, SECURITY 21---- -~-- I #9 '?:.°.~? J.~.~ '..Y..a. ... ,,... y_--I l,,./( .) c) THEUNDER-SECRETARY OF STATEFOREXTERNA; A~AIRS, CANADAY TO: bject: ... - ·AmeT ;& Far East .#10 27 i;;h•. .:0e. .Q ••••••• ember , •••••••• 1956efence/Sec. , •••• - No. 1--------i 5 JAN1961 3. I therefore include a memorandum which could be entitled: "The Soviet Menace as seen from The Hague", hoping these comments might be useful in assessing the present international crisis. Copies Referred To.............. . ....... ........ . \ No. of Enclosures 4. This report has no ambition of being prehensive but is meant to convey the substance our reactions here. comof Ambassador. one Post File No............... . .., 000365 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information 195 ..... I rir.:r 3 . ( 1. . .. l' ' - ,.;. ~- ......... , \.- ' 'V 000366 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information The Soviet 1. The Western countries are now paying the price of their mistake in demobilizing .their forces at the end of the war. The balance of military power being on the Soviet side at the present time, there is no decision that can be made by the western coalition that could adequately meet any Comr:iunist initiative, at least until the equilibrium is restored to a fair extent. 2. Being weak at every point of the Communist periphery, we can only improve our situation by concentrating our limited strength on a few or on a single point that is more essential or vital for our survival. This point, in my opinion, is Western Europe. 3. I would not wish to under-estimate the importance of protecting our interests and positions in Asia, but the core of Soviet power is almost out of reach if attacked from any Asiatic base, while it is under serious menace from Western Europe and the Middle East. Therefore, the principal effort of the Western coalition should be directed (a) towards Western Europe and (b) towards the Middle East, notwithstanding all the sacrifices we may have to accept in the Far East for a certain period. There is surely no need to elaborate the view that Western Europe must appear to the Soviets by far the most attractive area available for aggression aimed at total control. No other area would yield, for a comparable effort, anything ap~ proaching the prize which Western Europe represents in industrial plants, economic resources, technical skill and as a base for future operations against North America. Any Soviet provocation in Asia should be considered as a diversion. The present Chinese uncompromising attitude should be treated as such a diversion and a tactical retreat from Korea, shameful as it may appear at first, would prove in the long run more useful than further military complications with the Chinese hordes. 4. If Western Europe is accepted by the Western countries as their battlefield, with or without bloodshed, what are the chances at the present moment and for the next few months to come, of protecting it against Soviet occupation? I would like, without mentioning any names, to venture an analysis of two possible alternatives, basing my reasoning on information gathered through personal contacts with military authorities, colleagues who have been accredited to satellite countries and refugees from the same countries, including Eastern Germany.• 5. The questioning of refugees of varying origins who have reached Scandinavian or other western countries shows that until last surmner the Soviet authorities had done very little to improve their road and railway network from East to West. They are now replacing emergency bridges with permanent ones, rebuilding roads and duplicating their railway lines, but this programme should not be completed before one or two years' time. As they presently exist, the communication and transport facilities are quite inadequate on the ground to supply important fighting forces 000367 j �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 2 - in operation for any length of time. This is one of the reasons why a few Western Governments, like the Netherlands, have been less than hasty in their re-armament policy. 6. If the fact is accepted that war, according to the classical pattern, is unlikely before 1952 or 1853, is there any possibility of a "coup" along less orthodox conceptions? United states military publications have often mentioned the fact that the number of Soviet airbonne divisions is out of proportion with the normal defence of their territory. Assuming that this information is partly correct, one can easily imagine that these divisions could be moved at short notice to satellite airfields and from there be sprayed over Western Europe in a matter of hours. There would be no adequate Western organization to cope with them on landing and they could be helped by the local Communist parties. No heavy equipment would be required and most strategic positions could be occupied after minor skirmishes with the local police. In order to facilitate the task, Soviet parachutists might well use Western uniforms,. 7. I have been struck by the information coming from Poland that high-ranking local CQmrnunist officials have expressed their conviction that the occupation of Western Europe could be achieved so rapidly,'., that the United Kingdom and United States would be presented with a fait accompli. Peace would then be offered to them with such guarantees that their populations would be opposed to the destruction of "European civilization" through atomic bombing, under the pretext of saving it! s. Personally, I do not believe that things could go as simply as that. Soviet strategic and industrial centres would soon receive their load of atom bombs, but would this counter-attack restore the position in Western Europe and prevent a long period of preparations before the Western coalition could switch to the offensive on land? The Kremlin may vell consider that the West will not be ready to pay the price for liberating working classes that were already partly Communist and a bourgeois class and intelligentia that were already ripe for domination. In the circumstances, it is not what we Westerners believe that matters, but what the Politburo believes. This is the first alternative that I wanted to examine and my conclusion is that unorthodox war within the next year is a fair possibility. 1 9. The second alternative is a little more encouraging. I suppose that the Soviet leaders wish before starting hostilities: (1) to increase their stock of atom bombs; (2) to consolidate their position in the satellite countries; (3) to stockpile strategic raw materials, including petrol; (4) to improve their transportation system; then a postponement until 1952, that is, before Western strength can normally match their own, is more likely. This however, would mean a war of attrition with all the uncertainties that it involves for the Communist system. This is a longer-term possibility which could be more easily met if there were an element of surprise in the speed of Western mobilization. 000368 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 3 - It is difficult for anyone outside the inner Communist circle to know how well the Soviet leaders are informed about conditions in the rest of the vJOrld. vii th the exception of Molotov and Vishinsky, very few have personal knowledge- of foreign countries. They remind us of Hitler and his clique who were informed by men who did not dare to tell the truth if it were in contradiction with the Master Plan. Therefore the risk of Soviet miscalculation and blundering into war is not to be ruled out. 10. I have inquired from Dutch security sources whether they had any indication that the Netherlands Communist Party were preparing for clandestine activities in case of international complications. It seems that up to now their only plan is for going underground at short notice. No trace has yet been found of any sabotage programme, although the fact that most Dutch communists are connected with the Amsterdam or Rotterdam ports leads one to believe that they would try to prevent the military from using these ports for bringing reinforcements and supplies. 11. I also asked whether the top Dutch Communist leaders were expressing the same views as their Polish colleagues as mentioned in P~ragraph 7. The answer was in the negative but it was added that if such a plan exists the Dutch Communists are not important enough to be let in on the secret. They would only receive orders in due course. 12. What measures could the Atlantic coalition take at this stage to cope with alternative No. l? First of all, radio broadcast from the Atlantic Pact nations towards the Eastern Bloc should constantly insist on the impossibility of a limited war in Western Europe. No doubt should be left that by moving west, the S01riet forces, even if successful in reaching the Channel, would start a long and decisive war with the West. Reference should often be made to Hitler's disappointment at not reaching an agreement with the United Kingdom after the fi-.ench collapse in 13. 1940. The second precautionary measure would be to organize in all the Western European countries a home guard comparable to the United Kingdom model in 1940. Special attention should be given to the protection of airfields and other strategic points. This partial mobilization of manpower would bring home to the Western populations the danger confronting them and lead them to accept greater sacrifices for their defence. It would correspond to a state of emergency. 14. 15. With regard to the second alternative, the plans set up by the Atlantic organization are meant to cope with this possibility but the time factor cannot be over-estimated. Everything should be done to reduce the time limit already fixed. More particularly, a special effort should be made in the immediate fu~ure to increase U.S. forces in Germany up to a strength that will convince both Germany and the other continental countries that their own national contribution will not be useless. 000369 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information .• - 4 - 16. Finally there is the important question of war aims. The starting point of our reasoning could be that Europe cannot be reorganized and recover a normal life if the Soviet remain on the Elbe and if they control Eastern Europe. A day might come when Western strength may be so overwhelming that the Soviet will accept the necessity of retreating without fighting. But one could not be too optimistic about this possibility. It is much more likely that they will have to be accompanied home, volens nolens. This should be the first war aim of the Atlantic coalition. 17. The second aim would be the over-throwing of the present regime in Moscow. This could only be done with the support of the Russian people, and this support could only be enlisted if the Western countries started now to explain that they have no territorial ambition, that they want the Russian people to organize their life as they wish but that the continuation of a policy which condemns the whole world to the endless, sterile anxieties of war, cold or hot, will not be permitted. 000370 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Warm War / 27 DECEMBER 1950 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1950-12-27 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00088 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Canadian Ambassador, The Hague to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, "The international crisis arising out of the defeat of United Nations forces in Korea," 27 Dec. 1950, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4758, file no. 50069-D-40, part 1. Korean conflict Korean War Netherlands Pierre Dupuy Reid Soviet menace The Hague