1 20 10 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b00e21221b063463e3029f0da2bb7fab.pdf ed9711871604e4ce8772106b454606b2 PDF Text Text LBP/U: Ott~-a, Jan'Wll"y 16, 19S4.. There 11 no doubt nov that tar-reacbinc deciaiono have been made 1n Uishlngton in i-eepect. of detence ·ur. Ou1lee'e 1peecb on Januru."112 in policy and strategy. Sew York sakes that clear. The implementation of these doeieiono will ba e;radual and no dou'btc ev,u:-y effort will be ude br-1-na t.bem n°t'out 1n c w1 t.o caueei leaot. anxiety t,c aeons triends Ao ?:r. Ow.lee pute lt in N1,1w Iort: and alli.ea. wa, "It imperative t.bat chsnge abould be accompan1ed by undv8'tand1ng of' our true purpos•s, eUdden and speci.cular ebnnt;e had to be &'IOld•d• Otbemse there micht bnvo been a panic aiaong our friend& and miac:alculated 4ggroaeion by our enn1es." Neverthaleae, action deaia1ons would cppear.to be proceeding. .· .. to impl•ent new It will have tar- reaching conH(ltiencosfw'.:Canada • . •, : !' • One evidence of eh:1nr;0 in Onttted f'.tates policy t~ri.can ia th.tit. IUSO c:ount.r1•• .r~ no J.~r pressure tc> .tn.crun• ~•f'once expenditures. r..r. Dulles lective o.t. least subject now t.alke about "readJustmanta security effort" to Inde-ed• _ 1:i' the fft.'70 col• e.nd he mee.nareadjustment. downwarde, in t ems of cost tor both the United Ctatre• and 1 ts llATOal.lie•• IUTO 000204 �It'i.TO de£nnce f'orcee to be etabili•ed at t.bout, fifty in nu.rope are now D:1v1sione. plus w~at.evur Germon:,eMl produce •. Ybera 1s no longer any Pent;azon talkt .ot; lee.st 1n public• about ninety hundred.tl1v1s1onf>t1.ebs1ng eacentinl the defence or peace lo much tnlk. of tho nnew On the c;t?1or bnnd• t~re in Burope. or one or ninety-ti·ve look" end tl1e "lor15 ooultt, ui~ econmnic etnb111ty 11& the .foundot14n £or da1'enct, '81".ful"t.. All tb-ase concc,p~n ,u·c new put forward by !Jr. Dulloa, speciflcallJ at Va.rte in Decembor and 1n bi& r.ew·Yo~kspeeoh, as n nm, Jicarican a nev rn?o polloJ·• d1eoo'V'ery lo .fact, they b.:·u.'l~oviously su:-;;est.cd t.it ut~t.J meetings by llrit.t&~1 tmd. ether and etrona].y opposed by PJnor1candelo~at;ea. and b~en dele5at(ls• The hcer1enno clao in those aare strongly deproca~ed talk ot more defence for less cost by relyt.ns all on (!Ual1ty end ttnew :wee.pons". Ct.'t t.bia baa now cbs.i'tged. fbe.ra ie now no apparent . to build up fVi'i·Oforces in Europe to a point .'!.~ricnna ootloiderod ooeessar, a yeu 8t1t"Opewar, to be d•f'endad against effort Whlcb t.he or so ~o it :'."'e&tern aggreaoion. !he chnnse may be due to a genuine defence·by belie£ in th9 efficacy in part ot new method&ot/retal1ot1cn; to a £eel1n · tbat t.he cr161s ba aloo du.e t.o t,he oev A~erican policy ,,. ' ina;,ired b30 eased. But 1~ may of "diseP~T-lCo~nt p<>sa1blyes much by bUd5etnry. aa by stratenic considerations. olso 1t, 000205 �t The present pos1.t1on of the European Defence CommunitJ has a beor1ns on the new American policJ. Though EDOnow see.ms to be stalled. still talks about nm,c or notbing". and disappointaent .is one roason focussing .Americans ma¥ now arsu.e that on this The not coma together or certnin be1na tho case, should now become per·1pberal, respons1.b1llt1ee b7 atomic retaliation a sea and eir strateu line Spain running and the 1n case ot \.'ar • victory line, can be ech1eved. of the prevention achievement of victory pr-edcalnantly - and.Pakistan? More and more stress new doctrine States ltingdom through to Greece ond Turkey From this United holdinc from ttorwny to the United Mediterranean put policy • defence which can, in eny event, now bG left to the OeJ!'IISnst fbis Dullea, defence delay my be a as Europe trill they are relieved to det"end itself, this the BDOinto effect in United States attention frustration that of, or evon. an excuse for thin shitt. rationalization rougbly marbe It over the dela1 in bringing tor the sbi.tt .Alterna.t1 vely, tor that the Amer1oan·Government by developillg, •massive retaliatory power". 1a being placed on of war or. it it coees, tbe to use the- words of Mr. A&the Secretary ot State 1t in Sew York, "The basic dec1s1.on wss to depend primarilf upon a great capacitJ to retaliate, instantly, bg means and at plao.es ot our ehoos1ng." This 000206 �,Thia 1s to be made possible featuring up a strategic by building atomic weapons and "highly mobile naval I resorve 1 air and a.mphibious units". As a oonsequ.cnca of this new strateu less emphasis 1s to be placed on \'ihat Rr. Dnlles calla, phrase that mu.st sound ominous to Russia' a tree ttlocnl defensive To make this l)OWer". neighbours,, sound a little better, n1ocal defence will alwa7s be important", Mr. Dulles added. that but then he spoiled in a the ette,et somewhat by stating detenco alone would never be enough to contain tba.t such the mighty land arm., ot the ~OJllffllUl.1st worl4. there ls such a large The fact.that stookp1l.e ot a to.mic bombs and that increasing in voltule and etteot1vonesa to adopt th1s no.w strn.tas.,. decision believe othor atomic weapons are that lt commends itnelr, must ba•e aade easier There 1s reaaon to ls nO\'l becoming the feeling new otratety The tact cbcapor that perm.\ e "thinning t'ilson, as well as that detence b7 those methods than .1t otherwise would bo contirms there is a close connoot1on between the and budgetary reduction. to Pentagon espeo1ally, :people like Admiral Redford and Charles to the Treasury. the poller Thia strategy, Which 1s pledged, to tax ot course, out" of American toroea will fllso in Burope, 000207 �.,J _.J,· , t:.urope• of "br1.ng1ng boys boca 11, which will be popular tdth United Stotoa public op1n1cn. It is no~ surprisina becoru.ng 1norcaa1naJ.y unem3y ecbout thie tbot Buropenno ore new str.r.to6Y t1hich rniees n dor,rosoina tco.r tbnt. the Americans may consider that auropo, etm ' if no~ expondoblo, toreee, ovcroeea 1 tdll h~vo .to bo de.fended by its ueaJ.otca. · by t1oversttas. weapons.,, rot.her than by toreos: Europeans \dll tinht bloody, mon-to-mon way, while victory by atomic t-otnli.atlon. If tn t,he old-.taeh1oned, wlll con,e from t.bEt skies such v1ctoi-y comes only after oceupct1on nod des~ruot1on and liberation, it bao little Zo thlo the Acorieons m2y well reply nppoal for iuropennn. that- Guropean countrie_e a.re now st.i-onc enoU6h theoeelvoe, tdt.b some British nnd At:erican help .. but not too mueb ... to tr tboy will only unite I hold tho Cuosicns off; especially Naturally, the Uni tecl ~t:..t 1s to r~e every affort will be mde by thaao roars and tlml"'tl will be nothing liko erudo Qr ic.;mdi~to td.thn.rnvale from Uuropean soil. Indeed Prosident 1 .ndhorener! t.o tMSO polialea ~1oenho~r did, in .tact.. bis r.t'!to of tho tznion cpeech. Operation Disengagement slowly &u1 c.:-re£ull7 will a1•e such be re-ntfirnad. roassuranea Out J.t eeerui clear io baGinntne, dona no doubt. thoue;i1 te will th.11t. be in �6. of two Divisions The announced uithdrawal trom Korea and the great, interest Pakistan into tills tit now peripheral In short• the and e.tamic-naval. strategy. Americans a.re at.tempting and ~e should be well adv1sod. l think. to re-exnm1.Jle our own these 4evelopaenta. Of I am JlOt suggesting · .Am.er1can policy cannot be made without wenkening tho North Atlantic will roqu1re skill to undertaken oomm!.tments previously free thot1Selves fro• certain pol1oy 1a tbe light 1n strel16th-en1ng in \:ashington a.nd care Cong:res.e of the issues that abandoning collective obn:nge of or e•en arrongeraents. in t:ashilllJton involved this But this and en appreciation end tenrs end the teel1nss by of allies. It polic1 th~se qualities ere not shown, the new ma7 be oe.r.ried out 1n. auob e way that system, will be waallonec1amt e•en disappear. gran.to4 that wlll the oomuniats, in.terpret developmonts end exploit the whole N.ATO It ma1 be taken to~ tor whom NATOremains the olliet ena»J'; new American detence so a.s to te.cilitate and str•tegic th.ts disappearance. They will undoubtedlJ 'try to show tba t the Americans are abandoning end leaving the Bu:ropeans to their tete, take refuge in atom bombs and oontinentnl NATO• While they the.mselYes detenoe. Ca.ne.d1an 000209 �'I. Cana.d.1sn detenoe and rightly, pollo.v has been tirnl.y, founded on :NATO,and we should do everything can to keep thie foundation atrons. ie not going to be easy, polltloally, on the other to maintain at Wlimpe:1rod stre!l(Sth our forces overseas, are raducins their comltments hand, we it ruu and r.hile our neighbours through these •new decisions", the import of \Yhich botb Pros1dent Gisenhouer and Secretor1 Dulles hnve now made clear. It aoy be tha.t the American sda!nletratlon will not be the onl,y ones who will have to uke :reappr1aise1• of rorelgn an -'agonizing pollcJr. 000210 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 16 JANUARY 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-01-16 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00015 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Department of External Affairs draft memorandum for the Prime Minister, 16 Jan. 1954, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. atomic war Dwight Eisenhower John Foster Dulles Louis St. Laurent NATO US-Canada relations https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/bb10144e5f03e2298198ed809748c984.pdf 415b2a1f75e5b632834165e4f93a8d9d PDF Text Text _ .. . _, . ,;/; .,,, IMf~~ 1 Arnol4 Sal.th/l,IB TOP S~:a.? --ADEIJ ·· ·. ,\, REDtJn A S, 'RE'f•nuar,:v £8, llltw,, __ SECRET 5011 s-- P-Y IH-JAORhJIDUl.FOU fflh Mil·lltiT$R .. .i'ilf You ••keel tor my oo•ent,,au.o~en4u.m. to t.he .Friae !~Water. ..)~ I on th.• ~r•l\t / ¥/ i,.·_yj 2. There 1• eert•lnl.1, 1n at Y1ew, ao cloubt that fer J.'eachin& 4ec1alon• &>ec taku in l1e•b1Qa;ton ••aardiA& ~•fenoo pol1c1 and atr•tea,. ha.,• a. 'rhei-e ta oei-teinl.7 p .. t danger tll•t lhe aew pol1c7 •1 1nterprete4 •• • retura to oonlineAtallaa; but thla aight b9 ea uta1r ea.4 el'l'Oneou• •• 1t. woul4 be 4aqeroaa. I am 1nol1n•4 to think tha, the cbaiaa•• 1Jl pol1oJ are probabl7 d1ctate4 le•s bf bu4&etary eona1derat1ona than bJ aerioQ& atrat•~i• analt•l•, baee4 ~•rllaulerly on the 1Jnpl1cat1one ot new teehl11oal deTelep.aenta. •• for ua, Jeers there hea been preeHure tro.a aoientieta end othera to iut th• uin .. pba11a, in 4etenoe pol101, on the •x»loitet1on ot tb• technioal and econollio a.ipe:riol'itJ ot tbe weat. Thi• wO\l.14••n aor• e.aphea1• on expene1Y• •qu1paeat, an4 leae oa Mnpower. ~1••nhowe:r•• budget--••••• 1••terda7 reintoroee the •in that th• new Aaer1o~• pol1c7 1• ••autiellJ elona $he•• l1n$•, oonoentrat1q •r• on th• new wnpona ot air otrenoe aa4 e1r 4etenc•• 1nolQ41na •••11 wrniaa network• end au14e4 a1aa11•• ot all aorta, than oa infantry 41Y1eioaa. Sillilarly in th• naYJ there will ea t1a• goea on be aore UlJ)baa1a on. aubllar1n••• eapeo1allJ etoalo, an4 le•• on urge eurteoe •hlP•• 80 tar rrom b•i.11&1aolat1on1at, this new tren4 1n Un1te4 Stetea ,pc,1101 may be more cn,loaoua to tbat 01· th• Uni le& IU.aa4oa in th• 19"11 oentw:.v, but with th• ea.»lltaa1a now on a1r power rather then eN power. Th•r• la• a1111lar eapka•1• o.n tlle eoqu1a1tion an4 develoJ>Mat of b•••• at ••lecte4 apota • roWld th• worlt, to allow maxs..».a tl•xl bill ti. t.lnl t•4 sta tea pol101 tocl•J and toao~row, lit• United. E1ogdo& polioJ ill \he 19th centurr. 6. •• I 000195 �' - a. i lo lnvol••• la a4Utloa lo tuelan ,11.. tile proYla1on et eeo».Olllo et.4 aa4 of a1U.tsia1 aa4 poll,s.ea 1 adv_lo• w alliu. 411 pJ>onlti, •on.tin• tJasoa, an4 troopa to d•t•nt •• Bo oAe aooaaee lftb oen1u1 lnglalld of iao1a,1ontu.. ans lt Ille.bl •• equU, alaleac:U.q to 1••1 tbla oaara•aps.aa, tu O'nltet a,a,ea. It ..... pc,eelble th• uln t,atv• 1• J.aok ot atequl• oouultat1oa bJ th• vat.,e4 State• 1d.tll bar olll••• ~•ther lllaa a rearn 10 eoatlnenlall•• or a.-n to• ,11a, p•rlplleral at.1tate,1 tllat '• X tb1Dk the •Jba•l• out. Wou.141•••• touUnental iluope ln Dllll••' a,aeob. on untortum.te. ln vi•• ot tile gJ'Ollling SoYiet ttoekp11• ot atoalo an& bl4ro&•n veapou, Ill• •Qba•l• '1411 ~b•lll.1 •• •• auoll on au detene• aa on alr ott•••• fte• •1 al .. be laoreaalng Vnlled Sta.lee aaphaale on the &UJ.'0,-an ooritln.ml on taolllll•• tor axplolbtlon ot 11111 taotJ.oal ••• of atolllo ••apona aga11\st lnn41JJC lntan'117. ntallat.lon -, al.80 be aoae¥fba'I Adalea41ng •• well •• iiaaeni1a1i.,, tll••• d.nelo1119a1• in tJB11•4 Sia••• poll•i•• •1 NU l>e etratsgioau, aoun4. ••bJ••• ,o•• lapOrunt qualit1oat1oaa t• •• (i) It la •ital Ula\ •• Pollor b• a4equal•1' Wl4aa,oo4 bl' V:nlta4 S\atea alll••• hr tld.• 11 Will fla'f• to be •x»la1Jle4 a-aiav t;llan explalaa4 Un.ltd Slatoa 41ploaaot ••l>al al tbJ.a. ••1'• (11) tu n•• pouo, -, au• ,u., 1, .,. 111'.•1.f tban lleretoton aa, tlptiac tnvolY•• Ul• ua• ot •••• weapou. !Ida •1 aak• tl&ll$lna aor• ctltftollll to looa11••• rn "all or aotb.lnc,. \en4one, eould be 4aagenu • • • X X t. Slne• tile tange:r ot alaua4ernan4lq, wldell eou.14 lead to aerioa• al.an aal pan.le ta auo,-, 1• a real on•, lt wov.14 •••• panloulari, •••S.nbl• ~•' 1b.• PnM Id.mater utor• bl• tortb.ooalq tnp allov.14" taU1 b~l•t•4 OJI tba al tua\lu •• tbal ln kl.a 41•••1ona •l•ll ~uropean leader•, I.II.• 0e.D&41an Sntl••n•• allou.14b• oa •• •• I 000196 �- 3 - aide ot reaGauranoe to th• extent peraltt-4 end our • of th•• ••••am.•Jtt XSX 10. Iacldentelly, by the tact • XXX aJ.ght lt not be wcithwb1le to ••weeOAMt oonvenl•nt op~ortucdty tor a ~eneal 41aauaa1on w1tb DI.Ille• or Bedell 6a1th or i1aeahower, oa the ceneal question ot atrategy? be lntereatet. It la raaoomable the t •• DhoUl.4 ~uite apart from the iaplicaUon• ct United state• poltc1 to~ RA.TO,there will be• ~tiolillar problea to~ Canad.a, probable "oontinentel «•ten.••" eatalla nee4 tor iJ:lor•• •ill& 1n't'eatant in Cana do or aon•1, aD4 or a1J.' aqua4rona an4 11tu1»ower.It will b• l••• eaaJ to kMp lerc• Cana41an tore•• etat1one4 11. it••••- ne••••• A.o.u. eo: Aottna Uuder-s.e:reta,1 Defence L1•1aon (l) D1v1e1on 000197 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 22 JANUARY 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-01-22 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00016 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Memorandum for the Minister, 22 Jan. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. continental defence Lester Pearson NATO US-Canada relations https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b6ff961857a04e2b62446ffa7e95a5cf.pdf 5281a9c502a07a2e4a2e5e175211e103 PDF Text Text u ~~i,4)• . un~_~, vJ .~) ut; ~/U S L=tlf/ .M, w~li . Letter No....... ,.•.• '1 'J (} f, fIi----------~ ti j j .,;r\,, ~.)~-'\, .,f;t.¢~ ,9.•••••••.. •· · · •· }). f.~b.J.'Uqf.Y..25'., ..:J-.9.5?-f: .. Date ........ A pv'. l JII, L,{i,) omw, ,1L, No.:;;.~'!J !. .s:.-: ?.-..Y.b sf SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET FROM:THE CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THENORTHATLANTICCOUNCIL .AND THB 0EEC, PARIS TO: THE UNDER-SE~RETARY OF STATEFOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA ,..----H;eference ...... -----ubject: .... . J:.ItlP.li~a.tiAOS .. of. Jfaite.d. S.ta.te.s. 9.tr.at.egy.......................... . In addition to political consequences of the first importance for NATO, the new United States strategy will undoubtedly have effects on Canadian and also NATOmilitary planning. 6 -1---1 7 _8_\___ _ ' I : I 3 MAR1954 Copies Referred To .............. Y..QV.;r. J ... ~:t:t;~;r..NQ-.,l;>.~71. P.f. :EehruarY...5., ..19.5>+ ..................... . 2. To the extent that the new United States strategy is to concentrate power and to develop ability to retaliate massively at points of United States chosing, the protection of this retaliatory power will assume progressively greater importance and, in the end, it will become inseparable from the power itself. In a figurative but very real sense, the United States and the North American Continent will become a fortress as well as the power house of Western ability to deter and defeat aggression. The strength and invulnerability of the fortress will be essential elements of NATO security. No. of Enclosures 3. Canada must inevitably be part of the fortress "America"; and it is not difficult to foresee that a greater part of our military effort than hitherto will have to be devoted to the integrated defence system of the American Continent. This will be a contribution not only to our own and to United States security but to the defence of the Free World. If such is the case, there seem to be implications as regards the strength, nature and deployment of our forces. ... JJ.~l).~........• 4. Post No.. file 7/~(i~ ..... As regards strength, the danger to America and therefore to Canada rises in proportion to the increas ofSoviet power to wage unlimited atomic war. A few years hence, the main front may shift from Europe and centre in the armament competition between the offensivedefensive capacity of the Soviet Bloc and the American Continent. The race will not only involve better weapons but also a redeployment of those weapons (i.e. thicker walls for the fortress). Unless we can reduce our commitments outside the American Continent, our defence bill in future years may therefore be higher. 5. Moreover, it seems possible that a re-appraisal of the balance and the character of our forces might be necessary as the new United States strategy will almost inevitably bring the forces of our two countries into closer relationship. By a fact of geography, our strategy must be ins~arably linked with, and follow closely, that ••• 2 �• ' ·-, - 2 - of the United States •• So far, our strategy, in common with that of NATOas a whole~ has been based on the assumption that the main danger was in Europe and that our principal contribution was to help to provide the shield for that area. This resulted in the development of our present force structure which may not meet the needs of a different role than the one previously envisaged. It seems, therefore, that we should also have a "new look" at our force structure. 6. The deployment of our forces will probably create problems. In this regard there is likely to be a conflict between political and military requirements. It will now be necessary to re-examine carefully the allocation of our forces, within the NATOarea. This is not a new problem, but it may become more acute. Hithertot it was largely agreed that Europe was the threatened area and North American requirements were low in comparison. The North American area, because of the change in the United States strategic concept, .and the development in Soviet atomic capabilities, seems now to have a relatively higher priority. Unless there is an overall increase in the forces available, it will be necessary to make some reallocation of existing forces or perhaps a change in the direction of the defence effort. Our European partners will oppose any such suggestions, and we must be careful not to weaken the European front to the point where European morale will deteriorate in the knowledge that Soviet forces could occupy Western Europe easily; a new and delicate balance must be found between conflicting European and North American defence requirements. The final decision will not be made on military grounds alone; for political reasons, it may not be possible for the United States and ourselves to reduce our forces in Europe as much as purely military expediency might suggest. 7. If these tentative conclusions are examined in relation to some of the problems now facing NATO, the results are of interest. - _,,-__ 8. Let us take first the field of defence expenditures. The general agreement that the curve should flatten at approximately the present level, we feel, should be a tentative one. Bearing in mind that there can be no absolute security, defence expenditures should, in general, depend upon three factors: an assessment of Soviet political intentions, an assessment of Sovi~t military capabilities (atomic and otherwise)~ and the defence strategy that is employed. These interdependent, factors will not remain constant and must, therefore, be the subject of continuous review. In practice, we suspect, that as commitments cannot easily be reduced in Europe, and North America becomes more exposed, defence expenditures will go on increasing. 9. In connection with the "new look 0 concept, the point has been made that it offers only the alternative of an-.. atomic attack (global war) or the loss of~ local war, and is, therefore, much more likely to encourage p•ecemeal concessions. In reality, we doubt whether the "new look 0 implies such a fundamental change. As we see it, the arsenal of the West should continue to be diversified; it should continue to have both atomic weapons and conventional forces; it should be prepared both for atomic warfare and local aggression. The proper balance of forces is likely to be achieved by a series of approximations rather than by a single formula, but in any case, it seems unlikely that the aggregate cost will be less. • •• 3 000113 �.,, - 3 - 1~- 10. Further, in modern conditions, as the danger of a lightning attack increases,the need for larger and larger standing forces, with higher and higher standards of readiness grows. Our "peacetime" forces are larger than they have ever been. Other factors being equal, it is difficult to see how we will be able to avoid having even larger forces if the present trend continues. 11. The conclusions of this rather cursory the implications of the new United States strategy to be that: (a) NATOdefence burdens availability of new and more efficient in the long run; review of would appear in spite of the weapons may increase (b) there is likely to be a shift in the allocation of resources in favour of the North American as compared to the European area (hence the fresh need of a German contribution); the Canadian the nature, structure, and distribution forces are likely to be affected. (c) of THE DELEGATION I ·•" 000114 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 25 FEBRUARY 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-02-25 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00020 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Letter from Canadian Delegation to the North Atlantic Council to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 25 Feb. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. atomic war continental defence NATO https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/1d80d35209953c70a260730e87076478.pdf 385c76ec877f087c8beb16d04bab33ff PDF Text Text Defence Liaison/JGHHalstead/ga r 1A DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MEMORANDUM TO: ........ 'J:'.1;1!9 .. .i\<?..R, ... !].\1;~.~':'"~~<?;t:~~?-.~Y. .............. . ·····················································"'~~ ..... .FROM:.... P.~:f ~r:i.q~ .. ~~~t~'?F!..\ ~) ......................... . - REFERENCE: ..................................................... . Security Date .. CONFIDENTIAL .......................... M?:J?~.l:;l ..?,.. J ~.f?~....... . File No. ~-0IIf_. f- '-fo . We have prepared notes for the Minister on United States defence policy, as requested. At the same time, however, I think we should express our misgivings about the advisability of making such remarks in a public statement in the United States at this time. 2. Although they have purposely way that they comment on the new U.S. larly on Mr. Dulles' exposition of it, than directly these views are bound to Administration and the public as being aspects of United States policy (which been drafted in such a strategy, and particumore by implication be taken by the critical of certain they are). 3. Such questions as are posed in these notes can and should be raised with the United States authorities through official channels. There will undoubtedly be opportunity to discuss them at the forthcoming Consultation Meeting in Washington. I think, however, that it might be taken amiss if the Minister at the same time enters into public dis·cussion on the subject. It might be regarded as an appeal to the American people over the heads of the Administration or as outside interference in the lively debate which Mr. Dullest statement has set off. Such a false impression might jeopardize the chances of our getting sympathetic hearing in private talks with the Administration. Liaison Ext. 326 (2/53) . 000104 �i ' Defence ~,· Lj_aison/JGHHaistead/ga ?j/•t {-- A, )J!I) -f' • lfo RESTRICTED 1, 1954 March ·-- Notes on United States Defence Policy for the Minister 1 s Speech in the United States Defence importance public in this to us all. debate of the free It recently world, part in the lively cerning of course, domestic to do so. timely, But I think controversy For one thing, for me to take that has been waged con- words and the meaning strategy; point of yours and a national under \Jith and I do not intend and perhaps in everything you do and we feel On the other your shadow. strategic we are dependent 3. freedom as yours importance. across the Atlantic. the security continuing finds our efforts We take partner roughly one- of yours, an active interest of all of the of your continent and which is of great and In a very real you and sense, on each other. is our freedom, and that point one-sixteenth the consequences We in Canada are also our allies a population hand, we occupy an area which is almost· as large increasing also of view of a junior income about live actions. of of view on some aspects I mean the point we inevitably viction striking problem. on the North American continent. on the countries What do I mean v•J'henI speak of a "Canadian viewn? active in New York in it would be appropriate, of our common defence tenth Mr. Dulles' be impertinent to comment from a Canadian 2. and other Relations Sta.tes of vital has been under States of Mr. Dulles' in the United 1' that since on Foreign the' significance the 1hew look is a matter particularly It would, age is a matter in the United speech to the Council January. atomic that concrete to promote We are convinced their and stability cohesion aware of our dependence of all expression cooperation prosperity of the free the Atlantic that their is our prosperity, world depends powers. in our membership within on This con- in NATOand the developing Atlantic community. 000106 �- 2 - Another our association terms factor of varying 5. sparse population natural resources only a limited with its ·also on active service mutual sea-lanes. and training 6. several inception for this All this purpose gives questions in mind three The first as a military without full problem. regard In Europe NATO contributed Sabre jet for the defence important Canadian to our NATOallies quantities of equipment and nav~gators programme, and our Parlia- '\ over $1 billion. us the right, I think, - to express considerations but which sometimes and integrated dozen warships of common concern. basic States of Canadian-built of this which constitute We have also There is another to the duty we owe to ourselves evident of the in destroyers, forces. in Canada for pilots, Since the on defence Nations command. squadrons aid in the form of large ment has voted has Canada has of the United Like you,. ·we have provided observers. depends, in the Korean theatre, Gruenther's and have earmarked ammunition the we can be proud to the which forms part to NATOin Europe twelve contribution. relatively to develop and our three Kingdom among the United of the Atlantic its Nevertheless, second only to those under General fighters with around the globe. economic vitality Our brigade we have a brigade forces of friendship heavy obligations potential. means in two world wars and, more recently, Korea and in Europe. the United of view is that distances, of which I think of freedom.in a contribution vast on whi~h its military ties and creeds and its made contributions are still and special colours Canada, defence point with the Commonwealth and all of common traditions nations in the Canadian - in addition our views frankly In doing so, I have which are probably self- tend to be overlooked. is that defence No military to the political is a political measures effects should as well be chosen they will have. 000107 __j �- 3 Irn1eed, there are occasions be used specifically numerous examples stationing to serve of this, of United on the European Continent ganize its own collective Community. European countries to deal withdravm, it integration of petty either 8. plans area that Europe to orthe the to their own aggression If these troops the movement toward were European and give way to the tragic combination and isolationism that y-ears. isolation. is that Plans defence of other areas cannot for the defence of the world must obviously for the defence troops ,,,ithin of Soviet economic rivalry the inter-'l.var in geographic particular ,entirely of German militarism. nationalism, the are a of Western a guarantee with the threat that affords being and prosperity not be left is probable History These troops in the ability The second principle planned ends. means may Kingdom and Canaqian They are also would founder characterized United security will or with a revival political in peacetime. symbol of our faith Atlantic military one of the most recent States, living devices when certain take into be of a account (and not only 000108 �- 4 - ,, adjacent areas). related. joint It The third is that consultation. principle joint defence This principle in NATO, where we have gradually five years both a habit consultation smoothness and efficiency. consultation on defence States and certain other effect take of the threat ventional of their of atomic actually reduces deterrent is determination ultimatum, master be used if atomic weapons may involve instead 10. that If hostilities the atomic must be a clear that on this these sort compelled where it the decision of stopping of conto aggression is, Where aggression for the use is committed. ourselves unsuitable. and limited instead aggression proxy, minor First, understanding is placed should repercus- of policy. weapon in a situation example, political there for a major But of permanent to use the for one reason is launched or against the possibility into the Take its measures arise. to be effective, in enormously as a deterrent flexibility we may find or another, military retaliation strength our whole reliance a new factor likely and a clear • weapons will basis, consultation principles. complications military the United which complicates that Two major the United on a bilateral introduce on the principle account between is unique. of these sions. if today and surprising of multilateral application full of close and between an example Atomic weapons practical up over the last is the closest countries which I think planning built matters of course, defence has been recognized There and Canada, 9. require which now works with States in peacetime efforts and a machinery continuing but NATOprovides is closely by using of turning conflict them. The second the use of atomic complication in this weapons might, respect is in certain ••• 5 000109 �- 5 - circumstances, as well ~ause as in neutral advantages atomic of a public necessary, couse, opinion might might were lacking then be able countries, We should also visible will support if also be met with The enemy the domination but with of such without in the process may alarm reprisals population. reaction but in kind. the knowledge than to the that rather reassure if aggression than that tion is relatively vulnerable and inadequately with civil measures. These defence which should political 1i. on the account against atomic The factor application of atomic in geographic be on a global however, the world, equally nor can the prepared in weighing weapons that the advantages basis. also defence complicates should The threat and plans innnediate popula- factors the military isolation. is world-wide are all local deterrent. of the principle aggression clearly into disadvantages of reliance plw..ned be taken The power may exposed retaliation rather the people from a friendly of a country atomic of if public of the world's of troops of aggression, is, the weapon, weapons may have if the population defence on the keep in mind the psychological presence threat A or we might ·successfully have to reckon reassure gain. neutralization, proportion which the use of atomic concerned wielding from one quarter a large dis- should, countries. their force; countries Such support be disastrous to achieve aggression it delay. colllltry or at least alienate that in other the use of military defeat must be based be used without the results • the military convinced in the in allied whose political outweigh retaliation essential support reactions countries would far policy-of but public to meet The threat or serious not be of Soviet it must is not, in all parts of same means be used to meet it •• • 6 000110 �- 6 - .- -~. everywhere. Yet, introduces 11all an necessitate particular ~e'Wbe area of the master is 11 vital - warning concerning an implicit Perhaps atomic weapons "vitaln the use of atomic share t~sequences arise out of aggression action? to these however, that they be asked and carefully of that on the full are prepared others? which the principle of for or against the hand, be expected if to which might of the world questions weighed in the atomic and free with where I do not wish to suggest are the kind policy is to On the other decision in a part issuing complication can allies of a vital they have no commitments? success in the be reconciled to be no consultation, policy without can consultation is defence areas If the decision and rapid to be are not, retaliation? there what the answers are others to decide surprise use to the potential relates~ need for a of consequences while to be given Who is whether some areas the most serious involve one, .4nd if decisions. to justify the chain . . to aggression consultation. be a joint vital sense, the invitation 12. joint in this - how is a clear aggressor and painful sufficiently alone which may used to determine in motion! 11 weapons element difficult weapon and all would set labelled on atomic or nothing" extremely What criteria that reliance should be. of questions I think, that should in any consideration age, depends cooperation particularly - as I believe of all to make sacrifice~~freedo~ nations of when the it does which they share. 000111 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 2 MARCH 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-03-02 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00021 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Memorandum from Defence Liaison to the Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 2 Mar. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. defence liaison Dwight Eisenhower John Foster Dulles Korean War NATO https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/bc697ad832d5f8fdab6d135aabbd72d4.pdf 5a058b66637c386468e147dc8b961a12 PDF Text Text orJJ✓~b) ¥ / ~\9~~, ' ·"~ \--· f( -1ot ::;/t(/.-?..~ "7;,Y. j.~f.' ...... SECURI?:LASS~~ATION ~~sr~·~ l'-sS\:, !'li>, ;; -. ,· 'I ~• '• En. l No••• Despatch r-----=D.aa..at..e. '··.March . .22., .195-4 •.. · ...... FROM: ~--_-_ TO: ~~~ -~ ere nee •.•. a:.-::~-~lject: ..... W'-- ~!'.~ ~ • D _-:-\ , . -:------ _ \ ~/ . C:anad,i.an ·/4_¥'!,' ~~ S E C R E T '\}~ "'.~ .-ft."J . Ambassador, Canadi~ Embassy, WASHINGTON,D. C. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA Our. . Ue spa;t. ch. . ~.o•.. ll.? ..Q f ...JM WH'Y.. A?,.. ~.9.? It , ................. Iloite.d . .States ~ ✓4 ~ \l.. D~.f.enc~.. f.cfl-;l<;Y.• ...................................... . ,✓ :-----1 _rr. ___ , Copies Re £erred To .............. . No. of Enclosures \..: '5 ...:J........... . Post File No ............... Public interest in the United States has been focused more sharply on the country's new defence strategy in the past two weeks than~ any time since the new Administration took office. On the domestic political front Mr. Stevenson and Vice President Nixon debated the merits of the "new look"; within the Administration there were evidences of disagreement between Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, and General Ridgway, the Army Chief of Staff, on the role assigned to the Army under the new strategy; last but by no means least the international implications of the new strategy were underlined by Mr. Pearson's timely remarks to the National Press Club in Washington on March 15. Mr. Dulles, who, because of the demands on his time, has not been in Washington for any length of time in the past two months, was therefore faced at his press conference on March 16 with a number of searching questions on the~ new defence strategy of the United States. You will ~ remember that it was Mr. Dulles speaking on behalf of the President and the Administration, who described for the public's benefit the principles underlying the new defence strategy in his address to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on January 12. Mr. Dulles' answers to the questions asked at the press conference (copies of the transcript of which are attached) taken together with his article in the forthcoming issue of Foreign Affairs (our despatch No. 503 of March 18) go a long way towards clarifying the Secretary's remarks of January 12 and might even be considered to restate the policy outlined by Mr. Dulles at that time. ~ 2. While we do not wish in this l·etter simply to repeat the words of Mr. Dulles which are contained in the attached transcript, we do think that more than usual attention should be devoted to this press conference. From what I .ir. Pearson told us of his private conversations with Mr. Dulles last week it seems that Mr. Dulles made many of the points at this press conference whi~h he made in those talks. We believe that it might also be useful to relate the views of Mr. Dulles·as revealed in the attached transcript to the comments which we made on the new United States strategy in our despatch under reference. 11 . • •• 2 I I 000065 ( �c.. 195tiHAR2~-- ntl 11· 3 2 . ~-. ., 11) l ,, ,-·' J '000066 �-2- 3. Much of the domestic criticism which has been made of the "new look" has centered on the apparent decision of the Administration, as revealed in Mr. Dulles speech of January 12, to depend to a larger extent on the massive retaliatory power of the United States and less on the traditional method of meeting aggression on the ground where it occurs. It seems to us that in his most recent reply to questions from the press, Mr. Dulles has shifted his emphasis, if not his ground. He asserted that he had not meant to suggest in his January 12 tspeech that the United States would in every circumstance /retaliate instantly with its massive retaliatory power, i.e. atomic and thermonuclear weapons, but that what the United States had to build up was its capacity to retaliate instantly. The questi9n of whether or not the United States chose to use that capacity was a matter, he said, which would have to be dealt with in accordance with the facts of each situation. While Mr. Dulles' analysis of what he meant to convey in his earlier speech is valid, if one looks closely at the text of that speech, he must certainly be aware that it was not unreasonable that those who did not have access to his innermost thoughts might miss this fine distinction. With this latest explanation of the point a major element of the United States "new look" assumes much less novel proportions. According to Mr. Dulles, the Administration is simply determined to keep United States defence capacity in constant readiness so that if it is necessary to meet major aggression the United States will not require two or three years to get ready to retaliate. This is a reasonable decision for the Administration to take since in fact on two occasions the United States has been unprepared to shoulder its responsibility immediately in the face of major world conflicts; but when explained in these terms it seems to be a much less startling decision than Mr. Dulles' earlier speech would have led observers to believe had been made by the Administration. If observers are still left with some doubt in their minds on the question made famous by the New Yorker, "which paper do you read", !',tr. Dulles excuses himself from further clarification again by the eminently reasonable argument that one should not tell the enemy in advance exactly where, how and when one plans to retaliate. t 4. Mr. Dulles did go on to assure his questioners that the new United States strategy was not confined in the event of an act of aggression to the two channels of an all-out war or no resistance at all. He said that in indicating that there would be less emphasis. on local defence power, the Administration had simply made clear its intention not to be forced to meet aggression at the particular place and by the particular means which the aggressor selected. There were areas of importance to the aggressor--which were not necessarily either the front line of aggression or the capitals of Peking or Moscow~~where United States retaliation might be effective. What Mr. Dulles seems to be saying indirectly is what Admiral Radford referred to in our recent meeting of consultation as the "deep tactical offensive" use of United States atomic weapons (c.f. para. 35 of our report) ••• 3 000067 • �l -3Admiral Radford at that time explained his terms to mean the use of new weapons in a fashion which was something short of strategic bombing and something more than tactical bombing in front of one's own troops. We would surmise that what is in the minds of both Mr. Dulles and Admiral Radford is the sober realization that United States ground troops (and possibly even the ground troops of all the Western allies) can never match the potential enemy, Russian or Chinese, in numbers and that it is fatal therefore to plan to meet the potential enemy man for man on the ground. The United States aim seems to be to convince its potential enemies that their commitment of ground forces in any act of aggression will not necessarily lead to a United States response in kind. Mr. Dulles freely admitted the element of bluff in this strategy (although, of course, he does not use that word) when he told his questioners that the capacity to retaliate is in itself the great deterrent to aggress~on. "1 believe that the original Korean attack would not have occurred if it had not been assumed either that we would not react at all or if we did react would react only at the places and by the means that the aggressors chose." r 5. Another set of questions to 1~1r. Dulles were directly related by the questioners to Mr. Pearson's speech of March 15, and concerned United States consultation with its allies before a decision was taken to retaliate in any particular circumstance. Mr. Dulles replied in forthright terms that there would certainly be consultation in most of the cases that he could conceive of, for it was impli~it in the security system which has been built up among the Western allies that it operates only with the consent and acquiescence of all the partners who have helped to provide the facilities "which create a sort of international police system". We understood from Mr. Pearson that Mr. Dulles assured him privately that in his own mind a most important element of the United States capacity to retaliate was the whole-hearted co-operation of the allies of the United States and especially of those upon whose territory important United States bases existed. I think we can be certain that in Mr. Dulles mind at least, and probably too in the mind of the President, there is no lack of understanding ef tne need fo~0 ~~Il§tant and intimate consultation/ijith ~t~n~~~~r ti!!I§s on matters which concern the possible use of atomic weapons and the consequent likelihood of the outbreak of a major war. 6. Finally Mr. Dulles dealt directly and in the circumstances, we believe, quite courageously, with questions concerning the President's ability to_order instant retaliation without prior consultation with Congress. At his press conference on March 17- the President himself said that he had no intention of violating the Constitution in any action he might have to take with respect to the outbreak of war and that he thought "it was implicit in the Constitution that the President had to act against sudden unexpected aggression" (and by inference without prior consultation with Con:.;ress) • • • • •4 000068 �./e / · __ -4If one bears in mind that the Bricker controversy on the issue of the limitations on the President's power is very much in the minds of Congress, Mr. Dulles' replies on this occasion can only be taken as stemming from a strongly held conviction on the part of the Administration. Mr. Dulles gave it as his opinion that in any instance of aggression against members of NATOor against allies covered by the Rio Pact the President would have the authority to order instant retaliation even though in every circumstance he might not choie to exercise that authority without consulting Congress. Mr. Dulles admitted that the Indo-China situation would not be covered by French membership in NATO, but he said that he did not wish to imply that the United States should do nothing if the Chinese Communists with regular forces should cross the frontier into Indo-China. He was of the further opinion that the President did not have similar discretion in situations which would be covered only by the United Nations Charters. He refused to be drawn into a discussion of what he called the "twilight zonen of the President's power under the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief to take military action without a declaration of war by Congress. 7. The publication of Mr. Dulles' opinions dealt with in this letter constitutes an important bench-mark in the development of the new United States strategy. We have the impression that the events mentioned in paragraph 1 above have led to the necessity for a clearer thinking out of the Administration's broad objective, in this field. While Mr. Dulles' press conference will serve to clarify the issues further the subject is by no means finished with, and we expect to hear a good deal more of the "new look" both in and out of Congress before this year is over. r \ l 000069 �.. ~ ... >: . ·, _..., __ MARCH16, 1954 fID~rP/i\0011'i~~IJ ®rF~ifIM~ .'l?®IBl ii'COrn rPOOrn~~ PRESS ANJ?.RADIO NEWSCONFERENCE,TUESDAY,MARCH" 16, 1954 SECRETARYDULLES: I am glad to be back in Washingon,. aga:tn after quite· a considerable period of absences. ·L.have .two or three· statements which I would like to make before I subject myself to questio~s. I might say I ~ave just.come from the meeting of the Canadian Foreign Minis.ters and Ministe~s of Economic~, et detera. There is a meeting going on, We will have a com~unique i~sued this aft~rnoori sp l ~ill not want t6.discuss this at this ·particular.press conference. (See Press Release No. 140 ~ statement of the Secretary on the death of Harold B. Hinton). · ' I .have a· statement to make about the Caracas Conference, which ~ill be available at the close -0f this pres~ conference in mimeographed forni. · ( See Press Re lease No. 13'8) · · ·r will _be glad to answer any questioris. Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please give us'.the recon6il1ation of, one, the concept of instant retaliatioh; two, the concept of consultation with our allies; and, three, the concept of. involvement in war-ortly by ~n Act of Cong~ess? · A. I assum~ your reference· to "inst 9 nt retaliation" posedly ta_ken from ·an address of mine. . · · Q. And one. by the Vice~Presid~rit Saturday night. of the United . ' States is sup~ en ' '· A. I cannot. oomment on what the .Vice-President saidJ but I will be glad to comment 0n w~at I said~ If you will read my address of January 12, you will see what I advocated the~e was a "ca pad i ty" to retaliate fns ta ntly. In ;no pla·ce did I say : we would ~~~talia·te instantly, although we might indeed retali• ·atci ihstaritly under cortditions that call .for that. The e~~entia1 thing is to have the capacity to. retaliate fnstantly. It is lack of that capacity which 1ri ~Y opinibn ·accounted for such disasters. as Pearl· Harbor. · If we .had had the capacity to. ret~liate instantly~ ih my.opinion, there would have been no Pearl Harpor .. But:it· to0k about.four years to retaliate against Tokyo .... I believe we should have that-capacity ·to retaliate instantly. N~w, the question of whether or net you retaliate instantly and whefe y6u retaliate is a matter to be dealt with in accordance with the facts of each situation. I take it few would have any question but what if there were an attack upon the United States there would be instant retaliation. You have questions 000070 �' . • • NOo 14~ e~erit questions of retaliation in the ,bi:a violation Ot' a~.. attack upon·a member of the North Atlantic Treaty and upon other count1~1es with whom we have. treaty relationships!' ~ - ... The que~tion of circumstances under which you retaliate, where· ~{OU retaliate,/ how quickly ~rou retaliate, is a · matter which has to be dealt with in the. light of the facts of each particula_r case. One• thing I want to make clear beyond.the.possibility of doubt is that I don 1 t believe you should tell the enemy in advance just where, how, and when you plan to retaliate~ The whole essence of the program is that the action should be an action of our choosing and he is not' to lmow in .advance what it is,j and that uncer~ tainty on his part is a lrny to the success of the policy. Q. Sir# if I may pursue thato You mentioned in the event of an attack upon a member of the North Atlantic Treaty_ Alliance ...-you say what would then be instant retaliationg Does that mean :1.n the event the concept of 1nvolvement.1n war only by Act of Cong1•ess does not apply where there is an attack either upon the United States or upon a member of the alliance of wh~ch we are a part? Ae It means in all respects the United States acts in accordande wit~ its constitutional processes. ·There is no way in the world in which we can get away, or want to get away 9 or intend to get away from our constitutional processes~ How long that will take 6 I dontt know. It did not take very long after Pearl Harbo.r to get a declaration of war. The trouble is it did not do any immediate good to get a declaration of war because we did not have the capacity to do any~ thing with it. I have never advocated~ and nobody else in the Administration has advocated any departure from constitutional processes •. ·Jhe North Atlantic Treaty has provided that an attack against; one of those states shall be deemed the same as an attack against the United States~ We have other treaties with language which is not precisely the same as that. Just what action by the Congress is required is a matter to be decided in each case 8 as it always has been a matter to be decided in each case. The fact that you advocate having a capacity for instant retaliatio~ does not change your constitutional processeso It means we don 1 t have to wait for four .yea:r-s;after somebody attacks us before we are 1n a position effectively to h1t back. · Q,, Sir• 000071 �PR 142 Sir,.~q9es:.th.~ f~(>td>hat:·;the··Senate;;t>:f' the .Urtited;States has rat+fJ~4··.tl1~.t:N<;>r>1;11 ··A.ti.l-~nt!c Alliance mean in the: event of an attack on an ·Ally''we, .could,: within constitutional procedures, retaliate against that attack without further action in the Congress? :; · · ·" · Q. A. '.Pn~ti::Ls,:a:matter :which, 'as you,know,.iwas de'bated>ve-x•y: thorQi+.tshlY.·.in ·the Congres.s and· in ·the ·s-er.:ate ~ At the time · that ·Treaty was: .tatif:ted:··I was ..in ·the ~s:enate ~: :rt is my- • opinion that trie provisions of the Treaty, which state that an attack upon one of the Allies is :the :s.:ame· as· an:;attack'- ·. upon all -- or in other words that an attack upon one of our Allies is the same as an :.attack -up•ori the· Uni t-ed states\ That is also, I ma.y say, in the Rio Fact. That gives the Pr:e.eJd·ent:.:of:.•,:the.United ~-s:tates·, :tne· same:.authorit"y ;t'o '.react·' as he would have if the United States were attacked. . -~ - .:Thank ,-.you,;,:_sir;·: ;c •:,-·• > . ·:: -: Q. A. ':w:e:the~/~~- ·wo~ld~Se' ,..~tl~;t:_~~u:th~;·i:ty .._1~..eve;; ·cas~. ~:s: a ; · ;'.:. rqc3:tJ:;er, :for h,is '.-df.s:·cr.e.ti.on.,::.ilnsmy· 0p'inion; he' has· ·it'?· ..., < :. < • Q. He has the right? A.,,.,.-cln rnY,.'OP.ini-on:.:'he;·Jiaa.the '.right,.;.•i'•Thatr dc.e.s,:no:t··'nec·e:ss'aii1ly .-:, mean in all cases he would use the right witnout; co:nsult;atkin :': by Congress~ It would depend on the gravity of the attack, whethe.~- Jt, •Wa$.:rob.::v;i0:u:s.<the a.t;ta~h;··me_an:t:ral.'1.;,:o:ut.: w:ar_;,wti1ch > inev.;i.tably ,,.,,o.u'l:d:, i.nvoJve ..un:'.' Many ,mat.te·rs ::W01.(Ld.:ha'vei·.to ·:be>·;.··• considei'.e;d .:and:;dou:btle:ss.: .:wou,ld;:be ~·011sider.ed. '.by, the: Pr-e,sid'ent .'. : in ..qe:t.~r.m:i.n~ng,~:w:ne::t;liev·co:ri no,t>.·tcLuse ...his'.•di scre·t1onary ·-.•· · ··, · · authority. 1 Mr. Secret.ar.y:;\ qi±ght;-1' r.:ai.se ·a.-._question·.on- anbth~r- word. in the reference to capacity to retaliate. The sentence ends: 11 by means and at places of our choosing. 11 Now, Mb:. -Pear:s:ori raised the question whether the word 11our 11 meant'the United Sta,te:s., or.'::wne:t.her d:-t.:meant _;the. f.re~' c·orrimun,ity :o:c. natfons'.". ''. Q. ... ' ·:·: ::.... : 'Cl > ,••, ,,; .., ;:·. ••,•:- '\ A•\ •:.•1·. think {that, the sentence ;_iff",reas-ortably: ·.c:lear.:·,) ;Wou:1a:,; _. you .read_: the ,who;le seht.ence :if'>you: ..have ·±t: :before yoi:.i~ · :•.· , ··:·: ...... ~-- .. - ... , • ! , ; ; ••• .~_; :: :.-·. : ; :_;_::•,: -;--··.- •· :: ,., .. ::.__ ,-':.·: '<: .• '/• ·:::., , •:<; Ji,: .:;__ ~_ :::.: .. ·.?.:::(: ,.=, _, :.:. "·\·.1..,:··:_-,_·~ ,::. ·,•... ,1., -~_:,.~:·.:.::-!··.·: __ •; :.:~:.·. ;_: ~.:.- ~ •• ; . ·-..' '· . •.. . ~;- '. -~ <:..r_; .! --=· :·. ;:_.i'. . ~; )_ .. ... ..-:. :.·- . !~~:-· :·r ·_"·;:·~ ..~: -_....;··..: : .. , ··.1 · ' .-;:,,·-,': : ·: !~: ,. :. •' . . ~- . . .. ,",:,· ', <i ·-' ',•·-_; ·:·.,::,_:.' ~ ~_:'' .....:, . ';' -::·~ '·/:'.t .! ; ;,_-_; ~:;· , • .j . • '} ... : ••.• : .•-.. : ~- ·~ :· : i_: .•, :· '·' ~ ·::. ·.. · .' ~--· :. .~ . ' . . ,.' , :<,.·. ·: : Q~ ·.·Yes,•:,, ,_:·. _:;: , , :~ :-:.-~'.:-~L::·. ::· 1·- • .,. ,. • •• 'i : ,:.i... .'- - _.... ;, ••• • .' ••• ·,· __:_·_ ·.:.:_- _;_· •..... .. · : ' • ..·: •'•,: ,•;,-•,•,·. . J•.' ·.. 000072 �. "" 4 , PR 142 ··. ' ,,. .r Yes. ,,(reading):. IIThe. basic .. decision was to depend· primarily upon a great capac{i ~y ~o .retaliate, instantly, by means; ::and at pla.ces of our. 'choosing O" Q. A. _ .Do-es':.1t use the word· If free world".? Q. .There were two· sentences~ One is: "The basic decision -.::" was to depe:nd •p1.;imar11y.tipon a great. capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing .."·· ·. · A. Is that the whole.sentence? Q. That is the end of th~ senterice" A. Yes. I would like to have the first part of the sentence. first part is: · 1iBut : beforJ ~iJ..:1t.~ry planning could ... be :Chang.ea~~·-the Preside __nt a·na. hia .iidv~l3er.s,as represented by the .National Security Council, J-iad ,tO t·alr_e..some basic policy decisidns~. This has been· done~: T6~ ~a£ic.decision was to · depend primarilY upo1~-•' a:"tt1~~at p·apacity >k·o:, ~etaliate:, instantl:/, by means and at places'- \>f'. our. choos.+ng/ 1 ·, There was another ': · sentence. ·· · '· · · ··· · · · · · Q.. 0 The I think there was a ..senterc~::L iµ.: tl;:le.itex.t there about· the free world·. · : ··· · · A. whi-cih spoke·. -~~t ,in tnat particular Paragr~ph., There is an earlier·· .... sentence -to this part which says~ "The way to·,deter aggre's.;;.: ·::: sion is ,,for. the free community to be will;i.ng and able to , respond vigorously at places and .with means of its own ~hocis--~ i Dg II . . . . ,. ·, ' Q~ "' ~ A. I thought that Q. Which is it? was what you wei-•e reading from., A, Well, it would depend a good deal upon the circumstances. 'If there were an attack upon the United States and if we had the capacity to respond from our own bases, we would certainly do that It is .:1 I think.~ we 11 mown that the bases which we have in foreign countries are in general not usable as a matter of law and as a practical matter are not usable except with the consent of the countries where the bases are. For example, the bases which are available to our Strategic Air Force in Great Britain are not usable as a base of attack except with the consent of the British Governmento The same is true in general with all our foreign bases. Therefore, it is implicit in our security sy~tem that it operates with the consent and acquiescence of the other partners who have helped to provide the facilities which create a sort of international police system. · · Q. If I 6 000073 �. . -5- PR 142 Q. ·rf I might go on. There were two other worps which . Mr. Pearson raised. a· question to in relation :to the point · which' you have just made, the one being "instantly" and the · other be.ing 11means. 11 . · Does this mean the choosing of means would lie with the free community or only with the United States? w.ould there: be consultation? · A. Yes, there would certainly be consultation in most of the cases .that I can conceive of. ·I might say that I wrote, some weeks ago, an article for Foreign Affairs, which is in substance a. somewhat more pollsFiecf,;-Y-hope",;'"'"restate.ment of my spEH;1chwhich was .made before the Council of Foreign Relations, whioh publishes Foreign Affairs. That l did while I was flying back from BerlTn~---Y-under~"'"tand that is being released for publication tomorrow ipNew York by the magazine B orei!?a£ Af..fai:rs., That will elabo:;."'ate to so;ne extent the thesis which I expr·essed in my address of January 12. 1 Q~ I would like to ask another question on this subject. There has been some discussion and speculation to the effect that reliance on the capacity to retaliate instantly as a ma;Jor part of your defensive system would mean 11 in the case of a limited challenge in some remote area.., you would have the choice either of an all-out war 'or> no resistance .at all •. A.· That is not a correct analyi:is of the thesis at all. ··Let us ta.ke, for example.s the declaration which was made by the 16 powers in relation to Korea; which is one of the ill~strations I made in my spe~chi It has been stated there that if aggression should be resumed that·the reaction would not necessarily be confined to Korea. Now what does that mean? That .does not mean necessarily that there will be an effort made. to. drop· atomic bombs on Peiping or upon Moscow. It does mean that thsre are areas of importance to the aggressors in that vicinity which may have an industrial or strategic relationship to the operation which would no longer be wl.1.atGeneral MacArthur called a "privileged sanctuary". I :cannot imagine any policy more futile or more apt to create war than to adopt the policy that you will only react at the particular place, and by the means the aggressor selects. If anything would ever put a premium onaggression,· it would .be that. We want to' take away that premium on aggress~on. ·· · Q. Mr •. $ecretary 000074 �. 6 ":"" - ..:. :PR 142 , . -·.:. ,.· .. ' ' '·· Q •.. Mr. Secretary that speech,; there 1 while. we a;re annotating.' was a reference :tn there to a ;l;es$er reliance ..:on local. defense, and some at:estion has been raised-as-to whether:that meant-· less reliance on. defense. by local,: :i,.ndigenous. forces which , i we might aid~ for example, or less reliance on local actions by jmerican forces, in local sectora,of,tt~ long ~rontt .· -, . . say A ... What I meant there~ when. I say. rir•1 ; L m:tght. ihat tha~ spe?ch wa~ -not jtist a .personal speech 9: ,.-was-that, 1-f you .. have the capacity to. str.il{e-. an. aggressor at ,-the; points _which wil;J: h~rt him,. _the dete:r.re.nt power of, that is .sufficient so : that you clo not. need. 'bo have loc·a1 · defens-e ~a-ll aromid. · the : :, .. 2Q.,__ OOO-miJ.e ,perlm~ter of. the ..orbit of the _Soviet World· 'bacau-se your oe-terrent- power.i, to ·a large extent.,o,reinforces. your: · -· · local power- so that you .do- not. h_ave to depencLup_oh .havirig;'fn·. place forces in being sufficient to stop an attack in its tracl}s anywhere •where ..it. c.ould · occur because you rely .pr:LmarllY upon deterring that attack,. not necess.arily upon .being able to stop ·1 tJI. · -· . ., ' . ·,: , With, the Soviet-Chinese. Commun:is·tWor-la.~..:.with .:its ; . 8QQ.,·OOO" 00Q :Pe-Qpl:e occupying .a ,central_ :location., .with ·±ta vast land armies--it would be utterly impossible to have local .oe:fenses 'all ·.around ,that -.20,.000-mi.le orbit. suffic.i.ent. ,_ to stop .any ·blow that. might come at whereve.r they might -c::.7'-i,::roa'e to rr)ake i.t o., :So that YOU: have got ,t-0 f:i.nd some· way whereby . that _type of :local ground defense -:can be supplemented o And: ,.the wc;1yto suppl~_me_nt 1t ·~Lsto· have:, a. capa:city t.o .re.tali.ate •at,_: . times, pla,ce~; and witp me·thods .:of yo1...1r.ownc,ho:Qsing. • • . .., Now. tr;i_a.t doesn - ··'· • ' ., • ·• ~ ~ . -. • .. i. • •. • . • t. mean ..tha_t' you. El.l.iminate wholly,· by ,any .· means,. l.9nd forces·e -It means you, d:0 not nece;1;:1sari1y mal-~e them. y_our pr:irnaPy reliance because., as. ·against the ~ind .of . , . danger ~hich ,:;;o;,:(•f-Jatens.,:l,t if:; :impos·sible t.o match your potential enemy gt ,all points on :a -bases of man-for~-man; gun-fo:rgun and tank-for-tank. If we try to do that, we are -go:ing to go "bust". ~ I '- ' . qecretary., if· I may go back. to one point of yours, .yoµ said that in Europe the Pre.side.nt had the same qU1;;11or-ityunder the NATOa.nd. Rio Treaties ·to retaliate if the United States. was at-tack~clo; Well:i,.·.last WGdnesda.y he seemed to give a pledge that he would not use that because he said that there would be no involvement in war without Congressional approval. . , ·Q_. Mr. A. But if a different the. Senate matter. has given approval in advance., that is Q~ Well, 000075 �. . ·, , ... 7 ,_ PR 142 · Q. Well, the specific case ·was Indochina. what some of us were wondering about. , . . . - :t-think that was A •. Yes, .there has been no ·congressional approval given in· advance of ·a war in Indcichina to which the United Statea would be a pa1~ty o , He certainly did not me·an,' I think, to 'imply that if the United States was attacked, and if Congress was not in session~ that he would wait unt11·congress was called back into session and make a declaration of war bef·ore we would react to a bombing attack on New York City or Detroit or Washington. I think if any President waited under those circumstances, he would certainly not be carrying out the will of either the Congress 01 the American people. 1 Qa S11;'.!fI'm a little dense on this matter of Indochina_. Would you clarify this for me? France is our ally in tbe No1th Atlantic Alliance.. French tI•oops are fighting in Indochina.. If the :Chinese Communists,· with the r·egular forces· fr.om Chtna, ·should cross the f1"ontie1"' into Indochina 'and .. attack the armed· foi ces of our. all:\,, France» would our responsibilities or obligations unde1" the NATO allianc·e come into force? If not~' why? 1 1 A.· No, they will not because the NATOalliance does not apply to any- part of the·, world: except .the North Atlantic area as it 1s defined· in the :ti~eaty That definition in the. nipin i's confined_ to Europe/ al thou'gl) it does cover a portion of French North Africa-·;;..I ·think Algeria is cov~red by it. _ But in the main 8 it -covers ·oi1lythe- Eutiopean area, including a slight bit of North Africa:;·and, of course, the Asiatic portion of Turkey. : .•: : · · · ., · <I .... : f'f : Q. Mr. Secretary, ·: .., : _:_. ' . ~ inthe·co11text-::.. A. Now, I don I t mean to,· imply -that if the event you spoke of happened, we should -do nothing. I myself have sa•io that I believed that if that happened 1-'le should do something. But that doesn 1 t mean we- should- db it without Congressional app:toval or consultation. In the context of the 'ans·wer you just gave abo1:1t Detroit 1 or. Chi'cago ih referring to ·an- earlier answer gave, would it be fair to say that the.President has power to react in Europe in the case of a bombing of or Paris? Q. A. Yes, New York., you : · the same London, sir. Q. Sir, would it be accurate then to say that instant retaliation in effect is recognition of the restraining effect of the possession of atomic weapons--the deterrent power? Is there a distinction between instant retaliation and deterrent? It is a deterrent. A. Yes., 000076 �PR 14~ - -8- A. Yes, I have said that the capacity to retaliate powerfully and instantly is, in my opinion, the great deterrent, and that when you are faced with the kind of potential enemy, or. With the assets that this potential enemy has, I believe that a deterrent of that sort is the most effective way there is of preventing a war. Now I can imagine a 'different world condition where reliance might properly be placed upon other methods, and other means, but, as far as the present world condition·is concerned, that capacity to retaliate powerfully at places of our choosing 1s. in my opinion, what will serve as a powerful deterrent to war. I believe that the original Korean attack would not have occurred if it had not been asswood either that we would not react at all, or if we did react would react only at the place and by the means that the aggressors chose. I believe .. that the Allied Sixteen-Powei" Decla.ration, which now operates in the case of Korea, will probably pre~ent ~ny rene0al of Communist aggression there~ Mr. Se~•retary, in order to clarify something~ in my own mind at least, is it your understanding that the President's right to order instant retaliation applies only in the c~se of an attack either on the United States or another North Atlantic Treaty power because of the understanding that Congress has given? Q. A. The United States has two treaties that I referred to: One is the so-called Rio Treatt of Reciprocal Assistance, which contains the provision that an attack upon one is the same as an attack upon all; that same provision is found in the North Atlantic Treaty. In my opinion -- whatever it is worth as a lawyer, and as one who was in• the Senate when the North Atlantic Treaty was adopte.d -- I believe that that authorizes, is a consent in advance to the President reacting against an attack upon one of our allies named in those _· treaties in the same way that he would be authorized to react in the event of an attack upon the United states itself. I repeat, however, that the fact that the President has that Constitutional ·authority as the result of those tr(~aties in my opinion does not necessarily mean that he wou:Ld use it. He would use his discretion, I think, as to wh~ther or not to react instantlj, or whether to get eithe~ a formal-declaration of war by the Congress, or whether to have consultations which satisfied himself that that was the will of the Congress. That would be discretionary with the President. Mr. Secretary, doesn't the President under the United Nations Charter itself? Q. have that same power A. In 000077 �. . -9- .. Ao • ....~• . In my· opin.ion, ' , PR 142 rio (>· Does he not have the power under st:ttution as Commander in Chief? the United Q., A. . •:, Stat~$ C.on:-- To do ·:what? ' ' .. . To take military Congres~? Qe a decla1.,a.tion without action of war by \ ..• WellJ now you are raising the question which hae be~n debated ·ever since our nation was formedc There are certain~. ly areae \'lithj_n which a Pres:tdent can' act .:... c~;r•tainly are~s in which it has been cuatomar;v for Presidents act -without any formal action by the Congress,c There is a twilight zone thereo Nobody has ever attempted t<f defj_ne accurately that twilight zone, a~d I, snal,1 p.qt attempt :I:.t.i herea , , . .. :· .•. · - .. :,.·:;_., ,'.· /,'. '•";" ., A,. ·to at .one po:tn'tth~i"'k_-~r~u·· s~ia ::it1~ connect,ion witb con~~ltation t6 cbnstilt iri'.mo~t ias~i that-~ou -0an con~ ceive: of. II Would you 'c·onsideri ~ay~ an' attack 'upon the northe;r'n part of Cap.aqa _an ~ttacl{. upon the ...Uni,ted,., States$ and; ·would you cons\,i:t-t wt.th bth_e':i-•NATO·cfr.nintries '.l:iefor,e-·you· reacted to that at'tack?' '· .r ;:·,;:::-·:·'· ,. Q., Mr. Secretary, ;. ;_ ..• • ~. • ' .,. • I • ,:··, ' . l A. I do not think that: it· 1s wis'e . or· appropriate to try .to·. answer a hypothetical question of that sort. In the first . place, it is impossible to determine .in adyance what.all of the su..rrounding circumstances. are,.·and .it would certainly · .. also not be advisable to give any forel{nowledge to a potential_ enemy as to whether or not he would have any time between. his attack and having to suffer the consequences it. of Mr. Secretary, ference? Q. how are plans coming for the Geneva Con- A. The tnformation I got when I got.back to.my desk yesterday was that there is some evidence ,in .Moscow of_ delaying. tact:,-cs with respect to the practical arrangements for ,se.tting up the conference. There s,eenis -t;o )?e, ,an:.,i111pr'es_s.~on _t;~a:t the. Chinese C'ommunists are riot 'eptireTy' happy',.over, ...the:.:ar_range~ ments which were made for them be:Caus(f -they·h~d e~pected, hoped to be able to come to the conference·a:s cine.of the socalled Big Five. r.t'hat, of c.0J1rse_,. Wq.S: de:qied :to the,m and i:t. would see1n<as though the .{36Jiet ':pEf, ..... h'aps havef- got some expla:ining to do. :·And· the result iff.·at. leas;t :the:re .are some present de lays • ' · ·· · · "· · · · ' 1 1 ,._ ..., 000078 �PR 142 Sir, have you reached a conclusion John P. Davies? Q. yet in the case of A. No* The situation in tpe Davie$ case is this: I went over the very full summary of the evidence consisting of about 200 rather closely-t-y;ped pages before I went to Caracaa. It seemed that there were some points which called for explanation, and the lt;1,wyerin.the Security Office formulated a request for e~lanationa. Those were given to Mr.. Davies, and his counsel. They have now made a reply. The reply 1~ being studied in the Security Office, and I am waiting for their recommendations to me, or report to me, on the basis of those questions an,d the responses made by Mr. Davies. Mr. Secretary, ha.s . · the Soviet Foreign Off ic_e formally. informed you of the·dissatistaction of the Chinese Communist$, with the arrangements? Q. A. No, that is inference, Mr. Secretary, twenty-three Japanese fishermen suffered radio-active burns as a result of the latest explosion? And today the Japanese Foreign Minister said that Japan might ask compensation from the United States. I was wondering if you have any comment on the incident and upon his statement. Q. A. No, I have no comments to make. I only heard of it today·. We had a report from our Embassy in Tokyo, which I got this morning~ But I have no information as to how this unfortunate accident came about --assuming that the facts are as reported. Mr. Secretary, a report was published in London last week-end to the effect that the United States has told France that this country would offer economic inducements to Red ... China to end the Indochina war. Is that correct? Q. A. It is not correct. Mr. Secretary~ does the October 8 decision our final postion with respect to a. settlement Q. still r~present in Trieste? A. You have caught me a little bit unprepared on that· question. I have not had the opportunity to check up-I'm bound to say- ...with the developments in the Trieste matter since I got back from Caracas. So you will have to Just excuse me on that one. Mr. Secretary, Senator Dirksen said he would discuss. with you immediately upon your re:turn from C~acas'the matter of freeing German confiscated property. Would you te.JJ.__u_a .. wa..t..~.QPl,p.1on is? Should it be returned soon? -· Q. ' A. I 000079 �. . -11- PR 142 A. I don't care to express an opinion on that. I have an appointment with Senator Dirksen, and I expect to go over the matter with him, and until I have done that I do"''t care to express any opinion. Q. Mr. secretary, are the delaying tactics on the preparations for Geneva such that they might delay the conference itself? A. That is conceivable, Q. Thank you, sir. yes. Henry Suydam * * * State--PB, Wash., D.C. 000080 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 22 MARCH 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-03-22 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00025 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Message from Canadian Ambassador to the United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 22 Mar. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. Indo-China John Foster Dulles Korea NATO Nixon Stevenson https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/2fb31502edfb1fe5f82d9b9764a4ebba.pdf 5b4fe6ccae4b3151507096cf8c7df3b1 PDF Text Text ����� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Global Strategy / REEXAMINING NATO’S DEFENCE PLANNING Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00100 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Political Implications of New Proposals on Defence Planning and Global Strategy," n.d. [1952], LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. British Global Strategy Defence Planning NATO https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/41b378e8644b04a3418ac67dd42eb180.pdf 745f5178378f39fb3c84f4a22eb05368 PDF Text Text ����� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Global Strategy / JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1953 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953-01 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00102 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Representative of Canada at the North Atlantic Council, Paris, "NATO and Global Defence Problems," 2 Feb. 1953, and Wilgress memorandum for the Minister, "NATO and Global Planning," 24 Jan. 1953, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. global planning Heeney NATO North Atlantic Council Paris Pearson Wilgress https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c920b5c382de2fe262d959dea2367116.pdf 5a1f1029bcb3d61035be097423f590bd PDF Text Text �������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Global Strategy / 28 FEBRUARY 1953 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953-02-28 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00105 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Draft memorandum, "Global Strategy and Organization of Security in the Pacific Ocean Area," 28 Feb. 1953, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. global strategy NATO Pacific Ocean https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ebf21526d47b89e5bac90ab78f329093.pdf f7b6773b4ed9181d9677ee747da35e07 PDF Text Text ��� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Global Strategy / 5 MARCH 1953 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953-03-05 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00106 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Memorandum for Defence Liaison (1) Division, "NATO and Global Defence Problems," 5 Mar. 1953, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. Defence Liaison Division NATO Wilgress https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/bad6e7902f9136e2ac9a67b78641f283.pdf d72115633fa08cd2fa7528ec02f30085 PDF Text Text ��� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Global Strategy / 9 JUNE 1953 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953-06-09 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00107 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Canadian Delegation to the North Atlantic Council and the OEEC, Paris to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, "United States Global Strategy and NATO," 9 Jun. 1953, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. Heeney NATO North Atlantic Council OEEC Pearson