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FM NATOPARIS SEP29/61
TO EXTER-4AL 2486
REGl'STRY
OPIMMED
INFO LDN WASHDCEMBPARIS CCOS PRIORITY
DM/lliD PRIORITY FM CCOS
REF OURTEL 2458
SEP28
BERLIN-CON TIN GENCY PLANNING
OFOLLOWING IS A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF GEN NORSTADS
ATLANTIC COUNCIL THIS MORNING ON LIVE-OAK PLANNING.NORSTAD BEGAN
BY POINTING OUT THAT HE HAD REVEALED MUCH OF LIVE-OAK PLANNING
BEFORE WITHOUT REFERRING TO IT BY THAT NAME AND WITHOUT SPECIFIC
AUTHORIZATION TO DO SO.HE SAID THAT ANNEX A TO P0/61/765(PARA4
OF
OUR REFTEL)COVERED LIVE-OAK RATHER WELL.LIVE-OAK HAD NOT RPT NOT
EXTENDED TO PLANNING OF OPERATIONS WHICH COULD BE SAID TO BE OF A
MAJOR MILITARY SCOPE ON THE BASIS OF THE SIZE
INVOLVED.WIDER PLANNING,IE
OR NUMBER OF FORCES
PLANNING WITH A MAJOR MILITARY SCOPE,
TOOK PLACE ON A NATO,NOT RPT NOT A TRIPARTITE,BASIS.IT
IS TO THE
WIDER PLANNING THAT ANNEX B(PARA5 OUR REFTEL)REFERS.
2.THE
LIVE-OAK ORGANIZATION STARTED IN THE WINTER OF 1958-59
THE 1958
CRISIS
OVER BERLIN,ON A TRIPARTITE
WEST GERMANOBSERVER HAD PARTICIPATED.THE
AFTER
BASIS.MORE RECENTLY,A
TERMS OF REF FOR LIVE-OAK,
AS DESCRIBED ON A CHART DISPLAYED AT THE NEET ING, WERE: ( 1 )RECOMMEND
QUIET PRECAUTIONARY MILITARY MEASURES;(2)ASSIST
IN BClJN IN AIRLIFT
PLANNING:(3)PLAN
INITIAL
TIOOS IF ACCESS TO BERLIN WAS DENIED; (4)PLAN
THE THREE E~!BASSIES
PROBE OF SOVIET INTENFOR SUPPLEMENTARY
MILITARY EFFORTS.
3.IN
AN AMPLIFICATION,NORSTAD SAID THAT INCLUDED IN ITEM(l)IN
THESE TERMS OF REF WAS INTENSIFICATION
MAINTAINING SUPPLIES
OF NATO PRACTICE ALERTS;
FOR THE BERLIN GARRISON AT A TWELVE-MONTHLEVEL;
INCREASE PATROLLING OF EAST GERMANBORDERS BY UK AND USA;/-,$
8,:43--
SE IN AUTOBAHNTRAFF IC.
4.RE
ITEM(3),NORSTAD
SAID THAT LIVE-OAK HAD DEVELOPED PLANS TO DETER-
MINE WITHOUT QUESTION WHETHER THE ENEMY INTENDED TO USE FORCE TO
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FEB2 7 1985
PREVENTACCESSTO BERLIN.THECHARTTHATNORSTADDISPLAYEDAT THIS
POINT UNDERTHE HEADINGQUOTEPROBEOF SOVIET INTENTIONSUNQUOTE
PROVIDETDIN THE AIR FOR A PROBEBY ONE MILITARYTRANSPORT
FROMEACH
OF THE THREENATIONSANDFOR CIVILIAN TRANSPORTS
TO BE MANNED
BY
MILITARYCREWS;a-J THE GROUND
THEREWERETO BE SMALLTRIPARTITE CONVOYS.THE QUOTEGUIDINGPRINCIPLE UNQUOTE
SHOWNON THE BOTTOMOF THE
CHARTFOR THESE PROBESWASGIVENAS QUOTEWILL NOT RPT NOT FIRE
WNLESS FIRED UPONANDTHEN ONLYAS NECESSARYTO EXTRICATEITSELF
UNQUOTE.
SPEAKINGOF THESE PROBES,NORSTAD
SAID QUOTENONEOF THESE
PROBESHAVEENVISAGEDSUSTAINEDCOMBATUNQUOTE.HE
THENWENTON,
HOWEVE~TOWARNTHE COUNCILAS HE HADDONEIN THE PAST THAT,WHILE
FORCE WASIN CONTACTWITHFORCE,THEREWASALWAYS
DANGEROF LARGER
INVOLVEMENT
EVENTHOUGHINSTRUCTIONSSOUGHTTO MINIMIZE THIS DANGER.
THE DANGERREMAINED
NO RPT NO MATTERHOWSMALLTHE FORCE.WHILELIVEOAKPLANS HADNOT RPT NOT BEENCOORDINATED
IN A TECHNICAL
SENSE WITHNATOPLANS,THEYHADBEEN DEVELOPED
TO BE CONSISTENTWITH
THEM:THEFACT THATNORSTADHADLIVE-OAK UNDERHIS CONTROLWASA
GUARANTY
OF THIS.
5.TUR-JING NEXT TO ITEM(4),SUPPLEivJENTARY
MILITARYEFFORTS,NORSTAD
POINTED OUT THATTHIS WASBASEDON RATHERLARGERFORCES.HIS CHART
SAID THATTHE PURPOSEWOULD
BE TO QUOTETEST THE RANGEOF FORCE THE
USSR WASREADYTO APPLY UNQUOTE,AND
STATEDTHATTHE OBJECTIVEWAS
QUOTETO DEMONSTRATE
DETERMINATION
TO REACTWITHFORCE OR TO TEST
THE RANGEOF FORCE THE SOVIETS ARE READYTO APPLY UNQUOTE.FOR
THIS
PURPOSE,IN THE AIR NORSTADENVISAGEDTHE USE OF FIGHTERS TO SUPPORT
AIR PROBESANDTHE USE OF FIGHTERS TO SUPPORTGROUND
OPERATIONS.CN
LAND,ATRIPARTITE BATTALIONPROBEWOULD
BE INVOLVED.STUDY
HADTAKEN
PLACE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF EMPLOYING
A TRIPARTITE DIV.NORSTADALSO
SAID THATCONSIDERATION
HADBEEN GIVEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPANDINGTHE NUMBEROF COUNTRIESINVOLVEDBEYONDTHREE,BUTHE THOUGHT
THIS PROBLEMFELL UNDERANNEXB.NORSTADREMARKED
THATHE THOUGHT
••• 3
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FEB2 7 1985
THERE WASA BASIS FOR MAINTAININGTHE LIVE-OAK GROUP:THEREWERE
LEGAL AND OTHERREASONSWHYTHERE MUSTBE A BASIS FOR A TRIPARTITE
EFFORT.HE DREWATTENTIONTO THE FACT THAT ON THE PROBE LEVEL
PLANNINGWAS NOT RPT NOT ON A NATIONALBASIS BUT TRIPARTITE,GIVING
IT AN QUOTEALLIED FLAVOURUNQUOTE.
6.TURNING TO AIRLIFT OPERATIONSCITEM
2 IN HIS TERMS OF REF)NORSTADS
CHART SHOWEDA NUMBEROF ALTERNATIVES:Cl)A GARRISONAIRLIFT;(2)A
CIVILIAN AIRLIFTCSUBSTITUTINGMILITARY FOR CIVILIAN TRANSPORT);
(3)QUOTE TRIPLE PLAY UNQUOTE<THE
AIR EVACUATIONOF ALLIED NONCOMBATTANTS
AND OTHERSFROMWEST BERLIN IN 36 HOURS);(4)QUOTE Q-BALL
UNQUOTE<FULL
ALLIED AIRLIFT IN SUPPORTOF WEST BERLIN).NORSTADSAID
THAT THE THREE AMBASSADORS
IN BONNHADSPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY RELATING TO AIRLIFT PLANNING,BUTOBVIOUSLYIT WASTHE MILITARY COMMAND
STRUCTUREWHICHWOULDHAVETO CARRYOUT THE OPERATION.
7.CONTINUING WITH HIS ORAL PRESENTATION,NORSTAD
SAID THAT IN RECENT
WEEKS HE HAD TAKENSTEPS TO INCREASEPREPAREDNESS,FOREXAMPLEBY
.
ESTABLISHING A LIVE-OAK OPERATIONSAND INFO CENTREWHICHCOLLECTED
INFO CONCERNINGINCIDENTS AND OTHERMATTERSOF INTEREST TO THE LIVEOAK PLANNERS,FOLLOWED
TRENDSAND COULDMAKERECOMMENDATIONS.IF
NECESSARY,THEOPERATIONSAND INFO CENTRECOULDASSUMESOMEOPERATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY OR AT LEAST ASSIST WITH IT.NORSTAD EMPHASIZEDIT AS
HIS PERSONALVIEW THAT IF A PROBE WERENEEDEDIT WOULDBE BETTER TO
CONTROLIT THROUGHNATOCOMMAND
CHANNELS.HEHAD ALSO ACTIVATEDAN
AIR COMMAND
POST,SITUATED AT RAMSTEIN,ANDSTAFFED BY TRIPARTITE REPS,
WITH THE DUTYOF EVALUATINGTRAFFIC IN THE AIR CORRIDORSAND ASSESSING INCIDENTS.IT TOO WASCAPABLEOF EXERCISING OPERATIONAL
CONTROL.AFEW TRANSPORTANDFIGHTER AIRCRAFT WEREKEPT ON THE ALERT
TO REACT QUICKLYTO ANYRELOCKINGOF AIR TRANSPORTARRANGEMENTS.
THERE WASA CAPABILITY TO USE MILITARY OR CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT WITH OR
WITHOUTFIGHTER ESCORT IN SUCH A REACTION.HESPOKE OF THE INTRODUCTION RECENTLYOF A NEWFIGHTER AIRCRAFTWHICHWOULDBE QUOTEUSEF'UL•••• 4•
000208
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FEB2 7 1985
PAGEF'OL:R2486
IN THIS OPERATIONUNQUOTE.THE
EXACTIMPLICATIONOF THIS TERMWAS
NOT RPT NOT CLEAR;BUTSIGNIFICANCEMIGHTBE ATTACHED
TO IT BECAUSE
HIS REF WASSO POINTEDBUT AT THE SAMETIME SO VAGUE.THESEAIRCRAFT
ARE KEPT ON CONSTANTALERT,SOMREOF THEMON FIFTEEN-MINUTENOTICE,
SOME ON THIRTY-MINUTE,SOME
ON ONE-HOURANDSOMEON SIX-HOUR.THEY
WEREREADYTO MEETA SITUATION QUICKLYANDEFFECTIVELY.
8.LIVE-OAK IS CONSIDERINGANDREVIEWINGEAST GERMAN
MEANSOF INTERFERENCEWITH GROUND
ANDAAIR TRAFFIC ANDMEANSOF REACTINGPROMPTLY
TO SUCH INTERFERENCE.NORSTAD
SAID THAT EXPERIENCETHIS SUMMER
HAD
CONVINCEDHIM THAT IT WASPOSSIBLE TO REACTAT ONCEMORESAFELYAND
ON A SMALLERSCALE THANAFTER A DELAY.HEWASTHEREFOREKEEPING
FORCES IN POSITION FOR RAPID RESPONSEHO ANYACTIONBY THE OTHER
SIDE.REFERRING TO THE RELATIONSHIPOF LIVE-OAK TO NATOPLANNING,
NORSTADASSUREDTHE COUNCILTHAT IN HIS DUALCAPACITYHE HAD
ALWAYS
MADESURE ANDWOULDALWAYS
MAKESURE THAT LIVE-OAK PLANS
WOULDCOMPLEMENT
ANDSUPPLEMENT
NATOPLANS,NOTRPT NOT CONFLICT
WITH THEM.NATOMUSTBECOMEFULLY INVOLVEDIN°ANY LARGERPLANS FROM
THE FIRST MINUTE.
9.THE DISCUSSION WHICHFOLLOWED
THIS PRESENTATIONANDNORSTADS
QUESTIONOF A NEWEXERCISE TO FOLLOWUP QUOTEOPERATIONLONGTHRUST
UNQUOTEWHICHWASCANCELLED
LAST MAYARE THE SUBJECT OF SEPARATETELS.•
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REF OURTEL2458 SEP28
BERLINCONTINGENCY
PLANNING
'1.
COUNCILGAVEPRELIMINARY
CONSIDERATION
TO DOCUP0/61/765
AT A R STD ,..../
MEETING CH SEP29. GEN NORSTAD WAS PRESENT.HE BRIEFED THE COUNCIL
~Ji/
ON THE SCOPE AND PRESENT STATUS OF LIVE OAK PLANNING.FOR SAKE OF
,J_,
/
COOVENIENCE
WEARE REPORTINGHIS FORMALBRIEFING IN A SEPARATEMSG.
2.IN INTRODUCING
THE DISCUSSIONSECGENSAID THATHE REGARDED
TODAYS
SESSIOOAS ONEDSIGNEDPRIMARILYTO ELICIT FURTHERINFO.HE THEN
SET OUTHIS OWNINTERPRETATION
OF THE TWOANNEXES
TO THE DOCU.ANNEX
A,THE REPORTOF THE THREEGOVTS,WAS
NOT RPT NOT IN HIS ESTIMATION
00 E
WHICHCOUNCILCOMMENT
WASNECESSARILYREQUIRED.
IT WAS
REPORTING
ACTIONOF THE THREEGOVTSTO PLANFOR THE DEFENCEOF THEIR
OCCUPATION
FORCESIF ATTACKED
IN BERLIN.HETHOUGHT
THE THREEGOVTS,
AS ANYOTHERINDIVIDUALGOVTREPRESENTED
IN NATO,HADTHE RIGHTAND
THE DUTYTO PLANFOR THE DEFENCEOF THEIR OWNFORCESIF ATTACKED.
\
ANNEXB, IE INSTRUCTIONS
TO NATOMILITARYAUTHORITIESWASDIFFERiNT
\\
\
;
J
IN NATURE.
IT WASSECGENSUNDERSTAND.nm
THT IF IT OR SOMEVERSIONOF
!
IT WEREADOPTEDBY COUNCILALL EARLIERINSTRUCTIONS
TO NATOCOMMANDERSWITH.RESPECTTO BERLINWOULD
BE WITHDRAWN
ANDTHEREAFTER
ANY
CHANGESWHICHMIGHTBE DESIREDIN LIVE OAKPLANNINGWOULD
BE DEVELOPEDIN NATONO RPT NO MATTERFROMWHERETHE INITIATIVE FOR CHANGE
MIGHTCOME.IF THIS WASTHE CASE WECOULDFORGETTHE PROBLEM
WHICH
I
HADBEENPOSEDBY THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AMBASSADORIAL
STEERINGGROUP
IN WASHOC.HE
MADETWOFURTHERGENERALPOINTS.POLITICALDIRECT:VEAND
STRATEGICCONCEPTWERETHE GUIDINGDOCUSFOR NATOMILITARYPLANNING
ANDNO RPT NO PLANSINVOLVING
NATOFORCESSHOULDBE MADEWHICHDID
NOT RPT NOT COMEWITHINTHE AMBITOF THESETWODOCUS.HEDID NOT RPT
NOT THINKTHATTHE PLANNINGTOUCHED
ON IN EITHER ANNEXA ORB HAD
••• 2
000210
/
/
:~
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�N
PA GE TWO 2483
IN FACT
OF THESE BASIC
GONE BEYOND THE LIMITS
BELIEVED
THAT THE MILITARY
PLANS
SEEMED NECESSARY
TICAL
DIRECTIVE
AUTHORITIES
CONCEPT.NO
CRISIS
PRIMARILY
FOR PLANS TO DEFEND THE ALLIANCE
THE MILITARY
RPI
NO MATTER WHAT
COlvJMANDERS WERE RESPONSIBLE
WITHIN
THE TERMS OF THE
DOCUS.
3.AFTER
THIS
ARISE,
TO MAKE WHATEVER
THE BROAD CONCEPT OF THE POLI-
IMMEDIATE
BASIC
MIGHT
HAD THE RIGHT
TO THEM WITHIN
AND THE STRATEGIC
DOCUS.SECONDLY,HE
NORSTADS
POINT,A
WHICH MIGHT
BRIEFING
SERIES
ON LIVE
OAK PLANNING
OF QUESTIONS
BETTER
WERE RAISED
BE REPORTED IN
WHICH TOOK PLACE AT
BY COUNCIL
MEMBERS
SEQUENCE RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING
TO GROUP THEM UNDER GENERAL HEADINGS.
4.ITALIAN
MILITARY
ACTION
CONSULTATION
WOULD IN THE THREE .POWERS VIEW
WITH NATO. DID THE IDEA
FOR EXAMPLE, THE SMALL SCALE
REPLY WAS TO THE EFFECT
OF PLANS
OF PREVIOUS
THAT THE QUESTION
PREVIOUS
CONSULTATION
HE DID
ON THIS
SUBJECT
INVOLVED
HIS
THE IMPLEMENTATION
SCOPE OF RESPO.'J
HE WOULD CERTAINLY
ANY PLAN OF MILITARY
NOT RPT NOT KNOW OF ANY DECISION
BY ANY POLITICAL
HOPE THAT
ACTION
IF
GOVERN
PARA 3 .N ORSTADS
HAD BEEN CHARGED ONLY WITH DRAWING UP PLANS.HE
TO SAY HOWEVER THAT
BEEN TAKEN
REQUIRE
PROBES REFERRED TO IN
WHICH WAS NOT RPT NOT PROPERLY WITHIN
SIBILITIES.HE
MIND
OF
REP REFERRED TO PARA 8 OF ANNEX A AND ASKED WHAT SIZE
AUTHORITIES.
HE WAS REQUIRiD
HE COULD BE EMPOWERED TO
IN
WENT ON
THAT
HIS
HAD
OWN
TU IMPLEMENT
DO SO
THROUGH
NATO COMMAND CHANNELS AND NOT RPI NOT THROUGH SOME OTHER CHANNELS.
SEC GEN SAID
PLANS
1
THAT
IT
AT THE POINT
WAS HIS
VIEW
THAT
AT WHICH THEY MIGHT
PARA 8 WAS MEANT TO COVER ALL
HAVE TO BE HiPLEMENTED.USA,
FRENCH AND UK REPS AGREED.
5.SECGEN
THEN ASKED WHETHER IT
POSSIBLE
USE OF CORPS FORMATIONS
AT THE MOMENT.NORSTAD
THAN A DIV
WAS BEING
SAID
THAT
WAS TRUE THAT PLANNING
WAS BEING
THE
DONE ONLY ON A USA BASIS
ANY PLANNING
DONE ON A NATO BASISCAS
INVOLVING
INVOLVING
DISTINCT,WE
UNITS
LARGER
PRESUME,
••• 3
000211
�PAGE THREE2483
FROMLIVE OAKOR TRIPARTITE BASIS).
6.1 PUT MYFIRST QUESTIONSIN THE CONTEXTOF A FEW GENERALREMARKS
EMPHASISINGIN THE FIRST INSTANCETHAT IT WOULD
BE IMPOSSIBLEFOR
MY AUTHORITIESTO CONSIDERTHE ISSUES INVOLVEDANDBE IN A POSITia~
TO GIVE DECISIVE COMMENTS
UNDERTHE PROPOSEDTIMETABLE,IE BY NEXT
WEEK.THEPLANS REFERREDTO IN THESE PAPERS HADBEEN IN GESTATION
FOR SOMEMONTHS.
OURAUTHORITIESWOULD
REQUIREMORETHANA FEW DAYS
TO DIGEST THEM.TURNING
THENTO PARA8 OF ANNEXA I SAID THAT SINCE
IT WASA REPORTBY THE THREE POWERSWE WOULD
NOT RPI NOT PROBABLY
BE EXPECTEDTO CONSIDERREDRAFTINGIT.WE MIGHTHOWEVER
EXPRESS OUR
VIEWS 00 ITS SUBSTANCE.
IT STRUCKt'iE,FOR EXAMPLE,
THATTHE FIRST
SENTENCEOF PARASHOULDBE PUT IN MUCHMOREPOSITIVE TERMS.THETHREE
GOVTSWOULD
RECOGNIZETHATTHE IMPLEMENTATION
OF LIVE OAKPLANS
WOULD
UNDOUBTEDLY
HAVEPOLITICAL AS WELLAS MILITARY IMPLICATIONS
FOR NATO.INDEEDTHE PROBINGHADALREADYSTARTEDWHENUSA GARRISOO
IN BERLIN WASINCREASED.THISPROE HADALREADYHAD ITS POLITICAL
EFFECT ON THE SITUATION.WEMIGHTASK AS WELLWHAT·
WASTHE SIGNIFICANCEOF QUOTETIME PERMITTINGUNQUOTE
IN THE SECOND.SENTENCEOF
THE PARA.TIMEWASALWAYS
A FACTORWITH RESPECTTO MILITARYACTIVITIES.
NOOEOF US WOULD
WISH TO PREVENTNECESSARYACTIONSBUT WE MUST
CLARIFY AS MUCHAS POSSIBLE WHATTHE INTENTIONOF ALL CONCERNED
WAS.
WASIT SATISFACTORY,FOR
EXAMPLE,TOALL MEMBERS
OF ThE COUNCILTHAT
THIS ESCAPECLAUSESHOULDEXIST.WOULDIT NOT RPI NOT BE BETTERTHAT
COUNCILMEMBERS
SPOULDBE BETTERINFORMED
CONCERNING
THE ~UOTECATALOGUEOF PLANS UNQUOTE
REFERREDTO IN ANNEXBIN ORDERTHATTHEIR
GOVTSCOULDPERHAPSTAKEDECISIONS IN ADVANCE
WITH RESPECTTO SOME
OF THESE PLANS.IT WOULD
NOT RPT NOT OF COURSEBE PROPERFOR ME
TO RESERVE THE C DN GOVTS POSIT ION WITH HESP ECT TO A REPORT CONTA IN ING
THE VIEWS OF THE THREE GOVTS.I COULDHOWEVER
WARNTHE COUNCILTHAT
THEREWERECOMPLICATIONS
AHEADIF IT WASINTENDEDTHAT TH£
•••
4
000212
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�PAGE FOUR 2483
IMPLEMENTATION
OF PLANS WHICHCOULDAFFECT THE ALLIANCEDEEPLY
WASTO TAKEPLACEWITHOUTTHERE HAVINGBEENCONSULTATION
ANDCONSENT
IN THE COUNCIL.
6.SECGEN ANDREPS OF USA ANDUK TOGETHERGAVEA FAIRLY SATISFACTORY
ANSWERTO THIS LAST QUESTION.THEY
ALL AGREEDTHATTHE INTENTIONOF
THE PHRASEWASTO PROVIDEFOR THE ABILITY SITUATIONSWHEREIMMEDIATE
ACTIONWASFORCEDUPONA MILITARYCOMMANDER
BY EVENTS.FOREXAMPLE,IF
AN AIRCRAFTWASFIRED ON PLANNINGWOULD
HAVETO PROVIDEFOR THE
ABILITY TO RESPONDIMMEDIATELY.USA
REP EXPLAINEDHIS THINKINGIN
THIS REGARDBY REFERRINGTO A PEARL HARBOUR
TYPE OF SITUATIONWHERE
NECESSARYDEFENSIVEACTIONHADTO BE TAKENIMMEDIATELY.PARA
8 WAS
NOT RPT NOT INTENDEDTO LEAVETHE IMPRESSIONTHAT THEREWOULD
BE TWO
KINDS OF CONSULTATION, a'J E BETWEEN
THE THREEPOWERSANDTHE OTHER
WITH THE COUNCILAS A WHOLE.THISLAST COMMENT
MADEBY USA REP WAS
IN DIRECT RESPONSETO BELGIANREPS POINT THAT IF THEREWASTIME
FOR THE THREE GOVTSTO CONSULTTHERE WASTIME FOR THE COUNCILTO BE
CCNSULTED.
?.NETHERLANDSREP LED OFF THE QUESTIONINGWITH RESPECTTO ANNEXB
IN ASKINGWHETHER
IN NORSJADSVIEW THE THREECIRCUMSTANCES
OUTLINED
IN PARA6 D FITTED WITHIN THE POLITICAL DIRECTIVE ANDTHE STRATEGIC
CONCEPT.NORSTAD
SAID THAT BEFOREREPLYINGTO THIS PARTICULARQUESTION
HE WOULD
LIKE TO FIT THE DOCUIN SOMEPERSPECTIVE.HEHADHEARD
ABOUTTWOMONTHSAGOOF A POSSIBLE DIRECTIVE WHICHMIGHTBE PREPARED
ANDHADTAKENTHE VIEW THAT HE DID NOT RPI NOT NEED A NEWDIRECTIVE
SO FAR AS HIS MILITARYRESPONSIBILITIES WERECONCERNED
AT LEAST.HE
UNDERSTOOD
THATOTHERFACTORSHOWEVER
HADMADESUCHA DIRECTIVE
NECESSARY.HEHADSEEN A DRAFTDIRECTIVE SOMETWOWEEKSAGOAND
COULDSAY THATTHE PRESENTDRAFTWASA VAST IMPROVEMENT
OVERTHAT
ORIGINALDOCUEVENTHOUGHHE WOULD
HAVEWRITTENIT DIFFERENTLY
.THE
IMPORTANT
THING IN HIS MIND WASTHAT DOCUAS DRAFTERPERMITTEDA
••• 5
000213
�PAGE FIVE WRIE
BROADRANGEOF INTERPRETATIONANDHE WOULDBE THE ONE WHOWOULD
HAVETO INTERPRET IT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.HECOULDASSURE
COUNCILTHAT ANY INTERPRETATIONHE WOULDGIVE IT WOULDBE FULLY
WITHIN THE TERMSOF THE POLITICAL DIRECTIVE ANDWOULJSE CONSISTENT
WITH ESTABLISHEDSTRATEGICDOCTRINE.HEWOULDOF COURSEGO FURTHER
IN HIS MILITARY PLANNING.FOREXAMILE,MEASURES
OUTLINEDIN PARA 10
WEREIN HIS VIEW ONLYSOMEOF THE MEASURESWHICHHADTO BE CONSIDEREDTO PUT NATOFORCES IN A POSITION TO COPE WITH A MILITARY
EMERGENCY.HE
HADALREADYDIRECTEDHIS SUBORDINATE
COMMANDERS
TO
PREPARESUCH PLANS AS THEY THOUGHT
WERENECESSARYFOR A MILITARY
EMERGENCY
ANDWHILE THEY INCLUDEDTHE MEASURESOUTLINED
N!PARA 10
THEY WERENOT RPT NOT LIMITED TO THEM.HEMADEIT CLEARTHAT HE WAS
SPEAKING IN TERMSOF PLANS WITH A NATO-WIDEAPPLICATIONANDNOT
RPI NOT IN TERMSOF LIVE OAKPLANNING.SOFAR AS THE SPECIFIC QUESTION
PUT BY NELHERLANDS
REP WASCONNERNED,HE
COULDONLYSAY THAT AN INCONSISTENCY WITH NATODIRECTIVES AS HE UNDERSTOOD
THEMWOULDONLYEXIST
IF PARA 6D WEREREADAS BEING RESTRICTIVE IN
•
THE PLANNEDRECOURSE
TO NUCLEARWEAPONS.INOTHERWORDSIF THE SUBPARAMEANTTHAT ONLYUNDER
THESE THREE CONDITIONSCOULDNUCLEARWEAPONSBE USED HE WOULDTHINK
SUCH AN INTERPRETATIONRESTRICTIVE AND INCONSISTENTWITH THE STRATEGIC CONCEPTAS HE UNDERSTOOD
IT.
8.I
FOLLOWED
UP WITH THE QUESTIONSPECIFICALLY CONCERNING
SUBPARA
6DEMDIDTHIS IN GEN NORSTADSMINDSPECIFICALLY FALL WITHIN THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT.I WASTHINKINGIN TERMSOF POSSIBLE EFFECT OF USE OF
A QUOTENUCLEARSHOT ACROSSTHE BOWUNQUOTE.ONE
POSSIBLE OUTCOME
WAS
THE RAPID ESCALATIONSUGGESTEDEARLIER IN THE PAPER INTO A NUCLEAR
EXCHANGE.THISWASA RESULTWE DID NOT RPT NOT WANT.ONEOTHER
POSSIBLE RESULTWASTHAT THE"OTHERSIDE WOULDNOT RPT NOT RESPOND
ANDTHEN THE WESTWOULDBEARTHE ODIUMBEFOREWORLDOPINION OF THE
FIRST USE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS.
: MMY,T.JT
T '
'
•
000214
�PAGE SIX 2483
9. GENNORSTADSAID THAT HE THOUGHT
FIRST OF ALL THATTHE ACTION
COVEREDIN SUBPARA6 D3 WASCONSISTENTWITH NATODIRECTIVES.HE WENT
ON THENTO TRY TO ADDSOMEPERSPECTIVE.IT WASHIS VIEW THATUSE OF
NUCLEARWEAPONS
EVENSELECTIVELYCOULDBE CONSIDEREDONLYWHEN
EVERYTHING
ELSE HADFAILED,WHENPOLITICAL NEGOTIATIONSHADBROKEN
DOWN,
WHENECONOMIC
PRESSURESHADFAILED,WHENMINORPROBESHAD
FAILED TO CHANGETHE SITUATIONANDWHENFORCES HADACTUALLY
BEEN
FI RED ON.NO RPI NO MATTERHOWf1UCHWASSAID ABOUTTH:C::SE
PROBLEMS
EVENTUALLY
WECAf'1EBACKTO THE SAMEROOTPROBLEl'<l,
WHENGOV
TS WOULD
BE FACEDWITH A DECISION TO ACCEPTDEFEATOR TO TAKENUCLEARACTION.
HE HOPEDTHEREFORETHATWHENCOUNCILWASCONSIDERINGTHIS PARTICULAR
ASPECT THEYWOULD
CONSIDERIT IN THIS LIGHT,NAMELY
THATALL OTHER
CONCEIVABLE
STEPS HADBEEN TAKENTO REMEDYTHE SITUATIONAND HAD
FAILED TO HAVETHEIR EFFECT ON THE OTHERSIDE.
10.I
FOLLOWED
UP WITHTHE QUESTIONSET OUT IN PARA 12 OF YOURTEL
DL1223,IE WASIT INTENDEDTHATTHERE SHOULDBE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN
THE CIRCUMSTANCES
IN WHICHA POLITUCALDECISION WOULD
BE REQUIRED.
NORSTADSAID HE ACCEPTEDTHIS PARAAS A GENERALFRAMEWORK
FOR
\
;
PLANNINGAS HE WOULDINDEEDACCEPTTHE WHOLEDIRECTIVE IF IT CAME
TO HIM.HE DID NOT RPT NOT REGARDTHE DIRECTIVEAS GIVING HIIvlANY
OPERATIONAL
CLEARANCE;THAT
WOULD
HAVETO COMEFROMHIGHERAUTHORITY.
SECGL~CONCURRED
ANDDREWCOUNCILSATTENTIONTO THE GENERALPROVISO
MADEIN PARA8 OF ANNEXB THATALL PLANS WOULD
BE SUBJECT TO
DECISICNS BY GOVTS.
11.ITALIAN REP SOUGHTFURTHERCLARIFICATIONAS TO WHENPOLITICAL
DECISIONS WOULD
BE TAKENANDBY WHOM.SECGEN
ADMITTEDTHAT U GOOD
DEALMORECLARIFICATIONWASREQUIREDON THIS POINT.REVERTINGAGAIN
TOXTHEISSUE DEALTWITH IN PARA6D SECGENSAID HE UNDERSTOOD
THAT
BY SELECTIVEUSE WASMEANTUSE OF A SMALLWARHEAD
WITH GREATPRECISION ANDNOT RPT NOT,FOR EXAMPLE,
THE USE OF THE STRATEGICAIR
•••
7
000215
�PAGE SEVEN2483
COMMAND.NORSTAD
AGREED.FURTHERMORE
SECGENTHOUGHT
THAT SO FAR AS
POLITICAL DECISIONS WERECONCERNED
CONSIDERATION
HADTO BE GIVEN TO
THE FACT THAT BILATERALAGREEMENTS
WEREINVOLVED,!£ BETWEENUSA AND
OTHERINDIVIDUALGOVTS.COUNCIL
HADNOT RPI NOT MADEMUCHPROGRESS
IN ITS STUDYOF THE CONTROLANDUSE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS.AGREATDEAL
OF FURTHERCLARIFICATIONWASREQUIRED.UNTILTHAT ISSUE WASCLARIFIED THE PRESENTSYSTEMOF CONTROLWOULD
CONTINUETO EXIST.CSECGEN
WASREFERRINGIN THIS INSTANCETO USA CONTROLOF WARHEADS>.
12.BELGIAN REP,REFERRINGTO PARAS9 AND 10
OF
ANNEXB,ASKEDWHETHER
WE WEREJUST BEGINNINGTHE PROCESSOF PLANNINGOR HAOTH£ MEASURES
OUTLINEDALREADYBEENCONSIDEREDIN THE TRIPARTITE CONTEXT.NORSTAD
RPTEDWHATHE HADSAID EARLIER TO THE EFFECT THAT HE HADALREADY
ISSUED INSTRUCTIONSTO HIS COMMANDERS
TO PREPAREPLANS ON THESE
MEASURESANDON OTHERS.NATO-WIDE
PLANNINGTHEREFOREWASBEING UNDERTAKENcx,;J A NATO-WIDEBASIS ANDNOT RPT NOT ON A TRIPARTITE BASIS
EXCEPTFOR THOSESPECIFIC CONTINGENCY
PLANS WHICHHADHERETOFORE
COMEUNDERTHE LIVE OAKLABEL.
13.THERE FOLLOWED
SOMERATHERCONFUSEJDISCUSSION ON WHATWASMEANT
IN PARA6 B BY TERMQUOTEPOLITICAL AUTHORITIESUNQUOT£.FRENCH
REP
SAID THATTHEYWERETHE COMPETENT
POLITICAL AUTHORITIES,WHICH
WAS
NOT RPI NOT PARTICULARLY
ENLIGHTENING.USA
REP SAID THATTHE TERMUSED
IN PARA6 B HADTHE SAMEMEANINGAS THE TERMINOLOGY
OF PARA8.NORSTAD
WASAS USUALSTRAIGHTFORWARD
ON THE SUBJECT.IT WASCLEAR,HE SAID,
THATSOMEBODY
HADTO DIRECT HIM TO IMPLEMENT
PLANS WHICHHE HAD
DRAWN
UP. UNTIL HE WASTOLDDIFFERNTLYPOLITICAL AUTHORITESNEANT
TO HIM COUNCIL.HEWISHEDEVERYONE
TO UNDERSTAND
HIS POSITION CLEARLY.
IF AN EMERGENCY
WERETO ARISE TOMORROW
HE WOULD
SEEK COUNCILDIRECTICN. IN INTERPOSEDTO SUGGESTTHATFOR CDN AUTHORITIESIT WAS
DIFFICULT AT SUCHA DISTANCETO SEE GENNORSTADSUSCINCEURHAT.FOR
THEMANDFOR THE CDN PUBLIC GENNORSTADWASCOMMANDER
OF NATOTROOPS
•
• ••8
000216
�PAGE EIGHT 2483
NORSTADACCEPTEDTHE POINT WITH GOODGRACEBUT DID SUGGESTTHAT
INSOFARAS ANNEXA WASCONCERNED
ANOTHERAUTHORITYDID EXIST.S£CGEN
ONCEAGAINAGAINMADETHE POINT THAT IN HIS MINDTHE THREE GOVTS
HAD THE RIGHT ANDTHE RESPONSIBILITY TO TAKEACTIONTO DEFENDTHEIR
FOR:;ES IN BERLIN AGAINSTATTACKJUST AS EACH GOVTOF THE ALLIANCE
HAJ THAT RIGHT.I THOUGHTIT WISE TO LEAVENO RPT NO DOUBTON THIS
POINT IN THE MINDS OF THE COUNCILAND I INDICATEDTHEREFORETHAT I
WASSURE MY AUTHORITIESWOULDHOLDTHE VIEW THAT IF ANDWHENNORSTAD
ORDEREDFORCES INTO ACTIONHE WASSACEURANDNOBODYELSE.THAT HE
MIGHTPLAN WITH DIFFERENTHATS WASONE THING,BUTFOR PUBLIC OPINION,
CNCEHE ENGAGEDIN MILITARYACTION IT WOULD
BE DIFFICULT TO MAKE
LEGALDISTINCTIONS.FINLETTERSAID HE DID NOT RPI NOT WISH AT THIS
POINT TO COMMENT
FURTHERON PROBLEMANDNORWEGIAN
REP URGEDTHAT
FURTHERDISCUSSIONSSHOULDBE RESTOTO A MUCHMORELIMITED GROUP.
DISCUSSIONTHEREFOREBROKEOFF FAIRLY ABRUPTLYANDWILL BE RENEWED
ON TUES OCT3.
14.IT
IS FULLY RECOC¾JIZED
THAT NO RPT NO DECISIONS CAN BE REACHED
NEXT WEEKANDTHAT WE SHALLCONTINUETO ATTEMPTTO CLARIFY THE
MEANINGOF PAPERS BEFOREUS.THE ANSWERSTO SOMEOF THE QUESTIONS
POSED IN YOURTELDL1223 WILL BE APPARENTFROMTHE BRIEFING GIVEN
BY NORSTADON LIVE OAKPLANNING.I SHALLPURSUETHE OTHERQUESTIONS
AS COUNCILDISCUSSIONCONTINUES
LEGER
000217
�
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NATO
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Berlin Crisis / 29 SEPTEMBER 1961
Date
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1961-09-29
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CDTT00032
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NATO Paris to External Affairs, ‘‘Berlin-Contingency Planning,’’ 29 Sept. 1961, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-1-40, part 1.
air lift
Berlin contingency
Lauris Norstad
Live Oak
tripartite
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/de20d3d12f919449dc84054a49de020c.pdf
c35e89933f5635c5555aea8c138b2048
PDF Text
Text
.•
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J)L(,)Yl'l~i..t>,q
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October
11, 1951.
BERLIN - CONTINGENCY
PLANNING
Following repeated requests
from other members
of the Council for information
on contingency
planning,
the French, United Kingdom and United States authorities
presented
a report to the Council on their contingency
planning for Berlin on September 27. The information
contained
in this report was supplemented by a briefing
given by General Norstad on September 29. Additional
information
was also obtained during recent meetings of
the Council and from conversations
which General Kitching
had with Major-General
Baker of the United Kingdom who is
responsible,
under General Norstad,
for the preparation
of
"Live Oak" plans,
Following is a summary of the main
features
of "Live Oak" planning on the basis of the information currently
available .•
2,
As explained
by General Norstad, the "Live Oak" :
organization
started,
on a tripartite
basis,
in the winter;
of 1958-59,
More recently
a West German observer had
participated.
The underlying
purpose of the "Live Oak"
planning is to enable the Three Powers most directly
concerned to carry out their special responsibilities
regarding
Berlin in all contingencies.
It is primarily
directed
at readying appropriate
immediate responses
to
possible
Soviet Bloc interference
with Western rights
of
access to Berlin in the air or on the ground.
3.
According to the Three Power report,
General
Norstad has been responsible,
in his capacity
as.Commanderin-Chief
of United States forces in Europe, for developing
these plans over the past two years on the basis of
instructions
received
from the French, U.K, and U.S.A.
governments.
Although the Three Power report appears to,
be clear in this regard,
the discussion
in NATOCouncil ·
indicated
some difference
of view between the Permanent
Representatives
of the Three as to the origin of General:
Norstad's
precise authority.
It was the U.S. Permanent 1
Representative's
under·standing
that General Norstad. had
been given a special
capacity which was neither
that of,'
USCINCEURnor that of SACEURbut was one which gave him,
planning and command responsibilities
with respect
to the
Three Powers' troops in Berlin.
That capacity had been:
given to him in order to create a better
relationship
between Three Power planning and NATOplanning,
••• 2
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4.
"Live
NATO activity:
\~) ft~ 2? \(3?>5
Oak" planning
covers
three
main areas
of
(1)
The development of small-scale
military
probes
to determine Soviet/GDR intentions
with respect
to the denial of ground or air access by force;
(2)
The use of air lifts
as appropriate
essential
requirements
in the event
access is interfered
with or ground
denied;
(3)
The readying of limited
ground forces and
tactical
air forces to be employed, if necessary,
to demonstrate
tripartite
determination
to use
force.
'.1
to meet
civil air
access is
Ground Access
5,
The plans provide that a minimum of ground forces
are to be used and they must be composed of troops of the
three countries
most directly
concerned.
According to the
Three Power report,
the plans call for the use of "small
tripartite
convoys of various
configurations
designed to
test the access routes and overcome physical
o'ostacles".
The plans also include supplementary
military
efforts
(3
above) which would be designed ''to supplement the probe
efforts,
to demonstrate
the determination
to react with
force,
or to test the range of force the Soviets
are
prepared to apply".
The plans for these supplementary
efforts
provide for a total
of three battalion
group_s,
each comprising troops of the United States,
the United
Kingdom and France.
These groups would form approximately
one thousand men each and would form up as convoys to probe
the normal access roads to Berlin._. General Norstad has
indicated
that study has also been given to the possibility
of employing a tripartite
division.
According to 1/iajorGeneral Baker, such a larger force might be used, if
necessary,
to extricate
any Western forces in the corridor.
6.
All the information
available
indicates
that,
whatever the size of the forces used, they would operate
on instructions
to remain within the previously
defin°~
corridors.
i,,oreover,. they would be instructed
not to
open fire first~
if fired upon, they may fire but must then
withdraw.
Under no circumstances
would a force continue
to advance if fired upon.
7.
The French authorities
have agreed to plan for
such battalion
convoys but because they have not allocated
any forces for this purpose or agreed to decentralize
any
authority
for the employment of these convoys before the
event; it is estimated
that it would take at least three days
to assemble the initial
battalion
groups.
It is also clear
that these ground forces will be armed with conventional
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weapons only and full warning will be given to the Soviet
and East German authorities
before any convoy route crosses
the East-We st German border.
It is also intended that
maximum publicity
should be given in the Western press so
that it will be clear that the movement of limited
ground
forces is not a part of a surprise
offensive
operation.
Air Access
8.
It is considered
that the first
interference
with
the Allied rights
in air corridors
will consist
of a refusal
by the Soviet and East German officials
to acknowledge the
·
agreement for service
of West Berlin b11Western airlines.
In the circumstances,
the present
plans provide for military
air crews to fly empty civil aircraft
to test Soviet reaction.
Five complete air cr&ws have been trained
on civil
aircraft
by both the United States
and the United Kingdom and are
standing by at all times.
In the case of France,
civil air
crews will continue to fly the aircraft
under an administrative
arrangement whereby such crews can be quickly
converted
to "military"
status
by a system of "call-up".
9.
In addition,
the United States,
the United Kingdom
and France have each agreed to provide up to twenty-five
fighter
aircraft
to be available
to act as escort for the
civil aircraft
which fly to test Soviet intentions.
The
present
thinking
in the planning group is that fighters
should not accompany the first
civil aircraft
but would
be held ready in case one of these civil aircraft
is
attacked
or forced down. If such should happen, it is
intended that four or five fighter
aircraft
will act as
escorts
for each succeeding
aircraft
which may be sent
into the corridor.
The original
authority
given to General
Norstad contemplated
the immediate despatch of fighter
aircraft
to escort the first
civil aircraft
travelling
in the air corridor
following
interference
with normal
access.
Because of a difference
of view which has developed,
however, it seems likely
that the authority
currently
given
to General Norstad in this respect
may be changed to maim
it clear that the first
civil aircraft
to be sent in would
be without fighter
escort.
No definite
information
is
available
on the question
of warning to the Soviet and
East German authorities.
Apparently
the "Live Oak"
military
planners
have recommended that such a warning be
given in the event it is intended to send in fighter
escorts.
However, no final decision
has yet been reached
in this regard.
Air Lifts
10.
Two types of air lift
are envisaged.
The first
would be an entirely
military
air lift
designed to administer
to Allied forces in Berlin.
This would be put into
effect
immediately
if land access were blocked and these
military
aircraft
would continue to fly even if flights
by civil aircraft
were prohibited.
The second type would
..• 4
000479
�••
..;2:QVSECRET
be a larger
operation
for the support of the city of Berlin.
Because of existing
stocks of supplies
in Berlin,
it would
not be necessary
to institute
such an air lift
immediately.
11.
Although the proposed relationship
between the
various measures is still
not entirely
clear,
the latest
report from the Delegation
(Telegram 2564 of October 6)
indicates
that tho immediate reaction
to the blocking of
land access would be the flying in of a comparatively
small
number of military
aircraft
for the support of the military
garrison.
Other Measures
-·--- ·12.
In his oral briefing
to the Council on September 29,
General Norstad referred
to the "Live Oak" planners'
responsibility
for recommending "quiet precautionary
military
measures".
According to his explanation,
the terros
of reference
for this aspect of planning include:
(a) intensification
of NATOpractice
alerts;
(b) maintaining
supplies
for Berlin garrison
at lG-month level;
(c) increased
patrolling
of East German bordors by U .K. and U .S .A. forces;
and (d) an increase
in autobahn traffic.
He did not
elaborate
on these plans nor did he indicate
whether any of
them may have already been implemented.
Relation
of ''Live
Oak" Pl~nning
to N,ATO
13.
It is clear that the Three Power report on "Live
Oak" planning is not being forwarded to NATO Council for
approval but for information.
Progress has, however, been
made in the sense that,
for the first
time, the other
members of NATOhave been given a general outline
of the
planning of the Three and a promise that General Norstad
can provide additional
details
on request.
In addition,
the report
contains
a commitment on the part of the Three
that,
insofar
as possible,
the Council will be consulted
before any of these contingency
plans are implemented.
14.
Apart
which additional
areas requiring
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
from a few details
on "Live Oak" plans on
information
would be helpful,
the main
clarification
are:
how these plans relate
to non-military
currently
under consideration
(e.g.,
counter-measures);
measures
economic
the possible
sequence in which the various
and non-military
measures might be applied;
military
the eventual
relationship
between existing
"Live
Oak" plans and the: proposed Nl\TO military
plans
which are expected to be drawn up if agreement on
the necessary
guidance is arrived
at in the NATO
Council.
The report of the Three and the remarks
of General Norstad clearly
imply that the "Live
Oak" plans will continw" to remain separate
from
••• 5
000480
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the NATOmilitary
plans although the latter
will
be co-ordinated
with and will complement the more
limited
"Live Oak" plans.
On th_e other hand, a
statement
by the Secretary--General
on Septer;;ber 29
was open to interpretation
that at some later
stage, once the Council guidance to the NATO
military
authorities
is approved,
"Live Oak"
planning would be reviewed and would become completely
a NATOresponsibility;
(iv)
the expected relationship
between "Live Oak"
plans, the proposed N,~TOplans and the "general
overall
strategy,
.. on a world-wide
scale"
referred
to in the draft instructions
to the
NATOmilitary
authorities.
These instructions
go on to refer to the selective
application
of a
wide variety
of measures "agreed upon both in
Europe and on a world-wide basis (which) would
contribute
to the purpose of arriving
at a
settlement
on the problem of Berlin while
progressively
malcing the Soviets
aware of ttie
danger of general war".
000481
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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NATO
Dublin Core
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Title
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Berlin Crisis / 11 OCTOBER 1961
Date
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1961-10-11
Format
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PDF
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en
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CDTT00033
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Memorandum, ‘‘Berlin - Contingency Planning,’’ 11 Oct. 1961, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1.
air lift
Berlin contingency
France
German Democratic Republic
Lauris Norstad
Live Oak
Three Power report
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/d4b711ec8c45023a6be83d6d2f785e45.pdf
4d71f9245b7403d58b80f42adacffa5d
PDF Text
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S E CRE T
ANNEXB
SUGGESTEDINSTRUCTIONSTO NATOMILITARY AUTHORITIES
The parties
accordance
light
to the North Atlantic
with Articles
of the crisis
Berlin
taken
consulted
4 and 6 of the Treaty
provoked
together
threat
They have agreed
policy
in regard
a)
that
to 5erlin
the maintenance
the three
b)
with
regard
to decide
to meet the present
2;
Treaty
and in the
to the City
what steps
against
of
should
be
Berlin,
the basic
objectives
'
of NATO
are:
of the presence
Western
the maintenance
have in
garrisons
and security
of
in West Berlin;
of the freedom
and viability
of
West Berlin;
c)
the maintenance
of freedom
of access
to West
Berlin.
Every
3.
objectives
effort
if
application
possible
be made to attain
by negotiations
of non-military
sar;( to prepare
negotiations
so-called
for
German Democratic
Western.access
on the basic
rights
They are
military
posture
and will
to apply
They have agreed
comparable
It
the contingency
,that
may not in themselves
the
is however necessuch measures
deter
Republic"
to Berlin
the foregoing
and through
measures.
11
to block
4.
will
the u.s.s.R.
from taking
or otherwise
or
or the
action
to infringe
of the ',{est in Berlin.
therefore
detennined
as a clear
to improve
allied
indication
of their
capability
military
measures
if need be.
appropriate
to undertake
individually
programme:. to bffild
and collectively
added military
strength
for
Europe.
PURPOSE:
5.
The purpose
preparation
of these
by the major
instructions
allied
'
commanders
is to initiate
of NATOmilitary
000601
the
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SECRET
2
plans
with
in order
actions
to put the
alliance
by the Soviet
in a position
Bloc in a Berlin
to cope
crisis,
GENERALCONSIDERATIONS:
The following
6.
preparation
of all
a)
general,
actions
overall
strategy
scale
diplomatic,
measures.
measures,
agreed
is desir;ned
b)
psycholo3ical,
upon both
access
appropriate
increasing
the
of access,
At the
same time,
implemented
should
leave
as possible
of continuing
c)
political
Soviets
on a dangerous
any military
pre-emptive
objective
access,
of ai.,d be consistent
strategy.
Alliance
They must,
with
military
current
therefore,
members as a central
in continued
plans
denial
would be
as many oppor-
the desirability
of action.
risks
actions
authorities
unmistakable
Government
Therefore,
of all
with
and re-assess
operation
from·which
aim of applying
the way these
course
enemy action,
to re-open
the
risks
the Soviet
to pause
of interference
by political
enormous
making
but determined,
of plans
and with
at a
war.
in case
which vtoulcl present
to the Soviets
tunities
of general
be selected
basis,
progressively
be graduated
of circumstances
pressure
of arriving
while
a catalogue
could
of these
and on a world-wide
measures
should
be available
action
light
clarity
military
to Berlin
should
of Berlin
on a
and para-
application
to the purpose
a
political,
military
in Europe
of' the danger
appropriate
the
into
as appropriate
as appropriate
The selective
aware
underlie
have to be integrated
applicable
of the problem
the Soviets
in the
will
to contribute
settlement
should
plans:
and including
economic,
military
There
military
military
world-wide
with
considerations
rapid
escalation
while
the
will
i.rlli--nediate
be to induce
plans
must
defensive
retain
consideration,
and/or
take
concepts
the d'efence
the
account
of NATO
of the
_and they must not
000602
�.•
~
•
•
SECRET
3
commit
to
capabilities
defend
to
the
NATO territory,
crisis
created
on the
periphery
resources
Soviets
of Allied
might
capacity
risk
of a possible
by way of a diversion
Conunand Euro~.
in
to Soviet
NATO build-up
overall
in mi:-id the
be committed
:•·. reaction
of the
of the
!ceepin;,;
by the
which
initiative
prejudice
as well
at
The magnitude
operations
moves
any point
at
the
wouJ.d depend
as circumstances
of
West
1
s
on results
existing
at
the
time.
{ct) the
all
times.
Alliance
will
However,
planned
these
operations
three
circumstances
of:
to
defeat
necessity
(3)
can
avoid
a specific
selectively
Alliance
order
to use
ready
(1)
prior
nuclear
under
use
to
demonstrate
in
one of the
enemy;
(2)
the
operations,
employ
the
at
weapons
any
by the
milite.ry
decision
action
to nuclear
only
of major
to
for
recourse
be envisaged
political
in
stand
nuclear
will
or
weapons
and ability
of the
them.j
PROCEDURE:
7.
The plans
appraisal
dance
Atlantic
8.
be sent
in consultation
with
nent
will
riith
established
Council
the
the
St&nding
Military
NATO ,;,:..ocedu.re
approval
Committee
and forwarded
0
for
Group
by Go·,-~:-:~,:.,"'ts
for
in
accor-
to the
through
the
North
perma-
representatives.
~
The execution
decisions
of approved
by Governments
at
SP:ii:CIFIC INSTRUCTIONS
Under
9.
the
to
United
1'/orstad
the
Kingdom,
in his
contingency
to carry
out
'I-here
must
their
be full
'j'()
and
the
will
special
of the
Unit.ed
(LIVE
Governments
States
of
li
betv;een
of France,
of America,
OAK) to
responc.il:>i
coordinR-!;ion
subject
tLme.
as USCINCEUR has
plans
be the
EA70 I/iILT'.l'ARY Au"l'HORI'rIES
instructions
capacity
military
the
plans
General
made certain
tripartite
enable
Governments
-\;2P-9
this
these
con.corning
Berlin.
LIVE OAK planning
and NATO planning.
000603
�SECRET
4
10.
For the purpose
of providing
possible
of supplementary
alternatives,
coverinG
broad
the major
land,
advantages
specific
terms
a)
or naval
lli.'IO commanders
expected
provide
air
for
appropriate
initiation
plans.
should
alert
for
non-nuclear
air
c)
expanded
non-nuclear
ground
air
support;
selective
use
of nuclear
and ability
be set
of the Alliance
to
naval
prior
to
measuros;
operations;
operations
weapons
out in
plans
NA'I·Oforces
and/or
the
ur,;ently_:
military
expanded
necessary
should
be studied
of any tripartite
plans
be prepared
In particular,
measures
as
In each case,
risks
b)
will
should
as appropriate,
to accompany
a choice
l,A'I"O military
measures
and estimated
the following
as great
with
to demonstrate
to use
them.
000604
the
by
�
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NATO
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Berlin Crisis / 19 OCTOBER 1961
Date
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1961-10-19
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en
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CDTT00035
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Memorandum for the Prime Minister, ‘‘NATO Military Planning - Berlin,’’ 19 Oct. 1961, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1.
Allied Command Europe
German Democratic Republic
John Diefenbaker
Live Oak
Norman Robertson
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/965774cd5fe665536181fb0cd0eaf143.pdf
63c748eb62928c2b71c568d358880e77
PDF Text
Text
D.L.
de If. Mathewson/TP
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
•
MEMORANDUM
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I
To refresh
your memory concerning
contingency
planning
over Berlin and the relationship
of tripartite
( "Live Oak" )
planning
to NATO planning,
we attach
the following
papers:
1
A.
______
CIRCULATION
A Departmental
memorandum of October 11, 1961
summarizes, · the main features
of "Live Oak" and
touches·
on some of the difficulties
and obscurities
in
B.
the text of the "Instructions
to NATOMilitary
Authorities"
in connection
with NATOplanning
for a Berlin eme~gency
(circulated
as Annex B to NATODocument P0/61/765).
These instructions
were approved by Council on
/
October 25 and have bean circulated
by the Military
Committee as NATO Document C-M(61)104.
Canadian
approval was,however,
only given subject
to a
reservation
as set out in
c.
telegram DL-1325 of October
Prime Minister.
_,D.
19, approved
by the
Telegram DL-1521 of November 20 contains
com~entsj
approved by the Prime Minister
on an interpretation
given by Secretary-General
Stikkar
of certain
phrases which occur in Annex B to NATO Document
P0/61/765 (see B above).
The text of this inter-
1
I
• • • 2
Ext. 326 (6/56)
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October 11, 1951.
BERLIN - CONTINGENCY PLANNING
Following repeated requests from other members
of the Council for information on contingency planning,
the French, United Kingdom and United States authorities
presented a report to the Council on their contingency
planning for Berlin on September 27. The information
contained in this report was supplemented by a briefing
given by General Norstad on September 29. Additional
information was also obtained during recent meetings of
the Council and from conversations which General Kitching
had with Major-General Baker of the United Kingdom who is
responsible, under General Norstad, for the preparation of
"Live Oak" plans, Following is a summary of the main
features of "Live Oak" planning on the basis of the infor
mation currently available.•
2,
As explained by General Norstad, the "Live Oak" :
organization started, on a tripartite basis, in the winter;
of 1958-59, More recently a West German observer had
participated. The underlying purpose of the "Live Oak"
planning is to enable the Three Powers most directly
concerned to carry out their special responsibilities
regarding Berlin in all contingencies. It is primarily
directed at readying appropriate immediate responses to
possible Soviet Bloc interference with Western rights of
access to Berlin in the air or on the ground.
3.
According to the Three Power report, General
Norstad has been responsible, in his capacity as.Commander
in-Chief of United States forces in Europe, for developing
these plans over the past two years on the basis of
instructions received from the French, U.K, and U.S.A.
g overnments. Although the Three Power report appears to,
be clear in this regard, the discussion in NATO Council
indicated some difference of view between the Permanent
Representatives of the Three as to the origin of General:
Norstad's precise authority. It was the U.S. Permanent 1
Representative's under·standing that General Norstad. had
been given a special capacity which was neither that of,'
USCINCEUR nor that of SACEUR but was one which gave him,
planning and command responsibilities with respect to the
Three Powers' troops in Berlin. That capacity had been:
given to him in order to create a better relationship
between Three Power planning and NATO planning,
••• 2
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4.
"Live
NATO activity:
\~) ft~ 2? \(3?>5
Oak" planning
covers
three
main areas
of
(1)
The development of small-scale
military
probes
to determine Soviet/GDR intentions
with respect
to the denial of ground or air access by force;
(2)
The use of air lifts
as appropriate
essential
requirements
in the event
access is interfered
with or ground
denied;
(3)
The readying of limited
ground forces and
tactical
air forces to be employed, if necessary,
to demonstrate
tripartite
determination
to use
force.
'.1
to meet
civil air
access is
Ground Access
5,
The plans provide that a minimum of ground forces
are to be used and they must be composed of troops of the
three countries
most directly
concerned.
According to the
Three Power report,
the plans call for the use of "small
tripartite
convoys of various
configurations
designed to
test the access routes and overcome physical
o'ostacles".
The plans also include supplementary
military
efforts
(3
above) which would be designed ''to supplement the probe
efforts,
to demonstrate
the determination
to react with
force,
or to test the range of force the Soviets
are
prepared to apply".
The plans for these supplementary
efforts
provide for a total
of three battalion
group_s,
each comprising troops of the United States,
the United
Kingdom and France.
These groups would form approximately
one thousand men each and would form up as convoys to probe
the normal access roads to Berlin._. General Norstad has
indicated
that study has also been given to the possibility
of employing a tripartite
division.
According to 1/iajorGeneral Baker, such a larger force might be used, if
necessary,
to extricate
any Western forces in the corridor.
6.
All the information
available
indicates
that,
whatever the size of the forces used, they would operate
on instructions
to remain within the previously
defin°~
corridors.
i,,oreover,. they would be instructed
not to
open fire first~
if fired upon, they may fire but must then
withdraw.
Under no circumstances
would a force continue
to advance if fired upon.
7.
The French authorities
have agreed to plan for
such battalion
convoys but because they have not allocated
any forces for this purpose or agreed to decentralize
any
authority
for the employment of these convoys before the
event; it is estimated
that it would take at least three days
to assemble the initial
battalion
groups.
It is also clear
that these ground forces will be armed with conventional
000478
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weapons only and full warning will be given to the Soviet
and East German authorities
before any convoy route crosses
the East-We st German border.
It is also intended that
maximum publicity
should be given in the Western press so
that it will be clear that the movement of limited
ground
forces is not a part of a surprise
offensive
operation.
Air Access
8.
It is considered
that the first
interference
with
the Allied rights
in air corridors
will consist
of a refusal
by the Soviet and East German officials
to acknowledge the
·
agreement for service
of West Berlin b11Western airlines.
In the circumstances,
the present
plans provide for military
air crews to fly empty civil aircraft
to test Soviet reaction.
Five complete air cr&ws have been trained
on civil
aircraft
by both the United States
and the United Kingdom and are
standing by at all times.
In the case of France,
civil air
crews will continue to fly the aircraft
under an administrative
arrangement whereby such crews can be quickly
converted
to "military"
status
by a system of "call-up".
9.
In addition,
the United States,
the United Kingdom
and France have each agreed to provide up to twenty-five
fighter
aircraft
to be available
to act as escort for the
civil aircraft
which fly to test Soviet intentions.
The
present
thinking
in the planning group is that fighters
should not accompany the first
civil aircraft
but would
be held ready in case one of these civil aircraft
is
attacked
or forced down. If such should happen, it is
intended that four or five fighter
aircraft
will act as
escorts
for each succeeding
aircraft
which may be sent
into the corridor.
The original
authority
given to General
Norstad contemplated
the immediate despatch of fighter
aircraft
to escort the first
civil aircraft
travelling
in the air corridor
following
interference
with normal
access.
Because of a difference
of view which has developed,
however, it seems likely
that the authority
currently
given
to General Norstad in this respect
may be changed to maim
it clear that the first
civil aircraft
to be sent in would
be without fighter
escort.
No definite
information
is
available
on the question
of warning to the Soviet and
East German authorities.
Apparently
the "Live Oak"
military
planners
have recommended that such a warning be
given in the event it is intended to send in fighter
escorts.
However, no final decision
has yet been reached
in this regard.
Air Lifts
10.
Two types of air lift
are envisaged.
The first
would be an entirely
military
air lift
designed to administer
to Allied forces in Berlin.
This would be put into
effect
immediately
if land access were blocked and these
military
aircraft
would continue to fly even if flights
by civil aircraft
were prohibited.
The second type would
..• 4
000479
�••
..;2:QVSECRET
be a larger
operation
for the support of the city of Berlin.
Because of existing
stocks of supplies
in Berlin,
it would
not be necessary
to institute
such an air lift
immediately.
11.
Although the proposed relationship
between the
various measures is still
not entirely
clear,
the latest
report from the Delegation
(Telegram 2564 of October 6)
indicates
that tho immediate reaction
to the blocking of
land access would be the flying in of a comparatively
small
number of military
aircraft
for the support of the military
garrison.
Other Measures
-·--- ·12.
In his oral briefing
to the Council on September 29,
General Norstad referred
to the "Live Oak" planners'
responsibility
for recommending "quiet precautionary
military
measures".
According to his explanation,
the terros
of reference
for this aspect of planning include:
(a) intensification
of NATOpractice
alerts;
(b) maintaining
supplies
for Berlin garrison
at lG-month level;
(c) increased
patrolling
of East German bordors by U .K. and U .S .A. forces;
and (d) an increase
in autobahn traffic.
He did not
elaborate
on these plans nor did he indicate
whether any of
them may have already been implemented.
Relation
of ''Live
Oak" Pl~nning
to N,ATO
13.
It is clear that the Three Power report on "Live
Oak" planning is not being forwarded to NATO Council for
approval but for information.
Progress has, however, been
made in the sense that,
for the first
time, the other
members of NATOhave been given a general outline
of the
planning of the Three and a promise that General Norstad
can provide additional
details
on request.
In addition,
the report
contains
a commitment on the part of the Three
that,
insofar
as possible,
the Council will be consulted
before any of these contingency
plans are implemented.
14.
Apart
which additional
areas requiring
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
from a few details
on "Live Oak" plans on
information
would be helpful,
the main
clarification
are:
how these plans relate
to non-military
currently
under consideration
(e.g.,
counter-measures);
measures
economic
the possible
sequence in which the various
and non-military
measures might be applied;
military
the eventual
relationship
between existing
"Live
Oak" plans and the: proposed Nl\TO military
plans
which are expected to be drawn up if agreement on
the necessary
guidance is arrived
at in the NATO
Council.
The report of the Three and the remarks
of General Norstad clearly
imply that the "Live
Oak" plans will continw" to remain separate
from
••• 5
000480
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the NATOmilitary
plans although the latter
will
be co-ordinated
with and will complement the more
limited
"Live Oak" plans.
On th_e other hand, a
statement
by the Secretary--General
on Septer;;ber 29
was open to interpretation
that at some later
stage, once the Council guidance to the NATO
military
authorities
is approved,
"Live Oak"
planning would be reviewed and would become completely
a NATOresponsibility;
(iv)
the expected relationship
between "Live Oak"
plans, the proposed N,~TOplans and the "general
overall
strategy,
.. on a world-wide
scale"
referred
to in the draft instructions
to the
NATOmilitary
authorities.
These instructions
go on to refer to the selective
application
of a
wide variety
of measures "agreed upon both in
Europe and on a world-wide basis (which) would
contribute
to the purpose of arriving
at a
settlement
on the problem of Berlin while
progressively
malcing the Soviets
aware of ttie
danger of general war".
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SDG~EST·E:D INSTnUC'I'IONS TO :•U.'1'0ivlILITA?.Y AiSI'iiOliI'l'I;<;S
Tho parties
• acco,danco
to
'.'.'ith Articles
of: the. crisis'
l~r)1t
5:::rl tn consulted
tnl:en
the
to rne;;t
North
Treaty
4 and 6 of the
provoked
toi;;other
the
Atlanti&
,lith
rei;ard.
to decide
present
t•n•eat
to ~erlin
~re:
Treaty
to
·ahat
ac;:inst
have
and in
t"he CitJ
in
the
of
ste[;S
s• .cc.ld be
Borlin
•
,
0
•
in r~~ard
. '
"
n)
tho ~1nintcnance
of' t::ie [':cesc!"1ce and sec:..:rit/
of
o/
t,10 1:;r;.intcnar,co
o:: tllG
ot
\·iest
c),
freedom
s.nd viabilit:1
•
. ,j
Eerl in;
t.h0 ma:intenonco
of' froodom
of accesi.i
to
.iest
~·
Derlin.
•~.
3ve::.y_ effort
oL ·j ectives·
if
a,.o;,l :cr.tion
•' sarJ
to
s o-c'.,ll
y1.tll te
of non-military
for•t};e
::ms :::ay not
~;ac.o to attain
b:r nef;otiations
pos:.;ible
prepare
:1or:otiati
/
,
tu :)J.ocl~ Jest•Jrn
It
c:mtin,:;ency
ed ".German Domocra tic
a..::c1..3s.:.:to
~~
that
is· however
such
deter
the
Re';h.i:,li ~" from
~e1~1:i.n or
nee es-
u,easures
U,J.S,rt,
'
or
O:::'
t~,c'
ac t.i.on
tddn:;
ot!""1erv.:ise to
i.n1'rii1.ge
.
f:.,,d c::,lloctivoly
,
indivituall·J·
~uropc.
foregoing
and throu;;h
measures,
i!'l them:ielves
the
'
d
F'.JJPGSE:
,
:3.
"
The purpose
,n'ep,u•ation
by
or the£e
tho major
0
allipd
L1strL\Ct,_ons
com~:.anders
i .... .a,.,_
000482
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plans
in
·.., i th
order
actions
to
put
the'alliance
in
a position
by the ·Sov 1:et 1?loc. in a Berlin
to
eris
cope
~
is,
Gl:,.SR.AL CCll3IDErtA'I'IONS :\
~
G.
The following
pro;:,aration
of' all
oonsid.er&tions
military
military
actions
:,:c;icral,
overall.
strate;;y
.
::orld-wide
•
'
:-,ave to be
'
\
<\ff<i-Jpropriate
and includin<;
"l:ilitary
measures-;
1
to
l
.
.
contr.iu:.ite
..
political,
imd p<1.1'a-
a~plics.tion·o1·
V
l
,
a
these
. -
'in, s~r:~'pe and -on ~ world-\•tide
o..~;reed upon both
:,Gsi::~1cd
into
.
military
,,_ii
'
.
is
·i~al,
The selecti~~:''
.
r:ies._:..1
tll'GS,
I
on a
.
.
t
psyc1t,10
economic,
in.tcgrated·
as aprropriute
appli'2abie
1
C:~plamutic,
.
the.
,
will
.
scale
uncterlie
plans:
J
a)
should
to
.
.
\
basis,
.
t':;e ;)U,"pose
of' arriving
at
a
'\
r,Jt·t'··~,·,,,t
..L.t:.:•• v.~
•oi' ~ tl•c
.1.
..,,_.
Soviets
t:Hi
aware
':',·,are
to
should
appropriate
Berlin
111
cl::,ri t:;r to
.
of access,
.
•···---·--
Ern
ic:,
'!ii
Soviets
At the
in. caso
bi n,lans
·, bY:\pbliticnl
\
.
...
'
-'
prese1t
sr,o'.lld
.
. on
\1th
1.1nn:ist(J.kable
risks, 1 :;.n contiaued
to
c)
t:i.e Soviet
• I .
~
sos s'i the
course
.
-\
pbl'itical
' ,.
qf' act\i.o;i.,
.
Soviets
oporiltion
enemy action,
objective
to ro-opon
of all
access,
risks
rapid
TLorufore,
2,etions
military
will
.
i
escalation
·.1hile
h:10 immediate
!At
.
p~ans
str~3,te,sy.
'l'hoy must,
with
cu:·ront
thorofore,
.
musi\.' tako
defens.ive
r0tr,in
and/or
1.
to ;.induce
b0
the
ty ... ·
·
-~\
of' r;nd be consist0~t
be
des ira.bili
\
l
pl'o-E:mptive
denial
us m,my oppor-
::Covern\ont
paus o a:1d re-as
a dangerous
any military
.
'
....
'
.
\~•
oner.nous
·
.
______,. __----·"··-.-----------·--•·•······
.
of continuin;-'
authorities
\ ·1. .
.
feav0
as possible
tuni ties
which
.
tis110, tb~ vray ,t'beso.,. nlu.z1_s ·:;ould
sa:ne
•
ttho r1im of appl;ring
I
im::,lornonteci
from
.
. \.--··-·.
z.nd v:i!h
\:o.ild
th~
.
of interference
; . 1 ..but detorrr,ined.
. .·
be solsctei
c~1ld
pressure·
.1.naJ.-.1:n,,
·~
be gradt!t0d
of circw:-,st.:.ncos
-
I
w&.r, ·
a catalot~ue
-·~---···
t~ns li;ht
iime1·al
m0~ure,s
s,,ould
bo o:.n:i.ilable
action
incref,sin,;;
danc;er\of
military
.
.in
0 ,"el•f
m ·of' J....,"""._--·\".1..A..
,Jr11•nt"'n' ., 10 t·ro·~r,,,~
.
:.;;~....,,:,,..-:i...
v.;
of' the
a:;>prppriate
3.ccoss
0
~~-
~--'-'-'
.
b)
with
""··•bl
•
.,~
ac;,ount
.
concept:<i
"
defr,ncc
.
the
of NATO
und
tr..e·;:J must
....",.. .
...
'-.
of tho
000483
.
not
•
�"·, .
"''
.
-·----•-~--·---•·-·'!it
... ,--•--
----
S_ E C }~ JZ·'.·,:T
3
co;::1rr:i
t c'.lpabili'ti.93
to
the
prejuci.5..cv of tLc
in mi~1r::tho· risl:
l~~~i~l?
to ,:e.f',J:icl 1-L"
..1io territory·:,
0T10rall
_C(.'.pacit~r
of
n possible
~
r~sc
1
'IV.rJ.ichmight
:rec0
ini t'..E 1~i·1 CJ
o:· t:10
'. ••
rvacti
bu conr.:it"..:od in
Sovie ..t mov cs ·;:ouJ.d de pond
on to
;;,:::o l:iuild-up
a.t the
op0ro..tions
on results
existine
a3 wol::. u~\.circur,tstc.nco~
Jest's
at
the
\
d) . t:10 Alliance
'st1:.nd \ ror.dy
.~
r1ill
.
for
nuclear
action
at
•
'7 •
oxocu ti on o'f ·aµp!'ov ;;(:
.........
Govurn:nont.:i
0'F··,,-·,rc
.!..C:.1......
s.
I"'•"Ru~n-o"S
-~t.i.tl
•1'(
'Jndcr the
tho
UnJteci
::orstad
'
1~ilitnry
Kincdom,
in
his
at
--1
:"-"-··· •rn ".,...',J. l
th-v - tlrno.·
~,,,
;\,
·o,;,sr,
!.·,I'" l•J
· bo · v-.
.. 0 Subj UC t of
\i
.
\
'"""-lo,-··•1;;"
·,,·,-1T,T~,-_
..,,,"''
..
...
_,J,.
2.nd• tho
Unit·e:i
Stc,tos
I
.,-,.,.1..::
__.r-:_-!:J
__,,.,,_
ofatf,iorica,
:\
.'
as USCLJC.3Ui1 h2.s maC:0 certr.in
plans
(LIVZ
6AK) to on~ble
"',,
these
cEci'ry out
'Il1or0. n:u::;t !>·, full
\
,
Sh:.d llA.'IO r.lr:..n.ning •
1i.
re::ipo,,~1hilH;:
thoi.r ·;, spociul
.
.coordin~';ion
...
.
.-
~
~-
0
0.
1.Jot;-:oon this
~
!
GcnC~al.
tripr\rtito
Gov ern.mof1t"~
,,,-
conc::irn.lng
Berlin,
LIVE. OAK planning
'
· 000484
·
I
~
..
\.
;
to
.'-.-
1n·struc ti"on~ o:'' ·-the Go~10rrur1Gnts of ?ranee,
capacity
contin~nncy
,,,
'
�•
•
4
10.
For t~·1.c.1:,urpos o Of ::1·ov:"t.din..: · .cs gr8~ t :i· c:"ioic c as
,'•)'.J~i'blc.: of s_:~pplo:;i_;;1ti...i·y ::lt~rn-tivus;
'
c:Vv,i1'i:1~·-·bl;O,l<l l&nd,
''
;'
;;;sc, :nilit:1ry
plans
·-•{ ..
,
.
.
.
air
or nhv.:.l
..
'. .
- '
sl-,oul~ D(; ;:rc,pared
I,!(l<!SUl'OS
\
l . .:J ',r::·.:...~or
];.:~o·.
com11·-io.l1dorn
a.s G.!:'p·rop?'i:.:;.to
•. In oG.ch cc..su,
C
..,,
by
tl:0
-,
:,x:J'ac_t-ccl°
·:.,dv.c,ntt,:~e,s an-cl osti.11at,:,d r·isks.
co
s;;ould
s·3t :;out in
Jn'.purticular,
for
a)
the ·follo·.-:in:;
·;;.ppro~riate
initiation
alert
'c)
d)
.
.
\· .
0:xpandod ·non-nuclear
.
.
.
non-nucloE:.r
suppott;
selective
use
of nuclear
oporations-;
I
oporations
'
weapons
'
of th0 Allii.\.ncll
... t
.
.
\
.
,I
(
v;i th
,.
\
arid ability
to
mec,suros;
l~
,;round
jir
,:rior
..
. \le'
n~coss~ry
•.'/ill
n:llit"ry
'
.
air'and/or.n&val
. .. .
expandod
ur:;:intly:
i'or ;.;;,:r-o
i'orcos
~oasur':is
of a:1:1 ~i.i~ar~lto
.
b)
should
.
. . ·,
I bo studio~_
to
pl,:ms
\
to domonstrate
to use
tllom,
"\\
~
\ \\
t • '
tho
·,
.·
:,
,..
•
. ,• ~
~.,.
~
,
'
•
•
'
•
'•
t
·,· • --~
'
~
-~-· .....- ... ·-_......-·---~-- - ....-
-
,
..
•
• •
,~
--·-·- ~
,t·
•
~
'
--
_). -..... _..,:_,.___ .-----------·--·
.
'
,.
\;
.,'
,
Q.
\:
---•'
,,
•
000485
•
•
�j
DL (' )
1\11.'-'-'--'-t,
"}
1-.t-'(I l
'L-
~IM,Q,v..'< C
FI1 EXTERNAL OTT OCT19/tS1 SECRET
TO NATOPARIS DL1325 OPHli-lED
INFO CCOS DM/DND OPIM~1EDWASHDCCJS WASHDCPERM!SNY LDN E!'l'lBPARIS
BON BRU HAGUEROMEPRIORITY
Bi\G ANKARA ATHENS COPEN OSLO LISBON FM LDN
REF YOURTEL2687 OCT18
NI\TO MILITARY PLANNING •
PRIOOEMINISTER HAS APPROVEDTHE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
PROVIDED YOU ~!_AKE
IT CLEAR THE CON AUTHORITIES WISH TO RETAIN THEIR
RESERVATIONIN RESPECT OF GENERALCONSIDERATIONSSET OUT IN PARA6
.
-.\
PENDING FURTHER STUDY AND CLARIFICATION IN COIJNCIL,YOUARE _AUTHO~
fEZED TO AGREE TO DESP OF ANNEX B AS A DIRECTIVE TO MAJOR
MILITARYCOMMANDERS
FOR PLANNING f'URPOSESo ~~c
2. THIS APPROVALIS GIVEN ON UNDERSTANDINGTHAT DETAILED PLANS
WT.THC<l-1!4ANDERS
ASSESSMENTSOF RISKS AND ADVANTAGESARE AD
RE:FERENDU[1
TO GOVTSAt-JDPENDING RECEIPT OF SUCHPLANS,THE WAY
WOULDJ:3ECLEARED FOR:COUNCIL TO TAKE UP,AS
A M!\TTER OF FIRST PRIORITY
.
~~
S'F.CGENS
INXT!ATIVE FOR POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS ON A WESTERNNEG0°
'
TJ.ATING POSITXON.
S. IN APPROVINGTHIS TEL PRIMEMINISTER EXPRESSEDPARTICULARCON•
CERN THAT CAREFULATTENTION BE GIVEN TO NEED TO CLARIFY CJ:RCUM
0
l>lANCESOF AND AUTHORITIES .RESPQ'IISIBLEFOR QUOTE SPECIFIC POLITICAL
DECISION UNQUOTEREFERREDTO IN PARA6CD)3.
DECISXOM!';:'.
Ti.::::::, -; ..LL
FOR EXAMPLE,WOULDTHE
,:,. NATO GOIJTSOR BY :,. RZC!D G,ROUP
0
PERHAPS A MAJORITY OF COUN,Cit.
000486
�'
.
DEPARTMENT
OF EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS,
•
II
LSS
·
1
l;'ILE
DIARY
OUTGOIN~ MESSAGE
BIV
---.
F l LC
--'ffi'JW-l'filHir-~,--"---·------J¾ h.,--{·r- •-- ~ C U_I(TJ)~
..
-
Off
--------
~Qy
__20/jJ
NUMBER
---------·
.
am
··.
-
.
I
____L .. ..
_____ r __
llf.Cr.PfNCL
___
S.~Qfk}.l'.
~
C::0."'l(~f:,
O!'llllit. :W}·------~.
-·
r
----- .. -I
..
"
.,
L1 sr 0:,•1_
DL-•lf2l.
·-··-----
--'
------· --
--y•
·-
'
··-
-'--
.
...
··-
DM/D:tU)
Oi'lM!ilID
--,- -
.
--WAS-f~~-IJ»i:r»mM
-WAS~-(l..13
---
tC
~~
l:.01W11-~--
•
.
--
T,'; ,_, • .,,.,
---
. .
.
A.1Uf.k.lU.
·.i<lii~,.tlOPRl{liAGmi"' . O.SL.ir T,ISlV,i
0 , ..illlE:
Rt''· :
--~--,r,"
...
.....,
t: -~
.
...,, Jill,~"""'~~...:..~--·
YOiJR?tJ. Z78'1 0 OT., 26
S~bj.£_~l_:. fll.TG .fLANKING FOil Blrn.LI.No
THE
! -.
nu:wi:~,DTI3TER
'
..
!
HAS Afi'HOVED T!l:rl ii'OLLOWDIQ
CO~!Elf'l'S
.
.
1 S PAPBR P0/61/609
IN illilf..ATION2;0 'l'H,,i;SECRi..'U.i-iYGENJ.Q'!AL
WtiICH"
IVE \THflli!H::ITAND\11.J.,i_,
BE Ul! FOli DISC!Ji.l:ION DJ TBE C,.Ulrn;a. ll
'tlm 1,EAR PUTOREo fiHJ.$.E GOJ4,1BN1'8ARR BAS}])
ON '.l'i~EAllSIJlSf"'fI.011
,,
WUI.Oli.A.PfUR$. 'lO BE HA.DRIN 'l'IIE 51Wl!L'I'ARXGBNEilAL 1 $ PAFJffl
.
(I-A.RAf)
$>
'
• i'
.
'fiiA'to Di REGARD'tO Al!r! DECISIONS 'J.:OBB TMqnf; 111 ·
R1IiS?1i:CT
OF !{ATO PLAHS VffllCIIARE-·'DRAiliifUI10 'rdE "RULi: OF!
.
.
;
ll'l'IAUDII'l'YFOR NATO AGTlOH IS THE PRf..SENTfllSJ.TIOir' •
r
.
.
a~
ff
rs CLEARFROMIJIR/ s11m:ER1 !Ji PAl'Ji:R
11 AS FARASl'IA1'0,
.
rJ.A,ii:,mo
FOR :BRRLIUC0N:I'INC,~1Cll::srs
• .
fli.ntE!il2iCB to 11l'Ol.l'l'1CAL AUi'HORI'l'I!m 1
i~
an: :z.~Tr:Rl'RET.ED
M REiU<illG
•
li'UR 001iVE"£DID
,
fRfi:
ll:13 DE:J1SIOilS
.
.
,;
'
CU.NCEHN,ED
Tilh'l'
tmit
rn PARA 6 OF ANtni:t, B sncULD •
1-0· TEE UA'l'O a::i1niort as
Oil' GOVER!llllEUTS.·
ANINSTBI.WEH'I'
IN .ll.D.DI'l'IOU.p
.
11SP\~ClFIC
,
(
.
'
j'OJJlTIOAL .DECISION" Ri:'>PSRED Tu Dl FAI!A 6( d)t i)
I
A.1:DTBB .ll'l'ROVALJ.Nl,}Di.PLRM!l:nl'J:ATION
1:'ROCIEDvRl~Ili i'ARAS '7
······-----
-·--·
··-"
-
====================<i'~====-~-·=--=--.
APPROVEO
BV
�,
All't 8 ARE HITERffil."'rEP BY CANADA.AS,NEAJfINO THAT ALL)'IJ,.BB
BEFORE IMPLEDN'l'AT10!1 RAV"~'J.'O BE APPROYEDBY OOVf.RNM.@~TS
.
.
AND T:tAT THE EXECU'lIOli OF AP.i'RCVEDPLANS WILL BB "'l'H.E
.
3'.JB,L,CT OF' DEOISIOJS BY GOVEh'lilUillTSAlf THE Tll!!E.11•
a.
.FOR THE:PURPOSEOF
lti ,'.;:)ll!r;ECTIONl\'I'l'li 'l'H¼
Di!.ALINO\llITa 'lt!ILITAR\'. PLANNING
'
BE.RI.n,
Sii'U/1.T'l:cl;J,
IT IS. IM1'0HTANT
,,
'i'l:1lT IT IS OLEARLY WDERS'l'OGD THAT THE lrINAL HJ,;~HVtlSIBILITY
,
\
.B,;•rHPOH APfHOVAL OF FLA.NS AND F'GR DECISIONS TO IMl'LEM.li.1fT
·;:~!EUSiiO-JLD illj;Sf }7I'J.'HO-OVERli.lllmTSVldO i'iILL IDIPRESS TIJEIR
'
.
VlEW5 '.'1'fffiOUG:H
THEIR PE!lMAREN'fREP.IGSENTATIVES IN THE tlATO
c::;:nlCIL
AtlD fliAT NO DELEGA'l'IOHOF GOYEKHIIBNTALAUiHORiff
IN s1:CI! CUUCIAL MA'l''.tERSCAN DE OONTEW>I.ATED
Pl'{OVIDEP
0
T.t:iIS IS UliD.ERSTOOD
0 CANADAaABAfJCEPT.THB INTARPl{E'rATlQli
'
PLACED Oll ffl:&SB PARASBY THE SEORE'l'ARl GENEBAL
0
. BEARllG IN. JI' llD fHE CONCLUSIOll;tN THE SEORET~RY
'•
..
mm,;p..u,,sJ'APEfl
TB.AT "I'l' 18 DI 'l'RE COUNCIL 'r.liA'l' THE WILL
01'' GOVERNl&ENTS.
WILLBE EXPRT.SSSDBY THE PEHiiANEUTP.El'R£SEllTAT·IYE8• 0
WE BELI':~VE THAT Tlill COU'lfCIL SliOULD CONSIDER \'illAT iU::.t.SUiIBS
ARE P.EQ.UXRED
TO EN/IDLE IT TO DEAL EFF~CTIVELY /,l~D f..xTEDITL1tlSLY
Wl;tH SUCH D,U>ORTANTQUESTION&Iii ':raE EVENT OF AN EHEF!GENCYo
0
·,
"
000488
�, ..-
..
,
..,
·,
~
••
'• •
,"D,c_(,)
.
.,
..
,_,.-.; · Ii
11·
1
_'.!'.lit,
"""""'~'1r-.,,1,-~
(,2
·~
..
'.:0-,:.
N.'.TO SEClhlT
.
.,··ii),'.·,
\,,
'
E
h.'M iw-.t-
~<-
·/.
,:·
-~
•
.:~- '.
··.
··.:
'~.
·po/§1/809
,,
"
The ..Council will remember th.it durin[( its discussion.
of ~'Q/61/765, . .nnox .C, if was recogni sod tha."t. some. slightly,
cl.1fferent
wording ror;nrding
·p.ol i t'ic;:il uu thori tics,·
governments,,.
Coui1cil etc.,
wns" to ho found in four.pnrt.s
of' this document:.
•
..
,
.. .
of
I
•
~
(1 )• Tho e:stnbiishment
n cct:.;toguo
of plans nsked for• in pcrogrnph
G(b) is intended
to enabJ.c the
.ll.OJJ
ti..9.c.l _g_u_t)1oy_l;ti.o_s.
to select
the sppropriate
·
aotioh .in the ligh't of circumstnnces..
.. ·
(2).
In 6(d)(3.)
it. is st~,ted that there v1ilJ. have
·bei "a specific
i2,.<1,l_i_i;J,.£-aj.
__dccision
to employ
,nucl"ear weapons ••.•• •
to
In. pc.ro.grai)h 7 ..upproval
of the. plans is in.tended
to .. ~
be obt:iinod
through the 'following
procedure:
·t_he
i/
• plans. will ··be sent; to the Standing
Group for.
•·1 ·
appro:i sol in c onsulta.tion
11'.ith t~e Mili tnry Committoe,/
.•
in accordtmcc ·with established
NI.TO,procedure,
and
ff
will be fo.rwarcicd to .the North :.tL·.ntic
Counsil
for
f
:ipproval
by _gpvernments throuE,h the Permanent
(,
B._0prcscn_t.£,t).y_e_§..,.
~
·
'~
·,•,..
(3)
(4)
The executio;
~f.tll'e j:lans,
upprov~d o.ccor.ding to
this proceclurc,
\vill bu the' subject
of :ie<Cj_s.i_ons_~
,&oyo:rn_ments o.t :thcftime
(purogrcph
cl).
-~ . _ .· ..
C
. 2.
· It seems' to me that these diffcrpnt
,wordings h.:ive .not
been deli bcro. tely, us.0d for the purpose of cs tabli shing reo.lly
clear-cut
di st inc tioris :and, special'
tren tmo)1ts as regards
tl:le
·severecl h,ypotheses
covered
in. the relevunt",pur,ts
of __nnox B; I
c.malso _convi_nccd trot.we i~ight be faced with·grcat
difficulties
it' wu <lid not try ,t,o polish
up' the drafting
and t'o (;Ct a more
orde1•ly text.
·
~
I
~
>•
•
-~•
t
-•"-•
-
• ••
-
•-
...._
-
-
-
-
- ___...~
--;;·.~···-~-·--··•·
"~
'
·•
-- ,.
'
.
.
.:;.
· On _the other hand, 1 think I _cp.n ~,_ssurnc that there
i,s
agreement among us ·that the _!_n:s_ty_u_c_:tions
should be
sent. to the Military·
Comtic.nders.
1'urthcr
delo. 0' wciuld be
unc:c.ceptablf.;. right
now·.
~
.
a complete.
~
.
'
'
4 •. _. \"iould it, therefore•,
be p.ossibJ.·e that we upprove the
_·.nnexes ;. and D as they· stdnd i1t -this morrient, it being
uridcre,tood
that .we must,ritill
find ,c.· butter
understanding
of.
the .r1uestion:
_wha~tpo;J.i.tico.l, authority
hCls to mClkc decisions.
I am sure .tho.t discussions
on-that
matter will still
take a
·Jong time :ind this wi.11 bocoine c,uite-clear"whcin
w0 com0 to
· discuss
·the ,,uestions
ro.iscd in ·-my P0/61 /785. ··
.~
-
~
,;.;..J
.\.
..
.
---·-ta.'"''
· ,000489
0 '
•
.,
;;%'"'
~--~-
�.
.
..
•·
:··J:I
. __·-.
•
· · ·.5, · >-During our. disqussions
· stat-ements
huvc been ..,,mude, und
• . I think .£1,gJ'.ccmont...ho.s beim roe1ched; -th.it .until
we t_C:ke another
clcci cion,. tho i?gli t_!.g::_it_g~j;l)ori~ "meant in 6(b) and 6(d) 3, is the
8ouncil,
· ·we h:lVC not· yet ·discussed
pt,r::gruphs
7 and 8.Hero
tho position
might be slightly
clif'ferent
because,
ncccrding:o to
::irticl o 5 of the Tro~:-ty, each member hns the right
of individual
.
sclf"'-dcfcnce.
Therefore,
if nttacked,
cc.ch individual
member can
dee Jde how it is going to defend itself
and .. take~ those ac tiohs
which it deems necessc.ry.
On the other
hahd; if collec'£1ye·N..TO
. c.c tion is to, be ·to.ken, I think tlm t in that cnsc also the
expressions
used in pnrctgraphs
7 .:tnd 8. 'will .1i1ply c. clec·i_sion by
. the C9uncil.
.
· · · ·
·
· '~~"
··
·
'
' 6.
It nby be ·thl,t in •tho future· the presently
agreed rule
'.of unc.nirni ty wil1 'h:;Ye to be umended, bu,t we· h~-:vc not yet
reached
the. sfuge at' which such ·ch..,nges ·can ou ll)ade to this rule.
· Hence, "wo must take it for grantee. that this rule of imnriimi ty
..
for, lL'.L'O .tiction is the present
posi tiof! and c~:nnot be nl t-ercd.
'
..
.
.
. ·:- / , . ''· ,,,..·,,
.
.
.
. 7,
·The inter'pretc.tion
I suggest,
o:ccording
to. which
decisions
·w1'J.1 be tc.kcn· by· the ·Permanent .council
under . tho J;'ule
of unanirni t:,r, seems· to be ..in. line with' tho Tre., ty • · -'-rticle
9•
stc.tcs
th.,t the P-..irtics· t.o the Treaty
"estoblish
a Council,
on.
y.,hich each of them shc.11 bQ repros.entod,
to conqider
matters
cone crning , the i mpl cinen tn ti on of this Treaty" •
:. s c.n armed
atto.ck. agc'.inst one or more .of the ,.llied
,countri·cs
shnll be
COJ'\Siclcred Lm r:ttcck· ~,g~:inst them all (.'.rticles
5 r,nd 6),, it
scc\ns norm-,1- to c onsidor
thb. t ~my Ni.TO action
to be t:::kcn in cr,se
of such c,n ,ittc.ck would be discussed
and decidud i,n the Council.
Tho · governments
nc. turr,:ll'y will .send instructions
to their
·
Pe:rrr,nhent Rcpresen tati vei;:;.,··c.nd, therefor,,,
it would s,c,c:m the. t
whc11 the text . of .".nnex· B spcolrn -of. ·"dc,c i sions by governments"·
and
of·H·pc,11 ticc.l c.uthoritics;',
there .. is ·no contrc.diction
b0tween
this wording and the ''fu.ct thc:t -it is·in
the Counci1 .that the will
of g9vernP1entsi)Vill. .
be:-cxprossod
by
the
Permanent
Representotives.
.
.
•
•
'
'
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.
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'
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.
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Dublin Core
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Title
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NATO
Dublin Core
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Title
A name given to the resource
Berlin Crisis / 9 FEBRUARY 1962
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1962-02-09
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
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en
Type
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Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CDTT00038
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Defence Liaison (1) Division to Ignatieff, ‘‘Berlin: Contingency Planning,’’ 9 Feb. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1.
air lift
Berlin contingency
France
George Ignatieff
Lauris Norstad
Live Oak
SACEUR
Stikker
Three Power report
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/2b212a9c4192e96d407b7dbeb1812e3f.pdf
7e19cde3d1a3f0d50e1ee73e0d2ca379
PDF Text
Text
BRIEFINGWASA PRELIMINARY
OULINEOF NATOMILITARYPLANSWITHRESPECT
..
TO A BERLINCONTINGENCY
WHICHHE HADBEENINSTRUCTED
TO PREPAREIN
PARA10
or
COUNCILS
DIRECTIVECM(6!)104.A WRITENREPORTON THESE
PLANSWOULD
BE SUBMITTED
IN ABOUTTWOWEEKS
TO THE STANDING
GROUPFOR
CONSIDERATION
THROUGH
NORMAL
NATOCHANNELS
IE BY THEMILITARYCTTEE
ANDEVENTUALLY
BY THECOUNCIL.HE
ASKEDTHATTHEMATERIAL
BE GIVEN
' SECURE
THE HIGESTCLASSIFICATION,THAT
ITS CIRCULATION
BY BY THEMOST
MEANS
or TRANSMISSION
ANDTHATCONTENTS
BE 'RESTOON A NEEDTO KNOW
BASIS.
2.NORSTAND
EMPHASISED
THATWHAT
HE WASABOUTTO DESCRIBEWASTHE
QUOTECATALOGUE
OF PLANSUNQUOTE
MENTIONED
IN PARA6(8 >or CM•(61)104
FROMWHICHAPPROPRIATE
ACTIONCOULDBE SELECTED
BY THE POLITICAL
AUTHORITIES
IN THELIGHTor THECIRCUMSTANCES.HE
WASNOTRPT NOT
HIMSELFPRESSINGANYPARTICULAR
.PLAN.INADDITIONTHESEPLANSWERE
7
MEANT
TO APPLYONLYWHEN
THE IMPLEMENTATION
or LIVE OAKPLANSHAD
FAILED.THEY
WEREMEANT,IFTHIS STAGEor A CRISIS WEREEVERREACHED,
•
TO PROVIDE.THE
POLITICALAUTHORITIES
or NATOWITHSOMEOTHERCHOICE
THANALL..OR. NOTHING•
THE•-EXISTENCFQOF
THEfLANS
DID NOTRPTC.NOTNECES.
;
,
SARILYIMPLYAT THIS STAGEAN ABILITYTO CARRYTHEMout.NOR COULD
IT BE ASSUMED
THATIT WOULD
BE POSSIBLETO CARRYOUTPLANSIN THE
STAGESWHICHHE WASABOUTTO SKETCH.NEVERTHELESS
THEVERYEXISTENCE
OF PLANSGAVEDESIRABLE
FLEXIBILITYTO THECHOICESWHICHMIGHTHAVE
TO BE MADEBY THEPOLITICALAUTHORITIES.INSUMMARY
HE WASINDICATING
PLANSWITHRESPECT
_TOWHAT
THEALLIANCE
SHOULD
BE ABLETO DO BUTNO'l'.
RPT NOTNECESSARILY
WHAT
THEPOLITICALAUTHORITIES
WOULD
DECIDE
TO DO.
••• 2 •••
000459
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PAGE TWO 506
3.THE NATO MILITARY PLANS IN THIS- CONTE°XT
HAD.BEEN GIVEN
THE NAME
..
. '
'
.
'
.
..
,i
]"
OF QUOTE BERCONUNQUOTEPLANS.THERE WERETHREE MAIN SETS COVERING
>
~
,,-
...
PLANS FOR AIR,GROUND AND SEA ACTION AND WITHIN EACH SET THERE WERE
I
·!
,:i
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~4".,,# ,,'
,
GRADUATIONS..
.
..
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4.THERE WERE THREE PLANS F
~
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:BERCON ALPHA 1,ALPHA 2,
,_ANDBRA~of ALPHAl,! 1~p;;;~;-;;O:;;-V-;I
D~E;;D;·
.~F~:;;_ ;::;;;;.:~_A~Tr,I~_O~N""'O;F~L~A;R;~~i-~S~C:~~_L;~~F~,1;-;G;i:H
ESCORTS IN THE BERLIN CORRIDOR ALPHA2/PROVIDED FOR A NON-NUCLEAR
0
,~ATT~E FOR AIR SUPERIORITY OUTSIDE THE C.ORRiDOR,EI OVER EASTGERMANY.
\~R~
PL~NNING PROVIDED FOR A NUCLEARDEMONSTRATION
ON A SMALL --
..
-~
.
NUMBEROF SELECTED TARGETS EACH ONE OF WHICH WOULDBE AT LEAST TWO
ADVANTAGES
OF LPHA 1 WERE THAT
,, .
THERE WOULDBE RELATIVELY SMALL FORCES INVOLVED IN A SMALL AREA,ALL
:.I,
--
'
t·
..
t,
OF WHICH WOULDBE INSIDE THE CORRIDORS.IT THEREFORE INVOLVEDTHE
LEAST RISK OF ESCALATION.THE DISADVANTAGESWERE THAT IT WOULDBE
I.
t
..
•
EASIL y FRUSTRATED,THAT ITS SUCCESS woui:D NOT RPT NOT NECESSARITY
.,A
,,
'>.
AFFECT THE PROBLEMOF ACCESS AND THAT IT \iOULD HAVE TO BE CARRIED OUT
I
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.
I
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,.,
IN AN AREA WHERETHE MAXIMUM
SOVIET CONTROLEXISTED.THE ADVANTAGES
~F fLPH~·J2 ,wERE ~HAT ITS INITIAL :succEss
~As HIGLY L,,I-KELYs~-NCE IT
WOULDINVOLVE ALMOST 1000 PLANES.IT W0ULDCAUSE SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE
f,
0
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~
I
., \
.
-
.
TO THE sov IET AIRFQRCE. ITS PURPOSE WOULDBE TO GAIN AND MAINTAIN AIR
SUPERIORITY AND IT WOULDBE AN OFFENSIVE OPERATION.THE DISADVANTAGES
.
.
..
..,OF THE PLAN WERE THAT IT INVOLVED.A GREAT RISK OF' GENERALWARSINCE
~
~
'
\~-.
IT WAS A LARGE SCALE OPERATION WHICH WQULDPROBABLYINFLICT SUCH
·.,.
HEAVYDAMGESON THE SOVIET AIRF'ORCE THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT
RPT NOT ACCEPT THOSE DAMAGESWITHOUTRETAPIATION.THE' ADVANTAGESOF'
'THE \BRAV'ofPLAN WERE THAT IT WAS:s_IMPLE AND INVOLVEDTHE MOS~ LIMITED
.
USE Of NUCLEARWEAPONS.NORSTADINDICATED THAT ANY CUCLEARWEAPONS
.
I ' r ,,:
, ., .~ ~
ENVISAGED UNDER THIS PLAN WOULDBE UNDER !OKT IN YIELD AND WOULD
'
'
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BE DIRECTED AT PURELY MILITARY TARGETS MORETHAN TWOMILES FROM ANY
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CENTREOF' POPULATION.AT
A LATERPOINT IN HIS BRIEF'itr<rHE GAVEAS
.SHORTRANGETARGETIN ORDERTO ACHIEVEQUOTERIF'LE ACCURACYUNQUOTE,
AT .A
. A~ EXAMPLEA NUCLEAR
WEAPON
OF' I, 5KTS F'.IREDFROMA HOWITZER
'
I
-
'
THE DISADVANTAGES
OF' THE PLANWERETHATIT OF'F'ERED
NO RPT NO SIGN!·
'
FICANTMIJIIARY ADVANJ'AGE
ANDTHATIT PROVIDETHESOVIETS IF' T~EY
WISHEDWITHAN EXCUSETO REPLYWITHLARGESCALENUCLfARWEAPONS.
·-
THE RESULTCOULDFROMTHE MILIT ARY,POINT OF VIEWMEANTHE ACCEPTANCE
'
OF GREATMILITARYDAMAGE
ON OURS-IDE.
'
5. IN GENERAL
COMMENT
ON THESEPLANSANDIN RESPONSETO_._QUESTIO~S,
NORSTAD
INDICATEDTHATALL THREESTAGES·OF THE PLANSHADQUOTE
NUCLEAR
ANNEXES
UNQUOTE
IE THE SAMETYPE OF OPERATION
BUT USINGNU·
CLEARWEAPONS.SUCH
DOUBLEPLANSHADTO EXIST HE BELIEVEDIN THE EVENT
THATTHE SOVIET RESPONSEAT ANYPOINT WOULD
BE TO IMMEDIATELY
RAISE
THE THRESHHOLD,IE
TO RESPONDWITHNUCLEAR
WEAPONS.HE
INDICATEDAS
.
'
WELLTHATANYLOSSESSUFF'ERED
BY THE
WESTERN
FORCES
IN THE EARLIER
.
'
'
'
STAGESOF'THESEACTIONSWOULD
NATURALLY
DETRACT
FROMTHEIR MILITARY
ABILITYTO CARRYOUTMOREADVANCED
OPERATIONS.
6, PLANSWITHRESPECTTp--@OUND
5IoN
WERESUBDIVIDEDIN FOUR~
IE
BERCON
tHARLIE ttCHARLIE 2i:CHARLIE3\AND CHARLIE4• CHARLIE1 fROVIDED
F'ORAN ATTACKBY A REINF'ORCED
D.IV ALONGTHE AXIS HELMSTEDT·BERLIN.
CHARLIE2 PROVIDED
FOR A TWODIVISIONALATTACKIN FRONTOF'THE
CASTTLE
i
AREA.CHARLIE
3 PROVIDEDFOR A THREEDIV ATTACK
ON THE AXIS HELMSTEDT
TO MITTLELAND
CANAL-ELBE
RIVER.CHARLIE4 PROVIDEDFOR A THREEDIVISI·
'
ONALATTACKIN THE THURINGER-WALD
AREA.EACH
OF' THESEPLANSALSOHAD
_NUCLEAR~ANNXES,
I
I·
7.THE GENERAL
ADVANTAGE
OF ALL THESEPLANSWASTHATTHEYWOULD
DEMONSTRATE
THE SERIOUSINTENTOF NATOIN THE FACE OF SOVIETTHREATS
i
'
ANDTHE READINESSOF WESTERN
FORCESTO ENGAGEIN AN INCREASED
SCALE
OF'GROUND
ACTION.THEGENERAL
DISADVANTAGES
WERETHATSURPRISEWOULD
BE DIFFICULTTO ACKIEVE,THAT
CONTROL
OF THE AIR OVERTHE BATTLEAREA
'
' ALL
MIGHTBE DIFF'ICULTTO ACHIEVEANDMAINTAINANDTHATTHEYWERE
i
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PAGE FOUR 506
fEB 2 7 \985
SUBJECT TO RAPID DEFEAT.THE SPECIFIC
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
•
CHARLIE WERE THEN OUTLINED.THE
''-f
-
r,
I
ADVANTAGES OF CHARLIE I WERE THAT IT WAS
D_IRECTLY RELATED TO THE QUESTION OF ACCESS TO BERLIN, THAT IT COULD
BE EASILY MOUNTED,THAT IT HAD NO RPI NO MAJOR AFFECT ON NATO"s OVERALL
..
.
. ..
...
.
.
·~.
.
DEFENCES.AN~ I.HAT IT WAS EASIER TO JUSTIFY BECAUSE IT WAS DIRECTED
'
.·
~
,
(
~
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r.
. TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS ON THE AUTOBAHN.ITS DISDVANTAGES WERE THAT
'f:.
1.
""'
THE C0.-'1BATAREA WAS FAR AHEAD OF NATO·s EMERGENCYDEFENCE PLAN' 'i>os'I.-
.
'
.I
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TIONS AND. THAT IT WOULD BE EASY FOR THE SOVIETS TO CONTA.IN SUCH A
.. ' ' . i
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\) ;
•
SMALL. FORCE.THE ADVANTAGES OF CHARLIE 2 WERE THAT IT WAS EASY TO
EXECUTE AND, THAT ITS INITIAL
=
f
•
r_•
f,
.
.,;. ..
SUCCESS WAS LIKELY, ITS DISADVANTAGES
·
· •
~
f'
•
~;
.'\.,
-WERE THAT IT ,WAS OFF THE AUTOBAHN AND THEREFORE PERHAPS MORE DIFFI•
.
CULT TO JUSTIFY IN RELATION TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS AND THAT IT
..
,
TOO COULD
BE EASILY CONTAINED
BY THE SOVIETS.THE
.
'
.
.
LIE
.·
ADVANTAGES OF CHAR•
..
0
3 WERE THAT IT WOULD BE RELATED DIRECTLY TO THE PRQ,ELEM0F GROUND
-
.
. .. _,
·:-ta ; ·,1-+
~t'
· ACCESS TO. BERLIN AND THAT IT WOULD PROVIDE A GREATER PENETRATION CA•
'
•.
~
PABILITY,ITS
.
'
OVERALL. DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY
i
LIE
•,•T~~~-~
..'
DISADVANTAGES WERE THAT IT WOULD BEGIN TO DEGRADE THE
- .•
..
.
.
'
~
.
OF NATO DEFENCES,THE ADVANTAGES OF--CHAR-
'
.
4 WERE THAT IT WOULD STRENGTHEN THE FORWARDDEFENCE POSTURE OF
.
'
1'1'1E7tLLIANCE IF
-
ITS WERE SUCCESSFUL.HOWEVERIF
.
I
IT WERE DEFEATED THE
..___,
VERY SUBSTANTIAL .LOSS OF FORCES INVOLVED WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN
SERIOUSLY IN TERMS ~TO
•1·.s,,NORS,TAD THEN. TURNE_~TO
DEFENCE,
.
. .·
_
~~~~·R _HIS DIR~CT
PLANNING FOR~
CONTR(l., T HERL WAS ONLY ONE PLAN OF A GENERAL ORDER IN THIS CONTEXT
KNOWNAS QUOTE BERCON DELTA UNQUOTE.IT INVOLVEDCA>SURVEILLANCE AND
-·
CONTROL
OF. .SOVIET
BLOC SHIPPING
......
- ,. •.
-•
IN QUOTE ALLIED CCl'lMAND
EUROPE
.
.,
_.,.
.
~.
FOCAL AREAS UNQUOTE;CB>THE Ci.l<TROL AND/OR MINING OF THE BALTIC
.
•
.
STRAITS;CC)THE
·r
CONTROL AND /OR MINING OF THE TURKISH STRAITS;AND
.
1: .
'• '
~'
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( D) BOARDING, SEARCH AND ARREST WITH RESPECT TO BLOC SHI PPING, THE AD,
VANTAGES OF,THIS
AND THAT IT
I
~
'~
•
~
PLAN WERE THAT THERE WAS A LOW_RISK .~F ESCALATION
ALLOWED FOR THE EXPLOITATION
OF Clli:Nli:RALALLIED
SUPERIO. ,
HITY IN SEA POWER.ITS DISADVANTAGES WERE THAT IT
WAS NOT RPT NOT
000462
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PAGE FIVE. 506
FEB2 7 1985·
'[ DIRECTL y R:LATED TO THE BERLIN SITUATION
AND THAT IT MIGHT PRECI-,
AGAINST ALLIED
PI TATE LARGE SCALE.. SOV!ET SUBMARINE ACTIV!TY
SHIPPING
'
·"
ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD.
9.GEN NORSTAD THEN .SUMMEDUP THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES IN
GENERAL TERMS. OF ALL BERCON PLANNING WHETHER RELATED TO AIR,GROUND
OR SEA, THE ADVANTAGES WERE THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PLANS
WOULD DEMONSTRATETHE WILLINGNESS OF NATO TO USE SIGNIFICANT
FORCE
TO COUNTER SOVIET ACTION.PREPARATION TO EXECUTE THESE PALSN WOULD
IMPROVE THE GENERAL FORCE READINESS OF THE ALLIANCE.SOME OF THE PLliNS
MIGHT PRODUCE REAL MIL IT ARY ADVANTAGES. THE IMPLEMENTAT !ON OF ANY OF
-<::--------
1
THE PLANS MIGHT LEAD THE SOVIET UNION TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE OR CAUSE
'
'
THE:i•l_TO REOPEN ACCESS ROUTES WHICH/THEY HAD BARRED.THE DISADVANTAGES
---
WERE THAT ALL OF THE PLANS INVOLVED THLP.J.S.K-OF_G.£,NERAL WAR,THAT
~
'
MANY OF THEM COULD Bi. CONTAINED AND FRUSTRATED AND THEY MIGHT LEAD
TO THE SEIZURE OF WEST BERLIN
OR
ro AGGRESSIVE sov IET
ACTI ON ELSEWHERE.
BE.RCONPLANS WERE MUTUALLY INDEPENDENT BUT TWO OR MORE COULD BE CARRI E.D
OUT SIMULTANEOUSLY.IMPLENENTATION
OF THE GROUND PLANS WOULD REQUIRE
'
.'UR SUPERIORITY AND IT
WAS PROBABLY INEVITABLE
'
THEREFORE THAT ,GROUND
I
A.ND AIR PLANS \IIOULD HAVE TO BE PUT INTO EFFECT AT THE SAME TIME,
10. THE NORWEGIAN REP SAID THAT HE WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE OBJECTIVITY
WITH !/.!.XP3
...i'
'.vlTH WHICH GEN NORSTAD HAD GIVEN THIS
PRELIMINARY OUTLINE.HE
WONDERED
IF THE. EXPLANAT ION OF' BERCON BRAVO DID NOT RPT NOT DEMONSTRATETHE
ZXTREME DIFFICULTY
OF' EMPLOYING THE SELECTIVE
USE OF N UCLE AR WEAPONS
c
T
• RATHER THAN THE OBJECT STATED
r,BILITY
ni/ cMr.01>104
IE
QUOTE THE WILL AND THE
OF THE ALIANCE TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNQUOTE.WAS IT 'CON-
CEIVABLE THAT ONE NUCLEAR WEAPON COULD BE USED WITHOUT BRINGING A
NUCLEAR RESPONSE?NORSTADSIMPLY SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO
DRA~J UP, PLANS BY THE DOCU IN QUESTION AND THAT HE
/'-
BEi TF:VFQ IT _WAS
DESIRABLE TO HAVE SUCH PLANS.HE ,WAS PERFECTLY AWARE HOWEVERTHAT
~GOVTS
ACTING TrlROUGrl COUNCIL 1-!ADNOT RPT NOT APPROVED ANY OF THESE
.. , • 6
000463
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PAGE SIX, 506
·1
(!:1~1~)
FEB2 7 ,ss5
PLANS AND MIGHT NOT RPT NOT DO SO.THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION THERE~
FORE WAS PRIMARILY
POLITICAL
AND NOT RPT NOT MILITARY,ALTHOUGH
TURALLY WHATEVER DECISION WAS TAKEN HAD CERTAIN MILITARY
NA-
CONSEQUENCES,
THE DANISH REP ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE NORSTADS RESPONSIBILITY
TO
CHOOSE WHICH OF THE CONTINGENCY PLANS MIGHT BE IMPLEMENTED.NORSTAD
SAID HE BELIEVED THAT GOVTS ACTING. THROUGH COUNCIL MIGHT APPROVE
THESE PLANS AS PART OF THE CATALOGUE OF PLANS ENVISAGED IN CMC61)104
BUT HE FELT CERTAIN THAT THEY WOULD RESERVE TO THEMSELVES DECISION
WITH RESPECT TO IMPLEMENTATION.HE BELIEVED THAT BERCON PLANS WERE
OF AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT NATURE THAN LIVE
BK FFF~CTTVE.THIS
WAS NOT RPT NOT THE CASE HOWEVERWITH RESPECT TO
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BERCON PLANS.LIVE
+
OAK PLANS.THE EXPERIENCE
-,
OAK PLANS ENVISAGED ACTION
WHICH WAS ESEN'f IALL Y DEFENSIVE .BERCON PLANS ON THE OTHER HAND WERE
MEANT TO PROVIDE A DEMONSTRATION OF INTENT TO GO FURTHER AND THIS
WAS OBVIOUSLY A DECISION
TO BE TAKEN BY THE POLITICAL
AUTHORITIES.
THE ACTING SECGEN INTERJECTED TO REMIND THE MTG THAT PARA 8 OF DOCU
CM(61) i04
PROVIDED TH/\T QUOTE THE EXECUTION OF APPROVED PLANS WILL
Bf THE SUBJECT OF DECISIONS BY GOVTS AT THE TIME UNQUOTE.
J l oNORSTAD,WITH GREAT SERIOUSNESS,POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS SOME-
THH;G IN THE CHARACTER OF' HAVING TO TAKE EXECUTIVE DECISIONS WHICH
M~.DE A COMMANDEREJ(TREMF.LYCONSERVATIVE.HE HAD HAD THIS EXPERIENCE
IN THE PST TWO WEEKS.Hr: HAD BEEN THE TARGET OF QUOTE A GREAT DEAL OF
f;DVICE UNQUOTE IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS AND HAD. BEEN EXPOSED TO QUOTE
MANY BRILLIANT
IDEAS UNQUOTE AS TO HOW TO PROCfrED.IN RESTROSPECT
'
f1LL THE
ADVICE HAD BEEN BAD AND HE BELIEVED THAT COUNCIL WOULD AGREE
IF HE COULD EXPOSE SOME Of THAT ADVICE TO THEt'J.HE SAID HE HAD TO
1\ADNIT
THAT QUOTE HE HAD NOT RPT NOT HAD A BRILLIANT
\\HE
TOOK OVER THE
RESPONSIBILITY
IDEA SINCE
OF SUPREME COMMANDERUNQUOTE.
000464
�FEB2 7 1985
Pf-\GE SEVEN 506
12.FINALL Y IN RESPONSE TO A FURTHER,'QUESTIONNORSTAD INDICATED THAT
I
PLANS AFFECTING SPECIAL NATIONAL INTERESTS WOULDBE DISCUSSED IN·
GREAT DETAIL WITH APPROPRIATE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES IN ORDER THAT'
THIY COULDBE IN THE BEST POSITION TO TAKE SPECIFIC AND DELIBERATE
DECISIONS.HE MOVEDON THEN TO SPEAK IN MOREGENERALTERMS OF NATOS
l"ORWARD
STRATEGYAND HIS BRIEFING IN THIS RESPECT WILL BE DEALT
v'ITH IN A SEPARATE l1SG
IGNATIEFF•' •.
--
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000465
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Dublin Core
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Title
A name given to the resource
NATO
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Berlin Crisis / 24 FEBRUARY 1962
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1962-02-24
Format
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PDF
Language
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en
Type
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Text
Identifier
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CDTT00039
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
NATO Paris to External Affairs, ‘‘NATO Military Planning,’’ 24 Feb. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1.
BERCON plans
Berlin contingency
Lauris Norstad
Live Oak
North Atlantic Council
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b784f39b7d38a0b393a64332bc56f91f.pdf
9ab92d347983757ef970c5b2ba0b4516
PDF Text
Text
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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MEMORAND.t.t·~
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The telegram on Berlin Coatiagency
Planning waa not aiped by the Minister,
who
baa aent it back through the Uader-Secretary
and asked that it be put up to the Prime
Minister.
CIRCULATION
Ext. 326 (6/56)
000673
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OF EXTERNALAFFAIRS,CANAD~:-.. , '
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OUTGOING MESSAGE
DATE
CT29/62
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INFO:
BMBPARIS,
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Ref.:
YOURTIL 24,87 OF OCT2S
Subject:
BULIN CONTillGDiCY
PLANHIIG
THBPRIMEMDISTD HASAQUIDTO THI FOD1OF APPROVAL
FORTHI BERCOI/MAitCCIIPL.US II THI TBIIISSIT 101TH II PAR.AS
or
P0/62/6'+1
or
OCTS/62 PROVIDED
P Ai.AS(b)(ii)
IS AMINDIDALOIG THI
LINESYOUHAVIllDICATEDNAMILY
'!HAT"THI COUJICIL
APPROVBD
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PRINCIPLEilD POI PLAIIIIG PURPOSIS THI JIAJOI IATOCOMMAIIDDS
PLAHSII THI BDCOI ARDMAiCOISERIIS 01( THI BASISTHATTHBSI
REPRISIIITA CATALOGUE
OF PLANSFORPOSSIBLEACTIOiBYRATOFORCIS
IN THI IVEHTTHATTHI DFORTSOF THI THIEEPOWERS
TOMAINTAIH
ACCESS
TO BERLINII ACCORDANCB
WITHTHELIVI OAKPLAIS ARE
UNSUCCISSFUL
- THESELECTION
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PLAHSBEINGSUBJECT
TO A PRIORPOLITICALDECISION
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EXT.
18 (REV.
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(1)
PHONE
APPROVED
SIG,
NAME
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12/61)
000674
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BIPRBSSIIG CDN AGREEMENT
YOU SHOULDMill
FOR THE RICORD.TNli
8!:A.TIIIUT SIIOIII,D BIAQ
"1:N-'fIBW Of i&R&£1J GtJIDELIN&'SON IA:?e
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J..S AMIIIDll)e THI CAIADill
OOVBRNMEIT
IS COICERHBDAT THELACK OF DIFORMATIOI
GIVEN TO THE IATO COUICIL BI THE TRIP ARTITI POWIRS
01 PARALLELPOLITICAL COITIIGDCI
PLANNDIG A.NDII
AGREEINGTO THI APPROVALOF THE BERCOI/MARCONPLANS
IN PRIICIPLE
AID FOR PLANNINGPURPOSES THE CDN
OOVDNMENT
ASSUMES
THATIN FUTURE
THEREWILLBE
CONTIIUOUS CONSULTATION
INC OUNCIL ON A PARALLBL
CATALOGUEOF POLITICAL PLAilIS.
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000675
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THE PRIME :MINISTER
l
Berlin.
Coatiyenex
Planaiag
Last year the HATOGbllllcil iastructed
the
authorities
to prepare a catalogue of
plans for possible action by NATOforces in the
event that the efforts of the Tripartite
Powers
to maintain access to Berlin in accordance with
their own con.tingeney plus
(Live Oak} were uasuceessful.
It was agree4 that these plane were te
•• a eatalepe
and that there would be no questiea
of aay aclvance delegation of authority but rather
that the selectiea
and execution of one or •re
of
these plans would be subject to a speeifie political decision by Qovel"tllleats at the time.
NATOmilitary
These plans (copy attaohed) knolfll. as the
ancl air contingency plus)
/MARCON
(Maritille contingency plaaa) antl the Standiq
Group
appraisal of the plaas were cireulated
to KATO
mabers in the late SUllller and have been tile aubjeet
of a amber of restricted
meetings of the Couacil
in September and. October.
We have raised the
fellowing questions during the discussion in Couacil
on these plans:
BiRCON (growul
(a) We have been of the view that "the
selective
use of nuclear weapons" shc>ul4
not form part of the catalogue of Berlin
contingency plans since it appears
••• /2
000676
�- 2 -
contrary te agreed HA.TOguidelines on
nuclear strategy aad since SAGIUKhiaaelf
in hi• eoamenta oa the plan• haa expreaaed
the view that the aeleotive ue of aulear
weapoa• would achieve ao ailitary
advantage aad it is queatioaable
nether
it
would achieve the political
objective
ot deterriag the Soviet Union. While a
aaber
of other ••bera
of the Ceuacil
have agreed. with thia view it appear~_to
be the gaeral
coaa,:aaua that siace the
HATO• ilitary autaori~iea were •rigillally
asked to put· sueh a plan iR'their
catalegue and aiaee aay·or all of the plau
are subject to a speeitic,polit.ical
deciai•n by Gover•ata
at the tiae thia
particular
plan. should reaain in the catalogue. Mr.: Ignatieff' has informed us that/
we would be isolating
ourselves if we
insisted on having this item r•oved.
We
would recOlllllend that we agree to the it•
remaining in the catalogue but that whea
expressing our approval of the plans we
make a stateaent
for ~be record ~reaaiag
the view that "the·aelective
use of auelear.
weapoaa~ haa ao part ia Berlin Contin4aey
Planaing but iniieatillg
that••
would aot
wish tlua view te hold up Berlia Contiagency Planaiag.
l
(b) Meat ••b•r• of the Coacil
aave
expresaei to the Tripanite
Power• their
iissatiataction
at tie lack of iafomatien oa parallel
political
aeasurea which
the Tripartite
Powers would take in ease
the Soviet Union barred access to Berlill •
••• /3
000677
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would wieh to laaow
tripartite
plan• with regard to action
in the U. If. and in case the SoTiet
Uaion aecidea to aiga a aeparate __pea••
treaty.
We wuleratuul that the Ult aad
the u. s. are williag ta cliacusa their
political
plan• ia Council but that the
French GoTer•u.t
objects.
We woul4
suggest that in making our stat•at
in
Council approTing the BBRCON/MARCON
plna,
we state that Canadiu GoTel"lllleat •••mes
1illat ill future there will be contiaw,ue
ooaslll.tatioa in Council on a parallel
eatalope
of political
plans.
The IIATO Couaeil was origiaally
asked te
appreve the BERCOH/MilOOlfplus but a aaber of MA.TO
power• inclwiing ouraelTea haTe expre•••• the Tiew tl:lat
ainee the plus are aot detailed military plans but
rather a catalogue of plans the choice ot one or more
ot which is subject to a specific political
decision
by GoTermaents, it is ditticult
to give f4r • al approTal.
It now appears to be the consensus of the Council that
a formula should be used whereby the Council will
approve the plans ia principle
and for planning purposes.
Mr. Ipatieff,
the Canadian Peraanea,
NATORepresentatiTe,
phoned this ••rniJlc to say that
this queatien will come up for ieciaion in tae NATO
Geuacil no later than Wednesday, October 31. Mr.
Ignatieff
said that he Blight be able to haTe the
aeeting postponed for a day or two but that in ·his
personal opinion, particularly
now that all other NATO
•••••rs
were in
we should. also indieate
Canadian agreement to the formula approviD.g the BDCON/
MARCON
plans "in priaciple
and for plannin& purpose•"•
acr••••t,
•••/4,
000678
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Attached to t ia memorandUlllis a copy
(°' of NATODoeuaat P0,62/61+1 paragraph 8(b) of
{!;>which CGntains 1'he text to be apprcm1d. by
t-V VA.~
Comcil.
Attached to thia aeaorancla is a
<'\,
"\
telegram which, if you agree, will be sent to
L~
the NATODelegation instructing
the Delegation
~v
to approve the plans according to the tomula
set out in Paragraph S(b) of P0/62/6~1, subject
to the uumclmeat to Paracraph S(b) {ii) whereby
the Council will approve the plans in principle
and for planning purposes.
The telegram also
instructs
the Delegation to make a stat•ent
with
regard to the "selective
use of nuclear weapons"
on the lines set out in Paragraph 2(a) of this
Memorandumand a statement on "parallel
political
contingency plans" along the lines of Paragraph
2 {b) 0£ this Memorand.lDll. The text o:r thia telegram has been cleared. with the Department o:r
National Defence.
"'~4~J',!:i-
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The Minister has seen the attached telegram and has asked that it be suaaitte4 to you
tor your apprOTal.
N. A. R.
000679
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
NATO
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Berlin Crisis / 29 OCTOBER 1962
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1962-10-29
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
A language of the resource
en
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CDTT00049
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Defence Liaison (1) Division to Campbell, "Berlin Contingency Planning,’’ 29 Oct. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 2.
BERCON plans
John Diefenbaker
Live Oak
Marcon Series