1 20 4 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5510676163b8af7106b47d6883125dca.pdf d6d02102c0d044dd8cb9c00cd6fb384a PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Korea, Canopy, and Consultation / Canada’s position / 4 DECEMBER 1950, CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO SOS EXTERNAL AFFAIRS Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1950-12-04 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00069 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Canadian Ambassador to the United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs WA-3124, 4 Dec. 1950, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4758, file no. 50069-C-40, part 1. atomic war Hume Wrong Korea Lester Pearson https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/7179f35bf0e23e1f1658715b21ef8d13.pdf 3b218b61ef127baff91ee9b3a98bd925 PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Korea, Canopy, and Consultation / Truman’s Speech / 1 DECEMBER 1950 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1950-12-01 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00063 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Memorandum for the Minister, "The Bomb," 1 Dec. 1950, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4758, file no. 50069-C-40, part 1. Atomic Energy Commission Attlee Chalk River Combined Policy Committee Dana Wilgress Korea Louis St. Laurent UN https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/bc697ad832d5f8fdab6d135aabbd72d4.pdf 5a058b66637c386468e147dc8b961a12 PDF Text Text orJJ✓~b) ¥ / ~\9~~, ' ·"~ \--· f( -1ot ::;/t(/.-?..~ "7;,Y. j.~f.' ...... SECURI?:LASS~~ATION ~~sr~·~ l'-sS\:, !'li>, ;; -. ,· 'I ~• '• En. l No••• Despatch r-----=D.aa..at..e. '··.March . .22., .195-4 •.. · ...... FROM: ~--_-_ TO: ~~~ -~ ere nee •.•. a:.-::~-~lject: ..... W'-- ~!'.~ ~ • D _-:-\ , . -:------ _ \ ~/ . C:anad,i.an ·/4_¥'!,' ~~ S E C R E T '\}~ "'.~ .-ft."J . Ambassador, Canadi~ Embassy, WASHINGTON,D. C. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA Our. . Ue spa;t. ch. . ~.o•.. ll.? ..Q f ...JM WH'Y.. A?,.. ~.9.? It , ................. Iloite.d . .States ~ ✓4 ~ \l.. D~.f.enc~.. f.cfl-;l<;Y.• ...................................... . ,✓ :-----1 _rr. ___ , Copies Re £erred To .............. . No. of Enclosures \..: '5 ...:J........... . Post File No ............... Public interest in the United States has been focused more sharply on the country's new defence strategy in the past two weeks than~ any time since the new Administration took office. On the domestic political front Mr. Stevenson and Vice President Nixon debated the merits of the "new look"; within the Administration there were evidences of disagreement between Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, and General Ridgway, the Army Chief of Staff, on the role assigned to the Army under the new strategy; last but by no means least the international implications of the new strategy were underlined by Mr. Pearson's timely remarks to the National Press Club in Washington on March 15. Mr. Dulles, who, because of the demands on his time, has not been in Washington for any length of time in the past two months, was therefore faced at his press conference on March 16 with a number of searching questions on the~ new defence strategy of the United States. You will ~ remember that it was Mr. Dulles speaking on behalf of the President and the Administration, who described for the public's benefit the principles underlying the new defence strategy in his address to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on January 12. Mr. Dulles' answers to the questions asked at the press conference (copies of the transcript of which are attached) taken together with his article in the forthcoming issue of Foreign Affairs (our despatch No. 503 of March 18) go a long way towards clarifying the Secretary's remarks of January 12 and might even be considered to restate the policy outlined by Mr. Dulles at that time. ~ 2. While we do not wish in this l·etter simply to repeat the words of Mr. Dulles which are contained in the attached transcript, we do think that more than usual attention should be devoted to this press conference. From what I .ir. Pearson told us of his private conversations with Mr. Dulles last week it seems that Mr. Dulles made many of the points at this press conference whi~h he made in those talks. We believe that it might also be useful to relate the views of Mr. Dulles·as revealed in the attached transcript to the comments which we made on the new United States strategy in our despatch under reference. 11 . • •• 2 I I 000065 ( �c.. 195tiHAR2~-- ntl 11· 3 2 . ~-. ., 11) l ,, ,-·' J '000066 �-2- 3. Much of the domestic criticism which has been made of the "new look" has centered on the apparent decision of the Administration, as revealed in Mr. Dulles speech of January 12, to depend to a larger extent on the massive retaliatory power of the United States and less on the traditional method of meeting aggression on the ground where it occurs. It seems to us that in his most recent reply to questions from the press, Mr. Dulles has shifted his emphasis, if not his ground. He asserted that he had not meant to suggest in his January 12 tspeech that the United States would in every circumstance /retaliate instantly with its massive retaliatory power, i.e. atomic and thermonuclear weapons, but that what the United States had to build up was its capacity to retaliate instantly. The questi9n of whether or not the United States chose to use that capacity was a matter, he said, which would have to be dealt with in accordance with the facts of each situation. While Mr. Dulles' analysis of what he meant to convey in his earlier speech is valid, if one looks closely at the text of that speech, he must certainly be aware that it was not unreasonable that those who did not have access to his innermost thoughts might miss this fine distinction. With this latest explanation of the point a major element of the United States "new look" assumes much less novel proportions. According to Mr. Dulles, the Administration is simply determined to keep United States defence capacity in constant readiness so that if it is necessary to meet major aggression the United States will not require two or three years to get ready to retaliate. This is a reasonable decision for the Administration to take since in fact on two occasions the United States has been unprepared to shoulder its responsibility immediately in the face of major world conflicts; but when explained in these terms it seems to be a much less startling decision than Mr. Dulles' earlier speech would have led observers to believe had been made by the Administration. If observers are still left with some doubt in their minds on the question made famous by the New Yorker, "which paper do you read", !',tr. Dulles excuses himself from further clarification again by the eminently reasonable argument that one should not tell the enemy in advance exactly where, how and when one plans to retaliate. t 4. Mr. Dulles did go on to assure his questioners that the new United States strategy was not confined in the event of an act of aggression to the two channels of an all-out war or no resistance at all. He said that in indicating that there would be less emphasis. on local defence power, the Administration had simply made clear its intention not to be forced to meet aggression at the particular place and by the particular means which the aggressor selected. There were areas of importance to the aggressor--which were not necessarily either the front line of aggression or the capitals of Peking or Moscow~~where United States retaliation might be effective. What Mr. Dulles seems to be saying indirectly is what Admiral Radford referred to in our recent meeting of consultation as the "deep tactical offensive" use of United States atomic weapons (c.f. para. 35 of our report) ••• 3 000067 • �l -3Admiral Radford at that time explained his terms to mean the use of new weapons in a fashion which was something short of strategic bombing and something more than tactical bombing in front of one's own troops. We would surmise that what is in the minds of both Mr. Dulles and Admiral Radford is the sober realization that United States ground troops (and possibly even the ground troops of all the Western allies) can never match the potential enemy, Russian or Chinese, in numbers and that it is fatal therefore to plan to meet the potential enemy man for man on the ground. The United States aim seems to be to convince its potential enemies that their commitment of ground forces in any act of aggression will not necessarily lead to a United States response in kind. Mr. Dulles freely admitted the element of bluff in this strategy (although, of course, he does not use that word) when he told his questioners that the capacity to retaliate is in itself the great deterrent to aggress~on. "1 believe that the original Korean attack would not have occurred if it had not been assumed either that we would not react at all or if we did react would react only at the places and by the means that the aggressors chose." r 5. Another set of questions to 1~1r. Dulles were directly related by the questioners to Mr. Pearson's speech of March 15, and concerned United States consultation with its allies before a decision was taken to retaliate in any particular circumstance. Mr. Dulles replied in forthright terms that there would certainly be consultation in most of the cases that he could conceive of, for it was impli~it in the security system which has been built up among the Western allies that it operates only with the consent and acquiescence of all the partners who have helped to provide the facilities "which create a sort of international police system". We understood from Mr. Pearson that Mr. Dulles assured him privately that in his own mind a most important element of the United States capacity to retaliate was the whole-hearted co-operation of the allies of the United States and especially of those upon whose territory important United States bases existed. I think we can be certain that in Mr. Dulles mind at least, and probably too in the mind of the President, there is no lack of understanding ef tne need fo~0 ~~Il§tant and intimate consultation/ijith ~t~n~~~~r ti!!I§s on matters which concern the possible use of atomic weapons and the consequent likelihood of the outbreak of a major war. 6. Finally Mr. Dulles dealt directly and in the circumstances, we believe, quite courageously, with questions concerning the President's ability to_order instant retaliation without prior consultation with Congress. At his press conference on March 17- the President himself said that he had no intention of violating the Constitution in any action he might have to take with respect to the outbreak of war and that he thought "it was implicit in the Constitution that the President had to act against sudden unexpected aggression" (and by inference without prior consultation with Con:.;ress) • • • • •4 000068 �./e / · __ -4If one bears in mind that the Bricker controversy on the issue of the limitations on the President's power is very much in the minds of Congress, Mr. Dulles' replies on this occasion can only be taken as stemming from a strongly held conviction on the part of the Administration. Mr. Dulles gave it as his opinion that in any instance of aggression against members of NATOor against allies covered by the Rio Pact the President would have the authority to order instant retaliation even though in every circumstance he might not choie to exercise that authority without consulting Congress. Mr. Dulles admitted that the Indo-China situation would not be covered by French membership in NATO, but he said that he did not wish to imply that the United States should do nothing if the Chinese Communists with regular forces should cross the frontier into Indo-China. He was of the further opinion that the President did not have similar discretion in situations which would be covered only by the United Nations Charters. He refused to be drawn into a discussion of what he called the "twilight zonen of the President's power under the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief to take military action without a declaration of war by Congress. 7. The publication of Mr. Dulles' opinions dealt with in this letter constitutes an important bench-mark in the development of the new United States strategy. We have the impression that the events mentioned in paragraph 1 above have led to the necessity for a clearer thinking out of the Administration's broad objective, in this field. While Mr. Dulles' press conference will serve to clarify the issues further the subject is by no means finished with, and we expect to hear a good deal more of the "new look" both in and out of Congress before this year is over. r \ l 000069 �.. ~ ... >: . ·, _..., __ MARCH16, 1954 fID~rP/i\0011'i~~IJ ®rF~ifIM~ .'l?®IBl ii'COrn rPOOrn~~ PRESS ANJ?.RADIO NEWSCONFERENCE,TUESDAY,MARCH" 16, 1954 SECRETARYDULLES: I am glad to be back in Washingon,. aga:tn after quite· a considerable period of absences. ·L.have .two or three· statements which I would like to make before I subject myself to questio~s. I might say I ~ave just.come from the meeting of the Canadian Foreign Minis.ters and Ministe~s of Economic~, et detera. There is a meeting going on, We will have a com~unique i~sued this aft~rnoori sp l ~ill not want t6.discuss this at this ·particular.press conference. (See Press Release No. 140 ~ statement of the Secretary on the death of Harold B. Hinton). · ' I .have a· statement to make about the Caracas Conference, which ~ill be available at the close -0f this pres~ conference in mimeographed forni. · ( See Press Re lease No. 13'8) · · ·r will _be glad to answer any questioris. Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please give us'.the recon6il1ation of, one, the concept of instant retaliatioh; two, the concept of consultation with our allies; and, three, the concept of. involvement in war-ortly by ~n Act of Cong~ess? · A. I assum~ your reference· to "inst 9 nt retaliation" posedly ta_ken from ·an address of mine. . · · Q. And one. by the Vice~Presid~rit Saturday night. of the United . ' States is sup~ en ' '· A. I cannot. oomment on what the .Vice-President saidJ but I will be glad to comment 0n w~at I said~ If you will read my address of January 12, you will see what I advocated the~e was a "ca pad i ty" to retaliate fns ta ntly. In ;no pla·ce did I say : we would ~~~talia·te instantly, although we might indeed retali• ·atci ihstaritly under cortditions that call .for that. The e~~entia1 thing is to have the capacity to. retaliate fnstantly. It is lack of that capacity which 1ri ~Y opinibn ·accounted for such disasters. as Pearl· Harbor. · If we .had had the capacity to. ret~liate instantly~ ih my.opinion, there would have been no Pearl Harpor .. But:it· to0k about.four years to retaliate against Tokyo .... I believe we should have that-capacity ·to retaliate instantly. N~w, the question of whether or net you retaliate instantly and whefe y6u retaliate is a matter to be dealt with in accordance with the facts of each situation. I take it few would have any question but what if there were an attack upon the United States there would be instant retaliation. You have questions 000070 �' . • • NOo 14~ e~erit questions of retaliation in the ,bi:a violation Ot' a~.. attack upon·a member of the North Atlantic Treaty and upon other count1~1es with whom we have. treaty relationships!' ~ - ... The que~tion of circumstances under which you retaliate, where· ~{OU retaliate,/ how quickly ~rou retaliate, is a · matter which has to be dealt with in the. light of the facts of each particula_r case. One• thing I want to make clear beyond.the.possibility of doubt is that I don 1 t believe you should tell the enemy in advance just where, how, and when you plan to retaliate~ The whole essence of the program is that the action should be an action of our choosing and he is not' to lmow in .advance what it is,j and that uncer~ tainty on his part is a lrny to the success of the policy. Q. Sir# if I may pursue thato You mentioned in the event of an attack upon a member of the North Atlantic Treaty_ Alliance ...-you say what would then be instant retaliationg Does that mean :1.n the event the concept of 1nvolvement.1n war only by Act of Cong1•ess does not apply where there is an attack either upon the United States or upon a member of the alliance of wh~ch we are a part? Ae It means in all respects the United States acts in accordande wit~ its constitutional processes. ·There is no way in the world in which we can get away, or want to get away 9 or intend to get away from our constitutional processes~ How long that will take 6 I dontt know. It did not take very long after Pearl Harbo.r to get a declaration of war. The trouble is it did not do any immediate good to get a declaration of war because we did not have the capacity to do any~ thing with it. I have never advocated~ and nobody else in the Administration has advocated any departure from constitutional processes •. ·Jhe North Atlantic Treaty has provided that an attack against; one of those states shall be deemed the same as an attack against the United States~ We have other treaties with language which is not precisely the same as that. Just what action by the Congress is required is a matter to be decided in each case 8 as it always has been a matter to be decided in each case. The fact that you advocate having a capacity for instant retaliatio~ does not change your constitutional processeso It means we don 1 t have to wait for four .yea:r-s;after somebody attacks us before we are 1n a position effectively to h1t back. · Q,, Sir• 000071 �PR 142 Sir,.~q9es:.th.~ f~(>td>hat:·;the··Senate;;t>:f' the .Urtited;States has rat+fJ~4··.tl1~.t:N<;>r>1;11 ··A.ti.l-~nt!c Alliance mean in the: event of an attack on an ·Ally''we, .could,: within constitutional procedures, retaliate against that attack without further action in the Congress? :; · · ·" · Q. A. '.Pn~ti::Ls,:a:matter :which, 'as you,know,.iwas de'bated>ve-x•y: thorQi+.tshlY.·.in ·the Congres.s and· in ·the ·s-er.:ate ~ At the time · that ·Treaty was: .tatif:ted:··I was ..in ·the ~s:enate ~: :rt is my- • opinion that trie provisions of the Treaty, which state that an attack upon one of the Allies is :the :s.:ame· as· an:;attack'- ·. upon all -- or in other words that an attack upon one of our Allies is the same as an :.attack -up•ori the· Uni t-ed states\ That is also, I ma.y say, in the Rio Fact. That gives the Pr:e.eJd·ent:.:of:.•,:the.United ~-s:tates·, :tne· same:.authorit"y ;t'o '.react·' as he would have if the United States were attacked. . -~ - .:Thank ,-.you,;,:_sir;·: ;c •:,-·• > . ·:: -: Q. A. ':w:e:the~/~~- ·wo~ld~Se' ,..~tl~;t:_~~u:th~;·i:ty .._1~..eve;; ·cas~. ~:s: a ; · ;'.:. rqc3:tJ:;er, :for h,is '.-df.s:·cr.e.ti.on.,::.ilnsmy· 0p'inion; he' has· ·it'?· ..., < :. < • Q. He has the right? A.,,.,.-cln rnY,.'OP.ini-on:.:'he;·Jiaa.the '.right,.;.•i'•Thatr dc.e.s,:no:t··'nec·e:ss'aii1ly .-:, mean in all cases he would use the right witnout; co:nsult;atkin :': by Congress~ It would depend on the gravity of the attack, whethe.~- Jt, •Wa$.:rob.::v;i0:u:s.<the a.t;ta~h;··me_an:t:ral.'1.;,:o:ut.: w:ar_;,wti1ch > inev.;i.tably ,,.,,o.u'l:d:, i.nvoJve ..un:'.' Many ,mat.te·rs ::W01.(Ld.:ha'vei·.to ·:be>·;.··• considei'.e;d .:and:;dou:btle:ss.: .:wou,ld;:be ~·011sider.ed. '.by, the: Pr-e,sid'ent .'. : in ..qe:t.~r.m:i.n~ng,~:w:ne::t;liev·co:ri no,t>.·tcLuse ...his'.•di scre·t1onary ·-.•· · ··, · · authority. 1 Mr. Secret.ar.y:;\ qi±ght;-1' r.:ai.se ·a.-._question·.on- anbth~r- word. in the reference to capacity to retaliate. The sentence ends: 11 by means and at places of our choosing. 11 Now, Mb:. -Pear:s:ori raised the question whether the word 11our 11 meant'the United Sta,te:s., or.'::wne:t.her d:-t.:meant _;the. f.re~' c·orrimun,ity :o:c. natfons'.". ''. Q. ... ' ·:·: ::.... : 'Cl > ,••, ,,; .., ;:·. ••,•:- '\ A•\ •:.•1·. think {that, the sentence ;_iff",reas-ortably: ·.c:lear.:·,) ;Wou:1a:,; _. you .read_: the ,who;le seht.ence :if'>you: ..have ·±t: :before yoi:.i~ · :•.· , ··:·: ...... ~-- .. - ... , • ! , ; ; ••• .~_; :: :.-·. : ; :_;_::•,: -;--··.- •· :: ,., .. ::.__ ,-':.·: '<: .• '/• ·:::., , •:<; Ji,: .:;__ ~_ :::.: .. ·.?.:::(: ,.=, _, :.:. "·\·.1..,:··:_-,_·~ ,::. ·,•... ,1., -~_:,.~:·.:.::-!··.·: __ •; :.:~:.·. ;_: ~.:.- ~ •• ; . ·-..' '· . •.. . ~;- '. -~ <:..r_; .! --=· :·. ;:_.i'. . ~; )_ .. ... ..-:. :.·- . !~~:-· :·r ·_"·;:·~ ..~: -_....;··..: : .. , ··.1 · ' .-;:,,·-,': : ·: !~: ,. :. •' . . ~- . . .. ,",:,· ', <i ·-' ',•·-_; ·:·.,::,_:.' ~ ~_:'' .....:, . ';' -::·~ '·/:'.t .! ; ;,_-_; ~:;· , • .j . • '} ... : ••.• : .•-.. : ~- ·~ :· : i_: .•, :· '·' ~ ·::. ·.. · .' ~--· :. .~ . ' . . ,.' , :<,.·. ·: : Q~ ·.·Yes,•:,, ,_:·. _:;: , , :~ :-:.-~'.:-~L::·. ::· 1·- • .,. ,. • •• 'i : ,:.i... .'- - _.... ;, ••• • .' ••• ·,· __:_·_ ·.:.:_- _;_· •..... .. · : ' • ..·: •'•,: ,•;,-•,•,·. . J•.' ·.. 000072 �. "" 4 , PR 142 ··. ' ,,. .r Yes. ,,(reading):. IIThe. basic .. decision was to depend· primarily upon a great capac{i ~y ~o .retaliate, instantly, by means; ::and at pla.ces of our. 'choosing O" Q. A. _ .Do-es':.1t use the word· If free world".? Q. .There were two· sentences~ One is: "The basic decision -.::" was to depe:nd •p1.;imar11y.tipon a great. capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing .."·· ·. · A. Is that the whole.sentence? Q. That is the end of th~ senterice" A. Yes. I would like to have the first part of the sentence. first part is: · 1iBut : beforJ ~iJ..:1t.~ry planning could ... be :Chang.ea~~·-the Preside __nt a·na. hia .iidv~l3er.s,as represented by the .National Security Council, J-iad ,tO t·alr_e..some basic policy decisidns~. This has been· done~: T6~ ~a£ic.decision was to · depend primarilY upo1~-•' a:"tt1~~at p·apacity >k·o:, ~etaliate:, instantl:/, by means and at places'- \>f'. our. choos.+ng/ 1 ·, There was another ': · sentence. ·· · '· · · ··· · · · · · Q.. 0 The I think there was a ..senterc~::L iµ.: tl;:le.itex.t there about· the free world·. · : ··· · · A. whi-cih spoke·. -~~t ,in tnat particular Paragr~ph., There is an earlier·· .... sentence -to this part which says~ "The way to·,deter aggre's.;;.: ·::: sion is ,,for. the free community to be will;i.ng and able to , respond vigorously at places and .with means of its own ~hocis--~ i Dg II . . . . ,. ·, ' Q~ "' ~ A. I thought that Q. Which is it? was what you wei-•e reading from., A, Well, it would depend a good deal upon the circumstances. 'If there were an attack upon the United States and if we had the capacity to respond from our own bases, we would certainly do that It is .:1 I think.~ we 11 mown that the bases which we have in foreign countries are in general not usable as a matter of law and as a practical matter are not usable except with the consent of the countries where the bases are. For example, the bases which are available to our Strategic Air Force in Great Britain are not usable as a base of attack except with the consent of the British Governmento The same is true in general with all our foreign bases. Therefore, it is implicit in our security sy~tem that it operates with the consent and acquiescence of the other partners who have helped to provide the facilities which create a sort of international police system. · · Q. If I 6 000073 �. . -5- PR 142 Q. ·rf I might go on. There were two other worps which . Mr. Pearson raised. a· question to in relation :to the point · which' you have just made, the one being "instantly" and the · other be.ing 11means. 11 . · Does this mean the choosing of means would lie with the free community or only with the United States? w.ould there: be consultation? · A. Yes, there would certainly be consultation in most of the cases .that I can conceive of. ·I might say that I wrote, some weeks ago, an article for Foreign Affairs, which is in substance a. somewhat more pollsFiecf,;-Y-hope",;'"'"restate.ment of my spEH;1chwhich was .made before the Council of Foreign Relations, whioh publishes Foreign Affairs. That l did while I was flying back from BerlTn~---Y-under~"'"tand that is being released for publication tomorrow ipNew York by the magazine B orei!?a£ Af..fai:rs., That will elabo:;."'ate to so;ne extent the thesis which I expr·essed in my address of January 12. 1 Q~ I would like to ask another question on this subject. There has been some discussion and speculation to the effect that reliance on the capacity to retaliate instantly as a ma;Jor part of your defensive system would mean 11 in the case of a limited challenge in some remote area.., you would have the choice either of an all-out war 'or> no resistance .at all •. A.· That is not a correct analyi:is of the thesis at all. ··Let us ta.ke, for example.s the declaration which was made by the 16 powers in relation to Korea; which is one of the ill~strations I made in my spe~chi It has been stated there that if aggression should be resumed that·the reaction would not necessarily be confined to Korea. Now what does that mean? That .does not mean necessarily that there will be an effort made. to. drop· atomic bombs on Peiping or upon Moscow. It does mean that thsre are areas of importance to the aggressors in that vicinity which may have an industrial or strategic relationship to the operation which would no longer be wl.1.atGeneral MacArthur called a "privileged sanctuary". I :cannot imagine any policy more futile or more apt to create war than to adopt the policy that you will only react at the particular place, and by the means the aggressor selects. If anything would ever put a premium onaggression,· it would .be that. We want to' take away that premium on aggress~on. ·· · Q. Mr •. $ecretary 000074 �. 6 ":"" - ..:. :PR 142 , . -·.:. ,.· .. ' ' '·· Q •.. Mr. Secretary that speech,; there 1 while. we a;re annotating.' was a reference :tn there to a ;l;es$er reliance ..:on local. defense, and some at:estion has been raised-as-to whether:that meant-· less reliance on. defense. by local,: :i,.ndigenous. forces which , i we might aid~ for example, or less reliance on local actions by jmerican forces, in local sectora,of,tt~ long ~rontt .· -, . . say A ... What I meant there~ when. I say. rir•1 ; L m:tght. ihat tha~ spe?ch wa~ -not jtist a .personal speech 9: ,.-was-that, 1-f you .. have the capacity to. str.il{e-. an. aggressor at ,-the; points _which wil;J: h~rt him,. _the dete:r.re.nt power of, that is .sufficient so : that you clo not. need. 'bo have loc·a1 · defens-e ~a-ll aromid. · the : :, .. 2Q.,__ OOO-miJ.e ,perlm~ter of. the ..orbit of the _Soviet World· 'bacau-se your oe-terrent- power.i, to ·a large extent.,o,reinforces. your: · -· · local power- so that you .do- not. h_ave to depencLup_oh .havirig;'fn·. place forces in being sufficient to stop an attack in its tracl}s anywhere •where ..it. c.ould · occur because you rely .pr:LmarllY upon deterring that attack,. not necess.arily upon .being able to stop ·1 tJI. · -· . ., ' . ·,: , With, the Soviet-Chinese. Commun:is·tWor-la.~..:.with .:its ; . 8QQ.,·OOO" 00Q :Pe-Qpl:e occupying .a ,central_ :location., .with ·±ta vast land armies--it would be utterly impossible to have local .oe:fenses 'all ·.around ,that -.20,.000-mi.le orbit. suffic.i.ent. ,_ to stop .any ·blow that. might come at whereve.r they might -c::.7'-i,::roa'e to rr)ake i.t o., :So that YOU: have got ,t-0 f:i.nd some· way whereby . that _type of :local ground defense -:can be supplemented o And: ,.the wc;1yto suppl~_me_nt 1t ·~Lsto· have:, a. capa:city t.o .re.tali.ate •at,_: . times, pla,ce~; and witp me·thods .:of yo1...1r.ownc,ho:Qsing. • • . .., Now. tr;i_a.t doesn - ··'· • ' ., • ·• ~ ~ . -. • .. i. • •. • . • t. mean ..tha_t' you. El.l.iminate wholly,· by ,any .· means,. l.9nd forces·e -It means you, d:0 not nece;1;:1sari1y mal-~e them. y_our pr:irnaPy reliance because., as. ·against the ~ind .of . , . danger ~hich ,:;;o;,:(•f-Jatens.,:l,t if:; :impos·sible t.o match your potential enemy gt ,all points on :a -bases of man-for~-man; gun-fo:rgun and tank-for-tank. If we try to do that, we are -go:ing to go "bust". ~ I '- ' . qecretary., if· I may go back. to one point of yours, .yoµ said that in Europe the Pre.side.nt had the same qU1;;11or-ityunder the NATOa.nd. Rio Treaties ·to retaliate if the United States. was at-tack~clo; Well:i,.·.last WGdnesda.y he seemed to give a pledge that he would not use that because he said that there would be no involvement in war without Congressional approval. . , ·Q_. Mr. A. But if a different the. Senate matter. has given approval in advance., that is Q~ Well, 000075 �. . ·, , ... 7 ,_ PR 142 · Q. Well, the specific case ·was Indochina. what some of us were wondering about. , . . . - :t-think that was A •. Yes, .there has been no ·congressional approval given in· advance of ·a war in Indcichina to which the United Statea would be a pa1~ty o , He certainly did not me·an,' I think, to 'imply that if the United States was attacked, and if Congress was not in session~ that he would wait unt11·congress was called back into session and make a declaration of war bef·ore we would react to a bombing attack on New York City or Detroit or Washington. I think if any President waited under those circumstances, he would certainly not be carrying out the will of either the Congress 01 the American people. 1 Qa S11;'.!fI'm a little dense on this matter of Indochina_. Would you clarify this for me? France is our ally in tbe No1th Atlantic Alliance.. French tI•oops are fighting in Indochina.. If the :Chinese Communists,· with the r·egular forces· fr.om Chtna, ·should cross the f1"ontie1"' into Indochina 'and .. attack the armed· foi ces of our. all:\,, France» would our responsibilities or obligations unde1" the NATO allianc·e come into force? If not~' why? 1 1 A.· No, they will not because the NATOalliance does not apply to any- part of the·, world: except .the North Atlantic area as it 1s defined· in the :ti~eaty That definition in the. nipin i's confined_ to Europe/ al thou'gl) it does cover a portion of French North Africa-·;;..I ·think Algeria is cov~red by it. _ But in the main 8 it -covers ·oi1lythe- Eutiopean area, including a slight bit of North Africa:;·and, of course, the Asiatic portion of Turkey. : .•: : · · · ., · <I .... : f'f : Q. Mr. Secretary, ·: .., : _:_. ' . ~ inthe·co11text-::.. A. Now, I don I t mean to,· imply -that if the event you spoke of happened, we should -do nothing. I myself have sa•io that I believed that if that happened 1-'le should do something. But that doesn 1 t mean we- should- db it without Congressional app:toval or consultation. In the context of the 'ans·wer you just gave abo1:1t Detroit 1 or. Chi'cago ih referring to ·an- earlier answer gave, would it be fair to say that the.President has power to react in Europe in the case of a bombing of or Paris? Q. A. Yes, New York., you : · the same London, sir. Q. Sir, would it be accurate then to say that instant retaliation in effect is recognition of the restraining effect of the possession of atomic weapons--the deterrent power? Is there a distinction between instant retaliation and deterrent? It is a deterrent. A. Yes., 000076 �PR 14~ - -8- A. Yes, I have said that the capacity to retaliate powerfully and instantly is, in my opinion, the great deterrent, and that when you are faced with the kind of potential enemy, or. With the assets that this potential enemy has, I believe that a deterrent of that sort is the most effective way there is of preventing a war. Now I can imagine a 'different world condition where reliance might properly be placed upon other methods, and other means, but, as far as the present world condition·is concerned, that capacity to retaliate powerfully at places of our choosing 1s. in my opinion, what will serve as a powerful deterrent to war. I believe that the original Korean attack would not have occurred if it had not been asswood either that we would not react at all, or if we did react would react only at the place and by the means that the aggressors chose. I believe .. that the Allied Sixteen-Powei" Decla.ration, which now operates in the case of Korea, will probably pre~ent ~ny rene0al of Communist aggression there~ Mr. Se~•retary, in order to clarify something~ in my own mind at least, is it your understanding that the President's right to order instant retaliation applies only in the c~se of an attack either on the United States or another North Atlantic Treaty power because of the understanding that Congress has given? Q. A. The United States has two treaties that I referred to: One is the so-called Rio Treatt of Reciprocal Assistance, which contains the provision that an attack upon one is the same as an attack upon all; that same provision is found in the North Atlantic Treaty. In my opinion -- whatever it is worth as a lawyer, and as one who was in• the Senate when the North Atlantic Treaty was adopte.d -- I believe that that authorizes, is a consent in advance to the President reacting against an attack upon one of our allies named in those _· treaties in the same way that he would be authorized to react in the event of an attack upon the United states itself. I repeat, however, that the fact that the President has that Constitutional ·authority as the result of those tr(~aties in my opinion does not necessarily mean that he wou:Ld use it. He would use his discretion, I think, as to wh~ther or not to react instantlj, or whether to get eithe~ a formal-declaration of war by the Congress, or whether to have consultations which satisfied himself that that was the will of the Congress. That would be discretionary with the President. Mr. Secretary, doesn't the President under the United Nations Charter itself? Q. have that same power A. In 000077 �. . -9- .. Ao • ....~• . In my· opin.ion, ' , PR 142 rio (>· Does he not have the power under st:ttution as Commander in Chief? the United Q., A. . •:, Stat~$ C.on:-- To do ·:what? ' ' .. . To take military Congres~? Qe a decla1.,a.tion without action of war by \ ..• WellJ now you are raising the question which hae be~n debated ·ever since our nation was formedc There are certain~. ly areae \'lithj_n which a Pres:tdent can' act .:... c~;r•tainly are~s in which it has been cuatomar;v for Presidents act -without any formal action by the Congress,c There is a twilight zone thereo Nobody has ever attempted t<f defj_ne accurately that twilight zone, a~d I, snal,1 p.qt attempt :I:.t.i herea , , . .. :· .•. · - .. :,.·:;_., ,'.· /,'. '•";" ., A,. ·to at .one po:tn'tth~i"'k_-~r~u·· s~ia ::it1~ connect,ion witb con~~ltation t6 cbnstilt iri'.mo~t ias~i that-~ou -0an con~ ceive: of. II Would you 'c·onsideri ~ay~ an' attack 'upon the northe;r'n part of Cap.aqa _an ~ttacl{. upon the ...Uni,ted,., States$ and; ·would you cons\,i:t-t wt.th bth_e':i-•NATO·cfr.nintries '.l:iefor,e-·you· reacted to that at'tack?' '· .r ;:·,;:::-·:·'· ,. Q., Mr. Secretary, ;. ;_ ..• • ~. • ' .,. • I • ,:··, ' . l A. I do not think that: it· 1s wis'e . or· appropriate to try .to·. answer a hypothetical question of that sort. In the first . place, it is impossible to determine .in adyance what.all of the su..rrounding circumstances. are,.·and .it would certainly · .. also not be advisable to give any forel{nowledge to a potential_ enemy as to whether or not he would have any time between. his attack and having to suffer the consequences it. of Mr. Secretary, ference? Q. how are plans coming for the Geneva Con- A. The tnformation I got when I got.back to.my desk yesterday was that there is some evidence ,in .Moscow of_ delaying. tact:,-cs with respect to the practical arrangements for ,se.tting up the conference. There s,eenis -t;o )?e, ,an:.,i111pr'es_s.~on _t;~a:t the. Chinese C'ommunists are riot 'eptireTy' happy',.over, ...the:.:ar_range~ ments which were made for them be:Caus(f -they·h~d e~pected, hoped to be able to come to the conference·a:s cine.of the socalled Big Five. r.t'hat, of c.0J1rse_,. Wq.S: de:qied :to the,m and i:t. would see1n<as though the .{36Jiet ':pEf, ..... h'aps havef- got some expla:ining to do. :·And· the result iff.·at. leas;t :the:re .are some present de lays • ' · ·· · · "· · · · ' 1 1 ,._ ..., 000078 �PR 142 Sir, have you reached a conclusion John P. Davies? Q. yet in the case of A. No* The situation in tpe Davie$ case is this: I went over the very full summary of the evidence consisting of about 200 rather closely-t-y;ped pages before I went to Caracaa. It seemed that there were some points which called for explanation, and the lt;1,wyerin.the Security Office formulated a request for e~lanationa. Those were given to Mr.. Davies, and his counsel. They have now made a reply. The reply 1~ being studied in the Security Office, and I am waiting for their recommendations to me, or report to me, on the basis of those questions an,d the responses made by Mr. Davies. Mr. Secretary, ha.s . · the Soviet Foreign Off ic_e formally. informed you of the·dissatistaction of the Chinese Communist$, with the arrangements? Q. A. No, that is inference, Mr. Secretary, twenty-three Japanese fishermen suffered radio-active burns as a result of the latest explosion? And today the Japanese Foreign Minister said that Japan might ask compensation from the United States. I was wondering if you have any comment on the incident and upon his statement. Q. A. No, I have no comments to make. I only heard of it today·. We had a report from our Embassy in Tokyo, which I got this morning~ But I have no information as to how this unfortunate accident came about --assuming that the facts are as reported. Mr. Secretary, a report was published in London last week-end to the effect that the United States has told France that this country would offer economic inducements to Red ... China to end the Indochina war. Is that correct? Q. A. It is not correct. Mr. Secretary~ does the October 8 decision our final postion with respect to a. settlement Q. still r~present in Trieste? A. You have caught me a little bit unprepared on that· question. I have not had the opportunity to check up-I'm bound to say- ...with the developments in the Trieste matter since I got back from Caracas. So you will have to Just excuse me on that one. Mr. Secretary, Senator Dirksen said he would discuss. with you immediately upon your re:turn from C~acas'the matter of freeing German confiscated property. Would you te.JJ.__u_a .. wa..t..~.QPl,p.1on is? Should it be returned soon? -· Q. ' A. I 000079 �. . -11- PR 142 A. I don't care to express an opinion on that. I have an appointment with Senator Dirksen, and I expect to go over the matter with him, and until I have done that I do"''t care to express any opinion. Q. Mr. secretary, are the delaying tactics on the preparations for Geneva such that they might delay the conference itself? A. That is conceivable, Q. Thank you, sir. yes. Henry Suydam * * * State--PB, Wash., D.C. 000080 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 22 MARCH 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-03-22 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00025 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Message from Canadian Ambassador to the United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 22 Mar. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. Indo-China John Foster Dulles Korea NATO Nixon Stevenson https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/7c192127d219eb5c677c9ad095623b54.pdf 3e88a76cb8b086a2a88a3b376004dae8 PDF Text Text . .. DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. ( DUPLICATE~ DESPATCH UNCLASSIFIED TO: THESECRETARY OF STATEFOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA. THE CANADIAN AMBASSADORS! FROM; I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II I I I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I • I I I I. I I I I I I I I ~ I I I I I I . 503 No:. It I It I I I I I I I I I I Date: ............... I I I I II I I I I I I I I t It I It I March 18, 1954 , ............... . WASHINGTON,DoCo I 111::f erellce: I Security: .......................... I I I • I I I I I I I I •••••• I I I I I I I • I I I I I I I I I I I ••••••••• Article I I I I I I ••• I I I I I •••• I •• I I I •••••••• I by the U.So Secretary i I I &closures: , , ..... I .... I ,· in Foreign i , • , , • , •• , , ••• Air or Surface Mail:, ... ,.,,.,,.,,,,,,. of Sl.abject1, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ~, ~ , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , State , ..... P9st File No:. .... , .. ~ ........ Affairs I I I I t I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I t I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ~ I I I I I I, I I I I I I I I I I I I I I , , .. , , . , , Ottawa File No, References I enclose five copies of Department of State press release No. 139 of March 16, 1954, containing the text of the article prepared by the Secretary of State for the April issue of Foreign Affairs. 2. In his news conference of March 16, Mr. Dulles made the following remark concerning this article: "I might say that I wrote, some weeks ago, an article for Foreign Affairs, which is in substance a somewhat more polished, I hope, restatement of my speech which was made before the Council of Foreign Relations, which publishes Foreign Affairs. That I did while I was flying back from Berlin. I understand that is being released for publication tomorrow in New York by the magazine Foreign Affairs. That will elaborate to some extent the thesis which I expressed in my address of January 12." Internal Circulation 3. _The above quotation is taken from the transcript published in the New York Times of March 17 which you will have seen, and it is perhaps of some significance that he referred to this article in connection with a question arising out of Mro Pearso_nvs speech 'Before· the National Press Clubo (Sgd.) Go de T. Glazebrook For the Ambassador. Distribution to Posts 000498 fat, l80C (Rev. 2/52) �• RESTRICTED March 24, 1954. ALL POSTS ABROAD Attached is the text of an article by the United States .Secretary of State prepared for the April issue of Foreis;n Affairs. At a news conference on March 16 1 1954, Mr. Dulles remarked that this article constituted a more polished restatement of the speech which he delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on January 12 on the long~range global policy of the Eisenhower administration. The article elabo.ra tes the thesis expressed in the speech of January 12, but contains no basic change in the main elements of the new policy. Greater emphasis is given to a collective system of defence which is "the cornerstone of security for the free nations"o This security depends upon "the cooperation of our allies" without which the United would not even be in a position to retaliate massiv,ely against the war industries of an attacking nation.· The controversial statement in the speech of January 12 concerning the basic decision of the United States National Security Council "to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and in places of our choosing" does rtot appear in this articleo In stressing the importance of local defence, however, it is stated that "the ID9.in reliance must be on the power of the free community to retaliate with great force by mobile means at places of its own choice"o Acknowledgment reshaping of the military various respects"and the reply to criticism of the defence policy: is given to the fact that "this program was misconstrued·in following points are made in "new look" in the United States a) The United States does not intend to rely wholly on large-scale strategic bombing as the sole means to deter and counter aggression; b) the program is not a move away from collective security but rather the opposite; c) the United States policy does not envisage withdrawal of large forces from abroad in the interests of mobilityo Forces in the F:ar East will be reduced in number. but the force remaining will have great striking power. If the continental nations in Europe provide "a harmonious nucleus of integrated defence" the United States would expect to maintain substantial forces in Europe$ both in support of the forward strategy of defence and for political reasons;· d) while it will be practicable by this program to reduce economic aid to United States allies, this aid will not be wholiy excluded and the Technical Assistance Program will continueo 000499 �POLICYFOR SECURITYANDPEACE The following John Foster Dulles is a~ article for ~he April prepared by Secretary of State issue of Foreign Affairs. Since World War II, the United States has faced the diff,f.cult task of finding policies which would be adequate for pecurity and peace and at the same time compatible with ·its traditions. Never before has a great nati:on been called upon to adjust its thinking and its action so radically in so short a period. During the nineteenth century the maintenance of peace and order depended largely on Great Britain, with its Navy and the system of naval bases which enabled it to operate with mobility and flexibility throughout the world. By suitable commercial, investment and monetary policies, Great Britain and other nations with surplus capital stimulated economic growth in underdeveloped areas. The French Revolution had aroused men to respect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms. The United States also made its contribution. Our people devoted their energies largely to domestic matters, not because they lacked concern for others but believing that what our founpers called 1ethe conduct and examplett of freedom would exert a liberating influence everywhere. In fact, it did so. The 19great American experiment" was a source of hope and inspiration to men everywhere, and especially to those living under despotism. Our dynamic example of freedom drew many to our shores and inspired others, in the old world and the new, to emulate our course. All of these influences contributed to giving the world relative peace and security for the 100 years between the ending of the Napoleonic wars and the beginning of the First World War. During this period there were many advances in the practice of p9litical liberty, and generally throughout the world there was a great advance in material and social well-being. The events of the twentieth century, and especially the two World Wars and their aftermaths, have created an entirely new situation. In large measure the Uni tt(d States has inherited a responsibility for leadership whichi in the pastj has been shared by several nations. Today there rests upon us, to a unique degree, the threefold task of providing insurance against another world war; of demonstrating the good fruits of freedom which undermine the rule of despots by contrast; and of providing a major part of the effort required for the healthy growth of underdeveloped areas. The Eisenhower Administration inherited security policies that had much worth. Many of these policies were bipartisan in character. They reflected a national recognition of the peril facing the civilized world, a united determination to meet it, and an acceptance of the role of leadership thrust,, on us by events. We had helped to reestablish the economies of other countries shattered by the war. We had taken a major part in resisting the aggression in Korea. In the face of the Soviet threat we were engaged in rebuilding our military strength and that of other free countries. · These and like measures were costly. But they were necessary to our security. However, they partook much of an emergency character. By 1953 there was need to review our 000500 �- - 2 = securTty planning and to adjust our continuing military to the other requirements of a well-rounded, permanent effort policy. ·Under the condition-sin which we live, it is not easy to strlke, perfect balance between military and non-military efforts anq to ~hoose the type of military effort which serves us besto The essential is to recognize that there is an imperative need for .a balance which holds military expenditures to a minimum consistent with safety, so that a maximum of liberty may operate as a dynamic force against despotism. That is the goal of our policyo IIa The Nature of the Threat The threat we face is not one that can be adequately dealt with on an emergency basis. It is a threat that may long persist a Our policies must be adapted to this basic fact a The Soviet menace does not reflect the ·ambiti0ns :oiC.c' a single ruler, and cannot be measured by his life expectancy. There is no evidence that basic Soviet policies have been changed with the passing of Stalino Indeedi the Berlin Conference of last February gave positive evidence to the contrarya The Soviet Communists have always professed that they are planning for what they call 18an entire historical eraa 10 The assets behind this threat are vast. The Soviet bloc of Communist-controlled countries--a new form of imperialist colonialism--represents a vast central land mass ..with. a population of 800jOOO,OOOa About 10,000,000 men are -regularly under -arms, with many more trained millions in re-serve. T-hi--s--1.andfe-rce occupies a central position which permits of striking at any one of about 20 countries along a -per:1-me-t-er -of -seme 20 ;-000---mil-eso -·I-t is supplemented sy -i-n-cr-easing air power, equipped with atomic weapons:, able to -strik-e throu-g-h -northern Arctic routes which bring our industrial areas in range of quick attacka The threat is not merely militarya The Soviet rulers dispose throughout the world of the apparatus of international Communismo It operates with trained agitators and a powerful propaganda organization. It exploits every area of discontent, whether it be political disconten·t against 11 16 colonialism or social discontent against economic conditions. It seeks to: harass the existing order and pave the way for political coups which will install Communist=controlled regimes a B~ the use of many types of manoeuvres and threats, military and political, the Soviet rulers seek gradually to divide and weaken the free nations and to make their policies appear as bantrupt by overextending them in efforts which, as Lenin put it, are "beyond their strength." Then, said Lenin, '°our victory is assured a16 Then, said Stalin, will be the rnmoment for the decisive blowa 16 It is not easy to devise policies which will counter a danger so centralized and so vast~ so varied and so sustained. It is no answer to substitute the glitter of steel for the torch of freedome An answer can be found by drawing on those basic concepts which have come to be regularly practised within our civic communitieso There we have almost wholly given up the idea of relying primarily on house=by-house defense. 000501 �• - 3 = Instead 9 primary reliance is placed upon the combining concepts, namely,i the creation of power on a community and the use of that power so as to deter aggression by it costly to an aggressoro The free nations must apply ' same principles in the inte·rnational sphere o . IIIo of two basis making these Community Defense The cornerstone of security for the free nations must be a collective system of defenseo They clearly cannot achieve security separatelyo No single nation can develop for itself defensive power of adequate scope and flexibilityo In seeking to do so, each would become a garrison state and none would achieve securityo This is true of the United Stateso Without the cooperation of allies, we would not even be in a position to retaliate massively against the war industries of an :attacking nationo That requires international facilitieso Without them, our air striking power loses much of its deterrent powero With them, strategic air power becomes what Sir Winston Churchill -called the 18supreme deterrent on He credited to tt the safety of Europe during recent yearso But such power, while now a dominant factor, may not have the same significance forevero Furthermore, massive atomic and the:rmonuclear retaliation is not the kind of power which could most usefully be evoked under all circumstanceso Security for the free world depends, therefore, upon the development of collective security and community power rather than upon purely national potentials. Each: nation which shares the security should contribute in accordance with its capabilities and facilitie$o The Inter=American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) of 1947 set a postwar example in establishing the principle that an armed attack against one would be considered as an attack against all. The North A-tl--anti-c T-re-at-y i-s based on the same principle. Its m-ember-s-hav-e--g-ene-much further i-n -organi-zi-ng Joint forces and facilities as a part of the integrated security system. NATOprovides essential air and naval basesj to which its various members can contribute~= each according to its means ?"aridcapabilities o It provides the planes and ships and weapons which can use these baseso It provides so many points from which an aggressor could be harassed, in so many different ways, that he cannot prudently concentrate his forces for offense against a single victim. While NATObest exemplifies this collective security concept, there are other areas where the same concept is evolving, although as yet in a more rudimentary form. An example is the Western Pacific, where the United States has a series of collective security treaties which now embrace Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan and Korea. Collective arrangements are now in the making in the Middle East with Turkey-Pakistan as the nucleus. These developments show the growing acceptance of the collective security concept we describe. The United ;Nations is striving to make collective security effective on a basis broader than regionalism. The central principle of the Charter is that any armed attack is of universal concern and calls for collective measures of resistance. The Soviet Union, by its veto powerj has made it impractical, as yet, to make available to the Security Council the 1varmed forces, assistance, and fac:Lli ties 10 contemplated by Article 000502 �.. - 4 - 1,-3·of the· Chartero W}:lenaggression occurred in Korea, however, the pr~n~iple of collective action was invoked by the United Nations and acted on by more than a majority of the members, includin~ l~ which sent armed forces to Korea to repel the aggression o The "Uni ting for Peace'' Resolution, adopted by the General Assembly in November 1950, grew out of that experienceo That resolution will enable members of the United Nations to join in carrying out similar collective measures. .agaj:ns.t. any future aggression without being blocked by a [Soviet vetoo The free worla system of bases is an integral part of its co11ecti ve security o At the recent Four __;Power Conference in Berlin 9 Mr o Molotov repeatedly attacked these bases as evidence of aggressive purposeo Actually these bases on the territory of other sovereign countries are merely a physical expression of the collective security systemo They were constructed only at the request of the host nation and their availability depends upon its consent, usually as a legal condition and always as a practical oneo The requisite consent to the use of these bases would never be accorded unless it was clear that their use was in response to open aggression, and reasonably related to its scope and nature. This gives assurance of their community function. Thus the free world has practical means for achieving collective security both through the United Nations and the various regional arrangements already referred to. ·.lJL, ~ Strategy to Deter Aggression The question remainsg How should collective defense be organized by the free world for maximum protection at minimum cost? The heart of the problem is how to deter attacko This, we believe, requires that a potential aggressor be left in no doubt that he would be certain to suffer dam.age outweighing any possible gains from aggression. This result would not ·be --assured, -even by pollecti ve measures, if the free world sought to match the potential Communist forces, man for man and tank for tank, at every point where they might attack. The Soviet-Chinese bloc does not lack manpower and spends it as something that is cheap. If an aggressor knew he could always prescribe the battle conditions that suited him and engage us in struggles mainly involving manpowerj aggression might be encouraged. He would be tempted to attack in places and by means where his manpower sµperiority was decisive and., where at little cost he could 1mpose upon us great burdens. If the free world adopted that strategy, it could bankrupt itself and not achieve security over a sustained period. The free world must devise a better strategy for its defense, based on its own special assetso Its assets include, especiall.Y, air and"naval power and atomic weapons which are now available in a wide range, suitable not only for strategic bombing but also for extensive tactical use. The free world must make imaginative use of the deterrent capabilities of these new weapons and mobilities and exploit the full potential of collective security. Properly used, they can produce defensive power able to retaliate at once and effectively against any aggression. 000503 �.. To deter aggression, it is important to have the flexibility and the facilities which make various responses availableo In many cases, any open assault by Communist forces could only result in starting a general waro But the free world must have the means for responding effectively on a selective basis when it chooseso It must not put itself in the position where the only response open to it is general waro The essential thing is that a potential aggressor should know in advance that he can and will be , made to suffer for his -aggression more than he can possibly gain by it. This calls for a system in which local defensive strength is reinforced by more mobile deterrent powero The method of doing so will vary according to the character of the various areaso Some areas are so vital that a special guard should and can be put around themo Western Europe is such an areao Its industrial plant represents so nearly the balance of industrial power in the world that an aggressor might feel that it was a good gamble to seize it -- even at the risk of considerable hurt to himselfo In this respect, Western Europe is exceptionalo Fortunately, the Western European countries have both a military tradition and a large military potential, so .that through a European Defence Community, and with support by the United States ·and Britain, they can create an adequate defense of the Continento Most areas within the reach of an aggressor offer less value to him than the loss he would suffer from wellconceived retaliatory measures. Even in such areas, howe-ver:., local defense will always be importanto In every endangered area there should be a sufficient military establishment to maintain order against subversion ?nd to resist other forms of indirect aggression and minor satellite aggressions. This serves the indispensable need to demonstrate a purpose to resist, and to compel any aggressor to expose his real intent by such serious fighting as will brand him before all the world and promptly bring collective measures into operationo Potential aggressors have little respect for peoples who have no will to fight for their own protection or to make the sacrifices needed to make that fighting significanto Also, they know that such peoples do not attract allies to fight for their causeo For all of these reasons, local defense is importanto But in such areas the main reliance must be on the power of the free community to retaliate with great force by mobile means at places of its own choice a A would-be aggressor will hesitate to commit aggression if he knows in advance that he thereby not only exposes those particular forces which he chooses to use for his ·~ggression, ~ut ~lso deprives his other assets of "sanctuary" ~tatuso Th&t does not mean turning every local war into a world war. It does not mean that if there is a Communist attack somewhere in Asia, atom or hydrogen bombs will necessarily be dropped on the great industrial centres of China or Russia. It does mean that the free world must maintain the collective means and be willing to use them in the way which most effectively makes aggression too risky and expensive to be tempting o It is sometimes said that this system is inadequate because it assures an invaded country only that it will eventually be liberated and the invader punished a That observation misses the pointo The point is that a prospective 000504 �.. - 6 - attacker is not likely to invade if he believe~ the probable hurt will _outbalance the probable gain. A system which compels potential aggressor, to face up to that fact indispensably supp~ements a local defensive syst~m. L Practical We can alread·y begin Applications . ' to see applications of these policies. In Korea the forces fighting aggression had been so closely limited that they were forbidden even to apply the doct}ine of "hot pursuit" in relation to enemy planes that were based across the Yalu. The airfields from which attacks were mounted were immune, as were the lines and sources of their supply. The fighting there was finally stopped last July on terms which had been proposed many months before. That result was achieved, at least in part, because the aggressor, already denied territorial gains, was faced with the possibility that the fighting might, to his own great peril, soon spread beyond the limits and methods which he had selected, to areas and methods that we would select. In other words, the principle of using methods of our choice was ready to be invoked, and it helped to stop the war which the enemy had begun and had pursued on the theory that it would be a limited war, at places and by means of its choosing. The 16 memQers of the United Nations who fought in Korea have invoked the same principleo They have given public notice that if the Communists were to violate the armistice and renew the aggression, the response of the United Nations Command would not necessarily be confined to Koreao Today, if aggression were resumed, the United Nations Command would certainly feel free to inflict heavy damage upon the aggressor beyond the immediate area which he chose for his aggression. That need not mean indulging in atomic warfare throughout Asia. It should not be stated in advance precisely what would be the ~cope of military action if new a~gression occurred. That is a matter as to which the aggrespbr had best remain ignorant. But he can know and does know, in the light of present policies, that the choice in this respect is ours and hot his. In relation to Indo-China, the United stated that if there were open Red Chinese there, that would have "grave consequences confined to Indo-China." States has publicly Army aggression which might not be On December 26, 1953, President Eisenhower made an ifilportant statement which clearly reflected our present policy -as applied to Asia. He announced a progressive reduction -of United States ground forces in Korea. However, he went -on to point out that United States military forces in --t-he F-ar East will now feature nhighly mobile naval, air and - amphibious units;" and he added that in this way, despite some withdrawal of land forces, the United States will have --a capacity to oppose aggression "with even greater effect than he-r-etofore." In the same month the United State·s reaffirmed i t-s 1-ntent to maintain in Okinawa the rights made available -to us by the -Japanese Peace Treaty. This location is needed to ensure striking power to implement the collective security concept. In Europe, our intentions are primarily expressed by the North Atl-antic Treaty. Following the aggression in Korea of June 1950, the Treaty members proceeded to an emergency 000505 �.. - 7 - buildup of military strength in Western Europeo The st·rehgth built between 1950 and 1953 has served well the cause of peace. But by 1953, it did not seem necessary to go on at the original paceo At the April 1953 meeting of the NATOCouncil, the United States put forward a new concept, now known as that of the "long haul." It meant a steady development of defensive strength at a rate which would preserve and not exhaust the economic strength of our allies and ourselves. This would be reinforced by the availability of new weapons of vastly increased de·st-ructi ve power and by the striking power of an air force based .on internationally agreed positions. President Eisenhowe·r is now seeking an amendment of the present law to permit a freer exchange of atomic information with ,our NATO·.Allie•s. When we-went back to the NATOCouncil meeting of last December, we found that there was general acceptance of the "long ·aauln concept. The result is that most of our NATO allies are now able to achieve budgetary and economic stability, without large dependence on our economic aid. The growing free-world defensive system, supported by community facilities and coupled with adequate policies for their use, reflects the nearest approach that the world has yet made to a means to achieve effective defense, at minimum cost. VI. The. Current Military Program \ One of the basic tasks been to review our military foregoing policies. of the new Administration has program in the light of the In the years 1945-53, our military programs went through wide ffuuctuations which hindered orderly and efficient administrationo During the first part of this period, the policy -was to -recl·uee ·-t-he mili·tary -establi-shment drastically. During the latter -part of the -period, -the policy was to increase the military establishment rapidly. During both the decrease and the increase tne military budget reflected the so-called "balance of forcesP concept. In practical terms, this meant splitting the available funds into three roughly equal slices .for the Army, Navy and Air Force. When the E!senhower Administration took office, our national security programs, at home and abroad, were costing over 50 billion dollars a year, and were planned at about 55 billion dollars for the next year. Budgetary deficits were of the order of 10 billion dollars, despite taxes comparable to wartime taxes. Inflation was depreciating the purchasing power of the dollar6 Our allies were similarly burdened. The .American people have repeatedly shown that they are prepared to make whatever sacrifices are really necessary to insure our national safety. They would no doubt support military expenses at the levels which their government told them were required for security, even at the cost of budget deficits, resultant inflationary pressures and tax-levels which would impair incentives. But the patriotic will :to sacrifice is not something to be drawn upon needlessly. Government has the high duty to seek resourcefully and inventively the ways which will provide security without 000506 �• sacrificing economic and social welfareo The security poliGies we here describe m.ake possible more selective and more effi'cient programs in terms of the composition of forces and of procuremento The new Administration has sought to readjust, in an orderly way, the program for the military forceso Before this could be done, it was necessary to clarify the extent of our reliance on collective security; to define more clearly our basic strategy both in Europe and the Far East; to reassert our freedom of action in repelling future aggression; to assess the impact of newer types of weapons; and to relate the composition and size of our ready and potential forces to all these factors. Inevitably this has taken time. It bas required a series of difficult basic decisions by the President with ,the advice of the National Security Council and with supporting decisions by the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the Treasury Department. It has been necessary to exchange views with Congressional leaders and our principal allies and to inform world opinion so that neither our friends nor our enemies abroad would misinterpret what we were doingo By now, however, the new course is charted and is guiding our military planning. As a result, it is now possible to get, and share, more basic security at less costo That is reflected in the budget which the President has submitted for the 1955 fiscal yearo In this budget, national security expenditures for fiscal year 1955 will amount to 45 billion dollars as compared with 50 billion dollars for 1953 and 49 billion dollars for 19540 Initially this reshaping of the military program was misconstrued in various respects. Some suggested that the United States intended to rely wholly on large-scale strategic bombing as the sole means to deter and counter aggression. What has already been said should dispose of this erroneous ideao The potential of massive attack will always be kept in a state of instant readiness, and our program will retain a wide variety in the means and scope for responding to aggression. Othexs -i-n-t-erp-r-e-t-edthe -pxogram a-s -a move away from collective security. The· exact op·posi te is the case, as has been shown •. Our policies are· base,r squarely on a collective security system and depend for their success on its continuing vitality. Still others feared that we intended to withdraw our forces from abroad in the interest of mobilityo Now that the fighting is ended in Korea, our forces in the Far East will be reduced in numbers, as has previously been announced, but the kind of force that remains will have ,great striking powero Moreover, the program does not mean that we intend to pull our forces out of Europeo It is, of course, essential that the continental nations themselves provide a harmonious nucleus of integrated defenseo If they do so, the United States would expect to maintain substantial forces of its own in Europe, both in support of the forward strategy of defense and for political reasonso Another consequence of our new policies is that it has become practicable to reduce our economic :atcil to our allieso The Technical Assistance Program will go on and economic aid is not wholly excludedo There are still some places near the Soviet orbit where the national governments cannot maintain adequate armed forces without help from uso That is notably so in the Middle and Far Easto We have contributed largely, ungrudgingly, and I hope constructively, to end 000507 �.. - 9 - aggression and advanQe freedom in Indo=Chinao The stakes there are so high thijt it would be culpable not to contribute to the forces struggiing to resist Communist oppressiono But broadly speaking, economic aid in the form of grants is on its way out as a major element of our foreign policyo This is highly desirable from many standpointso It helps to make our own budget more manageable and it promotes more self-respecting international relationships. That is what our allies wanto Trade, broader markets and a flow of investment are far more healthy than intergovernmental grants-in-aid. It is, of course, important that we do actually develop these mutually advantageous substitutes for "aid." To do so is one of the major objectives of the Eisenhower Administration. It is an essential component of the over-all policies already described. gather In the ways outlined, the United States and its allies strength for the long-term defense of freedom. VIIo Our National Purpose We do not, of course, claim to have found some magic formula that ensures against all forms of Communist successes. Despoti;sm is entrenched as never before. It remains aggressive, particularly in Asiao In Europe, its purposes remain expansive, as shown by Mr. Molotov's plans at the Berlin Conference for Germany, Austria and all Europe. However, time and fundamentals will work for us, if only we will let theme The dibtators face an impossible task when they set themselves to suppress, over a vast area and for a long time, the opportunities which flow from freedom. We can be sure that 'there is going on, even within the Soviet empire, a sile~t test of strength between the powerful rulers and the multitudes of human beings. Each individual seems by himself to be helpless in this struggleo But tpeir aspirations in the --ag-greg-ate make up a mighty force. There are: some -si.-g-:a-sthat the Sovi-et ruler-s -are, in terms of dom~stic -policy, bending to some of the human desires of their people. There are promises of more food, more household goods, more economic freedom. This does not prove that the dictators have themselves been converted. It is rather that they may be dimly perceiving that there are limits to their power indefinitely to suppress the human spirit. That is a truth which should not be lost sight of as we determine our own policies. Our national purpose is not merely to survive in a world fraught with appalling danger. We want to end this ·era of danger. We shall not achieve that result -merely by developing a vast military establishment. That serves indispensably to defend us and to deter attack. But the sword of Damocles remains suspendedo The way to end the peril peacefully is to demonstrate that freedom produces not merely guns, but the spiritual, intellectual and material richness that all men want. · Such are the guiding principles we invoke o We haNe-~canfidence that if our nation perseveres in applying them, freedom will -ag--ain win the upper hand in its age=long struggle· with despotism, and that the danger of war will steadily recede. 000508 �.. DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS t DATE March 17, 1954 PUBLICATION NoYo Times Transcript of Secretary; Du'lles Remarks on Defense at His News Conferenceo Special to The New York Timeso WASHINGTON~ March 16 -- Secretarz_ of Stat&... Dulles ,.ilUthorize4.Jpr direct publication the following section of the transcript of his news conference today: bearing on the llaew J&.Q.K"in foreign affaj,rs and military policy: Q o - 11/Ir o -Secretary, would you please of, one, the concept of instant retaliation; consultation with our allies, and, three, ment in war only by an act of Congress? give us the reconciliation two, the concept of the concept of involve,, A,, - I assume your reference supposedly taken from an address to instance of mineo Q. - And one by the Vice President Saturday· II retaLiation" is of the Uni ted ..'8.tates on night~ ., Ao - I cannot comment on what the Vice President said, but I will b~ glad to comment on what I saido If you will read my address of .Jano 12 - you will see what I advocated th·e.re was a ~capacity" to retaliate instantlyo In no place did I say we would retaliate instantly, although we might indeed retaliate instantly under conditions that call for thato The essential thing is to have the capacity to retaliate instantlyo. It is lack of that capacity which in my opinion accounted· for such disa_sters as Pear'1 Harboro If we had had the capacity to retaliate instantly, in my opinion, there would· have be~n no Pearl Harbor o · But it took · about four years to retaliate against Tokyoo· I belteve we should. have that capacity to retaliate instantlyo 1 ' ,, Facts Will Be Weighed . -~,. ...·- .; Now, the question of whether or not you retaliate instantly and where you retaliate is a matter to be dealt with in accordance with the facts of each situationo I take it few would have any question but what if there were an attack up.on,>the United States there would be instant retaliationo Yo.u have questions of retaliation in the event of a violation or an attack upon a member of the North Atlantic Treaty and upon oth~r countries with whom we have treaty relationshipso · . The question of circumstances under which you retaliate, where you retaliate, how quickly you retaliate is a matter which has to be dealt with in the light of the facts of each particular caseo One thing I want to make clear beyond the possibility of doubt is that I don°t believe you should tell the enemy in advance just where, how, and when you plan to retaliateo The whole esse"iice of the program is that the action should be an action of our choosing and he is not to know in advance what it is, and that uncertainty on his part is a key to the success of the policyo Q.. - Sir, if I may pursue thato You mentioned in the event of an attack upon a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance 000509 �_, ... you say what would then be instant retaliationo Does that mean in the event the concept of involvement in war only by act of Congress does not apply where there is an attack either upon the United States or upon a member of alliance of which we are a part? Ao - It means·in all respects the United States acts in accordance with its constitutional processeso There is no way in the world in which we can get away, or want to get away, or intend to get away from our constitutional processeso How long that will take, I don 9 t knowo It did not take very long after Pearl Harbor to.get a declaration of waro The trouble is it qid not do any immediate good to get a declaration of war because we did not have the capacity to do anything with ito Defense Treaties Cited I have never advocated, and nobody else in the Administration has advocated any departure from constitutional processeso The North Atlantic Treaty has provided that an attack against one of those states shal1 be.deemed the same as an attack against the United Stateso We have other treaties with language which is not precisely the same as thato Just what action by the Congress is requir.ed is a matter to be decided in each case. The fact that you advocate hav1PS. a capacity for instant retaliation does not change your constitutional processeso It means we don't have to wait for four years after somebody attacks us before we are in a position eftectively to hit backo . .., Qo ~ Sir, does the fact that the Senate of the United States has ratified the North Atlantic Alliance mean in the event of an attack on an ally we could, within constitutional procedures, retaliate against that attack without action in the Congress? A. - That is a matter which, as you know, was debated very thoroughly in the Congress and in the Senate; at the time that treaty was ratified I was in the Senateo It is my opinion that the provisions of the treaty, which state that an attack upon one of the allies is the same as an attack upon all -- or in other words that an-attack upon one of our allies is the same as an attack upon- the United States -- and that is also, I may say, in the Rio pact -- that gives the President--,.;;_of_the United States the same authority to react as he would have if the United States were a ttackedo Qo - Thank you, matter siro Ao - Whether he would use that authority in every for his discretion., In my opinion he has ito case is a Qo - He has the right? A. - In my opinion he has the righto That does not necessarily mean in all cases he would use the right without consultation by Congresso It would depend on· the gravity of the attack, whether it was obvious the attack meant all-out war, which inevitably would involve uso Many matters would .have to be considered and doubtless would be considered A¥ the President in determining whether or not to use his discretibnary authorityo Qo - Mro Secretary, might I raise a question on another word in the reference to capacity to retaliateo The sentence ends: "By means and at places of our choosing"o Now, :Mro Pearson (Lester E. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs) raised the question whether the word "our" meant the United States 000510 �.. or whether - 3 it meant the free = community of nationso Ao - I think that the sentence is reasonably you read the whole sentence if you have 'it before Statement Qo - Yes o clearG you? Would Read to Dulles (Reading): "The basic decision great capacity to retaliate, of our choosing." A.· - Does it was to depend primarily upon a instantly, by means and at place use the word "free world?'' Qo - There were two sentenceso One is ' "The basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing." A. - Is that Ao· - Yes. the whole sentence? I would like to have the first part of the sentence. Q. - The ·first part be changed, the Presldent National Security Council, This has been doneo The upon a great capacity to places of our choosing." Q. - I think spoke about is: "But before military plan,ning could and his advisers, as represented by the had to take some basic policy decisiono basic decision was to depend primarily retaliate, instantly, by means and at there was a sentence the free worldo in the text there which Q.• - Not in that particular paragraph. There is an earlier sentence to this part which says: "The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing." A. - I thought that was what you were reading from. Qo - Which is it? A. - Well, it·would depend a good deal upon the circumstancesa If there were an attack upon the United States and if we had the capacity to respond from our own bases, we would certainly do thato It is, I think, well known that the bases which we have in f~reign countries are in general not use~ble as a matter of law, and as a practical matter are not useablej except with the consent of the countries where the bases are. For example, the bases which are available to our Strategic Air Force in Great Britain are not useable as a base of attack except with the consent of the British Governmento The same is true in general with all our foreign baseso Therefore, it is implicit in our security system that it operates with the consent and acquiescence of the other partners who have helped to provide the facilities which create a sort of international police systemo Q. - If I might go on. There were two other words which Mro Pearson raised a question to in relation to the point which you have just made, the one being "instantly" and the other being ''means. 11 Does his mean the choosing of means would lie with the free community or only with the United States? Would there be consultation? 000511 �., .. I • = 4 = A. - Yes, there would certainly be consultation in most of the cases that I can conceive ofo I might say that I wrote, some weeks ago, an article for Foreign Affairs, which is in substance a somewhat more polished, I hope, restatement of my speech which was made before the Council of Foreign Relations, which publishes Foreign Affairso That I did while I was flying back from Berlino I understand that is being released for publication tomorrow in New York by the magazine Foreign Affairso That will elaborate to some- extent the thesis which I expressed in my address of Jan,, -I2o qn another (Mro Dulles' article page of this issue in Foreign Affairs is published Qf The New York Timeso) - Q. - I would like to ask another question on this subjecto There has been some discussion and speculation to the effect that reliance on the capacity to retaliate instantly as a major part ·~f your defensive system would mean, in the case of a limited challenge in some remote area, you would have tpe choice either of an all-out war or no resistance at allo Ao - That is not a correct analysis of the thesis at all•o Let us take, for example, the declaration which\Y(ijs-·made by :'the sixteen powers in relation to Korea, which is one of the illustrations I made in my speecho It has been stated there that if aggression should be resumed that the reaction would not necessarily be confined to Koreao Now what does that mean? That does not mean necessarily that there will be an effort made to drop atomic bombs on Peiping or upon Moscowa It does mean that there are areas of importance to the aggressors in that vicinity which may have an industrial or strategic relationship to the operation which would no longer be what General MacArthur called a ''privileged sanctuaryo 11 I cannot imagine any policy more futile or more apt to create war than to adopt the policy that you will only react at the particular place, and by the means the aggressor selects 0 If anything would ever put a premium on aggressionj it would be thato We want to take away that premium on aggressiono Qo-- Mro Secretary, while we are annoting that speech, there was a reference in there to a lesser reliance on local defense, and some question has been raised as to whether that meant less reliance on defense by local, indigenous forces which we might aid, for ~ample, or less reliance on local actions by American forces, in local sectors of the long front? Ao - What I meant there, when I say "I", I might say that that speech was not just a personal speech,~was that if you have the capacity to strike an aggressor at the points which will hurt him, the deterrent power~of that is sufficient so that you do not need to have local defense all around the 20,000-mile perimeter of the orbit of the Soviet world because your deterrent power, to a large extent, reinforces your local power· so that you do not have to depend upon having in place forces-in-being sufficient to stop an attack in its tracks anywhere where it could occur because-you rely primarily upon deterring that attack, not necessary upon being able to stop ito f With the Soviet-Chi~ese-Communist world -800 9 000,000 people occupying a central location; with land armies - it would be utt,erly impossible to have all around that 20,ooo~mile orbit sufficient to stop might come at·whf)jever they might chose to make ita have got to find some way whereby that type of local with its its vast local defenses any blow that So that you ground defense 000512 �e •. • = can be supplemeritedo capacity to retailiate own c}1oosingo 5 = And the way to supplement it is to have a at times, places, and with methods of your Now that doesn 9 t mean that you eliminate wholly, by any means, land forces -- it means you do not necessarily make them your primary reliance because, as against the kind of d~nger which threatens,· it is impossible to match your potential enemy at all points on a basis of man-for-man, gun-for-gun and tankfo-r-tank., If we try to do that, we are going to go bus to Qo -Mro Secretary, if I may go back to one point of yours, you said that in.Europe the ·President had the same authority under the NATOand Rio treaties to retaliate if the United States was attaekedo Well, last Wednesday he seemed to give a pledge that he would not use that because he said that there would be no involvement in war without Congressional approvalo Ao - But if the Senate is a different mattero has given approval in advance, Qo - Well, the specific case was Indo-Chinao was what some of us were wondering about" I think that that Ao - Yes, there has been no Congressional approval given in advance of a war in Indo-China to which the United States would be a partyo He certainly did not mean, I think, to imply that if the United States was attacked, and if Congress was not in session, that he would wait until Congress was called back into session and make a declaration of war before we would react to a bombing attack on New York City or Detroit or Washington" I think if any President waited under those circumstances, he would certainly not be carrying out the will of either the Congress or the American peopleo Qo - Sir, I 0 m a little dense on this matter of Indo-China; would you clarify this for meo France is our ally in the North Atlantic alliance" French troops are fighting in Indo-Chinao If the Chinese Communists, with the regular forces from China, should cross the frontier into Indo-Ohina and attack the arme~ forces of our ally, France, would our responsibilities or obligations under the NATOalliance come into force? If not, why? . ' Ae - No, they will not because the NATOalliance does not apply to any part of the world except the North Atlantic area as it is defined in the treatyo That definition in the main is confined to Europe, although it does cover a portion of French North Africa -- I think Algeria is covered by ito But in the main, it covers only the European area, including a slight bit qf North Africa and, of course, the Asiatic. portion of Turkeyo Qo - Mro Secretary, in the context Ao - Now, I don 9 t mean to imply -- that if the event you of happened, we should do nothing" I myself have said that believed that if that happened we should do somethingo But doesn°t mean we should do it without Congressional approval consultationo spoke I that or .,. Qc - In the context of the answer you just gave about New York, Detroit or Chicago in referring to an earlier answer you gave, would it be fair to say that the President has the same power to react in Europe in the case of a bombing of London or Paris? A. - Yes, siro 000513 �.. = 6 - Q. - Sir, would it be accurate then to say that instant retaliation in effect is recognition of the restraining effect of the possession of atomic weapons -- the deterrent power? Is there a distinction between instant retaliation and deterrent? 1t is a deterrento A. - Yes, I have said that the capacity to retaliate fully and instantly is, in my opinion, the great deterrent, that wh~n you are faced with the kind of potential enemy, with the assets that this potential enemy has, I believe deterrent of that sort of the most effective way there is preventing a waro powerand or that a of Now I can imagine a di~ferent world condition where reliance might properly be placed upon other methods, and other means, but, as far as the present world condition is concerned,, · that capacity to retaliate powerfully at places of our chosing is, in my opinion, what will serve as a powerful deterrent to waro I believe that the original Korean attack would not have occurred if it had not been assumed either that we would not react at all, or if we did react only at the place and by the means that the aggressors choseo I believ • that the Allied sixteen-power declaration, which now operates in the case of Korea, will probably prevent any renewal of Communist aggression thereo Q. - Mro Secretary, in order to clarify something in my own ~ind at least, is. it your understanding that the Presideq.t's right to orde~ instant retaliation applies only in the case o! an attack either on the United States or another North Atlantic Treaty power because of the un~erstanding that Congress had given? President's Rights The United States ~s two treaties that I referred to: One is the so-called R:io Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, wh.i-ch contains the provision that an attack upon one is the same as an attack upon all; that sp.me provision is found in the North Atlantic Treaty o -In my opinion -- whatever it ls worth as a lawyer, and as one who was in the Senate whe.n the North At1iantlc Treaty was adopted -- I believe that that authorizes, is a: . ·. consent in advance to, the President reacting against an attack upon one of our allies named in those treaties in the same way that he would be authorized to react in the event of an attack upon the Onited States itselfo I repeat, however, that the fact that the President has that constitutional authority as the result of·those treaties in my opinion does not necessarily. mean that he would use ito He would use his discretion, 1 think, as to whether or not to react instantly, or whether to get either a formal declaration of war by the Congress, or whether to have consultations which satisfied himself that that was the will o! the Congresso That would be discretlonary _with the Presidento Qo - Mro Secretary, doesn 8 t the President power under the United ~ations Charter itself? A. - In my opinion, have that noo Q. - Does he not have the power under the United Constitution same as Commander in Chief? States A. - To do what? 000514 �\- .,., - 7 - Q. - To take military by Congresso action without a declaration of war A. - Well, now you are raising the question which, bas been debated ever since our nation was formedo There are certainly areas within which a President can act -- certainly areas in which it has been customary for Presidents to act -- withoat any formal action by the Congress. There is a twilight zone there. Nobody has ever attempted to define accurately that twilight zone• and I shall not attempt it hereo -q~.- lrlr. Secretary, at one point there you said "ln connection with consultation to consult in most cases that you can conceive of. 11 Would you consider, say, an attack upon the northern part of Canada an attack upon the United States, and would. you consult with other NATOcountries before you reacted to that attack? Q•. - I do not think that it J;ij wise or appropriate to try to answer a hypothetical question of·'that sort. In the first place, it is impossible to determine in advance what all of the surrounding circumstances are, and it would certainly also not be advisable to give any fore-knowledge to a potential enemy as to whether or not he would have any time between his attack and having ..to,. ~uffer the consequences of 1t. 000515 . _J � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 18 MARCH 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-03-18 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00023 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Despatch No. 503 from the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, 18 Mar. 1954, LAC, vol. 4903, RG 25, 50115-P-40, pt. 2. Berlin Dwight Eisenhower John Foster Dulles Korea Rio Pact Soviet bloc US National Security Council