1 20 2 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ad234a9dd23b9fd407aa9cbfe9419ced.pdf 57725dcff0b817599d45ebf494be577e PDF Text Text (THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER MAJESTY'S CANADIAN GOVERNMENT) IN REPLY PLEASIC QUOTE N0..9.~9. .... !.?..~., ..:-J.....t!T..f.9 ) 119tpartmtnt of Jlational3DtftnceTOP SECRET CANADA JOINT STAFF JOINT PLANNINGCOMMITTEE AOOR!SS REPLY TO CHAIRMAN CMIEF11 OF STAFF, OTTAWA. 24 lune 19.54. Secretary, Chiefs of S~aff OOW~SJW\D~D roSECREI RfmJll" A Sf~fJ ,.,~ Committee United States Defence Policy and the Possible Implications for Canadian Defence Policy 1. Reference is made to our letter CSC 1883-1 _dated 1.5 June 19.54, to which was attached-a JPC report on the above subject. Referenced letter requested this report be passed to the Chiefs of Staff Committee for approval. 2. :Subsequent to your distribution of the above paper to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff forwarded a letter to the Chairman, Joint Planning Committee, requesting that certain changes be made in this paper. These suggested changes were discussed by the Joint Planning Committee at their 14/.54 meeting, held on '2~ June 19.54, and with one exception the suggested changes were approved. The suggested change to which the Joint Planning Committee did not agree was the deletion, in para 20, of the probable U.S. request for authority to establish fighter bases in Canada. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, stated in his letter that he did not believe that the U.S. intended to make any such request; however, the Air Force :Member of the Joint Planning Committee, who is also the Chairman, Canadian Section, Cartada-u.s. Military Cooperation Committee, has been informed that the u.s. Air Force, at the working level, is giving consideration to forwarding such requests. ;. Attached hereto are copies of revised pages which should be substituted for the old pages 8, 9 and 10. It is requested that the revised paper be passed to the Chiefs of Staff Committee for approval. 8, 9 ~rid 10 of the above paper ~?'~ WYM/4972/mf (W. Y. Ma~n)~Commander A/Secretary Joint Planning Committee. �TOP SECRIT - 8 The Principles 18. of Continental The most important North America - effective making potential Apart from this requires, military early terms, to destroy adequate for a defence and against The-Continental Defence Programme aircraft third system, more northerly of the early enemy lodgements. through manned radar aircraft is also and sites warning out for and a system is under consideration. certain system in the Atlantic have for anti- the mid-Canada line, undertaking the systems, Surveys are now being carried warning United States There is also a the two countries fully interceptor weapons. a new early possible agencies, in establishing installations.for guns - in to combined planning CUSRPG,PJ'BD and other cooperated weapons - interceptor submarine .launched guided missiles In addition and in depth of aircraft. against to civil warning and anti-aircraft invading the war- of North America systems and defensive positions of been oonsidered. and the establishment guided missiles 19. against the defence aircraft, requirement of the defence has already USSR - aspect, authorities warning aspect retaliation of the in general Defence The -seaward extensions and I'acitio Oceans. 20. In addition in operation it is probable to these or in the planning that projects which are either or construction the United States stages, may request authority to: ...• ,/9 �TOP SECRET - 9 (a) construct radar (b) early warning stations; make suitable arrangements anti-aircraft cover of certain border such as Windsor-Detroit, Sault points Effect additional for the Ste. Marie and Niagra Falls. also conceivable that u.s. may the request authority fighter bases in Canada. It is to establish U.S. on Canadian Defence Pro~ramme 21. The effect defence of U.S. defence policy on the Canadian programme may be: the further (a) integration of the air defences of Canada and the United States; (b) an increase in the air Canada, including aircraft (c) aircraft, the increase in Canada's of anti- forces; participation in defence. Defence 22. One indirect increasing is, fighter and guided missile continental Civil defence forces demand for more effective and will coordinated but very important continue civil result continental of the defences to be, a demand for more adequate and defence. Conclusions 23. It was concluded been no fundamental earlier although change in U.S. defence "New Look" has marked a shift programme. that While continuing in emphasis to fulfil its policy, there the in the defence international has �TOFSECRET - 10 • commitments, and to strengthen capabilities, added stress vision on ~he development defence will defence continental weapons. As these missile interceptor forces, installations, take shape of continental effect for additional anti-aircraft further in one comm.and, and generally tion in planning and in defence may be concluded that substantially policies atomic on Canadian As noted above, the Canadian Government policy. financial, and and tactical have a direct may be faced with requirements systems, defences, programmes, the requirements undoubtedly has placed ot air power, the pro- for the use of strategic and thermonuclear in concrete own .fore.es and the Eisenhower Administration of more adequate preparations its physical integration closer radar and guided of air defences measures of coopera- commands. In general the demands on Canadian resources and manpower - are likely heavier. to be it - �IN MPLY PUA- QUOTE C.S..C. ....l§.e.3..~l ..J.;r..f .c) NO. .... TOP SECRET CANADA JOINT STAFF JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE ,-.,..,__,,.,...._~-~---· AODRIIIRIPLYTO ~;i - CHAIRMAN CNIIFS 0, STA,,, OTTAWA. - 15 June 1954 . ......... Joint Planning ~ Committee di--, ~ Soc, :3 /- '/--O~ . -\ United States Defence Policy and the Possible Implications for Canadian Defence Policy D-\ Item .5 of the 13/.54 Meeting of the 1. Reference Joint Planning final approved copy of the repo·rt subject, Committee. Attached hereto is the on the above which has now been passed to the Chiefs of oow!.Vt~fo) 2 ~P.~ '. r~:.;tut6·u.L .. ~ m-€.(!~·~m~ 1 ..... · "" . ~oon A SE~r·,: -d ~~~ WJgec;_;der A/Seoretary (W. Y. Mart?nf WYM/4972/mf Joint Planning Committee DISTRIBUTION_ C Plans I DGPO 3 &: 4 DNPO DAPS .5 6 & 7 OMO&:P DNPOSO(S) 8 External Affairs -9 (Mr. Rogers) Sec JPC 10 CJS 11 JPS 12 JPS(XA:::....'....) ____ . 13 Copy No. l 2 JUN12\ .1954 _ @· I i . ~-... ~ - hi;-,-,......-..:,\-.t-, -----------,-------,------------------000361 ,'· -, ..\~ �COP?' N:O,.__ 9...._ TOP SEORET CANADIAN lfi§ ONLY 19.54 1.5 June, UNITEDSTATESDEFENCEPOLICYANDTHE POSSIILI Dll>LICATIONS FOR CANADIAN DEFENCEPOLIOY' Report by the Joint Planning Committee to the Chiefs of Staff Committee FILE COPY Introduction The United prepared. States has entered In the face which has developed since that of this is to attempt paper defence Republican policy this will Broadly speaking, Truman Administration to define sihce U.S. of collective and through its alliances Altantic limited defence policy. policy und.er the · of Communist end U.S. through in the United defence based on regional alliances Nations •. Military mutual of South America and-the area were established; to the U.N. action what implications to Greece and Turkey; with nations whioh of the It was a policy security membership The purpose the advent of local perimeter. a principle was sent defence States the direction was one of containment on the Soviet assistance the United and to indicate power based on the development forces aggrsssion not happen again. has taken administration, of Russisn World War II, the "New Look" may have on Canadian 2. two World Wars un- of the .threat is determined u.s. --~ defence North U.S. forces were committed in Korea and the defence of Formosa; · aid was given to Indo-China. In addition ....• /2 to these �TOP SECRET - 2 - oommitments of U.S. foroes and material, embarked on a programme to strengthen which would not only serve would also provide a souroe and where it was considered particular air its own defenoe to defend North Amerioa, of reserve provision of foroes neoessary. In this but programme, of strategio of atomio weapons, and the for the Korean campaign. When the Eisenhower Administration was committed to undertake a searohing defence planning policy, of defence It was assumed that in contrast took office, reappraisal it of U.S. and of defence spending. to the programme of the Truman-Acheson regime a "New Look" would inevitably 4. Before attempting the Eisenhower briefly several foroes, power to be used when emphasis was given to the expansion power, the development 3. the United States to describe Government, factors the defence policy it might be helpful which have helped emerge. of to discuss to shape this "New Look". The Reason for the "New Look" ,. mitted The Republican campaign for the 1952 election the Eisenhower Administration a programme which included spending, duction to out taxes, of defence in the budget, as reducing expedient and the Congress expenditures, commitments, means of oarrying to to reduce Government and to balance was the obvious, foreign argued that promises com- the budget. the larg~st Re- single and for other reasons item suoh the most politically out this programme. the U.S. economy could not continue It was also to carry the .....;, _J �TOP SECRET - 3 heavy defence "crash load which had been required action" build must be spread up, and therefore over a longer period for the the defence effort of time and geared to the "long haul". 6. The decision possible to a large in Korea. extent In addition, have believed tension to reduce that spending by the cessation while the United the potential had lessened, administration defence considered that it of hostilities States threat neverthless by the increase willingness ?. is probable in defence factor deter weapons. constituted aggression, for retaliation its allies) retaliate, justify 8. reduction With this the realization thermonuclear to strike any target Administration to divert increased Administration in defence developed force. was the developatomic with effective force capacity power and of continental to could further that the Soviet Union had capacity gave the Eisenhower on which to justify to the strengthening air (and expenditures. in North America, more resources required which the U.S. weapons and the potential the basis and of the power to the strategic by means and at places the Eisenhower Finally spending, strength in some the reduction These weapons together ahd provided choose. with and strategic the real the of NATOand the which was used to explain ment by the U.S. of tactical airpower at least in the strength commitments ·and defence thermonuclear that by 1954 the power of the of the U.N. to meet aggression Another may not and international Communist world had been counter-balanced, measure, was made their decision of U.S. air defence. . ... . /4 �TOP SECRET - 4 - 9. It seems clear was dictated Party that largely to rescue wastefulness the need for a "new" defence by the commitment of the Republican the U.S. from the alleged cut Government spending its that the U.S., haul" to avert the allied thereby build threat u.s. by reducing new defence and its policy allies, and and air to meet aggression of the u.s.s.R., ncm called for that fundamental the Soviet change in of threat, the crash-action a deterrent the requirement to commit on the and Soviet,capabil;ties· of increased continental It would appear the strength at any point the development power and stronger It to the "long power provided which would somehow reduce forces commitments. must convert the need to continue New weapons_ and to with the arguments world now counter-balanced perimenter 10. its economic exhaustion, reducing up. failures of the Truman-Acheson Administration rationalized retaliatory defences. that in reality u.s. defence there policy. Eisenhower stated, Mr. Dulles added, Republican Government has assumed all has been no As President the "New Look" was not new, and, as the slogan was not a happy one. obligations which it and previous undertaken; it has continued The the international Administrations to provide have for·c,es, military equipment and economic assistance to its perimeter and 1 t has continued of the Comm.un1s·tworld; to strengthen increasing its own forces, effectiveness ment and availability policy of allies relying.heavily u.s. air on the on the power and the develop- of weapons of mass destruction • ....../; �TOP SECRET - 5 11. It may be possible clearly at this point what the "New Look" actually to outline means in practice, then to define what it may mean for Canada's The Principles of U.S. Defence Policy 12. Within the framework of these tions, it might be helpful concretely general the objectives the u,s. (b) the reinforcement the capacity (e) designed forces continental - air, defences. United States' build and maintain provides decisively for: land, and naval, of deterrent against policy its defence a sturdy military is substantial and effective power. elements of the The "crash power over the past has now revised over an extended to u.s.s.R.; U.S. defence terms to provide up of military allies, the high seas. These are the basic concept of its several has produced what Admiral Radford described "providing a effectively of controlling of readiness". haul" In priorities, to retaliate "a very high degree tained planning. such as in Korea; principles, in very general offensive consideramore in the homeland of the of these policy to define of contributing the capability On the basis planning. in NATO; actions targets defence of the defences those the capability "local" and of the North American continent; especially years assigning the defence (d) point Government must develop (a) (c) general of U.S. defence programme which, without action" at this more as The U.S. Government programme with the aim of posture period"; this which can be mainis the "long concept. . ...•. /6 �~ . . .( ' - ,>,~l'J . ' .; - ' ~_ J'" ... ,. ~ f • - ::, .. - . ~ ,.:! ~ ... - ' ' '~ , ·~ ' • ' t;;. • -. • ~ • ~ ' • ~ ! - . ... - ' , - ' TOP SECRET - 6U.S. Military 13. Programme The principal strengthening role of Allied Admiral Radford, tion defence This air and support requirements Although reducing effective will power will numerically its in fact, and tactical u.s. of its of· offensive of the alliance. services, their be increased better operations, through equipment and more Weapons power, the use for is of fundamental is based on the assumption to retaliate own choosing. may not necessarily part to that weapons which are available strategy it has the capacity places and exploita- of U.S. military of atomic and thermonuclear i~portance. to of manpower. In the development strategic according defensive, other The Role of Atomic and Thermonuclear 14. in the be superior provide of new weapons, utilization is, for the_toroes power will, the introduction forces maintenance power that any other". striking of the United States "the creation, of modern air present ~ \ instantly by means and at Atomic and thermonuclear be used, of the United States' that weapons but they are now considered conventional military a strength. U.S. Force Commitments Abroad 1;. As implied earlier, commitment of forces the United States abroad own in Europe". 16. U.S. policy with regard the Far East is much less "it primary is to NATO. In this has agreed of its principle the United States' "to maintain is not militarily substantial to committing clearly defined. sound", regard forces U.S. forces to As a general according to Admiral ..... /7 �TOF SECRET - 7Radt'ord, echoeing u.s. indefinitely however, troops the views of the Fresident, that land forces very quickly to the Korean war, and that intention of maintaining certain Okinawa in the Far East. declared that States in Korea while its forces hand to provide and Pakistan with economic Defences It was noted earlier to provide retaliation, effeoti Continent. important forces that ve defences This third aspeot to its Before defence turning policy may then be easier decisive and thirdly, With this the most for the Canadian defence to the specific oonsiderations is based. allies, is unquestionably programme, thereror.e, review the general programme was on the North Ame.rioan in terms of implications programme. u.s. the capab1l> of launching to give assistance to prepare defence time the United of reducing on the other Indo- aid. Continental u.s. has also which might not At the present and Indo-China and military designed Mr. Dulles intention continuing Korea, 17. its bases, -for consequences to Inda-China". has announced its Japan, committed if the Chinese Communist Army invades it would have "grave be confined be recalled, it has declared military example, China, It will to.Asia". the United States "to commit· details of the it might be well on which u.s. to continental background in mind, it to see the implications for Canadian defence policy. . ... ./8 �TOF SECRET - 8 - The Frinciples 18. of Continental The most important aspect North America - effective making potential considered. of the defence retaliation against of the USSR - has already Apart from this of North America requires, adequate Detenoe aspect, and military authorities in depth of early systems and defensive weapons - interceptor guided missiles in positions is also a requirement warning and anti-aircraft to destroy invading airguns - aircraft. for a defence launched. guided missiles been terms, and the establishment craft, and against the war- the defence in general warning to civil of There against submarine possible.enemy lodgements. The Continental 19. In addition PJ'BD and other operated Defenoe frogramme agencies, the two countries in establishing installations fully for interceptor tor anti-aircraft carried to coitbined<p;lann:1i'l8tlirougif 'the weapons. and a third under consideration. undertakin~ more northerly The United States the extension In addition in operation and sites warning system, the mid- system is 1s also of the mid-Canada line cover the ocean approaches 20. aircraft systems, Surveys are now being out for a new early Canada line, manned radar have co- to these to to the continent. projects or in the planning whioh are either or oonstruotion stages, �TOI: SECRET - 9 1t is proba.bJ.e that authority may request the United States to: (a) (b) establish u.s. strategic bomber) bases in Canada; construct additional radar (c) fighter (and possibly early stations; locate U.S •. anti-aircraft to-air guided missile and ground- units are close to vital U.S. areas. Effect on Canadian Defence Programme 21. The defence in Canada, in area.s such as Windsor which especially u.s. warning defence policy may affect the Canadian programme because of the political Canada should contribute ment of continental (a) proportionately defence. the integration requirement to the develop- This may require: of the air defences of Canada and the United States; (b) increase in the air Canada, including aircraft (c) fighter the increase forces of aircraft, and guided missile in Canada's in U.S. defence Civil defence anti- forces; participation projects in Canada. Defence 22. One indirect increasing defences but very important demand for more effective is, more adequate end will continue and coordinated result of the continental to be, a demand for civil defence. that �TOP SECRET - 10 - Conclusions 23. It was concluded been no fundamentl earlier that change in U.S. defence "New Look" has marked a shift programme. to fulfil commitments, and to strengthen continental the use of strategic As these the requirements a direct effect policy, its own forces of air and tactical policies has placed power, the provision defences, and preparations defence will on Canadian defence systems, installations, integration defences closer of air measures commands. Canadian resources likely in planning it may be concluded - financial, to be substantially the for anti-aircraft bomber bases, in one command, and generally of cooperation In general have · As noted above, forces, strategic programmes, undoubtedly policy. interceptor and guided missile for atomic and thermonuclear take shape in concrete of continental radar the and Canadian Government may be faced with requirements additional has international Administration on the development of more adequate weapons. its the Eisenhower added stress there in emphasis in the defence While continuing capabilities, although physical and in defence that the demands on and manpower - are neavier. .·. ·... 000371 �• (THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER MAJESTY'S CANADIAN GOVERNMENT) • IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE CSC 1883-1 {JPC) N ....................................................... . 1itpartmtntof j}atfonalDefence TOP SECRET CANADA JOINT STAFF JOINT PLANNINGCOMMITTEE ADDRESS REPLY TO CHAIRMAN CHIEFS OF STAFF, OTTAWA. S" o I IS - Joint Planning ~6k C.ommit tee ' ~-zn:> :rI -'/c, United States De:t'ence Policy and the ~ ~ S"2)2.or Possib~e-Implications for Canadian Defence Policy 1 lo O I( l 3 June 19.54 P-1Cf - 4 o Reference is made to our letter 19.54 on the ab6ve subject, to which was attached a final JPC paper which had been forwarded to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staffo CSC 1883-1 dated 11 February On 4 May 19.54, the Chairman requested the Joint Staff to prepare a new paper on this subject, which was to include all the information we now had on the United States' "New Look"." The Joint Planning Staff has prepared a 'draft report for JPC approval, a copy of which is attached. 2. 3. This item will next JPC meeting. be discussed at the ~,~~ (W.Y. ~ti;?w?~ WYM/4972/mf Joint Commander A/Secretary Planning Committee DISTRIBUTION C Plans DGPO DNPO DAPS I DMO.& P DNPOSO(S) External Affairs Rep. (Mr. Rogers) Sec JPC CJS JPS -JPS (XA) ( File @ . · . ~1;,:_"':,A~f,;)~;p·.:,_,_{/-;:;~•:'.V,:'.'.:?~~ _000372 II J �TOP SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY DRAF'l}; 19,4 3 June, UNITEDSTATESDEFENCEPOLICYAlIDTHE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADIAN DEFENCEPOLICY Report by the Joint Planning Committee to the Chiefs of Staff Committee States has entered Introduction The United prepared. two World Wars un- In the ~ace of the threat which has developed since World War II, is determined that of this is to attempt paper U.S. defence Republican policy this of Russian will to define sihce Broadly speaking, Truman Administration on the Soviet of collective and through its alliances Altantic was sent with area limited policy under through forces in Korea and the defence aid was given to Indo-China. based on Nations. and Turkey; U.S. defence regional mutual of South America and-the were established; the of Communist and U.S. in the United to Greece nations to the U.N. action policy. It was a policy security membership of the defence of local perimeter. a principle assistance defence which what implications was one of containment power based on the development forces the direction and to indicate U.S. States The purpose the advent the "New Look" may have on Canadian 2. the United not happen again. has taken administration, aggression alliances Military defence North were committed of Formosa; In addition to these .... . /2 000373 �TOP SECRET - 2 - commitments of u.s. forces and material, embarked on a programme to strengthen which would not only serve would also provide particular emphasis air the development power, provision 3. for defence of defence It was assumed that Truman-Acheson 4. Before but In this programme, to the expansion of strategic weapons, and the took office, a searching planning in contrast reappraisal it of U.S. and of defence spending. to the programme of the regime a "New Look" would inevitably attempting the Eisenhower briefly necessary. of atomic several to describe Government, factors forces, power to be used when Administration to undertake policy, own defence the Korean campaign. When the Eisenhower was committed of reserve was given of forces its States to defend North America, a source and where it was considered the United the defence it might policy be helpfui which have helped emerge. of to discuss to shape this "New Look". The Reason for 5. mitted the "New .Look" The Republican campaign for the Eisenhower Administration a programme which included spending, duction to cut taxes, of defence in the budget, as reducing expedient argued that commitments, means of carrying the U.S. to reduce and to balance was the obvious, com- and the Congress promises expenditures, foreign the 1952 election Government the budget. the largest and for to Re- single other reasons item such the most politically out this programme. economy could not continue It was also to carry the ooeoo/3 000374 �TOP SECRET - 3 heavy defence "crash load which had been required action" build must be spread up, and therefore over a longer period for the the defence effort of time and geared to the "long haul". 6. The decision possible to.reduce to a large in Korea. tension extent In addition, have believed that spending by the cessation while the United the potential had lessened, administration defence considered that it of hostilities States threat neverthless by the increase willingness 7. is probable in defence u.s. thermonuclear deter for retaliation its alli~s) ..,. 8. With this the Eisenhower reduction Finally strength the realization thermonuclear to strike any target force. the reduction was the developatomic the strategic force power and of continental capacity (and to could further expenditures. that the Soviet Union had capacity gave the Eisenhower on which to justify to the strengthening air required which the U.S. increased in North America, more resources and with effective weapons and the potential the basis in some of the power to Administration in defence developed Administration spending, by means and at places , with These weapons together and provided the of NATOand the and strategic the real choose. , to divert and defence weapons. aggression, justify in the strength of tactical constituted retaliate, at least which was used to explain commitments ment by the airpower factor that by 1954 the power of the of the U.N. to meet aggression Another may not and international Communist world had been counter-balanced, measure, was made their decision of U.S. air defence. 000375 �TOP SECRET - 4 - 9. It seems clear was dictated Party that largely to rescue wastefulness the U.S. from the alleged of the Truman-Acheson rationalized its that the U.S., haul" to avert the allied and its ' 119 policy allies, to meet aggression of the u.s.s.R., rtc:m called for that change in It the strength the Soviet of threat, a deterrent the requirement /0~, to commit on the capabilities of increased retaliatory defences. that in reality u.s. defence there policy. Eisenhower stated, Mr. Dulles added, ·the Republican Government has assumed all has been no As President the "New Look" was not new, and, as obligations which it undertaken; it slogan was not a happy one. and previous has continued The the international Administrations to provide have for·oes, military on the equipment and economic assistance to its allies perimeter of the Communist world; and it has continued to strengthen increasing its own forces, effectiveness ment and availability ... the crash-action an4 1that·9oviet continental . fundamental commitments. a~ any point the development It would appear and to power provided which would somehow reduce perimenter and with the arguments the need to continue power and stronger policy mus.t. conv._ert to the "long weapo~~- :.,and air U.S. forces 10. its economic exhaustion, thereby·•.r-ed.ucing threat by reducing new defence failures Administration world now co,-ziter-balanced . ~New a "new" defence by the commitment of the Republican cut Government spending ,11) cf'{:,:r the need for relying.heavily of u.s. air on the power and the develop- of weapons of mass destruction. 0 ••• 0 • / 5 000376 �TOP SECRET - .5 11. It may be possible ·clearly at this point what the "New Look" actually what it may mean for The Principles of 12. Within tions, it might concretely general the framework be helpful u.s. programme which, of these at this of U.S. Canada's defence planning. general policy considera- point without assigning the defence (b) the reinforcement more planning. In and maintain priorities, of the defences those the capability a provides of the North American especially "local" to define defence Government must develop (a) (c) and Defence Policy the objectives the more means in practice, then to define u.s, to outline for: continent; of its allies, in NATO; of contributing actions effectively to such as in Korea; + (d) the capacity-.to targets (e) of these forces continental defences. United States' action" build years - air, terms U.S. up of military what Admiral of readiness". has now revised its defence a sturdy military tained haul 11 over an extended power. Radford elements of the The "crash several described as The U.S. Government programme with posture period"; is and effective power over the past "a very high degree "providing policy subs,ta.ntial and naval, of deterrent u.s.s.R.; defence to provide land, against the high seas. These are the basic concept has produced of the of controlling principles, in very general offensive decisively in the homeland the· capability On the basis designed retaliate this the aim of which can be mainis the "long concept. 000000/6 000377 �TOP SECRET - 6 U.S. Military 13. Programme The prtncipal strengthening Admiral tion role of Allied Radford, "the of modern air of the United defence forces creation, power that power will and support requirements for present striking effective numerically provide and thermonuclear strategic and tactical it of its better 15. their equipment through and more WeaRons power, the use States' for is of fundamental instantly that by means and at Atomic and thermonuclear be used, weapons but they are now considered conventional military a strength. Commitments Abroad As implied earlier, commitment of forces the United States 16. u.s. the Far East "it with is much less States' primary is to NATO. In this has agreed own in Europe". policy the United abroad of its principle offensive is based on the assumption own choosing. of the United U.S. Force operations, to retaliate may not necessarily part of- weapons which are available strategy has the capacity places services, of U.S. military of atomic u.s. to that of manpower. In the development i.I,l).portance. and exploita- in fact_, ·1 be increased The Role of Atomic and Thermonuclear 14. to defensive, its·- oth~r of new weapons, utilization according . I • the·· f.orc_es of the alliance. ·'. power will, the introduction in the will. be superior Tµis air reducing is, maintenance any other". Although States "to maintain regard clearly is not militarily substantial to committing defined. sound", regard U.S. As forces forces to .a general according to Admiral ..... /? 000378 �TOP SECRET - 7Radford, echoeing indefinitely however, U.S. that troops the views of the President, land rorees the United States to the Korean war, intention to Asia". of maintaining and that certain Okinawa in the Far East. declared that China, in Korea while Japan, Korea, continuing on the other capably to give effective assistance defences This third in terms programme. Before defence time the United its forces hand to provide policy turning with economic programme was of launching to its allies, decisive and thirdly, on the North American is unquestionably to the therefore, considerations is based. be easier aspect u.s. the of implications programme, the general may then Indo- which might not and Pakistan forces defence has also of reducing to provide Continent. defence intention that to prepare review its earlier important .fqr Defences retaliation, u.s. Mr •. Dulles It was noted designed bases, its aid. Continental 17. military At the present and Inda-China and military committed has declared consequences to Indo-China". has announced it be recalled, Communist Army invades it would have "grave be confined States the Chinese It will very quickly example, if "to commit With this for the Canadian specific it the most details of the might be well on which U.S. background to see the implications for defence to continental in mind, it Canadian policy. 00000/8 000379 �TOP SECRET - 8 The Principles 18. of Continental The most important America - effective Defence aspect of the defence retaliation against potential of the USSR - has already from this aspect, the defence in effect, -air defence, means, adequate warning establishment weapons~ in depth interceptor aircraft 19. agencies, requires of early to joint planning the two countries interceptor aircraft and sites Surveys are now being carried system, the Mid-Canada the extension that through for aircraft. strategic ' to construct installations a third for weapons. warning more northerly States line is also system under- to cover the continent. to these to establish in a new early of the Mid-Canada the United the PJBD and anti-aircraft out for projects or in the planning (b) and anti- invading systems, The United to the ln addition (a) and defensive have cooperated line,and consideration. ocean approaches probable systems to destroy manned radar operation terms and the guided missiles fully 20. which authorities warning aircraft, Apart in general and military establishing taking been considered. Defence Programme In addition is under the war-making of North America, guns - in positions The Continental other to civil of Nort~ which are or construction States may request u.s. fighter bomber),-bases ,:, . ~ ' . additional either stages, in it is authority: (and possibly in Canada; early warning radar stations; •oooe/9 000380 j �TOP SECRET - 9 to locate ( C) UoSo anti-aircraft and ground-to-air units especially guided missile areas on Canadian 21. The U.S. Defence defence may affect the Canadian of the political requirement Canada should contribute of continental defence. This may require: the integration of the air proportionately and the United increase to the development defences in Canada; in Canada t.,s pa_~t;icipation ,~!rf,l.\q • I,,' \, in U.S. defence the increase and guided Civil projects \ One indirect increasing anti-aircraft forces. but very important demand for more effectj~~ and will coordinated continue civil to be, ' defence. Ar{ed S~s / · ass/stance eme~cy .. will in this . Tll'-HJreq~t trlidoubted'ly ./ defences . adequate will t. f o asJstanc:)9Lse I of the ~~~re /on a more pos1. 1.ve programme provfa.ing result contiiental i~~eats?r1re-a~/t~i:~l!"V~. i nsis . f . in'·canada; of Canadian missile '!~l ·~ . Defence 22. is, of Canada States; squadrons the increase ( d) that in the number of all-weather fighter ( C) to vital Programme policy programme because (b) in . areas. Effect (a) close such as Windsor which are u.s. defence in Canada, and ne~ <ffl~Y 7 ec 1.ng an areas./ be r~give e some p~efamme. • •••• /10 I 000381 ~ �TOP SECRET - 10 - Conclusions 23. It was concluded been no fundamentl earlier that change in U.S. "New Look" has marked a shift programme. continental the use of strategic weapons. As these the requirements and tactical of continental a direct effect on Canadian Canadian Government,nia:v additional radar and guided missile measures commands. Canadian likely of air resources interceptor undoubtedly policy •. As noted forces, strategic in planning may be concluded - financial, to be ~ubstantially will programmes, have above, the for anti-aircraft bomber bases, in one command, and generally of cooperation it for and thermonuclear with requirements installations, In general the provision and preparations defence defence defences has placed shape in concrete be faced systems, and power, atomic take the international own forces of air has in the defence its defences, policies there policy, Administration on the development of more adequate closer its the Eisenhower added stress integration to fulfil and to strengthen capabilities, defence in emphasis While continuing commitments, although physical and in defence that the demands on and manpower - are ~eavier. 000382 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 24 JUNE 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-06-24 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00031 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Joint Planning Committee report, “United States Defence Policy and the Possible Implications for Canadian Defence Policy," 24 Jun. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3. civil defence continental defence CUSRPG Joint Planning Committee PJBD US defense policy W.Y. Martin https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/7fadff2a92bb9a9da9cbe69e86e25ff7.pdf 671df20916b5d0b5ba1cbef094e2a176 PDF Text Text \ First Draf:t, AIDE MEMOIRE A study of Recent Changes and.Trends in United States Defence Policy and the Implications it might have..on Canadian Defence Policy Introduction 1. As a result of recent statements the Eisenhower Administration, by spokesmen of it has become evident that the US Government have re-assessed their defence policy and that a "NewLook" on defence may have emergedo f ··' Purpose 2. The purpose of this paper is to examine the "New Look" and consider what implications it may have on Canadian defence policyo United States Defence Concept 3. Broadly speaking United States the Truman Administration defence policy under was one of periphery a build-up of local and United States this peripheryo An example of this defence with defence forces on policy was the build= up of NATOforces to contain the Russians in Europe. back up their policy, the United States built To up a strategic air force and an atomic bomb stockpile to be ,either a deter= rent or a means of massive retaliatory striking During this period it was considered that the threat North America was9 in an overall wide threat, secondary to the threat of Russian aggression to assessment of the world= to Eu.ropeo It was also ~onsidered during the Truman Administration threat powero t~t the general was more immediate than is now thoughto 000124 �•• .. TOP SECRE.l' - 2 - 4. Since the Eisenhower Administration have been indications .. ' - " Public statements -·- leading spokesmen of the Eisenhower Administration emphasized the fact that the United States taken another look at their at the Ministerial Government has defence policy. For example, . . )1.- I 1q~7.:-t I speech on J.mle. 12 Mr. Dulles said that will"place more reliance depending"primarily 5. in a . .. . the United States power and powerr.. This means upon a great capacity to retaliate by means and at places of our own choosing". The Canadian Ambassador to t~e .. United states discussing states . upon community deterrent less dependance upon local defensive instantly Mr. Meeting of NATOin December 1953, ----~--- ' by have Dulles emphasized the "long haul" concept and later - there that there may be a change in United States defence policy and strategy. - took office the questi~n of possible in changes in Unite~ defence policy in his message No. 142 da_ted '24 .Jan 54, attributes these changes in part at least to the follow- ing facto1's: (a) the attitude unrelated taken by the Administration, to the Republican campaign promises for reductions in Government expenditures, that the United States tain (b) economy cannot main- in peacetime the levels up after of defence built the outbreak of the Korean war; the appreciation of the Administration there has been some slight tensions not and that the threat reduction that in world of Soviet aggres- sion is not as immediate as it was considered to be for planning purposes during the Truman Administration; TOP SECREI' -- "o o o/3 000125 �.. TOP SECRET - 3 - the reports (c), Staff .... , p~esented to th~ Chiefs of on the capabilities and availability . of nuclear weapons taken together with the decision ·on the part of the Administration Seek Congressional. friendly (d) allies to approval to share with . certain kpowledge concerning the tactical use of rruclear weapons; the decision taken by the Administration with the concurrence of its highest military advisers to rely on the "deterrent retaliatory power" to a greater or massive degree than on "local defences"p ioe. the meeting of _ aggression From thtCa:hadian would eem to United factor on the ground where it occurs~ Mil~ / befthe point of vie!the .\ / princi~asons ~efence policyo fo above---factors _L. \_~ any changes in -------- However, another important which should not be overlooked is the increasing Russian capability to attack North America with nuclear weapons. 60 Mr. Heeney developed his factors and arrived conclusion that there has been no important at the change in United States defence policy but that there will be _gradual changes in strategy. (a) These changes in strategy will be8 A general t~ghtening up on United States defence expenditures which will ma.inly affect personnel strengths and administrative over- heado TOP SECRET ooooo/4 000126 �.. 0 . TOPSECRET - (b) A greater reliance 4 - on new weapons including nuclear shared with friendly - - ... -- ___weapons .. - -- - .. - - . \. . to compensate for reductions . -manpower and to offset allies . in United- States additions to the Soviet arsenal. (c) Further strengthening of United States air power and especially or its ability to deliver the atomic goods. (d) Increased attention to continental defence in cooperation with Canada to protect the main base of the striking (e) power of the free world. The build-up in the United States of a strategic reserve of trained soldiery and weapons which will be committed to action where the Service Chiefs think they will do the most good, not necessarily at the point of actual aggression. (f) A highly cautious approach to involvement in any further incidents would result of the Korea type which in the commitment to battle of United States ground troops. 7. The Canadian military view is in agreement with the conclusions drawn by Mr. He;{neyon the possible United States strategy. changes in The soundness of such changes have not been considered in this paper. Possible Implications to Canadian Defence Policy North America .. 8. strategy It would appear that proposed changes in United States relative to the defence of the North American TOPSECREl' 000127 �TOP SECREI' - 5- continent based on the increasing Russian capability ?f prime importance to Canada. Possible results will be of these changes might be: (a) Extension of the early warning system to include: (1) the mid-Canada line (2) seaward extension (55th parallel); of the mid= Canada line; (3) construction of the Northern chain of -radar stations (4) (.G8jf'rodo); additi_onal gap-filling radar stations. (b) Increase (1) in air def~nce forces increase including: in all-weather fighter squadrons; (2) increase in AA (guided missile) forces; (3) formation of Bomarc squadrons (advanced type of ground to air guided missile); (4) (5) completion of the integration of Canada-US Air Defence forces; . requirement US fighter 9o States for construction bases in Canadao Should the above measures be proposed by the United 9 it is probable that the Canadian Government would have to reconsider the whole problem of Canadian participation in the air defence of North Americao Consequently probable that there will be an increasing ,,. of 9 it is need for Canada=US 0.ll000/6 000128 �• ,~ 6 = _J joint it is possible Ultimately planning. that pressure may be brou~ht to bear for the establishment integrated lOo commando W'nilst the fear has been expressed that the new United States strategy may result United States forces fr-a;he no indication~time t\ )·f . V withdraw effective theatre rf )y intention Therefor, , ,t is ass in Eu ope as previously . ,'riJ> .f J States there 9 is to in spite of the movement of United States atomic least .. EuroP.ean theatres combat forces from the NATOEuropean Canad' n commitm llo in the withdrawal of some V weapons to that theatre \ { J of an 11 fo theL ' United ;!e~s rest·riction H '\__ obscure. eapons by the , it is !mowirr--i..na.;..--no now remains on consideration planners of the possible , . . J~., b~' plannedo Use of Nuclear·weapons ,I '/ I . _ · Tje policy o~se of_nucl-ear military that any critical situation involving by United States use of atomic weapons in fJ the commitment of United forces. Canaa/4the br ' e pl".,7.,;:;:,f d implications of their cl/ \;J'f;~ usV f ,/, ------------------........ -- Jj Korea l2o It is thought that the planned withdrawal of two United states divisions in the situation from Korea implies United States thereo these two divisions battle However~ it should be noted that are being replaced by two ROKdivisions efficiency. confidence recently The planned reduction in the UN order of brought to combat in United States Army forces under the proposed 1954=55 budget amounts to approxi= mately two divisional sliceso It is possible 9 therefore» TOP SECl~ 0 O l.' 0/ /ryS 000129 �...:, , '' ,.. TOP SECREI' - 7 - that the two divisions withdrawn from Korea, or two ethers now in the United States, - nny be deactivated .. 195~0 Any further before l July plans for wit~~ forces from Korea will undoubtedly~e considera- - tion of the lfttla&Pawa:xor CommonwealthForces • ··- ---··· .. - --~ .. Mobile Strategic Reserve -• ( ·• C • . • -····- l3o It is considered the United 'states a strategic reserve of forces centrally policy of holding in the United States stems from the desire of the United States auttlorities have their forces as far as possible ployment to meet sudden aggression, committed in peripheral flexibility available rather defence with the consequent loss or It i~ not thought that this . . /I /"'\ . the use of other /than normal trahsportation the deployment for de- than have them and the problems or reinforcement, expenditures. to of' thifategil reserve;'• supply and policy.,,envisages /._ ..j facilities for/ Ji.icy/ . unv keepin_g with th' Canadian plan (to hoJn:d2/3 of the ~vision . f I assigned to SAO~ in Canada Dayo . Conclusion 14. It can therefore the main implications States Defence Policy, Continental be deduced from the foregoing that to Canada of the "NewLook" of United will primarily be in the field of Defence. 000130 J � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 8 FEBRUARY 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-02-08 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00019 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Joint Planning Committee draft report, “A study of Recent Changes and Trends in United States Defence Policy and the Implications it might have on Canadian Defence Policy,” 8 Feb. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. continental defence Dwight Eisenhower John Foster Dulles Joint Planning Committee Korean War US-Canada relations