1 20 11 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/92f03d66c25a84482656b057549f9784.pdf b5aa71a4d8472370e2abdf29d88d29cd PDF Text Text Cc~ . i'o<t']f • ' Y/& ~tti!. 6-~;M.,~ .J.oc.eos{r) ~ ~- C,,e-. ~ loll,._.~ ~:,/he ::::;r.1~ ~/~ ~~ /- ~, ~-- f- lo (~ Despatch 1 D---,--i1td. ! ; No. ~/0......(~~) AprJJ..) ..,.)-.~?ft!............... '. TO: OTTAWA No • • FILE •«. _]) -€t1// ~ -~r.~,, ... CLASS~CATION {I S E C R E T Canadian ~so Embassy, 11s·-tµ> WASHINGTON,D.C. CANADA ..No.... 142.. ot:. J.anuar.y .. Z2.,. l9.5.4-,...................... ~- . .\ 3 .St.at.es .. Defenc.e. P.olic.y. •......................................... Discussion in the past few weeks has made it clear that even in the United States advertising cannot make something new and different out·· of :·an old product, especially when that product is national security. In the process of re-explanation, the "new look" in United States defence policy has lost much of its novelty. The President himself has said that the slogan is not truly descriptive of what the Administration has in mind and furthermore that he despises slogans. IVIr. Dulles' speech of January 12 has been re-written and appears in the April issue of Foreign Affairs. It was given advance release as a State Department press release on March 16 (our despatch No. 503 of March 18). This revised description of United States defence policy, while still containing some of the debatable premises of its predecessor• makes it abundantly clear that the Administration's defence policy is essentially a continuation of past policies adapted to current circumstances. . No. of Enclosures file No............... . .Despatch .. Unit.ed Copies Re £erred To .............. f,/.,i.c.Lb'r'IA.U"' • THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, Reference.Our 1ubject: Ambassador, .~ ;/:'//, S:!2,Y ~ti FROM:The Canadian Post , . 2. The President has assured newsmen that the "new look", or the "Dulles doctrinen, is not new or revolutionary. The action taken by the Administration in the defence field, he said, was simply an attempt by intelligent people to keep abreast of the developments of the times. Patterns become out-moded in warfare as they do in any other field of activity. The United States did not plan to fight for its security in these days with muzzle-loaders. On the other hand the United States did not intend to take the extraordinary action of initiating an all-out war to settle issues affecting its interest, which were raised in some distant corner of the world. Mr. Dulles has admitted before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "tlle_. new look" was perhaps not~~ happy slogan. The development of the Administration's defence policy, he said, had been by evolution and not by revolution. It rested on certain new decisions taken by the National Security Council, but it was linked, as any successful policy had to be, with actions taken in the past. It was never intended to be a policy which would turn every local war into a world war. Nor was it a policy which minimized the importance of collective security. The cornerstone of security for the United States and for the free world, y 000516 / �1 ' .\.c:f:i~ ~'if~PN 4 • l 2 1954P.!>I?6 \, f ·, ~. , .. I ) I 000517 �-2- was a collective system of defence, community power rather than purely national potential. Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, has described the Administration's defence policy as the end-product of a searching review of the nation's military requirements for security and of the nature of the best United States contribution to balanced collective allied strength. It was not the first such review of military requirements, he said, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff have continuously reviewed security problems and requirements. (Admiral Radford's clearest public exposition of current United States defence policy is set out in the March 5 issue of U.S. News and World Report.) He has asserted that global strategic concepts as applied to collective allied strength have not changed but that there has been a change of emphasis in the composition of the United States forces which will be contributed to a balanced collective allied organization. His public definition of the essentials of the Administration's defence policy is perhaps worth quoting in full since it contains most of the elements, we believe, which were taken into consideration by the Administration in framing its present defence programme. "The "new look" is a military reassessment based on national objectives, the world situation, preparations for the long pull, our improved weapons, the increased strength of our collective forces, an evaluation of the existing threat, and a considered estimate of future trends and developments. "It provides for an improved readiness in our Reserve forces to meet today's requirement for rapid mobilization. It involves our Allies and the United Nations. It envisages certain military assistance and advice in the development and maintenance of Allied forces where needed and requested. It involves military strategy, timing, logistics and economy. It involves U.S. policies, commitments and risks." 3. It seems to us that we have reached the end at least of a chapter in this complicated subject and that, unless there is an appreciable change in the world situation, we may anticipate that the principles of United States military policy will not be subject to any important further changes or interpretations. '.l.'he conclusion which we reached in our despatch under reference that no revolutionary changes had taken place in United States military policy has, we think, been fully supported by recent explanations and clarifications by those most concerned in the Administration with defence policy. The next chapter will be concerned primarily with the budgetary base of the defence programme. As the individuai services make their cases before Congressional committees for funds, we may learn more of how the Administration's policy was formed. More important, perhaps we shall learn more of how domestic politics are to affect the Administration's defence policy. We doubt ••• 3 000518 �-3- that the hearings will, however, bring about any change in the principles upon which the Administration's· policy is based. We have sent you, with our comments, the texts referred to above. It may be worthwhile, however, before the defence programme is exposed to the vicissitudes of Congressional action, with all that involves, to send you our appreciation of recent developments which while not revising the substance of the conclusions we reached in our despatch under reference, will bring our comments up-to-date. 4. Mr. Dulles gave his speech of January 12 the title "The Evolution of Foreign Policy" but phrased his definition of the Administration's policy with respect to national security in such a manner as to give the impression that revolutionary decisions were to be implemented. The most important of these impressions was that henceforth the United States would rely primarily on instant and massive atomic retaliation at places of its own choosing to deter or if necessary to punish aggression. Less emphasis would be placed on the traditional policy of meeting aggression by direct and local opposition. The selection of military means and targets would give United States defence policy greater flexibility. Under the circumstances it would be possible to achieve additional basic security at less cost. It was essential that the United States not become permanently committed to vast military expenditures which might eventually lead to practical bankruptcy. The United States and the free world was concerned with Soviet planning which was in terms of entire generations. It was not sufficient, therefore, to adopt security measures which were adequate merely to ward off an immediate danger. It was for that reason that the United States had put forward at the last NATOCouncil meeting the concept of the "long haul" which involved the steady development of defensive strength at a rate which would preserve and not exhaust the economic strength of the United States and its allies. As a result of the basic decisions taken by the National Security Council the United States was in a position to seize the initiative from the potential aggressor. It must be repeated that the important fact about this speech of Mr. Dulles was the impression which it left. Mr. Dulles in recent weeks has said, with some justice, that the speech was subjected to much "mutilated quotation" and more will be said below about his more recent statements of clarification. It is of some importance, however, to mention briefly what happened between Mr. Dulles' speech of January 12 and his article in the April issue of Foreign Affairs. Through most of the intervening period Mr. Dulles was out of Washington, first at Berlin and later at Caracas, and was unable to answer questions directly as to the meaning of some of the more elliptical passages of his speech. 5. The first ripple of comment came immediately from the more responsible journalists who suggested with obvious disbelief that Mr. Dulles seemed to have indicated that there would be no more local wars so far ••• 4 000519 �-4as the United States was concerned but that local incidents of aggression would be met by all-out atomic bombing of the Communist capitals of Moscow and Peking. Some commentators questioned whether the President had the constitutional power to order such instant retaliation without consulting Congress. Others examined the implications of the policy for the allies of the United States and especially for those allies on whose soil United States bases had been built. At the same time tentative comment eddied in the swirls of Congressional consideration of the Bricker Amendment. On the whole, however, comment in this period was sparse and somewhat uncertain. The full tide of comment was loosed, as is so often the case in the United States, when the issue became the subject of domestic political controversy. 6. On March 6 in an address to a Democratic rally in Miami Beach which was nationally televised, Mr. Adlai Stevenson "in no spirit of partisan relish" suggested that the so-called "new look" in foreign and defence policy was not new at all but merely a continuation, with adaptations, of earlier (and Democratic) policies. he implied that the Administration, caught between two conflicting sets of promises, the balancing of the budget and the strengthening of United States defences, had given priority to the first and that its defence policy flowed from this decision. He made a plea for "true bipartisanship" in the formulation of policy in such an important field, implying that there had been little if any consultation with the opposition party by the Administration in the development of its defence policy. He called for a more forthright explanation of what the Administration had in mind. In this context his remarks had the bite which had become his trademark in the Presidential election campaign. "Issues of life and death should be clarified and not clouded, for security in our age cannot be bought by slogans and gimmicks •••• if our military policy is beyond the further financial endurance of the country, if this reliance on retaliation is the only reasonable policy for the long haul, then frankly tell us so and why. But don't confuse us and frighten our allies by misbranding disengagement as advance and retrenchment as initiative. Don't tell us we have something new and better for less when we haven't". Mr. Stevenson coupled his remarks on the Administration's defence policy with an attack on McCarthyism and by doing so invited political counter-attack. The Republican party immediately made arrangements for a television reply by Vice President Nixon on March 13. At his news conference during the intervening week, the President indirectly charged Mr. Stevenson with demagoguery, and denied vehemently that there had been any lack of consultation with Democratic leaders on defence and foreign policy matters. Mr. ~ixon was at his saccharine best in delivering ~hat· was in essence a political attack of a pretty low order on previous Democratic Administrations and which, if anything, served further to confuse observers as to the ••• 5 000520 �-5role assigned in United States its massive atomic retaliatory strategic power. thinking to 7. Within the Administration itself there were evidences of differing views. General Ridgway, the Army Chief of Staff, appearing before a Senate Appropriations sub-committee on March 15 expressed concern at the proposed reduction in army strength which is planned over the next two years. He refused to say whether he had recommended the cut. in army manpower, saying merely that he had accepteu a decision from a higher authority. Speaking to the National Press Club in Washington on March 19 Ge!leral Ridgway conceded the importance of new weapons of mass destruction but asserted that future wars, large or small, would be won finally on the ground. He thought there would be small wars which would not be of such a nature that they could be won by atomic mass destruction. It was obvious that General Ridgway was speaking for his service in much the same fashion as Admiral Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, did some weeks before in a public address to the Naval War College. Admiral Carney said that no single rigid course of action would safeguard the United States. Regardless of how the war was fought it would end on the ground and he was certain that the participants would not walk on the water to get there. He continued, "I see no alternative but to hedge our strategic bets ready to rush into the future but also prepared to meet, and rely on, the methods of the recent past. If we are honest with ourselves we will acknowledge that there are big wars, little wars, general wars, localized wars, Marquis of Queensbury wars, atomic wars and, perhaps, non-atomic wars". The Air Force with its own particular axe already well ground by the decisions already taken by the Joint Chiefs said very little in this period. Admiral Radford, as we have noted above, was quick to declare through various public channels that the United States was not building a Maginot line of atomic defences. In a role somewhat that of a referee, he argued that it was all a matter of emphasis and that at the moment the United States was emphasizing its advantages--its air power and its new weapons. These advantages were well based on the continuing strength of the army and navy which would be second to none in performance and capabilities. 8. The international implications of Mr. Dulles' speech were brought into focus by Mr. Pearson's address to the National Press Club in Washington on March 15. While, as we have mentioned before, a number of correspondents had touched on this point, Mr. Pearson's speech was taken as a point of departure by most responsible commentators for articles on the importance of United States consultation with its allies. We noticed only one sour comment on Mr. Pearson's speech, from Mr. David Lawrence adequately representing the lunatic fringe. 9. Against political strife, implications--Mr. which should go a this three-panelled service rivalry and Dulles produced his long way to ease the background--domestic international clarifications concern which ••• 6 000521 �~, J . ' -6his first speech engendered. We shall deal only briefly here with his remarks since the new explanation in his own words is available to you in the Foreign Affairs article and in the transcript of his press conference of March 16 (our despatch ~o. 528 of March 22). He asserted that there was no intention on the part of the Administration that the United States should in every circumstance retaliate instantly with its massive retaliatory power but that the Administration intended simply to build-up the United States capacity so to retaliate. The United States had entered two world wars unprepared; the Administration was determined that this should not happen again. This capacity for massive retaliation would supplement local defensive power but would not be a substitute for it. The Administration's new defence policy was evolved from past policies. A most important element of the United States capacity was the whole-hearted co-operation of the allies of the United States and especially of those upon whose territory important United States bases were built. The United States' allies would certainly be consulted in any situation affecting their security. In dealing with the President's power to order instant retaliation, Mr. Dulles took the stand that while joint action by the President and Congress in ordering retaliation was desirable, the Constitution did not leave the President impotent to act if consultation with Congress was impossible. The President would have exactly the same constitutional power to order retaliation against an attack on a NATOally as he had in the case of an attack on the United States if he believed that the attack was the first phase of an action against the United States. 10. The misunderstanding attendant upon the phrase "the new look" has been largely dispelled and the Administration's case has been put in more understandable terms. It would however be misleading to assume that there is nothing new in the United States defence programme for the next three years. Speaking with deep sincerity, Mr. Dulles assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recently that new decisions "were on the books" of the National Security Council which were not there two years ago. We shall probably never know of all the decisions which have been taken but we can hazard reasonably accurate guesses as to some of the more important. A paragraph from Mr. Dulles' article in Foreign Affairs gives us some clues, we think, and it might be worth examining it in detail. 11. Itwas necessary, he said, for the Administration "to re-assert our freedom of action in repelling future aggression and to re-assess the impact of newer types of weaponsn. 'l'hese words can be expanded to cover the deterrent of massive atomic\retaliation. It seems clear from this and other indications that the Administration decided that its service chiefs should henceforth assume that atomic weapons were to be used as conventional weapons whenever and wherever the security of the United ••• 7 000522 �-7States required their use; furthermore there were to be no more "privileged sanctuaries" beyond any future Yalu Rivers; finally the potential enemy should be made aware of these decisions in a manner designed to cause him most concern. These were decisions of principle. The exact manner of their implementation would vary with particular circumstances and here the enemy must be kept in doubt. He must know only that he would not necessarily be met man for man at the front line of aggression. 12. It was necessary, Mr. Dulles continues, for the Administration "to qualify the extent of our reliance on collective security and to define more clearly our basic $trategy in Europe and the Far East". Collective security, with all that entails in the way of United States overseas commitments, was accepted as the keystone of United States security. (This was not a new decision but nonetheless was an important re-affirmation of previous defence policies, if one bears in mind the extensive Republican attacks during the Presidential campaign on Democratic policies of "foreign entanglements".) The defence of Europe was given priority over that of the Far East, again with a full understanqing of the strength of the Asia Firsters in Republican ranks. In both areas local defence had to be built up to a point where United States manpower would not be a sine gua non for victory. It would not be sound strategy permanently to commit United States· land forces to Asia in anything like the numbers required for the prosecution of the Korean war. ~he system of United States bases throughout the world had to be maintained. The collective measures functions of the United Nations had to be strenghened. 13. Finally, Mr. Dulles writes, it was necessary "to relate the composition and size of our ready and potential forces to all these factors". It has been stated emphatically by Mr. Dulles and Admiral Radford that the balanced forces concept, in the sense of an equal share of the defence dollar to each of the three services, no longer governs United States defence policy. For the immediate future the emphasis will be on United States air power. The Administration believes, however, (according to Admiral Radford) that there must be a balance of forces in the alliance. 'l'he implication is clear that the emphasis for some other members of the coalition must be on the provision of increased manpower. There will be reductions in numbers in the other United States services but it is hoped to maintain (and this contrasts with an absolute increase in United States air strength) their present striking power with modern weapons. 14. The point dealt with in paragraph 11 is, of the three mentioned, probably the most important and the most susceptible of misinterpretation. For that reason we offer these additional comments in the full knowledge that we are venturing even further into the ••• 8 000523 �-8treacherous territory of surmise. It seems to us that the Ad.ministration has decided to take a calculated risk. In general terms it will threaten the potential enemy with atomic retaliation in the hope that such a threat will deter him from aggression. In specific terms it will define areas regarded by the United States as vital to its interests and to those of the free world. If, in spite of these warnings an act of aggression occurs, then and then only will the Administration decide finally what degree of retaliation is required. It may vary from the use of conventional weapons, through the deep tactical offensive which Admiral Radford spoke of at our recent meeting of consultation, to saturation atomic bombing of the enemy's heartland.. (Mr. Dulles' explanation on March 29 of United States policy towards the Indo-China situation seems to fit this pattern.) The Administration believes that this "principle of using methods of our choice" helped to bring the armistice in horea; "the aggressor was faced with the possibility that the fighting might, to his own great peril, soon spread beyond the limits and methods which he had selected to areas and methods which we would select". 15. Even during the Korean war decisions were taken which did not have the enthusiastic,approval of the closest allies of the United States. The Administration may again decide that it is necessary to act independently in this broader field of defence. We do not wish to draw this analogy too sharply. 'l'here is evidence that the President and his closest advisers on these matters are well aware of the necessity of consultation with their allies. Y~t in spite of public statements on the extent of United States consultation on defence policy, there has in fact been insufficient consultation with allies. In the circumstances it may prove necessary for those allies on most intimate terms with the United States to suggest a greater use by the United States of collective councils already in being for the more frequent exchange of views on how best to employ the defensive strength of the free world. It certainly makes more essential, as Mr. Pearson pointed out in Washington, the diplomacy which will lead to "an agreed collective decision without prejudicing speedy and effective action in an emergency". It underlines the importance of the meetings of consultation held from time to time b0tween senior Canadian and United States authorities. 16. In our despatch under reference we singled out certain other factors which seemed to us important in the development of the new United States defence policy: the United States estimate of the Soviet threat, the firm link established by the Administration between economic and military strength and the concern of the Administration at the state of United States reserve manpower strength. Additional information has been made available in the meantime on these three factors, in public statements and in our recent meeting of consultation with senior representatives of the State and Defense Departments. • •• 9 000524 �. ' -9- 17. The Administration's appreciation of the Soviet threat seems to be along the following lines. Soviet planning is in terms of generations. The Soviet Union is capable of launching a war at any time even though it is presently estimated that the Soviet Union is not likely to initiate a major war in the next three years. The collective strength of the free world has been increased significantly in the last three years and to the degree that it is stronger there is probably some relaxation of tension. Soviet pressure on the West, however, has not been relaxed and relaxation of tension is probably more in our minds than in the minds of Soviet planners. The Soviet threat is a three-pronged offensive on the military, economic and psychological fronts. It is as important to counter the last two threats as it is to meet the military threat. There is no alternative, therefore, to the "long pull" concept since the free world will have to live with the Soviet threat for an indefinite period. Such a situation of tension is infinitely preferable to atomic warfare. United States defence planning, therefore, must parallel Soviet planning and United States objectives must be defined not in terms of the next year or the current budget or the present Administration but in terms of the long range interests of the United States. We see no reason to challenge this United States estimate. 18. Administration spokesmen continue in public and private to stress the importance to national security of economic considerations. Their arguments follow two main lines, first that continued defence spending at the levels and following the methods of the last three years could result in the practical bankruptcy of the United States and its allies, and second that the use of new weapons under a more flexible strategy will in fact reduce necessary defence expenditures and give the free community of nations greater security at less cost. 'I'hese arguments are understandable in terms of Republican campaign promises. 'l'hey are less acceptable as arguments of fact. We cannot, however, assume that they are advanced by the Administration without some basis in the best estimates of its civilian and military advisers. Planned United States military expenditures remain high and only time will tell whether they are high enough. 19. Admiral Radford in the last meeting of consultation on March 4 connected the problems of expenditure and manpower. He said that, in the long term, Congressional appropriations would shape the defensive strength of the United States. In the short term, however, the problem of obtaining trained manpower was a greater problem than that of obtaining funds. In their reassessment of United States defence strength the service Chiefs estimated that the maximum defence forces which could be maintained over an indefinite period based on the present United States manpower pool and without dipping into reserves, would have ~o be limited to approx1 here might be some imately three million personnel. change in this situation as 1960 drew nearer for it was estimated that the size of the manpower pool then would • •••• 10 000525 �...10- increase significantly. 'l'hese calculations were obviously based on the estimate that the emergency conditions of all-out war would not arise. It was implied that even under emergency conditions the United States manpower pool and especially its pool of tnained reserves, would remain a problem of concern to the service Chiefs. 20. Our round-up of comment on United States defence policy would not be complete without some further reference to the relationship of domestic politics to recent developments. Exchanges over the past few weeks have revealed the possibility that partisan domestic politics could interfere with essential co-operation in the fields of foreign and defence policies. Since 1945, with a few lapses, Democratic and Republican co-operation in meeting the really big issues of foreign and defence policies has been achieved. It is clear, however, that the present Administration has not gone out of its way to take Democratic leaders into its confidence with respect to its present defence policy. Mr. Dulles admitted in his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 19 that perhaps there should have been closer consultation with opposition leaders in Congress. The Administration has now rectified to some extent the impression given in its earlier statements on defence policy that its new policy was a complete break from the unhappy Democratic past. Mr. Dean Acheson, breaking his year-long silence for the first time to comment on current United States policies u~ew York Times of March 28) added his warning to that of Mr. Stevenson's which is noted in paragraph 6 above. He asserted that, "this democracy and the coalition it leads are lost if the competition for leadership (and we believe he meant domestic United States leadership) becomes a competition in promising cheap and mechanical solutions to dangers which can only be met by effort long sustained". 21. The experiences of the past few weeks may lead the Administration to seek closer co-operation with opposition leaders in this important field. If this is done we believe that the A~T.inistration's defence programme is unlikely to run into any great difficulties in its passage through Congress. If it does not there is every likelihood that Democratic leaders will turn their big guns on the programme. Some observers have suggested that there was for a time some support in the councils of the Democratic party for the idea of attacking the President at his strongest point, his experience as a soldier. If his defence programme could be proven in the eyes of the public to be less than one would expect of an eminent soldier, some inroads might be made before the November elections on one of the strongest elements of Republican power, the President's popularity as an individual and the public's respect for him as a soldier. While it would probably be wise not to put this development outside the realm of possibility, we doubt, at the moment, that it is regarded as an important Democratic stratagem. • • • 11 000526 �.. -11- 22. The important question remains, and has in fact been posed by Democratic senators as to whether the United States has the military power to implement its new strategy. This is essentially a question of military concern and we would be interested to know what the thinking of our own Chiefs of Staff is. on the subject. Expressions of public concern in this field here in the United States are directed mainly to the adequacy or inadequacy of United States continental defences and their important counter-part civil defence preparation. We shall attempt, in the near future to draw together current comment on this aspect of United States defence policy. __ I • 000527 - I � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 1 APRIL 1954 / AMBASSADOR TO SOS EXTERNAL AFFAIRS Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-04-01 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00030 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Canadian Ambassador, Washington to Secretary of State for External Affairs, "United States Defence Policy," 1 Apr. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3. Adlai Stevenson Dulles doctrine John Foster Dulles Lester Pearson Ridgway https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f1637f2ef4d619895b9c0e918bfd56aa.pdf 4b9864d7fadf4cf0180ae93a956caaf7 PDF Text Text ~/ / ~ 1st Session 22nd Parliament 1.hn.ume 96 Number 81 House of Commons Debates Official Report Tuesday, March 30 1 1954 Mr. H.W. (Kootenay Page 5:480 Herridge West) (CCF-) ' I listened most carefully to the minister's explanation of Mr. Dulles' exptanation, and' while I fully ,appreciate, and I know the house appreciates, the stand the minister took in the speech he made in Washington, I must admit that when he finished I was just about as foggy as when he started. I am of the opinion that .when Mr. Dulles made the first speech he intended to say what he did say and · later tried to explain it away. My conviction. is somewhat strengthened by reading a speech Mr. Dulles made at the American Legion convention last September which l think dearly indicates the frame of mind with which Mr. Dulles approaches these questions. He addressed the American Legion convention in St. Louis on September 3 last year, and with respect to relations with the world at large he went on to say: I I There is much talk these days about the increased responsibility that now devolves upon the United States. That responsibili_ty ·is a reality ... we do not now have to be constantly taking international public opinion polls to find out what others want and then doing what it seems will make ·us popular. Leadership won that way is shabby and fleeting. Our present duty is rather to adhere with increased loyalty to what, in our past, has been tested and found worthy. Mind you, the past has been one of lackof consultation in these matters with the rest of the world. For more than a century our conduct and example won for us world-wide respect and prestige. That is the only kind of leadership worth having. I think these remarks indicate Mr. Dulles' rather independent attitude toward this question of consultation with allies before making statements and important decisions. As far as this group is concerned, we are of the opinion that when Mr. Dulles made that statement he intended to frighten the Soviet Union, but all he has done is to frighten most of his allies. We do urge that strong repre-, sentations be made to indicate the repercus- ' sions in this country following a speech such as -Mr. Dulles made with respect to massive ' retaliatory action and so on in case of certain/ circumstances. [Mr. Herridge.] ------:.::.-:.-:.:.:.:_:_-:_:_:_:_::_ 000009 �) 1st Session 22nd Parliament ··--olume 96 ,.., Number 81 House of Commons Debates Official Report Tuesday, March 30 1 1954 Pages 3476-77-78 --·- -- The Secretary, of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) in his speech said that in the Atlantic we want collective action, and we want consultation. Apparently all these things are necessary in the Atlantic. But in the Pacifi.c what system is there for united action? Such a system was not even mentioned by either the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State for External Affairs. There is no clear-cut policy. This su_bcommittee 7 - ... of the House of Representatives dealt with that too in their recommendations published yesterday when they stated: The· United States and free world lack a "clear and firm policy" on Asia and should draft one quickly. Asia today is the key continent. I have as an authority for that the Secretary of State for External Affairs. In 1950 upon his return from a trip to the Far East a report was issued the heading _of which is, "Asia, not Europe, Key Continent Now: Pearson." The article continues: Freshly returned from the trip today, Mr. Pearson said there had been a shift in the centre of gravity in international affairs from Europe to the Far East. He went on: Soviet imperialism, for the time being, seemed to be contained in Europe by two factors; the military alliance created by the Atlantic pact and the ,economic progress which had been attained. In the Far East, however, the Soviet brand of communism appeared to be making great progress, he noted. There was a danger it might overrun the whole of Asia. Its most dramatic success had been in China. That was on February 10, 1950. Yesterday the same hon. gentleman was quoted as saying here in Ottawa in a speech on Sunday, March 28: Mr. Pearson said that in his view there was nothing more important in the world today than the -1100million people in Asia. The Pacific area is obviously far more dangerous than the Atlantic and has been for some years. There has been a real war going on in the Pacific for some years now. Red China and the Soviet are together in Asia. It is not a case of just the Soviet Union. You have these two great nations together. Just think of the reserves of manpower available with which to make trouble in Asia. Red China is communist. We hear a lot of talk about this being an agrarian movement in China. I have here the latest publication of the "Behind the Headlines" ,, series of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. In an article entitled "China under Communist Control" the author, Dr. A. Stewart Allen, who was a medical missionary with the United Church of Canada in China from 1929 until he was deported in 1951, and who should know what he is writ• ing about, states: A large number of people still do not realize that the present changes there are not mainly the result of an agrarian reform movement, but of Russian communism which is the basis of the present government. He goes on to describe how the Chinese have tried to indoctrinate prisoners and people there who are in their control. He states: In indoctrination classes it was very plainly stated that the Chinese ·plan to assist in ushering in world communism. They state they have no need to worry about their northern borders which are friendly. But on all other borders, and especially to the south, they must assist in "liberating" their "friends" from their "colonial and oppressed status". Indio-China, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, India are all in the next line of threat from China. In Toronto a few weeks ago,· the date was January 25, Lieut. General A. C. Wedemeyer of the United States dealt with the same question and he said in part: However, many of our leaders were influenced after world war II by communist propaganda to the effect that the Chinese reds were peaceful agrarians-democratic and friendly to the objectives of the west. We have been paying for that false judgment ever since. He was addressing the Toronto Board of Trade. He pointed out that he had known Mao-Tze-tung and Chou En-lai for some years before they came into power. He stated: They owe everything to the Kremlin, from which they received their training and support. They are still receiving· liberal assistance from the Soviet union. So long as the communist oligarchy is secure in its rule of the Soviet empire, in my judgment, the Chinese reds would not dare desert it. Canada, our own country, is directly affected. Canada is a nation on the P<acific. Sometimes people think Canada only faces on the Atlantic, but Canada also faces on the Pacific and the Arctic and we would be wise to remember that in this house. If J,apan or Formosa or the Philippines go red then the first line of defence for this nation will be on the west coast. Make no mistake about ,that. If North America is ever invaded it will be from Asia, not from Europe, ,and it will be by the red Chinese. Let us not forget that fact either. Earlier today we had questions about the results of the "H" bomb tests at Bikini. On our west coast a few days ago they were using geiger counters to see whether a shipload of tuna fish caught by Japanese fishermen was radioactive. Our west coast is vitally concerned as regards the Pacific ocean and it should be remembered, Mr. Speaker, that the Pacific is not yet an American lake. These things -affect Canada on the Pacific but very little has been done in that ,area .to build a cohesive defence. The United States has a series of agreements. She has a defensive agreement with Australia and New Zealand known as the ANZUS treaty; she has another with the Philippines; and •• 2: 000010 �.. 1" - • 1st Session 22nd Parliament Volume 96 Number 81 House of commons Debates Official Report Tuesday, March 30, 1954 another with South Korea and she has a treaty of a little different sort with Japan. But Canada has been standing aloof in the Pacific. Canad.a has been following a· no commitment policy in so fiar as entering into any defence treaty has been concerned. Mr. Pearson: We have had 30,000 men in Korea. Mr. Green: I am aware of that, but Canada has not seen fit to take any part in any of these treaties in the Pacific. An hon. Member: Except in Korea. Mr. Green: Canada should take .a stand. Canada should have a policy for united ,action in the Pacific, a policy ,such that she will be consulted. We should be consulted about what is to be done in the Pacific, and we should have a policy of such a nature that the freedom-loving nations could work together in that area. The present government has never agreed. The Secretary of State for External Affairs has rather pooh-poohed my suggestion along these lines now for several years. I suggest the time has come for Canad~ to take some action. My suggestions have been that there should be worked out in ,the Pacific a defence pact similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and that in the meantime the ANZUS treaty could be extended ,to include some nations such as Canada and the United Kingdom. T,he Secretary of State for External Affairs replied with: "Oh, well, Canada has not been invited so how could we get in?" I am afraid Canada has never taken any· steps to ask for an invitation. There has never been any suggestion from the minister · or the Prime Minister. that Canada was a.nxious to get in or tha.t she would ever lift one little finger to bring about that result. Senator William F. Knowland, the majority leader in the United States Senate, upon his return from a trip to the Far East last November made certain suggestions. I have here a press dispatch dated November 17from Washington, in which he had some very interesting proposals to make. It reads in part as follows: He expressed the hope that the new Philippine president Ramon Magsaysay would call a conference of free "non-neutralist" Pacific nations as soon as possible to consider widening the old Australia, New Zealand, United States pact, which he said was too narrow a base, savouring too much of the outworn colonialism, to build a general Pacific security system on. Then the report continues: Senator Knowland envisaged the conference as including, besides the English-speaking nations of the Pacific, the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Formosa, Thailand, the Indo-Chinese succession [Mr. Green.] ---- ------ -- -- ·- - -- states of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, and went as far west as Pakistan, where the United States is considering establishing American bomber bases. He was asked about Canada, and whether he thought Canada should be a party. The report states as follows: Asked whether he thought Canada should be included in the proposed conference, Senator Knowland said: "If a conference of free nations were held certainly I would think Canada would be included." Canada, although a major Pacific power, is not a party to ANZUS or any other Pacific regional pacts created by the United States. Senator Knowland said he thought it was imperative to get the conference under wa·y soon, "Time is of the essence", he said. I asked' the Secretary of State for External Affairs about that matter in the house in November. As reported at page 151 of Hansard he replied as follows: ·Mr. Speaker, I am not aware of any such negotiations taking place at the present time or of their imminent likelihood, . I am aware that certain proposals have been made in Washington by members of the congress looking toward the extension of that pact. However, there have been no governmental negotiations as yet to this end, Other suggestions have been made. Why would it not be reasonable and perhaps vital to encourage natural alliances of the Asiatic nations, to extend the ANZUS treaty, and to make a real attempt to build in the Padfic a defensive alliance? I should like to hear from the Secretary of State for External Affairs, when he answers, why it is not ,possible for something like that to be done. My suggestion may not be the best one, but we just cannot -continue to have a vacuum in the Pacific. Something must be done to meet the situation in· that area. To me it is strange that the Prime Minister of this country, in thinking of the future in the Pacific, seemed to think that recognizing red China would end all the trouble. I regret that, while he was in the Far East, he did not direct his efforts to promoting a. policy for united a•ction by the freedom-loving nations in the Pacifrc area. I hope that the Secretary of State for External Affairs, when he replies, will be able to tell us that Canada is now adopting a policy which\ will bring about that end. We have waited all too long for leadership from the Canadian government with regard to Canada's interest in the Pacific. On this question we have had altogether too much soothing syrup from the Secretary of State for External Affairs. I hope he will now tell us that, for our own protection and in the interests of our fellow-nations associated with us in trying to save freedom for the world, Canada must adopt in the Pacific area a policy which is more realistic than any she has ever had. ------------ 000011 �Volume 96 1st Session Number 80 Mr. E. D. Fulton, 22nd Parliament House of Commons Debates Official Report Monday, March 29, 1954 Kamloops ( P.C.) - I should -, like now to discuss ·this matter of consultation in its international aspects. I think that in addition to a clear explanation from the minister as to what the policies of the Canadian delegation will be at Geneva, we are also entitled. to a clear explanation from the minister and the government as to how, in their view, the international consultation that he referred to as being so necessary, and to which he referred at such length, is going to be achieved. I am not going to follow him in all the tortuosities of his interpretation and his misgivings, and his subsequent reassurance as to the meaning of a speech made on January 12 by the secretary of state of the United States. I must say that to me, at any rate, it seemed that his belief that he had received an undertaking that there would be consultations is like a certain form of hypnosis, that is to say it was self-induced. I can see nothing in the various statements of the minister, and the subsequent statement by Secretary Dulles, which would entitle the government, this House of Commons or the nation to believe that it had an iron-clad assurance any more after the minister had spoken in Washington on this matter of consultation than before he 'had spoken. The minister himself has totd us that he took exception to three words in the speech of Mr. Dulles, when Mr. Dulles was outlining what is sometimes called the new concept of defence policy. Those words were "instantly", "means" and "our choosing". Using those words in the full context of the sentence, we find it reads in this way: The basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing. will as a general rule consult you before acting in any international situation, and we will consult you wherever possible. What other answer could be given? But I think we are entitled to ask: What sort -of assurance is this? Here is one of the sen-· tences used by the Secretary of State for the United States as quoted by our own minister at page 3330 of Hansard: In no place did I say we would retaliate instantly, although we might indeed retaliate instantly, under conditions that called for that. Well, that is just the point; what sort of assurance is that? What is the difference after that statement was made from what it was before it was made? In fact, it seems to me that it is pretty fatuous to say that we now have an assurance that there are ways of consultation, and that we have any right to be more reassured now than we were before. I think the fatuity that would there apply is made clear by the minister's own summary. as it is set out at page 3331 of Hansard, where he said: Mr. Speaker, I think the effect of this exchange of views, this conference, these statements and these clarifications has been that we ·now have a fairly clear and reassuring idea of what this new strategy and this new planning for defence is. One thing this interpretation does make clear is that diplomacy and consultation, which is part of diplomacy, is under this doctrine not Jess important but more important than ever before. Well, the whole atomic age and the speed with which things ·move, as well as the terrible and devastating results of atomic attack obviously make consultation more important than ever before. Then the minister goes on to say: Any decisions must surely be collective, whenever that can be done, before action has to be taken. Well, of course they should be collective. The Secretary of State for External Affairs told us that in his view, after he had made But the great question is-and it is the great question; and until it is his statement in Washington, all three of and unanswered answered I cannot see how we can accept those words had .been satisfactorily explained; so · that he now felt, he said, very much the minister's feeling of reassurance-when reassured that American policy did not mean · can that be done and what means are being worked out to ensure that it will be done? that there would be instant action or reaction Until we have that answer it seems to me on their part without consultation with their that a statement of that sort-"Any decisions allies. · must surely be collective, whenever that can But, Mr. Speaker, if the minister was be done, before action has to be taken"worried before he went to Washington, I can leaves us perhaps even in a more uncertain see no reason for his satisfaction now. The frame of mind than we were in before. problem -of course is, and always has been, The next question is: What decisions are one of ,consultation. Well, what did Mr. meant? Is it decisions as to general objec- ' Dulles say about this matter of consultation which would justify the minister in that feel- tives, or decisions as to methods of retaliation, ing of reassurance which he says he has? The or decisions as to circumstances under which minister did not summarize the effect of Mr. any sort of policy or retaliation will be folDulles' subsequent reassuring words. As I re- lowed; what sort of decisions are meant? call them, it seems to me that the effect of Then the other great question is: When what Mr. Dulles had subsequently said was can and when will that be done? What meassomething very much like this: Certainly, we ure of agreement between nations is there [Mr. Fulton.] 000012 �- 2 f. as to when it can and will be done? And so information, if you like, between the Canawe are left with the essential problem on dian government and the Canadian parliawhich I maintain we are entitled to be ment. That it seems to me has become a very informed by the government: What does this immediate problem in the light of the developgovernment intend to do to assure that there ments which have taken place in our foreign will be brought into existence, if it does not policy, and particularly in the light of the exist now, adequate machinery so that there fact that Canada has now undertaken comwill be prior consultation, and that there will mitments under a treaty of alliance, which is be agreed courses of action before those a relatively new departure in this country,. It courses of action have to be implemented, in is interesting to note that the minister made other words before the event of any Russian an implied condemnation of Mr. Dulles for attack. Because, as I see it, there is not what he said by almost a suggestion-that is, anything now in existence to· ensure that before it was satisfactorily explained-of a there will be always that prior consultation return to a continental secur,ity ·complex. and those agreed courses of action which can Here I read what the minister said at page be set in motion immediately. 3329 of Hansard of his statement on Thursday. It seems to me that no country, least of After analysing what Mr. Dulles might have all the United States, can contemplate the sort meant in his January 12 speech, he said: of delay that working out an agreed course And yet, if we relied too much on that· arid depreciated the importance of local defence. that would of action might entail, after an attack against be interpreted in many countries as meaning that the west had been commenced. Therefore some countries were expendable. And I doubt in the absence• of evidence that there exists if we· could maintain a coalition. even NATO, that consultative machinery now, which will very. Jong, on that basis. Inevitably there would enable us to arrive at an agreed course of be a retreat to isolation. action before attack, I cannot see any reason Therefore, Mr. Speaker, this was by inferfor reassurance, or any reason why the min- ence, as I read it at any rate, suggested by ister should be more satisfied after he was the minister as being a possible interpretation in Washington than before he went to of Mr. Dulles' speech. The minister went on: Washington. There would be a move towards what sometimes security, ·both in North I should like the minister to tell us what is is· called continental this is sometimes forgotten-in the Canadian policy, because certainly no America and-and Europe itself. country has a greater stake in this matter But security of this variety, continental security, than Canada. What is .the Canadian policy? is a delusion, because, and I think the house will What courses are we going to urge upon our agree with me, there can be no continental security without collective security. And there can be no allies in the North Atlantic treaty organizacollective security without collective arrangements tion to make sur,e that that organization for collective action. becomes and is used as a •consultative Well, as I say, it is interesting to trace machinery to enable us to work out those great courses of action in so far as that is developments in this country, and it is interhumanly possible in advance of a Russian esting to contrast that with what was Canada's policy just four short years ago when, attack? I say, "in so far as that is humanly in the dearest possible language, the Prime possible" because it seems to me that where Minister himself outlined the policy of conit is not possible-and we cannot anticipate every potential attack that may be made and tinental security, that particular policy which where it may be made and when it may be the minister has said it would be so wrong made by the Russians or by any other aggres- for the United States or anyone else to ·put sor-there has to be good faith and not all forward today. I am reading now from page 680 of Hansard for the second session of 1950. this trouble and to some extent these unrealistic misgivings that our allies intend almost You will recall, Mr. Speaker, that this session to react or to act without consulting with us. .was called not. very long after the outbreak of war in Korea, and the Prime Minister was But in those acts which cannot be foreseen and where even general principles cannot be discussing Canada's position with respect to sending forces to Europe under the North worked out in advance, then we do have to Atlantic treaty organization. He said that r,ely upon good sense and mutual underwhat we .were going to do was to make .$300 standing. million available. We were not going to make I should like to return to another aspect of any commitments to send troops to Europe this whole matter of consulting which seems 'under the North Atlantic treaty organization to have worr.ied the minister so much, but on because he said: which he has also left us, or in certain very I say that because it seems perfectly obvious to important aspects of which he has left this me that if we are to get the · greatest possible strength in Europe for the money and house, this parliament, in the dark. I refer effective resources we devote to national and international there again to the matter of consultation or security, $300 million spent on the equipping and 000013 �r .,,. 3 .J ,' ' The parties agree that an armed attack against arming of men already in Europe, men who are one or more of them in Europe or North America there, who have to be fed, clothed and lodged even shall be considered an attack against them all; if they are not armed, is going to provide much and consequently they agree that, if such an armed larger forces than the expenditure of the same amount of money in raising, equipping, arming, • attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized training, feeding, clothing and sheltering young by article ·51 of the charter of the United Nations, Canadians who would, under the present condition will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking of full employment, have to be drawn from the forthwith, individually and in concert with the other productive stream of this nation. parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and mainAnd the Prime Minister at another point tain the security of the North Atlantic area. on that same page said to an hon. member who had asked him, a question: I will· say to him at once that the government of Canada at this time is not considering the raising of Canadian forces to dispatch to Europe as a deterrent to aggression in Europe. So that we can say that just four short years ago no country was following more clearly and laying down more clearly a policy of continental security; that the job 'Of European defence is a job for the Europeans. · Surely, we shall help them with money and s'o on, but we are not going to help them with armed forces because· their defence is primarily ,their own problem. And four short years later, not even four full years later, our Secretary of State for External Affairs condemns what he says is the implica tiori in .Secretary Dulles' .speech of the return to continental defence policy. It is · interesting to see how far ~e have come in those four years along lines which I think we now all agree are correct; and the development which is important there is that we now have forces in Europe. We have a brigade groµp, we have an air division. The question now before us and the question with which most hon. members will agree with me is one that we are entitled to demand · that this government shoul'd answer is: What happens under these conditions to the concept which has always been the accepted principle in Canada that there shall be consultation, not only between governments but between government and parliament before Canadians are permitted to act? One recalls the history of discussi:ons of this type. One realizes immediately -that it has always been the accepted principle that the government will consult parliament, not only. before there shall be declaration of war particularly but even before committing Canadian troops to military action. We can remind ourselves of what the Secretary of State for External Affairs said in March 1949, when he was discussing the N'Orth · Atlantic treaty which had then just come into effect. At page 209'8 of Hansard of 1949 the Secretary of State for External Affairs is reported to have said: I need hardly add that if, in spite of our efforts to keep the peace, some member of this alliance is attacked and we are called upon to fulfil our commitments, this country, 'this parliament and this government will act with the necessary determination and dispatch. So far as this government is concerned, Mr. Speaker, in the face of a national emergency so grave as to ca!l into force our commit~ents under this pact, it would immediately desire to consult parliament. This has now become a regular procedure in our history, and no one of course would wish to depart from it. No government could fulfil the responsibility which action unde: this treaty would impose without being certam of the support of the people of this country expressed through their representatives in parliament. There we have the principle enunciated by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the first discussi'On of the North Atlantic treaty that before committing our forces to action we would consult parliament. If that were not definite enough the minister repeated himself on September 6, 1950, at the special session, where his remarks are ,reported at page 351 of Hansard. May I just remind the house that article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty states: It was in the light of that commitment and speaking on this subject at a later date that the minister said as reported at page 351 of Hansard for September 6, 1950: If there is an · attack made on a member of the North Atlantic group, that is an attack on all the members of the group. He was then asked by the hon. member for ~ancouver-Quadra (Mr. Green): Including Canada? And the minister Including answered: Canada. After some further change the substar,ce minister said: words which do not of the quotation the Parliament would then decide whether an attack had or had not been made on Canada. If parliament decided that such an attack had been made and we were at war, it is the custom of Canadians when they are attacked to fight back with materials and with men. Then a little later he said: I thought I had made that clear. An attack on western Germany which involved Canada by the decision of its parliament and its obligations under the North Atlantic pact would be met by materials and men. What then is the position in the light of the fact that we have a brigade in Europe? Supposing the Russians attack in ·Germany or in Austria. What is the position? What is the relation between the government and parliament if that development should occur while Canadian troops are in Europe? Are they to wait there until the government consults parliament? The minister has laid great stress on this matter of consultation in the international sphere, but he has left us in the dark on the question of national consultation. The minis- / ter said on Thursday last as reported at page 3330 of Hansard: I There is a second word to which I devoted some attention in my Washington speech, and that was · the wcrd "instantly". That word, in connection with the strategy we are discussing, involves no probl,em, as 1 see it, if there is a direct attack on your own territory, or indeed pornibly on the territory of your neighbour, because then it becomes a question of self-preservation and quick, effective, and instant action is essential and would be taken by any country attacked. No one, I believe, would take exception to that. · What happens then in the light of those statements and in the light of the present position in Europe with Canadian forces there in an atomic age with· the possibility· of atomic attack? What happens to the principles enunciated in 1949 and 1950? I conclude, sir, by repeating my position. This parliament is entitled to demand from the government a statement as to government policy on these issues. We are· entitled to know from the government what they would do with respect to the matter of consulting parliament in this sphere in the event of an · attack in ·Europe. ---· -· ... --- s - -------~! 000014 �• Volume 96 lat session 22114h.rl1ament Humbel"80 !louse of CommonsDebatoa Off1o1al_Rop-ort A.J1 Mr. Fraser.I St. John's East Uond.aJ',,r.taroh 99• 1954 [ 1-..)·__ , I was g7eatly surprised to hear the hon. member for Kamloops (Mr. Fulton) assert in this house tonight that the speech made by our Secretary of State for External Affairs to the national press club in Washington and the statement that followed it by Mr. Dulles in his article in Foreign Affairs has shed no light on the original statement by Mr. Dulles. I certainly cannot agree with that estimate. That statement of January 12 by the United .States secretary of state I have described as momentous. I think it was momentous for several reasons. First, it gave a dear and unequivocal warning to potential aggressors; .second, it seemed at first sight at any rate, to place great emphasis upon the utilization by the western powers of those resources in which they have the greatest advantage such as, for instance, their scientific svpremacy, -their technical know-how, their industrial .skill; all of which may be regarded as offsetting the vast, almost unlimited manpower ,of the Soviet bloc. But nevertheless, Mr. :Speaker, that statement inspired serious mis_givings. What were some of the causes of the uneasiness produced by the Dulles new look statement. First ·of all, of course,-as the .Secretary of State for External Affairs clearly showed in his speech on Thursday in this house-there was ·the question as to whether there would be prior consultation between the United States and its allies before resort was had to this policy of instant and massive retaliation. Fears were expressed in many quarters that the United States might be lapsing into a Q)olicy of continentalism. I have before me here extracts from Mr.Dulles' article in the April issue of Foreign Affairs, an article which followed the speech by our Secretary of States for External Affairs in Washington. I quote from Mr. Dulles' statement as follows: The cornerstone of security for the free nations must be a collective system of defence. They clearly cannot achieve security separately. No single nation can devel_op for itself defensive power of adequate scope and flexibility. In seeking to do so, each would become a garrison state and none would achieve security. And Mr. Dulles went on to say this: This is true of the United States. Without the ,co-operation of allies. we would not even be in a I position to retaliate massively against the war :industries of - an attacking nation. - ·- 1 __, Then he added a reference to the use of bases of the United States in foreign countries: The free world system of bases is an integral part of its collective security. At the recent fourpower conference in Berlin, Mr. Molotov repeatedly attacked these bases as evidence of aggressive purpose. Actually ·these bases on the territory of other sovereign countries are merely a physical expression of the collective security system. Then he went on to say this: They were constructed only at the request of the host nation and their availability depends upon its consent, usually as a legal condition and always as a practical one. The requisite consent to the use of these bases would never be accorded unless it was clear that their use was in response to open aggression, and reasonably related to its scope and nature. This gives assurance of their community function. Mr. Dulles said in his article in Affairs he restated, perhaps even more emphatically, in a press conference which he held in Washington on March 16. I quote from the report of that conference as · it appeared in the New York Times of March 17. This is Mr. Dulles answering a question, and he said: What Foreign -mnt-r--f)I I _7~ges/ It is, I think, well known that the bases which we have in foreign countries are in general not usable as a matter of law, and as a practical matter are not usable except with the consent of the countries where the bases are. For example, the bases which are available to our strategic air force in Great Britain ,are not usable as a ibase of attack except with the consent of the British government. The same is true in general with all our foreign bases. Therefore, it is implicit in our security system that it operates with the consent and acquiescence of the other partners ·who have helped to provide the facilities which create a sort of international police system . Later in that same press conference when asked if there would be consultation Mr. Dulles said: Yes, there would certainly be consultation most of the cases that I can conceive. of. in Now, Mr. Speaker, admittedly Mr. Dulles' statement does not say that there will be consultation in every · conceivable case, but it does say that there be consultation in most cases and · that there could not be use made of United States bases in other countries without the .consent of the host country. That, I think, is important for us to know in Canada, particularly for those of us who live in parts of Canada where the United States has military bases as, for example, in Newfoundland. · Another question which the new look statement of Mr. Dulles on January 12 raised in the minds of many people is this: Would the apparent reliance upon massive retaliatory action necessarily mean a general war? Would it mean that whenever aggression of any kind, even ·of a small kind, took place in any will part of the world retaliation would be atomic? W oµld the effect of this new look policy be exactly the opposite of the effect which the United Nations strove to achieve in Korea in · 1950, namely, to confine and localize the conflict and to prevent the extension of a local conflict into a world conflagration? Here, too, I think the statement of our Secretary of State for External Affairs led Mr. Dulles to give us clarification because in that same article in the April issue of Foreign Affairs Mr. Dulles stated: To deter aggression, it is important to have the flexibility arid the facilities which make various , responses available. In, many cases, any open assault by communist forces could only result in starting a general war. But the free world must have the means for responding effectively on a selective basis where it chooses. It must not put itself in the position where the only response open, to it is a general war. Again, he said: This calls for a system in which local defensive strength is reinforced by more mobile deterrent power. He added: In every endangered area there should be a sufficient military establishment to maintain order against subversion and to resist other forms of indirect aggression and minor satellite aggressions. This serves the indispensable need to demonstrate a purpose to resist •and to compel any aggressor to expose his real intent by such serious fighting as will brand him before all the world and promptly bring collective measures into operation. He concluded: That does not mean turning every local war into a world war. It does not mean that if there is a communist attack somewhere in Asia atom or hydrogen bombs wiH necessarily be dropped on the great industries of China or Russia. There, Mr. Speaker, is another very important point that has been clarified as a result of the questions put by our Secretary of State for External Affairs.· Yet another misgiving has been removed by the same cause. One question which I think suggested itself to many of us after reading Mr. Dulles' January speech was whether the new look policy would involve United States withdrawal from western Europe, whether it would mean a retreat into continentalism. There is no need for me to emphasize how serious that would have been, particularly in its psychological effect upon the continental countries of western Europe, and more particularly France about whom I propose to say a little more in a few moments. But here again we have an assurance from Mr. Dulles as found again in the article in Foreign Affairs. He says: Moreover, the program does not mean that we intend to pull our forces out of Europe. It is, of course, essential that the continental nations themselves provide a harmonious nucleus of integrated defence. If they do so, the United States would expect to maintain substantial forces of its own in Europe, both in support of the forward strategy of defence and for political reasons. 3461"'62 -- ..·--- --~·-..--- 1 �J; • •. countrieii wiilii:iut·"tr,e--consent of the liost country. That, I think, is important for us to know in Canada, particularly for those of us who live in parts of Canada where the United States has milita.ry bases as, for example, in Newfoundland. Another question which the new look statement of Mr. Dulles on January 12 raised in the minds of many people is this: Would the apparent reliance upon massive retaliatory action necessarily mean a general war? Would it mean that whenever aggression of any kind, even of a small kind, took place in any I �vo~• NU1ii( Session ParliWnenb 96 79 Mr. Cameron ~ Nanaimo 1 House of Commons Debates Official Report Friday, March 26 1 1954 ~C~t-=) I suggest, sir, fha.t""th;"'time has come for calculated risks. There are times when caution is the most reckless and dangerous course to follow. I suggest that this is one of those times. Let us for a moment consider the recent developments in United States and British military policy, and see how they fitl into our role in the world scene today. We, are spending some $2 billion, presumably for defence, and yet every report from the United States and Great Britain suggests that the United States is now retreating, if one may use that word, to dependence upon peripheral strategy; to dependence upon the very thing of which Mr. Dulles spoke in the United States and to which our government took exception. They are depending upon the power to drop atom bombs on actual or. potential enemies any time that they consider it -necessary. I suggest, sir, in that case we may well questioill the value of many of our defence expenditures today. This afternoon I heard the Minister of National Revenue (Mr. McCann) state he had been investigating slingshots. I would suggest it might be a good idea for him to investigate some of our conventional weapons to see if they are very much more valuable in an atomic age. I would suggest a careful examination of this expenditure in the light of recent developments, and in the light of the recent horrors in the Pacific, because it might well indicate a large part of these expenditures are useless burdens on our economy. Such an examination may indicate that now is the time for decisive action, a reduction in our defence expenditures and the application of -those funds to aid those parts of the world which may very well fall victims to communism throuJ;!h internal collapse and disorder. . -- - ----. 000017 �Mr. L.T. Stick Trinity - Conception Page 3400 f"~IB~iso-ttiat;-inview of the-, danger which threatens, local defence is not sufficient. In other words that we must have collective security if we are to survive. He said that collective action is needed on instant retaliation. May I comment on that last note which I took. Much has been said before by way of criticism of Mr. Dulles, secretary of state for the United States, when he announced the policy of instant retaliation. As on a great many other occasions in the history of this cold war in which we are engaged, the people in this and in other countries took counsel of their fears and wanted to know from Mr. Dulles what he meant by his statement. They wanted to know' from Mr. Dulles what he meant by it. Anybody who knows the United States and the foreign policy of the United States knows this. It has no aggressive intentions against anybody. When he made that statement he implied, if he did 1 not specify it at the time, that instant retalia- I tion meant only if we were suddenly attacked. '. With that statement of Mr. Dulles I agree. \ All military experts here and abroad tell you that if we go into a third world war we are not going to have a declaration of war; that it will come suddenly and possibly overnight. If we are going to call the United Nations into session to decide whether we will hit back and whether we are going to consult the United States and whether they will / are going to con~lt us, we ~a;,. lose the war overnight. We have to be reasonable about this and use our common sense. If the U.S.S.R. strikes at us suddenly, . through the air, are we going to wait to know, what Washington is going to do, or are we going to tie their hands by waiting and wasting precious' time so that we shall be handicapped to hit back? Because the expert .military. opinion today is that whoever gets in the first blow; and the first heavy blow, has a very good_ chance of winning the war on that.basis. I am with Mr. Dulles. If we are suddenly attacked, arrangements should be made so that the United States' hands are not tied and so that the strategic air force of the United States can hit back at once without any waste of time; otherwise time will play into the hands of Russia and not on our side. 000018 �.e96 .. r let Session 22nd farl1ainent 79 Hous$ ot CommonsDebates Otficie.l Report Friday, Mr. Phillippe ---·-5o·u6':l}-lo Xareh 26 1 . 1954 ~ti C Pages 3385-86 Picard ~ ·-=.;~,( Bellechasse (L) ,-Let us talk now of the line of defence 'in the . Far East should there be any attack made by the communist countries. As I just / said Japan is the first and northernmost point, then Okinawa, then Taiwan, then the Philippines. If the United• States hav.e come to the conclusion, as they apparently have, that any threat to Southeast Asia may come from communist China it is reasonable· that' they should try to establish such a line of defence. It is understandable that they should help and contribute to the armament of Japan so that it may insure its self. defence. It is not surprising either that they I made of Okinawa the strong arsenal it is at the moment. I am not revealing any secret when I describe Okinawa as a stronghold and evidently the formidable base from which could start any retaliation in that sector, action as envisaged by Mr. Dulles. It is known that the Americans have spent hundreds of millions on its defences. The next natural base is Taiwan. To leave an empty unused space between Okinawa and the Philippines would be unthinkable if we carry on from the same premise of the potential attack from the north. How can the U.S. recognize communist China and yet maintain bases on Taiwan that is under the control of the legitimate government of China that was expelled from the mainland. If Taiwan is part of a first line of defence how can you turn your back to the Chiang kai-shek government. When we come to consider the Chinese problem we . realize that it is more complex than most people seem to realize. 000019 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 30 MARCH 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-03-30 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00028 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Canada. Department of External Affairs. Excerpt from House of Commonds Debate Official Report. 30 March 1954. Record Group 25, vol. 2, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa. ANZUS John Foster Dulles Lester Pearson Red China Soviet imperalism https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/22ff32a0fa07bcc1662c094a54e573bf.pdf 521800db325e315295b4fa47a35820fc PDF Text Text \ ,.- - "' I) 0 ORIGIN AL TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATEf.OR ~XTERNALAFFAIRS,CANADA Priority __ System I_RP_O_R'r._!A_NT_. ____ ,. CYPHER•A'G'tO Oepamnental Cin:ufotion I No... I~~ WA-4:98 · · Rc?ferel'l(:e:· Your· telegram·EX-457· . .·• . : MINISTER 11 ·1 UNDER/SEC 0/UNDER/SEC · ,tlarch 24 11 19540 ·· of fiJa-~1-i·24!) 1954\Y\ . , \ \ Dulles. tes~imony-~on United ·Stat'es . \\ Sut,j~ 1 A/UNDER/SEC S ·. . ' . . ' .· defenc~ 0 --· policy. '\ / OUr telegram HA-493 of Narch 24 :conta3~a certain e~9erpts from the Du.lles testimony- 111h1chdeal~~1nly t'ii.1;h POL/Co-om,in SECTION reteP.ences 1n the hearing befo~~ the Senate For~ign Rtt:1at1ons Committee to your speech of lla~h 15. \:;'l!hey include Dulleso statement that the new United st~tea d$f'ence policy had been d1SCUS1?edat.the MATOCouncil meeting last December~ · rr-----n-1 ):>' 2: It 1aas only 111th\some diftieu.lty that we were able to arrange to see the rough transcript. He had it in our hande tor only about twenty mi11ute~i as it was on its wai· to t«r o Dulles for cheeking. It v1as to go from his off ic;e to the printers3 we can not therefore eend you an;v more of the transcript than that contained in WA ....q.93. 3. for what use it •Y be, however, we include below the summary of Nr. Dulles 0 s more significant remarks based on notes taken by an officer of the Embassy who attendea the meeting. ft1s summaey might be read toget..lter with the coverage of the Dulles• testimony by the 111re services and by the Hem York 'rimes of 1.tarch 20 which contains tai.rl7 lengthy quot'a!ions t'i'Om £he testimODYo '?he swmna:eyfollows Mr,., Dul.les11 own words as closel,- as hasty notes taken at · the bearing pe:mutt., R~erences C.C O~ 1)111,l)N J) Ii · ~ .Gk. ~{¼) I( A-fo1 ~ ~. ,, 1 rJ. _ • . j The noyeltf llff~ '' ,, h 4o Dulles echoed the Pres1.dent s s remarts ( at his press . conference on r.Jareh ll) t:1at nthe new look• t1as perhaps not; a happy slogan., Dulles said ansr sowid policy had to undergo a constant process of examination. There ~as no sense in a frozen policy o 'fhe development ot the Ac1ministrat1on I s defence policy ~as an evolutionary process which will continue and whieh will involve some adaptations of past policies and some shifts of emphasis. The Adm1n1stration~s . ~ p,,;.,, AAri. hu- ~---vl-:''7- ~ . V.L, (."2,,,) ,~. IA,/Y.·~ · ., ti· policy ;-_ · ~~~ v, ~'I. ·h / Done.iLaA,;.,...._-. 0me1l.:~ .'•l z tl2 ., Em. 230 (rev. 3/52) !!3 P, 'i70 of .~}?.eane'! .... look~. in this field tJas net based on a new philosopby of defence 1n tbe sense of a s1n~e,.a.1 e revolutionary acto lo policy 1n the defence or foreign fields could be successtul unless it had continuity t111th the past and v.nless it rested on firm biparti.san suppoi-t in Congress" .Possibly selectivity was the key-note of the Adm1nistrat1on•s =defence pol1CYo 0 0 0 ., 4 • • 2 000030 �• - 2 - The military were now free to select their own targets for the defence of the United States to a much greater degree than in the past. Dulles asked the Senators to take it on faith that new decisions had been taken by the National Security Council t1hich t1ere not on the recot'd two years ago {the clear inference was that one or these decisions related to the possible use of atomic ueapons 1n any circumstance affecting the security of the United States). Massi'!!.,,£ett!_l_~a_!!o_r- vs. local defences 5. Dulles thought there had been much mutilated quotation ot his January 12 speech. The t1hole emphasis 1n that speech had been on the necessity or building up the United States capacitl to retaliate. ~assive retaliation might not be the United Stai;es :rea,ction tn 11 every eircumst;ar1ce. f;tassi ve retaliation" t1aa not 11 necessarily "atomic retaliation ,; there had in raat been no mention of atomic retaliation in his ,January 12 speech. It would be utter folly$ however, to try to match Communist manpower with United States manpower under conditions chosen by the enemyo Flexibility must be maintained and 1t could not be maintained by concentra-: ting on one type or def'enceo The problem ot a proper balance ot the defence effort of the United States t1ould remain pe?'plex1ng. Masstve retaliation uas a supplement not a substitute tor local defensive power· which would alttays be important. Consultation Mre Dulles stressed that consultation by the United with its allies was essential to the United States security. The portion of the transcript which we s~nt you records some ot Ur. Dulles remarks on this acore t1hich are typical ot t1hat he said throut1hout the hearing. You also have th,? text of Mr. D-ulles opening statement to the Committee which sets out his views on the importance of' the alliance or. free nations against the potential aggressor. f!lro Dulles adm:1.tted in addition that his 011n consultation on the new defence policy ~1th the interested congressional committees mtght heve to be improved .. 6. States Con!!_.tJ_tuttona! er2,~l.<!1!~ 7. f.tr. Du_llesr views on the President's pot1er to order instant retaliation without consulting Congress ~as the subject ot searching questions by the Senators~ More·ttme was devoted to this matter in the hearing than to any other aspect of the problem -- a good indication of the Jealous guard Congress keeps over ~hat it regards as the pre~ogat1ves of the legislative brancho Dulles maintained in face of stiff questioning that while joint action by the President and Consress in ordering retaliation t.ras desirable, the c;on~t:J..tution did not leave the President impotent to act if consultation with Congress was impossible. It was obvious that'a ~ar could not be prosecuted without Congressional approval. In over a century, honever~ Congress had never declared war but had simply recognized ex post f'!,Ct~ that "a state of war exists". There was a twilight zone in constitutional practice tthich it was neither necessary nor possible to define in advance to meet every conceivable circumstance. Dulles thought that United States ratification ot the NATOtreaty made 1t more likely that 1n the event ot an attack on a BA'l'O ally the President would use the discretionary power·he possessed wider the constitution to order 000031 �- 3 United States retaliation without consultation with Congress if the time required for that consultation would further endanger United States security. It ~as a fact that under the NATOtreaty a.n attack on a NATOally l1as an attack on the United States. Such a tact ~ould obvtously loom large in the Pres1dent 1 s decision as to the necessity ot reacting immediately to aggression. Dulles stateq clearly that in his opinion the President would have exactly the same constitutional po~er to order retaliation against an attack on a MATOally as he had in the case of an attack on the United States. if he believed that the attack on the NATOally ~as the fi~st phase of an action against the United States. Dulles reiterated the Presd.dent•s oun assurances., however., that where-ever possible'Congress would be consulted. 8. Dulles refused to give his views as to t1hether United States military st1•ength was s~t'1cient to implement the defence policy which he was expounding on the grounds that this was a question which could beat be dealt 111th by the Secretary of l).etense and the Chiefs ot Staffo He refused also., rather lamely we believe., to be drawn into a discussion on the effect of McCarthyism on United States relations with its allies on the grounds that it would be an improper encroachment by the representative of the Executive Branch on the affairs of the Legislative Branch of the United States Government. 000032 �., (, v,•. F.v- :0 ' .., .. ,, .., .. B 51 000033 �INCOMING . " MESSAGE 0 ORIGIN AL Security Classification FROM: THE CAMADIAN Ar-IBASSADORTO THE t.mITED STATES. UNCLASSIFIED . . . ( . File No. s-o I Is- p .. 'f O TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA t /0 System Priority IMPORTANT EN CLAIR No. HA-493 Date ~arch 24~19540 Departmental Circulation MINISTER UNDER/SEC D/UNDER/SEC A/UNDER/SEC'S ReferenceJourteletype Subject: Dulles 'POL/CO-ORD IN testimony on United States defence policyo understand that yo\1 ttish to have for possible use on ~arch 25 the transcript of ~r. Dulles• testimony berore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Aarch 19 CThich is mentioned in our telegram tinder reference. We ~oro able to get access to a copy or the uncorrected transcript for a very brief period today and the passages 1n which special reference ttas made to your remarks of March 15 are included below. We were told that because of the unusual interest tlhich has already been displayed in the hearing, a special eff'ort will be m.a6e,··, speed up the printing of the formal ~oJR'! and it may be avail\'Je SECTION - c.e,05 WA-481 of r-1arch 200 J/fVL DN]!, I 't% ~ 'tJ;~ i ·..: lln Se,(. ~'~. . ~ ~ able (4Q Don2'!om,.coMM's sEcr111·r Oate__ 4..;;·~---1 ,f:Al\14111..:2::....; References in a t1eek. The State Department was most helpful in arranging for us to see the rough transcript, even if only·br1efly. The hope was expressed that in any use you made of it immediately you would not indicate that you ~ere quoting the record, even though you might in fact use the actual words of the transcript. Thia is only a rough transcript and there may be changes in the text before it is printed in the final report. In addition, the Senate Committee Hill not itself have the record tor some days at least .. 2. 3. Text ot excerpts from transcript, Eegins; Senator Ferguson: r:ir. Sec:i:•etary, hot-1many of our Allies have expreased a concern about t1hat you had to say in Neu York on the question or retaliation, I m0an publicly hot1 many have expressed themselves? Secretary · Dulles: I am t1illing to cover it privately toe ... cI uould say none of them have. Reference has been made to the statement that uas made bore by the Canadian Poreign ~inister. He said to m0 that it oas not intended as any criticism at all. He said he had thought he was expressing himself in quite a complimentary way about my speech ~hen he aaid he thought it was a speech of historieal import. And he ~as rather surprised at its interpretation which he said to me ~as a misinterpretation. He bad not intended to express himself in a critical way. · ···········2 000034 ":-ct.230 (re¥. 3/S2> �I -2- Senator Ferguson; Being in agreement with your speech in New York I want to say the. t I 't-ras surprised at the interpretation that has been given to it, but I am wondering whether or not we cannot look at Mr. Pearson's speech in i;his light -- that Cnnada, I think for many years has been very jealous of its position in the Empire and has in a way considered that a decla~ation of war by Great Brttain itself was not to be considered as a declara•tion of war by Canada. That has been the history has it not? Dulles: Yes Sir. Senator Ferguson: Being from Michigan and a.neighbour so close to Canada I know that we feeJ. that that is true and therefore he did express concern that any one else could c1ctually declare war for Cana.els. A11dI think the United States stands in the same position, does it not? That no one else can actually declare war fol" us. Dulles: I think the Dominion of Cane.de. has a very proper concern th.at it should nc·t, if I might put it th.at ,;-ray be taken for granted either •.••• Sor1ator Ferguson: Yes: D~lles, (continuing): By the United Kingdom or the United Etates tha.t it functions in this matte:r as an independent fr,overe1gn state just as "t-1e do. :3enator Ferguson: Yes - (continuing). Now this you have never considered pe:rsonally, that Mr. Pearson's remarks were ones of fear or apprehension that what yoQ were doing could not be a.greed ·to by Canada. Dulles: No, Sir•. Senator Ferguson: And from your experience, Canada has been consulted as other nations, I assume that is true. Dulles: Yes, Sir. Senator Smith: I have on.e more question Mr. Chairman, if' I may,,and that is the question of the extent to which under these agreements we consult with our Allies. 1 As a result of your Janua:ry 12 speech, that is when you first spoke of this capacity to retaliate, there have been fears expressed, and notably, I understand, by the canadian Foreign Minister Mr. Pearson, that the United States would not consult OU!' Allies in the event of an attack. These fears are based on the words in your speech, 11 by means and at places of our choosing". Now I interpreted that when I read it to mean that you were referring to our choosing rather than to the enemies choosing. You would not say our choosing exclusive of our Allies? Am I cor1--ect in my interpretation? Dulles: You ar-e absolutely correct, Senator, Smith. The emphasis upon °our" was in te1 ..ms of the free world or whatever portion of it is operating in counte~-distinction to the Soviet world. I was pointing out that if ve only respond at places and by means of their choosing then we do not exercise a maximum deterrent Rower, and that the. differences between nthe1r 11 and "ou:::." was in terms of tn'3 free world and 1 ts potential enemy. . ...... 3 000035 J �- 3 - ' Actually, or course, of consultation there is a very high degree which takes place between the United States and its pril1cipal Allies in this area. There have been close consultations with Canada. Admiral Radford, the Chairman or the .·Joint Chiefs of Staff. has. had a very tull talk with Canadian officials within the last two or three weeks. I had a long talk at dinner the next night, where the Canadian Foreign Minister had dinner with Im!• and we had .a v~ry full discussion on this matter. or course it was discussed in the military staff of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was discussed with the Council which is created under the so-called Anzus Treaty, the treaty between the United states, Australia and New Zealand, and consultation 1s inevitably an inherent part of this process of trying to build what I would refer to as community defenceA Senator Smith: Is it a proper question to ask you whether this whole policy or the capacity or retaliation, 1s thoroughly understood by our Allies, that is in any situation, I mean by the Higher Command# so that we are not putting over a new conception of it? Dulles: Well we have spent a great deal of time and effort Senator Smith, in exchanging views on this general subjecto Much of the time last year was spent 1n doing this. I had du:c•ing that year two meetings i.n Paris with the Foreign Ministers and Ministers of Defence of the NATOcountries, also Secretary Wilson was there, and the general conception that we were talking about was thoroughly tactical discussed at that time, including the use of new weapons which we are now beginning to supply OUI' Allies in Europe, subject to getting the necessary legislation authorization to give them somewhat more information about atomic weapons. But there has been a very considerable discussion of this general concept. Senator Knowland: The only thing that bothered me was where the question was as to the amount or consultation with our Allies and I want to have the fullest consultation possible. I would not ~ant the impression to get abroad that in all of these cases I have mentioned, and that type of a case, that we would be limited in talcing action until trans-Atlantic cables or telephone lines or discussions which might take place in London or Paris and other capitals of Europe had finally discussed the thing among themselves, which in effect might give them a veto power in taking action which would be essential to the security and the survival or the Uni•ted States or America and I think that there should be no misconception in the capitals of Europe that we would necessarily refrain rrom instant retaliation if our own survival was at stake. There has been no problem involved in our consultations which would limit or restrict in any way the capacity of the United states by 1ts Olm means to take whatever action it seemed fitting to take. There Dulles: is the question of the use, let us say, of a United states base in a foreign country~ where the use or that base might possibly attract a counter-attack and where • b • • • • e, 4 000036 �..., : .... - 4 - ' it is pretty nruch understood that we will in relation to action from that particular base~ but this act jointly foreign relates only as I say to foreign bases and I believe that in those circumstances we must expect a practical solution to be quite ready even though the theoretical formula in advance may not be easily found. You may say to some extent that the problem is similar to that which exists between the E.."l{ecutive and Congress. There ax•e twilight zones. I·t ls 11ever poss3.ble to have them all absolutely clearly defined in advanoe. Generally the act itself resolves the doubts. I am confident that in dealing t11'l;h our princ:'l..pal Allie1:: and those who have offered us facilities ror bases that the ffaets ~ould themselves resolve whenever- doubt cannot be solved by advance consultation. Ends. __.. \ .,. ,. 000037 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 24 MARCH 1954 / AMBASSADOR TO SOS EXTERNAL AFFAIRS Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-03-24 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00027 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Washington to External Affairs WA-498, 24 Mar. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. continental defence John Foster Dulles McCarthyism US-Canada relations https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b8b7fb88708d717ccb3246ef7b0c9a11.pdf 6466641102376ff0e657dc03a31e3306 PDF Text Text 1 . '_;,.,- . ...,, , TRANSMITTAL SLIP .;___ ~,, TO: ·The." ?ar.tment ..of .. External. .Affairs.,.. OTTAWA. '. .·•••L·••,1•••0••·••uOOOO&O••··••<••···~·······••uno~•-~·~••····~ .. ' ·FROM: 'l':~Canadi Security,. Unclassifi.ed Date .. .March. an. Emhas.sy., .. WASHINGTDN., . D. C.•.... 24., .. 195.4 •........... Air or Surface ... · ..... Despatching Authority .. .'. J.• J .•McCar.dle/jf ................... . 5 Department of State 1 • •••••••• i2'' // ~_: __ L~:-~o L_~~,2::-::: Also I referred to: 'lfn~ Press } Release No. by the ~~.r c:::£,,fl. Honorable John Foster Dulles before the ]_,-:;;_,__ l,l,S .., Senate Foreign Relations Committee, -...-r.\Friday, March 19, 1954.' 149 of March 19. 'Statement -Reference: Subject: Our Telegram WA-481 of March 20. Dulles States Testimony Defence. on United (Instruction D·~· e~ > ~V.,~ . ) II yl C>k ' JI.N. {) ~· on Reverse Side) \\ v,.r;--~<~' \1 ,}"',:,,.. -~Fb .1\~ i~~\ ,tN · ~? ., e,~O J{) , LY.~~·-----·-·--··••.~------·-\! Description .S:opies D-1 i below are for your information. -~ ........... ;l. No. · of enclosures. The documents described ... , ..... . 0 0: 1J ..•.• • 000048 _ �...\. ,-:~:"'·T ( }\9~?f :F .®.~~)~~Vi~1i'. @W. ~,r~~-~t..-•: MARCH19, ~rn ij •·-'.•w®oo ~oorn~·: .;,__ ·.:; -.::. ,i.ir9 '. 1954 ,..... ' ':':: :·,.•'• ..-:..:-.:··, .. '·•' : . ·-: , STATEMENT BY THE. HON(YRABLEJOHN .FOSTER DULLES . ·_ ·. ·. SECRETARY OF STA"TE ., - - , - _BEFORE THE .SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS. COMMITTEE. .. ,FRIDAY; MARCH19; 1954 < . :, · . ·.·· .... '/'; to. I am glad: discuss with you the ·pres_eni;·.·sta'.te of: .i'.. ;, our fore:lgn policy and its relation -to but' iµi1_ita,ry p:r1ograms.,-_.:•·.:: ·,.' ... ! ·I The central goal -of our .policy I::f ·pea~~- with freedom .. and security. Tl:le: menace of sovi~t :ploc ,de;spo.tism.i ·which:·.:·· . .·: .. now holds in its' grip one-third of the· world Is peoples; . _<_-,,. presents the most·s~rious danger· th~t·has,ev~~ copfjbnted us. The main aspects of this. . thr:·eat are apparent-..!' ...:.: ::• · . · ·_ i'... . . ', '• ' 1. The· "sovi·et r\ilers· .seem to feel se~ure on:iy' :i:n a· .-· world of conformity d0minated :by therri·~··· Partly.i, no. doubt, they are drJven by lust for_p9wer,. But to a 9onsiderable 1 • extent, I believe; ·they ..· are d•riven by'.'fear. of\ f.reedon:i To.' ,·,.;:_··,; :·~:> .!..,::. them freedo!J}: -~s. }?:. t~reat· to>~e:_J~P.mp:fcl ·out, wh,ef,e:V:\~r,,,:;t'.t:, · approaches th~i_tt:;vior1.d •.' .... -:,·_;;_,;:" ... _;•,.;::,}•:,~_°':'i<H: , ,, ... :ir: 1 0 2. The ·S-ovi~t bloc; ·p;~:ss·es;'es 1:What:_:;18°· ..tn: ~ari'y ~¼a:fs· the i..::-:~ '.;, most formiclabl~i:.mr~t tary :es tabl i~hm~nt the worid' 1-i'as e\reri. , . ,_'. :i, 1but known. · Its gre.:9:t. -str-eng,th .:i,.Eifna'.hpotye"±-•'j, al_:;rn....i t. i:;:i strong in term~'.':°9:f:'planes.,1;·. s-upmarine~. and:; .atorri:Lc::: o,apti1;Hli ttes. This vast. empir.e :cfofo:i'.hates,,the. 'c:e·ntra·l Eur.aS,ian l'~hd'mass.; ,-. '';'. extending from ;the Ri\ter., --Elb~.- ":i'.n'. GeTnia:hy.,tO,i thel ·:eti.c:L'f:tc'-. ' ::·,_:::; From within ·qf1,1~ ?f'._29~:9.9P: 'mi,l'.es;::-1t,,;;a(;)uJ._<i'.>~itJJ~e'·by ,. ' '..::-: land at any one· of appro:1ama.tely. 20 _3tates :;Qf,:-Eu.r9J?e, the -' :::-:(::l:: Middle East and AsiaJ and by air it Could st~i~e· Jh~ .N6rth,<:;:;:,r:i American: con:tinent. · · · :__ ,_. ..,.,:: .-,_,:.'.,- ari ~, ·1 ,·, .. , < ~... • ::; - ; •. '·· ... ::(•:.(ft·~~: .i .- ~; I •.. ::-,, I·.,> .. . ; .' . ,.. .: :. ; ,,; '. . .. . ,: ... i ' •: .•· .. :·,~.{ ...... :r· • I :·•·' ~: ~: ·.. :· ,:",' :·:·-'·;· ~. ( .. ' .:.·/. ·:_·~.: . ''·- .. "·, ·,* : 000050 .... · ! �... ·2- 3., Nor is the threat only 'militaryIt a political apparatus which operates in every world 1 seeking to capitaliz~ upon all of the unsatisfied ambitions ~hich inevitably· exist less degree throughout the free·world. · PR 149 also command country of tt _ discontents and in greater or .. · 4. The threat is. virtually. unlimi t.ed so. far as time is concerned. Soviet communism·opera.tes not in terms of an individual lifetime so that the threat will end with someone •s ··death •. It operates in· terms of what Lenin and Stalin called 11an ent.1re: histor.:t¢al: epa.!" ._..II To meet thatrnilita.ry·threat .requires on·our side a strategy which is both well-conce:tved:atid well-implemented., This military defensexrnust. be: w1.th1n.:t·he capacity of the free world to sustain ··1:t.'fot<an :indefil'tite · time without such impairment of its economic and social fabric as would expose 1t to piece~meal seizure.'from within-by the political apparatus .of comrnun:I:smo ' : •: : : .'.··,., · This calls for thinking and planning which is imaginative; which takes maximum possible advantage of the special resources of :the :e:ree-n,ations; and,wh1ch is steadily developed and.:ad~pted .to changin:g,cond1tionst The fundamental ·aim •of ,,;.our··national• secur1ty ·policies 1~· to·• deter aggre:ssion·.and _there'by· avert a:new-:waro.. :The essentials of this proble,m, may be ;:.br1e•f.ly summatiizecl::as_.fol1ow.s: · . l.: The free :nat:tons. can Jtchiev.e: ::security :Only by a collective syste.m .of defense. · No. single nation can develop alone adequate power to· deter· Soviet blo·c agg~ss1on against 1 ts vital inte.rests o · By_providing Joint fac11i t:1.es and by combining. thelr resources, the free nations can achieve a:, ... total strength and a flexibility whieh.c.a.n surpass that·o:f-. any potential enemy and can do so at bearable cost. This collective security concept is the. most highly developed in NATO.· But it is also embodied.in.the Rio Pact of 19~7 and, in more limited form, in various security arrangements· in .the Far East. The Turkey-Pakistan agreement maI'ks the. beginning. of applying the. collective_ security concept in-the Middle East, The Unite.d Nations 1s mov.ing in the-same direction, as· shown py its "Un,iting for Peaee 0 · Reso.lution. - ~2. In organizing their collective defense, the free nations should not attempt to match the Soviet bloe man for man and gun for gun. The \;>est way to deter aggression 1s to make the aggressor know in advance that he will suffer damage outweighing what he can hope to gain. Th\lS an aggressor muat not be able to count upon a sanct.,.ary status for those resourcea which he does not use in eomiµtt1ng aggression. 3. To apply 000051 �,; • j_ -3- ,. . PR 149 -·)" 3. To apply this deterrent principle the free world must maintain and be prepared to use effective means to make aggression too costly to be tempting. It must have the mobility and flexibility to bring collective power to bea~ against an enemy on a selective or massive basis as conditions may require. For this purpose its arsenal m~Jt include a wide range of air, sea and land power based on both conventional and atomic weapons. These new weapons can be used not only for strategic purposes but also for tactical purposes. The greatest deterrent to war is the ability of the free world to respond by means best suited to the particular area or circumstances. There should be a capability for massive retaliation without delayo I point out that the possession of that capacity does not impose the necessity of using it in every instance of attack. It is not our intention to turn every local war into a general war. 4. The magnitude and duration of the present danger and the need for flexibility of means to deter that danger makes it vital to the United 3tates, as never before, that it have firm allies. A firm alliance depends not merely upon documents, although these may be important. There must also be trust, understanding and good will as between the free nations. This implies not merely military commitments, but good economic and cultural relations as well. It is not charity on the part of the United States to be concerned with the economic health of other nations which help to support the basic strategy I describe. Neither is their good will a matter to which we can be indifferent o. All of this means that foreign policy has assumed, as never be~ore, a vital importance for the security of the United Stateso In the long haul the United States has a profound interest in insuring that its allies and the uncommitted areas of the free world are able to maintain viable economic and political systems~ That is why our foreign economic policy means so much to our own security. * State -- PB, Wash., * * * D.c. 000052 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 24 MARCH 1954 / DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS RELEASE Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-03-24 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00026 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Canadian Embassy, Washington to Department of External Affairs, "Department of State Press Release No. 149 of March 19," 24 Mar. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. John Foster Dulles Senate Foreign Relations Committee Soviet bloc https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/bc697ad832d5f8fdab6d135aabbd72d4.pdf 5a058b66637c386468e147dc8b961a12 PDF Text Text orJJ✓~b) ¥ / ~\9~~, ' ·"~ \--· f( -1ot ::;/t(/.-?..~ "7;,Y. j.~f.' ...... SECURI?:LASS~~ATION ~~sr~·~ l'-sS\:, !'li>, ;; -. ,· 'I ~• '• En. l No••• Despatch r-----=D.aa..at..e. '··.March . .22., .195-4 •.. · ...... FROM: ~--_-_ TO: ~~~ -~ ere nee •.•. a:.-::~-~lject: ..... W'-- ~!'.~ ~ • D _-:-\ , . -:------ _ \ ~/ . C:anad,i.an ·/4_¥'!,' ~~ S E C R E T '\}~ "'.~ .-ft."J . Ambassador, Canadi~ Embassy, WASHINGTON,D. C. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA Our. . Ue spa;t. ch. . ~.o•.. ll.? ..Q f ...JM WH'Y.. A?,.. ~.9.? It , ................. Iloite.d . .States ~ ✓4 ~ \l.. D~.f.enc~.. f.cfl-;l<;Y.• ...................................... . ,✓ :-----1 _rr. ___ , Copies Re £erred To .............. . No. of Enclosures \..: '5 ...:J........... . Post File No ............... Public interest in the United States has been focused more sharply on the country's new defence strategy in the past two weeks than~ any time since the new Administration took office. On the domestic political front Mr. Stevenson and Vice President Nixon debated the merits of the "new look"; within the Administration there were evidences of disagreement between Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, and General Ridgway, the Army Chief of Staff, on the role assigned to the Army under the new strategy; last but by no means least the international implications of the new strategy were underlined by Mr. Pearson's timely remarks to the National Press Club in Washington on March 15. Mr. Dulles, who, because of the demands on his time, has not been in Washington for any length of time in the past two months, was therefore faced at his press conference on March 16 with a number of searching questions on the~ new defence strategy of the United States. You will ~ remember that it was Mr. Dulles speaking on behalf of the President and the Administration, who described for the public's benefit the principles underlying the new defence strategy in his address to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on January 12. Mr. Dulles' answers to the questions asked at the press conference (copies of the transcript of which are attached) taken together with his article in the forthcoming issue of Foreign Affairs (our despatch No. 503 of March 18) go a long way towards clarifying the Secretary's remarks of January 12 and might even be considered to restate the policy outlined by Mr. Dulles at that time. ~ 2. While we do not wish in this l·etter simply to repeat the words of Mr. Dulles which are contained in the attached transcript, we do think that more than usual attention should be devoted to this press conference. From what I .ir. Pearson told us of his private conversations with Mr. Dulles last week it seems that Mr. Dulles made many of the points at this press conference whi~h he made in those talks. We believe that it might also be useful to relate the views of Mr. Dulles·as revealed in the attached transcript to the comments which we made on the new United States strategy in our despatch under reference. 11 . • •• 2 I I 000065 ( �c.. 195tiHAR2~-- ntl 11· 3 2 . ~-. ., 11) l ,, ,-·' J '000066 �-2- 3. Much of the domestic criticism which has been made of the "new look" has centered on the apparent decision of the Administration, as revealed in Mr. Dulles speech of January 12, to depend to a larger extent on the massive retaliatory power of the United States and less on the traditional method of meeting aggression on the ground where it occurs. It seems to us that in his most recent reply to questions from the press, Mr. Dulles has shifted his emphasis, if not his ground. He asserted that he had not meant to suggest in his January 12 tspeech that the United States would in every circumstance /retaliate instantly with its massive retaliatory power, i.e. atomic and thermonuclear weapons, but that what the United States had to build up was its capacity to retaliate instantly. The questi9n of whether or not the United States chose to use that capacity was a matter, he said, which would have to be dealt with in accordance with the facts of each situation. While Mr. Dulles' analysis of what he meant to convey in his earlier speech is valid, if one looks closely at the text of that speech, he must certainly be aware that it was not unreasonable that those who did not have access to his innermost thoughts might miss this fine distinction. With this latest explanation of the point a major element of the United States "new look" assumes much less novel proportions. According to Mr. Dulles, the Administration is simply determined to keep United States defence capacity in constant readiness so that if it is necessary to meet major aggression the United States will not require two or three years to get ready to retaliate. This is a reasonable decision for the Administration to take since in fact on two occasions the United States has been unprepared to shoulder its responsibility immediately in the face of major world conflicts; but when explained in these terms it seems to be a much less startling decision than Mr. Dulles' earlier speech would have led observers to believe had been made by the Administration. If observers are still left with some doubt in their minds on the question made famous by the New Yorker, "which paper do you read", !',tr. Dulles excuses himself from further clarification again by the eminently reasonable argument that one should not tell the enemy in advance exactly where, how and when one plans to retaliate. t 4. Mr. Dulles did go on to assure his questioners that the new United States strategy was not confined in the event of an act of aggression to the two channels of an all-out war or no resistance at all. He said that in indicating that there would be less emphasis. on local defence power, the Administration had simply made clear its intention not to be forced to meet aggression at the particular place and by the particular means which the aggressor selected. There were areas of importance to the aggressor--which were not necessarily either the front line of aggression or the capitals of Peking or Moscow~~where United States retaliation might be effective. What Mr. Dulles seems to be saying indirectly is what Admiral Radford referred to in our recent meeting of consultation as the "deep tactical offensive" use of United States atomic weapons (c.f. para. 35 of our report) ••• 3 000067 • �l -3Admiral Radford at that time explained his terms to mean the use of new weapons in a fashion which was something short of strategic bombing and something more than tactical bombing in front of one's own troops. We would surmise that what is in the minds of both Mr. Dulles and Admiral Radford is the sober realization that United States ground troops (and possibly even the ground troops of all the Western allies) can never match the potential enemy, Russian or Chinese, in numbers and that it is fatal therefore to plan to meet the potential enemy man for man on the ground. The United States aim seems to be to convince its potential enemies that their commitment of ground forces in any act of aggression will not necessarily lead to a United States response in kind. Mr. Dulles freely admitted the element of bluff in this strategy (although, of course, he does not use that word) when he told his questioners that the capacity to retaliate is in itself the great deterrent to aggress~on. "1 believe that the original Korean attack would not have occurred if it had not been assumed either that we would not react at all or if we did react would react only at the places and by the means that the aggressors chose." r 5. Another set of questions to 1~1r. Dulles were directly related by the questioners to Mr. Pearson's speech of March 15, and concerned United States consultation with its allies before a decision was taken to retaliate in any particular circumstance. Mr. Dulles replied in forthright terms that there would certainly be consultation in most of the cases that he could conceive of, for it was impli~it in the security system which has been built up among the Western allies that it operates only with the consent and acquiescence of all the partners who have helped to provide the facilities "which create a sort of international police system". We understood from Mr. Pearson that Mr. Dulles assured him privately that in his own mind a most important element of the United States capacity to retaliate was the whole-hearted co-operation of the allies of the United States and especially of those upon whose territory important United States bases existed. I think we can be certain that in Mr. Dulles mind at least, and probably too in the mind of the President, there is no lack of understanding ef tne need fo~0 ~~Il§tant and intimate consultation/ijith ~t~n~~~~r ti!!I§s on matters which concern the possible use of atomic weapons and the consequent likelihood of the outbreak of a major war. 6. Finally Mr. Dulles dealt directly and in the circumstances, we believe, quite courageously, with questions concerning the President's ability to_order instant retaliation without prior consultation with Congress. At his press conference on March 17- the President himself said that he had no intention of violating the Constitution in any action he might have to take with respect to the outbreak of war and that he thought "it was implicit in the Constitution that the President had to act against sudden unexpected aggression" (and by inference without prior consultation with Con:.;ress) • • • • •4 000068 �./e / · __ -4If one bears in mind that the Bricker controversy on the issue of the limitations on the President's power is very much in the minds of Congress, Mr. Dulles' replies on this occasion can only be taken as stemming from a strongly held conviction on the part of the Administration. Mr. Dulles gave it as his opinion that in any instance of aggression against members of NATOor against allies covered by the Rio Pact the President would have the authority to order instant retaliation even though in every circumstance he might not choie to exercise that authority without consulting Congress. Mr. Dulles admitted that the Indo-China situation would not be covered by French membership in NATO, but he said that he did not wish to imply that the United States should do nothing if the Chinese Communists with regular forces should cross the frontier into Indo-China. He was of the further opinion that the President did not have similar discretion in situations which would be covered only by the United Nations Charters. He refused to be drawn into a discussion of what he called the "twilight zonen of the President's power under the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief to take military action without a declaration of war by Congress. 7. The publication of Mr. Dulles' opinions dealt with in this letter constitutes an important bench-mark in the development of the new United States strategy. We have the impression that the events mentioned in paragraph 1 above have led to the necessity for a clearer thinking out of the Administration's broad objective, in this field. While Mr. Dulles' press conference will serve to clarify the issues further the subject is by no means finished with, and we expect to hear a good deal more of the "new look" both in and out of Congress before this year is over. r \ l 000069 �.. ~ ... >: . ·, _..., __ MARCH16, 1954 fID~rP/i\0011'i~~IJ ®rF~ifIM~ .'l?®IBl ii'COrn rPOOrn~~ PRESS ANJ?.RADIO NEWSCONFERENCE,TUESDAY,MARCH" 16, 1954 SECRETARYDULLES: I am glad to be back in Washingon,. aga:tn after quite· a considerable period of absences. ·L.have .two or three· statements which I would like to make before I subject myself to questio~s. I might say I ~ave just.come from the meeting of the Canadian Foreign Minis.ters and Ministe~s of Economic~, et detera. There is a meeting going on, We will have a com~unique i~sued this aft~rnoori sp l ~ill not want t6.discuss this at this ·particular.press conference. (See Press Release No. 140 ~ statement of the Secretary on the death of Harold B. Hinton). · ' I .have a· statement to make about the Caracas Conference, which ~ill be available at the close -0f this pres~ conference in mimeographed forni. · ( See Press Re lease No. 13'8) · · ·r will _be glad to answer any questioris. Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please give us'.the recon6il1ation of, one, the concept of instant retaliatioh; two, the concept of consultation with our allies; and, three, the concept of. involvement in war-ortly by ~n Act of Cong~ess? · A. I assum~ your reference· to "inst 9 nt retaliation" posedly ta_ken from ·an address of mine. . · · Q. And one. by the Vice~Presid~rit Saturday night. of the United . ' States is sup~ en ' '· A. I cannot. oomment on what the .Vice-President saidJ but I will be glad to comment 0n w~at I said~ If you will read my address of January 12, you will see what I advocated the~e was a "ca pad i ty" to retaliate fns ta ntly. In ;no pla·ce did I say : we would ~~~talia·te instantly, although we might indeed retali• ·atci ihstaritly under cortditions that call .for that. The e~~entia1 thing is to have the capacity to. retaliate fnstantly. It is lack of that capacity which 1ri ~Y opinibn ·accounted for such disasters. as Pearl· Harbor. · If we .had had the capacity to. ret~liate instantly~ ih my.opinion, there would have been no Pearl Harpor .. But:it· to0k about.four years to retaliate against Tokyo .... I believe we should have that-capacity ·to retaliate instantly. N~w, the question of whether or net you retaliate instantly and whefe y6u retaliate is a matter to be dealt with in accordance with the facts of each situation. I take it few would have any question but what if there were an attack upon the United States there would be instant retaliation. You have questions 000070 �' . • • NOo 14~ e~erit questions of retaliation in the ,bi:a violation Ot' a~.. attack upon·a member of the North Atlantic Treaty and upon other count1~1es with whom we have. treaty relationships!' ~ - ... The que~tion of circumstances under which you retaliate, where· ~{OU retaliate,/ how quickly ~rou retaliate, is a · matter which has to be dealt with in the. light of the facts of each particula_r case. One• thing I want to make clear beyond.the.possibility of doubt is that I don 1 t believe you should tell the enemy in advance just where, how, and when you plan to retaliate~ The whole essence of the program is that the action should be an action of our choosing and he is not' to lmow in .advance what it is,j and that uncer~ tainty on his part is a lrny to the success of the policy. Q. Sir# if I may pursue thato You mentioned in the event of an attack upon a member of the North Atlantic Treaty_ Alliance ...-you say what would then be instant retaliationg Does that mean :1.n the event the concept of 1nvolvement.1n war only by Act of Cong1•ess does not apply where there is an attack either upon the United States or upon a member of the alliance of wh~ch we are a part? Ae It means in all respects the United States acts in accordande wit~ its constitutional processes. ·There is no way in the world in which we can get away, or want to get away 9 or intend to get away from our constitutional processes~ How long that will take 6 I dontt know. It did not take very long after Pearl Harbo.r to get a declaration of war. The trouble is it did not do any immediate good to get a declaration of war because we did not have the capacity to do any~ thing with it. I have never advocated~ and nobody else in the Administration has advocated any departure from constitutional processes •. ·Jhe North Atlantic Treaty has provided that an attack against; one of those states shall be deemed the same as an attack against the United States~ We have other treaties with language which is not precisely the same as that. Just what action by the Congress is required is a matter to be decided in each case 8 as it always has been a matter to be decided in each case. The fact that you advocate having a capacity for instant retaliatio~ does not change your constitutional processeso It means we don 1 t have to wait for four .yea:r-s;after somebody attacks us before we are 1n a position effectively to h1t back. · Q,, Sir• 000071 �PR 142 Sir,.~q9es:.th.~ f~(>td>hat:·;the··Senate;;t>:f' the .Urtited;States has rat+fJ~4··.tl1~.t:N<;>r>1;11 ··A.ti.l-~nt!c Alliance mean in the: event of an attack on an ·Ally''we, .could,: within constitutional procedures, retaliate against that attack without further action in the Congress? :; · · ·" · Q. A. '.Pn~ti::Ls,:a:matter :which, 'as you,know,.iwas de'bated>ve-x•y: thorQi+.tshlY.·.in ·the Congres.s and· in ·the ·s-er.:ate ~ At the time · that ·Treaty was: .tatif:ted:··I was ..in ·the ~s:enate ~: :rt is my- • opinion that trie provisions of the Treaty, which state that an attack upon one of the Allies is :the :s.:ame· as· an:;attack'- ·. upon all -- or in other words that an attack upon one of our Allies is the same as an :.attack -up•ori the· Uni t-ed states\ That is also, I ma.y say, in the Rio Fact. That gives the Pr:e.eJd·ent:.:of:.•,:the.United ~-s:tates·, :tne· same:.authorit"y ;t'o '.react·' as he would have if the United States were attacked. . -~ - .:Thank ,-.you,;,:_sir;·: ;c •:,-·• > . ·:: -: Q. A. ':w:e:the~/~~- ·wo~ld~Se' ,..~tl~;t:_~~u:th~;·i:ty .._1~..eve;; ·cas~. ~:s: a ; · ;'.:. rqc3:tJ:;er, :for h,is '.-df.s:·cr.e.ti.on.,::.ilnsmy· 0p'inion; he' has· ·it'?· ..., < :. < • Q. He has the right? A.,,.,.-cln rnY,.'OP.ini-on:.:'he;·Jiaa.the '.right,.;.•i'•Thatr dc.e.s,:no:t··'nec·e:ss'aii1ly .-:, mean in all cases he would use the right witnout; co:nsult;atkin :': by Congress~ It would depend on the gravity of the attack, whethe.~- Jt, •Wa$.:rob.::v;i0:u:s.<the a.t;ta~h;··me_an:t:ral.'1.;,:o:ut.: w:ar_;,wti1ch > inev.;i.tably ,,.,,o.u'l:d:, i.nvoJve ..un:'.' Many ,mat.te·rs ::W01.(Ld.:ha'vei·.to ·:be>·;.··• considei'.e;d .:and:;dou:btle:ss.: .:wou,ld;:be ~·011sider.ed. '.by, the: Pr-e,sid'ent .'. : in ..qe:t.~r.m:i.n~ng,~:w:ne::t;liev·co:ri no,t>.·tcLuse ...his'.•di scre·t1onary ·-.•· · ··, · · authority. 1 Mr. Secret.ar.y:;\ qi±ght;-1' r.:ai.se ·a.-._question·.on- anbth~r- word. in the reference to capacity to retaliate. The sentence ends: 11 by means and at places of our choosing. 11 Now, Mb:. -Pear:s:ori raised the question whether the word 11our 11 meant'the United Sta,te:s., or.'::wne:t.her d:-t.:meant _;the. f.re~' c·orrimun,ity :o:c. natfons'.". ''. Q. ... ' ·:·: ::.... : 'Cl > ,••, ,,; .., ;:·. ••,•:- '\ A•\ •:.•1·. think {that, the sentence ;_iff",reas-ortably: ·.c:lear.:·,) ;Wou:1a:,; _. you .read_: the ,who;le seht.ence :if'>you: ..have ·±t: :before yoi:.i~ · :•.· , ··:·: ...... ~-- .. - ... , • ! , ; ; ••• .~_; :: :.-·. : ; :_;_::•,: -;--··.- •· :: ,., .. ::.__ ,-':.·: '<: .• '/• ·:::., , •:<; Ji,: .:;__ ~_ :::.: .. ·.?.:::(: ,.=, _, :.:. "·\·.1..,:··:_-,_·~ ,::. ·,•... ,1., -~_:,.~:·.:.::-!··.·: __ •; :.:~:.·. ;_: ~.:.- ~ •• ; . ·-..' '· . •.. . ~;- '. -~ <:..r_; .! --=· :·. ;:_.i'. . ~; )_ .. ... ..-:. :.·- . !~~:-· :·r ·_"·;:·~ ..~: -_....;··..: : .. , ··.1 · ' .-;:,,·-,': : ·: !~: ,. :. •' . . ~- . . .. ,",:,· ', <i ·-' ',•·-_; ·:·.,::,_:.' ~ ~_:'' .....:, . ';' -::·~ '·/:'.t .! ; ;,_-_; ~:;· , • .j . • '} ... : ••.• : .•-.. : ~- ·~ :· : i_: .•, :· '·' ~ ·::. ·.. · .' ~--· :. .~ . ' . . ,.' , :<,.·. ·: : Q~ ·.·Yes,•:,, ,_:·. _:;: , , :~ :-:.-~'.:-~L::·. ::· 1·- • .,. ,. • •• 'i : ,:.i... .'- - _.... ;, ••• • .' ••• ·,· __:_·_ ·.:.:_- _;_· •..... .. · : ' • ..·: •'•,: ,•;,-•,•,·. . J•.' ·.. 000072 �. "" 4 , PR 142 ··. ' ,,. .r Yes. ,,(reading):. IIThe. basic .. decision was to depend· primarily upon a great capac{i ~y ~o .retaliate, instantly, by means; ::and at pla.ces of our. 'choosing O" Q. A. _ .Do-es':.1t use the word· If free world".? Q. .There were two· sentences~ One is: "The basic decision -.::" was to depe:nd •p1.;imar11y.tipon a great. capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing .."·· ·. · A. Is that the whole.sentence? Q. That is the end of th~ senterice" A. Yes. I would like to have the first part of the sentence. first part is: · 1iBut : beforJ ~iJ..:1t.~ry planning could ... be :Chang.ea~~·-the Preside __nt a·na. hia .iidv~l3er.s,as represented by the .National Security Council, J-iad ,tO t·alr_e..some basic policy decisidns~. This has been· done~: T6~ ~a£ic.decision was to · depend primarilY upo1~-•' a:"tt1~~at p·apacity >k·o:, ~etaliate:, instantl:/, by means and at places'- \>f'. our. choos.+ng/ 1 ·, There was another ': · sentence. ·· · '· · · ··· · · · · · Q.. 0 The I think there was a ..senterc~::L iµ.: tl;:le.itex.t there about· the free world·. · : ··· · · A. whi-cih spoke·. -~~t ,in tnat particular Paragr~ph., There is an earlier·· .... sentence -to this part which says~ "The way to·,deter aggre's.;;.: ·::: sion is ,,for. the free community to be will;i.ng and able to , respond vigorously at places and .with means of its own ~hocis--~ i Dg II . . . . ,. ·, ' Q~ "' ~ A. I thought that Q. Which is it? was what you wei-•e reading from., A, Well, it would depend a good deal upon the circumstances. 'If there were an attack upon the United States and if we had the capacity to respond from our own bases, we would certainly do that It is .:1 I think.~ we 11 mown that the bases which we have in foreign countries are in general not usable as a matter of law and as a practical matter are not usable except with the consent of the countries where the bases are. For example, the bases which are available to our Strategic Air Force in Great Britain are not usable as a base of attack except with the consent of the British Governmento The same is true in general with all our foreign bases. Therefore, it is implicit in our security sy~tem that it operates with the consent and acquiescence of the other partners who have helped to provide the facilities which create a sort of international police system. · · Q. If I 6 000073 �. . -5- PR 142 Q. ·rf I might go on. There were two other worps which . Mr. Pearson raised. a· question to in relation :to the point · which' you have just made, the one being "instantly" and the · other be.ing 11means. 11 . · Does this mean the choosing of means would lie with the free community or only with the United States? w.ould there: be consultation? · A. Yes, there would certainly be consultation in most of the cases .that I can conceive of. ·I might say that I wrote, some weeks ago, an article for Foreign Affairs, which is in substance a. somewhat more pollsFiecf,;-Y-hope",;'"'"restate.ment of my spEH;1chwhich was .made before the Council of Foreign Relations, whioh publishes Foreign Affairs. That l did while I was flying back from BerlTn~---Y-under~"'"tand that is being released for publication tomorrow ipNew York by the magazine B orei!?a£ Af..fai:rs., That will elabo:;."'ate to so;ne extent the thesis which I expr·essed in my address of January 12. 1 Q~ I would like to ask another question on this subject. There has been some discussion and speculation to the effect that reliance on the capacity to retaliate instantly as a ma;Jor part of your defensive system would mean 11 in the case of a limited challenge in some remote area.., you would have the choice either of an all-out war 'or> no resistance .at all •. A.· That is not a correct analyi:is of the thesis at all. ··Let us ta.ke, for example.s the declaration which was made by the 16 powers in relation to Korea; which is one of the ill~strations I made in my spe~chi It has been stated there that if aggression should be resumed that·the reaction would not necessarily be confined to Korea. Now what does that mean? That .does not mean necessarily that there will be an effort made. to. drop· atomic bombs on Peiping or upon Moscow. It does mean that thsre are areas of importance to the aggressors in that vicinity which may have an industrial or strategic relationship to the operation which would no longer be wl.1.atGeneral MacArthur called a "privileged sanctuary". I :cannot imagine any policy more futile or more apt to create war than to adopt the policy that you will only react at the particular place, and by the means the aggressor selects. If anything would ever put a premium onaggression,· it would .be that. We want to' take away that premium on aggress~on. ·· · Q. Mr •. $ecretary 000074 �. 6 ":"" - ..:. :PR 142 , . -·.:. ,.· .. ' ' '·· Q •.. Mr. Secretary that speech,; there 1 while. we a;re annotating.' was a reference :tn there to a ;l;es$er reliance ..:on local. defense, and some at:estion has been raised-as-to whether:that meant-· less reliance on. defense. by local,: :i,.ndigenous. forces which , i we might aid~ for example, or less reliance on local actions by jmerican forces, in local sectora,of,tt~ long ~rontt .· -, . . say A ... What I meant there~ when. I say. rir•1 ; L m:tght. ihat tha~ spe?ch wa~ -not jtist a .personal speech 9: ,.-was-that, 1-f you .. have the capacity to. str.il{e-. an. aggressor at ,-the; points _which wil;J: h~rt him,. _the dete:r.re.nt power of, that is .sufficient so : that you clo not. need. 'bo have loc·a1 · defens-e ~a-ll aromid. · the : :, .. 2Q.,__ OOO-miJ.e ,perlm~ter of. the ..orbit of the _Soviet World· 'bacau-se your oe-terrent- power.i, to ·a large extent.,o,reinforces. your: · -· · local power- so that you .do- not. h_ave to depencLup_oh .havirig;'fn·. place forces in being sufficient to stop an attack in its tracl}s anywhere •where ..it. c.ould · occur because you rely .pr:LmarllY upon deterring that attack,. not necess.arily upon .being able to stop ·1 tJI. · -· . ., ' . ·,: , With, the Soviet-Chinese. Commun:is·tWor-la.~..:.with .:its ; . 8QQ.,·OOO" 00Q :Pe-Qpl:e occupying .a ,central_ :location., .with ·±ta vast land armies--it would be utterly impossible to have local .oe:fenses 'all ·.around ,that -.20,.000-mi.le orbit. suffic.i.ent. ,_ to stop .any ·blow that. might come at whereve.r they might -c::.7'-i,::roa'e to rr)ake i.t o., :So that YOU: have got ,t-0 f:i.nd some· way whereby . that _type of :local ground defense -:can be supplemented o And: ,.the wc;1yto suppl~_me_nt 1t ·~Lsto· have:, a. capa:city t.o .re.tali.ate •at,_: . times, pla,ce~; and witp me·thods .:of yo1...1r.ownc,ho:Qsing. • • . .., Now. tr;i_a.t doesn - ··'· • ' ., • ·• ~ ~ . -. • .. i. • •. • . • t. mean ..tha_t' you. El.l.iminate wholly,· by ,any .· means,. l.9nd forces·e -It means you, d:0 not nece;1;:1sari1y mal-~e them. y_our pr:irnaPy reliance because., as. ·against the ~ind .of . , . danger ~hich ,:;;o;,:(•f-Jatens.,:l,t if:; :impos·sible t.o match your potential enemy gt ,all points on :a -bases of man-for~-man; gun-fo:rgun and tank-for-tank. If we try to do that, we are -go:ing to go "bust". ~ I '- ' . qecretary., if· I may go back. to one point of yours, .yoµ said that in Europe the Pre.side.nt had the same qU1;;11or-ityunder the NATOa.nd. Rio Treaties ·to retaliate if the United States. was at-tack~clo; Well:i,.·.last WGdnesda.y he seemed to give a pledge that he would not use that because he said that there would be no involvement in war without Congressional approval. . , ·Q_. Mr. A. But if a different the. Senate matter. has given approval in advance., that is Q~ Well, 000075 �. . ·, , ... 7 ,_ PR 142 · Q. Well, the specific case ·was Indochina. what some of us were wondering about. , . . . - :t-think that was A •. Yes, .there has been no ·congressional approval given in· advance of ·a war in Indcichina to which the United Statea would be a pa1~ty o , He certainly did not me·an,' I think, to 'imply that if the United States was attacked, and if Congress was not in session~ that he would wait unt11·congress was called back into session and make a declaration of war bef·ore we would react to a bombing attack on New York City or Detroit or Washington. I think if any President waited under those circumstances, he would certainly not be carrying out the will of either the Congress 01 the American people. 1 Qa S11;'.!fI'm a little dense on this matter of Indochina_. Would you clarify this for me? France is our ally in tbe No1th Atlantic Alliance.. French tI•oops are fighting in Indochina.. If the :Chinese Communists,· with the r·egular forces· fr.om Chtna, ·should cross the f1"ontie1"' into Indochina 'and .. attack the armed· foi ces of our. all:\,, France» would our responsibilities or obligations unde1" the NATO allianc·e come into force? If not~' why? 1 1 A.· No, they will not because the NATOalliance does not apply to any- part of the·, world: except .the North Atlantic area as it 1s defined· in the :ti~eaty That definition in the. nipin i's confined_ to Europe/ al thou'gl) it does cover a portion of French North Africa-·;;..I ·think Algeria is cov~red by it. _ But in the main 8 it -covers ·oi1lythe- Eutiopean area, including a slight bit of North Africa:;·and, of course, the Asiatic portion of Turkey. : .•: : · · · ., · <I .... : f'f : Q. Mr. Secretary, ·: .., : _:_. ' . ~ inthe·co11text-::.. A. Now, I don I t mean to,· imply -that if the event you spoke of happened, we should -do nothing. I myself have sa•io that I believed that if that happened 1-'le should do something. But that doesn 1 t mean we- should- db it without Congressional app:toval or consultation. In the context of the 'ans·wer you just gave abo1:1t Detroit 1 or. Chi'cago ih referring to ·an- earlier answer gave, would it be fair to say that the.President has power to react in Europe in the case of a bombing of or Paris? Q. A. Yes, New York., you : · the same London, sir. Q. Sir, would it be accurate then to say that instant retaliation in effect is recognition of the restraining effect of the possession of atomic weapons--the deterrent power? Is there a distinction between instant retaliation and deterrent? It is a deterrent. A. Yes., 000076 �PR 14~ - -8- A. Yes, I have said that the capacity to retaliate powerfully and instantly is, in my opinion, the great deterrent, and that when you are faced with the kind of potential enemy, or. With the assets that this potential enemy has, I believe that a deterrent of that sort is the most effective way there is of preventing a war. Now I can imagine a 'different world condition where reliance might properly be placed upon other methods, and other means, but, as far as the present world condition·is concerned, that capacity to retaliate powerfully at places of our choosing 1s. in my opinion, what will serve as a powerful deterrent to war. I believe that the original Korean attack would not have occurred if it had not been asswood either that we would not react at all, or if we did react would react only at the place and by the means that the aggressors chose. I believe .. that the Allied Sixteen-Powei" Decla.ration, which now operates in the case of Korea, will probably pre~ent ~ny rene0al of Communist aggression there~ Mr. Se~•retary, in order to clarify something~ in my own mind at least, is it your understanding that the President's right to order instant retaliation applies only in the c~se of an attack either on the United States or another North Atlantic Treaty power because of the understanding that Congress has given? Q. A. The United States has two treaties that I referred to: One is the so-called Rio Treatt of Reciprocal Assistance, which contains the provision that an attack upon one is the same as an attack upon all; that same provision is found in the North Atlantic Treaty. In my opinion -- whatever it is worth as a lawyer, and as one who was in• the Senate when the North Atlantic Treaty was adopte.d -- I believe that that authorizes, is a consent in advance to the President reacting against an attack upon one of our allies named in those _· treaties in the same way that he would be authorized to react in the event of an attack upon the United states itself. I repeat, however, that the fact that the President has that Constitutional ·authority as the result of those tr(~aties in my opinion does not necessarily mean that he wou:Ld use it. He would use his discretion, I think, as to wh~ther or not to react instantlj, or whether to get eithe~ a formal-declaration of war by the Congress, or whether to have consultations which satisfied himself that that was the will of the Congress. That would be discretionary with the President. Mr. Secretary, doesn't the President under the United Nations Charter itself? Q. have that same power A. In 000077 �. . -9- .. Ao • ....~• . In my· opin.ion, ' , PR 142 rio (>· Does he not have the power under st:ttution as Commander in Chief? the United Q., A. . •:, Stat~$ C.on:-- To do ·:what? ' ' .. . To take military Congres~? Qe a decla1.,a.tion without action of war by \ ..• WellJ now you are raising the question which hae be~n debated ·ever since our nation was formedc There are certain~. ly areae \'lithj_n which a Pres:tdent can' act .:... c~;r•tainly are~s in which it has been cuatomar;v for Presidents act -without any formal action by the Congress,c There is a twilight zone thereo Nobody has ever attempted t<f defj_ne accurately that twilight zone, a~d I, snal,1 p.qt attempt :I:.t.i herea , , . .. :· .•. · - .. :,.·:;_., ,'.· /,'. '•";" ., A,. ·to at .one po:tn'tth~i"'k_-~r~u·· s~ia ::it1~ connect,ion witb con~~ltation t6 cbnstilt iri'.mo~t ias~i that-~ou -0an con~ ceive: of. II Would you 'c·onsideri ~ay~ an' attack 'upon the northe;r'n part of Cap.aqa _an ~ttacl{. upon the ...Uni,ted,., States$ and; ·would you cons\,i:t-t wt.th bth_e':i-•NATO·cfr.nintries '.l:iefor,e-·you· reacted to that at'tack?' '· .r ;:·,;:::-·:·'· ,. Q., Mr. Secretary, ;. ;_ ..• • ~. • ' .,. • I • ,:··, ' . l A. I do not think that: it· 1s wis'e . or· appropriate to try .to·. answer a hypothetical question of that sort. In the first . place, it is impossible to determine .in adyance what.all of the su..rrounding circumstances. are,.·and .it would certainly · .. also not be advisable to give any forel{nowledge to a potential_ enemy as to whether or not he would have any time between. his attack and having to suffer the consequences it. of Mr. Secretary, ference? Q. how are plans coming for the Geneva Con- A. The tnformation I got when I got.back to.my desk yesterday was that there is some evidence ,in .Moscow of_ delaying. tact:,-cs with respect to the practical arrangements for ,se.tting up the conference. There s,eenis -t;o )?e, ,an:.,i111pr'es_s.~on _t;~a:t the. Chinese C'ommunists are riot 'eptireTy' happy',.over, ...the:.:ar_range~ ments which were made for them be:Caus(f -they·h~d e~pected, hoped to be able to come to the conference·a:s cine.of the socalled Big Five. r.t'hat, of c.0J1rse_,. Wq.S: de:qied :to the,m and i:t. would see1n<as though the .{36Jiet ':pEf, ..... h'aps havef- got some expla:ining to do. :·And· the result iff.·at. leas;t :the:re .are some present de lays • ' · ·· · · "· · · · ' 1 1 ,._ ..., 000078 �PR 142 Sir, have you reached a conclusion John P. Davies? Q. yet in the case of A. No* The situation in tpe Davie$ case is this: I went over the very full summary of the evidence consisting of about 200 rather closely-t-y;ped pages before I went to Caracaa. It seemed that there were some points which called for explanation, and the lt;1,wyerin.the Security Office formulated a request for e~lanationa. Those were given to Mr.. Davies, and his counsel. They have now made a reply. The reply 1~ being studied in the Security Office, and I am waiting for their recommendations to me, or report to me, on the basis of those questions an,d the responses made by Mr. Davies. Mr. Secretary, ha.s . · the Soviet Foreign Off ic_e formally. informed you of the·dissatistaction of the Chinese Communist$, with the arrangements? Q. A. No, that is inference, Mr. Secretary, twenty-three Japanese fishermen suffered radio-active burns as a result of the latest explosion? And today the Japanese Foreign Minister said that Japan might ask compensation from the United States. I was wondering if you have any comment on the incident and upon his statement. Q. A. No, I have no comments to make. I only heard of it today·. We had a report from our Embassy in Tokyo, which I got this morning~ But I have no information as to how this unfortunate accident came about --assuming that the facts are as reported. Mr. Secretary, a report was published in London last week-end to the effect that the United States has told France that this country would offer economic inducements to Red ... China to end the Indochina war. Is that correct? Q. A. It is not correct. Mr. Secretary~ does the October 8 decision our final postion with respect to a. settlement Q. still r~present in Trieste? A. You have caught me a little bit unprepared on that· question. I have not had the opportunity to check up-I'm bound to say- ...with the developments in the Trieste matter since I got back from Caracas. So you will have to Just excuse me on that one. Mr. Secretary, Senator Dirksen said he would discuss. with you immediately upon your re:turn from C~acas'the matter of freeing German confiscated property. Would you te.JJ.__u_a .. wa..t..~.QPl,p.1on is? Should it be returned soon? -· Q. ' A. I 000079 �. . -11- PR 142 A. I don't care to express an opinion on that. I have an appointment with Senator Dirksen, and I expect to go over the matter with him, and until I have done that I do"''t care to express any opinion. Q. Mr. secretary, are the delaying tactics on the preparations for Geneva such that they might delay the conference itself? A. That is conceivable, Q. Thank you, sir. yes. Henry Suydam * * * State--PB, Wash., D.C. 000080 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 22 MARCH 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-03-22 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00025 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Message from Canadian Ambassador to the United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 22 Mar. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. Indo-China John Foster Dulles Korea NATO Nixon Stevenson https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/cdd580d37733d91e7db7b9840c3d6193.pdf 0131c7d474ef30b460fe8bb30ae66183 PDF Text Text .. INCOM~NG .. ., . MESSAGE f) ORIGINAL Security Classification FROM: THE CANADIAN AtmASSADOR TO THE UNITED STAT UNCLASSIFI~ filoNo.? TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATEFOR EXTERNALAFFAIRS,CANADA System Priority EN CLAIR Departmental Circulation No. WA-481 I ~/' Dore V ;r MINISTER Subject: A/UNDER/SEC'S POL/CO-ORD t 'N SECTION Dulles, - March 20, 1954. Reference: UNDER/SEC D/UNDER/SEC /.-I I ~#//~-- i testimony on United States defence-referencei to iir. Pearson's comment. In a three-hour session open to the public on Jlarch 19, Secretary Dulles answered questions posed by the Senate Foreign Relations Commi.ttee on the nev United States defence strategy~ An officer of the Embassy attended the hearing and a report will bs forwal'ded to you next veek. We thought you might be interested, houevar, to knov of the references made in the hGaring to your remarks bsfore the National Press Club on. I • I I March 15. References ccos T)/M. OND ~tw• ~,~~t;t;,v ~/.Jr. ,i t 'I t~ ,T JtJ, 2. At one point in the hearing Senator Fe?'guson (R-Mich.) asked Mr. Dulles how many allies of· the United States had expressed concern publicly over the new United States defence strategy. Mr. Dulles replied that to the best of his knowledge~ none had. Since reference had been made earlier in the hearing to 70ur statemen.t, Dulles want on to say that in private converseticns vhich you had v1th him last veek, you had indicated your surprise that the press had regarded your statement as critical of United States defence policies and that you had assured him that you had not intended that your remarks should be taken as criticism of United States policy. Senator Ferguson said that he had been equally surprised at the 1X>neof the press reports. He thought that you had simply indicated the basic t~uth that nobody could declare var for Canada, a situation which he hoped would hold true for the United States as ~ell. In a. fleeting reference to Canada's historical background, Fe:rguson suggested that Canada had always baen "jealous of its position in the British Empire" and had historically insisted that it have the right to make up its own mind as to whether it would act 1n an instance where a United K1ngc:1om declaration of war vas made. Dulles said. that he thought that you had been simply expressing tb.e proper concern or a responsible ~1n1ster of the Canadian Government. that Canada's action in any particular circumstance should not bs taken for granted, oither by the UrLited. States or the United Kingdom. Ferguson asked Mr. Dulles if Canada had been consulted on recent develoµnents in United States strategic thinking and Dulles assured him t~t Call&da and all the NA'l'O allies had been made aware of t'4e la~eat vieva or the United State• Oovel'Jl9nt 1n th1a reapeot. · ••••••• 2 000082 Ext.230 {rev.5/52) ------~----~~----------------~ ___ J �-.. ... 1."' ... ' . -2- 3. In an earlier exchange with Senator (R-N.J.) on the question of consultation of the United Sta.tea., Dulles said that with Smith the allies he had assured you in private conversation that consultation by the United States with its allies was basic to the United States capacity to retaliate against an aggressor. He we.nt on to say that the new strategy of the United States had been thoroughly discussed at last December's meeting of the NATOCouncil. 4. The transcript of this hearing is not likely to be available for a month or so. Tb.ere have 1n the past been occasions, however, when we were able to arrange to get access to the tape recordings made of such hearings. You might let us know if you think the exact transcript of the exchanges mentioned above are important for your purposes and we will make an effort to get them for you. 000083 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 20 MARCH 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-03-20 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00024 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Washington to External Affairs WA-481, 20 March 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. British Empire John Foster Dulles Lester Pearson Senate Foreign Relations Committee https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/7c192127d219eb5c677c9ad095623b54.pdf 3e88a76cb8b086a2a88a3b376004dae8 PDF Text Text . .. DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. ( DUPLICATE~ DESPATCH UNCLASSIFIED TO: THESECRETARY OF STATEFOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA. THE CANADIAN AMBASSADORS! FROM; I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II I I I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I • I I I I. I I I I I I I I ~ I I I I I I . 503 No:. It I It I I I I I I I I I I Date: ............... I I I I II I I I I I I I I t It I It I March 18, 1954 , ............... . WASHINGTON,DoCo I 111::f erellce: I Security: .......................... I I I • I I I I I I I I •••••• I I I I I I I • I I I I I I I I I I I ••••••••• Article I I I I I I ••• I I I I I •••• I •• I I I •••••••• I by the U.So Secretary i I I &closures: , , ..... I .... I ,· in Foreign i , • , , • , •• , , ••• Air or Surface Mail:, ... ,.,,.,,.,,,,,,. of Sl.abject1, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ~, ~ , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , State , ..... P9st File No:. .... , .. ~ ........ Affairs I I I I t I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I t I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ~ I I I I I I, I I I I I I I I I I I I I I , , .. , , . , , Ottawa File No, References I enclose five copies of Department of State press release No. 139 of March 16, 1954, containing the text of the article prepared by the Secretary of State for the April issue of Foreign Affairs. 2. In his news conference of March 16, Mr. Dulles made the following remark concerning this article: "I might say that I wrote, some weeks ago, an article for Foreign Affairs, which is in substance a somewhat more polished, I hope, restatement of my speech which was made before the Council of Foreign Relations, which publishes Foreign Affairs. That I did while I was flying back from Berlin. I understand that is being released for publication tomorrow in New York by the magazine Foreign Affairs. That will elaborate to some extent the thesis which I expressed in my address of January 12." Internal Circulation 3. _The above quotation is taken from the transcript published in the New York Times of March 17 which you will have seen, and it is perhaps of some significance that he referred to this article in connection with a question arising out of Mro Pearso_nvs speech 'Before· the National Press Clubo (Sgd.) Go de T. Glazebrook For the Ambassador. Distribution to Posts 000498 fat, l80C (Rev. 2/52) �• RESTRICTED March 24, 1954. ALL POSTS ABROAD Attached is the text of an article by the United States .Secretary of State prepared for the April issue of Foreis;n Affairs. At a news conference on March 16 1 1954, Mr. Dulles remarked that this article constituted a more polished restatement of the speech which he delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on January 12 on the long~range global policy of the Eisenhower administration. The article elabo.ra tes the thesis expressed in the speech of January 12, but contains no basic change in the main elements of the new policy. Greater emphasis is given to a collective system of defence which is "the cornerstone of security for the free nations"o This security depends upon "the cooperation of our allies" without which the United would not even be in a position to retaliate massiv,ely against the war industries of an attacking nation.· The controversial statement in the speech of January 12 concerning the basic decision of the United States National Security Council "to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and in places of our choosing" does rtot appear in this articleo In stressing the importance of local defence, however, it is stated that "the ID9.in reliance must be on the power of the free community to retaliate with great force by mobile means at places of its own choice"o Acknowledgment reshaping of the military various respects"and the reply to criticism of the defence policy: is given to the fact that "this program was misconstrued·in following points are made in "new look" in the United States a) The United States does not intend to rely wholly on large-scale strategic bombing as the sole means to deter and counter aggression; b) the program is not a move away from collective security but rather the opposite; c) the United States policy does not envisage withdrawal of large forces from abroad in the interests of mobilityo Forces in the F:ar East will be reduced in number. but the force remaining will have great striking power. If the continental nations in Europe provide "a harmonious nucleus of integrated defence" the United States would expect to maintain substantial forces in Europe$ both in support of the forward strategy of defence and for political reasons;· d) while it will be practicable by this program to reduce economic aid to United States allies, this aid will not be wholiy excluded and the Technical Assistance Program will continueo 000499 �POLICYFOR SECURITYANDPEACE The following John Foster Dulles is a~ article for ~he April prepared by Secretary of State issue of Foreign Affairs. Since World War II, the United States has faced the diff,f.cult task of finding policies which would be adequate for pecurity and peace and at the same time compatible with ·its traditions. Never before has a great nati:on been called upon to adjust its thinking and its action so radically in so short a period. During the nineteenth century the maintenance of peace and order depended largely on Great Britain, with its Navy and the system of naval bases which enabled it to operate with mobility and flexibility throughout the world. By suitable commercial, investment and monetary policies, Great Britain and other nations with surplus capital stimulated economic growth in underdeveloped areas. The French Revolution had aroused men to respect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms. The United States also made its contribution. Our people devoted their energies largely to domestic matters, not because they lacked concern for others but believing that what our founpers called 1ethe conduct and examplett of freedom would exert a liberating influence everywhere. In fact, it did so. The 19great American experiment" was a source of hope and inspiration to men everywhere, and especially to those living under despotism. Our dynamic example of freedom drew many to our shores and inspired others, in the old world and the new, to emulate our course. All of these influences contributed to giving the world relative peace and security for the 100 years between the ending of the Napoleonic wars and the beginning of the First World War. During this period there were many advances in the practice of p9litical liberty, and generally throughout the world there was a great advance in material and social well-being. The events of the twentieth century, and especially the two World Wars and their aftermaths, have created an entirely new situation. In large measure the Uni tt(d States has inherited a responsibility for leadership whichi in the pastj has been shared by several nations. Today there rests upon us, to a unique degree, the threefold task of providing insurance against another world war; of demonstrating the good fruits of freedom which undermine the rule of despots by contrast; and of providing a major part of the effort required for the healthy growth of underdeveloped areas. The Eisenhower Administration inherited security policies that had much worth. Many of these policies were bipartisan in character. They reflected a national recognition of the peril facing the civilized world, a united determination to meet it, and an acceptance of the role of leadership thrust,, on us by events. We had helped to reestablish the economies of other countries shattered by the war. We had taken a major part in resisting the aggression in Korea. In the face of the Soviet threat we were engaged in rebuilding our military strength and that of other free countries. · These and like measures were costly. But they were necessary to our security. However, they partook much of an emergency character. By 1953 there was need to review our 000500 �- - 2 = securTty planning and to adjust our continuing military to the other requirements of a well-rounded, permanent effort policy. ·Under the condition-sin which we live, it is not easy to strlke, perfect balance between military and non-military efforts anq to ~hoose the type of military effort which serves us besto The essential is to recognize that there is an imperative need for .a balance which holds military expenditures to a minimum consistent with safety, so that a maximum of liberty may operate as a dynamic force against despotism. That is the goal of our policyo IIa The Nature of the Threat The threat we face is not one that can be adequately dealt with on an emergency basis. It is a threat that may long persist a Our policies must be adapted to this basic fact a The Soviet menace does not reflect the ·ambiti0ns :oiC.c' a single ruler, and cannot be measured by his life expectancy. There is no evidence that basic Soviet policies have been changed with the passing of Stalino Indeedi the Berlin Conference of last February gave positive evidence to the contrarya The Soviet Communists have always professed that they are planning for what they call 18an entire historical eraa 10 The assets behind this threat are vast. The Soviet bloc of Communist-controlled countries--a new form of imperialist colonialism--represents a vast central land mass ..with. a population of 800jOOO,OOOa About 10,000,000 men are -regularly under -arms, with many more trained millions in re-serve. T-hi--s--1.andfe-rce occupies a central position which permits of striking at any one of about 20 countries along a -per:1-me-t-er -of -seme 20 ;-000---mil-eso -·I-t is supplemented sy -i-n-cr-easing air power, equipped with atomic weapons:, able to -strik-e throu-g-h -northern Arctic routes which bring our industrial areas in range of quick attacka The threat is not merely militarya The Soviet rulers dispose throughout the world of the apparatus of international Communismo It operates with trained agitators and a powerful propaganda organization. It exploits every area of discontent, whether it be political disconten·t against 11 16 colonialism or social discontent against economic conditions. It seeks to: harass the existing order and pave the way for political coups which will install Communist=controlled regimes a B~ the use of many types of manoeuvres and threats, military and political, the Soviet rulers seek gradually to divide and weaken the free nations and to make their policies appear as bantrupt by overextending them in efforts which, as Lenin put it, are "beyond their strength." Then, said Lenin, '°our victory is assured a16 Then, said Stalin, will be the rnmoment for the decisive blowa 16 It is not easy to devise policies which will counter a danger so centralized and so vast~ so varied and so sustained. It is no answer to substitute the glitter of steel for the torch of freedome An answer can be found by drawing on those basic concepts which have come to be regularly practised within our civic communitieso There we have almost wholly given up the idea of relying primarily on house=by-house defense. 000501 �• - 3 = Instead 9 primary reliance is placed upon the combining concepts, namely,i the creation of power on a community and the use of that power so as to deter aggression by it costly to an aggressoro The free nations must apply ' same principles in the inte·rnational sphere o . IIIo of two basis making these Community Defense The cornerstone of security for the free nations must be a collective system of defenseo They clearly cannot achieve security separatelyo No single nation can develop for itself defensive power of adequate scope and flexibilityo In seeking to do so, each would become a garrison state and none would achieve securityo This is true of the United Stateso Without the cooperation of allies, we would not even be in a position to retaliate massively against the war industries of an :attacking nationo That requires international facilitieso Without them, our air striking power loses much of its deterrent powero With them, strategic air power becomes what Sir Winston Churchill -called the 18supreme deterrent on He credited to tt the safety of Europe during recent yearso But such power, while now a dominant factor, may not have the same significance forevero Furthermore, massive atomic and the:rmonuclear retaliation is not the kind of power which could most usefully be evoked under all circumstanceso Security for the free world depends, therefore, upon the development of collective security and community power rather than upon purely national potentials. Each: nation which shares the security should contribute in accordance with its capabilities and facilitie$o The Inter=American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) of 1947 set a postwar example in establishing the principle that an armed attack against one would be considered as an attack against all. The North A-tl--anti-c T-re-at-y i-s based on the same principle. Its m-ember-s-hav-e--g-ene-much further i-n -organi-zi-ng Joint forces and facilities as a part of the integrated security system. NATOprovides essential air and naval basesj to which its various members can contribute~= each according to its means ?"aridcapabilities o It provides the planes and ships and weapons which can use these baseso It provides so many points from which an aggressor could be harassed, in so many different ways, that he cannot prudently concentrate his forces for offense against a single victim. While NATObest exemplifies this collective security concept, there are other areas where the same concept is evolving, although as yet in a more rudimentary form. An example is the Western Pacific, where the United States has a series of collective security treaties which now embrace Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan and Korea. Collective arrangements are now in the making in the Middle East with Turkey-Pakistan as the nucleus. These developments show the growing acceptance of the collective security concept we describe. The United ;Nations is striving to make collective security effective on a basis broader than regionalism. The central principle of the Charter is that any armed attack is of universal concern and calls for collective measures of resistance. The Soviet Union, by its veto powerj has made it impractical, as yet, to make available to the Security Council the 1varmed forces, assistance, and fac:Lli ties 10 contemplated by Article 000502 �.. - 4 - 1,-3·of the· Chartero W}:lenaggression occurred in Korea, however, the pr~n~iple of collective action was invoked by the United Nations and acted on by more than a majority of the members, includin~ l~ which sent armed forces to Korea to repel the aggression o The "Uni ting for Peace'' Resolution, adopted by the General Assembly in November 1950, grew out of that experienceo That resolution will enable members of the United Nations to join in carrying out similar collective measures. .agaj:ns.t. any future aggression without being blocked by a [Soviet vetoo The free worla system of bases is an integral part of its co11ecti ve security o At the recent Four __;Power Conference in Berlin 9 Mr o Molotov repeatedly attacked these bases as evidence of aggressive purposeo Actually these bases on the territory of other sovereign countries are merely a physical expression of the collective security systemo They were constructed only at the request of the host nation and their availability depends upon its consent, usually as a legal condition and always as a practical oneo The requisite consent to the use of these bases would never be accorded unless it was clear that their use was in response to open aggression, and reasonably related to its scope and nature. This gives assurance of their community function. Thus the free world has practical means for achieving collective security both through the United Nations and the various regional arrangements already referred to. ·.lJL, ~ Strategy to Deter Aggression The question remainsg How should collective defense be organized by the free world for maximum protection at minimum cost? The heart of the problem is how to deter attacko This, we believe, requires that a potential aggressor be left in no doubt that he would be certain to suffer dam.age outweighing any possible gains from aggression. This result would not ·be --assured, -even by pollecti ve measures, if the free world sought to match the potential Communist forces, man for man and tank for tank, at every point where they might attack. The Soviet-Chinese bloc does not lack manpower and spends it as something that is cheap. If an aggressor knew he could always prescribe the battle conditions that suited him and engage us in struggles mainly involving manpowerj aggression might be encouraged. He would be tempted to attack in places and by means where his manpower sµperiority was decisive and., where at little cost he could 1mpose upon us great burdens. If the free world adopted that strategy, it could bankrupt itself and not achieve security over a sustained period. The free world must devise a better strategy for its defense, based on its own special assetso Its assets include, especiall.Y, air and"naval power and atomic weapons which are now available in a wide range, suitable not only for strategic bombing but also for extensive tactical use. The free world must make imaginative use of the deterrent capabilities of these new weapons and mobilities and exploit the full potential of collective security. Properly used, they can produce defensive power able to retaliate at once and effectively against any aggression. 000503 �.. To deter aggression, it is important to have the flexibility and the facilities which make various responses availableo In many cases, any open assault by Communist forces could only result in starting a general waro But the free world must have the means for responding effectively on a selective basis when it chooseso It must not put itself in the position where the only response open to it is general waro The essential thing is that a potential aggressor should know in advance that he can and will be , made to suffer for his -aggression more than he can possibly gain by it. This calls for a system in which local defensive strength is reinforced by more mobile deterrent powero The method of doing so will vary according to the character of the various areaso Some areas are so vital that a special guard should and can be put around themo Western Europe is such an areao Its industrial plant represents so nearly the balance of industrial power in the world that an aggressor might feel that it was a good gamble to seize it -- even at the risk of considerable hurt to himselfo In this respect, Western Europe is exceptionalo Fortunately, the Western European countries have both a military tradition and a large military potential, so .that through a European Defence Community, and with support by the United States ·and Britain, they can create an adequate defense of the Continento Most areas within the reach of an aggressor offer less value to him than the loss he would suffer from wellconceived retaliatory measures. Even in such areas, howe-ver:., local defense will always be importanto In every endangered area there should be a sufficient military establishment to maintain order against subversion ?nd to resist other forms of indirect aggression and minor satellite aggressions. This serves the indispensable need to demonstrate a purpose to resist, and to compel any aggressor to expose his real intent by such serious fighting as will brand him before all the world and promptly bring collective measures into operationo Potential aggressors have little respect for peoples who have no will to fight for their own protection or to make the sacrifices needed to make that fighting significanto Also, they know that such peoples do not attract allies to fight for their causeo For all of these reasons, local defense is importanto But in such areas the main reliance must be on the power of the free community to retaliate with great force by mobile means at places of its own choice a A would-be aggressor will hesitate to commit aggression if he knows in advance that he thereby not only exposes those particular forces which he chooses to use for his ·~ggression, ~ut ~lso deprives his other assets of "sanctuary" ~tatuso Th&t does not mean turning every local war into a world war. It does not mean that if there is a Communist attack somewhere in Asia, atom or hydrogen bombs will necessarily be dropped on the great industrial centres of China or Russia. It does mean that the free world must maintain the collective means and be willing to use them in the way which most effectively makes aggression too risky and expensive to be tempting o It is sometimes said that this system is inadequate because it assures an invaded country only that it will eventually be liberated and the invader punished a That observation misses the pointo The point is that a prospective 000504 �.. - 6 - attacker is not likely to invade if he believe~ the probable hurt will _outbalance the probable gain. A system which compels potential aggressor, to face up to that fact indispensably supp~ements a local defensive syst~m. L Practical We can alread·y begin Applications . ' to see applications of these policies. In Korea the forces fighting aggression had been so closely limited that they were forbidden even to apply the doct}ine of "hot pursuit" in relation to enemy planes that were based across the Yalu. The airfields from which attacks were mounted were immune, as were the lines and sources of their supply. The fighting there was finally stopped last July on terms which had been proposed many months before. That result was achieved, at least in part, because the aggressor, already denied territorial gains, was faced with the possibility that the fighting might, to his own great peril, soon spread beyond the limits and methods which he had selected, to areas and methods that we would select. In other words, the principle of using methods of our choice was ready to be invoked, and it helped to stop the war which the enemy had begun and had pursued on the theory that it would be a limited war, at places and by means of its choosing. The 16 memQers of the United Nations who fought in Korea have invoked the same principleo They have given public notice that if the Communists were to violate the armistice and renew the aggression, the response of the United Nations Command would not necessarily be confined to Koreao Today, if aggression were resumed, the United Nations Command would certainly feel free to inflict heavy damage upon the aggressor beyond the immediate area which he chose for his aggression. That need not mean indulging in atomic warfare throughout Asia. It should not be stated in advance precisely what would be the ~cope of military action if new a~gression occurred. That is a matter as to which the aggrespbr had best remain ignorant. But he can know and does know, in the light of present policies, that the choice in this respect is ours and hot his. In relation to Indo-China, the United stated that if there were open Red Chinese there, that would have "grave consequences confined to Indo-China." States has publicly Army aggression which might not be On December 26, 1953, President Eisenhower made an ifilportant statement which clearly reflected our present policy -as applied to Asia. He announced a progressive reduction -of United States ground forces in Korea. However, he went -on to point out that United States military forces in --t-he F-ar East will now feature nhighly mobile naval, air and - amphibious units;" and he added that in this way, despite some withdrawal of land forces, the United States will have --a capacity to oppose aggression "with even greater effect than he-r-etofore." In the same month the United State·s reaffirmed i t-s 1-ntent to maintain in Okinawa the rights made available -to us by the -Japanese Peace Treaty. This location is needed to ensure striking power to implement the collective security concept. In Europe, our intentions are primarily expressed by the North Atl-antic Treaty. Following the aggression in Korea of June 1950, the Treaty members proceeded to an emergency 000505 �.. - 7 - buildup of military strength in Western Europeo The st·rehgth built between 1950 and 1953 has served well the cause of peace. But by 1953, it did not seem necessary to go on at the original paceo At the April 1953 meeting of the NATOCouncil, the United States put forward a new concept, now known as that of the "long haul." It meant a steady development of defensive strength at a rate which would preserve and not exhaust the economic strength of our allies and ourselves. This would be reinforced by the availability of new weapons of vastly increased de·st-ructi ve power and by the striking power of an air force based .on internationally agreed positions. President Eisenhowe·r is now seeking an amendment of the present law to permit a freer exchange of atomic information with ,our NATO·.Allie•s. When we-went back to the NATOCouncil meeting of last December, we found that there was general acceptance of the "long ·aauln concept. The result is that most of our NATO allies are now able to achieve budgetary and economic stability, without large dependence on our economic aid. The growing free-world defensive system, supported by community facilities and coupled with adequate policies for their use, reflects the nearest approach that the world has yet made to a means to achieve effective defense, at minimum cost. VI. The. Current Military Program \ One of the basic tasks been to review our military foregoing policies. of the new Administration has program in the light of the In the years 1945-53, our military programs went through wide ffuuctuations which hindered orderly and efficient administrationo During the first part of this period, the policy -was to -recl·uee ·-t-he mili·tary -establi-shment drastically. During the latter -part of the -period, -the policy was to increase the military establishment rapidly. During both the decrease and the increase tne military budget reflected the so-called "balance of forcesP concept. In practical terms, this meant splitting the available funds into three roughly equal slices .for the Army, Navy and Air Force. When the E!senhower Administration took office, our national security programs, at home and abroad, were costing over 50 billion dollars a year, and were planned at about 55 billion dollars for the next year. Budgetary deficits were of the order of 10 billion dollars, despite taxes comparable to wartime taxes. Inflation was depreciating the purchasing power of the dollar6 Our allies were similarly burdened. The .American people have repeatedly shown that they are prepared to make whatever sacrifices are really necessary to insure our national safety. They would no doubt support military expenses at the levels which their government told them were required for security, even at the cost of budget deficits, resultant inflationary pressures and tax-levels which would impair incentives. But the patriotic will :to sacrifice is not something to be drawn upon needlessly. Government has the high duty to seek resourcefully and inventively the ways which will provide security without 000506 �• sacrificing economic and social welfareo The security poliGies we here describe m.ake possible more selective and more effi'cient programs in terms of the composition of forces and of procuremento The new Administration has sought to readjust, in an orderly way, the program for the military forceso Before this could be done, it was necessary to clarify the extent of our reliance on collective security; to define more clearly our basic strategy both in Europe and the Far East; to reassert our freedom of action in repelling future aggression; to assess the impact of newer types of weapons; and to relate the composition and size of our ready and potential forces to all these factors. Inevitably this has taken time. It bas required a series of difficult basic decisions by the President with ,the advice of the National Security Council and with supporting decisions by the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the Treasury Department. It has been necessary to exchange views with Congressional leaders and our principal allies and to inform world opinion so that neither our friends nor our enemies abroad would misinterpret what we were doingo By now, however, the new course is charted and is guiding our military planning. As a result, it is now possible to get, and share, more basic security at less costo That is reflected in the budget which the President has submitted for the 1955 fiscal yearo In this budget, national security expenditures for fiscal year 1955 will amount to 45 billion dollars as compared with 50 billion dollars for 1953 and 49 billion dollars for 19540 Initially this reshaping of the military program was misconstrued in various respects. Some suggested that the United States intended to rely wholly on large-scale strategic bombing as the sole means to deter and counter aggression. What has already been said should dispose of this erroneous ideao The potential of massive attack will always be kept in a state of instant readiness, and our program will retain a wide variety in the means and scope for responding to aggression. Othexs -i-n-t-erp-r-e-t-edthe -pxogram a-s -a move away from collective security. The· exact op·posi te is the case, as has been shown •. Our policies are· base,r squarely on a collective security system and depend for their success on its continuing vitality. Still others feared that we intended to withdraw our forces from abroad in the interest of mobilityo Now that the fighting is ended in Korea, our forces in the Far East will be reduced in numbers, as has previously been announced, but the kind of force that remains will have ,great striking powero Moreover, the program does not mean that we intend to pull our forces out of Europeo It is, of course, essential that the continental nations themselves provide a harmonious nucleus of integrated defenseo If they do so, the United States would expect to maintain substantial forces of its own in Europe, both in support of the forward strategy of defense and for political reasonso Another consequence of our new policies is that it has become practicable to reduce our economic :atcil to our allieso The Technical Assistance Program will go on and economic aid is not wholly excludedo There are still some places near the Soviet orbit where the national governments cannot maintain adequate armed forces without help from uso That is notably so in the Middle and Far Easto We have contributed largely, ungrudgingly, and I hope constructively, to end 000507 �.. - 9 - aggression and advanQe freedom in Indo=Chinao The stakes there are so high thijt it would be culpable not to contribute to the forces struggiing to resist Communist oppressiono But broadly speaking, economic aid in the form of grants is on its way out as a major element of our foreign policyo This is highly desirable from many standpointso It helps to make our own budget more manageable and it promotes more self-respecting international relationships. That is what our allies wanto Trade, broader markets and a flow of investment are far more healthy than intergovernmental grants-in-aid. It is, of course, important that we do actually develop these mutually advantageous substitutes for "aid." To do so is one of the major objectives of the Eisenhower Administration. It is an essential component of the over-all policies already described. gather In the ways outlined, the United States and its allies strength for the long-term defense of freedom. VIIo Our National Purpose We do not, of course, claim to have found some magic formula that ensures against all forms of Communist successes. Despoti;sm is entrenched as never before. It remains aggressive, particularly in Asiao In Europe, its purposes remain expansive, as shown by Mr. Molotov's plans at the Berlin Conference for Germany, Austria and all Europe. However, time and fundamentals will work for us, if only we will let theme The dibtators face an impossible task when they set themselves to suppress, over a vast area and for a long time, the opportunities which flow from freedom. We can be sure that 'there is going on, even within the Soviet empire, a sile~t test of strength between the powerful rulers and the multitudes of human beings. Each individual seems by himself to be helpless in this struggleo But tpeir aspirations in the --ag-greg-ate make up a mighty force. There are: some -si.-g-:a-sthat the Sovi-et ruler-s -are, in terms of dom~stic -policy, bending to some of the human desires of their people. There are promises of more food, more household goods, more economic freedom. This does not prove that the dictators have themselves been converted. It is rather that they may be dimly perceiving that there are limits to their power indefinitely to suppress the human spirit. That is a truth which should not be lost sight of as we determine our own policies. Our national purpose is not merely to survive in a world fraught with appalling danger. We want to end this ·era of danger. We shall not achieve that result -merely by developing a vast military establishment. That serves indispensably to defend us and to deter attack. But the sword of Damocles remains suspendedo The way to end the peril peacefully is to demonstrate that freedom produces not merely guns, but the spiritual, intellectual and material richness that all men want. · Such are the guiding principles we invoke o We haNe-~canfidence that if our nation perseveres in applying them, freedom will -ag--ain win the upper hand in its age=long struggle· with despotism, and that the danger of war will steadily recede. 000508 �.. DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS t DATE March 17, 1954 PUBLICATION NoYo Times Transcript of Secretary; Du'lles Remarks on Defense at His News Conferenceo Special to The New York Timeso WASHINGTON~ March 16 -- Secretarz_ of Stat&... Dulles ,.ilUthorize4.Jpr direct publication the following section of the transcript of his news conference today: bearing on the llaew J&.Q.K"in foreign affaj,rs and military policy: Q o - 11/Ir o -Secretary, would you please of, one, the concept of instant retaliation; consultation with our allies, and, three, ment in war only by an act of Congress? give us the reconciliation two, the concept of the concept of involve,, A,, - I assume your reference supposedly taken from an address to instance of mineo Q. - And one by the Vice President Saturday· II retaLiation" is of the Uni ted ..'8.tates on night~ ., Ao - I cannot comment on what the Vice President said, but I will b~ glad to comment on what I saido If you will read my address of .Jano 12 - you will see what I advocated th·e.re was a ~capacity" to retaliate instantlyo In no place did I say we would retaliate instantly, although we might indeed retaliate instantly under conditions that call for thato The essential thing is to have the capacity to retaliate instantlyo. It is lack of that capacity which in my opinion accounted· for such disa_sters as Pear'1 Harboro If we had had the capacity to retaliate instantly, in my opinion, there would· have be~n no Pearl Harbor o · But it took · about four years to retaliate against Tokyoo· I belteve we should. have that capacity to retaliate instantlyo 1 ' ,, Facts Will Be Weighed . -~,. ...·- .; Now, the question of whether or not you retaliate instantly and where you retaliate is a matter to be dealt with in accordance with the facts of each situationo I take it few would have any question but what if there were an attack up.on,>the United States there would be instant retaliationo Yo.u have questions of retaliation in the event of a violation or an attack upon a member of the North Atlantic Treaty and upon oth~r countries with whom we have treaty relationshipso · . The question of circumstances under which you retaliate, where you retaliate, how quickly you retaliate is a matter which has to be dealt with in the light of the facts of each particular caseo One thing I want to make clear beyond the possibility of doubt is that I don°t believe you should tell the enemy in advance just where, how, and when you plan to retaliateo The whole esse"iice of the program is that the action should be an action of our choosing and he is not to know in advance what it is, and that uncertainty on his part is a key to the success of the policyo Q.. - Sir, if I may pursue thato You mentioned in the event of an attack upon a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance 000509 �_, ... you say what would then be instant retaliationo Does that mean in the event the concept of involvement in war only by act of Congress does not apply where there is an attack either upon the United States or upon a member of alliance of which we are a part? Ao - It means·in all respects the United States acts in accordance with its constitutional processeso There is no way in the world in which we can get away, or want to get away, or intend to get away from our constitutional processeso How long that will take, I don 9 t knowo It did not take very long after Pearl Harbor to.get a declaration of waro The trouble is it qid not do any immediate good to get a declaration of war because we did not have the capacity to do anything with ito Defense Treaties Cited I have never advocated, and nobody else in the Administration has advocated any departure from constitutional processeso The North Atlantic Treaty has provided that an attack against one of those states shal1 be.deemed the same as an attack against the United Stateso We have other treaties with language which is not precisely the same as thato Just what action by the Congress is requir.ed is a matter to be decided in each case. The fact that you advocate hav1PS. a capacity for instant retaliation does not change your constitutional processeso It means we don't have to wait for four years after somebody attacks us before we are in a position eftectively to hit backo . .., Qo ~ Sir, does the fact that the Senate of the United States has ratified the North Atlantic Alliance mean in the event of an attack on an ally we could, within constitutional procedures, retaliate against that attack without action in the Congress? A. - That is a matter which, as you know, was debated very thoroughly in the Congress and in the Senate; at the time that treaty was ratified I was in the Senateo It is my opinion that the provisions of the treaty, which state that an attack upon one of the allies is the same as an attack upon all -- or in other words that an-attack upon one of our allies is the same as an attack upon- the United States -- and that is also, I may say, in the Rio pact -- that gives the President--,.;;_of_the United States the same authority to react as he would have if the United States were a ttackedo Qo - Thank you, matter siro Ao - Whether he would use that authority in every for his discretion., In my opinion he has ito case is a Qo - He has the right? A. - In my opinion he has the righto That does not necessarily mean in all cases he would use the right without consultation by Congresso It would depend on· the gravity of the attack, whether it was obvious the attack meant all-out war, which inevitably would involve uso Many matters would .have to be considered and doubtless would be considered A¥ the President in determining whether or not to use his discretibnary authorityo Qo - Mro Secretary, might I raise a question on another word in the reference to capacity to retaliateo The sentence ends: "By means and at places of our choosing"o Now, :Mro Pearson (Lester E. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs) raised the question whether the word "our" meant the United States 000510 �.. or whether - 3 it meant the free = community of nationso Ao - I think that the sentence is reasonably you read the whole sentence if you have 'it before Statement Qo - Yes o clearG you? Would Read to Dulles (Reading): "The basic decision great capacity to retaliate, of our choosing." A.· - Does it was to depend primarily upon a instantly, by means and at place use the word "free world?'' Qo - There were two sentenceso One is ' "The basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing." A. - Is that Ao· - Yes. the whole sentence? I would like to have the first part of the sentence. Q. - The ·first part be changed, the Presldent National Security Council, This has been doneo The upon a great capacity to places of our choosing." Q. - I think spoke about is: "But before military plan,ning could and his advisers, as represented by the had to take some basic policy decisiono basic decision was to depend primarily retaliate, instantly, by means and at there was a sentence the free worldo in the text there which Q.• - Not in that particular paragraph. There is an earlier sentence to this part which says: "The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing." A. - I thought that was what you were reading from. Qo - Which is it? A. - Well, it·would depend a good deal upon the circumstancesa If there were an attack upon the United States and if we had the capacity to respond from our own bases, we would certainly do thato It is, I think, well known that the bases which we have in f~reign countries are in general not use~ble as a matter of law, and as a practical matter are not useablej except with the consent of the countries where the bases are. For example, the bases which are available to our Strategic Air Force in Great Britain are not useable as a base of attack except with the consent of the British Governmento The same is true in general with all our foreign baseso Therefore, it is implicit in our security system that it operates with the consent and acquiescence of the other partners who have helped to provide the facilities which create a sort of international police systemo Q. - If I might go on. There were two other words which Mro Pearson raised a question to in relation to the point which you have just made, the one being "instantly" and the other being ''means. 11 Does his mean the choosing of means would lie with the free community or only with the United States? Would there be consultation? 000511 �., .. I • = 4 = A. - Yes, there would certainly be consultation in most of the cases that I can conceive ofo I might say that I wrote, some weeks ago, an article for Foreign Affairs, which is in substance a somewhat more polished, I hope, restatement of my speech which was made before the Council of Foreign Relations, which publishes Foreign Affairso That I did while I was flying back from Berlino I understand that is being released for publication tomorrow in New York by the magazine Foreign Affairso That will elaborate to some- extent the thesis which I expressed in my address of Jan,, -I2o qn another (Mro Dulles' article page of this issue in Foreign Affairs is published Qf The New York Timeso) - Q. - I would like to ask another question on this subjecto There has been some discussion and speculation to the effect that reliance on the capacity to retaliate instantly as a major part ·~f your defensive system would mean, in the case of a limited challenge in some remote area, you would have tpe choice either of an all-out war or no resistance at allo Ao - That is not a correct analysis of the thesis at all•o Let us take, for example, the declaration which\Y(ijs-·made by :'the sixteen powers in relation to Korea, which is one of the illustrations I made in my speecho It has been stated there that if aggression should be resumed that the reaction would not necessarily be confined to Koreao Now what does that mean? That does not mean necessarily that there will be an effort made to drop atomic bombs on Peiping or upon Moscowa It does mean that there are areas of importance to the aggressors in that vicinity which may have an industrial or strategic relationship to the operation which would no longer be what General MacArthur called a ''privileged sanctuaryo 11 I cannot imagine any policy more futile or more apt to create war than to adopt the policy that you will only react at the particular place, and by the means the aggressor selects 0 If anything would ever put a premium on aggressionj it would be thato We want to take away that premium on aggressiono Qo-- Mro Secretary, while we are annoting that speech, there was a reference in there to a lesser reliance on local defense, and some question has been raised as to whether that meant less reliance on defense by local, indigenous forces which we might aid, for ~ample, or less reliance on local actions by American forces, in local sectors of the long front? Ao - What I meant there, when I say "I", I might say that that speech was not just a personal speech,~was that if you have the capacity to strike an aggressor at the points which will hurt him, the deterrent power~of that is sufficient so that you do not need to have local defense all around the 20,000-mile perimeter of the orbit of the Soviet world because your deterrent power, to a large extent, reinforces your local power· so that you do not have to depend upon having in place forces-in-being sufficient to stop an attack in its tracks anywhere where it could occur because-you rely primarily upon deterring that attack, not necessary upon being able to stop ito f With the Soviet-Chi~ese-Communist world -800 9 000,000 people occupying a central location; with land armies - it would be utt,erly impossible to have all around that 20,ooo~mile orbit sufficient to stop might come at·whf)jever they might chose to make ita have got to find some way whereby that type of local with its its vast local defenses any blow that So that you ground defense 000512 �e •. • = can be supplemeritedo capacity to retailiate own c}1oosingo 5 = And the way to supplement it is to have a at times, places, and with methods of your Now that doesn 9 t mean that you eliminate wholly, by any means, land forces -- it means you do not necessarily make them your primary reliance because, as against the kind of d~nger which threatens,· it is impossible to match your potential enemy at all points on a basis of man-for-man, gun-for-gun and tankfo-r-tank., If we try to do that, we are going to go bus to Qo -Mro Secretary, if I may go back to one point of yours, you said that in.Europe the ·President had the same authority under the NATOand Rio treaties to retaliate if the United States was attaekedo Well, last Wednesday he seemed to give a pledge that he would not use that because he said that there would be no involvement in war without Congressional approvalo Ao - But if the Senate is a different mattero has given approval in advance, Qo - Well, the specific case was Indo-Chinao was what some of us were wondering about" I think that that Ao - Yes, there has been no Congressional approval given in advance of a war in Indo-China to which the United States would be a partyo He certainly did not mean, I think, to imply that if the United States was attacked, and if Congress was not in session, that he would wait until Congress was called back into session and make a declaration of war before we would react to a bombing attack on New York City or Detroit or Washington" I think if any President waited under those circumstances, he would certainly not be carrying out the will of either the Congress or the American peopleo Qo - Sir, I 0 m a little dense on this matter of Indo-China; would you clarify this for meo France is our ally in the North Atlantic alliance" French troops are fighting in Indo-Chinao If the Chinese Communists, with the regular forces from China, should cross the frontier into Indo-Ohina and attack the arme~ forces of our ally, France, would our responsibilities or obligations under the NATOalliance come into force? If not, why? . ' Ae - No, they will not because the NATOalliance does not apply to any part of the world except the North Atlantic area as it is defined in the treatyo That definition in the main is confined to Europe, although it does cover a portion of French North Africa -- I think Algeria is covered by ito But in the main, it covers only the European area, including a slight bit qf North Africa and, of course, the Asiatic. portion of Turkeyo Qo - Mro Secretary, in the context Ao - Now, I don 9 t mean to imply -- that if the event you of happened, we should do nothing" I myself have said that believed that if that happened we should do somethingo But doesn°t mean we should do it without Congressional approval consultationo spoke I that or .,. Qc - In the context of the answer you just gave about New York, Detroit or Chicago in referring to an earlier answer you gave, would it be fair to say that the President has the same power to react in Europe in the case of a bombing of London or Paris? A. - Yes, siro 000513 �.. = 6 - Q. - Sir, would it be accurate then to say that instant retaliation in effect is recognition of the restraining effect of the possession of atomic weapons -- the deterrent power? Is there a distinction between instant retaliation and deterrent? 1t is a deterrento A. - Yes, I have said that the capacity to retaliate fully and instantly is, in my opinion, the great deterrent, that wh~n you are faced with the kind of potential enemy, with the assets that this potential enemy has, I believe deterrent of that sort of the most effective way there is preventing a waro powerand or that a of Now I can imagine a di~ferent world condition where reliance might properly be placed upon other methods, and other means, but, as far as the present world condition is concerned,, · that capacity to retaliate powerfully at places of our chosing is, in my opinion, what will serve as a powerful deterrent to waro I believe that the original Korean attack would not have occurred if it had not been assumed either that we would not react at all, or if we did react only at the place and by the means that the aggressors choseo I believ • that the Allied sixteen-power declaration, which now operates in the case of Korea, will probably prevent any renewal of Communist aggression thereo Q. - Mro Secretary, in order to clarify something in my own ~ind at least, is. it your understanding that the Presideq.t's right to orde~ instant retaliation applies only in the case o! an attack either on the United States or another North Atlantic Treaty power because of the un~erstanding that Congress had given? President's Rights The United States ~s two treaties that I referred to: One is the so-called R:io Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, wh.i-ch contains the provision that an attack upon one is the same as an attack upon all; that sp.me provision is found in the North Atlantic Treaty o -In my opinion -- whatever it ls worth as a lawyer, and as one who was in the Senate whe.n the North At1iantlc Treaty was adopted -- I believe that that authorizes, is a: . ·. consent in advance to, the President reacting against an attack upon one of our allies named in those treaties in the same way that he would be authorized to react in the event of an attack upon the Onited States itselfo I repeat, however, that the fact that the President has that constitutional authority as the result of·those treaties in my opinion does not necessarily. mean that he would use ito He would use his discretion, 1 think, as to whether or not to react instantly, or whether to get either a formal declaration of war by the Congress, or whether to have consultations which satisfied himself that that was the will o! the Congresso That would be discretlonary _with the Presidento Qo - Mro Secretary, doesn 8 t the President power under the United ~ations Charter itself? A. - In my opinion, have that noo Q. - Does he not have the power under the United Constitution same as Commander in Chief? States A. - To do what? 000514 �\- .,., - 7 - Q. - To take military by Congresso action without a declaration of war A. - Well, now you are raising the question which, bas been debated ever since our nation was formedo There are certainly areas within which a President can act -- certainly areas in which it has been customary for Presidents to act -- withoat any formal action by the Congress. There is a twilight zone there. Nobody has ever attempted to define accurately that twilight zone• and I shall not attempt it hereo -q~.- lrlr. Secretary, at one point there you said "ln connection with consultation to consult in most cases that you can conceive of. 11 Would you consider, say, an attack upon the northern part of Canada an attack upon the United States, and would. you consult with other NATOcountries before you reacted to that attack? Q•. - I do not think that it J;ij wise or appropriate to try to answer a hypothetical question of·'that sort. In the first place, it is impossible to determine in advance what all of the surrounding circumstances are, and it would certainly also not be advisable to give any fore-knowledge to a potential enemy as to whether or not he would have any time between his attack and having ..to,. ~uffer the consequences of 1t. 000515 . _J � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 18 MARCH 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-03-18 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00023 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Despatch No. 503 from the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, 18 Mar. 1954, LAC, vol. 4903, RG 25, 50115-P-40, pt. 2. Berlin Dwight Eisenhower John Foster Dulles Korea Rio Pact Soviet bloc US National Security Council https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/1d80d35209953c70a260730e87076478.pdf 385c76ec877f087c8beb16d04bab33ff PDF Text Text Defence Liaison/JGHHalstead/ga r 1A DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MEMORANDUM TO: ........ 'J:'.1;1!9 .. .i\<?..R, ... !].\1;~.~':'"~~<?;t:~~?-.~Y. .............. . ·····················································"'~~ ..... .FROM:.... P.~:f ~r:i.q~ .. ~~~t~'?F!..\ ~) ......................... . - REFERENCE: ..................................................... . Security Date .. CONFIDENTIAL .......................... M?:J?~.l:;l ..?,.. J ~.f?~....... . File No. ~-0IIf_. f- '-fo . We have prepared notes for the Minister on United States defence policy, as requested. At the same time, however, I think we should express our misgivings about the advisability of making such remarks in a public statement in the United States at this time. 2. Although they have purposely way that they comment on the new U.S. larly on Mr. Dulles' exposition of it, than directly these views are bound to Administration and the public as being aspects of United States policy (which been drafted in such a strategy, and particumore by implication be taken by the critical of certain they are). 3. Such questions as are posed in these notes can and should be raised with the United States authorities through official channels. There will undoubtedly be opportunity to discuss them at the forthcoming Consultation Meeting in Washington. I think, however, that it might be taken amiss if the Minister at the same time enters into public dis·cussion on the subject. It might be regarded as an appeal to the American people over the heads of the Administration or as outside interference in the lively debate which Mr. Dullest statement has set off. Such a false impression might jeopardize the chances of our getting sympathetic hearing in private talks with the Administration. Liaison Ext. 326 (2/53) . 000104 �i ' Defence ~,· Lj_aison/JGHHaistead/ga ?j/•t {-- A, )J!I) -f' • lfo RESTRICTED 1, 1954 March ·-- Notes on United States Defence Policy for the Minister 1 s Speech in the United States Defence importance public in this to us all. debate of the free It recently world, part in the lively cerning of course, domestic to do so. timely, But I think controversy For one thing, for me to take that has been waged con- words and the meaning strategy; point of yours and a national under \Jith and I do not intend and perhaps in everything you do and we feel On the other your shadow. strategic we are dependent 3. freedom as yours importance. across the Atlantic. the security continuing finds our efforts We take partner roughly one- of yours, an active interest of all of the of your continent and which is of great and In a very real you and sense, on each other. is our freedom, and that point one-sixteenth the consequences We in Canada are also our allies a population hand, we occupy an area which is almost· as large increasing also of view of a junior income about live actions. of of view on some aspects I mean the point we inevitably viction striking problem. on the North American continent. on the countries What do I mean v•J'henI speak of a "Canadian viewn? active in New York in it would be appropriate, of our common defence tenth Mr. Dulles' be impertinent to comment from a Canadian 2. and other Relations Sta.tes of vital has been under States of Mr. Dulles' in the United 1' that since on Foreign the' significance the 1hew look is a matter particularly It would, age is a matter in the United speech to the Council January. atomic that concrete to promote We are convinced their and stability cohesion aware of our dependence of all expression cooperation prosperity of the free the Atlantic that their is our prosperity, world depends powers. in our membership within on This con- in NATOand the developing Atlantic community. 000106 �- 2 - Another our association terms factor of varying 5. sparse population natural resources only a limited with its ·also on active service mutual sea-lanes. and training 6. several inception for this All this purpose gives questions in mind three The first as a military without full problem. regard In Europe NATO contributed Sabre jet for the defence important Canadian to our NATOallies quantities of equipment and nav~gators programme, and our Parlia- '\ over $1 billion. us the right, I think, - to express considerations but which sometimes and integrated dozen warships of common concern. basic States of Canadian-built of this which constitute We have also There is another to the duty we owe to ourselves evident of the in destroyers, forces. in Canada for pilots, Since the on defence Nations command. squadrons aid in the form of large ment has voted has Canada has of the United Like you,. ·we have provided observers. depends, in the Korean theatre, Gruenther's and have earmarked ammunition the we can be proud to the which forms part to NATOin Europe twelve contribution. relatively to develop and our three Kingdom among the United of the Atlantic its Nevertheless, second only to those under General fighters with around the globe. economic vitality Our brigade we have a brigade forces of friendship heavy obligations potential. means in two world wars and, more recently, Korea and in Europe. the United of view is that distances, of which I think of freedom.in a contribution vast on whi~h its military ties and creeds and its made contributions are still and special colours Canada, defence point with the Commonwealth and all of common traditions nations in the Canadian - in addition our views frankly In doing so, I have which are probably self- tend to be overlooked. is that defence No military to the political is a political measures effects should as well be chosen they will have. 000107 __j �- 3 Irn1eed, there are occasions be used specifically numerous examples stationing to serve of this, of United on the European Continent ganize its own collective Community. European countries to deal withdravm, it integration of petty either 8. plans area that Europe to orthe the to their own aggression If these troops the movement toward were European and give way to the tragic combination and isolationism that y-ears. isolation. is that Plans defence of other areas cannot for the defence of the world must obviously for the defence troops ,,,ithin of Soviet economic rivalry the inter-'l.var in geographic particular ,entirely of German militarism. nationalism, the are a of Western a guarantee with the threat that affords being and prosperity not be left is probable History These troops in the ability The second principle planned ends. means may Kingdom and Canaqian They are also would founder characterized United security will or with a revival political in peacetime. symbol of our faith Atlantic military one of the most recent States, living devices when certain take into be of a account (and not only 000108 �- 4 - ,, adjacent areas). related. joint It The third is that consultation. principle joint defence This principle in NATO, where we have gradually five years both a habit consultation smoothness and efficiency. consultation on defence States and certain other effect take of the threat ventional of their of atomic actually reduces deterrent is determination ultimatum, master be used if atomic weapons may involve instead 10. that If hostilities the atomic must be a clear that on this these sort compelled where it the decision of stopping of conto aggression is, Where aggression for the use is committed. ourselves unsuitable. and limited instead aggression proxy, minor First, understanding is placed should repercus- of policy. weapon in a situation example, political there for a major But of permanent to use the for one reason is launched or against the possibility into the Take its measures arise. to be effective, in enormously as a deterrent flexibility we may find or another, military retaliation strength our whole reliance a new factor likely and a clear • weapons will basis, consultation principles. complications military the United which complicates that Two major the United on a bilateral introduce on the principle account between is unique. of these sions. if today and surprising of multilateral application full of close and between an example Atomic weapons practical up over the last is the closest countries which I think planning built matters of course, defence has been recognized There and Canada, 9. require which now works with States in peacetime efforts and a machinery continuing but NATOprovides is closely by using of turning conflict them. The second the use of atomic complication in this weapons might, respect is in certain ••• 5 000109 �- 5 - circumstances, as well ~ause as in neutral advantages atomic of a public necessary, couse, opinion might might were lacking then be able countries, We should also visible will support if also be met with The enemy the domination but with of such without in the process may alarm reprisals population. reaction but in kind. the knowledge than to the that rather reassure if aggression than that tion is relatively vulnerable and inadequately with civil measures. These defence which should political 1i. on the account against atomic The factor application of atomic in geographic be on a global however, the world, equally nor can the prepared in weighing weapons that the advantages basis. also defence complicates should The threat and plans innnediate popula- factors the military isolation. is world-wide are all local deterrent. of the principle aggression clearly into disadvantages of reliance plw..ned be taken The power may exposed retaliation rather the people from a friendly of a country atomic of if public of the world's of troops of aggression, is, the weapon, weapons may have if the population defence on the keep in mind the psychological presence threat A or we might ·successfully have to reckon reassure gain. neutralization, proportion which the use of atomic concerned wielding from one quarter a large dis- should, countries. their force; countries Such support be disastrous to achieve aggression it delay. colllltry or at least alienate that in other the use of military defeat must be based be used without the results • the military convinced in the in allied whose political outweigh retaliation essential support reactions countries would far policy-of but public to meet The threat or serious not be of Soviet it must is not, in all parts of same means be used to meet it •• • 6 000110 �- 6 - .- -~. everywhere. Yet, introduces 11all an necessitate particular ~e'Wbe area of the master is 11 vital - warning concerning an implicit Perhaps atomic weapons "vitaln the use of atomic share t~sequences arise out of aggression action? to these however, that they be asked and carefully of that on the full are prepared others? which the principle of for or against the hand, be expected if to which might of the world questions weighed in the atomic and free with where I do not wish to suggest are the kind policy is to On the other decision in a part issuing complication can allies of a vital they have no commitments? success in the be reconciled to be no consultation, policy without can consultation is defence areas If the decision and rapid to be are not, retaliation? there what the answers are others to decide surprise use to the potential relates~ need for a of consequences while to be given Who is whether some areas the most serious involve one, .4nd if decisions. to justify the chain . . to aggression consultation. be a joint vital sense, the invitation 12. joint in this - how is a clear aggressor and painful sufficiently alone which may used to determine in motion! 11 weapons element difficult weapon and all would set labelled on atomic or nothing" extremely What criteria that reliance should be. of questions I think, that should in any consideration age, depends cooperation particularly - as I believe of all to make sacrifice~~freedo~ nations of when the it does which they share. 000111 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 2 MARCH 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-03-02 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00021 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Memorandum from Defence Liaison to the Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 2 Mar. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. defence liaison Dwight Eisenhower John Foster Dulles Korean War NATO https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/7fadff2a92bb9a9da9cbe69e86e25ff7.pdf 671df20916b5d0b5ba1cbef094e2a176 PDF Text Text \ First Draf:t, AIDE MEMOIRE A study of Recent Changes and.Trends in United States Defence Policy and the Implications it might have..on Canadian Defence Policy Introduction 1. As a result of recent statements the Eisenhower Administration, by spokesmen of it has become evident that the US Government have re-assessed their defence policy and that a "NewLook" on defence may have emergedo f ··' Purpose 2. The purpose of this paper is to examine the "New Look" and consider what implications it may have on Canadian defence policyo United States Defence Concept 3. Broadly speaking United States the Truman Administration defence policy under was one of periphery a build-up of local and United States this peripheryo An example of this defence with defence forces on policy was the build= up of NATOforces to contain the Russians in Europe. back up their policy, the United States built To up a strategic air force and an atomic bomb stockpile to be ,either a deter= rent or a means of massive retaliatory striking During this period it was considered that the threat North America was9 in an overall wide threat, secondary to the threat of Russian aggression to assessment of the world= to Eu.ropeo It was also ~onsidered during the Truman Administration threat powero t~t the general was more immediate than is now thoughto 000124 �•• .. TOP SECRE.l' - 2 - 4. Since the Eisenhower Administration have been indications .. ' - " Public statements -·- leading spokesmen of the Eisenhower Administration emphasized the fact that the United States taken another look at their at the Ministerial Government has defence policy. For example, . . )1.- I 1q~7.:-t I speech on J.mle. 12 Mr. Dulles said that will"place more reliance depending"primarily 5. in a . .. . the United States power and powerr.. This means upon a great capacity to retaliate by means and at places of our own choosing". The Canadian Ambassador to t~e .. United states discussing states . upon community deterrent less dependance upon local defensive instantly Mr. Meeting of NATOin December 1953, ----~--- ' by have Dulles emphasized the "long haul" concept and later - there that there may be a change in United States defence policy and strategy. - took office the questi~n of possible in changes in Unite~ defence policy in his message No. 142 da_ted '24 .Jan 54, attributes these changes in part at least to the follow- ing facto1's: (a) the attitude unrelated taken by the Administration, to the Republican campaign promises for reductions in Government expenditures, that the United States tain (b) economy cannot main- in peacetime the levels up after of defence built the outbreak of the Korean war; the appreciation of the Administration there has been some slight tensions not and that the threat reduction that in world of Soviet aggres- sion is not as immediate as it was considered to be for planning purposes during the Truman Administration; TOP SECREI' -- "o o o/3 000125 �.. TOP SECRET - 3 - the reports (c), Staff .... , p~esented to th~ Chiefs of on the capabilities and availability . of nuclear weapons taken together with the decision ·on the part of the Administration Seek Congressional. friendly (d) allies to approval to share with . certain kpowledge concerning the tactical use of rruclear weapons; the decision taken by the Administration with the concurrence of its highest military advisers to rely on the "deterrent retaliatory power" to a greater or massive degree than on "local defences"p ioe. the meeting of _ aggression From thtCa:hadian would eem to United factor on the ground where it occurs~ Mil~ / befthe point of vie!the .\ / princi~asons ~efence policyo fo above---factors _L. \_~ any changes in -------- However, another important which should not be overlooked is the increasing Russian capability to attack North America with nuclear weapons. 60 Mr. Heeney developed his factors and arrived conclusion that there has been no important at the change in United States defence policy but that there will be _gradual changes in strategy. (a) These changes in strategy will be8 A general t~ghtening up on United States defence expenditures which will ma.inly affect personnel strengths and administrative over- heado TOP SECRET ooooo/4 000126 �.. 0 . TOPSECRET - (b) A greater reliance 4 - on new weapons including nuclear shared with friendly - - ... -- ___weapons .. - -- - .. - - . \. . to compensate for reductions . -manpower and to offset allies . in United- States additions to the Soviet arsenal. (c) Further strengthening of United States air power and especially or its ability to deliver the atomic goods. (d) Increased attention to continental defence in cooperation with Canada to protect the main base of the striking (e) power of the free world. The build-up in the United States of a strategic reserve of trained soldiery and weapons which will be committed to action where the Service Chiefs think they will do the most good, not necessarily at the point of actual aggression. (f) A highly cautious approach to involvement in any further incidents would result of the Korea type which in the commitment to battle of United States ground troops. 7. The Canadian military view is in agreement with the conclusions drawn by Mr. He;{neyon the possible United States strategy. changes in The soundness of such changes have not been considered in this paper. Possible Implications to Canadian Defence Policy North America .. 8. strategy It would appear that proposed changes in United States relative to the defence of the North American TOPSECREl' 000127 �TOP SECREI' - 5- continent based on the increasing Russian capability ?f prime importance to Canada. Possible results will be of these changes might be: (a) Extension of the early warning system to include: (1) the mid-Canada line (2) seaward extension (55th parallel); of the mid= Canada line; (3) construction of the Northern chain of -radar stations (4) (.G8jf'rodo); additi_onal gap-filling radar stations. (b) Increase (1) in air def~nce forces increase including: in all-weather fighter squadrons; (2) increase in AA (guided missile) forces; (3) formation of Bomarc squadrons (advanced type of ground to air guided missile); (4) (5) completion of the integration of Canada-US Air Defence forces; . requirement US fighter 9o States for construction bases in Canadao Should the above measures be proposed by the United 9 it is probable that the Canadian Government would have to reconsider the whole problem of Canadian participation in the air defence of North Americao Consequently probable that there will be an increasing ,,. of 9 it is need for Canada=US 0.ll000/6 000128 �• ,~ 6 = _J joint it is possible Ultimately planning. that pressure may be brou~ht to bear for the establishment integrated lOo commando W'nilst the fear has been expressed that the new United States strategy may result United States forces fr-a;he no indication~time t\ )·f . V withdraw effective theatre rf )y intention Therefor, , ,t is ass in Eu ope as previously . ,'riJ> .f J States there 9 is to in spite of the movement of United States atomic least .. EuroP.ean theatres combat forces from the NATOEuropean Canad' n commitm llo in the withdrawal of some V weapons to that theatre \ { J of an 11 fo theL ' United ;!e~s rest·riction H '\__ obscure. eapons by the , it is !mowirr--i..na.;..--no now remains on consideration planners of the possible , . . J~., b~' plannedo Use of Nuclear·weapons ,I '/ I . _ · Tje policy o~se of_nucl-ear military that any critical situation involving by United States use of atomic weapons in fJ the commitment of United forces. Canaa/4the br ' e pl".,7.,;:;:,f d implications of their cl/ \;J'f;~ usV f ,/, ------------------........ -- Jj Korea l2o It is thought that the planned withdrawal of two United states divisions in the situation from Korea implies United States thereo these two divisions battle However~ it should be noted that are being replaced by two ROKdivisions efficiency. confidence recently The planned reduction in the UN order of brought to combat in United States Army forces under the proposed 1954=55 budget amounts to approxi= mately two divisional sliceso It is possible 9 therefore» TOP SECl~ 0 O l.' 0/ /ryS 000129 �...:, , '' ,.. TOP SECREI' - 7 - that the two divisions withdrawn from Korea, or two ethers now in the United States, - nny be deactivated .. 195~0 Any further before l July plans for wit~~ forces from Korea will undoubtedly~e considera- - tion of the lfttla&Pawa:xor CommonwealthForces • ··- ---··· .. - --~ .. Mobile Strategic Reserve -• ( ·• C • . • -····- l3o It is considered the United 'states a strategic reserve of forces centrally policy of holding in the United States stems from the desire of the United States auttlorities have their forces as far as possible ployment to meet sudden aggression, committed in peripheral flexibility available rather defence with the consequent loss or It i~ not thought that this . . /I /"'\ . the use of other /than normal trahsportation the deployment for de- than have them and the problems or reinforcement, expenditures. to of' thifategil reserve;'• supply and policy.,,envisages /._ ..j facilities for/ Ji.icy/ . unv keepin_g with th' Canadian plan (to hoJn:d2/3 of the ~vision . f I assigned to SAO~ in Canada Dayo . Conclusion 14. It can therefore the main implications States Defence Policy, Continental be deduced from the foregoing that to Canada of the "NewLook" of United will primarily be in the field of Defence. 000130 J � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 8 FEBRUARY 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-02-08 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00019 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Joint Planning Committee draft report, “A study of Recent Changes and Trends in United States Defence Policy and the Implications it might have on Canadian Defence Policy,” 8 Feb. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. continental defence Dwight Eisenhower John Foster Dulles Joint Planning Committee Korean War US-Canada relations https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ee6a47d17570e0e31aaa18b236b188bc.pdf ab8a666eb2b6eaa10e66509590cfbba7 PDF Text Text ':fh:/~or ,s-f- {tr ~"j• -9 .f,;itTM!:~ J111i O II l l ··- .. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CAN.A.DA -:;;, b) 7 + // 0 JI RESTRICTED // CIRCULAR DOCUMENT No. B. Ottawa, JanQary 26, 1954. 5/54 Subject: Foreign Policy Speech by Mr. Dulles in New York· on January 12 • I enclose, for your information, the text of a foreign policy speech by Mr. Dulles in New York on January 12, along with a Minute pre1><_ared in the Department summarizing the main poin~s. ~ } Secretary of State for External Affairs To the Heads of Canadian Posts Abroad. 000172 �.• . • Foreign Pol.icy Speech by Mr. Dulles in New York on January 120 RESTRICTED January 2,, 1954 J.G.H.Halstead/hf All Posts Abroad Attached is the text of a most important address given by the United States Secretary of State to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on January 12. The purpose of this address was evidently to announce the long-range global policy which the _Eisenhower Administration, after a ·year• s study in the National Security Council, had formulated. 2. The main distinction between this new policy and the policy of the previous Administration is represented as being that the new policy is based on assumptions and will embrace objectives and methods that should be valid over a long period of years, whereas the old policy was made up of ad hoc measures designed to meet immediate emergencies. The new policy is intended to regain for the United States strategic flexibility in the continuing struggle with the Soviet Union. 3. The main elements summarized as follows: of the new policy may be (a) "The basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and in places of our choosing." (b) Military planning would, therefore, __ . shift emphasis from conventional forces and weapons (designed to meet aggression anywhere in the. world by direct and local opposition) to strategic reserves, strategic air power and nuclea~_weapons, designed _to launch crippling retaliatory attacks against the enemy's forces or his home base if the Soviets launch aggression. (c) It is calculated that this new d·efence policy would cost less money·--tnan the old one and would enable the United States to support the necessary defence effort over a long period without grave budgetary, economic or social disturbances. \ \ 4. Mr. Dulles gave the following application of the new policy: (a) examples of In the Far East_: (i) UoSo land forces in Korea will gradually be withdrawn in order augment the strategic reserve; to 000173 �f - 2 - (b) (ii) The Communists are warned that if there is a renewal of aggression in Korea or if there is open Chinese aggression in Indo-China, there will be "grave consequences" that might not be confined to Korea or Indo-China; (iii) To underline this thre,at, Mr. Dulles expresses the intention of the United States to maintain its striking power in Okinawa. In Europe: (i) The UoSe had already proposed that the pace of the.NATO defence effort be changed from a rapid build-up to the "long haul 11• (ii) The NATOforces will be reinforced by the striking power of the U.S. strategic air force. (iii) (c) With respect (i) (ii) (iii) (d) The security and prosperity of Europe cannot be assured without a German defence contribution and Franco-German cooperation, ·for both of which objectives establishment of the European Defence Community is "indispensable 0 • to economic policy: U.S. economic aid will be _limited, "broadly speaking", to situations where it is essential to military strength and where that military strength is essential to safeguard a particular strategic area. Other grants in aid will be replaced by "trade, broader markets and a flow of investments 11 o The technical assistance programme and disaster relief will be continued. With respect to foreign policy: (i) The United States will never make a "deal" with the UoS.S.R. which would seem "to endorse captivity''. ( In other words, the United States will not accept any general settlement which, for example, would endorse the status quo in Eastern Europe.) (ii) The United States will be prepared to negotiate on specific matters th~t "advance the cause of human welfare" (e.g. the peaceful use of atomic energy, the unification of Germany, the liberation of Austria and the unification and evacuation of Korea). 000174 �.. ,' DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR THE·,J'RESS January No. 8 12, 19 5'4 ADDRESSBY THE HONORABLE JOSN FOSTERDULLES SECRETARY OF STATE BEFORETHE COUNCILON FOREIGNRELATIONS NEWYORKCITY, JANUARY12, 195'4 THE EVOLUTION OF FOREIGNPOLICY It is now nearly a year since the Eisenhower Administration took office. During that year I have.often spoken of various parts of our foreign policies. Tonight I should like to present an over-all view of those policies which relate to our security. The Good in Past Policies First of all, let us recognize that many of the preceding foreign policies were good. Aid to Greece and Turkey had . checked the Communist drive to the Mediterranean. The European Recovery Program had helped the peoples of Western Europe to pull out of the post-war morass. The Western powers were steadfast in Berlin and overcame the blockade with their airlift. As a loyal member of the United Nations, we had reacted with force to repel the Communist attack in Korea. When that effort exposed our military weakness 7 we rebuilt rapidly our military establishment. We also soughb a quick buildup of armed strength in Western Europe. These were the acts of a nation which saw the danger of Soviet Communism; which realized that its own safety was tied up with that of others; which was capable of responding boldly and promptly to emergencies. These are precious values to be acclaimed. Also, we can pay tribute to Congressional bipartisanship which puts the nation above politics. The InsUfficiency of Past Policies But we need to recall that what we did was in the main emergency action, imposed on us by our enemies. Let me illustrate. 1. We did not in advance, that it army to fight land pull out of Korea. back. send our army into Korea because we judged, was sound military strategy to commit our battles in Asia. Our decision had been to It was Soviet-inspired action that pulled us 2. We did not decide in advance that billions annually as foreign economic aid. policy in response to the Communist efforts free economies of Western Europe. it was wise to grant We adopted that to sabotage the · 000175 �.. ·- 2 = 3o We did not build up our military establishment at a rate which involved huge budget deficits, a depreciating currency and a feverish economy, because this seemed, irt advance, a good policy. Indeed, we decided otherwise until the Soviet military threat was clearly revealed. We live in a world where emergencies are always possible and our survival may depend upon our capacity to meet emergencies. Let us pray that we shall always have that capacity. But, having said that, it is necessary also to say that emergency measures - however good for the emergency - do not necessarily make good permanent policies. Emergency measures are costly, . they are superficial and they imply that the enemy has the initiative. They cannot be depended on to serve our long-time interestso The Need for Long-Range Policies This "long time" factor is of critical importance. The Soviet Communists are planning for what they call "an entire historical era", and we should do the same. They seek, through many types of manoeuvres, gradually to divide and weaken the free nations by over-extending them in efforts which, as Lenin put it, are "beyond their strength so that they come to practical bankruptcyff. Then, said Lenin, "our victory is assured 11• Then, said Stalin, will be "the moment for the decisive blow". In the face of this strategy, measures cannot be judged adequate merely because they ward off an immediate danger. It is essential to do this, but it is also essential to do so without exhausting ourselves. ,, felt When the Eisenhower Administration applied that some transformations were needed. this test, we It is not sound military strategy permanently t'o commit U.S. land forces to Asia to a degree that leaves us no strategic reserves. It is not sound economics, or good foreign policy, to support permanently other countries; for in the long run, that creates as much ill will as good will. Also, it is not sound to become permanently committed to military expenditures so vast that they lead to "practical bankruptcy". Change was imperative to assure the stamina needed for permanent security. But it was equally imperative that change should be accompanied by understanding of our true purposes. Sudden and spectacular change had to be avoidedo Otherwise, there might have been a panic among our friends, and miscalculated aggression by our enemieso We can, I believe, make a good report Collective in these respects. Security We need allies and collective security. to make these relations more effective, less be done by placing more reliance on deterrent dependence on local defensive power. Our purpose is costly. This can power, and less 000176 : �.. ,i - 3 This is accepted practice so far as local communities are concerned. We keep locks on our doors; but we do not have an armed guard in every home. We rely principally on a community security system so well ~quipped to punish any who break in and steal that, in fact, would-be-aggressors are generally · · deterred. That is the modern way of getting maximum protection at a bearable cost. What the Eisenhower Administration seeks is a similar international security system. We want, for ourselves and the other free nations, a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost • ... .. 0 1 1 locai ~~:;~~:f:~i~~w!~~~! -~6fif!1~ri~~t ;ig:~; p~!e~ \ of the Communist worldo Local defenses must be reinforced by ) the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. a potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit him. Otherwise, for example, a potential aggressor, who is_glutted with manpower, might be tempted to attack in confidence that resistance would be confined to manpower. He might be tempted to attack in places where his superiority was decisive. , !1ir I The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing. ' .d .,. So long as our basic policy concepts were unclear, our military leaders could not be selective in building our military power. If an enemy could pick his time and place and method of warfare - and if our policy was to remain the traditional one of meeting aggression by direct and local opposition - then we needed to be ready to fight in the arctic and in the tropics; in Asia, the Near East and in Europe; by sea, by land and by air; with old weapons and with new weapons. The total cost of our security efforts, at home and abroad, was over $50,000,000,000 per annum, and involved, for 1953, a projected budgetary d~ficit of $9,000,000,000; and $11,000,000,000 for 1954. This was on top of taxes comparable to war-time taxes; and the dollar was depreciating in effective value. Our allies were similarly weighed down. This could not be continued for long without grave budgetary, economic and social consequences. . before military planning could be changed, the President and his advisers, as represented by, the National Security Council, had to take some basic policy decisions. This has been done. The basic decision was to d¢pend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing./ Now the Department of Defense and the ·Joint Chiefs of Staff can shape our military establishment to fit what is our policy, instead of having to try to be ready to meet the enemy's many choices. That permits of a selection of military means instead of a multiplication of means. As a result, it is now possible to get, and share, more basic security at less cost. 1 1 ·~ The Far East Let us now see how this foreign policy, taking first concept has been applied the Far East. to · In Korea this Administration effected a major transformation. The fighting has been stopped on honorable terms. That was possible because the aggressor, already thrown back to and 000177 . ' �- 4 - behind his place of beginning, was faced with the possibility that the fighting might, to his own great peril, soon spread beyond the limits and methods which he had selected. The cruel toll of American youth, and the non-prod.ucti ve expenditure of many billions has been stopped. Also our armed forces are no longer largely committed to the Asian mainland. We can begin to create a strategic reserve which greatly improves our defensive posture. This change gives added authority to members of the United Nations which fought the Communists renewed the aggression, the response would not necessarily be confined the warning of the in Korea that if United Nations' to Korea. I have said, in relation to Indochina, that if there were open Red Chinese Army aggression there, that would have "grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina". I expressed last month the intention of the United States to maintain its position in Okinawa. Th:j.s is needed to ensure adequate striking power to implement the collective security concept which I describe. All of this is summed up in President Eisenhower's important statement of December 26. He announced the progressive reduction of the United States ground forces in Korea. He pointed out that the United States military forces in the Far East will now feature "highly mobile naval, air and amphibious unitsll; and he said in t;his way, despite some withdrawal of land forces, the United States will have a . capacity to oppose aggression "with even greater effect than heretofore". The bringing home of some of our land forces also vides a most eloquent rebuttal to the Communist charge "imperialism". - proof If we turn to Europe, we see readjustments in the NATO collective security effor'to Senator Vandenberg called the North Atlantic Treaty pledges· 11the most practical deterrent and discouragement to war which the wit of man has yet devised". But he said also that "if the concept and objective are to build sufficient forces in being to hold the Russian line••• it present ruinous corollaries both at home ancl abroad'''• In the first years of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, after the aggression in Korea, .its members made an emergency buildup of military strength. I do not question the judgment of that timeo · The strength thus bw.lt has served well the cause of peaceo But the pace originally set could not be maintained indefinitely. At the April meeting of the NATOCouncil, the United States put forward a new concept now known as that of the "long haul 11 o That meant a steady development of defensive strength at a rate which will preserve and not exhaust the economic strength of our allies and ourselves. This · would be reinforced by the striking power of a strategic air force based on internatLonally agreed positions. 000178 �- 5We found, at the ,Council of last December, that there was general a~ceptance of the "long haul" concept, and recognition that it better served the probable needs than an effort to create full defensive land strength at a ruinous price. One of the emergency aspects of NATOis that begun before there was a solid foundation. For example, Western defended without a defense cannot be defended without participation is excluded still in force. it was Europe cannot be successfully of West Germany •. West Germany help from the Germans. German by the armistice arrangements The West German Republic needs to be freed from the armistice; and new political arrangements should be made to assure that rearmed Germans will serve the common cause and never serve German militarism. The French produced a plan to take care of this matter. It was to create a European Defence Community, composed of France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and West Germany. They would have a European Army, including Germans, but there would be no national armies in West Europe. A treaty to create th.is Defense Community was signed in May 1952. But when the Eisenhower Administration took office last January, no Government had sought parliamentary ratification,'and the project was nigh unto death. President Eisenhower is deeply convinced that there can be no long-term assurance of security and vitality for Europe, and therefore for the Western world including the United States, unless there is a unity which will include France and Germany and end the disunity which has led to recurrent wars, and in our generat±on to two World Wars. As NATO's Chief Commander, and now as President, he continues to make clear the importance which the United States attached to the consummation of the European Defens:.e Community and, we would hope thereafter, a Political Community. Until the goals of EDC are achieved, NATO, and indeed future peace, are in jeopardy. Distrust between France and Germany is inflammable and already Communist agents are looking to it as a means for international arson. There are of course immense difficulties in the way of the final consummation of Franco-German unity. But we have confidence that peace will soon have the indispensable foundation of the EDC. Economic Aid New collective security concepts reduce non-productive military expenses· of our allies to a point where it is desirable and practicable also to reduce economic aid •. There was need of a more self-respecting relationship, and that, indeed, is what our allies wanted. Trade, broader markets and a flow of investments are far more healthy than inter-governmental grants-in-aid. 000179 �,_ .. - 6 - There are still some strategic spots where the local governments cannot maintain adequate armed forces without some financial support from us. In these .cases, we take the judgment of our military advisers as to how to proceed in the common interest. For example, we have contributed largely, ungrudgingly, and I hope constructively·,. to end aggression and advance freedom in Indochinao The Technical Assistance Program is being continued, and we stand ready to meet non-recurrent needs due to crop failures or like disasters. But, broadly speaking, foreign budgetary aid is being limited to situations where it clearly contributes to mili'tary strength. The Hope In the ways I outlined term defense of freedom. we gather strength for the long- We do not, of course, claim to have found some magic formula that ensures against all forms of Communist successes. It is normal that at some times and at some places there may be setbacks to the cause of freedom. What we do expect to ensure is that any setbacks will have only temporary and local significance because they will leave unimpaired those free world assets which in the lo~g run will prevail. =- If we can deter such aggression as would mean general war, and that is our confident resolve, then we can let time and fundamentals work for us. We do not need self-imposed policies which sap our strength. The fundamental, on our ~ide, is the richness--spiritual, intellectual and material--that freedom can produce and the irresistible attraction it-then sets up. That is why we do not plan ourselves to shackle freedom to preser~e ·freedom. We intend that our conduct and example shall continue, as in the past, to show all men how good can be the fruits of freedom. If we rely on freedom,. then it follows that we must ab~ .. stain from diplomatic moves which would seem to endorse captivity. That would, in effect, be a conspiracy against freedom. I can assure you that we shall never seek illusory secur.ity for ourselves by such a ""deal". We do negotiate about the cause of human welfareo specific matters but only to advance President Eisenhower electrified the world with his proposal to lift a great weight of f~ar by turning atomic energy from a means of death into a source of life. Yesterday, I started procedural talks with the Soviet -G·bv.ernment on that topic. We have persisted, with our Allies, in seeking the unification of Germany and the liberation of Austria. Now the Soviet rulers have agreed to discuss these questions. We expect to meet them soon in Berlino I hope they will come with a sincerity which will equal our own. We have sought a conference to unify of foreign troops. So far, our persistence have not given up. Korea and relieve it is unrewarded; but we 000180 I �- 7These efforts at negotiation are normal initiatives that breathe the spirit of freedom. They involve no plan for a partnership division of world power with those who suppress freedom. If we persist in the courses I outline we shall confront dictatorship with a task that is, in the long run, beyond its strength. For unless it changes, it must suppress the human desires that freedom satisfies -- as we sha~l be demonstrating. If the dictators persist in their present GOUrse then it is they who will be limited to superficial successes, while their foundation crumbles under the treat of their iron boots. Human beings, for the most part, want simp~e things. They want to worship God in accordance with the dictates of their conscience. But that is not easily granted by those who promote an atheistic creed. They want to think in accordance with the dictates of their reason. But that is not easily granted by those who represent an authoritarian system. They want to exchange views with others and to persuade and to be persuaded by what appeals to their reason and their conscience. But that is not easily granted by those who believe ih a society of conformity. They want to live i-n their homes without fear. But that is not easily granted by those who believe in a police state system. They want to be able to work productively and creatively and to enjoy the fruits of their labor. But that is not easily granted by those who look upon human beings as a means to create a powerhouse to dominate the world. We can be sure that there is going on, even within Russia, a silent test of strength between the powerful rulers and the multitudes of human beings. Each indi~idual no doubt seems by himself to be helpless in this struggle. But their aspirations in the aggregate make up a mighty force. There are signs that the rulers are bending to some of the human desire·s of their people. There are promises of more food, more household goods, more economic freedom. That does not prove that the Soviet rulers have themselves been converted. It is rather that they may be dimly perceiving a basic fact, that is that there are limits to the power of any rulers indefinitely to suppress the human spirit. J In that God-given fact lies our greatest hope. It is a hope that can sustain us. For even if the path ahead be long and hard, it need not be a warlike path; and we can know that at the end may be found the blessedness of peace. State--PB, Wash., D.C. L �Refer: "l\ssistant Under-Secretaries ............---American Division LZ'ommonwealth Division Londotr""" _ ./""' Embassy, PariYNATO, Par~ Brusse~ _ Copenhage~ The Hagu~ t.-rr.L.( 1) 1.15.L.(2) I i 7 \ I t,Z'conomic Division ,-.European Division Eastern Division --,:,01. Co. Sec. U.N. Division Vi"];;J.me Minister, '-Mr. Claxton ~OS '-B7NI, Finance £.Bi'M, DDP .:.Bank of Canada ~ec. to the Cab. 1.,'1)7 "'1.DNP I~ ''::jrn,~ U)M)C, ¥-" Rom.-e/ Atheng../ Ankara_..-/ Bo~ / New DelhV Karachi-Canberra,...,/ Wellington---""'" \ \\ \J / . v ,r, · '\\• ' r1,,1·'\'-) ?-1/ . ") . 000182 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 25 JANURARY 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-01-25 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00017 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived External Affairs to All Posts Abroad, "Circular Document No. B. 5/54," 25 Jan. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. continental defence Dwight Eisenhower John Foster Dulles Okinawa Soviet bloc US National Security Council western Europe https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b00e21221b063463e3029f0da2bb7fab.pdf ed9711871604e4ce8772106b454606b2 PDF Text Text LBP/U: Ott~-a, Jan'Wll"y 16, 19S4.. There 11 no doubt nov that tar-reacbinc deciaiono have been made 1n Uishlngton in i-eepect. of detence ·ur. Ou1lee'e 1peecb on Januru."112 in policy and strategy. Sew York sakes that clear. The implementation of these doeieiono will ba e;radual and no dou'btc ev,u:-y effort will be ude br-1-na t.bem n°t'out 1n c w1 t.o caueei leaot. anxiety t,c aeons triends Ao ?:r. Ow.lee pute lt in N1,1w Iort: and alli.ea. wa, "It imperative t.bat chsnge abould be accompan1ed by undv8'tand1ng of' our true purpos•s, eUdden and speci.cular ebnnt;e had to be &'IOld•d• Otbemse there micht bnvo been a panic aiaong our friend& and miac:alculated 4ggroaeion by our enn1es." Neverthaleae, action deaia1ons would cppear.to be proceeding. .· .. to impl•ent new It will have tar- reaching conH(ltiencosfw'.:Canada • . •, : !' • One evidence of eh:1nr;0 in Onttted f'.tates policy t~ri.can ia th.tit. IUSO c:ount.r1•• .r~ no J.~r pressure tc> .tn.crun• ~•f'once expenditures. r..r. Dulles lective o.t. least subject now t.alke about "readJustmanta security effort" to Inde-ed• _ 1:i' the fft.'70 col• e.nd he mee.nareadjustment. downwarde, in t ems of cost tor both the United Ctatre• and 1 ts llATOal.lie•• IUTO 000204 �It'i.TO de£nnce f'orcee to be etabili•ed at t.bout, fifty in nu.rope are now D:1v1sione. plus w~at.evur Germon:,eMl produce •. Ybera 1s no longer any Pent;azon talkt .ot; lee.st 1n public• about ninety hundred.tl1v1s1onf>t1.ebs1ng eacentinl the defence or peace lo much tnlk. of tho nnew On the c;t?1or bnnd• t~re in Burope. or one or ninety-ti·ve look" end tl1e "lor15 ooultt, ui~ econmnic etnb111ty 11& the .foundot14n £or da1'enct, '81".ful"t.. All tb-ase concc,p~n ,u·c new put forward by !Jr. Dulloa, speciflcallJ at Va.rte in Decembor and 1n bi& r.ew·Yo~kspeeoh, as n nm, Jicarican a nev rn?o polloJ·• d1eoo'V'ery lo .fact, they b.:·u.'l~oviously su:-;;est.cd t.it ut~t.J meetings by llrit.t&~1 tmd. ether and etrona].y opposed by PJnor1candelo~at;ea. and b~en dele5at(ls• The hcer1enno clao in those aare strongly deproca~ed talk ot more defence for less cost by relyt.ns all on (!Ual1ty end ttnew :wee.pons". Ct.'t t.bia baa now cbs.i'tged. fbe.ra ie now no apparent . to build up fVi'i·Oforces in Europe to a point .'!.~ricnna ootloiderod ooeessar, a yeu 8t1t"Opewar, to be d•f'endad against effort Whlcb t.he or so ~o it :'."'e&tern aggreaoion. !he chnnse may be due to a genuine defence·by belie£ in th9 efficacy in part ot new method&ot/retal1ot1cn; to a £eel1n · tbat t.he cr161s ba aloo du.e t.o t,he oev A~erican policy ,,. ' ina;,ired b30 eased. But 1~ may of "diseP~T-lCo~nt p<>sa1blyes much by bUd5etnry. aa by stratenic considerations. olso 1t, 000205 �t The present pos1.t1on of the European Defence CommunitJ has a beor1ns on the new American policJ. Though EDOnow see.ms to be stalled. still talks about nm,c or notbing". and disappointaent .is one roason focussing .Americans ma¥ now arsu.e that on this The not coma together or certnin be1na tho case, should now become per·1pberal, respons1.b1llt1ee b7 atomic retaliation a sea and eir strateu line Spain running and the 1n case ot \.'ar • victory line, can be ech1eved. of the prevention achievement of victory pr-edcalnantly - and.Pakistan? More and more stress new doctrine States ltingdom through to Greece ond Turkey From this United holdinc from ttorwny to the United Mediterranean put policy • defence which can, in eny event, now bG left to the OeJ!'IISnst fbis Dullea, defence delay my be a as Europe trill they are relieved to det"end itself, this the BDOinto effect in United States attention frustration that of, or evon. an excuse for thin shitt. rationalization rougbly marbe It over the dela1 in bringing tor the sbi.tt .Alterna.t1 vely, tor that the Amer1oan·Government by developillg, •massive retaliatory power". 1a being placed on of war or. it it coees, tbe to use the- words of Mr. A&the Secretary ot State 1t in Sew York, "The basic dec1s1.on wss to depend primarilf upon a great capacitJ to retaliate, instantly, bg means and at plao.es ot our ehoos1ng." This 000206 �,Thia 1s to be made possible featuring up a strategic by building atomic weapons and "highly mobile naval I resorve 1 air and a.mphibious units". As a oonsequ.cnca of this new strateu less emphasis 1s to be placed on \'ihat Rr. Dnlles calla, phrase that mu.st sound ominous to Russia' a tree ttlocnl defensive To make this l)OWer". neighbours,, sound a little better, n1ocal defence will alwa7s be important", Mr. Dulles added. that but then he spoiled in a the ette,et somewhat by stating detenco alone would never be enough to contain tba.t such the mighty land arm., ot the ~OJllffllUl.1st worl4. there ls such a large The fact.that stookp1l.e ot a to.mic bombs and that increasing in voltule and etteot1vonesa to adopt th1s no.w strn.tas.,. decision believe othor atomic weapons are that lt commends itnelr, must ba•e aade easier There 1s reaaon to ls nO\'l becoming the feeling new otratety The tact cbcapor that perm.\ e "thinning t'ilson, as well as that detence b7 those methods than .1t otherwise would bo contirms there is a close connoot1on between the and budgetary reduction. to Pentagon espeo1ally, :people like Admiral Redford and Charles to the Treasury. the poller Thia strategy, Which 1s pledged, to tax ot course, out" of American toroea will fllso in Burope, 000207 �.,J _.J,· , t:.urope• of "br1.ng1ng boys boca 11, which will be popular tdth United Stotoa public op1n1cn. It is no~ surprisina becoru.ng 1norcaa1naJ.y unem3y ecbout thie tbot Buropenno ore new str.r.to6Y t1hich rniees n dor,rosoina tco.r tbnt. the Americans may consider that auropo, etm ' if no~ expondoblo, toreee, ovcroeea 1 tdll h~vo .to bo de.fended by its ueaJ.otca. · by t1oversttas. weapons.,, rot.her than by toreos: Europeans \dll tinht bloody, mon-to-mon way, while victory by atomic t-otnli.atlon. If tn t,he old-.taeh1oned, wlll con,e from t.bEt skies such v1ctoi-y comes only after oceupct1on nod des~ruot1on and liberation, it bao little Zo thlo the Acorieons m2y well reply nppoal for iuropennn. that- Guropean countrie_e a.re now st.i-onc enoU6h theoeelvoe, tdt.b some British nnd At:erican help .. but not too mueb ... to tr tboy will only unite I hold tho Cuosicns off; especially Naturally, the Uni tecl ~t:..t 1s to r~e every affort will be mde by thaao roars and tlml"'tl will be nothing liko erudo Qr ic.;mdi~to td.thn.rnvale from Uuropean soil. Indeed Prosident 1 .ndhorener! t.o tMSO polialea ~1oenho~r did, in .tact.. bis r.t'!to of tho tznion cpeech. Operation Disengagement slowly &u1 c.:-re£ull7 will a1•e such be re-ntfirnad. roassuranea Out J.t eeerui clear io baGinntne, dona no doubt. thoue;i1 te will th.11t. be in �6. of two Divisions The announced uithdrawal trom Korea and the great, interest Pakistan into tills tit now peripheral In short• the and e.tamic-naval. strategy. Americans a.re at.tempting and ~e should be well adv1sod. l think. to re-exnm1.Jle our own these 4evelopaenta. Of I am JlOt suggesting · .Am.er1can policy cannot be made without wenkening tho North Atlantic will roqu1re skill to undertaken oomm!.tments previously free thot1Selves fro• certain pol1oy 1a tbe light 1n strel16th-en1ng in \:ashington a.nd care Cong:res.e of the issues that abandoning collective obn:nge of or e•en arrongeraents. in t:ashilllJton involved this But this and en appreciation end tenrs end the teel1nss by of allies. It polic1 th~se qualities ere not shown, the new ma7 be oe.r.ried out 1n. auob e way that system, will be waallonec1amt e•en disappear. gran.to4 that wlll the oomuniats, in.terpret developmonts end exploit the whole N.ATO It ma1 be taken to~ tor whom NATOremains the olliet ena»J'; new American detence so a.s to te.cilitate and str•tegic th.ts disappearance. They will undoubtedlJ 'try to show tba t the Americans are abandoning end leaving the Bu:ropeans to their tete, take refuge in atom bombs and oontinentnl NATO• While they the.mselYes detenoe. Ca.ne.d1an 000209 �'I. Cana.d.1sn detenoe and rightly, pollo.v has been tirnl.y, founded on :NATO,and we should do everything can to keep thie foundation atrons. ie not going to be easy, polltloally, on the other to maintain at Wlimpe:1rod stre!l(Sth our forces overseas, are raducins their comltments hand, we it ruu and r.hile our neighbours through these •new decisions", the import of \Yhich botb Pros1dent Gisenhouer and Secretor1 Dulles hnve now made clear. It aoy be tha.t the American sda!nletratlon will not be the onl,y ones who will have to uke :reappr1aise1• of rorelgn an -'agonizing pollcJr. 000210 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 16 JANUARY 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-01-16 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00015 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Department of External Affairs draft memorandum for the Prime Minister, 16 Jan. 1954, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. atomic war Dwight Eisenhower John Foster Dulles Louis St. Laurent NATO US-Canada relations