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https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/965774cd5fe665536181fb0cd0eaf143.pdf
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PDF Text
Text
D.L.
de If. Mathewson/TP
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
•
MEMORANDUM
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I
To refresh
your memory concerning
contingency
planning
over Berlin and the relationship
of tripartite
( "Live Oak" )
planning
to NATO planning,
we attach
the following
papers:
1
A.
______
CIRCULATION
A Departmental
memorandum of October 11, 1961
summarizes, · the main features
of "Live Oak" and
touches·
on some of the difficulties
and obscurities
in
B.
the text of the "Instructions
to NATOMilitary
Authorities"
in connection
with NATOplanning
for a Berlin eme~gency
(circulated
as Annex B to NATODocument P0/61/765).
These instructions
were approved by Council on
/
October 25 and have bean circulated
by the Military
Committee as NATO Document C-M(61)104.
Canadian
approval was,however,
only given subject
to a
reservation
as set out in
c.
telegram DL-1325 of October
Prime Minister.
_,D.
19, approved
by the
Telegram DL-1521 of November 20 contains
com~entsj
approved by the Prime Minister
on an interpretation
given by Secretary-General
Stikkar
of certain
phrases which occur in Annex B to NATO Document
P0/61/765 (see B above).
The text of this inter-
1
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• • • 2
Ext. 326 (6/56)
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October 11, 1951.
BERLIN - CONTINGENCY PLANNING
Following repeated requests from other members
of the Council for information on contingency planning,
the French, United Kingdom and United States authorities
presented a report to the Council on their contingency
planning for Berlin on September 27. The information
contained in this report was supplemented by a briefing
given by General Norstad on September 29. Additional
information was also obtained during recent meetings of
the Council and from conversations which General Kitching
had with Major-General Baker of the United Kingdom who is
responsible, under General Norstad, for the preparation of
"Live Oak" plans, Following is a summary of the main
features of "Live Oak" planning on the basis of the infor
mation currently available.•
2,
As explained by General Norstad, the "Live Oak" :
organization started, on a tripartite basis, in the winter;
of 1958-59, More recently a West German observer had
participated. The underlying purpose of the "Live Oak"
planning is to enable the Three Powers most directly
concerned to carry out their special responsibilities
regarding Berlin in all contingencies. It is primarily
directed at readying appropriate immediate responses to
possible Soviet Bloc interference with Western rights of
access to Berlin in the air or on the ground.
3.
According to the Three Power report, General
Norstad has been responsible, in his capacity as.Commander
in-Chief of United States forces in Europe, for developing
these plans over the past two years on the basis of
instructions received from the French, U.K, and U.S.A.
g overnments. Although the Three Power report appears to,
be clear in this regard, the discussion in NATO Council
indicated some difference of view between the Permanent
Representatives of the Three as to the origin of General:
Norstad's precise authority. It was the U.S. Permanent 1
Representative's under·standing that General Norstad. had
been given a special capacity which was neither that of,'
USCINCEUR nor that of SACEUR but was one which gave him,
planning and command responsibilities with respect to the
Three Powers' troops in Berlin. That capacity had been:
given to him in order to create a better relationship
between Three Power planning and NATO planning,
••• 2
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4.
"Live
NATO activity:
\~) ft~ 2? \(3?>5
Oak" planning
covers
three
main areas
of
(1)
The development of small-scale
military
probes
to determine Soviet/GDR intentions
with respect
to the denial of ground or air access by force;
(2)
The use of air lifts
as appropriate
essential
requirements
in the event
access is interfered
with or ground
denied;
(3)
The readying of limited
ground forces and
tactical
air forces to be employed, if necessary,
to demonstrate
tripartite
determination
to use
force.
'.1
to meet
civil air
access is
Ground Access
5,
The plans provide that a minimum of ground forces
are to be used and they must be composed of troops of the
three countries
most directly
concerned.
According to the
Three Power report,
the plans call for the use of "small
tripartite
convoys of various
configurations
designed to
test the access routes and overcome physical
o'ostacles".
The plans also include supplementary
military
efforts
(3
above) which would be designed ''to supplement the probe
efforts,
to demonstrate
the determination
to react with
force,
or to test the range of force the Soviets
are
prepared to apply".
The plans for these supplementary
efforts
provide for a total
of three battalion
group_s,
each comprising troops of the United States,
the United
Kingdom and France.
These groups would form approximately
one thousand men each and would form up as convoys to probe
the normal access roads to Berlin._. General Norstad has
indicated
that study has also been given to the possibility
of employing a tripartite
division.
According to 1/iajorGeneral Baker, such a larger force might be used, if
necessary,
to extricate
any Western forces in the corridor.
6.
All the information
available
indicates
that,
whatever the size of the forces used, they would operate
on instructions
to remain within the previously
defin°~
corridors.
i,,oreover,. they would be instructed
not to
open fire first~
if fired upon, they may fire but must then
withdraw.
Under no circumstances
would a force continue
to advance if fired upon.
7.
The French authorities
have agreed to plan for
such battalion
convoys but because they have not allocated
any forces for this purpose or agreed to decentralize
any
authority
for the employment of these convoys before the
event; it is estimated
that it would take at least three days
to assemble the initial
battalion
groups.
It is also clear
that these ground forces will be armed with conventional
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weapons only and full warning will be given to the Soviet
and East German authorities
before any convoy route crosses
the East-We st German border.
It is also intended that
maximum publicity
should be given in the Western press so
that it will be clear that the movement of limited
ground
forces is not a part of a surprise
offensive
operation.
Air Access
8.
It is considered
that the first
interference
with
the Allied rights
in air corridors
will consist
of a refusal
by the Soviet and East German officials
to acknowledge the
·
agreement for service
of West Berlin b11Western airlines.
In the circumstances,
the present
plans provide for military
air crews to fly empty civil aircraft
to test Soviet reaction.
Five complete air cr&ws have been trained
on civil
aircraft
by both the United States
and the United Kingdom and are
standing by at all times.
In the case of France,
civil air
crews will continue to fly the aircraft
under an administrative
arrangement whereby such crews can be quickly
converted
to "military"
status
by a system of "call-up".
9.
In addition,
the United States,
the United Kingdom
and France have each agreed to provide up to twenty-five
fighter
aircraft
to be available
to act as escort for the
civil aircraft
which fly to test Soviet intentions.
The
present
thinking
in the planning group is that fighters
should not accompany the first
civil aircraft
but would
be held ready in case one of these civil aircraft
is
attacked
or forced down. If such should happen, it is
intended that four or five fighter
aircraft
will act as
escorts
for each succeeding
aircraft
which may be sent
into the corridor.
The original
authority
given to General
Norstad contemplated
the immediate despatch of fighter
aircraft
to escort the first
civil aircraft
travelling
in the air corridor
following
interference
with normal
access.
Because of a difference
of view which has developed,
however, it seems likely
that the authority
currently
given
to General Norstad in this respect
may be changed to maim
it clear that the first
civil aircraft
to be sent in would
be without fighter
escort.
No definite
information
is
available
on the question
of warning to the Soviet and
East German authorities.
Apparently
the "Live Oak"
military
planners
have recommended that such a warning be
given in the event it is intended to send in fighter
escorts.
However, no final decision
has yet been reached
in this regard.
Air Lifts
10.
Two types of air lift
are envisaged.
The first
would be an entirely
military
air lift
designed to administer
to Allied forces in Berlin.
This would be put into
effect
immediately
if land access were blocked and these
military
aircraft
would continue to fly even if flights
by civil aircraft
were prohibited.
The second type would
..• 4
000479
�••
..;2:QVSECRET
be a larger
operation
for the support of the city of Berlin.
Because of existing
stocks of supplies
in Berlin,
it would
not be necessary
to institute
such an air lift
immediately.
11.
Although the proposed relationship
between the
various measures is still
not entirely
clear,
the latest
report from the Delegation
(Telegram 2564 of October 6)
indicates
that tho immediate reaction
to the blocking of
land access would be the flying in of a comparatively
small
number of military
aircraft
for the support of the military
garrison.
Other Measures
-·--- ·12.
In his oral briefing
to the Council on September 29,
General Norstad referred
to the "Live Oak" planners'
responsibility
for recommending "quiet precautionary
military
measures".
According to his explanation,
the terros
of reference
for this aspect of planning include:
(a) intensification
of NATOpractice
alerts;
(b) maintaining
supplies
for Berlin garrison
at lG-month level;
(c) increased
patrolling
of East German bordors by U .K. and U .S .A. forces;
and (d) an increase
in autobahn traffic.
He did not
elaborate
on these plans nor did he indicate
whether any of
them may have already been implemented.
Relation
of ''Live
Oak" Pl~nning
to N,ATO
13.
It is clear that the Three Power report on "Live
Oak" planning is not being forwarded to NATO Council for
approval but for information.
Progress has, however, been
made in the sense that,
for the first
time, the other
members of NATOhave been given a general outline
of the
planning of the Three and a promise that General Norstad
can provide additional
details
on request.
In addition,
the report
contains
a commitment on the part of the Three
that,
insofar
as possible,
the Council will be consulted
before any of these contingency
plans are implemented.
14.
Apart
which additional
areas requiring
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
from a few details
on "Live Oak" plans on
information
would be helpful,
the main
clarification
are:
how these plans relate
to non-military
currently
under consideration
(e.g.,
counter-measures);
measures
economic
the possible
sequence in which the various
and non-military
measures might be applied;
military
the eventual
relationship
between existing
"Live
Oak" plans and the: proposed Nl\TO military
plans
which are expected to be drawn up if agreement on
the necessary
guidance is arrived
at in the NATO
Council.
The report of the Three and the remarks
of General Norstad clearly
imply that the "Live
Oak" plans will continw" to remain separate
from
••• 5
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the NATOmilitary
plans although the latter
will
be co-ordinated
with and will complement the more
limited
"Live Oak" plans.
On th_e other hand, a
statement
by the Secretary--General
on Septer;;ber 29
was open to interpretation
that at some later
stage, once the Council guidance to the NATO
military
authorities
is approved,
"Live Oak"
planning would be reviewed and would become completely
a NATOresponsibility;
(iv)
the expected relationship
between "Live Oak"
plans, the proposed N,~TOplans and the "general
overall
strategy,
.. on a world-wide
scale"
referred
to in the draft instructions
to the
NATOmilitary
authorities.
These instructions
go on to refer to the selective
application
of a
wide variety
of measures "agreed upon both in
Europe and on a world-wide basis (which) would
contribute
to the purpose of arriving
at a
settlement
on the problem of Berlin while
progressively
malcing the Soviets
aware of ttie
danger of general war".
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SDG~EST·E:D INSTnUC'I'IONS TO :•U.'1'0ivlILITA?.Y AiSI'iiOliI'l'I;<;S
Tho parties
• acco,danco
to
'.'.'ith Articles
of: the. crisis'
l~r)1t
5:::rl tn consulted
tnl:en
the
to rne;;t
North
Treaty
4 and 6 of the
provoked
toi;;other
the
Atlanti&
,lith
rei;ard.
to decide
present
t•n•eat
to ~erlin
~re:
Treaty
to
·ahat
ac;:inst
have
and in
t"he CitJ
in
the
of
ste[;S
s• .cc.ld be
Borlin
•
,
0
•
in r~~ard
. '
"
n)
tho ~1nintcnance
of' t::ie [':cesc!"1ce and sec:..:rit/
of
o/
t,10 1:;r;.intcnar,co
o:: tllG
ot
\·iest
c),
freedom
s.nd viabilit:1
•
. ,j
Eerl in;
t.h0 ma:intenonco
of' froodom
of accesi.i
to
.iest
~·
Derlin.
•~.
3ve::.y_ effort
oL ·j ectives·
if
a,.o;,l :cr.tion
•' sarJ
to
s o-c'.,ll
y1.tll te
of non-military
for•t};e
::ms :::ay not
~;ac.o to attain
b:r nef;otiations
pos:.;ible
prepare
:1or:otiati
/
,
tu :)J.ocl~ Jest•Jrn
It
c:mtin,:;ency
ed ".German Domocra tic
a..::c1..3s.:.:to
~~
that
is· however
such
deter
the
Re';h.i:,li ~" from
~e1~1:i.n or
nee es-
u,easures
U,J.S,rt,
'
or
O:::'
t~,c'
ac t.i.on
tddn:;
ot!""1erv.:ise to
i.n1'rii1.ge
.
f:.,,d c::,lloctivoly
,
indivituall·J·
~uropc.
foregoing
and throu;;h
measures,
i!'l them:ielves
the
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F'.JJPGSE:
,
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"
The purpose
,n'ep,u•ation
by
or the£e
tho major
0
allipd
L1strL\Ct,_ons
com~:.anders
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plans
in
·.., i th
order
actions
to
put
the'alliance
in
a position
by the ·Sov 1:et 1?loc. in a Berlin
to
eris
cope
~
is,
Gl:,.SR.AL CCll3IDErtA'I'IONS :\
~
G.
The following
pro;:,aration
of' all
oonsid.er&tions
military
military
actions
:,:c;icral,
overall.
strate;;y
.
::orld-wide
•
'
:-,ave to be
'
\
<\ff<i-Jpropriate
and includin<;
"l:ilitary
measures-;
1
to
l
.
.
contr.iu:.ite
..
political,
imd p<1.1'a-
a~plics.tion·o1·
V
l
,
a
these
. -
'in, s~r:~'pe and -on ~ world-\•tide
o..~;reed upon both
:,Gsi::~1cd
into
.
military
,,_ii
'
.
is
·i~al,
The selecti~~:''
.
r:ies._:..1
tll'GS,
I
on a
.
.
t
psyc1t,10
economic,
in.tcgrated·
as aprropriute
appli'2abie
1
C:~plamutic,
.
the.
,
will
.
scale
uncterlie
plans:
J
a)
should
to
.
.
\
basis,
.
t':;e ;)U,"pose
of' arriving
at
a
'\
r,Jt·t'··~,·,,,t
..L.t:.:•• v.~
•oi' ~ tl•c
.1.
..,,_.
Soviets
t:Hi
aware
':',·,are
to
should
appropriate
Berlin
111
cl::,ri t:;r to
.
of access,
.
•···---·--
Ern
ic:,
'!ii
Soviets
At the
in. caso
bi n,lans
·, bY:\pbliticnl
\
.
...
'
-'
prese1t
sr,o'.lld
.
. on
\1th
1.1nn:ist(J.kable
risks, 1 :;.n contiaued
to
c)
t:i.e Soviet
• I .
~
sos s'i the
course
.
-\
pbl'itical
' ,.
qf' act\i.o;i.,
.
Soviets
oporiltion
enemy action,
objective
to ro-opon
of all
access,
risks
rapid
TLorufore,
2,etions
military
will
.
i
escalation
·.1hile
h:10 immediate
!At
.
p~ans
str~3,te,sy.
'l'hoy must,
with
cu:·ront
thorofore,
.
musi\.' tako
defens.ive
r0tr,in
and/or
1.
to ;.induce
b0
the
ty ... ·
·
-~\
of' r;nd be consist0~t
be
des ira.bili
\
l
pl'o-E:mptive
denial
us m,my oppor-
::Covern\ont
paus o a:1d re-as
a dangerous
any military
.
'
....
'
.
\~•
oner.nous
·
.
______,. __----·"··-.-----------·--•·•······
.
of continuin;-'
authorities
\ ·1. .
.
feav0
as possible
tuni ties
which
.
tis110, tb~ vray ,t'beso.,. nlu.z1_s ·:;ould
sa:ne
•
ttho r1im of appl;ring
I
im::,lornonteci
from
.
. \.--··-·.
z.nd v:i!h
\:o.ild
th~
.
of interference
; . 1 ..but detorrr,ined.
. .·
be solsctei
c~1ld
pressure·
.1.naJ.-.1:n,,
·~
be gradt!t0d
of circw:-,st.:.ncos
-
I
w&.r, ·
a catalot~ue
-·~---···
t~ns li;ht
iime1·al
m0~ure,s
s,,ould
bo o:.n:i.ilable
action
incref,sin,;;
danc;er\of
military
.
.in
0 ,"el•f
m ·of' J....,"""._--·\".1..A..
,Jr11•nt"'n' ., 10 t·ro·~r,,,~
.
:.;;~....,,:,,..-:i...
v.;
of' the
a:;>prppriate
3.ccoss
0
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.
b)
with
""··•bl
•
.,~
ac;,ount
.
concept:<i
"
defr,ncc
.
the
of NATO
und
tr..e·;:J must
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co;::1rr:i
t c'.lpabili'ti.93
to
the
prejuci.5..cv of tLc
in mi~1r::tho· risl:
l~~~i~l?
to ,:e.f',J:icl 1-L"
..1io territory·:,
0T10rall
_C(.'.pacit~r
of
n possible
~
r~sc
1
'IV.rJ.ichmight
:rec0
ini t'..E 1~i·1 CJ
o:· t:10
'. ••
rvacti
bu conr.:it"..:od in
Sovie ..t mov cs ·;:ouJ.d de pond
on to
;;,:::o l:iuild-up
a.t the
op0ro..tions
on results
existine
a3 wol::. u~\.circur,tstc.nco~
Jest's
at
the
\
d) . t:10 Alliance
'st1:.nd \ ror.dy
.~
r1ill
.
for
nuclear
action
at
•
'7 •
oxocu ti on o'f ·aµp!'ov ;;(:
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Govurn:nont.:i
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s.
I"'•"Ru~n-o"S
-~t.i.tl
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'Jndcr the
tho
UnJteci
::orstad
'
1~ilitnry
Kincdom,
in
his
at
--1
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th-v - tlrno.·
~,,,
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·o,;,sr,
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· bo · v-.
.. 0 Subj UC t of
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as USCLJC.3Ui1 h2.s maC:0 certr.in
plans
(LIVZ
6AK) to on~ble
"',,
these
cEci'ry out
'Il1or0. n:u::;t !>·, full
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LIVE. OAK planning
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1n·struc ti"on~ o:'' ·-the Go~10rrur1Gnts of ?ranee,
capacity
contin~nncy
,,,
'
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10.
For t~·1.c.1:,urpos o Of ::1·ov:"t.din..: · .cs gr8~ t :i· c:"ioic c as
,'•)'.J~i'blc.: of s_:~pplo:;i_;;1ti...i·y ::lt~rn-tivus;
'
c:Vv,i1'i:1~·-·bl;O,l<l l&nd,
''
;'
;;;sc, :nilit:1ry
plans
·-•{ ..
,
.
.
.
air
or nhv.:.l
..
'. .
- '
sl-,oul~ D(; ;:rc,pared
I,!(l<!SUl'OS
\
l . .:J ',r::·.:...~or
];.:~o·.
com11·-io.l1dorn
a.s G.!:'p·rop?'i:.:;.to
•. In oG.ch cc..su,
C
..,,
by
tl:0
-,
:,x:J'ac_t-ccl°
·:.,dv.c,ntt,:~e,s an-cl osti.11at,:,d r·isks.
co
s;;ould
s·3t :;out in
Jn'.purticular,
for
a)
the ·follo·.-:in:;
·;;.ppro~riate
initiation
alert
'c)
d)
.
.
\· .
0:xpandod ·non-nuclear
.
.
.
non-nucloE:.r
suppott;
selective
use
of nuclear
oporations-;
I
oporations
'
weapons
'
of th0 Allii.\.ncll
... t
.
.
\
.
,I
(
v;i th
,.
\
arid ability
to
mec,suros;
l~
,;round
jir
,:rior
..
. \le'
n~coss~ry
•.'/ill
n:llit"ry
'
.
air'and/or.n&val
. .. .
expandod
ur:;:intly:
i'or ;.;;,:r-o
i'orcos
~oasur':is
of a:1:1 ~i.i~ar~lto
.
b)
should
.
. . ·,
I bo studio~_
to
pl,:ms
\
to domonstrate
to use
tllom,
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BON BRU HAGUEROMEPRIORITY
Bi\G ANKARA ATHENS COPEN OSLO LISBON FM LDN
REF YOURTEL2687 OCT18
NI\TO MILITARY PLANNING •
PRIOOEMINISTER HAS APPROVEDTHE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
PROVIDED YOU ~!_AKE
IT CLEAR THE CON AUTHORITIES WISH TO RETAIN THEIR
RESERVATIONIN RESPECT OF GENERALCONSIDERATIONSSET OUT IN PARA6
.
-.\
PENDING FURTHER STUDY AND CLARIFICATION IN COIJNCIL,YOUARE _AUTHO~
fEZED TO AGREE TO DESP OF ANNEX B AS A DIRECTIVE TO MAJOR
MILITARYCOMMANDERS
FOR PLANNING f'URPOSESo ~~c
2. THIS APPROVALIS GIVEN ON UNDERSTANDINGTHAT DETAILED PLANS
WT.THC<l-1!4ANDERS
ASSESSMENTSOF RISKS AND ADVANTAGESARE AD
RE:FERENDU[1
TO GOVTSAt-JDPENDING RECEIPT OF SUCHPLANS,THE WAY
WOULDJ:3ECLEARED FOR:COUNCIL TO TAKE UP,AS
A M!\TTER OF FIRST PRIORITY
.
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S'F.CGENS
INXT!ATIVE FOR POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS ON A WESTERNNEG0°
'
TJ.ATING POSITXON.
S. IN APPROVINGTHIS TEL PRIMEMINISTER EXPRESSEDPARTICULARCON•
CERN THAT CAREFULATTENTION BE GIVEN TO NEED TO CLARIFY CJ:RCUM
0
l>lANCESOF AND AUTHORITIES .RESPQ'IISIBLEFOR QUOTE SPECIFIC POLITICAL
DECISION UNQUOTEREFERREDTO IN PARA6CD)3.
DECISXOM!';:'.
Ti.::::::, -; ..LL
FOR EXAMPLE,WOULDTHE
,:,. NATO GOIJTSOR BY :,. RZC!D G,ROUP
0
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IN illilf..ATION2;0 'l'H,,i;SECRi..'U.i-iYGENJ.Q'!AL
WtiICH"
IVE \THflli!H::ITAND\11.J.,i_,
BE Ul! FOli DISC!Ji.l:ION DJ TBE C,.Ulrn;a. ll
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'fiiA'to Di REGARD'tO Al!r! DECISIONS 'J.:OBB TMqnf; 111 ·
R1IiS?1i:CT
OF !{ATO PLAHS VffllCIIARE-·'DRAiliifUI10 'rdE "RULi: OF!
.
.
;
ll'l'IAUDII'l'YFOR NATO AGTlOH IS THE PRf..SENTfllSJ.TIOir' •
r
.
.
a~
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rs CLEARFROMIJIR/ s11m:ER1 !Ji PAl'Ji:R
11 AS FARASl'IA1'0,
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All't 8 ARE HITERffil."'rEP BY CANADA.AS,NEAJfINO THAT ALL)'IJ,.BB
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.
.
AND T:tAT THE EXECU'lIOli OF AP.i'RCVEDPLANS WILL BB "'l'H.E
.
3'.JB,L,CT OF' DEOISIOJS BY GOVEh'lilUillTSAlf THE Tll!!E.11•
a.
.FOR THE:PURPOSEOF
lti ,'.;:)ll!r;ECTIONl\'I'l'li 'l'H¼
Di!.ALINO\llITa 'lt!ILITAR\'. PLANNING
'
BE.RI.n,
Sii'U/1.T'l:cl;J,
IT IS. IM1'0HTANT
,,
'i'l:1lT IT IS OLEARLY WDERS'l'OGD THAT THE lrINAL HJ,;~HVtlSIBILITY
,
\
.B,;•rHPOH APfHOVAL OF FLA.NS AND F'GR DECISIONS TO IMl'LEM.li.1fT
·;:~!EUSiiO-JLD illj;Sf }7I'J.'HO-OVERli.lllmTSVldO i'iILL IDIPRESS TIJEIR
'
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VlEW5 '.'1'fffiOUG:H
THEIR PE!lMAREN'fREP.IGSENTATIVES IN THE tlATO
c::;:nlCIL
AtlD fliAT NO DELEGA'l'IOHOF GOYEKHIIBNTALAUiHORiff
IN s1:CI! CUUCIAL MA'l''.tERSCAN DE OONTEW>I.ATED
Pl'{OVIDEP
0
T.t:iIS IS UliD.ERSTOOD
0 CANADAaABAfJCEPT.THB INTARPl{E'rATlQli
'
PLACED Oll ffl:&SB PARASBY THE SEORE'l'ARl GENEBAL
0
. BEARllG IN. JI' llD fHE CONCLUSIOll;tN THE SEORET~RY
'•
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TB.AT "I'l' 18 DI 'l'RE COUNCIL 'r.liA'l' THE WILL
01'' GOVERNl&ENTS.
WILLBE EXPRT.SSSDBY THE PEHiiANEUTP.El'R£SEllTAT·IYE8• 0
WE BELI':~VE THAT Tlill COU'lfCIL SliOULD CONSIDER \'illAT iU::.t.SUiIBS
ARE P.EQ.UXRED
TO EN/IDLE IT TO DEAL EFF~CTIVELY /,l~D f..xTEDITL1tlSLY
Wl;tH SUCH D,U>ORTANTQUESTION&Iii ':raE EVENT OF AN EHEF!GENCYo
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The ..Council will remember th.it durin[( its discussion.
of ~'Q/61/765, . .nnox .C, if was recogni sod tha."t. some. slightly,
cl.1fferent
wording ror;nrding
·p.ol i t'ic;:il uu thori tics,·
governments,,.
Coui1cil etc.,
wns" to ho found in four.pnrt.s
of' this document:.
•
..
,
.. .
of
I
•
~
(1 )• Tho e:stnbiishment
n cct:.;toguo
of plans nsked for• in pcrogrnph
G(b) is intended
to enabJ.c the
.ll.OJJ
ti..9.c.l _g_u_t)1oy_l;ti.o_s.
to select
the sppropriate
·
aotioh .in the ligh't of circumstnnces..
.. ·
(2).
In 6(d)(3.)
it. is st~,ted that there v1ilJ. have
·bei "a specific
i2,.<1,l_i_i;J,.£-aj.
__dccision
to employ
,nucl"ear weapons ••.•• •
to
In. pc.ro.grai)h 7 ..upproval
of the. plans is in.tended
to .. ~
be obt:iinod
through the 'following
procedure:
·t_he
i/
• plans. will ··be sent; to the Standing
Group for.
•·1 ·
appro:i sol in c onsulta.tion
11'.ith t~e Mili tnry Committoe,/
.•
in accordtmcc ·with established
NI.TO,procedure,
and
ff
will be fo.rwarcicd to .the North :.tL·.ntic
Counsil
for
f
:ipproval
by _gpvernments throuE,h the Permanent
(,
B._0prcscn_t.£,t).y_e_§..,.
~
·
'~
·,•,..
(3)
(4)
The executio;
~f.tll'e j:lans,
upprov~d o.ccor.ding to
this proceclurc,
\vill bu the' subject
of :ie<Cj_s.i_ons_~
,&oyo:rn_ments o.t :thcftime
(purogrcph
cl).
-~ . _ .· ..
C
. 2.
· It seems' to me that these diffcrpnt
,wordings h.:ive .not
been deli bcro. tely, us.0d for the purpose of cs tabli shing reo.lly
clear-cut
di st inc tioris :and, special'
tren tmo)1ts as regards
tl:le
·severecl h,ypotheses
covered
in. the relevunt",pur,ts
of __nnox B; I
c.malso _convi_nccd trot.we i~ight be faced with·grcat
difficulties
it' wu <lid not try ,t,o polish
up' the drafting
and t'o (;Ct a more
orde1•ly text.
·
~
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· On _the other hand, 1 think I _cp.n ~,_ssurnc that there
i,s
agreement among us ·that the _!_n:s_ty_u_c_:tions
should be
sent. to the Military·
Comtic.nders.
1'urthcr
delo. 0' wciuld be
unc:c.ceptablf.;. right
now·.
~
.
a complete.
~
.
'
'
4 •. _. \"iould it, therefore•,
be p.ossibJ.·e that we upprove the
_·.nnexes ;. and D as they· stdnd i1t -this morrient, it being
uridcre,tood
that .we must,ritill
find ,c.· butter
understanding
of.
the .r1uestion:
_wha~tpo;J.i.tico.l, authority
hCls to mClkc decisions.
I am sure .tho.t discussions
on-that
matter will still
take a
·Jong time :ind this wi.11 bocoine c,uite-clear"whcin
w0 com0 to
· discuss
·the ,,uestions
ro.iscd in ·-my P0/61 /785. ··
.~
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· · ·.5, · >-During our. disqussions
· stat-ements
huvc been ..,,mude, und
• . I think .£1,gJ'.ccmont...ho.s beim roe1ched; -th.it .until
we t_C:ke another
clcci cion,. tho i?gli t_!.g::_it_g~j;l)ori~ "meant in 6(b) and 6(d) 3, is the
8ouncil,
· ·we h:lVC not· yet ·discussed
pt,r::gruphs
7 and 8.Hero
tho position
might be slightly
clif'ferent
because,
ncccrding:o to
::irticl o 5 of the Tro~:-ty, each member hns the right
of individual
.
sclf"'-dcfcnce.
Therefore,
if nttacked,
cc.ch individual
member can
dee Jde how it is going to defend itself
and .. take~ those ac tiohs
which it deems necessc.ry.
On the other
hahd; if collec'£1ye·N..TO
. c.c tion is to, be ·to.ken, I think tlm t in that cnsc also the
expressions
used in pnrctgraphs
7 .:tnd 8. 'will .1i1ply c. clec·i_sion by
. the C9uncil.
.
· · · ·
·
· '~~"
··
·
'
' 6.
It nby be ·thl,t in •tho future· the presently
agreed rule
'.of unc.nirni ty wil1 'h:;Ye to be umended, bu,t we· h~-:vc not yet
reached
the. sfuge at' which such ·ch..,nges ·can ou ll)ade to this rule.
· Hence, "wo must take it for grantee. that this rule of imnriimi ty
..
for, lL'.L'O .tiction is the present
posi tiof! and c~:nnot be nl t-ercd.
'
..
.
.
. ·:- / , . ''· ,,,..·,,
.
.
.
. 7,
·The inter'pretc.tion
I suggest,
o:ccording
to. which
decisions
·w1'J.1 be tc.kcn· by· the ·Permanent .council
under . tho J;'ule
of unanirni t:,r, seems· to be ..in. line with' tho Tre., ty • · -'-rticle
9•
stc.tcs
th.,t the P-..irtics· t.o the Treaty
"estoblish
a Council,
on.
y.,hich each of them shc.11 bQ repros.entod,
to conqider
matters
cone crning , the i mpl cinen tn ti on of this Treaty" •
:. s c.n armed
atto.ck. agc'.inst one or more .of the ,.llied
,countri·cs
shnll be
COJ'\Siclcred Lm r:ttcck· ~,g~:inst them all (.'.rticles
5 r,nd 6),, it
scc\ns norm-,1- to c onsidor
thb. t ~my Ni.TO action
to be t:::kcn in cr,se
of such c,n ,ittc.ck would be discussed
and decidud i,n the Council.
Tho · governments
nc. turr,:ll'y will .send instructions
to their
·
Pe:rrr,nhent Rcpresen tati vei;:;.,··c.nd, therefor,,,
it would s,c,c:m the. t
whc11 the text . of .".nnex· B spcolrn -of. ·"dc,c i sions by governments"·
and
of·H·pc,11 ticc.l c.uthoritics;',
there .. is ·no contrc.diction
b0tween
this wording and the ''fu.ct thc:t -it is·in
the Counci1 .that the will
of g9vernP1entsi)Vill. .
be:-cxprossod
by
the
Permanent
Representotives.
.
.
•
•
'
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.
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,r 000490
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
NATO
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Berlin Crisis / 9 FEBRUARY 1962
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1962-02-09
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
A language of the resource
en
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CDTT00038
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Defence Liaison (1) Division to Ignatieff, ‘‘Berlin: Contingency Planning,’’ 9 Feb. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1.
air lift
Berlin contingency
France
George Ignatieff
Lauris Norstad
Live Oak
SACEUR
Stikker
Three Power report
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5003b08bcc9240d886ebf4641f8d1274.pdf
af20c641e012e15ff438ad6e9feb08aa
PDF Text
Text
--
.
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5-1'
FM NATOPARIS
OEC4/61
TO EXTERNAL 3273
SECRET
OPIMMEO
INFO CCOS LON WASHOC EMBPARIS PERMISNY BONN BRU HAGUE ROME PRIORITY
TT OM/ONO PRIORITY
OM/FIN
FM CCOS
OTT DM/DDP OTT PRIORI TY FM OTT.
'
BAG ANKARA ATHENS COPEN OSLO LISBON
FM LON
REF OURTEL 3249
NOV30/61
DEC MINI!:.1'ERIAL
MTG:GERMANY AND BERLIN
i
THERE SEEMS TO BE LITTLE
WILL DOMINATE THIS
IT
IS
IMPOSSIBLE
DOUBT THAT THE PROBLEM OF GERMANY AND BERLIN
YEARS DEC MINISTERIAL
MTG.AT THIS
PARTICULAR
TO BE SURE WHETHER THE EFFECT ON THE ALLIANCE
BE TO MOVE TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT ON COPING WITH THE BERLIN
OR WHETHER IT
wILL
AGREE, IT
ALSO DOMINATE THE PUBLIC-RELATIONS
WILL
BE TO REVEAL THE INABILITY
BECAUSE THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS
AND WILL
EITHER
TO THE NATO MINISTERIAL
IS
WILL
PROBL£M,
OF THE ALLIANCE
TO
ASPECT OF THE MTG
HAVE MET PREVIOUSLY
ON OECtl,
HAVE ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE OF SUBSTANCE WHICH WILL
REQUIRE NATO FOLLOW-UP ACTION
IT
WILL
TIME
OR,AS WE HOPE,WILL
HAVE DEFERRED
MTG THE ISSUANCE. OF A COMMUNIQUE OF SUBSTANCE
THESE VERY FACTORSCTHE PRE~EMINENCE OF THE SUBJECT,THE
MTG OF THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS,
SURROUND THE SUBJECT)WH!CH
MAKE IT
BY WAY OF A USEFUL PREDICTION
POSSIBLE THAT FURTHER BILATERAL
AND THE PUBLIC
DIFFICULT
OF THE LIKELY
INTEREST
PRIOR
WHICH WILL
FROM HERE TO GIVE MUCH
COURSE OF EVENTS.IT
PROBING AT THE STATE DEPT,THE
IS
FO,
AND THE QUAI DORSAY MIGHT CONTINUE TO PROVE ILLUMINATING.
2.0NE
FACTOR WHICH CAN BE EXPECTED TO REMAIN CONSTANT,AT
LNTIL
HIS MTG WITH ADENAUER ON DEC9 AND POSSIBLY THEREAFTER,IS
OPPOSITION
OF DE GAULLE TO ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS,OR
FOR SUCH NEGOTIATIONS,
WHILE HE C<NSIDERS
A THREAT FROM THE USSR.<THE
, LON TEL
4283
LEAST
PREPARING
THAT THE WEST IS, UNDER
SECGEN AGREES WITH EMBPARIS TEL
NOV30 IN MAKING THIS
THE
1588
ASSESSMENT. )SEEN FROM HERE,
000497
AND
�...
,..
..
.......·-·· ..,..,
--
PAGETWO3273
THEREIS A MEASURE
OF UNCERTAINTY
AS TO THE REALGERMAN
POSITION.THE
KROLLINTERVIEW
WOULD
SEEMTO SUGGESTTHATNEGOTIATIONS
HAVENOT RPT
NOT BEENRULEDOUT;THERECENTEMPHASISON AN INTERNATIONALIZED
AUTOBAHN
SUGGESTSHOWEVER
THATTHE GERMAN
STARTINGPOSITIONFOR
NEGOTIATIONS
MAYNOTRPT NOTBE A VERYFRUITFULONE.USAADOPTION
OF
THIS IDEA,ANDTHE EMPHASISON THE RETENTION
OF OCCUPATION
RIGHTS
AS A FALL-BACK
POSITIONCSOTHATANYAGREEMENT
BETWEEN
USA,THEUK,
FRANCEANDTHE USSR WOULD
MERELYBE SUPERIMPOSED
ON THESEEXISTING
OCCUPATION
RIGHTS)MIGHT
SUGGESTTHATUSA ATTITUDEIS NOWSOMEWHERE
.
BETWEEN
THOSEOF GERMANY
ANDTHE UK.EVENTHE LATTERMUSTNOT RPT
.
.
.
NOTBE EXPECTED
TO TAKETOOEXPOSEDA POSITION IN FAVOUROF NEGOTIATIONS IN VIEWOF UK NEEDOF FRENCHANDGERMAN
SUPPORTWHILESEEKING ADMISSIONTO EEC.WHAT
THIS ANALYSISSEEMSTO SUGGESTIS THAT
PRESSUREAMONG
THE FOURPOWERS
MOREDIRECTLYCONCERNED
IN F'AVOUR
OF'
NEGOTIATIONS,OR
AT ANYRATEFOR NEGOTIATIONS
ON A BASIS WHICHMIGHT
BE MEANINGFUL
TO USSR,HASDECLINEDDURINGTHE LASTMONTH.THE
NATO
COUNCILRESOLUTIONS
NOV6AND15(0URTEL2914 NOV6ANDP0/61/840;
OURTEL3060 NOVIS ANDP0/61/864)SEEM IN RETROSPECT
TO HAVEREPRESENTED
THE HIGH POINT IN THE COUNCILSPRESSUREON THE FOURTO AGREEUPON
A NEGOTIATING
POSITION ANDRESUME
THE INTERRUPTED
CONTACTS
WITHUSSR
TO DETERMINE
A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION.SINCE
THENTHE ONLYVISIBLE MOVE
HAS BEENKROLLSCONVERSATION
WITHKHRUSHCHEV.
3.THE LINE OF ACTIONWHICHTHOSEFOREIGNMINSTERSwiio'ARENOT RPT
NOTOF THE FOURMAYWISHTO ADOPTWILL.PRESUMABLY
BE DETERMINED
IN
PARTBY THE SORT OF REPORTCOR
REPORTS)THE
FOURMAYMAKEAT THE
BEGINNINGOF THE NATOMINISTERSDISCUSSIONOF'BERLINANDGERMANY.
THEREIS ALSOA POSSIBILITY THATTHE ALLIANCE
WILL HAVEMADEAVAILABLE
TO IT A PAPEROR PAPERSPREPARED
BY THE AMBASSADORIAL
WORKING
GROUP
IN WASHDC
F'ORDISCUSSIONBY THE SENIOREXPERTS,AND
THATTHE SENIOR
.
EX?ERTSTHEMSELVES
MAYBE MOVED
TO GIVE A BRIEFINGTO COUNCIL
••• 3
000498
�'
'
I
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,.,::-
f.t,tl
:'ilf,,
ill'Ol
PAGE .T.HREE,
,. AJ ....
• a
,-,_..,,.., 3273_
... ,nuc:.
..... ., vr.u,.;
:) -., r·1;1u O1· JJ~f" ,~138 3VA~; HCCi 1:~T 1 • I{'.'
BEFORE.DEC13•.IF.,HOW.EVER,ASIS SUGGESTEDIN ,PARA5 OF LDN TEL 4283
u .... .., .......
ic -'-'""
.. ,
rl,,,. 1..;i..:1.1
nJ!Nv
,.,:u'1 !ilAU,t;-,•l\ -!l·,;Ofi\'t
NOV30,THE,FOUR .FOREIGNMINISTER$, ARE .LIKELY TO _PART.WITHOUTREACHING
...,_
... .,........ , ..,,......, J..,. -'.lC V'l ,,.., 1CJ.1' .. ~t'G l'l'I !111 ll,1'1 1'01 It'll U.JO(·,
AGREEMENT
pAND TO CARRY.THEIR LACK.OF .AGREEMENTINTO_THE NATO MINIST•
c..
,.'
'
,i..3.-J ,..Jtu ,,. ....,l..:iii-.
. ..,,_,.•v ..~v.:i
,.,)tC:t
,-1.:,..C 1·.1,.1rt,~}1~~;- -l:C
•.J!&'1lt~U-.1H
l,"ljiMJ.J.-·'H(Jii
J!G.-w.,,r~b~?f.i'.~~}f. io.
ERIA,,L.
~~.!--.I~f!-Yr;!,.H,A""ti"'T~f
.~11INj!Jll.~~utA~
1,M,TGl.JT~:,,S_,E..fMJ,
11
RECONCILE DIFFERENCES.AMO~GJ,TH~,
FOUR,O_RT!'AT ,.THE.cqMM,!JNIQUE,
WILL BE,
.c-lu.i•~-•if.....-.
.•
JJl••.f•\J
t·
..,.ht
r,U"\
t. ..
i.-,Jt,1
1Jf·f~c.,,.:tt"1
ABLE TO.REFLECT ANY SUBSTANTIALMEASURE,OF AGREEMENT.
,vu_..,
2~,.;.,f\l
-w ,,f,._.,;f c;,
,>.u:J ,,.,,.,, ~~i..:11
-iH.JI
:Cl)•~
,;·.1,'lc.'JT;A8
~..-1,~
Jh1 ,,
4. THti~EStE.N,l~A;.5
..~c.EJP._F~,C}J
J.H,E Jl.!,Nl~Jf,Ri.~~ MT,~},~ ~1~,,,~~!H,}H~~-l.P\J~,
r,.oR~.IGN,MINISTERS .MOST.DIRECTLY,CONCERNEDWITH GERMANYAND.BERLIN '
]\JLGG.!11':C)rJH,
'V,U.-l A ,..,-~IJ.J
.lGt!l..!l:",W
l'I..,
.J:..~ ..:i:t,1I
"I.U
l...J l t l
:,J;JJh
CA C::Jf." 1 .~
tt"".,
ADOPTINGA RANGE.QF ATTITUDES TOWARDSTHE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATION
VHQIAW
;:a,,,1.1b1 Ci,11.;
,211:
,n.,·;i1,:m,11!u~
'.;/',,_).-,
1·1J'l"'·'''·''·'•ll!I
\\,,
,J,
ll'J
·
WITH.USSR.,.HE Is ,.NATURALLY
DEEP.LYcONCERNED
.BY THIS PROSPECT AND.,AS
~:.11..t
..1.;.in
1 .d~'.ihli.)1.3i.i.
JGA~f
..1n& Pi1 'lt
c:,h~J .....-'tu.
'\,.;
n•C(Jty
.. ~~tc
.iJ~Tfi.1:i..1
1 ~11 _,:,~·
.rs
TRYING,TO .INFLUENCE,THE.FRENCH
,1v11Alll,',tlll..1 u,;i,. '1:Jlll::
_._, l::i'.J~ ... ':
YOU \HLL .KN.OW
.F:ROM.MYTEL 32.72 DEC2
dl.:n,
u.:,:aC:.:11'<,-11,
au••
1·,r1
,u,.
GIU•
POSITION ,WHICH .SEEMS TO.•BE THE. CRUCiAL ONE FOR.ACHIEVING SOME SORT1 .
C.;!H.;i"\IH
n;,i,.Cin,,11
I\Jll'! ..,111
.;,1"1
•,u t.,4C:tJ.'H:f•·.t.:1111m
11"1
1,)<.Ui\
l~•t!,1
,
I~R~~~~
11~'.1~~'
~~1
0
2
OF
I r!iil~~~~G
,F :', !,
J1½s~.i~
1' C
THAT.HE FEARS THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME INCLINATION ONATHEP.ART OF.
"-'""-"" , .... '\o 111t1C! ,:::nl
JIU 1,.. ,,; IH,11,1 r.v c:<:... ,t<!A.:IA tl.-J:;
Cui,'!:,;>.~
THE.FRENCHHTO,USE. NON•AGREEMENT
O.VER0THER M_EAS.URES,
PARTICUl.ARL'f oVER
0 l .:l<.1»1 C: <" lM I '" · Jtci,' .J.ii\ •.• , 1 ~
"" i nJ4
11 \u c.1 ,uu<I J fl\, ii 1"1 'lDIIAf
COUNTERMEASURES
ASAA~'-'EXCUSE,,F,OR
,REEUSING,AGREEMENT..,,TO.NEGOTI
ATE.,, ._
Q~~t
,~u
r1l1u~n
.:,J;-~A 1..tJ
..:u1l
'\:J
Gn.us·1.:i~
n~Ju
.....ilr·;;;
"'.J(J"tWHJf".
•
THERE HA~.,.BEEN,.ATENDENCY, WHICH BEG1N wITH
RUSKS ADDRESS
iiTO THEr r·
t-,,A,f .., l 1 ~1J ..J.
1ti1 t,U 0 fl 110 1 ~••Jj
COUNCIL LAST AUG AND WHICHHAS BEEN RE-ITERATED BY THE SECGEN AS
.'lvA1t .:ill.u.1;sI, 1;U .,.nT {•~ .sl.1 ut ,,.1.:12.:,il\1'l.:11.~r<1
T1.ula uli
.lRtn.3\~HH"
- - •--;.-,_- • -~••if 3 .,,1ll'IJ.
'\
.a,rvnrr."r,..1
1
..i..:.;.·,
Rttr~tl~LXe~
I
[~:-~IEW .THE ,BE~LIN'
_
3;1
ASPECTS FOR NATO.THERE IS A GENUINE FEELING ON THE PART OF: THE SECGEN
.,uJI\V .1..11n:: 3•111 ,3,"
11·•tlil .i• 1
AND USA THAT,.P.RPGRESS_
ON ANY ONE~OF{THESE THREE ASPECTS SHOULDNOT ,
11\MI-. 1 ,.:nv,.:i"."1111,-'c!li
?'~-,;,••
1 ,1.:,;J,,-, .:,• Pl .:,'1fl\~1•c:1,u<! -.,J .\Ul.?UJ;J.,VJ
RPT NOTO~E~1h~o~~r.:1ioJYiiuJ~Ol~ ~R·i3E~~!?itt8G~;~s=-~NT'!'~E: °,TH~~ 1~':~CTS.
THERE SEEMS TO BE SOMETHINGCLOSE TO SATISFACTION WITH PROGRESS IN
... 1J\T.::u l'1A ,;I .lI.1>1..s~,, ,vl ,: ',} l l t J. 10u.:111 \'.J l Jl j'-''l ~.::ilff•: \ ,- ' 11u.1 ' .,.
THEi'.IELD lOF ,MILIJA,R'(~PREPAREDNESS.IN THE ~EM~IN~NG Tw9 FIE~DS -,,1'1, !> r.J ii
tll
_
_
_ _ ..
• .. H C'J.1.Ju~~-_.H; , l • J • ··" 1 ., ,. r L
rr~~~-'
OF N~GOTI~:.:_ON~I~~Dl'fC?~~~!R<1~9u,~1E.flM~~~~REJp
PROGRESS AND MOREOBV_IOUSDIVERGENCEOF 1INTERESTS.,THE NON-FOUR,AIDED
JI',
.J,"l)V;IA
tfJl'l.tfl1
.SMI
d~llli1PH,
llll
3'J;11
<1 l•JUL.J
•-,J1; .,,; 1..
.: .. s,li;!nt1
,
IN THE PAST BY TW0 0f THE FOUR,HAVE PREVIOUSLY SHOWNAN INTEREST
h ~(;IJ cir..i1 1 AiTu:;.,~ 1u , IJJl6!.;:;cl.l'1 _.,11, ,:.;;,.1,,,; o, ;t_;<11Jj.1 •-"" =:
IN GETTING ON WITH NEGOTIATIONS~SOMEOF THE NON•FOUR,HOWEVER,HAVE
MIi i .IU 1.:iii.11'
.,nu!1
11.JUll
}llH, J
.i.J i;U u
'
•.Ol
1",IJ ' l
t. •., T . C:' ,c,.
-
-
,,
ii
s
,'-t JI• · t.!J:'
BEEN MORERELUCTANTTO MAKEPROGRESS IN THE FIELD OF COUNTERMEASURES
.:1v1TAr,:,.11JA ·rilA R.!!•t'l.::lfJ 1ti.,t1t1u2 t,T r,11111,
.. •iJT ,. 1,. , Ir"''
,.
oo-e4
000499
I ,
�........, . .
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.
PAGE FOUR 327 3
WHILE THE FOUR HAVE BEEN ABLE TO UNITE ON COUNTERMEASURESEXCEPT
-
.
··~
,-.~,
r
FOR ONE IMPORTANT POINT WHICH IS DEALT WITH IN MYTEL 3272.THUS
RPT
NOT
wouLo Not
't
BE roo
suRPRisrNG
r·
r
j_~
TO.SEE. THE FouR,.iF
""'.-·-. _.
.
t.
~i ..
IT
cRITic-fzto
T.
_
••
· '
-~~;,,•::~
.
FOR LACK OF AGREEMENT OVER NEGOTIATIONS, COUNTER-'ATTACK OVER ECONOMIC
COUNTERMEAsuhE:S.THIS WOULD BE .AN
_
.
IMPO.RTANT
_
, 1: ·
to"KEEP.. IN
FAC1'0R
•T
· .,
· -.
MIND f ·-
'-,
t .
': -;·
.r
tt,
IN EXERTING PRESSURE FOR THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS.
1
5. THE BRITISH,
•
t.
.
l
.,
•" . ,
-
. '
., __ ,._
- ... -
.
WE KNOW FROM MSGS FROM LDN~TEND TO THINK ·or NEGOTIATI CNS
r •
IN TERMS OF a'ROADE; GERMAN QUEST! ONS( AS THE DEPT' DOES), INV0Lv'1Na'•
1
sucH ·MATTE~s AS RECOGNITION or THE • ooiR-NEissE
;j
I
p;
•
..,.
·!
..1_
NON
•.AGGREss·xaN""
LINEtA
_·•;.<.·~~ ..···•·~:,,·•
.
PACT OR ARRANGEMENT OF SOME SORT BETWEEN THE NATO AND THE WARSAW. '
. -
. ' .'
.·.-
! T ,. '
-~.,. .
,
'
I
.,__
t 1'' _·
•
! •
1:
.
t
~. = :,,, -
. .
:-
POWERS,AND SOME SORT. OF DEALINGS WITH THE- EAST GERMANS.THESE ARE ' '7 • ; r, , ) ~~.. : •. (""•.-'
, .'..~.
• • ••:-- _.._, .~f : .
SUBJECTS ON WHICH NATO EXAMINATION HAS NOT RPT NOT PROGRESSED VERY - .
T
;""
•
...
1
..
•
•
.
•
I
1>
: T•
0-,,.
,-
·•. ·r'
I
,
,,_
,
"(;'
tJ
.I,~
..
FAR, BUT. AGAIN THE BRITISH ANALYSIS OF THE FRENCH 'APPROACH APPEARS
"'J'f'" _• ..., •
I_~
'_!
.• "'. "r.'.,r.
•
..,,
• ",
j_l'.
'
TO BE SIGNIFICANT<PARA3
LDN TEL-4283):THERE
WOULD°CLEARLY"BE SOME
>
i.•
T~ . -
~'l
\,
""
_..,.~,•
.,._
f
,. •
·!'
.
1
-
·:
-
... "
RISK IN TOO MUCH READINESS ON OUR PART OR ·oN THE PART OF ANY MEMBER
... • fO .
f'""'-.
... -•
OF THE ALLIANCE
M> .-
....
AT THIS
~-T.
·- _.
GERMANS-FEEL STRONGLY WHILE
1
RETICENT:THE
,,,,.
•
,....
.
;-
.
•_f ,,
".:
-
"
C
~,,,
....
"
'
-
.....
:
r '•
·•
r
0
1
,¥'
O
...
,.
'HAVE
IN,.OURTEL 309:.iNOVl'i
'
,
T
..
•
• .'"
1:•i
.,
:, •. T
0
,-.
'."'
1
T·'"
•·"1 ;i
.
-,,-_
.- l''l'
-
_..
-,:
..,.... ",-
f
•-,_
-,, ·
--~:
i.1 ·
THAT
,-;J:·
THERE ARE AS YET NO RPT NO SIGNS OF THE COUNCIL BEING ABLE TO
"'
"!'·
t
DEVELOP AN AGREED POLiCY
MOSTLY\1s
~t
A RESULT oF"DE
"'"
.t
·;·•
..
r ,~
..,~
-.•
i
..,
GAULLES - ATTITu!Sii:: His
...
_~
..
,..
.....,,,.
FORTHCOMING,MTG WITH,
t'
·1 I
'
·
•
' ..
-"\\I
"Ii
'(
•
•
' ·
t ·7
f
1
• ., '
<':'
RPT No LoNGER ro' BLOCK THE poss1B1L1rY'
r•
-~ ,-,,
&
'"".',
f\ •
..
RESPECT.IF
~EM~DE 1N· 0k1NoiNG rHEFRENCH ~ROUND-No~
PERCHANCE PROGREss•foGu;:,
'.
·"t
.,.
ADENAUER WILL -THEREFORE BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT IN THIS
·
--,
QN NEGOTIATIONS OVER BERLIN IN ANY DETAIL,
-,,·":1--
•
;•-C, 1
-•
-
·
REMAIN.
AND THINK THEY - ARE STILL VALID. '
., •
' '
'
"''
f~ l rr-~ ....
.,,.. , ·"• :1· 1- r. '1' ·.: ·"
... ~-- -~.,.. ,
.._...
6. OUR CONCLUSION ON SUBSTANCE AT THE 'PRESENT TIME,THEREFORE;Is
,
·' ..
THE UN 'i1£Lo1wE
iHE.SUGGESTIONS MADE
IN"T~rs-Fi'ELD
,
r
.,,1~-"t"_,.. .~ •
..
't.1t.IN
0
·~
'
ATTHE .FORTHCO'lING
A ·cDN'INif'i'ATIVE·,
MT; MI GHT' THEREF'6RE' SEEi/'ro
RE~EXAMINED'
~-
?' -, .•.,
- __
r-.
1
"'\
' ..
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE
JAIN";'LINE ..·F'OR
MINISTE~I~c'
M'
••
STAGE To BARGAiN AWAY 'i>oINTS' ON WHICH THE·
· .-
' "'\
•''"
n .• -
-
-
¥
oF NEGOTIATIONS
t,_
:'"'
r- •
· ,
_
QUADRIPARTITE
.-:..
oN
·A
i
, .
..
BASIS,THE SITUATION WOULD LOOK MUCH MORE HOPEFUL THAN
_·-, _ - .. · ; . ,. • ":0 n :·· •
;;,- -· ·
- · r ,,-,, , ,. -·
· '.' · rIT DOES NOW.IT. IS T'OO'EARLY TO SUGGEST WHETHER ANY ALTEfiNATIVE
000500
�••
.... -,
PAGEFIVE 3273
TO QUADRIPARTITE
NEGOTIATIONS(EG
USA-USSREXCHANGES>COULD
BE CONTEMP•
LATEDo
7.IF ONEPASSESFROMSUBSTANCE
TO PUBLICRELATIONS,THE
PROBLEM
WILL
BE A RELATIVELY
SIMPLE If THE FRENCHPOSITIONCANBE CHANGED.IFIT
•
CANNOT
RPT NOTTHENSOMEEFFORTWILL HAVETO BE MADETO AVOID
LEAVINGTOOOBVIOUSAN IMPRESSIONOF A SPLIT WITHINTHE ALLIANCE.
THIS EFFORTWOULD
HAVETO BE IN VERYGENERAL
TERM~.ATTHt VERYBEST,
IF THE FRENCHPOSITIONWERENOT RPT NOTALTOGETHER
UNYIELDING,THE
COMMUNIQUE
MIGHTBE ABLETO BALANCE
ON THE ONEHANDEMPHASISQN
'
ADHERENCE
TO PRESENTRIGHTSANDFREEDOMS
COMBINED
WITHPREPAREDNESS,
WITH,ONTHE OTHER,ASTATEMENT
OF READINESSTO NEGOTIATE
UNDER
SUITABLECONDITIONS.DEPENDING
UPONTHE DEGREEOf DIVERGENCE
Of THE.
FRENCHPOSITION,READINESS
TO NEGOTIATE
MIGHTHAVETO BECOME
A TENUOUS
ELEMENT
IN THE COMMUNIQUE.IF
THERECOULDBE NO RPT NO OFFERTO
NEGOTIATE
IN THE COMMUNIQUE,THE
POSITION OF THE ALLIANCEWOULD
BECOME
DIFFICULT INDEED.
LEGER
000501
�
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Title
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NATO
Dublin Core
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Title
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Berlin Crisis / 4 DECEMBER 1961
Date
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1961-12-04
Format
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PDF
Language
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en
Type
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Text
Identifier
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CDTT00037
Source
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NATO Paris to External Affairs, ‘‘Dec Ministerial Mtg:Germany and Berlin,’’ 4 Dec. 1961, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1.
de Gaulle
France
Léger
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/de20d3d12f919449dc84054a49de020c.pdf
c35e89933f5635c5555aea8c138b2048
PDF Text
Text
.•
.,
•...
\
J)L(,)Yl'l~i..t>,q
(-J...'i '(, '1
.•
A-rt=l..w......tA
-;--
i
October
11, 1951.
BERLIN - CONTINGENCY
PLANNING
Following repeated requests
from other members
of the Council for information
on contingency
planning,
the French, United Kingdom and United States authorities
presented
a report to the Council on their contingency
planning for Berlin on September 27. The information
contained
in this report was supplemented by a briefing
given by General Norstad on September 29. Additional
information
was also obtained during recent meetings of
the Council and from conversations
which General Kitching
had with Major-General
Baker of the United Kingdom who is
responsible,
under General Norstad,
for the preparation
of
"Live Oak" plans,
Following is a summary of the main
features
of "Live Oak" planning on the basis of the information currently
available .•
2,
As explained
by General Norstad, the "Live Oak" :
organization
started,
on a tripartite
basis,
in the winter;
of 1958-59,
More recently
a West German observer had
participated.
The underlying
purpose of the "Live Oak"
planning is to enable the Three Powers most directly
concerned to carry out their special responsibilities
regarding
Berlin in all contingencies.
It is primarily
directed
at readying appropriate
immediate responses
to
possible
Soviet Bloc interference
with Western rights
of
access to Berlin in the air or on the ground.
3.
According to the Three Power report,
General
Norstad has been responsible,
in his capacity
as.Commanderin-Chief
of United States forces in Europe, for developing
these plans over the past two years on the basis of
instructions
received
from the French, U.K, and U.S.A.
governments.
Although the Three Power report appears to,
be clear in this regard,
the discussion
in NATOCouncil ·
indicated
some difference
of view between the Permanent
Representatives
of the Three as to the origin of General:
Norstad's
precise authority.
It was the U.S. Permanent 1
Representative's
under·standing
that General Norstad. had
been given a special
capacity which was neither
that of,'
USCINCEURnor that of SACEURbut was one which gave him,
planning and command responsibilities
with respect
to the
Three Powers' troops in Berlin.
That capacity had been:
given to him in order to create a better
relationship
between Three Power planning and NATOplanning,
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4.
"Live
NATO activity:
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Oak" planning
covers
three
main areas
of
(1)
The development of small-scale
military
probes
to determine Soviet/GDR intentions
with respect
to the denial of ground or air access by force;
(2)
The use of air lifts
as appropriate
essential
requirements
in the event
access is interfered
with or ground
denied;
(3)
The readying of limited
ground forces and
tactical
air forces to be employed, if necessary,
to demonstrate
tripartite
determination
to use
force.
'.1
to meet
civil air
access is
Ground Access
5,
The plans provide that a minimum of ground forces
are to be used and they must be composed of troops of the
three countries
most directly
concerned.
According to the
Three Power report,
the plans call for the use of "small
tripartite
convoys of various
configurations
designed to
test the access routes and overcome physical
o'ostacles".
The plans also include supplementary
military
efforts
(3
above) which would be designed ''to supplement the probe
efforts,
to demonstrate
the determination
to react with
force,
or to test the range of force the Soviets
are
prepared to apply".
The plans for these supplementary
efforts
provide for a total
of three battalion
group_s,
each comprising troops of the United States,
the United
Kingdom and France.
These groups would form approximately
one thousand men each and would form up as convoys to probe
the normal access roads to Berlin._. General Norstad has
indicated
that study has also been given to the possibility
of employing a tripartite
division.
According to 1/iajorGeneral Baker, such a larger force might be used, if
necessary,
to extricate
any Western forces in the corridor.
6.
All the information
available
indicates
that,
whatever the size of the forces used, they would operate
on instructions
to remain within the previously
defin°~
corridors.
i,,oreover,. they would be instructed
not to
open fire first~
if fired upon, they may fire but must then
withdraw.
Under no circumstances
would a force continue
to advance if fired upon.
7.
The French authorities
have agreed to plan for
such battalion
convoys but because they have not allocated
any forces for this purpose or agreed to decentralize
any
authority
for the employment of these convoys before the
event; it is estimated
that it would take at least three days
to assemble the initial
battalion
groups.
It is also clear
that these ground forces will be armed with conventional
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weapons only and full warning will be given to the Soviet
and East German authorities
before any convoy route crosses
the East-We st German border.
It is also intended that
maximum publicity
should be given in the Western press so
that it will be clear that the movement of limited
ground
forces is not a part of a surprise
offensive
operation.
Air Access
8.
It is considered
that the first
interference
with
the Allied rights
in air corridors
will consist
of a refusal
by the Soviet and East German officials
to acknowledge the
·
agreement for service
of West Berlin b11Western airlines.
In the circumstances,
the present
plans provide for military
air crews to fly empty civil aircraft
to test Soviet reaction.
Five complete air cr&ws have been trained
on civil
aircraft
by both the United States
and the United Kingdom and are
standing by at all times.
In the case of France,
civil air
crews will continue to fly the aircraft
under an administrative
arrangement whereby such crews can be quickly
converted
to "military"
status
by a system of "call-up".
9.
In addition,
the United States,
the United Kingdom
and France have each agreed to provide up to twenty-five
fighter
aircraft
to be available
to act as escort for the
civil aircraft
which fly to test Soviet intentions.
The
present
thinking
in the planning group is that fighters
should not accompany the first
civil aircraft
but would
be held ready in case one of these civil aircraft
is
attacked
or forced down. If such should happen, it is
intended that four or five fighter
aircraft
will act as
escorts
for each succeeding
aircraft
which may be sent
into the corridor.
The original
authority
given to General
Norstad contemplated
the immediate despatch of fighter
aircraft
to escort the first
civil aircraft
travelling
in the air corridor
following
interference
with normal
access.
Because of a difference
of view which has developed,
however, it seems likely
that the authority
currently
given
to General Norstad in this respect
may be changed to maim
it clear that the first
civil aircraft
to be sent in would
be without fighter
escort.
No definite
information
is
available
on the question
of warning to the Soviet and
East German authorities.
Apparently
the "Live Oak"
military
planners
have recommended that such a warning be
given in the event it is intended to send in fighter
escorts.
However, no final decision
has yet been reached
in this regard.
Air Lifts
10.
Two types of air lift
are envisaged.
The first
would be an entirely
military
air lift
designed to administer
to Allied forces in Berlin.
This would be put into
effect
immediately
if land access were blocked and these
military
aircraft
would continue to fly even if flights
by civil aircraft
were prohibited.
The second type would
..• 4
000479
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be a larger
operation
for the support of the city of Berlin.
Because of existing
stocks of supplies
in Berlin,
it would
not be necessary
to institute
such an air lift
immediately.
11.
Although the proposed relationship
between the
various measures is still
not entirely
clear,
the latest
report from the Delegation
(Telegram 2564 of October 6)
indicates
that tho immediate reaction
to the blocking of
land access would be the flying in of a comparatively
small
number of military
aircraft
for the support of the military
garrison.
Other Measures
-·--- ·12.
In his oral briefing
to the Council on September 29,
General Norstad referred
to the "Live Oak" planners'
responsibility
for recommending "quiet precautionary
military
measures".
According to his explanation,
the terros
of reference
for this aspect of planning include:
(a) intensification
of NATOpractice
alerts;
(b) maintaining
supplies
for Berlin garrison
at lG-month level;
(c) increased
patrolling
of East German bordors by U .K. and U .S .A. forces;
and (d) an increase
in autobahn traffic.
He did not
elaborate
on these plans nor did he indicate
whether any of
them may have already been implemented.
Relation
of ''Live
Oak" Pl~nning
to N,ATO
13.
It is clear that the Three Power report on "Live
Oak" planning is not being forwarded to NATO Council for
approval but for information.
Progress has, however, been
made in the sense that,
for the first
time, the other
members of NATOhave been given a general outline
of the
planning of the Three and a promise that General Norstad
can provide additional
details
on request.
In addition,
the report
contains
a commitment on the part of the Three
that,
insofar
as possible,
the Council will be consulted
before any of these contingency
plans are implemented.
14.
Apart
which additional
areas requiring
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
from a few details
on "Live Oak" plans on
information
would be helpful,
the main
clarification
are:
how these plans relate
to non-military
currently
under consideration
(e.g.,
counter-measures);
measures
economic
the possible
sequence in which the various
and non-military
measures might be applied;
military
the eventual
relationship
between existing
"Live
Oak" plans and the: proposed Nl\TO military
plans
which are expected to be drawn up if agreement on
the necessary
guidance is arrived
at in the NATO
Council.
The report of the Three and the remarks
of General Norstad clearly
imply that the "Live
Oak" plans will continw" to remain separate
from
••• 5
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the NATOmilitary
plans although the latter
will
be co-ordinated
with and will complement the more
limited
"Live Oak" plans.
On th_e other hand, a
statement
by the Secretary--General
on Septer;;ber 29
was open to interpretation
that at some later
stage, once the Council guidance to the NATO
military
authorities
is approved,
"Live Oak"
planning would be reviewed and would become completely
a NATOresponsibility;
(iv)
the expected relationship
between "Live Oak"
plans, the proposed N,~TOplans and the "general
overall
strategy,
.. on a world-wide
scale"
referred
to in the draft instructions
to the
NATOmilitary
authorities.
These instructions
go on to refer to the selective
application
of a
wide variety
of measures "agreed upon both in
Europe and on a world-wide basis (which) would
contribute
to the purpose of arriving
at a
settlement
on the problem of Berlin while
progressively
malcing the Soviets
aware of ttie
danger of general war".
000481
�
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Title
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NATO
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Berlin Crisis / 11 OCTOBER 1961
Date
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1961-10-11
Format
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PDF
Language
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en
Type
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Text
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CDTT00033
Source
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Memorandum, ‘‘Berlin - Contingency Planning,’’ 11 Oct. 1961, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1.
air lift
Berlin contingency
France
German Democratic Republic
Lauris Norstad
Live Oak
Three Power report