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20
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(THIS
DOCUMENT
IS THE
PROPERTY
OF HER
MAJESTY'S
CANADIAN
GOVERNMENT)
IN REPLY PLEASIC QUOTE
N0..9.~9.
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119tpartmtnt
of Jlational3DtftnceTOP SECRET
CANADA
JOINT
STAFF
JOINT PLANNINGCOMMITTEE
AOOR!SS REPLY TO
CHAIRMAN
CMIEF11 OF STAFF,
OTTAWA.
24 lune 19.54.
Secretary,
Chiefs of S~aff
OOW~SJW\D~D
roSECREI
RfmJll"
A Sf~fJ ,.,~
Committee
United States Defence Policy and the Possible
Implications
for Canadian Defence Policy
1.
Reference is made to our letter
CSC 1883-1
_dated 1.5 June 19.54, to which was attached-a
JPC
report on the above subject.
Referenced letter
requested
this report be passed to the Chiefs of
Staff Committee for approval.
2.
:Subsequent to your distribution
of the
above paper to the Chiefs of Staff Committee,
the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff forwarded a letter
to the Chairman, Joint Planning Committee, requesting that certain
changes be made in this paper.
These suggested changes were discussed
by the
Joint Planning Committee at their 14/.54 meeting,
held on '2~ June 19.54, and with one exception the
suggested changes were approved.
The suggested
change to which the Joint Planning Committee did
not agree was the deletion,
in para 20, of the
probable U.S. request for authority
to establish
fighter
bases in Canada.
The Chairman, Chiefs of
Staff Committee, stated in his letter
that he did
not believe that the U.S. intended to make any
such request;
however, the Air Force :Member of the
Joint Planning Committee, who is also the Chairman,
Canadian Section,
Cartada-u.s. Military
Cooperation
Committee, has been informed that the u.s. Air
Force, at the working level,
is giving consideration
to forwarding such requests.
;.
Attached
hereto
are
copies of revised pages
which should be
substituted
for the old pages 8, 9 and 10. It is
requested that the revised paper be passed to the
Chiefs of Staff Committee for approval.
8, 9 ~rid 10 of the above paper
~?'~
WYM/4972/mf
(W. Y. Ma~n)~Commander
A/Secretary
Joint Planning Committee.
�TOP SECRIT
- 8 The Principles
18.
of Continental
The most important
North America - effective
making potential
Apart from this
requires,
military
early
terms,
to destroy
adequate
for a defence
and against
The-Continental
Defence Programme
aircraft
third
system,
more northerly
of the early
enemy lodgements.
through
manned radar
aircraft
is also
and sites
warning
out for
and a
system is under consideration.
certain
system in the Atlantic
have
for anti-
the mid-Canada line,
undertaking
the
systems,
Surveys are now being carried
warning
United States
There is also a
the two countries
fully
interceptor
weapons.
a new early
possible
agencies,
in establishing
installations.for
guns - in
to combined planning
CUSRPG,PJ'BD and other
cooperated
weapons - interceptor
submarine .launched
guided missiles
In addition
and
in depth of
aircraft.
against
to civil
warning
and anti-aircraft
invading
the war-
of North America
systems and defensive
positions
of
been oonsidered.
and the establishment
guided missiles
19.
against
the defence
aircraft,
requirement
of the defence
has already
USSR -
aspect,
authorities
warning
aspect
retaliation
of the
in general
Defence
The
-seaward extensions
and I'acitio
Oceans.
20.
In addition
in operation
it
is probable
to these
or in the planning
that
projects
which are either
or construction
the United States
stages,
may request
authority
to:
...• ,/9
�TOP SECRET
- 9 (a)
construct
radar
(b)
early
warning
stations;
make suitable
arrangements
anti-aircraft
cover of certain
border
such as Windsor-Detroit,
Sault
points
Effect
additional
for the
Ste.
Marie and Niagra Falls.
also
conceivable
that
u.s. may
the
request
authority
fighter
bases in Canada.
It is
to establish
U.S.
on Canadian Defence Pro~ramme
21.
The effect
defence
of U.S. defence
policy
on the Canadian
programme may be:
the further
(a)
integration
of the air
defences
of Canada and the United States;
(b)
an increase
in the air
Canada, including
aircraft
(c)
aircraft,
the increase
in Canada's
of
anti-
forces;
participation
in
defence.
Defence
22.
One indirect
increasing
is,
fighter
and guided missile
continental
Civil
defence forces
demand for more effective
and will
coordinated
but very important
continue
civil
result
continental
of the
defences
to be, a demand for more adequate
and
defence.
Conclusions
23.
It was concluded
been no fundamental
earlier
although
change in U.S. defence
"New Look" has marked a shift
programme.
that
While continuing
in emphasis
to fulfil
its
policy,
there
the
in the defence
international
has
�TOFSECRET
- 10 •
commitments, and to strengthen
capabilities,
added stress
vision
on ~he development
defence will
defence
continental
weapons.
As these
missile
interceptor
forces,
installations,
take shape
of continental
effect
for additional
anti-aircraft
further
in one comm.and, and generally
tion in planning
and in defence
may be concluded
that
substantially
policies
atomic
on Canadian
As noted above, the Canadian Government
policy.
financial,
and
and tactical
have a direct
may be faced with requirements
systems,
defences,
programmes, the requirements
undoubtedly
has placed
ot air power, the pro-
for the use of strategic
and thermonuclear
in concrete
own .fore.es and
the Eisenhower Administration
of more adequate
preparations
its
physical
integration
closer
radar
and guided
of air defences
measures of coopera-
commands.
In general
the demands on Canadian resources
and manpower - are likely
heavier.
to be
it
-
�IN MPLY
PUA-
QUOTE
C.S..C.
....l§.e.3..~l
..J.;r..f
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NO. ....
TOP SECRET
CANADA
JOINT
STAFF
JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE ,-.,..,__,,.,...._~-~---·
AODRIIIRIPLYTO
~;i -
CHAIRMAN
CNIIFS 0, STA,,,
OTTAWA.
-
15 June 1954
. .........
Joint
Planning
~
Committee
di--,
~
Soc, :3 /- '/--O~
.
-\
United States Defence Policy and the Possible
Implications
for Canadian Defence Policy
D-\
Item .5 of the 13/.54 Meeting of the
1.
Reference
Joint
Planning
final
approved copy of the repo·rt
subject,
Committee.
Attached
hereto
is the
on the above
which has now been passed to the Chiefs
of
oow!.Vt~fo)
2 ~P.~
'. r~:.;tut6·u.L
.. ~ m-€.(!~·~m~
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A SE~r·,:
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WJgec;_;der
A/Seoretary
(W. Y. Mart?nf
WYM/4972/mf
Joint
Planning
Committee
DISTRIBUTION_
C Plans I
DGPO
3 &: 4 DNPO
DAPS
.5
6 & 7 OMO&:P
DNPOSO(S)
8
External
Affairs
-9
(Mr. Rogers)
Sec JPC
10
CJS
11
JPS
12
JPS(XA:::....'....)
____
. 13
Copy No. l
2
JUN12\ .1954
_
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TOP SEORET
CANADIAN
lfi§ ONLY
19.54
1.5 June,
UNITEDSTATESDEFENCEPOLICYANDTHE POSSIILI
Dll>LICATIONS
FOR CANADIAN
DEFENCEPOLIOY'
Report
by the Joint
Planning
Committee
to the
Chiefs
of Staff
Committee
FILE
COPY
Introduction
The United
prepared.
States
has entered
In the face
which has developed
since
that
of this
is to attempt
paper
defence
Republican
policy
this
will
Broadly
speaking,
Truman Administration
to define
sihce
U.S.
of collective
and through
its
alliances
Altantic
limited
defence
policy.
policy
und.er the ·
of Communist
end U.S.
through
in the United
defence
based on
regional
alliances
Nations •. Military
mutual
of South America and-the
area were established;
to the U.N. action
what implications
to Greece and Turkey;
with nations
whioh
of the
It was a policy
security
membership
The purpose
the advent
of local
perimeter.
a principle
was sent
defence
States
the direction
was one of containment
on the Soviet
assistance
the United
and to indicate
power based on the development
forces
aggrsssion
not happen again.
has taken
administration,
of Russisn
World War II,
the "New Look" may have on Canadian
2.
two World Wars un-
of the .threat
is determined
u.s.
--~
defence
North
U.S. forces
were committed
in Korea and the defence
of Formosa; ·
aid was given
to Indo-China.
In addition
....• /2
to these
�TOP SECRET
- 2 -
oommitments of U.S. foroes
and material,
embarked on a programme to strengthen
which would not only serve
would also provide
a souroe
and where it was considered
particular
air
its
own defenoe
to defend North Amerioa,
of reserve
provision
of foroes
neoessary.
In this
but
programme,
of strategio
of atomio weapons, and the
for the Korean campaign.
When the Eisenhower Administration
was committed to undertake
a searohing
defence
planning
policy,
of defence
It was assumed that
in contrast
took office,
reappraisal
it
of U.S.
and of defence
spending.
to the programme of the
Truman-Acheson regime a "New Look" would inevitably
4.
Before attempting
the Eisenhower
briefly
several
foroes,
power to be used when
emphasis was given to the expansion
power, the development
3.
the United States
to describe
Government,
factors
the defence
policy
it might be helpful
which have helped
emerge.
of
to discuss
to shape this
"New Look".
The Reason for the "New Look"
,.
mitted
The Republican
campaign for the 1952 election
the Eisenhower
Administration
a programme which included
spending,
duction
to out taxes,
of defence
in the budget,
as reducing
expedient
and the Congress
expenditures,
commitments,
means of oarrying
to
to reduce Government
and to balance
was the obvious,
foreign
argued that
promises
com-
the budget.
the larg~st
Re-
single
and for other
reasons
item
suoh
the most politically
out this
programme.
the U.S. economy could not continue
It was also
to carry
the
.....;,
_J
�TOP SECRET
- 3 heavy defence
"crash
load which had been required
action"
build
must be spread
up, and therefore
over a longer
period
for
the
the defence
effort
of time and geared
to
the "long haul".
6.
The decision
possible
to a large
in Korea.
extent
In addition,
have believed
tension
to reduce
that
spending
by the cessation
while
the United
the potential
had lessened,
administration
defence
considered
that
it
of hostilities
States
threat
neverthless
by the increase
willingness
?.
is probable
in defence
factor
deter
weapons.
constituted
aggression,
for retaliation
its
allies)
retaliate,
justify
8.
reduction
With this
the realization
thermonuclear
to strike
any target
Administration
to divert
increased
Administration
in defence
developed
force.
was the developatomic
with effective
force
capacity
power and of continental
to
could further
that
the Soviet
Union had
capacity
gave the Eisenhower
on which to justify
to the strengthening
air
(and
expenditures.
in North America,
more resources
required
which the U.S.
weapons and the potential
the basis
and
of the power to
the strategic
by means and at places
the Eisenhower
Finally
spending,
strength
in some
the reduction
These weapons together
ahd provided
choose.
with
and strategic
the real
the
of NATOand the
which was used to explain
ment by the U.S. of tactical
airpower
at least
in the strength
commitments ·and defence
thermonuclear
that
by 1954 the power of the
of the U.N. to meet aggression
Another
may not
and international
Communist world had been counter-balanced,
measure,
was made
their
decision
of U.S. air
defence.
. ... . /4
�TOP SECRET
- 4 -
9.
It seems clear
was dictated
Party
that
largely
to rescue
wastefulness
the need for a "new" defence
by the commitment of the Republican
the U.S. from the alleged
cut Government spending
its
that
the U.S.,
haul"
to avert
the allied
thereby
build
threat
u.s.
by reducing
new defence
and its
policy
allies,
and
and air
to meet aggression
of the u.s.s.R.,
ncm called
for
that
fundamental
the Soviet
change in
of
threat,
the crash-action
a deterrent
the requirement
to commit
on the
and Soviet,capabil;ties·
of increased
continental
It would appear
the strength
at any point
the development
power and stronger
It
to the "long
power provided
which would somehow reduce
forces
commitments.
must convert
the need to continue
New weapons_
and to
with the arguments
world now counter-balanced
perimenter
10.
its
economic exhaustion,
reducing
up.
failures
of the Truman-Acheson Administration
rationalized
retaliatory
defences.
that
in reality
u.s.
defence
there
policy.
Eisenhower
stated,
Mr. Dulles
added,
Republican
Government has assumed all
has been no
As President
the "New Look" was not new, and, as
the slogan was not a happy one.
obligations
which it and previous
undertaken;
it has continued
The
the international
Administrations
to provide
have
for·c,es, military
equipment and economic assistance
to its
perimeter
and 1 t has continued
of the Comm.un1s·tworld;
to strengthen
increasing
its
own forces,
effectiveness
ment and availability
policy
of
allies
relying.heavily
u.s.
air
on the
on the
power and the develop-
of weapons of mass destruction
•
....../;
�TOP SECRET
- 5 11.
It may be possible
clearly
at this
point
what the "New Look" actually
to outline
means in practice,
then to define
what it may mean for Canada's
The Principles
of U.S. Defence Policy
12.
Within the framework of these
tions,
it might be helpful
concretely
general
the objectives
the
u,s.
(b)
the reinforcement
the capacity
(e)
designed
forces
continental
- air,
defences.
United States'
build
and maintain
provides
decisively
for:
land,
and naval,
of deterrent
against
policy
its
defence
a sturdy
military
is
substantial
and effective
power.
elements
of the
The "crash
power over the past
has now revised
over an extended
to
u.s.s.R.;
U.S. defence
terms to provide
up of military
allies,
the high seas.
These are the basic
concept
of its
several
has produced what Admiral Radford described
"providing
a
effectively
of controlling
of readiness".
haul"
In
priorities,
to retaliate
"a very high degree
tained
planning.
such as in Korea;
principles,
in very general
offensive
consideramore
in the homeland of the
of these
policy
to define
of contributing
the capability
On the basis
planning.
in NATO;
actions
targets
defence
of the defences
those
the capability
"local"
and
of the North American continent;
especially
years
assigning
the defence
(d)
point
Government must develop
(a)
(c)
general
of U.S. defence
programme which, without
action"
at this
more
as
The U.S. Government
programme with the aim of
posture
period";
this
which can be mainis the "long
concept.
. ...•. /6
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TOP SECRET
- 6U.S. Military
13.
Programme
The principal
strengthening
role
of Allied
Admiral Radford,
tion
defence
This air
and support
requirements
Although reducing
effective
will
power will
numerically
its
in fact,
and tactical
u.s.
of its
of·
offensive
of the alliance.
services,
their
be increased
better
operations,
through
equipment and more
Weapons
power, the use
for
is of fundamental
is based on the assumption
to retaliate
own choosing.
may not necessarily
part
to that
weapons which are available
strategy
it has the capacity
places
and exploita-
of U.S. military
of atomic and thermonuclear
i~portance.
to
of manpower.
In the development
strategic
according
defensive,
other
The Role of Atomic and Thermonuclear
14.
in the
be superior
provide
of new weapons,
utilization
is,
for the_toroes
power will,
the introduction
forces
maintenance
power that
any other".
striking
of the United States
"the creation,
of modern air
present
~
\
instantly
by means and at
Atomic and thermonuclear
be used,
of the United States'
that
weapons
but they are now considered
conventional
military
a
strength.
U.S. Force Commitments Abroad
1;.
As implied
earlier,
commitment of forces
the United
States
abroad
own in Europe".
16.
U.S. policy
with regard
the Far East is much less
"it
primary
is to NATO. In this
has agreed
of its
principle
the United States'
"to maintain
is not militarily
substantial
to committing
clearly
defined.
sound",
regard
forces
U.S. forces
to
As a general
according
to Admiral
..... /7
�TOF SECRET
- 7Radt'ord, echoeing
u.s.
indefinitely
however,
troops
the views of the Fresident,
that
land forces
very quickly
to the Korean war, and that
intention
of maintaining
certain
Okinawa in the Far East.
declared
that
States
in Korea while
its
forces
hand to provide
and Pakistan
with economic
Defences
It was noted earlier
to provide
retaliation,
effeoti
Continent.
important
forces
that
ve defences
This third
aspeot
to its
Before
defence
turning
policy
may then be easier
decisive
and thirdly,
With this
the most
for the Canadian defence
to the specific
oonsiderations
is based.
allies,
is unquestionably
programme, thereror.e,
review the general
programme was
on the North Ame.rioan
in terms of implications
programme.
u.s.
the
capab1l> of launching
to give assistance
to prepare
defence
time the United
of reducing
on the other
Indo-
aid.
Continental
u.s.
has also
which might not
At the present
and Indo-China
and military
designed
Mr. Dulles
intention
continuing
Korea,
17.
its
bases, -for
consequences
to Inda-China".
has announced its
Japan,
committed
if the Chinese Communist Army invades
it would have "grave
be confined
be recalled,
it has declared
military
example,
China,
It will
to.Asia".
the United States
"to commit·
details
of the
it might be well
on which
u.s.
to
continental
background in mind, it
to see the implications
for Canadian
defence policy.
. ... ./8
�TOF SECRET
- 8 -
The Frinciples
18.
of Continental
The most important
aspect
North America - effective
making potential
considered.
of the defence
retaliation
against
of the USSR - has already
Apart from this
of North America requires,
adequate
Detenoe
aspect,
and military
authorities
in depth of early
systems and defensive
weapons - interceptor
guided missiles
in positions
is also a requirement
warning
and anti-aircraft
to destroy
invading
airguns -
aircraft.
for a defence
launched. guided missiles
been
terms,
and the establishment
craft,
and against
the war-
the defence
in general
warning to civil
of
There
against
submarine
possible.enemy
lodgements.
The Continental
19.
In addition
PJ'BD and other
operated
Defenoe frogramme
agencies,
the two countries
in establishing
installations
fully
for interceptor
tor anti-aircraft
carried
to coitbined<p;lann:1i'l8tlirougif 'the
weapons.
and a third
under consideration.
undertakin~
more northerly
The United States
the extension
In addition
in operation
and sites
warning system,
the mid-
system is
1s also
of the mid-Canada line
cover the ocean approaches
20.
aircraft
systems,
Surveys are now being
out for a new early
Canada line,
manned radar
have co-
to these
to
to the continent.
projects
or in the planning
whioh are either
or oonstruotion
stages,
�TOI: SECRET
- 9 1t is proba.bJ.e that
authority
may request
the United States
to:
(a)
(b)
establish
u.s.
strategic
bomber) bases in Canada;
construct
additional
radar
(c)
fighter
(and possibly
early
stations;
locate
U.S •. anti-aircraft
to-air
guided missile
and ground-
units
are close
to vital
U.S. areas.
Effect
on Canadian Defence Programme
21.
The
defence
in Canada,
in area.s such as Windsor which
especially
u.s.
warning
defence
policy
may affect
the Canadian
programme because of the political
Canada should contribute
ment of continental
(a)
proportionately
defence.
the integration
requirement
to the develop-
This may require:
of the air
defences
of
Canada and the United States;
(b)
increase
in the air
Canada, including
aircraft
(c)
fighter
the increase
forces
of
aircraft,
and guided missile
in Canada's
in U.S. defence
Civil
defence
anti-
forces;
participation
projects
in Canada.
Defence
22.
One indirect
increasing
defences
but very important
demand for more effective
is,
more adequate
end will
continue
and coordinated
result
of the
continental
to be, a demand for
civil
defence.
that
�TOP SECRET
- 10 -
Conclusions
23.
It was concluded
been no fundamentl
earlier
that
change in U.S. defence
"New Look" has marked a shift
programme.
to fulfil
commitments, and to strengthen
continental
the use of strategic
As these
the requirements
a direct
effect
policy,
its
own forces
of air
and tactical
policies
has placed
power, the provision
defences,
and preparations
defence will
on Canadian defence
systems,
installations,
integration
defences
closer
of air
measures
commands.
Canadian resources
likely
in planning
it may be concluded
- financial,
to be substantially
the
for
anti-aircraft
bomber bases,
in one command, and generally
of cooperation
In general
have
· As noted above,
forces,
strategic
programmes,
undoubtedly
policy.
interceptor
and guided missile
for
atomic and thermonuclear
take shape in concrete
of continental
radar
the
and
Canadian Government may be faced with requirements
additional
has
international
Administration
on the development
of more adequate
weapons.
its
the Eisenhower
added stress
there
in emphasis in the defence
While continuing
capabilities,
although
physical
and in defence
that
the demands on
and manpower - are
neavier.
.·. ·... 000371
�•
(THIS
DOCUMENT
IS THE
PROPERTY
OF
HER
MAJESTY'S
CANADIAN
GOVERNMENT)
•
IN REPLY
PLEASE
QUOTE
CSC 1883-1 {JPC)
N .......................................................
.
1itpartmtntof j}atfonalDefence
TOP SECRET
CANADA
JOINT
STAFF
JOINT PLANNINGCOMMITTEE
ADDRESS REPLY TO
CHAIRMAN
CHIEFS OF STAFF,
OTTAWA.
S" o I IS -
Joint
Planning
~6k
C.ommit tee
'
~-zn:> :rI -'/c,
United States De:t'ence Policy and the
~ ~ S"2)2.or
Possib~e-Implications
for Canadian Defence Policy
1
lo
O
I(
l
3 June 19.54
P-1Cf
-
4
o
Reference
is made to our letter
19.54 on the
ab6ve subject,
to which was attached
a final
JPC paper which had been forwarded to the
Chairman, Chiefs of Staffo
CSC 1883-1 dated 11 February
On 4 May 19.54, the Chairman
requested
the Joint Staff to prepare a new
paper on this subject,
which was to include
all the information
we now had on the United
States'
"New Look"." The Joint Planning Staff
has prepared a 'draft report for JPC approval,
a copy of which is attached.
2.
3.
This item will
next JPC meeting.
be discussed
at the
~,~~
(W.Y. ~ti;?w?~
WYM/4972/mf
Joint
Commander
A/Secretary
Planning Committee
DISTRIBUTION
C Plans
DGPO
DNPO
DAPS
I
DMO.& P
DNPOSO(S)
External Affairs
Rep.
(Mr. Rogers)
Sec JPC
CJS
JPS
-JPS (XA)
(
File
@
.
· . ~1;,:_"':,A~f,;)~;p·.:,_,_{/-;:;~•:'.V,:'.'.:?~~
_000372
II
J
�TOP SECRET
CANADIAN
EYES ONLY
DRAF'l};
19,4
3 June,
UNITEDSTATESDEFENCEPOLICYAlIDTHE POSSIBLE
IMPLICATIONS
FOR CANADIAN
DEFENCEPOLICY
Report
by the Joint
Planning
Committee
to the
Chiefs
of Staff
Committee
States
has entered
Introduction
The United
prepared.
two World Wars un-
In the ~ace of the threat
which has developed
since
World War II,
is determined
that
of this
is to attempt
paper
U.S. defence
Republican
policy
this
of Russian
will
to define
sihce
Broadly
speaking,
Truman Administration
on the Soviet
of collective
and through
its
alliances
Altantic
was sent
with
area
limited
policy
under
through
forces
in Korea and the defence
aid was given
to Indo-China.
based on
Nations.
and Turkey;
U.S.
defence
regional
mutual
of South America and-the
were established;
the
of Communist
and U.S.
in the United
to Greece
nations
to the U.N. action
policy.
It was a policy
security
membership
of the
defence
of local
perimeter.
a principle
assistance
defence
which
what implications
was one of containment
power based on the development
forces
the direction
and to indicate
U.S.
States
The purpose
the advent
the "New Look" may have on Canadian
2.
the United
not happen again.
has taken
administration,
aggression
alliances
Military
defence
North
were committed
of Formosa;
In addition
to these
.... . /2
000373
�TOP SECRET
- 2 -
commitments
of
u.s.
forces
and material,
embarked on a programme to strengthen
which would not only serve
would also
provide
particular
emphasis
air
the development
power,
provision
3.
for
defence
of defence
It was assumed that
Truman-Acheson
4.
Before
but
In this
programme,
to the expansion
of strategic
weapons,
and the
took office,
a searching
planning
in contrast
reappraisal
it
of U.S.
and of defence
spending.
to the programme of the
regime a "New Look" would inevitably
attempting
the Eisenhower
briefly
necessary.
of atomic
several
to describe
Government,
factors
forces,
power to be used when
Administration
to undertake
policy,
own defence
the Korean campaign.
When the Eisenhower
was committed
of reserve
was given
of forces
its
States
to defend North America,
a source
and where it was considered
the United
the defence
it might
policy
be helpfui
which have helped
emerge.
of
to discuss
to shape this
"New Look".
The Reason for
5.
mitted
the "New .Look"
The Republican
campaign for
the Eisenhower
Administration
a programme which included
spending,
duction
to cut taxes,
of defence
in the budget,
as reducing
expedient
argued
that
commitments,
means of carrying
the U.S.
to reduce
and to balance
was the obvious,
com-
and the Congress
promises
expenditures,
foreign
the 1952 election
Government
the budget.
the largest
and for
to
Re-
single
other
reasons
item
such
the most politically
out this
programme.
economy could not continue
It was also
to carry
the
ooeoo/3
000374
�TOP SECRET
- 3 heavy defence
"crash
load which had been required
action"
build
must be spread
up, and therefore
over a longer
period
for
the
the defence
effort
of time and geared
to
the "long haul".
6.
The decision
possible
to.reduce
to a large
in Korea.
tension
extent
In addition,
have believed
that
spending
by the cessation
while
the United
the potential
had lessened,
administration
defence
considered
that
it
of hostilities
States
threat
neverthless
by the increase
willingness
7.
is probable
in defence
u.s.
thermonuclear
deter
for
retaliation
its
alli~s)
..,.
8.
With this
the Eisenhower
reduction
Finally
strength
the realization
thermonuclear
to strike
any target
force.
the reduction
was the developatomic
the strategic
force
power and of continental
capacity
(and
to
could further
expenditures.
that
the Soviet
Union had
capacity
gave the Eisenhower
on which to justify
to the strengthening
air
required
which the U.S.
increased
in North America,
more resources
and
with effective
weapons and the potential
the basis
in some
of the power to
Administration
in defence
developed
Administration
spending,
by means and at places
,
with
These weapons together
and provided
the
of NATOand the
and strategic
the real
choose.
,
to divert
and defence
weapons.
aggression,
justify
in the strength
of tactical
constituted
retaliate,
at least
which was used to explain
commitments
ment by the
airpower
factor
that
by 1954 the power of the
of the U.N. to meet aggression
Another
may not
and international
Communist world had been counter-balanced,
measure,
was made
their
decision
of U.S. air
defence.
000375
�TOP SECRET
- 4 -
9.
It
seems clear
was dictated
Party
that
largely
to rescue
wastefulness
the U.S. from the alleged
of the Truman-Acheson
rationalized
its
that
the U.S.,
haul"
to avert
the allied
and its
' 119
policy
allies,
to meet aggression
of the u.s.s.R.,
rtc:m called
for
that
change
in
It
the strength
the Soviet
of
threat,
a deterrent
the requirement
/0~,
to commit
on the
capabilities
of increased
retaliatory
defences.
that
in reality
u.s.
defence
there
policy.
Eisenhower
stated,
Mr. Dulles
added, ·the
Republican
Government has assumed all
has been no
As President
the "New Look" was not new, and, as
obligations
which it
undertaken;
it
slogan
was not a happy one.
and previous
has continued
The
the international
Administrations
to provide
have
for·oes,
military
on the
equipment
and economic assistance
to its
allies
perimeter
of the Communist world;
and it
has continued
to strengthen
increasing
its
own forces,
effectiveness
ment and availability
...
the crash-action
an4 1that·9oviet
continental
.
fundamental
commitments.
a~ any point
the development
It would appear
and to
power provided
which would somehow reduce
perimenter
and
with the arguments
the need to continue
power and stronger
policy
mus.t. conv._ert to the "long
weapo~~- :.,and air
U.S. forces
10.
its
economic exhaustion,
thereby·•.r-ed.ucing
threat
by reducing
new defence
failures
Administration
world now co,-ziter-balanced
. ~New
a "new" defence
by the commitment of the Republican
cut Government spending
,11)
cf'{:,:r
the need for
relying.heavily
of u.s.
air
on the
power and the develop-
of weapons of mass destruction.
0
•••
0
• /
5
000376
�TOP SECRET
- .5 11.
It may be possible
·clearly
at this
point
what the "New Look" actually
what it may mean for
The Principles
of
12.
Within
tions,
it might
concretely
general
the framework
be helpful
u.s.
programme which,
of these
at this
of U.S.
Canada's
defence
planning.
general
policy
considera-
point
without
assigning
the defence
(b)
the reinforcement
more
planning.
In
and maintain
priorities,
of the defences
those
the capability
a
provides
of the North American
especially
"local"
to define
defence
Government must develop
(a)
(c)
and
Defence Policy
the objectives
the
more
means in practice,
then to define
u.s,
to outline
for:
continent;
of its
allies,
in NATO;
of contributing
actions
effectively
to
such as in Korea;
+
(d)
the capacity-.to
targets
(e)
of these
forces
continental
defences.
United
States'
action"
build
years
- air,
terms
U.S.
up of military
what Admiral
of readiness".
has now revised
its
defence
a sturdy
military
tained
haul
11
over an extended
power.
Radford
elements
of the
The "crash
several
described
as
The U.S. Government
programme with
posture
period";
is
and effective
power over the past
"a very high degree
"providing
policy
subs,ta.ntial
and naval,
of deterrent
u.s.s.R.;
defence
to provide
land,
against
the high seas.
These are the basic
concept
has produced
of the
of controlling
principles,
in very general
offensive
decisively
in the homeland
the· capability
On the basis
designed
retaliate
this
the aim of
which can be mainis the "long
concept.
000000/6
000377
�TOP SECRET
- 6 U.S. Military
13.
Programme
The prtncipal
strengthening
Admiral
tion
role
of Allied
Radford,
"the
of modern air
of the United
defence
forces
creation,
power that
power will
and support
requirements
for
present
striking
effective
numerically
provide
and thermonuclear
strategic
and tactical
it
of its
better
15.
their
equipment
through
and more
WeaRons
power,
the use
States'
for
is of fundamental
instantly
that
by means and at
Atomic and thermonuclear
be used,
weapons
but they are now considered
conventional
military
a
strength.
Commitments Abroad
As implied
earlier,
commitment of forces
the United
States
16.
u.s.
the Far East
"it
with
is much less
States'
primary
is to NATO. In this
has agreed
own in Europe".
policy
the United
abroad
of its
principle
offensive
is based on the assumption
own choosing.
of the United
U.S. Force
operations,
to retaliate
may not necessarily
part
of-
weapons which are available
strategy
has the capacity
places
services,
of U.S. military
of atomic
u.s.
to that
of manpower.
In the development
i.I,l).portance.
and exploita-
in fact_, ·1 be increased
The Role of Atomic and Thermonuclear
14.
to
defensive,
its·- oth~r
of new weapons,
utilization
according
.
I
•
the·· f.orc_es
of the
alliance.
·'.
power will,
the introduction
in the
will. be superior
Tµis air
reducing
is,
maintenance
any other".
Although
States
"to maintain
regard
clearly
is not militarily
substantial
to committing
defined.
sound",
regard
U.S.
As
forces
forces
to
.a general
according
to Admiral
..... /?
000378
�TOP SECRET
- 7Radford, echoeing
indefinitely
however,
U.S.
that
troops
the views of the President,
land rorees
the United
States
to the Korean war,
intention
to Asia".
of maintaining
and that
certain
Okinawa in the Far East.
declared
that
China,
in Korea while
Japan,
Korea,
continuing
on the
other
capably
to give
effective
assistance
defences
This third
in terms
programme.
Before
defence
time the United
its
forces
hand to provide
policy
turning
with
economic
programme was
of launching
to its
allies,
decisive
and thirdly,
on the North American
is unquestionably
to the
therefore,
considerations
is based.
be easier
aspect
u.s.
the
of implications
programme,
the general
may then
Indo-
which might not
and Pakistan
forces
defence
has also
of reducing
to provide
Continent.
defence
intention
that
to prepare
review
its
earlier
important
.fqr
Defences
retaliation,
u.s.
Mr •. Dulles
It was noted
designed
bases,
its
aid.
Continental
17.
military
At the present
and Inda-China
and military
committed
has declared
consequences
to Indo-China".
has announced
it
be recalled,
Communist Army invades
it would have "grave
be confined
States
the Chinese
It will
very quickly
example,
if
"to commit
With this
for
the Canadian
specific
it
the most
details
of the
might be well
on which U.S.
background
to see the implications
for
defence
to
continental
in mind,
it
Canadian
policy.
00000/8
000379
�TOP SECRET
- 8 The Principles
18.
of Continental
The most important
America
- effective
Defence
aspect
of the defence
retaliation
against
potential
of the USSR - has already
from this
aspect,
the defence
in effect,
-air defence,
means,
adequate
warning
establishment
weapons~
in depth
interceptor
aircraft
19.
agencies,
requires
of early
to joint
planning
the two countries
interceptor
aircraft
and sites
Surveys
are now being carried
system,
the Mid-Canada
the extension
that
through
for
aircraft.
strategic
'
to construct
installations
a third
for
weapons.
warning
more northerly
States
line
is also
system
under-
to cover
the
continent.
to these
to establish
in
a new early
of the Mid-Canada
the United
the PJBD and
anti-aircraft
out for
projects
or in the planning
(b)
and anti-
invading
systems,
The United
to the
ln addition
(a)
and defensive
have cooperated
line,and
consideration.
ocean approaches
probable
systems
to destroy
manned radar
operation
terms
and the
guided missiles
fully
20.
which
authorities
warning
aircraft,
Apart
in general
and military
establishing
taking
been considered.
Defence Programme
In addition
is under
the war-making
of North America,
guns - in positions
The Continental
other
to civil
of Nort~
which are
or construction
States
may request
u.s.
fighter
bomber),-bases
,:,
.
~
'
.
additional
either
stages,
in
it
is
authority:
(and possibly
in Canada;
early
warning
radar
stations;
•oooe/9
000380
j
�TOP SECRET
- 9 to locate
( C)
UoSo anti-aircraft
and ground-to-air
units
especially
guided missile
areas
on Canadian
21.
The U.S.
Defence
defence
may affect
the Canadian
of the political
requirement
Canada should
contribute
of continental
defence.
This may require:
the integration
of the air
proportionately
and the United
increase
to the development
defences
in Canada;
in Canada t.,s pa_~t;icipation
,~!rf,l.\q
• I,,'
\,
in U.S. defence
the increase
and guided
Civil
projects
\
One indirect
increasing
anti-aircraft
forces.
but very
important
demand for more effectj~~
and will
coordinated
continue
civil
to be,
'
defence.
Ar{ed S~s
/
· ass/stance
eme~cy
..
will
in this
.
Tll'-HJreq~t
trlidoubted'ly
./
defences
.
adequate
will
t.
f
o
asJstanc:)9Lse
I
of the
~~~re
/on a more pos1. 1.ve programme
provfa.ing
result
contiiental
i~~eats?r1re-a~/t~i:~l!"V~.
i nsis
. f
.
in'·canada;
of Canadian
missile
'!~l
·~ .
Defence
22.
is,
of Canada
States;
squadrons
the increase
( d)
that
in the number of all-weather
fighter
( C)
to vital
Programme
policy
programme because
(b)
in .
areas.
Effect
(a)
close
such as Windsor which are
u.s.
defence
in Canada,
and
ne~ <ffl~Y
7
ec 1.ng an
areas./
be r~give
e
some
p~efamme.
• •••• /10
I
000381
~
�TOP SECRET
- 10 -
Conclusions
23.
It was concluded
been no fundamentl
earlier
that
change in U.S.
"New Look" has marked a shift
programme.
continental
the use of strategic
weapons.
As these
the requirements
and tactical
of continental
a direct
effect
on Canadian
Canadian
Government,nia:v
additional
radar
and guided
missile
measures
commands.
Canadian
likely
of air
resources
interceptor
undoubtedly
policy •. As noted
forces,
strategic
in planning
may be concluded
- financial,
to be ~ubstantially
will
programmes,
have
above,
the
for
anti-aircraft
bomber bases,
in one command, and generally
of cooperation
it
for
and thermonuclear
with requirements
installations,
In general
the provision
and preparations
defence
defence
defences
has placed
shape in concrete
be faced
systems,
and
power,
atomic
take
the
international
own forces
of air
has
in the defence
its
defences,
policies
there
policy,
Administration
on the development
of more adequate
closer
its
the Eisenhower
added stress
integration
to fulfil
and to strengthen
capabilities,
defence
in emphasis
While continuing
commitments,
although
physical
and in defence
that
the demands on
and manpower - are
~eavier.
000382
�
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Title
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Deterrence
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New Look / 24 JUNE 1954
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1954-06-24
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PDF
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en
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Text
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CDTT00031
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Joint Planning Committee report, “United States Defence Policy and the Possible Implications for Canadian Defence Policy," 24 Jun. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3.
civil defence
continental defence
CUSRPG
Joint Planning Committee
PJBD
US defense policy
W.Y. Martin