1 20 39276 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/105111cf5490d0c5edc04ec39bc83347.jpg 9f4e9133563b15eb31aba9b36fab262e Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CHRETIEN SPEECH Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 8, 2003 Description An account of the resource Prime Minister Jean Chretien receives a standing ovation after defending the government's stand on the war in Iraq in a speech in the House of Commons in Ottawa Tuesday, April 8, 2003. The prime minister is also celebrating his 40th anniversary of being elected as a member of Parliament.(CP PHOTO/Jonathan Hayward) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource (CP PHOTO/Jonathan Hayward) Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived (CP PHOTO/Jonathan Hayward) https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/67b461795338a3e08acb621265f62d9e.pdf 42220c64189466a8b20e2dd8ab045c64 PDF Text Text � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDSI (Special Intelligence Section) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Portrait of E. Herbert Norman Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource N.D. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <span>National Film Board/Library and Archives Canada</span> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG53 Item no. 449, [1971-271 NPC] PA-134317, Library and Archives Canada https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/24ddb69b70d5a74d22053dcaf3dd9a80.pdf 7afeb726742111320dc07a365547d018 PDF Text Text LRP Roto 2 -EMO TOUft R.EPORT •LESSONS L&AteMEb OI cfu L 03 ERGOGRIP KEB< oUtaoooooi �Document disclosed under the Acces^cHnformaUor^c^^ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Documents Removed from R112 Accessions for Processing or Preservation Formerly: OFRC 2003-1109 Removed from: 2008-1183 1 LRP ROTO 2 END Tour Report [Black Binder] Removed: 1 CD APOLLO LRP Det SECRET Created on 1/28/2010 5:12:00 PM Created by Marsden 000002 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Documents Removed from R112 Accessions for Processing or Preservation Created on 1/28/2010 5:12:00 PM Created by Marsden 000003 ■ �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET (CONFIDENTIAL less enclosures) Commanding Officer Long Range Patrol Detachment South West Asia Stn Forces Belleville Belleville, ON s.15(1) Def K8N 5W6 3180-1 (CO LRP DET) 1 July 2003 Distribution List 11 LRP DET END TOUR REPORT & LESSONS LEARNED References: A. 3180-1 (CO LRP Det) 1 July 03 LRP Det End Tour Report (encl) B. QR&O7.05 1.(U) Enclosed, please find subject Report and the 1 CAD MS Access Lessons Learned database. As this report represents a closeout document, key Det produced publications have been included as Annexes, thus this will serve as a starting point for the next major LRP deployment. Further, the Lessons Learned have been exported from the database and incorporated within Annex A to the report for ease of reference. 2.(U) Op APOLLO has been a tremendous experience for the LRP community. In short we safely and successfully accomplished our mission. Along the way we have learned lessons that span the Strategic to Tactical Levels of war. The following few are worth considering within the broader context. Dav Rotations. From a Force Employment perspective, the switch to Day 3.(U) rotations was entirely successful. We maintained the same ops tempo, yet with only two-thirds of the aircrew and four-fifths of the ground crew. The more frequent turnover did involve a greater admin and training burden, but this was taken in stride. Flying rates were high thus fatigue was a concern, though through close monitoring and spelling off individual members with HQ staff we kept risk in check. 4.(U) It remains to be seen how domestic Force Generators will comment on LRP However, as I will be trading in my FE “Woodland Green” hat for a FG blue wedge in four days, I should point out that one of the key benefits of Days is the “many hands make light work” approach to manning. Owing to the late (Jan 03) start to LRP a great many members had already been deployed, leaving a smaller pool from which to draw. Further, the low readiness levels at all units meant that the more frequent rotations incurred a high training bill, such that some units were simply unable to spread the work amongst the many. 5.(C) VANGUARD Force Package. 6.(C) OQTW and Asymmetric Threats. Traditional LRP employment assumed ops would take place from secure airfields, arrivals and departures would be flown in areas of air 1/3 SECRET (CONFIDENTIAL less enclosures) i 000004 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET (CONFIDENTIAL less enclosures) s.15(1) Def supremacy, and threats on station would simply be avoided. APOLLO taught us that outside of the Simulator, real life presents threats that are much more difficult to observe, predict and avoid. Indeed, the asymmetric threats posed by terrorists were ubiquitous, exceptionally difficult to quantify and even more difficult to predict. Accordingly, current doctrine, procedures and equipment do not permit full spectrum employment of the CP 140. 7(C) Post-AIMP, it is even more likely we will see the fleet deployed in similarly threatening theatres, thus we must start now, working to develop our doctrine, tactics and procedures to meet these challenges. Further, the importance of maintaining the self-defence suite in AIMP cannot be overstated. 8(C) C4I. APOLLO reinforced the necessity to remain fully engaged in net-centric warfare. Over the course of APOLLO we gained access to without which we would have been severely hampered in our ability to carry out assigned missions. 9.(C) Presently, DDIOs make no reference to a deployed capability aside from national systems. From both air force and joint perspectives, planners should develop and maintain a able to respond to the needs ana reieasaomty or an emerging coalition. 10(C) Conclusion. Our participation made it clear to all throughout the CF and beyond that LRP can make an efficient, useful contribution that goes beyond traditional ASW, and do so reliably during peacetime and rising tensions. Notwithstanding our successes readers are cautioned that, from an LRP perspective, Op APOLLO was conducted in a relatively benign theatre. With care and attention, the LRP capability will be a flexible resource in great demand by warfare commanders both afloat and in the field F.G. Bigelow Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding Officer DISTRIBUTION LIST Action CA JTFSWA NCE TAMPA FL//COMD// Information CA JTFSWA NCE TAMPA FL//COS/J3 AIR// WComd 14 Wing Greenwood WComd 19 Wing Comox 1 CAD HQ Winnipeg//A3 MAR// 2/3 SECRET (CONFIDENTIAL less enclosures) 000005 �uocument aisciosea unaer me Access io injormanon mu Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET (CONFIDENTIAL less enclosures) CO 404 Sqn Greenwood CO 405 Sqn Greenwood CO 407 Sqn Comox CO 415 Sqn Greenwood CO MPEU Greenwood OC MPSET Greenwood CONSU CO TAL Det CO NCOS Enclosure: 1 3/3 SECRET (CONFIDENTIAL less enclosures) 000006 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET s.15(1)Def LRP Operations PO Box 5113 Stn Forces Belleville Belleville, ON K8N5W6 3180-1 (CO LRP DET) 1 Jul 2003 Distribution List LONG RANGE PATROL DETACHMENT - ROTO 2 - END TOUR REPORT References: A. 3350-134-32 CA JTFSWA Commander’s Concept of Operations (COO) Long Range Patrol Detachment (LRP DET) dated 24 March 2003 B. 3180-1 (CO LRP DET) 10 Sep 02 Roto 1 TO&E and ICS/PSO Training Recommendations INTRODUCTION 1. (U) Planning for the crew composition of Long Range Patrol Detachment Rotation 2 began at 14 Wg Greenwood on 15 Oct 02. Final combat readiness training was completed and the Det was declared Op Ready for deployment on 20 Dec 02. Although the total length of the deployment was to cover a six-month term, line air and maintenance crews were to be rotated every "" days. The deployment was completed over three separate flights, one week apart. Personnel designated to deploy for the entire six-month commitment were deployed on the first two flights. The Det Change of Command coincided with the first ROTO 2 flight on 08 Jan 03. 2. (U) The detachment was comprised of a headquarters element, an Operations Flight that included two Combat-Ready aircrews, Operations, Mission Support, Intelligence/ Electronic Warfare sections, and a Maintenance Flight with three ground crews. ROTATION 3. (U) During early Dec 02, the CO and DCO conducted a recce visit to Camp Mirage, followed by in-briefings by NCE J Staff in Tampa. The CO and DCO, accompanied by associated HQ pers, deployed to Camp Mirage in late Dec 02 to familiarize themselves with the camp and its environs, and to prepare to conduct a command handover Board of Inquiry (BOI). Their early arrival in-theatre also allowed them to conduct a liaison visit to Bahrain to introduce themselves to CTF 57 command staff and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) coalition representatives. 4. (U) A total of six aircrews and seven maintenance crews rotated through the LRP ' detachment during the six-month commitment (two of the maintenance crews completed 2 X day tours). There was no overlap between incoming and departing crews. Whereas previous ROTOs scheduled one no-fly day per month, ROTO 2 scheduled one per! day aircrew rotation, thus was able to accommodate the more frequent turnover while maintaining the same ops tempo. 5. (U) The no-fly day coincided with the arrival of each new crew in order to give them time to complete their in-routine and to allow for some adjustment to the considerable time zone difference. The first two aircrews received thorough area and mission familiarization under the 1/12 SECRET 000007 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information s.15(1) Def SECRET supervision of experienced ROTO 1 crews. Having the new crew leads fly with an experienced crew, presenting an opportunity to observe a complete mission oriented subsequent aircrews. The new crew, monitored by qualified headquarters staff, then conducted their first mission. 6. (U) The Maintenance Flight comprised three 8-person crews, three specialist personnel, and an MFC and D/MFC. The crews deployed via three regularly scheduled sustainment flights, one week apart. 7. (U) Initial draw down planning commenced in May, and official notification of Det termination was received 06 Jun 03. The final LRP mission was flown on 19 Jun 03. The two CP-140s redeployed to Greenwood on 20 Jun 03, each aircraft carrying one aircrew and one half of a maintenance crew. The second maintenance crew, accompanied by several non-essential staff, returned via the regularly scheduled sustainment flight on 26 Jun 03. The headquarters element and associated personnel remained in-theatre until 04 Jul 03 completing the detachment closeout. OPERATIONS Summary of Operations 8. (C) Comd CA JTFSWA held OPCOM of the LRP Det. IAW ref A, OPCON was assigned to Comd US CENTCOM and was exercised through CTF-57 (Forward), the maritime patrol and reconnaissance element of US 5th Fleet, headquartered in Bahrain. CTF-57, having air assets deployed throughout the AOR, primarily tasked the LRP Det to support operations in the Gulf of Oman and North Arabian Sea (GOO/NAS). Although the LRP Det’s primary oparea was the GOO/NAS, crews were routinely directed by the GOO/NAS Commander (CTF 151) to transit the Strait of Hormuz (SOH) in search for or to conduct surveillance on COI’s or HIV’s thought to be located in the CAG/SAG area. There were four occasions when the LRP Det was tasked to provide Direct Support (escort) to aircraft carrier battle groups transiting the SOH. On 20 Feb 03, LRP taskings were reduced to six hours on-station as crews had demonstrated the ability to provide 100% coverage of the assigned oparea in a shorter time than was initially assessed. 9. (C) The LRP Det flew a total of 158 operational missions and three maintenance test flights for a total of hours during the 189-day deployment. No pilot proficiency trainers were necessary thanks to the day rotation schedule. The sole 6-month Det pilot was able to maintain proficiency and complete Supervisory Training sequences coincident with routine missions. The average flight time was 7.5 hrs, with the longest and shortest were 9.8 and 3.1 hrs respectively. As mentioned, the day rotation schedule required five no-fly days in order to allow incoming air crews time for in-routine and to adjust circadian rhythms. Of the 160 scheduled operational missions, the Det failed to complete only two; the first due to a Flight Safety incident which resulted in an early RTB, and a second owing to ramp snags that delayed the launch to a point that precluded gainful employment. Thus, the mission completion rate for ROTO 2 was 99%. 10. (C) Post-mission reports were filed in “Rainform Purple” format through normal channels. This well established format included all relevant mission information, such as a detailed report of contacts investigated, communications and data-link reliability, area weather, significant events, stores expenditures, and a brief narrative that chronicled the on-station period. ■ The vast 2/12 SECRET 000008 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information s.15(1) Def SECRET majority of missions were At the OI Us discretion, crews were required to seek additional information by hailing vessels and conducting formal queries over marine VHF-FM radio. 11. (C) Standard maritime traffic consisted of large merchant vessels (oil tankers, bulk carriers, and general cargo), cargo dhows, fishing dhows, small open-hulled boats (“go-fasts”), and coalition and non-coalition warships. Air traffic consisted of coalition and non-coalition maritime helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft, and transiting commercial and military aircraft. On average, each event located, identified, photographed, and reported 30 merchant vessels and 10 fishing vessels. Typically, 5-6 merchant vessel queries were conducted on each flight using the VHF-FM radio. The standard query format covered some 20 vessel specific items, taking approximately 15 minutes to complete. Queries occasionally consumed even more time when vessels were slow to respond to the initial hail or when language difficulties slowed comms. 12. (C) Although the tasked surveillance area was normally in the GOO/NAS, crews were occasionally assigned to carry out Further, and perhaps more importantly, i . Notwithstanding the challenges and limitations, the Det worked to secure AG taskings, as they provided our crews with extremely valuable experience and built their confidence. When Canada's participation in OIF was still a possibility, it was imperative that our crews achieve the highest possible readiness, thus be able to operate safely throughout the theatre. 13. (C) Aside from SOH escort missions (during which the aircraft penetrated Iranian and Omani TTW under the terms of Transit Passage), all operations were conducted over High Seas. Once on station, the aircraft operated Due Regard in both uncontrolled and controlled airspace. For some crews, this was a new experience, having retained the misunderstanding that Due Regard only applies in Oceanic airspace. Further, many crews were not accustomed to exploiting civil ATS for flight following and receiving traffic advisories to assist with effective deconfliction while operating Due Regard. During the course of several missions, the aircraft 3/12 SECRET 000009 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information s.15(1) Def SECRET was challenged by Omani or Iranian air defence authorities or by Iranian naval vessels and aircraft. Crews were instructed to respond to these challenges in a courteous and professional manner. No significant incidents or problems were reported as a result of these challenges. Other taskings included tracking HIV's or other vessels suspected of illegal activity, and search and rescue. The detection and location of designated Contacts Of Interest (COI’s) was an important part of any mission. Potential COI’s included all vessel types thus crews monitored all traffic for any unusual or suspicious behaviour. Location Number of Missions Total Hours Purpose 149 4 j_______________ 4_____________ 3 (formed part of GOO missions) Table 1: Mission Statistics (8 Jan 03-19 Jun 03) Contact Merchant Vessels Fishing Vessels COI # Identified 4365 1739 42 9 10 CCOI HIV Table 2: Contact Statistics (8 Jan 03-19 Jun 03) Training 15. (U) In-theatre pilot proficiency training was not required during day rotations, except for a headquarters pilot who completed the requisite proficiency sequences at the end of missions and while on HLTA. 1 CAD quarterly proficiency requirements were conducted before and after each rotation for the remaining the pilots. No dedicated PPF’s were required nor scheduled. 16. (C) Similarly, routine crew operational readiness training (COREX) was not required during the 56-day rotation, unlike the previous 6-month rotations. However, crews were authorized to seek permission from their TACON to conduct training (no sonobuoy drops), if time permitted after the mission was complete. The OPCON authority retained authority for sonobuoy release. On two occasions, the crews conducted Search and Rescue Training (simulated SKAD drop) after completing their assigned mission for Det staff proficiency. 4/12 SECRET 000010 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information s.15(1) Def c SECRET Rules of Engagement 17. (S) Impact of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 18. (S) Although Canada did not support OIF, Australia, a local OEF coalition partner, was a participant. Throughout the war, the close working relationship that had developed with the RAAF Det continued, even as measures were introduced to ensure there was no direct or indirect Canadian support for OIF missions. The separate paths chosen had a significant impact on our Mission Support office. With of the RAAF Det, plans were made to build a Coalition Ops Centre, which would support CA, AS, NL, and eventually NZ LRP detachments. Such an Ops Centre would have paid dividends by pooling the expertise from each nation and provide manning relief to all concerned. Workable solutions had been developed to deal with issues such as releasability, information system access, and national rear-links. Once each nation declared their OIF intentions, planning for such combined ops centre ceased, save for the continued inclusion of the RNLN staff which shared our Mission Support spaces. However, the lessons learned during CF/RNLN/RAAF OEF cooperation proved invaluable when we assisted the RNZAF Det stand-up. 19. (C) At the onset of OIF, US authorities understandably restricted a considerable amount of information from CA units. Despite these restrictions, all operationally necessary and need-to-know OEF mission information was made available. Standoff Distances 20. (C) Various OTC’s imposed differing standoff distances. Generally speaking, the standoff distances in the Arabian Gulf (AG) were greater than those directed for use by Coalition aircraft employed in the GOO/NAS. The LRP Det raised this issue with CTF 151 staff 5/12 SECRET 000011 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information s.15(1) Def SECRET information gathered by LRP crews tor intelligence purposes was continually assessed to ensure that the procedures in place for obtaining high quality digital imagery respected the OTC’s stand-off policy. International Straits 21. (C) In the SOH, aircraft have the right of Transit Passage through Iranian and Omani waters. ( I I l • i ms oio noi prove to oe a great problem as, with careful positioning over International Waters, the Aurora could still maintain an effective lookout ahead of the force Threat Levels 22. (S) Promulgated threat levels in the AO ranged from low to high during the course of the deployment. We queried these threat levels through Intel staffs locally, at NCE Tampa, through National channels and from our OPCON, Most importantly, the threat to LRP aircraft on station remained ' 23.(S) EQUIPMENT STATUS 24. (S) Operations: a. 6/12 SECRET 000012 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def b. Self protection. c. Image transfer capability. d. Constant wear Life Preserver / Survival Vest (LP/SV). The constant wear LP/SV has been in use since Dec 02. LRPA crews have found it to be suitable. e. Digital Video Camera. f. Magnified Night Vision Goggles (NVG). A UOR submitted for An interim solution that involved g- Flying Clothing. NCE approval to purchase 100% cotton T-shirts for wear under flying shirts was granted for ROTO 2. All LRP Det aircrew wore the 2-piece TacHel flight suit and were very satisfied with the suitability of this garment. A number of newer 2 pc ‘Nomex’ flight suits were also issued. Early indications are that these were egually suitable for use in theatre. h. GPS. 25. (S) Mission support. The LRP Det relied on the ADDN message system to deliver the vast majority of critical message traffic Outgoing messages and SITREPs were often transmitted 7/12 SECRET 000013 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information s.15(1) Def SECRET authorities. Post-mission imagery packages were transmitted 26. (S) Intelligence: a. b. 27. (U) Maintenance. There were no significant changes to report with respect to equipment status from previous reports. PERSONNEL 28. (U) LRP Det ROTO 1 deployed with 69 people out of an establishment of 74 personnel. 29. (U) Three members were repatriated, one for administrative purposes surrounding an unforecast posting, and two compassionate cases. TAVs were not requested to backfill, owing to the short time remaining between the repatriation and the planned roto. Two other members were granted compassionate leave and then returned to theatre. A further two members were redeployed later than expected due to medical restrictions imposed in theatre. 30.(C) Two TO&E changes were completed during ROTO 2. The first was to reduce the number of AESOps per crew from four to three. This change took effect for the last two crews that deployed. The Det assessed the situation with respect to workload complexity and intensity and determined i ne uet maae a proposal to employ wmgs-stanaaro ANAVs and PLTs (those awaiting MOAT training) to augment the crews in lieu principally to assume responsibility for manipulating digital images on the laptop. Risk aversion by gatekeepers within the community precluded timely staffing of this proposal. Coincident with the reduction of was a shift in the mission profile, away from high contact density areas such as the Shark Fin, thus through good fortune the lack of 8/12 SECRET 000014 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information s.15(1) Def < SECRET augmentation had little effect on the performance of the Crews. The second change involved transferring all Intelligence and Electronic Warfare positions on the LRP TO&E to the TAL Det TO&E. This action was initiated to support unity of command, as the Int/EW members were split between TAL & LRP Dets. TAL was selected to accept the LRP positions when it became apparent that LRP’s future was uncertain, and the TAL Det was more likely to remain in theatre much longer. 31.(U) Annex B provides a more detailed review of the detachment’s personnel TO&E. Manning 32. (U) Maintenance Flight. a. The Maintenance Flight consisted of the Maintenance Flight Commander, the D/Maintenance Flight Commander, two AMCROs, and an ACS technician. There were three maintenance crews of eight technicians including the Crew Chief. Each crew worked a 12 on/24 off schedule (Day/Night/Off). Given the stable and predictable flying program and the lack of heavy maintenance (prop/engine changes) during this ROTO, there was surplus capacity to perform required maintenance. That said, the potential existed for the mission to switch to all sensor employment (i.e. under-sea surveillance) which would have significantly increased the workload. b. The manning level for the Maintenance Flight was predicated on a one flight per day mission schedule. As in the Ops Flight, only those personnel deployed for the full six-month rotation received the two 96 hr R&Rs and an HLTA period. There was a slight peak in activity when a swap aircraft arrived in theatre, but this was easily accommodated. 33. (U) Operations Flight. Aircrews generally flew every second day. As crews rotated in, schedule adjustments allowed the Det to continue flying routine missions concurrent with incoming crew training. The result was that the senior crew flew three times over a four-day period when an incoming crew arrived. Careful planning allowed the Det to avoid imposing an operational tempo that would have increased crew stress and fatigue by pushing flying hour limitations. The normal period was extended to allow of flying during the same time period. Crews were monitored closely for signs of fatigue, and HQ personnel were responsive to requests from crewmembers to replace personnel who needed a rest. Further, at the five to six week mark, individual crewmembers were directed to take a 3day rest period during which HQ staff replaced them. 34. (C) Intelligence & Electronic Warfare. The Air Tactical Intelligence Centre (ATIC) was formed by combining Intelligence and EW personnel from the LRP and TAL detachments. The section was The section supported both detachments and provided limited support to NSU and NCCIS. There was an excellent working relationship and the LRP Det was highly satisfied with the Intelligence and EW support we received. Although a minimum of personnel are required to maintain a 24/7 schedule, the additional personnel allowed the section to provide more background material and freed up personnel to collect imagery to brief crews on the threat at various airfields and deployed locations in the AO. 9/12 SECRET 000015 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Lol sur I'acces a I'information SECRET Morale 35. (U) During the period leading up to the outbreak of hostilities, the sense of anticipation kept everyone focused and morale high. Once hostilities commenced, the confinement of personnel to camp, except for approved duty, resulted in an expected drop in morale. While the primary reason for this dip in morale can be attributed to the uncertainty regarding when the walking out privileges would return, the fact that we watched our traditional Allies head off every day fight OIF led to confusing emotions. In any event, there were no serious morale issues in the Det, and the lockdown brought the best out of our personnel, as they were more than willing to work their beyond their regular shift periods to assist their mates, keep busy and maintain focus. SUPPORT 36. (U) The CF National Support Unit provided all domestic support requirements including force and airfield protection. Specific comments regarding C2 and Unit interaction are contained in Lessons Learned. 37.(U) During the close-out BOI, it came to the Det’s attention that while only two DA accounts were handed over during the Roto 1 to 2 BOI, there were an additional four DAs and an SPSL account that neither Roto 1 nor Roto 2 personnel were aware of. My immediate concern relates to two deficient laptop computers. In the broader context, I am deeply disturbed that these accounts could remain effectively ‘underground,” in the Det’s name, yet have no accountability attached to individual DA holders on my staff. I have ordered an SI and the results will dealt with in the close-out BOI. Spare Parts 38. (U) Minimum/Maximum levels - A careful review of the min/max levels was conducted upon handover and new levels were set. Close coordination with NSU supply ensured that additional parts were ordered to bring quantities up to a war-fighting stance. This resulted in increased aircraft serviceability, thanks to a reduced requirement to rob parts from the other aircraft. Infrastructure 39. (U) Maintenance infrastructure in theatre was limited to a maintenance trailer and a sea container. Lacking hangars to conduct maintenance and provide an escape from the heat and humidity, most heavy maintenance activities were delayed until sundown. Major spare parts (engine, prop, and APU) were stored under a tent for 16 months. A climate-controlled shelter/building would have provided protection for expensive aircraft components and limited the risk of damage to aircraft parts due to the harsh environment. As a result of having to store parts without adequate shelter the major components noted above will require a thorough inspection prior to aircraft installation. LESSONS LEARNED 40. (U) Reference B is a comprehensive review of DCDS and 1 CAD mandated ICS/PSO training requirements conducted by our predecessors on Roto 1. Much of this training was not applicable to CP140 operations in this theatre of operations. The document makes specific recommendations for changes/deletions based on APOLLO experiences and is fully supported by Roto 2. 10/12 SECRET 000016 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def 40. (U) Lessons Learned from Roto 2 have been captured using the 1 CAD MS Access database application for onward dissemination. Further, they have been divided by functional area, exported to MS Word, and are attached at Annex A for ease of reference. CTF-57 Liaison 41. (C) The Canadian MPA liaison officer at CTF-57 was an invaluable link between the LRP Det and the OPCON authority. Further, the Det Commander and Ops Flight Commander conducted liaison visits that helped strengthen an already excellent working relationship between the two units. However, it should be noted that while CTF 57 staff worked diligently to provide effective OPCON, their method could not be described as doctrinally compliant. Indeed, for forces expecting an Air Component construct, following a continuous Battle Rhythm to ensure that air resources are apportioned and allocated IAW the higher Commander’s intent, CONCLUSION 42. (U) Op APOLLO has been a tremendous experience for the LRP community. In the larger context, this was a relatively small and straightforward operation; a two plane Det conducting surface surveillance - merely a fraction of our total warfare capability. However, our participation made it clear to all throughout the CF and beyond that LRP can make an efficient, useful contribution that goes beyond traditional ASW, and do so reliably during peacetime and rising tensions. In short, we provide a flexible option to Strat Level planners assessing what Canada can offer an emerging Coalition. 43.(C) Notwithstanding our successes, readers are cautioned that, from an LRP perspective, Op APOLLO was conducted in a relatively benign theatre. vvitn care and attention, the LKH capability will be a flexible resource in great demand by warfare commanders both afloat and in the field. FG Bigelow LCol “ Commanding Officer 11/12 SECRET 000017 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET ANNEXES Annex A Appendix 1 Appendix 2 Appendix 3 Appendix 4 Appendix 5 Appendix 6 Appendix 7 Appendix 8 Appendix 9 Annex B Annex C Annex D Lessons Learned General Personnel Flight Ops Maintenance Logistics C4I Training GOO Gouge, Hot Weather, and Littoral SOPs TACNOTE - CP 140 Self Defence Tactics T.O.&E. LRP Det Flying Orders LRP Det Ops Directives DISTRIBUTION LIST Action CA JTFSWA NCE TAMPA FL//COMD// Information (Soft Copy via TITAN only) CA JTFSWA NCE TAMPA FL//COS/J3 AIR// WComd 14 Wing Greenwood WComd 19 Wing Comox 1 CAD HQ Winnipeg//A3 MAR/Aerospace Warfare Centre// CO 404 Sqn Greenwood CO 405 Sqn Greenwood CO 407 Sqn Comox CO 415 Sqn Greenwood CO MPEU Greenwood OC MPSET Greenwood CO NSU CO TAL Detachment CO NCCIS CF JOG Kingston CFMWC Halifax 12/12 SECRET 000018 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information s.15(1) Def UNCLASSIFIED Annex A - Lessons Learned Table of Contents Appendix 1 - General 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. SQUADRON DEPLOYMENT - VANGUARD PLANNING LRP VANGUARD FORCE PACKAGE MOUNTING WING COORDINATION AND SUPPORT DAY ROTO - IMPACT ON FLIGHT OPS 6 MONTH VS DAY DEPLOYMENT Appendix 2 - Personnel 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. TO&E - MISSION SUPPORT SHORTFALLS FLYING BILLETS FOR DET HQ BACKUP AIRCREW RESERVISTS EMPLOYMENT TECH TRAINING FLIGHT DECK MANNING UNTRAINED PERSONNEL NAVAL VPLO REQUIREMENT EMEDDING LN O WITHIN OPCON AUTHORITY NBCO REQUIREMENT ADMIN SUPPORT REQUIREMENT ALCOHOL POLICY WHILE ON R&R Appendix 3 - Flight Ops 1. 2. 3. 4. FLIGHT OPS IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT RISK LEVEL/STANDOFF DISTANCE/CONTACT IDENTIFICATION INSHORE OPS NAVIGATION HOT WEATHER AND LITTORAL SOPs Appendix 4 - Maintenance 1. MOUNTING WING (14 AMS) MAINT SUPPORT CELL 2. GROUND AIR CONDITIONING UNITS 3. HOT WEATHER TECHNICAL ORDERS A- 1 /2 UNCLASSIFIED 000019 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information UNCLASSIFIED Appendix 5 - Logistics 1. ACCOMMODATIONS - MINIMUM REQUIREMENT DEFINITION AND FLIGHT SAFETY 2. R&R ACCOMODATIONS 3. TRANSPORT OF PERSONNEL FROM BASE TO APOE 4. SHIPPING AIRCRAFT PARTS INTO THEATRE 5. DANGEROUS CARGO SHIPPING 6. ARMAMENT FACILITIES EVALUATION 7. SUPPLY STOCK 8. TECH TEST EQUIPMENT 9. AMSE 10. PARTS STORAGE SPACE Appendix 6 - C4I 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. CAMP MIRAGE COMMAND AND CONTROL PORTABLE WING LEVEL C2 DEPLOYABLE COALITION NETWORKING MESSAGE HANDLING AND DISSEMINATION LEGAL ISSUES - LAW OF THE SEA AND LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ATO ISSUES Appendix 7 - Training THEATRE SPECIFIC TRAINING -OPERATIONS HQ/MSO PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING PORTABILITY OF QUALIFICATIONS - COMBAT READY CREWS COMBAT READINESS DESIGNATION VS MISSION SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS 5. CTD AMMENDMENTS REQUIRED FOR NEW CAPABILITIES 6. SHALLOW WATER ASW - INCLUSION IN CTD 1. 2. 3. 4. A-2/2 UNCLASSIFIED 000020 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET Annex C - LRP Det Flying Orders Part 1 - JTFSWA LRP DET ORDERS Part 2 - LRP DET CONTINGENCY PLANS SECRET 000021 �Document disclosed under tHe Access to Informattun Act— Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def Appendix 1 to Annex A - LRP Roto 2 3180-1 (LRP Det CO) 01 July 2003 Lessons Learned - General 1. (U) Issue - SQUADRON DEPLOYMENT - VANGUARD PLANNING Discussion - While there was support within the LRP community to deploy as a formed unit, a number of factors combined to preclude such an approach. Most noticeably, the requirement to maintain sufficient resources (aircraft and crews) on both coasts to meet standing CAS and CMS taskings, and the difficulty for the While there are advantages (stability being the principal one) to having a static det for the first six months, it is costly in terms of aircrew, i.e., three, vice two must be deployed to carrv out the same number of missions. Perhaps more important, the notion of a given Sqn assuming High Readiness (HR) for a given year effectively places that Sqn on Standby to deploy. To ensure domestic ops are maintained, and to provide the critical mass necessary for the Sqn to field not only a force restructuring would be essential. Quite simply, the operational Sqns. LRP community would need to be The principal benefits of this approach would be: a. The HR Sqn CO would have direct control over personnel selection. This one issue proved to be a significant challenge for this deployment, including the previous rotos, as Sqns and Units were forced to negotiate for personnel to populate the TO&E. This led to unnecessary nomination delays and uncertainty for the members concerned. b. The Det is already a Team - they have trained together, they have operated at home together, they know and offset each other’s strengths and weaknesses, and, finally, they deploy together. During our Roto we witnessed the advantages of this approach with formed air crews, who unlike our counterparts in TAL, arrived as cohesive teams that required less supervision and took challenges in stride. c. Given that current the VANGUARD plan fails to identify which Sqn will provide the air and ground crews to meet the notice to move deadline, it is a case of "everyone is responsible, thus no one is responsible." This leads units to pay less attention to critical readiness elements (such as individual qualifications and currency items - weapons, first aid, etc), such that the community as a whole is poorly, if not unprepared, to respond to an expeditionary tasking. A robust LRP Sqn (minimum 6 Line Air Crews and Organic (Sqn) Maint) could retain responsibility for a VANGUARD Det for a year, after which the ownership would transfer to the sister Sqn. When the Sqn deployed, key core staff positions (that would favour a six month approach) A1 - 1 /4 SECRET 000022 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'occes a I'information s.15(1) Def SECRET could be shared by Sqn Exec and Support Staff. Eg, the Sqn CO would retain responsibility for ops both at home and deployed, alternating with his DCO. This would be to the benefit of both the deployed Det and the Sqn at home. Recommendations - Given that the LRP VANGUARD conops is currently under review, not to mention that the Project Transform results are coming together, now is the ideal time to reconsider VANGUARD force packaging and adapt it to a Sqn approach based on rotations. Lessons Learned - Effective VANGUARD planning and preparation is key to fielding a responsive LRP capability on short notice with minimum disruption to domestic ops and force generation. 2. (C) Issue - LRP VANGUARD FORCE PACKAGE Discussion - The detachment remains a proven force package for conducting deployed LRP Ops. It gives us the capacity to reliably generate yet does not impose undue strain on the LRP fleet. As a result, it presents a relatively cost effective, rapidly deployable option for Strat Level planners looking to provide forces to an emerging coalition, or a "stand alone" response to an activity requiring ISR. Attempts in the past to deploy a single aircraft have met with problems, principally owing to aircraft availability/serviceability. HSDN is a case in point. Further, the mission support/ops staff overhead associated with a single aircraft Det is only marginally smaller, thus efficiencies favour the two aircraft configuration. Lastly, having in theatre, augmented by provide redundancy in case illness/grounding or repatriation. While this package worked well for Roto 2, it must be noted that this was based on the Roto plan. If, for whatever reason, the decision was to return to a rotation, then the three Crews would be required, both to accommodate HLTA, and to mitigate the ops tempo (which could not be maintained safely for that longer period). Recommendations - VANGUARD planning should continue to be based on a two-aircraft/crew force package, using ’otations starting with the initial deployment. Lessons Learned - A Det is the minimum critical mass to deploy and provide a reliable force package for the gaining OPCON authority. 3. (U) Issue - MOUNTING WING COORDINATION AND SUPPORT Discussion - There were reports of concerns early on in APOLLO at the Op and Strat Levels that the Det should avoid direct contact and coordination with the Mounting Wing (14 Wg), owing to potential conflicts with the Chain of Command (DCDS-Comd JTF SWA-CO LRP Det). Such concerns were unfounded, and the Det enjoyed excellent support from 14 Wg, without any hint of interference with the Chain of Command. Among other reasons, the weekly teleconference between the Det Comd and the 14 Wg Branch Heads was key to the effective comms and timely resolution of issues. Recommendations - As poor comms are the root of almost every evil, Deployed Dets should continue to maintain regular, open communications with the respective Mounting Wing. Further, by conducting a teleconference with key players (WComd & Branch Heads), problems are dealt with more quickly and effectively than might otherwise be possible. A1-2/4 SECRET 000023 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Laisur I'acces a /'information s.15(1) Def SECRET Lessons Learned - Comms, comms, comms... 4. (U) Issue - ■DAY ROTO - IMPACT ON FLIGHT OPS Discussion - Overall, a -day deployment had no effect on the ability of the LRP Det to maintain the Ops Tempo previously achieved during six-month Rotos. However, some issues are worthy of consideration: had to be monitored carefully, despite the authorized increase First, the of From day most Crewmembers totalled in excess of hours. By the end of the Roto, the accumulated effects of fatigue began to show, individuals having flown a patrol every second day. Accordingly, at about week 5 or 6, HQ aircrew substituted for individuals to allow a three-day rest period. It should be noted that our trips were relatively short (7-8 hours). Had we flown to the capacity of the aircraft (10+ hrs), the 30 day totals would have been commensurately higher. However, such longer missions are usually associated with longer transits, thus they are not necessarily more demanding from a fatigue point of view. ■day schedule was force generation itself, because The major benefit associated with a in there were one third fewer aircrew deployed at any given time. Further, with only theatre, more demanding warfare and other flying proficiency skills did not atrophy to the same extent as when deployed for six months (especially considering the crews were limited to a single, rather uncomplicated, mission profile). While fatigue was a closely monitored concern, the day-on, day-off schedule encouraged strict sleep discipline, whereas the six month crews with two days between missions were more likely to allow their sleep patterns to vary widely. Recommendations - The Day Roto plan should form the basis for VANGUARD planning. Lessons Learned - With a steady schedule and option for no-fly days where required, a ; -day rotation option is well suited for LRP deployment. 5. (U) Issue - 6 MONTH VS 56-DAY DEPLOYMENT Discussion - LRP Det went from a six-month rotation schedule to a -day plan. Although there are arguments that support either tour length, the impact of switching tour lengths well into the deployment was significant. day roto had many advantages and From a Maint Fit perspective, the introduction of the disadvantages. Advantages: 1) Reduction of TO&E. Maint Fit was able to reduce the number of personnel from 35 to 29. 2) With rotations, technicians remained focused and morale remained high. 3) Deployment experience was shared amongst a greater number of technicians. A1 -3/4 SECRET 000024 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information s.15(1) Def SECRET However there were some disadvantages: 1) Although not a direct impact on Op Apollo, the additional training and leave bill associated with an increased number of technicians and rotations created a shortage of trained, authorized technicians at home units. ■i 2) Increased rotations (every caused a significant rise in administrative responsibilities of the HQ staff (briefs, duty lists, training, explanation of procedures, etc). 3) There was little information available WRT entitlements such as pay, leave, UAB etc. This was a dissatisfier amongst many technicians. 4) The technicians that were scheduled for 3 rotations were effectively tied-up for a year with no consideration for courses or appointments. 5) The two in, two out etc, schedule was actually harder on some families with small children, as saying good-bye to the family on multiple occasions proved difficult with the kids. Recommendations - The day roto concept would be an overwhelming success if implemented at the start of a roto (with enough lead time) instead of a year into a deployment. Successful implementation demands: a. Deployable units ensure their members maintain their qualifications (eg weapons, first aid, etc), so that when preparing to deploy the training bill is not excessive. Our VANGUARD planning lessons learned refers. b. Units do not adopt the 2-in/2-out approach. Indeed, one of the principal benefits of day rotos is the concept "many hands make light work." 2-in/2-out fails to spread the burden amongst potential deployable pers, and negates the flexibility to complete career courses or prepare/complete postings, not to mention the impact on family stability. Lessons Learned - The tour length ( -day / -month) should not change during the deployment. A1 -4/4 SECRET 000025 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET Appendix 2 to Annex A - LRP Roto 2 3180-1 (LRP Det CO) 01 July 2003 Lessons Learned - Personnel 1. (C) Issue - TO&E - MISSION SUPPORT SHORTFALLS Discussion - TO&E establishment flexibility. The establishment for LRP Det was set at the correct figure, but a particular restricted position caused a great deal of difficulty. The Mission Support Office was planned for ROTO 2 to have 1 Chief Mission Support Officer (CMSO), 1 Mission Support Analyst (MSA), and 4 Mission Support Officers (MSO), with 1 of the MSO positions restricted. The Det made the wrong decision to continue to restrict this position in Roto 2. The restriction was made during ROTO 1 based on the lack of a dynamic range of mission taskings (crews were employed exclusively in the same area conducting the same task). The mundane nature of the operation led to the appropriate decision to restrict a position. ROTO 2 HQ staff accepted the resultant situation, perhaps naively believing that, if there was a need to unrestrict that position due to an increase in Op tempo or intensity, or to cover off extended periods of manning shortages, such as HLTA or backfilling other positions, relief would be forthcoming. This was not the case. As the early months of 2003 proved to be an extremely intense period in the AOR, MSOs were task saturated attempting to cope with the volume and complexity of message traffic and mission preparation, not the least important being airspace deconfliction. HQ staff were more directly involved in the mechanics of MSO duties rather than maintaining a distance to allow for a clear overview. Making matters more difficult was the fact that the CMSO dagged red at the last minute, with no suitable backup. A series of stopgap measures were implemented by the Mounting Wing (short duration MSO TAVs) that were challenged by the LRP Det, but directed nonetheless, the MSO section was faced with a near constant rotation of personnel who did not necessarily have the skill sets to deal with the intensity of the operation. Further, requests for relief during the HLTA period that were absolutely essential if Mission Support personnel were not to burn out were put off and delayed, ultimately being approved at the last possible moment creating undue stress on all the staff. The lack of timely action on the part of tasking agencies directly led to a situation that was ripe for errors and mishaps. Recommendations - Bona fide backup personnel must be identified for key personnel to alleviate last minute scrambles and to avoid sending less than ideal replacements. HHQ must be reactive to requests from the field for replacement personnel, and must take timely action to fill requirements accordingly. Lessons Learned - Presumably TO&Es must be robust enough to carry on through a whole spectrum of operational intensities. The cost to FGs is that personnel may be underemployed as a guard against the time when their presence is needed, as the system has proven not to react quickly enough when the call for assistance goes out. 2. (U) Issue - FLYING BILLETS FOR DET HQ Discussion - Det HQ positions-use of other than current aircrew. Refinement of the core Det HQ positions with respect to hard flying billets is required for the long-term viability of Op Apollo. Non­ flying billets can then be filled by other than current aircrew on the squadrons as long as the required skill sets are there. This becomes even more critical for related positions such as LO in Bahrain, and the Staff position on the NCE in Tampa. A2 -1 / 6 000026 �Document disclosed under the Access to IhformattOrrAct Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information s.15(1) Def SECRET Recommended Action - If Op Apollo is to continue past the suggested Oct timeframe, help in filling the non-flying positions from the greater AF community will be required. 3. (C) Issue - BACKUP AIRCREW Discussion - HQ staff as backup aircrew. The Det HQ staff was built bearing in mind that these personnel would represent the Det's sole ability to provide backup aircrew in the event of grounding or fatigue affecting line aircrew. Recommendations - Lessons Learned 4.(U) Issue - RESERVISTS EMPLOYMENT Discussion - Use of Reservists in support of Op Apollo. Reservist volunteers have and will continue to support Op Apollo. LL for ROTO 1 and 2 indicate it is imperative that decisions on individuals being eligible for nomination as candidates are made very early (6 months) in order to facilitate processing for contract extensions and upgrading of security clearances. Recommendations - Decisions on the use of individual Reservists must be made very early (6 months) in order to facilitate processing for contract extensions and upgrading of security clearances. Lessons Learned - While reservists can provide an excellent contribution to a deployed force, admin requirements demand timely nomination and processing. 5. (U) Issue - TECH TRAINING Discussion - Although the Maintenance crew structure was adequate to support operations, the CP 140 community lost a great opportunity to train technicians. Two training positions on each crew (6 pers total) would have helped ease the workload, as well as provide a meaningful venue for training. This would have relieved some of the training burden at the home units, and helped the techs gain qualifications, faster. Recommendations - Future long-term deployments should make allowances for the training of technicians. Lessons Learned - Deployed operations provide an excellent venue for training. A2 - 2 / 6 SECRET 000027 �s.15(1) Def Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Laisur faeces a I'information SECRET 6. (U) Issue - FLIGHT DECK MANNING Discussion - The five-man Flight Deck was maintained for Roto 2. While the missions were relatively short (six hour planned on-station period), the aircraft was rarely flown above 1000 MSL, owing to the requirement to visually ID and photograph all surface contacts. Had the contact density been light, or if Stand Off sensors were available, then there would have been greater opportunity for Flight Deck members to take much needed breaks, however, this was not the case. Further, the repetitive nature of the mission tasking, combined with the high flying rate (120 - 130 hours per 30 day period, maintained from day , meant that the risks of complacency and fatigue were ever present. Recommendations - Deployments with the same mission profiles and ops tempo should maintain the five-man Flight Deck. Redundancy for illness/grounding can be achieved by either ensuring that at least three of the four line FE's are A Category, or by filling a Core (6 month) Staff position with an A Cat FE. An A Cat on staff provides greater flexibility for the Force Generator, in that B Cat FEs can be employed on all Day Crews. Lessons Learned - Intensive low-level flying requires a five-member Flight Deck. 7. (C) Issue - UNTRAINED PERSONNEL Discussion - Untrained personnel. The Det was able to effectively employ personnel who had attained wings status but not yet achieved aircraft type qualifications. Certain positions within the Det had Terms of Accountability that allowed for personnel that had yet to achieve qualification on the CP140 to be effectively employed. These positions were typically within the Ops section dealing with matters that are common to all aircraft fleets, and the duties and tasks were normally a matter of central communications for the Det. Two main benefits accrue: first, the FG is not obligated to deploy another fully qualified aircrew member during times of chronic shortages; second, the deployed untrained person gains invaluable experience that can only serve to make them more valuable to the home unit when aircraft qualifications have been received. In our case, we selected a Lt awaiting ANAV MOAT training and her employment was an unqualified success. Recommendations - Make use of untrained personnel whenever prudent. Lessons Learned - Not all deployed personnel need to be top category to be of value to the Det. 8. (C) Issue - NAVAL VPLO REQUIREMENT Discussion - VPLO requirement. There is a requirement to have a VPLO embedded in CTG/CTF staff in order to ensure seamless integration and employment of LRP assets. The level of expertise WRT LRP capabilities and limitations as well as SOPs normally present in CTG/CTF staff varies widely, wholly dependent on the background and experience level of the Air O (normally an MH officer). The lack of embedded LRP expertise creates a great deal of unnecessary discussion and crisis management. Issues such as Maritime Campaign Planning and Level of Effort required to produce effective surveillance for the Commander afloat would be more efficiently A2 - 3 / 6 S EC R ET 000028 �Document disclosed under the Accesslo'fnJorMOtion Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET addressed with an LRP representative on the CTG/CTF staff. Major Maritime exercises make use of a VPLO within the Command staff to ensure that all assets are utilized effectively, thus gaining the optimum training value at the unit, group, and force level, and maximizing interoperability opportunities. Recommendations - Embed a VPLO within CTG/CTF staff. Lessons Learned - Scores of major Joint operations exercises have proven the effectiveness and necessity of a VPLO as part of the Commander's staff if sorties are to provide a high degree of value for the Commander. 9. (C) Issue - EMEDDING LN O WITHIN OPCON AUTHORITY Discussion - The CTF 57 LNO was part of the F2C2 (Friendly Force Coordination Centre) and not part of CTF 57 (the LRP Det OPCON authority). The CTF-57 Air LNO position was part of the F2C2 having only a liaison relationship with CTF57. Although the CTF-57 organization chart showed that the LNO was under the command of the CTF 57 N3, this was not the case. The N3 provided no direction to any of the Coalition LNOs but merely acted as a conduit for addressing problems specific to each MPA detachment. As a result, Coalition LNOs had little input into the day-to-day functioning of CTF-57. They were briefed 5 times a week and had the opportunity to discuss issues at those fora, however, these discussions rarely resulted in satisfactory action being taken. Most problems were dealt with through the N3 in groups of ones or twos. Global solutions were not readily achievable, if at all. Some of CTF 57 staff were relatively inexperienced (compared to the LNOs) and in theatre for short periods. This sometimes made it more difficult for them to recognize potential problems. It took longer to reach viable solutions once they had been identified. Also, CTF 57 was undermanned for the workload. During Op Apollo, the staff was required to task up to 28 aircraft, from 9 nations, some with more than one platform type with varying capabilities and ROE. On top of this, there were at least three distinct missions on going, MIO, OIF, and OEF. This undermanned and somewhat inexperienced staff had difficulty coping with the workload. If the LNOs were embedded within CTF 57, the OPCON would have had more manpower and experience to draw from and would be better able to employ those assets. The LNOs would have been able to devote more of their energies toward planning operations and less toward correcting mistakes. Most importantly, the LNO would have had a much more direct effect on how CTF conducted its business, thus better able to encourage doctrinally compliant execution f its OPCON responsibilities. Recommendations - In future operations the LRP LNO should be embedded within the MPA OPCON authority. The position should fall under the N3 section and deal primarily with plans. Lessons Learned - LRP LNOs could more effectively meet the requirements of the LRP Detachment if he was embedded in the organization than if employed strictly in the liaison role. 10. (C) Issue - NBCO REQUIREMENT Discussion - There was an insistence from HHQ planners that each Det have an NBCO, NBC NCM, and a RADSO, yet these were all secondary duties. Due to the difficulties encountered by FG to produce qualified personnel to fill these positions, a great deal of negotiation between Sqns was required to ensure these positions were filled. Additional positions were not added to the Det's TO&E A2 - 4 / 6 SEC RET 000029 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'occes a /'information SECRET to cover off this requirement, so, in effect, the Det was directed to deploy a specific individual into the core staff. This situation that could have led to having the wrong skill set for the primary duty but the appropriate skill set for the secondary duty. I will not suggest there is no requirement for an NBC staff to be deployed. However, if the need is truly as great as the pressure to deploy someone into this secondary duty suggests, then perhaps this should be something more than a secondary duty. A small cell of expertise within the camp under the command of the camp Commandant, with each unit offering up an individual to provide redundancy in each of the positions, would fill the operational need. It would also relieve the Det from possibility of deploying an individual who might not have the appropriate skill set to excel at their primary task. Recommendations - Create a single NBC organization for the camp. With each operation, fill the operational need and relieve the Det from possibility of deploying an individual unit supplying one individual to allow redundancy. Lessons Learned - The Camp TO&E as whole must be rationalized to allow for correct manning of important secondary duties. 11.(U) Issue - ADMIN SUPPORT REQUIREMENT Discussion - This ROTO faced difficulties with document control due to the lack of an Admin clerk as part of the TO&E. Part time support was the routine on previous ROTOs, however, during ROTO 2, we did not have any Admin support early in the ROTO and had only a part time Admin clerk for the last four months. This clerk worked two afternoons per week in LRP. This Det, like all operations, needs to have the ability to effect suitable document control and file keeping measures. Recommendations - The TO&E for this and all other Dets should include embedded Admin support. Lessons Learned - LRP's document control was difficult throughout the ROTO this problem could have been overcome by the proper level of Admin support. 12.(U) Issue - ALCOHOL POLICY WHILE ON R&R Discussion - The alcohol restriction (2 can rule) posed significant enforcement challenges and was a serious dissatisfier for members proceeding on well-deserved R&R breaks. In essence, certain members felt that given the requirement to observe the alcohol limit, then they would rather remain on Camp, rather than pay out of pocket for Hotel accn. Recommendations - Identify a suitable R&R center (eg a resort) where the alcohol policy could be relaxed. Ideally, we would locate a safe resort that caters to westerners (so our personnel would not stick out, for both FP and image concerns). Further, an MP or Senior NCM could stay on duty at the same resort while members enjoy R&R and: a. conduct overt presence patrols (a la Shore Patrols) to deter unwanted/embarrassing behaviour. b. be known to resort staff and be the first to respond if management had any concerns regarding inappropriate behaviour. A2 - 5 / 6 SECRET 000030 �Document disclosed unaer the Access lu InfurHiuliun-Act----Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information I SECRET Lessons Learned - DDIO alcohol limitations and in-theatre R&R pose challenges that could be overcome with some careful planning and execution. A2 - 6 / 6 SECRET 000031 �»> Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information s.15(1) Def SECRET Appendix 3 to Annex A - LRP Roto 2 3180-1 (LRP Det CO) 01 July 2003 Lessons Learned - Flight Ops 1. (C) Issue - FLIGHT OPS IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT Discussion - Traditional LRP employment has assumed ops would take place from secure airfields, arrivals and departures would be flown in areas of air supremacy, and threats on-station would simply be avoided, primarily through the application of Risk Level doctrine. APOLLO taught us that a Det may face threats that were not so easy to observe or predict. Indeed, the asymmetric threats posed by terrorist organizations were ubiquitous and exceptionally difficult to predict. Accordingly, it is prudent to adopt measures to mitigate such risks, both around the airfield, enroute and on station. Lastly, the importance of incorporating a self-defence suite into AIMP cannot be overstated. Given the difficulty predicting a hostile act against an Aurora anywhere during the mission, the SDS provides one last opportunity to mitigate a potential risk factor. Recommendations - Develop and implement tactics and procedures to deal with these threats. Attached to the end of the Roto 2 LRP End Tour report is a TACNOTE designed to form the basis of these tactics. Ensure that the self-defence suite is not removed from AIMP, and, should the Aurora be deployed into a similar theatre before AIMP completion, serious consideration should be given to accelerating the incorporation of an interim SDS capability. Lessons Learned - The simple Cold War approach to hostilities (Yes/No) does not recognize the realities of smaller scale regional conflicts and asymmetric threats. Our tactics and procedures must change with the times. 2. (C) Issue - RISK LEVEL/STANDOFF DISTANCE/CONTACT IDENTIFICATION Discussion - During the course of operations, each Sector Commander afloat published a stand-off distance for his AO. There were not necessarily equal distances in each AO. Stand-off distances were published for warships, friendly and neutral, along with merchant vessels; actual distances were nn the AAW caoabilitv of the warships, It must be noted that throughout the course of Op APOLLO, no civilian vessels oi any size or type proved to have any anti-air weaponry on board, despite numerous boardings carried out by CTG 307 assets alone. A3 -1 / 5 SECRET 000032 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information s.15(1) Def SECRET The very nature of the contact identification information required The implemented procedures when compared with published doctrine on this subject resulted in a very confusing situation for LRP crews to deal with on a daily basis. If one accepts that the standoff distance was valid, then any relief given to the LRP crews The TACON (OTC) does not have the authority to reassign Risk Levels. At first qlance, it appears we did not technically follow published doctrine, though practically speaking the vice provide for the safety of our aircraft from attack. It was assessed the likelihood that any Coalition aircraft would be engaged was very low. By closing contacts within published distances, LRP crews could accomplish assigned tasks and provide Commanders afloat with the required level of contact identification. LRP Det maintained a very close watch on the published threat levels, and, working closely with Intel staff, we monitored all sources that might indicate that the threat to our crews was on the increase. Discussions between LRP and Command Staff afloat resulted in LRP has received copies of proposed TACNOTES 3550 and 3555 that deal with these topics. As has been identified in previous major exercises, current Risk Level doctrine fails to adequately address those situations in which it is unlikely surface units would engage friendly aircraft. Recommendations - Doctrine which specifies procedures and limitations WRT Risk Levels, Stand-off Distances, and Contact Identification requirements, need to be re-written in a coherent fashion. Fuse these related topics so that clear and unequivocal direction can be given to aircrews and gaining commanders (eg OTCs) throughout the spectrum of operations from peace to war. Lessons Learned Coherent doctrine enveloping Risk Level, Stand-off Distance, and Contact Identification requirements must be published. A3 - 2 / 5 000033 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a /’information S E C R ET 3. (U) Issue - INSHORE OPS NAVIGATION Discussion - Current method of employing the aircraft fitted GPS for precise navigation (eg when attempting to close but not penetrate TTW) is very awkward, resulting in far less than ideal situational awareness and crew coordination, thus aircraft control suffers. Presently, a "MapNav" with unspecified qualifications, sits to the right of the NavCom, and, without knowledge of the accuracy of our somewhat dated GPS receiver, with an unknown time lag of the GPS itself, reads the scrolling lat/long digits off the display. The time lag, and therefore positional inaccuracy, is increased depending on the time it takes the MapNav to manually plot the position and determine the relative distance from TTW (again, with unspecified accuracy, dependant on both the operator's ability/mental dexterity and the chart he or she is using). Then, one must add the time lag between the MapNav communicating that info via intercom (which can be a little hectic, further complicated by busy radio circuits) to the Pilot, who must then interpret the information and physically input steering corrections. If the intent was simply to stay well away from TTW (like we avoid land in IMC/night conditions on peacetime patrols at home), it works just fine, especially in places like the North Arabian Sea. On the other hand, if the aim is to get in tight (eg where bad guys lurk, playing games as they dart in & out of TTW, especially in confined waters (SOH, Arabian Gulf), the current method, with the associated lag times, is difficult at best. If we simply plugged a Garmin into the existing antenna at the NO Station, the MapNav would have immediate graphical depiction of proximity to TTW (using waypoints plotted in a route to identify TTW). Now, the only lag we are dealing with is the voice comm link to the pilot - a very significant improvement. For this reason, an intermediate and quicker fix might be to shoot for just that authorization. Recommendations a. While we await a technical fix, the techniques and procedures that have been developed and fine-tuned during APOLLO should be incorporated into OJT syllabi for appropriate trades (not just ANAV, but probably pilots as well, possibly AESOPs). Only Crew members appropriately trained and qualified should be employed when closer than about 5nm from the border to be protected. Only through a structured trials procedure would the accumulated errors of this method of navigation be quantifiable, but experience has shown that a trained crew should be comfortable approaching to 1 nm from TTW without great concern for penetration (assuming a fairly regularly shaped coastline. For obvious reasons, irregular coastlines or confined maneuvering space will make this more difficult). b. As an interim measure, the current GPS could be easily replaced with a slightly more modern unit at very low cost (if not for free, if we utilize the CF's current inventory of CT-133 Garmin 90 receivers). The key advantage is the graphical display which eliminates a number of the steps in the current process, and does away with manual plotting altogether. Although a simple unit such as the Garmin 90 lacks a moving map display, it is a simple matter to manually plot waypoints that approximate TTW (essentially, this is a curve fitting exercise - more points, better fit). These points could be inserted manually, but by using a simple GPS application such as GARTRIP ™, a shareware program available on the Internet, one can type the waypoints in A3 - 3 / 5 SECRET 000034 �s.15(1) Def Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET on a PC, and download them directly to the GPS. Aside from the ease of waypoint entry (vice using the receivers awkward toggle switch entry method), the waypoints may be printed out to crosscheck against the raw chart data. As a second check, they can be printed out to scale and by overlaying the printout on a suitable chart and can be visually compared with the TTW in question. Assuming our aircrew understand the importance of selecting the appropriate chart Datum, one has an almost pilot­ proof method of waypoint entry and confirmation. The same software application can also be used to build a route, following the TTW waypoints. As most receivers will limit the number of waypoints in a given route, it may be necessary to build more than one route to describe an AOR's TTW. These routes are then downloaded in the same manner directly to the GPS. With the waypoints and routes safely downloaded, it is a very simple matter to activate the desired route, which will then be drawn on the GPS graphical display. As one zooms in to a smaller and smaller scale, the aircraft's distance from TTW is immediately apparent, as is the aircraft's orientation. This information can then be relayed directly to the pilot. While the cheapest and easiest solution would be to install a single GPS at the NavCom station, using the existing power source and antenna, ideally the Fit Sta would also have a GPS so they could maintain SA directly (with the usual cautions about channelized attention on a nav display). However, the technical requirements (and airworthiness clearances required) for using even a portable, battery operated GPS with an antenna in the overhead window may prove too challenging. The final logical step in this interim capability would be to draw the positional feed from the GPS and input it to a laptop at the NavCom station with either C2PC, or perhaps a commercial (COTS) navigation application. The advantages are, of course, the ability to plot key information, such as operating, restricted areas, mission specific waypoints, in effect giving true moving map display well before the fleet will receive the same during AIMP. Lessons Learned - The current navigation suite is poorly suited to inshore operations. Structured training results in crews qualified to exploit existing capability, yet a modest investment in technology would result in a significant increase in operational capability. 4. (U) Issue- HOT WEATHER AND LITTORAL SOPs Discussion - Operations in the SWA theatre, particularly in the Eastern approaches to the Straits of Hormuz (Sharkfin) presented specific challenges owing to both the proximity to land, and the extreme temperatures. Rotos 0, 1, and 2 all developed procedures and techniques to deal with these challenges. With the introduction of Day rotations, it became critical to encapsulate and standardize the direction to incoming crews, owing to the frequent rotations. Accordingly, the "GOO GOUGE" was produced, using the familiar SMM format. This document is included as an Annex to the Roto 2 End Tour report. While these techniques were considered theatre specific, they should form the basis for normal hot weather or littoral ops, such that the next time we deploy to a similar region, this will all be old hat. Further, even routine deployments to "warm" (in comparison to bloody hot) locations such as Hawaii would benefit from application of these newfound techniques and procedures. A3 - 4 / 5 SECRET 000035 �Document disclosed under the Access io information mci Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET Recommendations - The LRP community, and specifically 404 (MP &T) Sqn, should review the GOO GOUGE and extract those elements suitable for inclusion into existing pubs (SMM, AOI, etc). Lessons Learned - The CP-140 is capable of operating effectively in hot weather in the littoral, with minor changes to current techniques and procedures. A3 - 5/5 SECRET 000036 �Document disclosed under the Access to information net Document divulgue en vertu de la Lai sur I'acces a I'information SECRET Appendix 4 to Annex A - LRP Roto 2 3180-1 (LRP Det CO) 01 July 2003 Lessons Learned - Maintenance 1. (U) Issue - MOUNTING WING (14 AMS) MAINT SUPPORT CELL Discussion - A dedicated Maintenance Support Cell at the main support base (14 AMS) provided an invaluable service to the LRP Det. Having personnel designated at the home unit to assist in the tracking of parts, engineering support, and in a general support role was instrumental in the smooth operation of the Maintenance Detachment. Given the time change between Greenwood and Camp Mirage (7-8 hrs), personnel in Greenwood who were working on the significant issues / problems of the LRP Maint Det could easily contact the AEG (in Ottawa) on our behalf and have a solution to us by the next morning. Recommendations - Future deployed ops should continue to have a dedicated maint support embedded within the mounting wing. Lessons Learned - A dedicated cell of personnel should be assigned responsibility to assist the Maintenance Detachment when required (usually in emergencies). 2. (U) Issue - GROUND AIR CONDITIONING UNITS Discussion - The Ground Air Conditioning Units (GAUs) initially used in theatre were inadequate for operating in the extreme temperatures of the desert. Given the extreme daytime temperatures (50 degrees Celsius) and ramp temperatures of 80 degrees Celsius, the air conditioner units from Canada were not able to produce enough cooling power. These units were replaced by larger, more powerful ACE 802s on a trial basis. During the trial, it was determined that smaller GAUs (ACE 804s) were sufficient, and they were eventually procured and are currently being used in theatre. Recommendations - Units should procure GAUs that can handle all types of operating environments (ACE 804s). Lessons Learned - To be a more effective operating force, and in essence to be able to operate anywhere, anytime, proper equipment is required. 3. (U) Issue - HOT WEATHER TECHNICAL ORDERS Discussion - Currently no hot weather technical procedures / orders exist detailing the effects of hot weather on critical aircraft systems (powerplant / EDC etc). Without documented parameters (temperature I pressure etc) of the powerplant of the CP-140, and how the values are affected by hot weather operations, the technician is left to his/her experience and word of mouth to determine if the readings are normal, although the readings may be out of limits (for normal operation). Recommendations - Hot weather parameters I procedures must be defined in a hot weather technical publication. Lessons Learned - Powerplant parameters will change during hot weather operations which, under normal conditions, would render the aircraft unserviceable. A4 SECRET 000037 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information s.15(1) Def SECRET Appendix 5 to Annex A - LRP Roto 2 3180-1 (LRP Det CO) 01 July 2003 Lessons Learned - Logistics 1. (U) Issue - ACCOMMODATIONS - MINIMUM REQUIREMENT DEFINITION AND FLIGHT SAFETY Discussion - When pers were originally billeted at Camp Mirage, Units were allocated a fixed number of rooms within specific barrack blocks. This allocation allowed the Dets to meet their needs, promote unit cohesion, and minimize room changes as individuals rotated or TAVs were accommodated. The arrival of the D&S platoon and the ever-present TAVs made the practice of Unit allocation of barracks/rooms no longer possible. Compounding the problem was the roto shift, as both LRP and TAL Dets adopted the -Day Roto Plan, thus the makeup of these Det’s changed monthly. Owing to a stated insistence that there is no correlation between Flight Safety and room allocation, CO NSU refused to discuss, let alone agree to allocation criteria proposed by the COs of LRP and TAL Dets. While this speaks to the dysfunctional C2 arrangement at Camp Mirage (dealt with separately under C4I), it also identifies the challenges faced by CO NSU, who was been caught between NCE direction to accept more personnel on Camp, and the flying Dets Flight Safety concerns. It also highlights a shortcoming in the higher orders (including DDIOs) that fail to identify the bed down requirements (ie specify room allocation criteria) for flying units. In the case of TAL & LRP, Flight Safety was considered in the strict sense of the definition, as it deals with the Accidental (thus preventable) loss of personnel or aircraft. Operational factors and associated losses were not considered, given that we were involved in Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Indeed, if we were at war or engaged in hostilities, then the operational imperative might drive us to adopt measures that increased the risk of an accidental loss to achieve mission success. Thus for OOTWA, Flight Safety considerations should receive the same importance as they would for routine domestic operations or force generation. In the absence of published guidance on Crew Rest versus Accommodation entitlement, and the resulting affect on Flight Safety, two main factors should be considered: the consequence of error, and ability to withdraw from the workplace. Put simply, while almost every member of Camp Mirage can enhance or detract from Flight Safety, certain members, because of their occupation or workplace, have a more significant impact. To this end, three occupations warrant special consideration: a. Aircrew. Owing to the consequence of error, and the obvious inability to withdraw from the workplace, orders exist to provide aircrew with adequate crew rest before a mission. In APOLLO, the situation is exacerbated by the high flying rates (approximately 130 hours per month) and the nature of the work. In the case of LRP, crews spend the vast majority of the on-station period below 1000 feet. TAL crews fly varied schedules, often into potentially hostile, remote airfields that require the complete coordination of a tactically trained crew. Neither TAL nor LRP crews may take R&R during their Day Rotations, thus the potential for cumulative fatigue exists. Finally, of all the crew members, the importance of the Aircraft Captains remaining fully alert until engine shutdown, while obvious, cannot A5 -1 / 5 SECRET 000038 �Document disclosed under the Access td InforiYidtion Act Document divulgu4 en vertu de la Loi sur I'accds a I'information SECRET be overstated. Accordingly, aircrew and, in particular, Aircraft Captains, are afforded the highest priority for ensuring that adequate, uninterrupted sleep can be attained. b. Ground Crew. While it is obviously much simpler for the Ground Crewman to withdraw from the work place (yet all to often the member does not, owing to pride, resulting in a Human Factors assessment of "Pressing" following an incident or accident), the consequence of error is equally significant to that of the Aircrew. Further, the environmental conditions at Camp Mirage increase the potential for early fatigue onset. Temperature extremes can be mitigated somewhat by scheduling maintenance activities after dark, yet this affects circadian rhythms and associated impairment to functioning. Thus, while perhaps less critical than for Aircrew, it is imperative that Ground Crew are afforded with accommodation that will permit adequate, uninterrupted rest before going on shift. c. LRP Mission Support Officers/TAL Ops Officers. While perhaps not self-evident, these individuals work alone on extended shifts overnight and have no ready backup. The volume and complexity of operational message traffic demands they remain fully alert and able to plan comprehensive Mission briefings and flight profiles. Looking at these groups, the principal concern is to provide these members, in order of priority, with uninterrupted rest to avoid accumulated sleep deficit and fatigue. This does not necessarily require single rooms for all, though members sharing rooms should be on the same crew, thus maintain the same shift/sleep cycle. Recommendations - The simplest approach would be to publish criteria for accn footprint (perhaps based on the considerations discussed above) that would apply to future Joint Ops. However, requirements will differ, as will physical realities (eg for embarked HELAIRDETs, TACHEL units in the field, etc) thus some options may be simply impossible to achieve. Further, some flying operations, owing to the duration and hazards of particular missions, will dictate more or less stringent concerns for the quantity and quality of rest. In lieu of attempting to write a set of standards that will satisfy every potential DCDS operation, it is recommended that DDIOs simply direct that Flying Unit COs are responsible for determining what accommodations are required to meet the demands of their respective operation. In the final analysis, accommodations are just another resource that COs are expected to manage, and should be treated no differently. Lessons Learned - Commanders at all levels must be empowered to exercise their best judgment, husband resources, always with a view to ensuring safe and effective operations. 2. (U) Issue - R&R ACCOMODATIONS Discussion - Owing to a lack of suitable subsidized accn, a number of Camp Mirage personnel did not take advantage of R&R in the manner or spirit the orders intended. For members deployed for 6 months, the importance of meaningful R&R on the well being of our members cannot be overstated. Although the orders allow for two 96-hour R&R periods per deployment, the lack of funding caused some members to simply take time off, but remain at the Camp. While this sort of rest is helpful, it does not provide anywhere near the rejuvenating effects, as a stay away would have. A5 - 2 / 5 SECRET 000039 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /‘information SECRET s.15(1) Def Recommendations - Increase R&R benefits to meet the basic accommodation (2 per room) and per diem requirements of the local R&R destinations. Lessons Learned - If R&R benefits are insufficient to meet basic accn & meal requirements, some members will not take advantage of this essential break from Ops, thus degrading the effectiveness of the Unit as a whole. Further, by ensuring the member is not out of pocket, COs can order members on R&R without causing financial distress. 3. (U) Issue - TRANSPORT OF PERSONNEL FROM BASE TO APOE Discussion - Comox has a definite disadvantage when it comes to transporting personnel from/to home base to the APOE in Trenton during ROTO changeovers. For a person deploying from Greenwood the average travel time to/from theatre is 4 days. For Comox personnel it doubles to 8 days. In effect, the time spent in transit increases from 2 days if CAL was used from Comox to 8, thus 6 days were wasted. For 407 personnel on the day rotation, this waste equates to a loss of 2.7 person years per year of operation. Further, added travel, accn and per diem costs accrued, thanks to the circuitous and fractured travel itinerary. While a detailed business case has not been completed, initial estimates indicate that had west coast personnel traveled via CAL alone, it would have been roughly cost neutral, yet would have saved the significant time wasted in transit For 407 pers on the day rotation, this waste equates to a loss of 2.7 person years per year of operation. Recommendations - CAL only, in lieu of a CAL & SF mix should be considered when developing movement plans, both as a means to save travel costs and to limit time wasted. Lessons Learned - Service Air is often not the most resource efficient option. 4. (U) Issue - SHIPPING AIRCRAFT PARTS INTO THEATRE Discussion - Given the limited number of spares held by the deployed unit, the Supply System (and Sustainment Flights) must be able to react to an immediate part requirement. Weekly sustainment flights were normally sufficient to meet the needs of the unit for parts. However, on occasion, FEDEX was employed to get a part from Canada into theatre in 2-3 days. Items that were FEDEXed were addressed to "Mr." instead of rank specific individuals in order to avoid lengthy Custom delays. This was an overwhelming success as it proved a reliable method to get AOGs into theatre quickly and saved missions from being lost. Recommendations - Ensure a responsive Supply system (that uses other methods of shipping parts i.e., a commercial courier) is in place to properly support the requirements of flying operations. Further, when setting up contracts, host nation advice should be sought to determine techniques (such as not addressing packages to Rank/Name/Unit) that facilitate expeditious movement of packages. Lessons Learned - Couriers such as FEDEX are effective and reliable way to quickly obtain urgently required parts in theatre. A5 - 3 / 5 SECRET 000040 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lai sur I'acces d I'information SECRET 5. (U) Problem - DANGEROUS CARGO SHIPPING Discussion - The requirement for the transport I packaging I shipping of Dangerous Cargo (DC) was not fully supported by the NSU. DC could only be shipped from Canada via the weekly sustainment flight. In addition, a TAV had to be called in because NSU had no qualified DC packer, even though the requirement had been identified. Recommendations - Given the constant requirement for the handling / shipping of DC (batteries/gases etc), a fully DC qualified individual must be in theatre. In addition, a reliable non-DND (ie. Commercial) method of transporting DC into theatre (for urgent requirements) must be provided. Lessons Learned - NSU must have a fully DC qualified individual available to process our DC requirements, and the system used to transport the DC must be responsive to our needs. 6. (U) Issues - ARMAMENT FACILITIES EVALUATION Discussion - A proper evaluation of existing Armament facilities / capabilities and requirements was not adequately conducted before the deployment of the LRP Det into theatre. There were numerous difficulties experienced with respect to armament (improper safety distances, improper storage of munitions etc) as a result of inadequate site plans and the fact that a proper armament inspection was not performed. In addition, there was no initial study conducted on the feasibility of storing and use etc. of Mark 46 torpedoes. Recommendations - A full, proper inspection of existing armament facilities, assessing current as well as possible future requirements must be conducted prior to the arrival of the deploying unit. Lessons Learned - Armament requirements can change significantly during a deployment. An improperly conducted, or incomplete armament survey may have limiting and drastic effects on the operation. 7. (U) Issue - SUPPLY STOCK Discussion - There was an inadequate supply of C class (consumable) items gaskets / O rings etc. There was a shortage of C class items in theatre that led to the borrowing of these items (when available) from other Coalition members, and, on occasion, this led to the unserviceability of the aircraft. Recommendations - A rationalization of required consumables for all B class items (part lists) should be conducted, for what items are required (gaskets, O rings, packing etc) on replacement/repair. Lessons Learned - Insufficient consumables led us to rob serviceable major components (engine I prop IAPU) rendering them unserviceable for significant periods. The shortage of even the smallest, inexpensive parts will render the aircraft unserviceable. 8. (U) Issue - TECH TEST EQUIPMENT Discussion - There was not enough test equipment available in the Supply System / Greenwood to fully meet the deployed unit’s requirements. Test equipment is used to quickly fault find aircraft avionics equipment such as RADAR, TACAN, IFF, AFCS, RADALT, PITOT STATIC etc. A5 - 4 / 5 SECRET 000041 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET On more than one occasion, LRP Det was left without the capability to diagnose a snag as a result of a shortage of Test equipment in the Supply System. Often there would only be two serviceable sets of test equipment (one at 407, one at 14 AMS). Recommendations - A review of holdings of test equipment should be conducted to ensure that there are adequate quantities for use at the main operating bases, as well for deployed units. Lessons Learned - Test equipment provides a vital service because it can prevent hours of fault finding of unserviceable systems. Test equipment should be considered critical equipment for deployments, spared accordingly, and included in the TO&E. 9. (U) Issue-AMSE Discussion - A great deal of AMSE used on the deployment was unreliable as it often broke down due to its shoddy condition. Most AMSE was shared amongst the Coalition members operating from Ramp 2. The majority of the AMSE needed constant attention / repair from the EME techs. Recommendations - The CF holding of AMSE needs to be updated (new items purchased/ or existing items reconditioned). Lessons Learned - AMSE is critical in the performance of servicing and maintenance on the aircraft and reliable equipment is required. 10. (U) Issue - PARTS STORAGE SPACE Discussion - Given the length of the deployment, there was insufficient infrastructure in place for the storage of spare parts and equipment. LRPs spare engine, prop and APU were stored under a mod tent for 18 months. With the high temperatures and humidity of the operating environment, this equipment will likely experience rust out prematurely. In addition, the mod tent was damaged, and the spare parts exposed during a severe rain I wind I lightning storm in April 2003. All major aircraft spares had to be tagged unserviceable and will require a shop inspection before installation. FLIRs (and their associated shipping containers) return to Canada with significant signs of corrosion from exposure. Recommendations - A climate controlled shelter/building has to be made available for the storage of critical / expensive items. Lessons Learned - Temporary shelters are not suitable for the storage of aircraft parts. The exposure to sand / rain / wind leads to premature corrosion of the components. A5- 5 / 5 SECRET 000042 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def Appendix 6 to Annex A - LRP Roto 2 3180-1 (LRP Det CO) 01 July 2003 Lessons Learned - C4I 1. (U) Issue - CAMP MIRAGE COMMAND AND CONTROL Discussion - The C2 arrangements for Camp Mirage did not support the long-standing principal of "Ops Primacy," thus detracting from safe and effective mission completion. Four independent units (NSU, TAL, LRP and NCCIS) shared Camp Mirage and each reported directly to Comd JTF SWA. The CO of NSU was designated Camp Commandant (as a full Colonel, he out-ranked all other COs on Camp). This relationship divorced the responsibility for resources and Camp focus from the Chain of Command. TAL and LRP COs were responsible for safe and effective operations, yet they lacked sufficient control over the resources to support it. CO NSU had authority to direct the application of resources, thus he occasionally found himself caught between the direction from Higher Headquarters, and the requests from the air Det CO's. However, CO NSU had no responsibility for the mission success (or failure), nor for the safety of the flying operation. Quite simply, it was a case of authority without responsibility. Recommendations - In the future, such Camps should be commanded by an Operational Commander. Within 1 CAD, the Wing concept exemplifies this very notion: the Commander fights his Wing. While APOLLO was a Joint operation, this Air Force model remains valid, as the Camp Commander could be an Operator (who would be better able to appreciate the Operational Imperatives and weigh against safety or mission risk) from any service. Indeed, there are examples in Canada where a Wing Commander has non- Air Force forces under his command. 19 Wing is a case in point, where the WComd commands a marine unit as well as the Sqns. It is not the intent to exploit this lesson learned to point fingers over relatively minor incidents. Quite simply, there were occasions where NSU's requirements and priorities were inconsistent with those of the Operational Units (TAL and LRP), and ops suffered as a result. Lessons Learned - Ops primacy must remain the cornerstone of Command and Control arrangements, and Command authority must never be severed from the responsibility for mission accomplishment. 2. (C) Issue - PORTABLE WING LEVEL C2 Discussion - Once the crew briefing was completed and the aircraft was out of UHF radio range, Mission Support had limited accessibility to the mission being conducted. Unclassified communications were sent and received via Iridium, and other than the real-time chat network with certain coalition ships so-fitted, no secure comms were available. Traditionally secure comms were maintained through use of CRATT, yet there was no provision for this service in theatre. Recommendations - A portable data interpretation analysis center (P-DIAC, or WOPS) is required to execute Wing-level control of operations from austere locations, and to provide effective mission support. This would include a secure link directly to the aircraft. If HF (either for CRATT or Datalink) is to be considered, emissions security to transmit HF frequencies in the vicinity of a secure Ops Office would need to be accounted for in the system design. Lessons Learned - A portable Wing level C2 (P-DIAC) is required to maintain a secure link with aircraft during missions. A6 -1 / 5 000043 �s.15(1) Def Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET 3. (C) Issue - DEPLOYABLE COALITION NETWORKING Discussion - The move away from traditional message based C2 towards net-centric warfare is a well developed trend. However, DDIOs simply direct NCCIS to provide DWAN, TITAN and STU III capabilities. These National systems fell short of our requirements. Over the course of APOLLO we gained access to without which we would have been severely hampered in our ability to carry out assigned missions. To their credit, NCCIS responded to every request for assistance and saw that these systems were well maintained. However, this was all done on an ad hoc basis. When it was determined that LRP Det was to operate from an austere location, initial planning should have foreseen these requirements, and the TO&E adjusted accordingly. Recommendations - The Air Force should develop and maintain a secure, deployable networking capability, able to respond to the needs and releasability of an emerging coalition. Eg, while AFCCIS/TITAN may meet the needs of routine peacetime ops, we should have the capability to deploy and support at least a Wing Level networking capability, able to be adapted to the coalition network of the day. Accordingly, while the system would likely be based on traditional COTS products (eg MS Office), the releasability of the system would not be determined until the members of the Coalition are named. Further, aside from the hard and software, plans should include the means to achieve sufficient bandwidth to ensure effective communications. In the context of this discussion, Wing Level implies While each community (Ftr/LRP/TAL, etc) will have differing requirements, a centrally controlled 1 CAD capability should be able to respond to each in kind, and would provide the basis for a Op Level CFACC/CAOC should that be required to meet a National or Coalition emergency. In the National context, Op Level planners (CFJOG?) should likewise prepare to field an Op Level secure networking capability to meet the needs of Coalition warfare. Along the same vein, while the Air Force should take responsibility for fielding an organic capability, DDIOs should direct that NCCIS support this capability when the CF deploys joint forces. Lessons Learned - Net-centric warfare is here to stay, thus we must be prepared to operate in this environment if we are to stay relevant. 4. (C) Issue - MESSAGE HANDLING AND DISSEMINATION Discussion -1 A6- 2 / 5 S EC R ET 000044 �s.15(1) Def Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'occes a I'information S E C R ET In effect, the MSOs spent more time on clerical duties than they did maintaining SA. Given the very basic systems NCCIS deployed with, they provided the best support they could with However, the messaging system was simply inadequate to meet tne needs of our operation. The detachment requires Recommendations - Lessons Learned - The volume of information in modern warfare demands that automation be exploited to ensure decision makers have the right facts when they need them. 5. (C) Issue - LEGAL ISSUES - LAW OF THE SEA AND LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT Discussion - The current Use of Force manual lacks clear guidance on basic and theatre specific LOS issues, forcing deployed Commanders to repeatedly seek direction from AJAG, HHQ and DFAIT. Although Canadian forces have been operating in the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman for well over ten years, this Unit could not find a standing document or publication to describe what territorial waters Canada respects in the AOR. Likewise, there is no published direction regarding which waterways are considered International Straits by Canada, and subsequently no direction on how such Straits should be treated by ships aircraft. Further, this Unit was unable to obtain charts suitable for navigation that had TTW boundaries pre-plotted, thus individual Crews were forced to manually plot same, raising the potential for an error and subsequent TTW violation. Further, basic definitions such as "Innocent Passage” and "Transit Passage" are not included in the Use of Force Manual. Of great concern was the discovery of a previous Roto's briefing package that indicated Innocent Passage was acceptable for aircraft. Needless to say, this was immediately corrected. The lack of this published direction leads to unnecessary queries, and worse yet, the potential for subordinate Commanders to apply ROE inconsistently. A6 - 3 / 5 000045 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information SECRET s.15(1) Def Recommendations - To ensure all deployed forces are operating with the same set of basic facts and thus interpreting ROE in the same manner, suggest that the following items should be included as an Annex within the Use of Force Manual: a. Definitions of Innocent Passage and Transit Passage, including which units (ships vs aircraft) may exercise which. b. A list of countries by AOR, indicating what limit Canada recognizes or respects regarding TTW. c. A list of Straits which Canada recognizes as International Straits for the purpose of exercising Transit Passage. d. The production of suitable plotting charts (1:500,000 and 1:1,000,000) scale with TTW boundaries pre-plotted by Hydrographic Services. These should be of a quality that allows them to be used for navigation. Lessons Learned - ROE direction must be clear and complete, with HHQ providing amplifying guidance to ensure same. For regions such as SWA, which has seen on-going CF operations for over a decade, and will likely for some time to come. It would be much more efficient to have this direction published in a standing document than having to re-invent the wheel each time a force is dispatched to the theatre. 6. (C) Issue-ATO ISSUES Discussion - During the start of hostilities against Iraq (OIF), the OEF CFACC used an ATO in the Arabian Gulf, while operations over water in the Gulf of Oman were still using the Green rainform to task missions. In order to prepare for the possibility that we might be tasked via ATOs, we initiated a search for methods to obtain, parse, and disseminate the information in the ATO database. Problems arose with all three of these tasks. The ATO, as a whole, was over 250 pages of information, and was sent electronically. Bandwidth coming into the Camp would not be able to handle such a large file. Our U.S. Liaison officer was, for a time, walking over to the American operations to download the ATO onto a zip disk from jNext, we were unable to parse the information into useful information for specific LRP flights. Problems and delays arose with trying to obtain software for this use, and the classified (TITAN) computers themselves did not have updated versions of office software to install the programs. Finally, training of the ATO process and manipulation was needed, however, none of the MSOs had previous experience in working with an ATO. Recommendations - Ideally, all 1 CAD units will switch to an ATO based tasking system, thus it will be second nature to our personnel. Until such time, ATO manipulation should be included in MSO training prior to deployment. It is also recommended that there be sufficient bandwidth capabilities to up and download large amounts of information. A6 - 4 / 5 SECRET 000046 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET Lessons Learned - Had the ATO process been implemented for LRP operations, mission effectiveness and preparation would have suffered. In addition, there was potential for incidents to occur due to the inability to receive and integrate ATO information into briefings. A6 - 5 / 5 SECRET 000047 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET Appendix 7 to Annex A - LRP Roto 2 3180-1 (LRP Det CO) 01 July 2003 Lessons Learned - Training 1. (U) Issue - THEATRE SPECIFIC TRAINING -OPERATIONS Discussion - The training value of the QMS scenarios was very poor for theatre operations. While it was expected that the initial serials would be rather generic, owing to a lack of awareness of the theatre and the missions, subsequent training should have adapted more quickly to the evolving mission. In an attempt to assist in this process, the LRP Det passed up to date briefings and packages back to Canada. The mission and the players changed significantly during the early part of our Roto, but it was a simple matter to transmit these materials via TITAN, thus ensure the Crews had the latest and best info shortly before departure. Recommendations - A briefing binder from the theatre should be sent to units as a training tool to prepare the incoming crews. This would include Operations Directives and current message traffic. This was done twice during ROTO 2 and allowed for the familiarization of message traffic and specific operations procedures. In addition, an aircrew "gouge sheet", pertinent information that may not otherwise be communicated to new crews, should be sent to incoming crews in order to prepare for deployment. Lessons Learned - Crew preparation for missions in theatre can be greatly enhanced by timely input from the deployed Det. Briefings, messaging, and notes should be sent continually to the squadrons. 2. (C) Issue - HQ/MSO PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING Discussion - There is a requirement for key HQ staff and Mission Support personnel to have Battle Staff Training prior to deployment. For example, throughout the course of this ROTO there were unending discussions between the Det and the OPCON authority on the need for missions to be tasked via an ATO. One of the larger drawbacks in the event missions would be tasked via an ATO was the lack of organic expertise within the Det. There was a large variance in the exposure to and expertise in working in these fields, i.e., some had had Battle Staff courses or had experience in major exercises, and some had no previous experience. This lack of a standard knowledge and skill level directly resulted in certain personnel being forced to assume a greater workload. If pre-deployment Battle Staff training had been conducted in these areas all ops support personnel could have been employed to their full potential. Additional problems associated with this topic relating to hardware and software requirements can be found in the C4I appendix. Training in related areas such as ROE and Air Ops law issues such as TTW must also be addressed in the same manner. This Det relied on the expertise provided by the Legal Advisor to brief our crews appropriately but these topics are best discussed over long periods so that a variety of scenarios and possible course of action are well known and understood by all Flight Ops personnel. Opportunities exist during exercises to ensure that additional personnel get at least a basic understanding of some of these issues. There are also cadres with expertise in the Warfare Centres that may be utilized. TraditionaIly this type of training is provided to a select number of senior officers, however, in practice, it is the junior officer that must apply the principles and procedures. A7 - 1 / 4 SECRET 000048 ■ �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'informotion s.15(1) Def SECRET Recommendations - Units, Squadrons, and the Air Force as a whole, should make Battle Staff training available to a wider range of personnel. In addition, they should implement quotas to ensure that personnel deployed either in a similar situation to Op APOLLO or in a Vanguard scenario are fully trained to provide complete mission support. Lessons Learned - HQ and Mission Support personnel need to receive Battle Staff training. 3. (U) Issue - PORTABILITY OF QUALIFICATIONS - COMBAT READY CREWS Discussion - The CTD directs that crew qualifications are not portable when a crew reaches Combat Ready (CADM 30-300, Chap 3, para 9d). It also states that crews are only qualified for operations outside of Canada in Times of Tension and War if they hold that qualification (CADM 30-300, Chap 2, para 5). This means that should any key member of the crew be unable to fly a given mission the crew would degrade to Operations Ready readiness state at best. The CTD implies that the crew would then no longer be capable of participating in missions. Experience during Op Apollo has shown that it is possible to substitute personnel of similar training and experience and still maintain an effective, combat capable crew. It was also noted that it would not have been possible to maintain the mission completion record if it had been necessary to use only crews that met the strict guidelines for Combat Ready. This section of the CTD is unnecessarily restrictive. Adherence to this rule will significantly increase administration burden without providing any significant benefit in performance. Recommendations - The CTD should be amended to allow for the substitution of similarly qualified key crewmembers for operational missions at the discretion of the Det commander while maintaining the Combat Ready status. Lessons Learned - While crew integrity is a vital part of the readiness equation for LRP crews, it is both practical from a personnel management point of view and effective from a readiness standpoint, to have qualified personnel fill in for key crewmembers. 4. (U) Issue - COMBAT READINESS DESIGNATION VS MISSION SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS Discussion - The readiness requirements necessary to achieve Combat Ready were excessive and unnecessary for successful employment in Operation Apollo. To achieve Combat Ready status,, and therefore become employable on operations outside Canada in Times of Tension and War (CADM 30-300 Chap 2, para 5), crews have to achieve all seven Readiness Qualifications, which included skills that were extremely unlikely to be used in Operation Apollo. These included By preparing for missions that were unlikely, the training period was lengthened and resources were unnecessarily expended without a resultant increase in mission effectiveness. Recommendations - The CTD readiness definitions should be modified to allow the Force Employer to determine those Readiness Qualifications that are essential to the operation. Those would then form the minimum for a crew to be considered Combat Ready and therefore deployable. A7 - 2 / 4 S ECRET 000049 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information s.15(1) Def SECRET Lessons Learned - The CTD should be flexible enough to allow for tailoring of readiness requirements to the operation in order to keep training costs to a minimum. A word of caution: ideally all our crews will strive to achieve and maintain qualifications in all warfare areas, yet, at times, this is neither practical nor possible. However, the LRP community must learn from the Airlift experience, in which the number and complexity of crew qualifications unduly restricted employment during APOLLO. Put simply, the Readiness system should support the generation of Crews that can be employed in any reasonably foreseeable mission during the deployment in question. If there is very little/almost no likelihood that a given capability will be required, then the FG should not be required to see that qualification is achieved before declaring the force Op Ready. However, if there is a reasonable chance the capability will be required during the deployment, we definitely do not want to see lame duck crews arrive in theatre. 5. (C) Issue - CTD AMMENDMENTS REQUIRED FOR NEW CAPABILITIES Discussion - The CTD did not require the demonstration of proficiency of some new equipment, such as the Digital Camera and the Iridium Satellite phone, which were used in Op Apollo. Although individuals were trained in their use, the CTD did not demand the crews to train or qualify with the new equipment. This effectively meant that crews became proficient on the new equipment "on the job," resulting in reduced mission effectiveness. Not all the new equipment will have a requirement for inclusion in the CTD as it may already be encompassed by the existing Readiness Qualifications or individual proficiency requirements. Each new piece of equipment should be examined separately to determine if crew training is required. If such a requirement exists the CTD should be amended to reflect the new readiness requirement. The digital camera is a classic case in in point, in that crews were required to achieve Combat Quals using wet film (35mm and Belly Camera), yet used neither of these cameras in theatre - only the digital camera was employed operationally. Recommendations - The CTD should incorporate new equipment into the Readiness Qualifications as soon as there is a demonstrated crew proficiency requirement in excess of that for the individual operators. Lessons Learned - All skills that require a crew proficiency vice an individual proficiency should be included in the CTD. New equipment must be included a soon as a crew training requirement beyond that already found in the CTD is identified. 6. (C) Issue - Discussion -' A7 - 3 / 4 SECRET 000050 I 1 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def Recommendations - Modify the CTD as a readiness qualification. This can be done by modifying the existing MP qualifications or adding additional ones. versus Lessons Learned - The CTD must recognize the different skills required for and the possibility that LPR crews may be required to exercise those skills. A7 - 4 / 4 SECRET 000051 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information UNCLASSIFIED Appendix 8 to Annex A - LRP ROTO 2 3180-1 (LRP Det CO) 01 July 2003 GOO Gouge Departure: As the FE reaches the plane, he should be following the Hot Weather Ops section of the AOIs. The new procedure will be to pull the Circuit Breakers for the Radar Altimeters and the Radiant Floor Heaters; the floor heaters will most likely be pulled and tagged while the planes are in the gulf. Each morning a met brief will be ready for pick up at the met section. They will have a printed copy of the forecasts/actuals as well as the NOTAMs for the various FIRs that you may be flying in. This is fairly important as you have to scan these to check for various activations of restricted/danger areas. They are fairly easy to plot out. We normally sent one pilot to do the MET/Flight Plan and the other two pilots went to start reading message traffic. The brief is not what we get back home, surprise surprise. They have skimmed through most of the message traffic can come up with a Cliff Notes version. Sometimes the join does not arrive on time, but if you are in the DIMMS, it is usually a safe assumption that it is the same as the day before and the zeros and ones never aligned to get the message here in time. As I am sure you already know, the most important thing here is the onsta time and not the briefed take off time, therefore, you will need to adjust your t/o time to ensure that you are not late, otherwise, same procedure for a dev as back home. As for your flight plan, it needs to be faxed to both Dubai and Minhad tower, and usually followed by a phone call to Dubai. The numbers are all on speed dial in ops. There are a bunch of canned routes on a disk that you will probably get. As per the UAE AIP, “the flight plan for a controlled flight should be amended or a new flight plan submitted in the event of a delay of more than 30 minutes in excess of the estimated off-block time. Failure to amend the flight plan within 45 minutes will result in automatic flight plan cancellation.” Trust me, this is a pain. This must be done with Dubai, either by phone or radio. If this is not done, a new plan must be filed and this will result in a 40 minute delay. (10 minutes to walk in, fax and 30 minutes for the new time). Not too great when the CO is breathing down your neck. And many times, they will still require you to fax a new flight plan anyways. A8 - 1 / 5 UNCLASSIFIED 000052 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information UNCLASSIFIED • • • • • Arm the SKAD first (this keeps it quiet in the Bomb Bay - and the ground crew are not in your way while doing it) Start the APU (this is the signal for the ground crew to show up) Close the Bomb-Bay Doors (we have been losing power carts at the most inopportune time by turning on the hydraulic pumps - does not make sense) Disconnect ground power Disconnect ground air (do this last - I don’t think I need to say why) For starting engines, I recommend you call ground prior to the on board check. Sometimes it takes them 10-20 minutes to give you start clearance, and some times they even forget to call you back. Be aware, if you call during prayers, it could take 20 minutes. They are very polite. Telling you how to suck eggs. “Minhad ground, this is MD302, request engine starts 14, souls on board" From the CO, always try to use the word request... "Request clearance for...” You can expect them to mumble back stby, and eventually, cleared engine starts, with the altimeter setting. Normally, you can get your clearance from ground during taxi. "Minhad ground MD302 ready to copy IFR clearance” If you use the old standing by airways, he will most likely leave you standing... IFR Clearance: will normally be “cleared to destination Minhad 09 departure, squawk, contact Dubai 124.45 airborne” On departure, you will be glad to hear a Brit on the radios, very easy to understand. If departing rwy 09, they usually keep you on rwy heading until a few miles out, and then they clear you to your next point. If on rwy 27, it can get busy as they will turn you towards Dubai (from what we have seen) and then back towards TONVO. When level, you will contact UAE Control on 124.85 and approaching TONVO, Muscat on 128.15 prior to chopping. Muscat is a bit harder to understand, basically all they want from you is when you are going "tactical”. Sometimes they will ask you to remain that freq, all you have to tell them is “sorry, we have to change radio freqs” Transition altitude in the UAE is FL 145, and they will not (in the time we tried) approve 14,000 as an altitude. IN THE AREA: You have most likely plotted out the airspace that has showed up in the NOTAMs. There has been much discussion on what to do with areas that are not in the NOTAMs. Basically, the concept of DUE REGARD applies here, as these are international waters, ie 12 miles. However due regard means just that, it is not a licence to fly around blindly without talking to people. Typically in the GOO, we put a 30 mile MEZ around Fujiharah and a 50 mile MEZ around Muscat. For Fuj, the American and British charts generally depict the same thing Class C airspace above 1500 feet. They do differ though, one says it tops at 7500 the other at 9500 feet. So, just ensure you are outside 30 nm prior to going tactical and descending. As for Muscat, the base does differ. On the British A8 - 2 / 5 UNCLASSIFIED 000053 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information UNCLASSIFIED chart, they divide the TCA into sectors. Inside 50 miles, the base is 4500 ft and inside 25 miles the base is 2500 feet. On the American charts, they depict the base as 1500. Both depict the top as FL250. As for in the GOO, most of your time will be spent in Muscats FIR which starts at the surface. They understand you will be off their freq, and it is no problem to call them up asking for flight following. You may be called by the Royal Omani Air Force on guard. Usually all they want to know is that you are a coalition aircraft - then they leave you alone. As for the restricted/danger areas, when we showed up we were told, if it is not in the NOTAMs, don’t worry about it. Great information, mostly correct. Remember we talked about 12 miles, high seas -> due regard... -> Legally we can go in these restricted areas without talking to anyone, but do we want to? Some are in the NOTAMs, some are not. GOO Areas: OOD37 - This airspace is typically seen in the NOTAMs, we avoide it when active. OID80 - never saw it in the NOTAMs, always flew in it. OID55 - Same as D37 - stayed out when active OOD 38 - Should be about 5 or 6 to the east while in Shark Fin. Straits of Hormuz: OOD38 - You should be about 8 miles to the east on a straits passage. OID18 - never saw it in the NOTAMs - Should be on the edge during a straits passage. OOR15 - You will be a couple miles to the North of this area on a straits passage. However a Sea King had problems while operating in this area - they were called on guard...-Awaiting further instruction from NDHQ. OID53 - You will skirt the bottom edge on a straits passage. OID44 - activated by NOTAMs - Straits passage will go through this. OMR 57,58,60 - These 3 areas are extensive helo ops from sfc to 3500 and 4500 feet depending on the are you are in. I recommend checking in with Dubai on 124.45 for some sort of flight following. There is a freq that you will get from ops, 126.4. I have not tried that freq and unsure how it works - It is like 126.7 back home. Use the centre NAG/CAG/SAG Further up in the gulf, there are not many areas that are of concern. The furthest we got was 28N, so I will not comment past there. Bahrain’s TCA needs to be avoided. We treated it like Fuj and Muscat and put a 40 mile MEZ around it. The British charts depict it from 1000 agl to FL 170, which matches the American charts. Another crew said they were happy if you were below 2000 feet in A8 - 3 / 5 UNCLASSIFIED 000054 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information UNCLASSIFIED international water. Again, if you must enter under due regard, keep comms with centre for flight following. When searching in the vicinity of oil rigs/fields, stay on top > 1500 ft unless well clear, or if it is only an isolated rig. (From the CO) Coming Home: When returning from the GOO, we have not had much luck calling up Muscat and getting cleared back to MINHAD via FUJ. They always want us to follow our filed flight plan. One thing to make sure is that you do not come over Omani (land) airspace on the way home. By the way, this is near impossible. They always fly you over Omani territory on they way home. We have tried many times, no luck. Avoid if possible. While at altitude, the plane must be vacuumed. When returning from the SAG, Dubai will give you a very straight forward clearance. Local Weather will be text messaged to the plane 30 minutes prior to off station time. A handy feature.... Landing: Upon landing, you will need to watch the temps in reverse. The CO does not want us to use brakes on the landing roll out, for 2 reasons. 1. Hot Brakes, 2. Tough to change them here. You may be wondering Hot Brakes? Well, if they are already warm to begin with.... Once at a good speed, we roll the flaps up for the taxi back in. We shut the landing lights off around the “your yolk call” This should help them from overheating on the ground. Roll the flaps down again when in the final parking spot. When stopped. The aircraft must be emptied. This includes all rations, garbage and lavatory items (yes the shitter is your responsibility. - recommend telling all pax - they use it, they clean it, prior to flight) Calling the Camp from the Plane 0016139967811 Trunk 2162 Local 00971502284000 ext 40177 gets Camp Operator and then the local 42 or 43 or 48 instead of 50 A8 - 4 / 5 UNCLASSIFIED 000055 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information UNCLASSIFIED Calling a Cell 0097150 and then the Cell MSP OFC MFC CO____ CWO INTO LRP WO Local 4104 4101 4061 4100 4102 4105 4204 Cell 624- 5627 625- 0878 624-5592 624-5621 644-5863 624-0850 Calling Bahrain 00973 and then the 7 digit number. A8 - 5 / 5 UNCLASSIFIED 000056 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET s.15(1) Def Appendix 9 to Annex A - LRP Roto 2 3180-1 (LRP Det CO) 01 Jul 2003 Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare Centre FMO Halifax, NS B3K 2X0 MTA: 3250-6 (TAC) 13 June 2003 Applicable to: AWC Distribution List MARITIME TACTICAL NOTE XXX SELF PROTECTION MANEUVRES - CP140 AURORA Reference: A: NIMROD Tactics Manual Section 8 B: Liaison LRP Det SWA/RAAF P3 Det SWA INTRODUCTION Traditionally it was assumed that the CP140 would always remain clear of threats during a conflict due to its - Conflicts, such as the Gulf War and the Campaign Against Terrorism have proven that LRPA may have to enter areas where friendly air superiority is not established. When asymmetric threats are present in the theatre, such as a terrorist threat, the tactical problem becomes that much more difficult to deal with when applying traditional self-defence procedures, such as Normally a CP140 would not be expected to probe too far inside however if the threat to the surface force was immediate with no other assets avaiiaoie, it is conceivable that LRPA would be put at risk. Whereas the CP140 normally operated from secure aerodromes, the move away from Cold War scenarios and with the transition from MP to LRP raises the spectre of facing threats overhead home plate, during transit and throughout the on station period. This TACNOTE provides suggested self protection maneuvers for areas of operation that would make the CP140 most vulnerable to attack. 1. This TACNOTE is divided into two sections as follows: a. Section 1.1 - Surface Threats and Evasion 1.2 - IR Threats b. Section 2.1 - Airborne Threats and Evasion 2.2 - Defensive Action Plan 2. Comment on this TACNOTE is invited IAW TACNOTE ONE. 3. This TACNOTE was submitted by LRP DET SWA ROTO2. A9- 1/20 SECRET 000057 �Pages 58 to I a 76 are withheld pursuant to section sont retenues en vertu de Particle 15(1) Def of the Access to Information Act de la Loi sur I'acces a ('information �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information UNCLAS Annex B to 3180-1 (CO LRP Det) dated 01 Jul 03 LRP DET ROTO 2 TO&E - PERSONNEL ESTABLISHMENTS 1. Authorized Establishment: a. ROTO 2 deployed 70 personnel from an establishment of 74. The four shortfall positions are described in para 2. a. of this section. b. Of the 70 personnel initially deployed, two AESOps positions were restricted (14 Mar 03) due to manageable ops intensity. Further, five positions were transferred to TAL's TO&E (19 Jun 03) due to the requirement to maintain a robust ATIC combined with LRP closure. The recommended TO&E changes were developed and forwarded to NCE TAMPA J1. c. Therefore, the current authorized establishment for the LRP Det is 67 military members. Details of the TO&E can be found at Annex C. 2. Posted Strength: On the Detachment's last day of Operations, 19 Jun 03, the posted strength was 63 personnel as delineated below: HQ Ops Crews MSO MAI NT HQ MAI NT Crews 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 8 X LCol XCWO X Maj X Capt X Lt XWO X Maj/Capt/Lt X Maj/Capt/Lt 6 X WO/Sgt/MCpI 4 X WO/Sgt 3 X Capt 1 XSgt 1 X Maj/Capt 1 XMWO 1 XCpI 2 X MCpI/CpI 3 XSgt 21 X MCpI/CpI Det CO Det CWO Ops Fit Comd D/Ops Fit Comd Ops O Ops Fit WO Pilots Tacnavs/Navcoms/ ASOs AESOPs Fit Engineers CMSO/MSO MSA MFC D/MFC ACS Tech AMCRO Crew Chiefs Techs 3. Attachments and Detachments: Not Applicable B1/2 UNCLAS 000077 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information UNCLAS Annex B to 3180-1 (CO LRP Det) dated 01 Jul 03 LRP DET ROTO 2 TO&E - PERSONNEL SHORTAGES Three LRP ROTO 2 positions were restricted as they were originally assessed to be required only if the detachment was tasked consistently in an ASW role: one D/Ops O, position 243113; one Mission Support Officer, position 243050; and one EW Analyst, position 252652. Upon deployment, one CMSO, position 243047, was not filled due to medical restriction. This position number was ultimately left vacant after administrative repatriation of replacement member on 31 May 03. B2/2 UNCLAS 000078 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'ac'ces a I'information PROTECTED A Appendix to Annex B 3180-1 (CO LRP Det) dated 01 Jul 03 LRP DET ROTO 2 PERSONNEL s.19(1) POSITION ID DESCRIPTION SOURCE 243028 243031 243029A000 243029B000 243032 243107 243113 243123. 243030A000 24303QB000 243030C000 243030D000 243228A000 243228B000 243228C000 243228D000 243223A000 243223B000 243223C000 243223D000 243221A000 243221B000 243221C000 243221D000 243218A000 243218B000 243218C000 243218D000 243161A000 243161B000 DET COMP DET CWO OPSO OPSO OPS FLIGHT WO OPS FLT COMP D/OPS FLT COMP D/OPS O _TN_ ______ TN_ _ TN ______ TN______ AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP___ AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP L/AESOP L/AESOP L/AESOP L/AESOP FLT ENGR FLT ENGR AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG START DATE 28-Dec-02 28-Dec-02 4-Jan-03 9-Mar-03 4-Jan-03 30-Dec-02 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG END DATE SN SURNAME INIT RANK MOC UIC IA CA LCol 32 CWO 526 Capt 31 Lt 31 WO 81 31 Maj Capt 31 2552 2552 2552 2552 2555 2561 2561 OUELLET SMITH JLR CR Capt Capt 31 31 2555 2552 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 DESROCHES BEDFORD JT KA Sgt MWO 81 81 102 2552 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 BULL TD MCpI 81 2555 AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 KING HATFIELD FR LR MCpI WO 81 81 2555 2552 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 LERETTE GILFILLAN SHP GM Sgt Sgt 81 81 2555 2552 AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 GALLANT AD Sgt 91 2555 4-Jul-03 4-Jul-03 11-Mar-03 4-Jul-03 4-JUI-03 ~4-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 BIGELOW BROWN BERTRAND FORGET DOUCETTE MCLEOD STEPHENSON FG TN RA L JR B1-1/9 PROTECTED A 000079 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information PROTECTED A Appendix to Annex B 3180-1 (CO LRP Det) dated 01 Jul 03 LRP DET ROTO 2 PERSONNEL FLT ENGR 243161C000 243161D000I FLT ENGR 243160A000 FLT ENGR 243160B000 FLT ENGR FLT ENGR 243160C000 243160D000 FLT ENGR 243140A000 FO FO 243140B000 FO 243140C000 243140D000 _FO _ 243139A000 FO 243139B000 FO FO 243139C000 243139D000 FO 243138A000 MPC/MPCC 243138B000 MPC/MPCC MPC/MPCC 243138C000 243138D000 MPC/MPCC 243117A000 ASO B 243117B0Q0 ASO B 243117C000 ASO B_ ASOB 243117D000 ASO A 243115A000 243115B00Q ASO A ASO A 243115C000 243115D000 ASO A 243112A000 NC 243112B000 NC 243112C000 NC 243112D000 NC AESOP 243483A000 243483B000 AESOP s.19(1) AIRCOM/19 WG 25-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 TRUESDELL SW Sgt 91 2552 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 JENKINS CASHMAN LF PL Sgt MWO 91 91 2555 2552 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 DUMONT SHAWAGA JRP TD Capt Capt 32 32 2555 2552 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 BACKHOUSE HENDRICKS Capt TR Capt 32 32 102 2552 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 WAGSTAFF REAUME _JD GF Maj LCol 32 32 2555 133 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 FUGGER FAULKNER KO JR Lt Capt 31 31 2555 2552 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 JUTRAS WRIGHT JPM JA Capt Capt 31 31 2555 2552 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 PENNER CASTONGUAY EJ JRP Capt Capt 31 31 2555 2552 AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 ___!INMAN MACDONNELL DL JH CpI MCpI 81 81 2552 2561 B1-2/9 PROTECTED A 000080 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information PROTECTED A Appendix to Annex B 3180-1 (CO LRP Det) dated 01 Jul 03 LRP DET ROTO 2 PERSONNEL 243483C000 243483D000 243238A000 243238B000 243238C000 243238D000 243236A000 243236B000 243236C000 243236D000 243234A000 243234B000 243234C000 243234D000 243163A000 243163B000 243163C000 243163D000 243162A000 243162B000 243162C000 243162D000 243143A000 243143B000 243143C000 243143D000 243142A000 243142B000 243142C000 243142D000 243141A000 243141B000 AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP L/AES OP L/AES OP L/AES OP L/AES OP FLT ENGR FLT ENGR FLT ENGR FLT ENGR FLT ENGR FLT ENGR FLT ENGR FLT ENGR FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO MPC/MPCC MPC/MPCC s.19(1) AIRCOM/14 WG 9-May-03 8-Jul-03 AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 9-May-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 20-Jun-03 SCHNABEL TETU FRASER AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 9-May-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 20-Jun-03 CHISLETT ASTLES LAPORTE VC JC JLM AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 9-May-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 20-Jun-03 RAITHBY MURPHY NELSON WW DE GD AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 9-May-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 20-Jun-03 NEVETT SEABROOK DERHAK AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 9-May-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 20-Jun-03 LEVESQUE BALOGH LECLERC AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 9-May-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 20-Jun-03 FORD HUMBER PUBLICOVER AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 9-May-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 20-Jun-03 AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 81 81 81 2552 2561 102 WO WO WO 81 81 81 2552 2561 2555 Sgt Sgt Sgt 81 81 81 2552 2554 2555 PE Sgt RW WO KP MWO 91 91 91 2552 2552 2555 JF Sgt FA CWO JWD Sgt 91 91 91 2552 102 2555 DR LJ DB Capt Maj Capt 32 32 32 2552 2555 2555 DESILETS LOURME REIMER AKH GP LG Capt Maj Capt 32 32 32 2552 2561 2555 MAELAND WIGHT BF KE Capt Capt 32 32 2552 2561 M WO JRRJ MCpI MWO B1-3/9 PROTECTED A 000081 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information PROTECTED A appendix to Annex B 3180-1 (CO LRP Det) dated 01 Jul 03 LRP DET ROTO 2 PERSONNEL MPC/MPCC 243141C000 243141D000 MPC/MPCC 243126A000 243126B000 243126C000 243126D000 243124A000 243124B000 243124C000 243124D000 243120A000 243120B000 243120C000 243120D000 243110A000 243110B000 243110C000 243110DQ00 243119 243128 243133 243136 243157 243158 243159 243164 243240 243242 243245 243247 244370 243047 s.19(1) 3AMERONKELLY MR Capt 32 2555 LITTLE COUTURE MATHESON CE JLG KM Capt Lt Lt 31 31 31 2552 2561 2555 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 20-Jun-03 ROMANS PARISIEN DEBRUYN ER SV RJ Capt Capt Capt 31 31 31 2552 2561 2555 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 9-May-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 20-Jun-03 NEGENMAN NYCHOLAT ALBERT RH DE RF Capt Capt Capt 31 31 31 2552 2561 2555 AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 9-May-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 20-Jun-03 ROBERTSON VINET COOPER AM RJ DG Capt Capt Capt 31 31 31 2552 2561 2555 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 19-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 20-Apr-03 HONE PLOURDE MOORE KENNEY BOURGON COTE MACDONALD GIGNAC DONEGAN KEEPING LEGERE SMART OKEEFE FENSKE JRR JRS DM KC JGJP GJE SD KD MG RWT RJ BK LA JP Capt Capt Capt Capt Maj Capt Capt WO Sgt MCpI MCpI MCpI Sgt Capt 31 31 31 31 32 32 32 91 81 81 81 81 91 31 2561 2561 2561 2561 2561 2561 2561 2561 2561 2561 2561 2561 2561 2552 AIRCOM/14 WG 9-May-03 20-Jun-03 ASO B ASO B 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4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 20-Dec-02 30-Dec-02 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 31-May-03 8-Jul-03 26-Jun-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 19-Jun-03 19-Jul-03 12-Jun-03 19-Jun-03 26-Jun-03 17-Jun-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 26-Jun-03 8-Jul-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 GOULD MCDONNELL MACMILLAN 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 GOGUEN BRUMSEY NEALE 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 TUOHY HEITMANN FROST MCLEAN TURPIN COBB HOWLETT FOWLER WESTERN WARR BERNARD VICTOR CHEMIJ WALDNER REID ' BISHOP RIDGEWAY OR _D_ RA CpI CpI B1-5/9 PROTECTED A 000083 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information PROTECTED A Appendix to Annex B 3180-1 (CO LRPDet) dated 01 Jul 03 LRP DET ROTO 2 PERSONNEL AVN 243356C000 AVN 243356D000 PROPULSION 243286A000 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3233 3233 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 CHILDS VIDITO CHILDS WS BL WS Sgt Sgt Sgt 514 526 514 3233 3233 3233 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 KRESKY GREENING DURETTE HASKELL WOOLRIDGE DB SK JP HF IC CpI CpI MCpI MCpI CpI 526 526 514 514 514 3233 3233 3233 3233 3233 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 7-Mar-03 2-May-03 8-Jul-03 4-Mar-03 11-Mar-03 6-May-03 1-Jul-03 CpI 526 3233 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 7-Mar-03 2-May-03 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 7-Mar-03 MACDONALD OLIVER CROZIER RR SJ MCpI CpI 526 514 3233 3233 11-Mar-03 6-May-03 1-Jul-03 DILLON WHEATON GOGUEN AC SA JR MCpI 526 CpI 526 MCpI 526 3233 3233 3233 11-Mar-03 6-May-03 BUGLAR SMITH CJ 514 526 3233 3233 CpI CpI B1-6/9 PROTECTED A 000084 �Document 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CJ MCpI Sgt CpI 514 565 514 3233 3233 3233 11-Mar-03 6-May-03 1-Jul-03 PAYNE COLE KRESKY WM _RA DB MCpI 514 MCpI 514 CpI 526 3233 3233 3233 4-Jan-03 7-Mar-03 2-May-03 11-Mar-03 6-May-03 1-Jul-03 NESBITT TEILLET NESBITT PA MP PA Sgt Sgt Sgt 526 514 526 3233 3233 3233 AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 21-Mar-03 16-May-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 25-Mar-03 20-May-03 4-Jul-03 OUWENDYK DT CpI 514 2552 STEEL SNELL TH AK CpI CpI 514 514 2552 2552 AIRCOM/19WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 21-Mar-03 16-May-03 25-Mar-03 20-May-03 4-Jul-03 GAUTHIER LILLIE PRIOR JYR BW PP CpI CpI MCpI 526 514 514' 2552 2552 2552 AIRCOM/14 WG 2-May-03 1-Jul-03 YOUDEN LL AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 7-Mar-03 2-May-03 11-Mar-03 6-May-03 1-Jul-03 FOX MACLEOD FOX DA DA DA AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 7-Mar-03 2-May-03 11-Mar-03 6-May-03 1-Jul-03 CROZIER WARD MACDONALD AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 7-Mar-03 2-May-03 11-Mar-03 6-May-03 1-Jul-03 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 7-Mar-03 2-May-03 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG I B1-7/9 PROTECTED A 000085 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information PROTECTED A appendix to Annex B 3180-1 (CO LRP Det) dated 01 Jul 03 LRP DET ROTO 2 PERSONNEL NAVIGATION 243396A000 243396B000 NAVIGATION NAVIGATION 243396C000 NAVIGATION 243396D000 TACTICAL 243392A000 243392B000 TACTICAL TACTICAL 243392C000 243392D000 TACTICAL 243390A000 NAVIGATION 243390B000 NAVIGATION NAVIGATION 243390C000 NAVIGATION 243390D000 243388A000 TACTICAL 243388B000 TACTICAL TACTICAL 243388C000 243388D000 TACTICAL 243382A000 PROPULSION PROPULSION 243382B000 PROPULSION 243382C000 243382D000 PROPULSION 243262A000 CREW CHIEF CREW CHIEF 243262B000 CREW CHIEF 243262C000 CREW CHIEF 243262D000 DET COMP LRP001 DET CWO LRP002 OPSO LRP003 OPS FLIGHT WO LRP004 OPS FLT COMP LRP005 D/OPS FLT COMP LRP006 D/OPS O LRP007 LRP008 CMSO s.19(1) 526 526 526 3233 2552 2552 MCpI 526 CpI 526 CpI 526 2552 2552 2552 514 514 514 2552 2552 2552 SD AS RR CpI 514 MCpI 526 MCpI 526 2552 2552 2552 KEITHMURRAY EDGETT LEWIS DA JG RG MCpI 514 MCpI 514 CpI 514 3233 2552 2552 WALLACE WETMORE PENNEY WT GM MJ 526 526 526 2552 2552 2552 AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 21-Mar-03 16-May-03 11-Mar-03 . 20-May-03 i 4-Jul-03 MCVEIGH KASSAY COMEAU VLD BJ AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 21-Mar-03 16-May-03 25-Mar-03 20-May-03 4-Jul-03 NORMAN AKMENS WALLACE HD EA AD AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 21-Mar-03 16-May-03 25-Mar-03 20-May-03 4-Jul-03 SYKES PIEC SELLSTED SA ML SJ AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 21-Mar-03 16-May-03 25-Mar-03 20-May-03 4-Jul-03 ARCAND WILSON KAZIMER AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 21-Mar-03 16-May-03 25-Mar-03 20-May-03 4-Jul-03 AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 21-Mar-03 16-May-03 25-Mar-03 20-May-03 4-Jul-03 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 AIRCOM/14 WG CpI CpI CpI CpI CpI CpI Sgt Sgt Sgt B1-8/9 PROTECTED A 000086 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I’accis a I'information PROTECTED A Appendix to Annex B 3180-1 (CO LRP Det) dated 01 Jul 03 LRP DET ROTO 2 PERSONNEL MSP LRP009 LRP010 MSP LRP011 ESS INTO LRP012 LRP013 INT OP INT OP LRP014 LRP015 INT OP MSP LRP016 EWC SP ANALYST LRP017 QIC MAINT LRP018 NCO l/C LRP019 TSS LRP020 TSS LRP021 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AI RCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG MSP LRP DET TACNAV AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 260636 260922 8-Jul-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 _______ TAVS 18-May-03 23-Mar-03 4-Apr-03 27-Apr-03 VENNE MCBEAN JRRD| Capt 31 JD Maj 31B 102 2561 s.19(1) B1-9/9 PROTECTED A 000087 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET Annex C - LRP Det Flying Orders Part 1 - JTFSWA LRP DET ORDERS Part 2 - LRP DET CONTINGENCY PLANS SECRET 000088 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information JTFSWA LRP DET ORDERS <0 O ' __ : a'A >» s 0*> o Q 0° SOUTH WEST ASIA ROTO ONE ROTO / 1/32 Ch 3 000089 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /‘information RECORD OF AMENDMENTS AL NO Original Ch 1 Ch 2 Ch 3 AMEND DATE DATE ENTERED SIGNATURE 12 Mar 02 10 Oct 02 19 Mar 03 01 Feb 02 12 Mar 02 10 Oct 02 19 Mar 03 Marley Hogan McLeod 2/32 Ch 3 000090 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information LONG RANGE PATROL DETACHMENT ORDERS TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME 1 - LOCAL FLYING ORDERS VOLUME 2 - CONTINGENCY PLANS (Held in MSO Lockup) VOLUME 1- LOCAL FLYING ORDERS SECTION 100 - GENERAL 100.1 — LRP Detachment and Crew Organization 100.2 - Correspondence 100.3 - Handling of Classified Mail 100.4 - Security 100.5 - Dress 100.6 - Crew Administration 100.7 - Leave Procedure 100.8 - Static Displays - Non-Service Personnel 100.9 - Flight Information Publications (FLIPS) 100.10 - Aviation Credit Card Policy & Directives 100.11 - Telephone Use 100.12 - Critical Incident Stress Management SECTION 101 - AIRCREW ORDERS/FLIGHT OPS 101.1 - Alcoholic Beverages - Consumption 101.2 - Aircrew Information File 101.3 - Monthly/Quarterly Reading File 101.4 - LRP Detachment Weekly Flying Program 101.5 - LRP Detachment Daily Flying Program 101.6 - Operational Flights - Briefing - Debriefing 101.7-CPI/ELT Testing 101.8 - Refuelling Priorities and Safety 101.9 - Operational Flights - Delay 101.10- Operational Flights - Cancellation 101.11- Hot Weather Pre-Flight Procedures 101.12- Engine Start Procedure 101.13- Engine Run 101.14- Landing Lights - Collision Avoidance 101.15 - Post Flight Requirements - Inbound Report 101.16- Vacuuming of Aircraft 101.17 - Flaps after Landing 101.18- Standby 101.19- Authorization and Conduct of Flights 101.20 - MP Crew Commander Authority 101.21 - Mission Reports 101.22 - LRP Detachment Daily Routine 101.23 - Rations and Rations Handling 101.24 - Aircrew Logbooks 101.25 - Personal Equipment/Dual Layer Clothing 101.26 - Aircraft Accidents or Incidents 101.27 - Conduct of OJT Programs 3/32 Ch 3 000091 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information 101.28 - Crew Pubs Bag 101.29 - Iridium Telephone 101.30 - Digital Imagery Upload 101.31 -Emergency Diversion Airfields SECTION 102 - TERMINAL AERODROME - DESCRIPTION 102.1 - Minhad Military Air Traffic Zone 102.2 — Airspace Coordination 102.3 - Radio, Navigation, Radar and Lighting 102.4 - Airfield Information 102.5 - Flight Planning Centre (FPC) 102.6 - VFR Circuit Procedures 102.7 - Special VFR (SVFR) 102.8 - Traffic Pattern 102.9 - Circuit Procedures 102.10 — Go Around and Fly Through Procedures 102.11 - Vehicle Traffic and Aerodrome 102.12 - Radio Frequencies 102.13 - Fuel Dumping - Area and Procedures 102.14 - DICP Review of OMDM 102.15 - Approach Plates Modified iaw DICP Review SECTION 103 - EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES 103.1 - Emergency Response Plan (ERP) 103.2-Crash Equipment SECTION 104 - ARMAMENT SAFETY ORDERS - AIRCREW 104.1 - Armament Safety Orders 104.2 - Parking/Loading Area for Aircraft Loaded with Bomb Bay Stores 104.3 - Loaded Aircraft - Security 104.4 - Sono Launch Tube Restrictions 104.5 - Armament Load - AMRS Certification 104.6 — Signal Underwater Sound (SUS) Charge - Safety Precaution 104.7 - ASW Stores Safety Precautions 104.8 - Action in Event of Hang-up or Misfire 104.9 - Emergency Jettison of Stores 104.10 - Ditching/Crash Landing with Explosives 104.11 - Accident Investigations 104.12- Munitions Handling 104.13 - Uploading/Downloading of Aircraft 104.14 - Arming/De-arming of Aircraft 104.15 - Touch and Go Landing With Ordnance 104.16 - Air Weapons Occurance Reporting 104.17 - Small Arms Procedures On-Board Aircraft 104.18 - Fuel Dump Procedure SECTION 105 - MARITIME PATROL IMP) STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES 105.1 - Six-Hour Standby 105.2 - Two-Hour Standby Launch Procedures 105.3 - One-Hour Standby Requirements 105.4 - One and Two-Hour Standby Aircraft Designation/Use SECTION 106 - AIRCREW PROFICIENCY 106.1 - All Trades 4/32 Ch 3 000092 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acc&s a /'information 106.2-Pilots Attachments (1): 1. JTFSWA LRP Det Flight Safety Program 1010-2 (UFSO) Jun 02 (2) : Aircraft Crash I Significant Incident Response (3) : JTFSWA LRP Det NBC Concept of Operations 3472-2 (NBCO) Sep 02 VOLUME 2 -LRP CONTINGENCY PLANS- (Held in MSO Lockup) 5/32 Ch 3 000093 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information JTFSWA LRP DET ORDERS z^'0N % _)C i > ->2 • « •«. V ■ i .• . ■Jtf ?-*. D° 2 o Q SOUTH WEST ASIA R0T00NE * r /' **V-. VOLUME ONE FLYING ORDERS 6/32 Ch 3 000094 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information 7/32 Ch 3 000095 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information Section 100 GENERAL 100.1 - LRP Detachment and Crew Organization 1. LRP Detachment Organization | COMMANDING OFFICER [ scwo I IF OFC/DCO MFC I | DEP OFC |P D/MFC 1 - Maint Support OPS/O CMSO INTO A CREW CREW 1 MSO’s 4 CREW 2 - OPS WO MSA INT 2/IC J || I EW Supr~]| J[ B CREW C CREW Int Ops | EW Ops | 8/32 Ch 3 000096 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information 2. LRP Det Recall Chart Commanding Officer 4100 624-5592 I Maint Fit Comd 4061 625-5621 I A Crew Chief 4140 552-4948 D/MFC 4140 624-5621 I I B Crew Chief 4140 624-6318 I C Crew Chief 4140 552-4135 Det CWO 4102 458-0122 I I AMCRO ACS 4123 I Ops Fit Comd 4101 624-5627 I OpsO 4109 624-5781 Crew 9 455-3003 Crew 10 655-2513 D/Ops Fit Comd 4109 552-3098 I I CMSO 4104 655-1540 I I ~1 MSO's MSA 4104 4104 I IntO 4105 644-5863 I I lnt2/IC 4105 453-3724 I EW Supr 4129 457-8043 IntOps EW Ops Ops WO 4204 624-0850 9/32 Ch 3 000097 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 10/32 Ch 3 000098 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 100.2 - Correspondence 1. All correspondence will be received, recorded and dispatched through the Camp CR. Addressees are to action official correspondence quickly and return the documents to the LRP clerk for filing. 2. The LRP clerk is to retain and file correspondence of a routine nature and of concern to LRP Det members only. 3. Authority to release messages or letters is vested in the Comd LRP Det and members of his executive only. No LRP Det member is to initiate unauthorized official correspondence with external agencies. 100.3 - Handling of Classified Mail 1. All incoming classified mail will be registered by the Camp CR. The Camp CR, if required, will obtain signatures for classified mail passed to LRP Det sections or individuals. 2. When a classified document is passed by hand from one section or individual to another, the Camp CR must be advised. 3. No other badges are to be wom on flying clothing without the consent of the Comd LRP Det. 4. Metal or plastic name tags or insignia of any kind shall not be wom on flying clothing. 5. Ball caps may be wom on board aircraft only. The ball cap is not an official headdress and shall not be wom while in uniform, within the confines of the base. 6. 1AW Refs : A. 1 CADORD 2-007 and B. 1 CAD COMD 025 241545Z Feb 03 LRP Det Mbrs will either wear the one piece flight suit, or both the shirt and trousers. For all Take-offs and Landings, and at all other times when, in the opinion of the Aircraft Captain, the risk to aircraft in flight warrents a higher level of individual protection. Dress for aircrew personnel while not performing flying duties shall be either the one or two-piece combat flying suit or combat fatigue clothing. 100.6 — Crew Administration 1. Personal Development Reports. MPCCs are responsible for ensuring that PDRs are completed on each crew member. In exceptional circumstances a letter of assessment will be produced. 100.4 - Security 100.7 - Flight Information Publications (FLIPS) 1. The Mission Support Office must be secured when no one is present. 1. FLIP allocation and distribution are determined by consultation between the Ops O/MPC. The Ops O approves FLIP requirements and ensures that sufficient quantities, including spares, are procured through the Supply system. 2. The flight line, Operations Flight Office, Mission Support and the Comm Centre are restricted access areas. Aircrews are permitted access to all areas except the Comm Centre. 100.5 - Dress 1. The dress and appearance of all aircrew personnel is to be of the highest standard at all times. 2. The following badges only are authorized on flying clothing: a. a LRP Det badge worn on the left sleeve with the centre top of the crest 3 cm below the shoulder seam; b. cloth issue name tags are to be worn above the right breast pocket; c. flying badges are to be worn above the left breast pocket; and d. camouflage squadron crest on right sleeve. 2. The Ops O will provide FLIPs to users as required. The Ops O will advise the crews ASAP when new FLIPs are available for pick-up. . 3. FLIPs for the LRP Det AOR are carried onboard the Aurora . It is the responsibility of the MPAC/MPC to ensure before flight that the aircraft contains the required pubs for the flight. 4. After the last flight of the day, the standard FLIPs should be folded and placed in the pubs holding bins by the pilot and co-pilot's seats. 5. As FLIP quantities are limited and difficult to obtain, users must exercise due care to minimize wearand-tear. Aircraft Captains shall advise the Ops O of any discrepancies or deficiencies with enough time to obtain the necessary FLIPS. 100.8 - Aviation Credit Card Policy & Directives The following procedures shall be used for all aviation credit cards: 11/32 Ch 3 000099 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information a. the person signing the credit card purchase shall annotate the purchase slip with the aircraft serial indication and his own identity; b. the MPAC/MPC shall confirm that all credit card purchase slips were for the services rendered/matcrial received in the public interest; and c. report the loss of any credit card to the Ops O by the quickest means possible. 5. Activation. A request to activate a CISRT will be passed to the MO or Chaplain. 6. Participation. The CO could order LRP Det personnel to participate in a critical incident stress debriefing or defusing. However, it is emphasized that a debriefing or defusing can be extremely beneficial and all personnel involved in an incident will be strongly encouraged to participate. Confidentiality is strictly maintained for CISRT members and those receiving CIS interventions. 100.09- Telephone Use 1. Any long distance phone calls should be made through LRP Operations or Mission Support. If possible, AVN access should be attempted before commercial lines are utilized. 100.10- Critical Incident Stress Management Ref: CFAO 34-55 1. Description. The purpose of this SOP is to establish the basis whereby a Critical Incident Stress Response Team (CISRT) could be activated on the request of LRP Det management. The objective of the CISRT is to intervene early in a post-traumatic situation for the psychological well-being of LRP Det personnel. 2. General. Critical incidents would include an aircraft crash or accident, death or suicide of a LRP Det member, or any other significant or traumatic event. The effect of post incident stress of the nature described can have potentially devastating psychological implications on our LRP Det personnel. The LRP Det does not have a CISRT to deal with issues such as these. If a situation arises the MO and Chaplain will be the lead personnel, until a CISRT can be formed. The goals of a CISRT are to conduct a debrief or defuse service personnel involved in such an incident. The debrief is not an operational critique but rather a structured format to assist people who are having normal reactions to an abnormal and devastating situation. 3. Requirement. A request for CISRT intervention on the behalf of LRP Det personnel will be the result of a LRP Det leadership evaluation of the critical incident and post-incident effects. 4. Authority. Authority to request CISRT intervention rests with CO LRP Det or MPCC in consultation with the CO. In their absence, the Acting CO shall have the authority to activate the team. 12/32 Ch 3 000100 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information s.15(1) Def Section 101 101.1 - Monthly/Quarterly Reading Requirements 1. All LRP Det aircrew shall read the following publications within the first seven days of each month or quarter (as applicable) or prior to commencing flying duties during the month/quarter. LRP Det aircrew shall “initial as having read” monthly/quarterly required reading on the AIF file: a. Monthly or as amendments are published: 1. If takeoff for an operational mission is not possible within six hours of briefing, the crew should normally be released. The type of mission, time of day, previous duty and length of patrol will be considered. If mission priority is such that the flight must be flown and a replacement crew is not available, the MPCC is to advise the tasking authority to amend the mission parameters to meet an 18-hour crew duty day. 2. The decision to release a crew and assign another will be made by the LRP Det Comd, Ops Fit Cdr or Ops O as applicable. (1) LRP Det Flying Orders; b. Quarterly: (1) CF Flying Orders, B-GA-100-001 /A A-000; (2) 1 CAD ORD Vol 2; (3) 1 CAD ORD Vol 3; (4) 1 CAD ORD Vol 5; and (5) 1 CAD SMM. 2. The LRP Det Operations Officer (Ops O) shall provide up-to-date copies of the above publications on CD or access to the pubs via intranet DIN. 101.2 - LRP Det Weekly Flying Program I. The Ops O will promulgate a weekly flying program. 101.3- LRP Det Daily Flying Program 1. A daily flying program will be published by LRP Det Ops. The Ops Fit Cdr is to be advised of any changes to the daily program. 2. MPCCs are to make arrangements with LRP Det Ops for fuel load or any other specific requirements at least 24 hrs prior to intended departure time. 101.4-CPI/ELT Testing CPI/ELT Testing should take place within the first five minutes of any hour for a duration not to exceed five seconds. CPIs/ELTs may be tested at other times if necessary. Base ATC approval is required for all tests. 101.5-Onerational Flights - Cancellation 1. The authority for the amendment or cancellation of a mission rests with the tasking authority. 101.6 - Engine Runs 1. The primary CP 140 high power engine run-up area will coordinated with Minhad Ground. 2. Low power engine runs must also be coordinated with Minhad Ground. 3. Aircraft Captains and Crew Chiefs are to ensure that aircraft conducting engine runs are positioned to ensure that the wake turbulence created by the engines will not cross any runway. 101.7 - Post-Flight Requirements - Inbound Report 1. Approximately 30 minutes prior to landing, aircraft are to advise callsigns Icy Ops and Eskimo, on UHF 295.0 MHZ of their ETA, fuel and services required on landing. 101.8 - Vacuuming of Aircraft I. Due to excessive amounts of fine dust and dirt, crews are required to vacuum to the aircraft on the return leg of each flight. 2. Due to the dust clogging the filter, crews should clean the filter during pre-flight, periodically during flight and shall clean it before landing. 101.9-Standby 101.4- Operational Flights - Delay Refs: A. 1 CAD ORD 2-004 Section 4 13/32 Ch 3 000101 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 1. From time to time it may be necessary to place crews on increased standby readiness. 2. Standby liability periods are accepted by the LRP Det in 24-hour increments from 0800 hrs (local) until the following day at 0800 hours. The standby crew shall work toward becoming airborne and mission capable as soon as possible after the initial alert. 3. The standby crew will not normally be tasked during their standby period. During the standby period crew members shall remain on the Base, and keep their MPCC advised of their whereabouts at all times. The MPCC shall initially check in with the LRP det Duty Ops Officer and keep him/her advised of his/her whereabouts for the duration of the liability period. Activities must be governed by the principle that becoming airborne as soon as possible remains the first priority. 4. Crew members scheduled for standby duties shall not consume alcoholic beverages after 2000 hrs the night prior to commencing the liability period, until the standby period is terminated. 101.10- Authorization and Conduct of Flights Refs: A. B-GA-100-003/AA-GDO (CF Flying Orders) B. 1 CAD ORD 2-002 C. 1 CAD ORD 2-006 D. 131903Z Oct 01 1CAD HQ Comd 259 FDI Risk Mitigation Plan/Op Apollo 1. Flight Authorization - Scheduled Flights. The daily flying program will be recognized as the initial direction for all flights scheduled therein and, as such, shall be approved and signed by either the LRP Det Comd or an FAO. All other flights require authorization by an FAO. A change of tasking, MPCC or MPC represents a change to the Daily Flying Program and will, therefore, require authorization by an Authorizing Officer. MPCCs and MPCs are self-authorizing on Form CF-773 for the specific flights scheduled on the Daily Flying Program as detailed below: a. Operational Missions. An MPCC is self­ authorizing for operational and standby operational/SAR missions; b. Local PPF. All local PPF require authorization by an FAO; and 2. Flight Authorization - Unscheduled Flights. An FAO must authorize any flight not promulgated by the Daily Flying Program. 3. Special Take-off Limits. Below landing limit take-offs are authorized IAW ref D, with the following exception: The LRP Det Comd, OFC or a designated FAO must authorize the take-off when the visibility is less than one half statute mile or RVR 2400 (800 meters). 101.11 - Mission Reports 1. The MPCC will submit to Mission Support a Mission Report following operational flights. 2. The Aircraft Captain will submit to LRP Det Ops a Captain's Report following all flights. The report should include any significant observations or deviations from the assigned task. 3. MPCCs are encouraged to submit special reports regarding tasking, equipment, etc, when this information is deemed beneficial to the LRP Det. 101.12 - Aircrew Logbooks 1. The end-month summary of flying times including all subtotals, shall be entered in the individual's logbook. Crew logbooks shall be submitted monthly to the appropriate MPCC for signature. MPCCs will submit their logbooks to the Ops Fit Comd. The Ops Fit Comd and Det CWO shall submit their logbooks to the LRP Det Comd. 2. Aircrew shall make use of the official LRP Det logbook stamp. All logbooks shall be left in the designated space accessible to supervisory staff. 101.13- Personal Equipment/Dual Laver Clothing Ref: 1 CAD Orders, Vol 2, 2-007 para 19. 1. A double layer of clothing shall be worn by all aircrew to the maximum extent practicable. In hot weather, any decision not to wear a double layer of clothing will be based on loss of protection versus adverse effects of heat stress. 2. It is prohibited to carry any personal equipment outside flying suit pockets. The Gerber multi-tool may be carried as long as it is secured on the belt or within a flight suit pocket, and is appropriately marked with the individuals name and service number. 3. In order to prevent FOD only controlled tools are to be used on the aircraft. Gerber multi-tools and non-issue MAG light may be carried on the aircraft for personal emergency/survival purposes provided they are secured in a closed zippered pocket. Use of these tools for maintenance action on the aircraft is strictly 14/32 Ch 3 000102 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information s.15(1) Def prohibited. Aircrew must take precautions to ensure equipment is secured and accounted for on de-planing. b. AirSat CB shall be powered off (CB pulled) when not in use during covert or on emcon restricted missions; and 4. The Following standard greeting shall be used by crews when answering the Iridium Telephone: 101,14 - Aircraft Accidents or Incidents 1. The LRP Det Comd and OPS Fit Cdr shall be informed of aircraft accidents or incidents as quickly as possible. 2. Aircraft accident/incident reports are to be filed within 12 hours of the occurrence. Guidelines for accident/incident reporting are contained in the GPH 204. Aircraft Occurrence Reports (CF 215) will be filed through the LRP Fit Safety Officer. Flight Safety reports will also be sent to Minhad Base Operations. 3. Aircrew involved in an aircraft accident or physiological incident are required to undergo medical examination by a medical officer as soon as possible after the occurrence. “Canadian Forces Patrol Aircraft XXX (tail #) This is an unsecure line, how may I help you?" 101.17 - Digital Imagery Upload 1. There are several modem equipped AirSats that are able to connect to the internet and e-mail digital images to required e-mail addresses. The following shall apply: a. b. c. No classified data shall be sent; Pictures shall be saved as small as possible in JPEG format; and Data transferred shall be of significant operational value, and a log shall be kept of all transmitted pictures. 101.15- Crew Pubs Bag 101.18- Emergency Diversion Airfields 1. Ata minimum, each crew shall carry the following publications, including the latest amendments, on all operational missions: 1. Airfields in the United Arab Emirates, such as Al Dhaffa, Fujairah and Abu Dhabi, are suitable diversion airfields if unable to return to Al Minhad. a. 1 CAD SMM, b. JTFSWA LRP Local Flying Orders, and c. SAR Manual. 101.16 - Iridium Telephone Ref: C-12-140-000/MB-002 AO1 Section 52 1. The Iridium telephone is cleared for use on Op Apollo aircraft by an AirSat trained NavCom. 2. Crews should ensure the Iridium Telephone system is turned on during all missions. Periodically, crews should conduct an Iridium test with LRP Mission Support (001-613-996-7811 trunk 2162 - Local 4104). 3. The following restrictions shall be followed: a- 2. Airfields in other Gulf states including Bahrain (Manamah Intnl), Qatar (Doha), Kuwait (Kuwait Intnl), Oman (Masirah) are suitable as emergency diversion fields. 3. Unless an emergency is so extreme that a crew cannot make land at one of the aforementioned airfields, crews should not divert to airfields in the following nations: Oman (other than Masirah), Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India. 4. Under no circumstances shall crews divert to airfields in Iraq, Yemen or Somalia. 5. Other suitable diversion airfields, outside the Gulf Region, include: Diego Garcia, Djibouti, Kenya (Mombassa), the Maldives (Male Intnl) and the Seychelles (Victoria Intnl). 6. Crews must be aware that in case of emergency, and they are attempting to gain permission to land at the nearest suitable aerodrome, that this request could be denied. 15/32 Ch 3 000103 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Section 102 TERMINAL/AERODROME - DESCRIPTION. OPERATION Ref: Minhad Airbase Local Operating Procedures. Ref: AFM 11-17 Minhad Local Operating Procedures 1. Reduced weather minima for VFR flights within the Minhad MATZ shall apply to all Minhad based aircraft. VFR flight will be permitted down to a reported visibility of 3000M and I or cloud ceiling of 1000 ft. 102.1 - Minhad Military Air Traffic Zone 1. The Minhad Military Air Traffic Zone vertical dimensions are from the surface to FL145 and is bounded by the following points: a. 25 06 00N-055 18 40E; b. 25 00 40N-055 38 30E; c. 24 56 30N-055 11 55E; d. 25 06 00N-055 27 50E; e. 24 50 19N-055 38 10E; and f. 25 02 55N-055 11 50E. 2. The traffic pattern and circuit may be flown when the MATZ is under reduced weather minima. Should the cloud ceiling be 1000ft then the pilot should fly the traffic pattern at an altitude of 700 feet MSL in order to remain clear of cloud. 102.5 - Special VFR (SVFR) 2. Approach control service in the Minhad MATZ is provided by Minhad Radar/Dubai Radar unless delegated to Minhad Tower. 3. Minhad Tower will provide aerodrome control service to traffic operating in the Minhad MATZ up to 1500 feet MSL or higher if airspace is delegated to the aerodrome controller. 102.2 - Radio. Navigation. Radar and Lighting 1. Radio equipment includes primary and backup VHF/UHF transmitters and receivers; navigation equipment includes a VOR/DME, an NDB and an ILS. 2. UHF Frequencies. The primary radio for local traffic is VHF, with UHF available as a backup. UHF frequencies must be requested from Tower for back-up. 102.3 - Airfield Information 1. The Airfield elevation is 174 feet and Magnetic Variation is 1 East. 2. Marking aids arc standard on runway and taxiways. 3. The aerodrome reference point is: 25 01 31N-055 22 12E, which is the mid-point of runway on the centre line. 102.4 - VFR circuit procedures 1. When the reported visibility is less than 3000 meters, but not less than 1500 meters, aircraft are permitted to operate on Special VFR clearances (SVFR). Geographical separation shall be provided between each aircraft, and from all IFR flights. 2. For SVFR for local helicopters refer to AFM 11-17 Minhad Local Operating Procedures. 102.6 - Traffic Pattern 1. The traffic pattern is located to the south of the airfield and consists of a crosswind leg, downwind leg, base leg and final. The final leg is eliminated if the aircraft flies a base leg to initial. Circuit altitude is 1500' MSL. 102.7 - Go Around and Fly Through Procedures 1. If not cleared to land or for a touch and go, aircraft are to go around at a minimum of 100 ft AGL. The following procedures are to be followed: a. Go Around. Aircraft captains may go around at any time for flight safety reasons, operational reasons or when instructed to do so by ATC. Pilots initiating a go around are to advise ATC as soon as possible. A go around instruction from ATC must be acknowledged as soon as it is safe to do so. When going around, aircraft are not to climb above 1000 feet MSL before the departure end of the runway; and b. Fly Through. ATC may instruct an aircraft to fly through at any time and aircraft must acknowledge this command. A pilot may elect to fly through for any reason and must inform ATC as soon as it is safe to do so. Aircraft flying through must regain or maintain their circuit altitude. 16/32 Ch 3 000104 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information 102.8 - Vehicle Traffic on Aerodrome 1. For Canadian operations, only line vehicles are allowed on the ramp. 102.9 Fuel Dumping - Area and Procedures Ref: 1 CAD HQ Uniform Spill Reporting Protocol 1262-1 6 July 1998 TBP 102.10- DICP Review ofOMDM Ref: http://winnipeu.mil.ca/a3ar/Pubs/DICP pubs/Minhad UAE.doc At ref Division 1CP carried out a review of the approached at Minhad airfield. The following approach plates reflect this review. 17/32 Ch 3 000105 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information 102.11 - Approach Plates Modified in accordance with DICP Review INSTRUMENT APPROACH CHART - CAB AD ELEV 174 FT DUBAI / Minhad ILS/DME RWY 27 (Cot c+d+e) GMC 121.925 290.5 TWR 118.55 24811 APR 122.50 252.8 HEIGHTS RELATED TO THR RWY 27 055'So’ MSA ’■ 2400 25 NM from MIN VOR 2400/^25 NM Seole liSOO.OOO . HEIGHTS IN I KT 03 2£ 2.000FJ 10' src ■ 'minhad IMN KJ9.9 i 'Ji 6 DME MIN\115.2 / .11 DME T. IMN DME CH 99X 'Off, 09ff ^fe-267 280MATZ FUS 13 DME. SFC MIN 620 / / 0'7 MSA 2400 25 NM. jo-tig; .1 src «> , 055,10’, 2500 MISSED APPROACH: Climb '.0 2500 FT. , p55'|20’, MIN VOR/OME B* 13 DME MIN 11 DME 6 DME 100-- IMN FAF (GP INOP) CP 1190 *»*»• RDH 53 I----- 1------ 1------ 1------ 1 NM FROM 8 9 10 11 12 THR RWY 27 A Circling o: Procedure not authorized with DME INOP ALS INOP VIS changed: ILS 3/4 LOC 1 3/4 5 I ° 5 3 2100 — 267 IMN < ____ ELEV I7f (THR 27) OCA (OCH) ILS CAT I Straight-in GP INOP Approach 551 TL FL150 TA 13000 IMN I 3 DME Continue straight J ahead to 3 DME • (west of) MIN. I Then Left Turn to join holding at MIN VOR. o ’24' 05530' 5 , 374 (200) D___ 1/2 700 (526) 1 1/4 B 960 (786) NM Altitude ONH rr Ground Spaed NTS Rota of Doacent j FT/MIN Central Air Base - Minhad 1380 (1206) 3 2 1/4 DUE from THR E _2_ 3 520 60 820 1110 80 ICO 120 140 160 295 395 495 590 690 790 5 1410 1700 6 2000~ Procedure reviewed for TERPS by 1 CAD HQ DICP 7 Aug 02 18/32 Ch 3 000106 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information F AD ELEV 174 FT INSTRUMENT APPROACH CHART - CAB I DUBAI / Minhad VOR/DME RWY 09 (Cat C+D+E) IGMC 121.925 290.5 i TWR 118.55 248.1 ; APP 122.50 252.8 HEIGHTS RELATED TO AD ELEV — ‘ ' 055T0' ", MSA 2400 25 NM - .' from MIN VOR 055'30- ' BEARINGS ARE MAGNETIC ALTITUDES 4 ELEV IN FEE! -------- —-------- MSA-.. Scole 1:500,000 2400£25 NM from MIN VOR NM 1. R62 SFC irr AVOR/DMEFAF S DME MIN 11 DM MIN I —090 510 1 MINHAD 260L. 087' ^27<T= IS I. 11 DME MIN Ml juopn 576 *620 \ SEC *17 617 ■:«i, SFC MSA / from MIN VOR SFC , , psspy. , p55|W , 6 DME 2100 -s 087— OST AL NM FROM MIN VOR S 12 150* ELEV 174_________ (AD ELEV) 11 10 9 OCA (OCR) VOR/DME o . » Climb to 2500 FT. Continue straight ahead to 3 0ME (east of) MIN VOR. Then Right Turn to join holding ot MIN VOR. MAPI 510- ■ MISSED APPROACH: I FAF IF i\ 2500 I —■1V MIN I __ I- from MIN'^VOR 124‘ 055(30', MIN VOR/DME 11 DME MIN MSA ; ' •2400. 25 NM- UNI b 2400 25 NM ' 8 7 6 A 5 3 4 2 1 0 c B D____ 1 3/4 720 (582) E Stroighl-in Approach •O I Circling a: Procedure not authorized with DME INOP 3 a 960 (786) Central Air Base - Minhad 5 i 2 3 Altitude QNH n 610 890 1160 1440 1720 KTS 60 80 100 120 140 160 FT/MIN 285 380 475 565 650 755 Rate of Descent 3 17380 (1206)3 ‘.M Ground Speed LU 2 1/4 DME from MIN 4 • \6 2000 Procedure reviewed for TERPS by 1 CAD HQ DICP 7 Aug 02 19/32 Ch 3 000107 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information AD ELEV 174 FT INSTRUMENT APPROACH CHART - CAB J' I-' ' MSA:' 'v MSA •- 1—r—1—i—r—| 055'bo' ' e^Tfu/sso/x' < 2400-25 NM J from MIN'VOR I '......... bl ' 7/ DUBAI / Minhad VOR/DME RWY 27 (Cat C+O+E) GMC 121.925 290.5 TWR 118.55 248'. 1 APP 122.50 252.8 HEIGHTS RELATED TO AD ELEV MSCT - Stole 1:500,000 2400r/25 NM. from MIN VOR 'till NM Inn? • - ' i25-. TO' . ‘ ' SFC I 03 25 W-flEI 10' SFC V: & 550 XyWF* ^1^%. \ I (moofI \lNHAD MM MIN\115.2 r ^9oy/M 335 1 I /? I p55'|1 O', 2500 MISSED APPROACH: Climb to 2500 FT. Continue straight X" ahead to 3 DME » (west of) MIN. Then Left Turn to join holding at MIN VOR. I I i I s ■ J' , , J517 ^4554^ I , , . <o *o. ftssrpcr, , MSA R51 f> MSA I 13 DME . MIN 620 &/\ t/018 \ Z15,000£T\ SFC X 017 WL SFC I / \B50/ src / I . ■ A . ■ 055,30', OCA (OCH) VOR/DME U r ................. y/ MIN VOR/DME ir 1 8 DME MIN 100--^ I 2 OWE MIN MAPI 0 2 >r FAF 13 DME MIN _ I I — 267 2100 IF .5'' 925 A__ I ____________ ELEV 174 (AD ELEV) 3 T> 1 [SZS]^ MATZ fJJ-45 -’•WPH ... 2400 25 NM/ g, from MIN VOR' 26£! A----- 1Q£ 25oo 28<y Li 13 DME \MIN MIN .A534 I !5’X 8 d'M£'4 ‘ " / DME CK.99X 3 A 4 5 B 6 7 8 9 10 NM FROM MIN VOR/DME 12 11 I _D__ 1 1/2 C 800 (626) E Straight-in Approach 1 I 'I ______ Circling__________________ Procedure not authorized with DME INOP ALS INOP VIS changed: 2 UJ 3 o Ground Speed Rate of Descent 3 I Central Air Base - Minhad 1380 (1206) 3 2 1/4 960 (786) DME from MIN Altitude QNH NM n KTS FT/MIN 3 520 60 295 4 ~82? 80 395 5 6 7 1110 1410 1700 140 100 120 590 690 495 8 2000 160 790 Procedure reviewed for TERPS by 1 CAD HQ DICP 7 Aug 02 20/32 Ch 3 000108 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information © VOR/DME N 2501.5 E 5520.9 + 174 MINHAD AIR BASE 60 THRESHOLD RWY 09 N 2501.5 E 5521.3 + 140 A B WEST RAMP N 2501.3 E 5521.8 + 160 RAMP 2 N 2501.3 E 5522.1 + 162 c =4 o 7=5 NORTH ATC RAMP 1 N 2501.3 E 5522.5 + 165 E EAST RAMP N 2501.4 E 5522.8 + 165 F THRESHOLD RWY 27 N 2501.6 E 5523.1 + 174 27 21/32 Ch 3 000109 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /‘information Section 103 EMERGENCY RESPONSE/PROCEDURE 103.1 - Emergency response plan (ERP) 1. LRP emergency response plan shall be to initiate the LRP callout in accordance with the LRP Callout Chart at 100.1 para 2. As required, LRP Ops shall also contact: a. Minhad Bops - 89-40099 or 89-40111, 04 221 5150 (commercial); b. Minhad Ground - 121.925 MHz c. NSU Ops-Local 4110. 103.2 - Crash equipment 1. General. Minhad is a Category 6 airfield. 22/32 Ch 3 000110 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Section 104 ARMAMENT SAFETY ORDERS - AIRCREW 104.1 - Armament Safety Orders The following Armament Safety Orders are to be observed by all personnel. 104.2 - Parking/Loading Areas for Aircraft Loaded with Bomb Bav Stores TBP 104,3 - Loaded Aircraft - Security Refs: A. 1 CAD Order Vol 3, 3-203 Annex F B. QPM C. W11300-1 (W Comd) 20 April 1994 1. Civilian Airfields. Security details, requirements and considerations for loaded aircraft located at civilian airfields are detailed at ref. Contract security guards are authorized and preferred over crewmembers. Any incurred costs are to be paid similar to field or other civilian support agencies. 104.4 - Sono Launch Tube Restriction 1. Due to the possibility of dropping sonos, etc., Aurora SLTs must be empty for all flights except operational, ASW training or authorized trial missions. In particular, pilot proficiency and pilot training flights that involve touch-and-go landings arc prohibited when SLTs are loaded. 104.5 - Armament Load - AMRS Certification Ref: A. SSO AEM 091 091605Z SEP 91 B. C-l 2-140-000/MB-002, Part 2, Sect 75 1. To ensure that the Aircraft Captain is aware of the aircraft armament state, the form CF 338 (yellow) Aircraft Armament State, will identify the type and number of stores loaded and will be certified by the armament up-loading Crew Chief. 2. A "Nil" entry will be made and signed by an authorized AVN Tech when no armament stores are carried. Although SKAD is not a weapon, the CF 338 shall reflect "LOADED" to indicate the Bomb Bay status (similar to Pannier). The "ARMED" and "DE­ ARMED" blocks should be crossed out or marked "N/A" as they relate to maintenance action for weapons only; SKADs are to be Readied or Safetied by Checklist. 104.6 - Signal Underwater Sound (SUS) Charges Safety Precautions 1. Aircrew are reminded of the potential danger involved in handling SUS charges because of the explosive content. 2. Stores readied for use, but not expended, shall have safety devices re-installed before being returned to the storage compartment. 104.7 - ASW Stores Safety Precautions 1. Safety precautions and procedures as laid down in 1 CAD ORDERS, Aircraft Operating Instructions (AOIs), checklists, and squadron aircrew orders and instructions are to be observed during loading, pre-flight, releasing and jettisoning of all ASW stores carried in the Aurora aircraft. 2. Any changes made by technicians or aircrew to the sono load (internal or external) are to be noted and signed on the Sono Load Sheet by the individual making the change. 3. Disposal of time expired stores will be routinely flown out of theatre on swap aircraft. 104.8 - Action in Event of Hang-up or Misfire Ref: 1 CAD Orders, Vol 3, Book 4, Chapter 105 1. In the event of a hang-up or misfire, all action required by AOIs, checklists, squadron orders and instructions to release the weapons shall be carried out over an operative range or over open water. If the armament cannot be successfully released or fired, all armament controls and switches shall be turned to OFF or SAFE, and the route chosen to return to Minhad shall be over the most sparsely populated areas. 2. Air Traffic Control shall be informed when an aircraft is to land with suspected hang-up or misfire. On landing, bomb bay equipped aircraft shall be taxied directly to the HCA, located at either end of runway. The Aircraft Captain shall not attempt to open the bomb bay doors until armament personnel arrive on the scene to assess the situation. The Aircraft Captain shall remain with the aircraft until armament personnel arrive on the scene, al) non-essential personnel shall evacuate to a safe distance (2,000'). 3. If the aircrew receive indication of an armament problem with a SKAD equipped aircraft before take-off or subsequent to landing, the Aircraft Captain shall NOT declare an emergency. However, if this occurs with an aircraft carrying torpedoes the 23/32 Ch 3 000111 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information aircraft captain shall declare an EMERGENCY with Air Traffic Control. local Aircraft Maintenance Instructions (AMIs) when deployed. 104.9 - Ditching/Crash Landing with Explosives 104.13 - Uploading/Downloading of Aircraft 1. If a ditching or crash landing is imminent and explosive stores are being carried on the aircraft, the Captain shall: 1. The uploading/downloading of SKAD may be carried out in aircraft parking spots. a. b. if practicable, jettison stores as per procedures detailed in 1 CAD Orders Vol 3 art 3-201. This action is to be taken only when, in the opinion of the Captain, the risk is less than that of attempting a landing with weapons on board; and ifjettison action cannot be taken prior to landing, ensure that all armament switches are placed "OFF" or "SAFE". 2. If no fire occurs, the aircraft shall be guarded until an AWS Tech or salvage party arrives. The Aircraft Captain shall notify the salvage crew if explosives remain onboard. 3. If fire occurs, explosions may take place at any time. There is no safe period after which no explosions will occur. Tests show that the majority of explosions occur between two and five minutes after commencement of fire. Explosions and the resulting debris arc dangerous over a wide area. Pyrotechnics do not create a great danger of explosion but they will bum intensely and give off a dense cloud of smoke. 4. The Captain of the aircraft shall ensure that the aircraft involved is not tampered with in any way after landing until cleared by the MFC or designate. 104.11 - Accident Investigation In the event of any accident involving explosives, pyrotechnics, or armament equipment which inflicts injury on any crew members or causes damage to the aircraft or its equipment, the evidence shall not be disturbed until a qualified Armament Officer has investigated, unless by so doing the safety of the aircraft is jeopardized. 104.12 - Munitions Handling Refs: A. C-09-153-001/TS-000 B. B-GA-297-001/TS-000 1. Munitions such as CADS, flares and smokes which require disposal shall be handled LAW refs and NOTE: IAW HN MOU, Bomb Bay Weapons are not authorized. If Bomb Bay weapons are authorized, upload/download locations will be promulgated. 104.14 - Arming/De-arming of Aircraft 1. Arm/De-arming of SKAD may be carried out at aircraft parking spots. NOTE: IAW HN MOU, Bomb Bay Weapons are not authorized. If Bomb Bay weapons are authorized, arm/de-arm locations will be promulgated. 104-15 - Touch and Go Landing with Ordnance Touch and go landings with loaded SLTs/PSLTs or Bomb Bay stores arc prohibited. 104.16 - Air Weapons Occurrence Reporting Ref: B-GA-297-001/TS-000 1. Accidcnts/incidents involving air weapons or the malfunctioning of a weapon system shall be reported immediately upon return to LRP Det Flight Safety Officer by submitting a Flight Safety Report. 2. If an aircraft is on deployment or is forced to land away from Minhad, the Captain shall report the occurrence to LRP Det Flight Safety Officer, file a Flight Safety Report and ensure local armament orders arc complied with. 104,17- Small Arm Procedure Onboard the Aircraft 1. Each crew will designate an Aircraft Weapons Safety Officer (AWSO). The AWSO will be responsible to ensure that all personal weapons are proven safe prior to and after being allowed on the A/C. The ASWO will also ensure magazines are inspected and stored in the ammo box held in the aft storage compartment (jail) prior to flight. 2. If carried onboard the A/C individual 9MM Pistols will be carried in the appropriate holster with no magazine loaded. 24/32 Ch 3 000112 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'accis a I'information 104.18- Fuel Dump Procedures Aircraft requiring to dump fuel shall coordinate with Minhad tower. 25/32 Ch 3 000113 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information 26/32 Ch 3 000114 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Section 105 AIRCREW PROFICIENCY 105.1 — Pilots Ref: A. 1 CAD ORD 5-504 Annex A App 1 B. 1 CAD Response to MPSET TAV, 23 Sep 2002 1. Supervised Training. The requirement to conduct a quarterly supervised training flight on the deployed PSTC qualified senior pilot is waived. However, every effort should be attempted to conduct the required quarterly sequences when MPSET or 404 Sqn are in theatre. 27/32 Ch 3 000115 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I’information Attachment 1 LRP Det Flight Safety Program Memorandum 1010-2 (UFSO) 19 Mar 03 Distribution List JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH WEST ASIA LRP DET FLIGHT SAFETY PROGRAMME 1. Attached at Annex A is the initial Op Apollo flight safety programme. 2. The most successful aspects of other programmes have been incorporated with the intent of continuing what has proven to be a successful system, with tailoring to the specific situation of the deployment. The FS program will be in a quarterly format to tie into the schedule of briefings and ground training. The highlights for improvement of the Flight Safety Programme will continue to be enhanced safety through continuing educational initiatives. 3. UFSO. Comments regarding additions or amendments would be appreciated and may be passed directly to the Det //original signed by// F. Bigelow LCol CO LRP Det 4100 Annex A: Joint Task Force South West Asia LRP Det Flight Safety Programme And Annual Accident Prevention Plan Distribution List Action WFSO Info OFC AFC MFC TFC UFSO UMFSO/ AMCRO AMO CC's 000116 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /‘information s.15(1) Def Attachment 1 LRP Det Flight Safety Program JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH WEST ASIA LRP DET FLIGHT SAFETY PROGRAMME AND ANNUAL ACCIDENT PREVENTION PLAN 1. This programme has been prepared in consideration of the following: a. b. Education (1) Increasing the level of education has been identified as essential if we wish to continue to improve the level of safety within all realms of Detachment operations (2) Participation among all Detatchment personnel is important in order to raise the stature and importance of safety in daily procedures and practises (3) Improvement in the flow of flight Safety information ensuring that it is smooth, timely and efficient Aircraft (1) limited resources in both spare parts and aircraft (2) high operational tempo (3) c. d. Manpower (1) aircrew (2) groundcrew - affected by trade restructuring in (4) lack of access to training aids and limited resources for training in theatre (5) rate of flying time - over days Historical Background (1) There is a significant amount of information available highlighting Aurora incidents/accidents to use as training material. Both our own experiences since 1981 and those of our Allies can serve this purpose. 2. The presentation of the following subjects is considered essential to minimise the potential for accidents. The topics are to be presented and discussed on Ground Training Days, regular morning briefings, crew checks, during supervised training flights and by MPCCs and Crew Chiefs with crewmembers. a. Aircraft AOI review with emphasis on known deficiencies and recurring flight safety incidents Orders review in light of recent Airforce wide changes on structure and procedures b. Supervisors Ensuring that Squadron supervisors recognise both the limitations of the aircraft and the members c. Operations (1) FD1 failures 000117 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Attachment 1 LRP Det Flight Safety Program d. e. f. g- (2) Asymmetric handling and associated hazards (3) Low level handling and associated hazards (4) Ground operations / procedures for both Ground and Air crew (5) Fuel management (6) Crew resource management - CRM (7) Ditching and bailout (8) Emergency procedures (9) INS/GPS limitations Environment (1) Temperature Extremes and Seasonal changes (2) Wildlife activity Physiological (1) Fatigue and crew rest on deployed operations (2) Disorientation in IMC or night (3) Drug and alcohol usage (both over and under counter) Psychological (1) Stress management (2) Maintaining focus due to Boredom Associated Air Operations Facilities (1) ATC awareness and participation (2) Emergency/Crash response review 3. The UFSO will direct the programme, according to the attached time line, which has been divided into quarters. The Det UFSO will maintain a close liaison with both the Ops and Maintenance sections to ensure a co-ordinated effort, and that the respective trades receive appropriate representation. 4. The following methods of information dissemination are available: a. Briefings (1) Morning - A review of new and relevant historical incidents. Specific topics supported by overhead slides and videos. (2) Ground Training Day - To include guest speakers, and major topics briefings. (3) Crew MPCCs I Crew Chiefs - Written briefs using the distribution list system to ensure continuity of information disimenation. 000118 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information Attachment 1 LRP Det Flight Safety Program b. c. Bulletin Boards (1) located in Ops briefing area and groundcrew servicing. (2) reflects current issues and incidents with posters and articles. (3) items will be relevant, varied and rotated on a timely basis to avoid stagnation and to encourage interest. Aircrew Information File Maintains its high posture requiring the aircrew to sign as having read. d. Directorate of Flight Safety Brief Conducted annually for all Det personnel. e. Seasonal Briefings Conducted as required usually in conjunction with a ground training day. f. Magazines and Publications To be reviewed and acquired to ensure relevancy and completeness. 8- h. Methods of Feedback (1) Safety Comment Forms - available in ops and servicing. (2) Annual safety survey and in house safety surveys. (3) Flight Safety Committee meetings. Flight Safety Bulletin Maintained by the D/UFSO to include both military and civilian Flight Safety articles and incidents, with emphasis on MP related operations and a distribution that ensures circulation to all Det personnel. OP APOLLO DET ANNUAL TIMETABLE SUBJECTS 1st Quarter (Jan - Mar) a. Change posters to highlight -weather considerations - taxiing in congested areas - fatigue - self - medication - fuel considerations - situational awareness - disorientation - ordinance safety - POL handling -FOD - tool control b. UFSO to review Flight Safety training / course requirements and seek the CO’s approval for nominated personnel to be forwarded to the WFSO for subject courses and staffing as crew flight safety reps 000119 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I’information Attachment 1 LRP Det Flight Safety Program c. Brief Squadron on Flight Safety Stats during every FS briefing for the previous year at the first ground training day d. Brief the proper procedures for filing Initial FS reports while on deployment e. Brief crews on crew resource management f. Lectures to crews on bird migration and nesting g- Seasonal brief (Spring) h. Review FDI risk mitigation plan 2nd Quarter (Apr - Jun) a. Change posters to highlight: - wind shear -FOD - thunderstorm hazards - near misses - ATC interaction - over water weather hazards - aircraft towing and marshalling operations - fuel management b. Brief on filing FS Initials c. Brief deployed operations and their inherent FS challenges d. Brief FDI failures without warning flags e. Review the proper use of safety equipment for both air and ground crews f. Review marshalling procedures and responsibilities 3rd Quarter (Jul - Sep) a. Change posters to highlight: - self medication - drug and alcohol use/abuse -CRM - thunderstorm hazards - disorientation - maintenance safety practices b. Prepare a Flight Safety survey that is informal in nature for both air and ground crew personnel. c. Review crash response procedures with DETCO, D/DETCO, OFC, MFC, WFSO, AMO d. Brief on Det procedures for filing of Flight Safety initial reports and investigation procedures 000120 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Attachment 1 - LRP Det Flight Safety Program 4th Quarter (Oct -Dec) a. Change posters to highlight: - pressing in poor weather - wind shear - taxiing occurrences - tool control - white out - near misses - festive season hazards - low flying - air weapon safety - fuel management b. Briefing on hazards associated with pressing the weather during low-level flight c. Present briefing on air weapons safety d. Brief FDI risk mitigation plan and the hazards associated with FDI failures e. Review FS plan for the present year and adjust as required in preparation for publishing the next year's FS Plan in December MAINTENANCE SPECIFIC SUBJECTS TO BE ACTIONED THROUGHOUT THE YEAR 1. The squadron Maintenance Flight Safety NCM shall ensure that the following practices are in place: a. b. c. F.O.D, Prevention (1) Conduct FOD prevention lectures and briefings (2) Ensure FOD collectors are easily accessible and used by all personnel (3) Investigate each FOD incident and assist the UFSO in developing preventative measures Tool Control Program (1) Ensure all personnel adhere to tool control procedures (2) Conduct tool serviceability checks Emergency Procedures Familiarization (1) All maintenance personnel involved with aircraft handling will be informed of crash crew procedures (2) Briefings on Det fire drills and fire response exercises will be carried out quarterly 000121 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information Attachment 1 LRP Det Flight Safety Program d. e. f. g- h. (3) Fire-fighters shall give familiarization lectures and schedule practices once per rotation (4) Ensure that appropriate personnel are informed on the procedures to follow in the event of hot brakes (5) Ensure that all personnel involved in aircraft refuelling are familiar with pertinent safety orders and fuel handling procedures Safety Precautions General (I) Ensure work areas are kept clean and free of all debris and contaminants (2) Ensure appropriate precautions are taken near aircraft, eg. hydraulic warning signs (3) Discuss the dangers involved in using compressed gases, eg. nitrogen and compressed air Safety Procedures in the Vicinity of Aircraft (D Approaching and leaving running aircraft, eg. rotating props (2) ESD hazards (3) Refuelling, parking and starting procedures (4) Monitor vehicle and ground handling equipment operation around squadron and transient aircraft (5) Ensure towing procedures are correct and speed is appropriate for the prevailing conditions (6) Ensure proper safety equipment is worn on the flight line, eg. ear defenders, anti-static clothing and eye protection Seasonal Changes (D Ensure ground crew are briefed on requirements of seasonal changes (2) Hazards associated with high winds and reduced visibility Flight Safety Procedures (1) Crew Chief responsibilities with regards to the dissemination of FS information (2) Ground Crew responsibilities and procedures with regards to filing incident reports (3) Brief all Ground Crew on the Squadron Flight Safety Program as a whole Ground Training Davs Maintenance Flight Safety personnel will give Flight Safety specific briefings at each ground training day on maintenance related subjects and topics. AIR WEAPON SPECIFIC SUBJECTS TO BE ACTIONED THROUGHOUT THE DET 000122 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Attachment 1 LRP Det Flight Safety Program The Air Weapons Safety program encompasses all maintenance and operational air weapons activities, including flying operations, from the moment that the air weapons are removed from storage until they are delivered on target or returned to storage. In order to cover this scope of the program the following items will be actioned: a. b. Education and Training (1) all Det personnel, tailored to their exposure to air weapons in the course of their duties, that will cover all hazards associated with air weapons and explosives used within the Det (2) Ensure that all personnel involved with air weapons activities are fully versed on emergency response procedures to situations requiring EOD assistance. (3) Ensure that all personnel involved with air weapons activities fully comprehend emergency response procedures regarding Otto Fuel spills. This will include, as a minimum, two Otto Fuel response drills per year that will be conducted in conjunction with the Fire Hall (If required). (4) Continuation and improvement upon the present courses to train weapon load crew personnel. Inspections and Standards (1) Monthly inspections of Det air weapons work areas and explosive storage sites to ensure that facilities, materiel and equipment is safe, adequate and authorized. (2) Conduct an annual internal Air Weapons Safety Survey (Int AWSS) IAW B-GA-297-000/TS-001. (4) Maintain proficiency of qualified load crewmembers to ensure operational effectiveness and periodically monitor to ensure that procedures are safe, standard, current and approved. 000123 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Attachment 1 LRP Det Flight Safety Program OP APOLLO AIRCRAFT CRASH / SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT RESPONSE In the event of aq crash or significant incident involving a CP-140 Aurora during Operation Apollo, all operations, flight and maintenance personnel must be aware of the protocol to be followed. After initial emergency response is notified, the following items must completed: □ Advise the NSU Commander local 4155 or cell: 456-0850 □ Advise the LRP Detachment Commander local 4100 or cell: 624-5592 □ Advise LRP Det Ops local 4101/4109 or cell: 624-5781 □ Warn the Directorate of Flight Safety (DFS): 1-800-WARN DFS (1-800-927-6337) □ Advise the respective Wing Commander, 14 Wg and/or 19 Wg □ Call tower/ATC. Secure the tapes, if possible, and quarantine them. □ Quarantine the crew, log books, and all AMCRO paper work. □ Arrange medical examinations for the crew. □ Retrieve the voice and Flight Data Recorders from the site if possible and secure them. Note the location where they were found. □ Secure the crash site and preserve evidence. □ Take aircraft fluid samples if required (fuel, hydraulic oil) □ Arrange for photo technician to photograph the site and other applicable evidence. □ UFSO shall interview all witnesses separately as soon as possible. F. Bigelow Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officer Long Range Patrol Detachment 000124 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information Attachment 3 - LRP Det NBC Concept of Operations JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH WEST ASIA LRP DET NBC CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS This Concept of Operations has been drafted as an all-encompassing document to address Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) issues that could affect the operational success of the Long Range Patrol Detachment (LRP) mission. It is imperative that all personnel assigned to the LRP detachment be familiar and understands the issues discussed within. 1. NBC trained personnel a. Lieutenant Louise Forget, has been assigned duties of NBC Officer for LRP Det. She is a qualified Unit NBC Defence Officer and can be reached at BB 46 Room 12, at LRP Operations (Bldg 6) ext 4109 or on cellular phone: 624-5781 b. WO John Doucette, has been assigned duties of NBC NCM for LRP Det. He can be reached at BB 48 Room 19, at LRP Operations (Bldg 6) ext 4204 or on cellular phone: 624-0850. Cpl Dave Bishop, has been assigned duties of LRP Radiation Safety Officer (RADSO). He is Advanced RADSO qualified and can be reached at BB 48 Room 4 or at LRP Maintenance ext 4140 c. d. NSU NBCD Section, has NBCD subject matter expert. They can be reached at building 24, ext 4172 or on cellular phone at 624-5763. 2. Threat and Risk Assessment a. The estimate of the likelihood and extent of injury to deployed personnel and damage to facilities and equipment given a defined political and/or military situation and defined factors are known as “Threat Assessment”. b. “Risk Assessment” can be defined as a commander’s estimate of mission goals weighed against the threat assessment. A risk assessment will consider many factors including own vulnerability, potential gain/advantage, the threat, available countermeasures and the impact on mission success. Following this assessment, the commander may make decisions or take action including changes to protective measures or operational tasks. c. The current NBC threat to deployed personnel at Camp Mirage is updated by NDHQ Ottawa (DG Int) and promulgated through the chain of command by the LRP Intelligence section to the CO LRP Det immediately. 3. Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) a. There are varying levels of MOPP. The decision on the MOPP dress state will be made by the CO NSU after consideration of the local NBC threat and hazard information, meteorological conditions and mission/task of the units concerned. The climate in the UAE is generally very hot and sunny. Personnel performance degrades significantly in this type of climate and this factor should be taken into consideration when assigning MOPP levels. b. The current MOPP level assigned for LRP personnel is MOPP READY (Modified). Personnel B-l/3 000125 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information s.15(1) Def Attachment 3 - LRP Det NBC Concept of Operations will have their C4 mask available (with recent modifications completed), Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) issued and available within 5 minutes. Any changes to the MOPP state of dress will be promulgated immediately through the chain of command. The different MOPP levels are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 4. Equipment and Training a. Each member of the LRP Det has received at a minimum, pre-deployment training from their home units in the care and use of their IPE and associated equipment. All personnel should be in possession of the following protective equipment: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. b. When ordered, Medical Counter Measures (MCM) may be distributed to counteract any effects of suspected nerve agents. These MCM will be distributed to personnel who have received a medical briefing on their use by a medical officer and have the proper documentation indicating so. Furthermore, it is imperative that all personnel review procedures for use of MCM’s as well as first aid procedures and self-aid procedures. The Medical Section currently holds the following MCM’s: 1. 2. 3. 4. LRP Personnel are to store their personal equipment where they spend the majority of their time and ensure it is maintained in good working order. Any discrepancies are to be reported to LRP NBC Officer immediately. NBC training at the airbase for the LRP Det will be limited and will only be attempted on a non-interference basis with flying operations. Selected personnel will conduct training on detection devices and equipment as the opportunity arises and under the direction of NSU NBC Officer. Periodic refresher training will be conducted on LRP Ground Training Days and will utilize available resources from the NSU NBC Section. c. B-2/3 000126 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information Attachment 3 - LRP Det NBC Concept of Operations 5. Operations in an NBC Environment Operating in an NBC environment can be challenging both physically and psychologically. Given a. the extremely limited decontamination facilities available at Camp Mirage, operations in a contaminated environment are neither prudent nor plausible. Therefore, in the event of an increased NBC threat to personnel and equipment at Camp Mirage, the priority for the LRP Det is to consider relocating the two CP 140 aircraft to safe havens before a perceived threat becomes imminent. This will ensure “survivability” of the assets and afford the opportunity to continue operations from another location almost immediately. The primary priority as stated, is to remove the airframes from the potential hazard in a timely and efficient manner. Every effort will be undertaken to evacuate as many personnel as possible on each aircraft, however, in an increased threat environment it may be necessary to launch the aircraft with only a minimum crew to ensure the assets survive. The remaining personnel and equipment will then be under the control of CO NSU and subject to his evacuation plan. NBC trained personnel will remain in theatre to perform reconnaissance functions and decontamination duties under the guidance of the NSU NBC Officer. This will include those personnel who have received only familiarization training. b. In the event of an increase in the NBC threat level, the notice to personnel will be initiated by CO LRP Det or DCO LRP Det via utilization of the LRP Recall list and/or other means. If required, the rendezvous point for LRP personnel is between BB 46 and BB 48 located on the accommodation side of Camp Mirage. Further direction on information or procedures will be given when all are accounted for. It is imperative that supervisor’s be aware of their personnel’s whereabouts at all times during an increased threat level. Conclusion This NBC Concept of Operations serves as a reminder that although the threat of an NBC attack may be minimal at this stage, adequate preparation and planning as well as education can help prevent drastic effects from chemical or biological agents. Armed with sound training and knowledge that your IPE will protect you in time of need, the hectic times that preclude or follow an NBC related incident can be kept to a minimum. NBC related literature and reference material is available through the LRP NBC Officer. B-3/3 000127 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET s.15(1) Def Annex C - LRP Det Flying Orders 3000-1 (Plans) 01 Jul 03 LRP DET CONTINGENCY PLANS AIM 1. This document details the contingency plans for the LRP Det Al Minhad UAE. It is broken down into four distinct eventualities, which may result in relocation or repatriation of the detachment or a major change to the day to day operating parameters. Specifically those eventualities are: a. evacuation of Al Minhad base; b. redeployment - to another operating base in the AOR or home; c. mission change; and d. major change to operating conditions. EVACUATION 2. Evacuation may come about for a variety of reasons including but not exclusively: a. Imminent attack (conventional or non-conventional) localized at Al Minhad; b. Immediate recall by Canadian gov’t due to higher priority tasking elsewhere; and c. Immediate expulsion by HN. Regardless of the reasons for evacuation the manner of conducting the evacuation is 3. dependent upon the time frame, the operating conditions and the operational priorities. a. b. Operating conditions may include: i. under attack; ii. conventional attack expected; C -1 /12 SECRET 000128 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def c. iii. non-conventional attack expected; iv. terrorist attack expected; v. civil disturbance; or vi. civil disaster. CF, JTFSWA, Coalition or CO’s priorities may include: i. survival of personnel; ii. survival of aircraft to continue to operate; and/or iii. survival of aircraft to preserve resource/deny enemy. C-2Z12 SECRET 000129 �Pages 130 to I a 133 are withheld pursuant to section sont retenues en vertu de Particle 15(1) Def of the Access to Information Act de la Loi sur I'acces a ('information �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def MISSION CHANGE PLAN 31. Possible changes to mission may include: a. VIP transport; b. MEDEVAC; c. Humanitarian aid delivery; and d. Anti-submarine Warfare. 32. With CC130 aircraft in theatre it is unlikely the first three tasks would be assigned, however, the det is easily adapted to operate in these roles. Limiting factors include: a. Diplomatic clearance problems due to aircraft type (bomber); b. c. 33. Aircraft speed is considerably greater than CC130 so there is a remote chance that this aspect could be exploited for a high speed transport of VIP or Medevac. ASW is a conceivable role change. Limiting factors include: a. b. c. d. ASW PLAN 34. a. b. C-7/12 SECRET 000134 �■ Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET s.15(1) Def C. d. 35. 36. CHANGE TO OPERATING CONDITIONS • PLAN Changes to operating conditions at Al Minhad detailed in para 3 b. will likely cause a 37. disruption to flying operations. a. b. c. d. JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH WEST ASIA LRP DET NBC STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE PURPOSE 1. This document has been drafted as an all-encompassing document to address Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) issues that could affect the operations of the Long Range Patrol Detachment (LRP) while part of the JTFSWA. All personnel assigned to the LRP detachment must be aware of the procedures and issues discussed within this document. BACKGROUND 1. Operating in an NBC environment can be challenging both physically and psychologically. C-8/ 12 SECRET 000135 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def 2. The importance of having a proper NBCD SOP is amplified by : a. b. The asymmetric nature of the forces involved in our theatre of operations; The use of chemical weapons in the AOR during previous conflict; and GENERAL The NSU NBCD section is ultimately responsible for all NBCD measures at Camp 1. Mirage. This document specifically addresses LRP Detachment NBCD issues: training, individual protection equipment, Medical Counter-Measures, actions to be taken in flight and on the ground in the event of NBC contamination. NBCD TRAINING Each member of the LRP Det has received at a minimum pre-deployment training 1. from their home units in the care and use of their IPE and associated equipment. Furthermore, the following personnel have been assigned specific NBC duties and will provide NBCD expertise to LRP Det: a. Lieutenant Louise Forget, LRP Det NBC Officer. She can be reached at BB 46 Room 12, at LRP Operations (Bldg 6) ext 4109 or on cellular phone: 624-5781 b. WO John Doucette, LRP Det NBC NCM. He can be reached at BB 48 Room 19, at LRP Operations (Bldg 6) ext 4204 or on cellular phone: 624-0850. c. CpI Dave Bishop, LRP Det Radiation Safety Officer (RADSO). He can be reached at BB 48 Room 4 or at LRP Maintenance ext 4140. d. during R&R and HLTA periods LRP may share NBCD expertise with TAL, LRP and NSU NBCD pers; e. NSU NBCD Section. They can be reached at building 24, ext 4172 or on cellular phone at 624-5763 or through NSU Ops local 4110 and Cellular 454-6583. NBC training for the LRP Det will be limited and will only be attempted on a non­ 2. interference basis with flying operations. NBCD qualified personnel will conduct training on NBCD detection and equipment as the opportunity arises and under the direction of NSU NBC Officer. Periodic refresher training will be conducted on LRP Ground Training Days and will utilize available resources from the NSU NBC Section. NBCD EQUIPMENT LRP Personnel are to store their personal equipment where they spend the majority 1. of their time and ensure it is maintained in good working order. Any discrepancies are to be reported to LRP NBC Officer immediately. All personnel should be in possession of the following protective equipment: C-9/ 12 SECRET 000136 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT The estimate of the likelihood and extent of injury to deployed personnel and damage 1. to facilities and equipment given a defined political and/or military situation and defined factors are known as "Threat Assessment". The current NBC threat to deployed personnel at Camp Mirage is updated by NDHQ Ottawa (DG Int) and promulgated through the chain of command by the LRP Intelligence section to the CO LRP Det immediately. 2. “Risk Assessment” can be defined as a commander’s estimate of mission goals weighed against the threat assessment. NBC Risk management balances the importance of preventing casualties against the degradation in operational effectiveness that result from adopting restrictive protective measures. 3. Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) is the NBCD dress readiness level that has been decreted by the Commanding Officer after consideration of the local NBC threat and hazard information, meteorological conditions and mission/task of the units concerned. The current MOPP level on Camp Mirage is MOPP READY (Modified). The MOPP level in effect is posted on buiding 29, just by the gate on the ops side of the camp as well as by the LRPVTAL HQ building. The different MOPP levels are: MEDICAL COUNTER-MEASURES (MCM) 1. When ordered by CO NSU or CO LRP, Medical Counter Measures may be distributed to counteract any effects of suspected nerve agents. The following MCM will be distributed to personnel through the LRP Det Chain of Command and the CO shall be advised when all personnel have received their MCM. It is important that all personnel review procedures for use of MCM’s as well as first 2. aid procedures and self-aid procedures. C-10 /12 SECRET 000137 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET s.15(1) Def 3. The LRP Medical Counter-Measures are currently held by the FMed Section and can be accessed through the following personnel: Capt McMahon, Pharmacist, local 4148, cell 655-3795 and WO Sheath, 4176, cell 552-4154. Personnel required to spend more than 24 hrs on duty outside Camp Mirage area can receive their MCM by sending an e-mail to the FMed section. NBCD OPERATIONS 3. In the event of an increase in the NBC threat level, the notice to personnel will be initiated by CO LRP Det or DCO LRP Det via utilization of the LRP Recall list and/or other means. If required, the rendezvous point for LRP personnel is between BB 46 and BB 48 located on the accommodation side of Camp Mirage. Further direction on information or procedures will be given when all are accounted for. It is imperative that supervisor's be aware of their personnel's whereabouts at all times during an increased threat level. In the event of an NBC attack, LRP personnel are to seek cover from any liquid precipitation and wait for further instructions. Immediately after an attack, it is essential personnel remain in their shelter in order to prevent dissemination of contamination to other personnel and equipment. 4. The LRP Det recognize the Host Nation siren alarm as depicted in Annex A. Furthermore, NSU NBCD cell will be announcing any NBCD information through the PA system. LRP members must also be aware of the metal on metal warning signal that can be used by anyone detecting NBC contamination. A detailed plan for NBC operations can be found at the end of this document. LRP 5. members should be prepared to take the following actions to limit the exposure of aircrew and airplane to NBC contamination. C-ll / 12 SECRET 000138 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information I SECRET s.15(1) Def C. CONCLUSION Although the threat of an NBC attack is minimal at this stage, adequate preparation and planning as well as education can help prevent drastic effects from chemical or biological agents. Furthermore, NBC related literature and reference material is available through the LRP NBC Officer. C -12 /12 SECRET 000139 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def Annex D - LRP OP DIRECTIVES 3180-1 (LRP Det CO) 01 Jul 03 No. Reference I 03/001 (amended) 1. Telecon LT(N) Stromberger, JOCC Bahrain, CTF 57.2 17 Feb 03 Standoff ranges: CTG 50.6 (CTF 50) direction (3) 2. CTG 50.6 (CTF 50) COALITION FORCE OPTASK SCC SUPP (U) 152210ZJUL02 3. CTF 151 OPTASK SCC (C GCTF) SUPP 241729Z APR 03 Updated 30 May 03 D- 1 18 SECRET 000140 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def No. Reference 03/002 1. ROEIMPL/JTFSWA 031-2003 2. STANDING OPTASK CTG 50.4 (CTF151) 3. OPTASK SCO SUPP 152210Z JUL 02 CTG 50.6 (CTF 50) 4. Search and Rescue Iranian Maritime Boundary-10 Jul 02 Territorial Waters General: In accordance with international law and as depicted on current navigation charts (usually 12 nm from a country's coastline). (3) Iran: When operating in the vicinity of Iran, crews shall respect the Iranian claim of sovereignty, 12 nm from lowest waterline using straight baselines. Use only Canadian national direction for reference. All other states in vicinity of GOO/SOH/SAG: Lower water line plus 12 nm Search and Rescue: If a distress call comes from the territorial waters of another state, an aircraft can enter those waters, without permission, when: 1. Someone is in danger of being lost at sea. 2. The aircraft will only engage in bona fide efforts to render emergency assistance to save lives. 3. The location of the danger or distress is reasonably well known, thus the aircraft will not conduct area search. 4. Entry into TTW will only be made after all attempts to employ other resources have failed to protect life (eg: friendly/neutral warships, local SAR agencies, commercial shipping) (4,5) 03/003 Updated 30 May 03 D-2/8 SECRET 000141 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET s.15(1) Def No. Reference 03/004 LRP Det Comd Direction Comms NAVCOMs are to Open and Close watch with KEEPTRACK at the beginning and end of each mission. Once you open watch, it is IMPERATIVE that you notify KEEPTRACK when you no longer require flight following (i.e. when you chop to the ACU). If no response from KEEPTRACK on HF call c/s WATCHDOG on same circuits as a back-up. If unable HF comms with KEEPTRACK or WATCHDOG use IRIDIUM to phone KEEPTRACK or have the ship call on your behalf. If you are within UHF range, messages to KEEPTRACK can be relayed through Icy Ops. 003/005 LRP Det Comd Direction Request Feedback on Comms with KEEPTRACK be included in Purple remarks 003/006 Tactical SITREPs When able Crews are to conduct a Tactical Sitrep Swap with relieving MPA, eg. RAF NIM. A swap of all tracks is not practical but significant info should be passed such as Areas covered; last Area covered; contact density; HIVs in area; disposition of force; etc. 003/007 GOO AIR CONTROL ISSUES CTG 50.4 301015Z Jan 03 Position Reoortina 003/008 GOO SCC JOIN PKG CTG 50 4 030755Z Feb 03 Frequency Monitoring All Air Units operating in or transiting GOO shall monitor VHF-AM 123.45 MHz or UHF SSC Coord 313.45 MHz 003/009 Primary hailing frequency is CH 13 VHF-FM Updated 30 May 03 D-3/8 SECRET 000142 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def No. Reference 03/011 LRP Det Comd Direction 003/012 Email 10 Feb 03 COMUSNAVCENT/COM FIFTHFLT-ITCS(SW) 03/013 Omani Restricted Area OO(R)-15and SOH Transit Passage CTG 50.4 (CTF 151) 040945Z Feb 03 03/014 JOCC Bahrain Purples TACNAVs/MPCCs are to ensure that they are prepared to provide a complete accounting of the mission's activities from takeoff to landing in the Purple Narrative. Crew Logs are not optional for these missions. All logs are subject to review and are required for post­ flight reports and archival purposes. The Purple narrative shall identify the total number of contacts investigated and how many COI/CCOI vessels were detected. Do not report GCTF naval forces in the purple (see Brief Book page 36 for complete list of countries) To assist CTG 50.4 with tracking which vessels have been hailed previously, indicate in the Contact Narrative when a vessel has been hailed by your Event. The Purple Remarks shall indicate the total number of Hails carried out. (plus #COIs, CCOIs, #HIVs, #VOIs, #Merch, #Fish, #Queries) 003/015 COMUSNAVCENT/COM FIFTHFLT OPORD 1000-01 Subsurface contacts All contacts will be investigated during SSC missions. Once determined the contact is subsurface, report and request direction from ACU. LRP Det Comd Direction Email: LNO Bahrain 24 Jan 03 Updated 30 May 03 D-4/8 S E C R ET 000143 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRETI s.15(1) Def No. Reference 003/017 LRP Det Comd Direction Standard Equipment Crews shall conduct their missions with ALL standard aircraft equipment. All aircraft equipment (pubs, cameras, laptops, etc.) must be removed from the airplanes at the end of each mission and returned to Mission Support. 003/018 LRP Det Comd Direction All contacts should be photographed unless it interferes with the tasking assigned by the ACU. Photos of only VOIs, COIs, CCOIs, and HIVs will be saved on the laptop. All other images will be kept on flash cards. 003/019’ LRP Det Comd Direction 8 Mar 03 IFF Transponder | 003/020 (removed) Updated 30 May 03 D-5/8 SECRET 000144 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgut en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET s.15(1) Def Reference No, 003/021 CTF 57 Email LNO CTF 57 16 Mar 03 Significant Incidents Crews are to treat the following events as significant incidents: C. When queried (non-standard) by air traffic or other controllers; D. Operational incidents that affect aircraft safety or the conduct of the mission. Notes. • • • • Crews are not to go out of their way to establish comms with the A/C unless flight safety is an issue. Crews are reminded that'Neutral'A/C are non-friendly. Treat all encounters with caution and take all steps necessary to protect classified information. Non-coalition air and maritime assets monitor maritime communications traffic and have used it to query coalition forces. Coalition maritime forces operating in the AOR have encountered overflights of P-3, F-27, Atlantique, Mirage, and F-4 aircraft. Crews are reminded to be vigilant, Reporting. Significant Incidents shall be reported via a separate Significant Incident Report (SIR), and should be mentioned in the Purple or MISREP. The SIR shall contain the following information: time and position duration of encounter communications details how did A/C detect each other did the other A/C 'sneak-up from what direction did it approach any indication of tasking of the A/C any other information thought to be relevant to the incident CTF57 requires this information as soon as possible after the incident. 003/022 (removed) TTW Standoff Updated 30 May 03 D-6/8 SECRET 000145 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET s.15(1) Def No. Reference 03/023 1. LRP Det Comd Direction 24 Mar 03 (email) 2 Commanders Intent SOH-Western Traffic Separation Scheme Transit (CTF 151) 210945ZMAR03 03/024 1. LRP Det Comd direction 29 May 03(email) On-Station Delays As the OPCON authority, CTF-57 tasks the on-station times (usually six hours in duration). In the event that ramp snags or weather delays a take-off, crews shall normally complete the six hour on-station period. However, the trip may be cut short if: a. the tasked mission has been completed and the OTC (usually CTF 151) has no further tasking, or b. Crew day or fatigue issues prevent the safe completion of the mission, or c. The crew swaps the surveillance mission with a relieving MPA. CTF-57 does not require a Green-dev for any delays less than 3 hours. However, they shall be advised of the revised on/off station times through either the Mission Support Office or Keeptrack. Amendment Date Original 28 Feb 03 CH1 8 Mar 03 003/001 amended. 003/019, 003/020 added CH2 22 Mar 03 003/002 amended, 003/010 removed, 003/021, 22 added CH3 25 Mar 03 003/023 added CH4 27 Mar 03 003/001, 002 amended, 003/022 removed CH5 29 Mar 03 003/020 removed Updated 30 May 03 D-7/8 SECRET 000146 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def CH 5 29 May 03 003/024 added CH 6 30 May 03 003/001 amended Updated 30 May 03 D-8/8 SECRET 000147 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDAF (Operation APOLLO) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource LRP ROTO 2 - END TOUR REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED - 01 JUL 03 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 01-Jul-03 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2019-03644 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Library and Archives Canada, RG24, 3350-134 Binder Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDAF00004 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00001 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Policy on Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 14-Aug-02 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Privy Council Office Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2021-00218 PCO Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/139b5f48fb5eeb2a6ec6f7d027d76b36.pdf c857efe5dfd2ef6cc59a322d32388529 PDF Text Text ���� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. 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Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00015 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Policy on Iraq [Heavily Sanitized] Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 14-Aug-02 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Privy Council Office Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2021-00218 PCO Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/925a3de8a075d38145097fe38125d8fc.pdf d928de769e489ab6a2bf3543a118e85a PDF Text Text ������������������������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. 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Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00014 Title A name given to the resource Cables from Canadian Mission to the United Nations Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1, 2003 - March 17, 2003 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Global Affairs Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2021-01097 GAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/d59c725096b99c1ca2f2e258580600a2.pdf 64cafb0f68ec46236b1a7bc626ef20c7 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information ___________________________■ E 8C0001 2G 1 1812D-18-8 Sec SEC ■ DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS M. BLOODWORTH — “CIO SEO Iraq ■F ffEL M ff CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS MjNISl|fe_- MM^l. Plans et ;.W Iraq WORTH- WEYES ONLY i' u O Id CD CO cn gw 0 CM r—I CT M 0° =—™ I CM 00 SESSS5 O O 7 7= ™ 04 O E- co CM O O ® OJ Mima Q I rH ■ 11 11 ■> co o E o o o I O ■ H r- Q T-r-rCM 00 000025 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulg.ue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information FILE MAINTENANCE CHECKUST LISTEDE CONTRdLE POUR CENTRETIEN DU DOSSIER □ Protect all files and records as official property. ProtEger tous les dossiers et les documents comme Etant la proprietE officielle. Clean records prior to adding them to files. Nettoyer les documents avant de les ajouter 4 leur dossier respectif. Remove all envelopes, flags, tags, pins, spikes, clips and superfluous staples. Enlever tout articles inutiles (enveloppes, papillons, Etiquettes, Epingles, trombones, attachesfeuilles, agrafes etc.). File papers and TDs chronologically, the latest date on top. Classer les documents en ordre chronologique, la date la plus rEcente sur le dessus. Prepunch holes at the top. left • corner of the papers. Percer des trous du coin superieur' gauche du document. Attach papers to the file by a paper spike for easy handling. Pour faciliter la manutention, attacher les documents au dossier au moyen d’une attache-feuille. When a file becomes thicker than 2", a subsequent volume should be created. Lorsque le dossier a plus de 2” d'Epaisseur, crEer uri nouveau volume. Destroy duplicate material. Keep a copy only if it has additional information. DEtruire tous les duplicates qui ne contiennent aucun renseignements supplementaires. Verify the security classification of new documents added to the file. Verifier la cote de sEcuritE des nouveaux documents ajoutE au dossier. Upgrade the file to the required level as required. Augmenter la cote de sEcuritE si nEcessaire. . 000026 �Document disclosed untfer the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en v(rp drA^tc^yir n^esjt I'mjbrmation 1*1 iaV iC k National Defence Defense nationale National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 NO V 2 1 2QC2 The Minister BRIEFING NOTE ON CANADIAN ACCESS TO US PLANNING Enclosed for your information is a briefing note on the requirement for early militaryto-military discussions between Canada and the US regarding any possible future Canadian contribution to action against Iraq. R.R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff Margaret Bloodworth Deputy Minister Encl (1) Canada CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) 000027 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur facets a /'information 04^'/ /X s TAa Xa s ’^La AIx x a ^s 'c A o X^s z _o <_J^ ~L(v \ 5 L VAA-r IX 2Ab^- 1U^ v k m J!1 \t )CSLj ^L. ~4d Va g O^—P '^-J--- \ . A—000028 �CONFIDENTIAL CANADIAN (UNCLASSIFIED Without Enclosure) -------- General Correspondence No^ber 19, 2002 " ’ v ccmMercury Manual Docket Slip Doc Date: 19/11/2002 BF Date: 3%? Document: 644913 Control: CDS2002-337834 File No.: 3000-1 Input Date: 19/11/2002 Due Date: Org/Gp: CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF Subject: BN FOR MND - ON CANADIAN ACCES TO US PLANNING Comment: Author: K CALDER XRef: DATE L1U CHG TO 50 Orf ^0 Grp/Sct: ADMPOL INTL REMARKS Az L C<^V\ \AT-l jyufu^ li ajkq a ^- CONFIDENT (UNCLAS: _______ . 000029 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information • CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: Briefing Note on Canadian Access to US Military Planning File #/Numero de reference: 3450-1 (Corri Barr, D PK Pol 6) DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI FROM/DE: J.J. Gauvin Cmdre Concur :COS J3_____ COS J3/CEM J3 Date: D PK Pol/D Pol MP Z Date: 1$ Al 2.COZ- ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) FROM/DE: Concur d g i S Po T/d g Poi Si (J Date: DCDS^CEMD Date: CDS/CEMD DM/SM FROM/DE: ADM Pol/SMA Pol Date: Sous-Ministre de la Defense Rationale CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) NOV 1 9 2002 Deputy Minister of Notional Defence REF: 34G63 000030 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ISSUE • Any delay in a Canadian government decision to engage in military-to-military planning on Iraq could seriously compromise Canada’s ability to provide an effective and timely contribution to any future campaign. BACKGROUND • With the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1441 on the situation in Iraq, the US is moving into a more active and public phase in its coalition-building and military planning for any possible future action in the event of Iraqi non-compliance with the terms of the inspections. DISCUSSION • The US Embassy has formally demarched Canada to engage in planning and to gauge what contributions - including combat troops and combat support - it could provide should military means be required to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. The US has indicated that it would prefer to act with the broadest possible international coalition and would welcome Canada’s support. • A delay in Canadian access to military planning would erode the Canadian Forces flexibility to participate should the international community determine that force is, indeed, required. Such access at this juncture would also serve to inform Canada’s decision-making process. If the Canadian Government decides to deploy Canadian Forces against Iraq, thus putting Canadian lives at risk, that decision should be informed by the fullest possible understanding of US plans. • The Canadian Embassy in Washington reports its interlocutors have said that, barring the outbreak of hostilities in the coming weeks, there is still adequate time for allies to volunteer and integrate forces into ongoing planning. However, US officials also stress that the longer a Canadian decision to engage in military-to-military discussions takes, the less relevant and credible any potential Canadian military contribution would be. • Rather than committing Canada to joining a campaign irrespective of the outcome of the United Nations inspection process, early participation in US planning would be extremely prudent - particularly if Canada could become involved in any action against Iraq (as the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs have both publicly suggested). Canadian Forces access to planning at this stage would not constitute acceptance of any specific task or the commitment of resources. Canada would simply be engaging in prudent military planning and preparation. 1/2 CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) 000031 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) Prepared By: Responsible Director: Responsible Director-General Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Com Barr. D PK Pol 6,996-1741 Col G. C6te, DPK Pol. 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross. DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder. ADM (Pol), 992-3458 15 Nov 02 2/2 CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) 000032 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de^e.Loi surliacces a I'information SECRET(CEO) M'l 2 ^MEMORANDUM 3450-1 (DPK Pol 6) 7 "1 / / <S°^002 / ■ 1 Nov 02 ■ Dist List REQUEST FOR REVIEW OF DFAIT IRAQ PAPER pi> 1. Enclosed for your review and comments is a paper on Iraq drafted by DFAIT with some preliminary input from DND/CF. The only portion that has been formally approved by DND/CF is the “Options for military contributions” on pages 8 and 9; we have not yet provided input to the rest of the paper. In particular, your review should focus on any strategic issues that may not be 2. addressed (i.e., Is there a case to be made for intervention? What are the overriding implications for Canada? etc.), the legal basis for action, military options and advice, and the overall structure of the paper. Additionally, given the paper’s current length, suggestions to eliminate repetition and wordiness would be appreciated. In order that we may provide substantive comments to DFAIT in a user-friendly format, please forward your input to the Directorate of Peackekeeping Policy no later than the close of business on 5 November 2002. DPK Pol will consolidate all comments and forward them to DFAIT for inclusion in a new document. The finished product is intended to be a joint document guiding deliberations on the issue and will, therefore, need to be agreed to in its entirety by both Departments. j. 4. Please accept my regrets regarding the unavoidably tight deadline. Any comments or questions should be addressed to Corri Barr, DPK Pol 6, at 996-1741. H.Cameron Ross MGen DGIS Pol 992-2769 Encl (1) Action DG Pol Plan COS J3 JAG 1/2 SECRET(CEO) 000033 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information < SECRET(CEO) Information ADM(Pol) EA/DM D Pol Dev D Strat A D Law I DPK Pol 2/2 SECRET(CEO) 000034 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /‘information J -1- Michael Walma Defence and Security Relations Division 992-6205 Graeme McIntyre Middle East Division 944-5995 SECRET (Ct-O} 23 October 2002 IDR0360 Information Memorandum for: The Minister of Foreign Affairs c.c. Minister for International Trade c.c. Minister for International Cooperation and c.c. Secretary of State (Asia-Pacific) c.c. Secretary of State (Central and Eastern Europe and Middle East) c.c. Secretary of State (Latin America and Africa) (Francophonie) ISSUE: Memo on Iraq Policy Implications 1. This memo deals with Security Council scenarios and possible military contributions. It complements earlier broader analyses in memos GMR0595 (Aug 14) and GMR0589 (Aug 06). SUMMARY: 2. Indications that the Security Council may be nearing a decision on a draft resolution on Iraq will necessitate increased Canadian political and diplomatic management of the issue. Timelines for decisions will become shorter, the issues to be addressed more difficult and, equally important, the need for well-crafted communications lines more vital. This memo outlines four possible scenarios based on broad potential outcomes from the UN Security Council’s discussion of Iraq and identifies the legal, military, diplomatic and communications issues that each would present. The four potential outcomes are: A. B. C. D. No new resolution is adopted One or more resolutions are adopted but the authorisation of force is ambiguous; One or more resolutions are adopted, the authorisation of force is clear, but gridlock in the Security Council prevents a finding of Iraqi non-compliance; or There is a clear authorisation of force and the Security Council agrees that Iraq is in breach. With today’s indications that the Security Council may be close to agreeing on a resolution, outcomes B) and D) appear most likely, but outcome C) remains a lesser possibility. Should we face option B), we are almost certain to see the return of inspectors, which would delay the need for a decision on Canadian participation in military action for a short time. However, we would ultimately need to weigh the implication that participation could be seen as a weakened commitment to international law against the impact of non-participation on our relations with the United States. Clear evidence of non-compliance will factor heavily in our final decision. Option D), although unlikely to occur, would create the clearest conditions for Canada, politically and legally, as the Prime Minister has said that Canada will participate in a military campaign under these conditions. However, our ability to participate will be severely limited by short time lines and our non-participation in current US military planning. This memo reviews military options as comprehensively as possible, including that of 3. 000035 �4 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'accis a I’information * -2backfilling for the US in the Balkans or Afghanistan as a substitute for or complement to, direct participation. While does not favour backfilling due to resource constraints and possible troop morale issues, DFAIT believes possible backfilling scenarios must remain on the table to maximise the government’s future policy flexibility. BACKGROUND: 4. To date, with President Bush’s 12 September speech to the UN General Assembly and in the absence of any overt US pressure to support and contribute to a unilateral military option, policy options and the communications strategy for explaining our approach have been easy - uncomplicated and free of difficult issues. 5. This will soon change. For Canada, the political, legal and diplomatic management of the Iraq issue is about to enter a new, more complex and increasingly unpredictable phase. Timelines for decisions and, equally importantly, well-crafted communications lines, will become shorter and the issues to be addressed, much more difficult. 6. Whilst the situation in NY is too dynamic to predict, reports today (Friday) indicate that the US may well be nearing agreement with France on a draft resolution. This would be the first step in a consultative process to be engaged by the US with the other P5 and then the E10. The draft resolution is likely to be officially tabled quickly. 7. The compromise between the US and French positions will probably be reflected in a single resolution that essentially contains within it (a) the two stages that had originally be requested by France and (b) language that gives the US the trigger or automaticity elements they had been seeking. However, the use of force language may be weaker than that originally sought by the US. Rather than using the usual terms of art for military action (e.g. all necessary means), it may instead refer to the need for full compliance....in order to restore international peace and security. It is already becoming apparent that the US and France are reading the resolution in two quite different ways. 8. Although it is dangerous to make predictions on the outcome of the consultative process and eventual language of the resolution, it seems that intense consultations took place over the weekend and on Monday with the prospect of a tabling of the resolution for consideration, but no agreement has been found. For Canada, an approved resolution will mean we will be moving into another level of ambiguity and complexity in managing Canadian policy responses to Iraq. The UN Security Council will likely be unclear in terms of the key issues of determination of breach and the decision-making process regarding the use of force. At the same time, the global political environment is becoming more obscured and complicated with, inter alia, Korean nuclear weapons programmes revelations, the Bali bombing and the Yemen and Kuwait attacks. 9. The Government of Canada will soon have to move beyond easy appeals to the US and others to use the UN, and will face questions regarding possible Canadian political support for or military involvement in an eventual US-led military operation which may - or may not - derive its mandate and legitimacy from a UN Security Council decision. The political and legal uncertainties in the current situation require us to think through the options, possible responses and the way in which Ministers speak publicly about this issue. The following paper outlines the cunent state of play, some of the possible scenarios that we may be 10. faced with in the coming weeks and draft communications lines for dealing with these questions. 1. CURRENT SITUATION: 000036 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -X -3- 11. ^p.t present, the scenarios presented in our August memo (Ref:GMR0595, 14 August 2002) still largely pertain. Canada has been able to assert that concerns about Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council resolutions must be considered the continuing responsibility of the Council and that all action be directed to, and through, that forum. We have even been able to say that we have seen some success in this approach - the US has engaged the UN process, at least to now. 12. Canada has been able to accompany this overall UN approach with an active bilateral diplomatic effort (at the level of Ministers, the PM and officials) aimed at: engaging the US and encouraging them to work through the UN; working with other key allies such as the UK; encouraging the other P5 to live up to their responsibilities; and, pressing influential regional partners in the Middle East such as Egypt to engage Iraq directly in dialogue to encourage full cooperation and compliance with its obligations. We have clearly stated at the UN that we need an unambiguous resolution that would contain serious consequences for Iraqi non-compliance. 13. US position: The US remains determined to depose Saddam Hussein, working from the premise that Saddam’s government poses a fundamental threat to US strategic interests. While the Bush Administration has focused in public on Iraq’s WMD capacity and ambitions (and sought to connect Iraq to al Qaeda), a broader case for regime change is being pursued in Washington. Military action will probably begin in January-February 2003, although an earlier campaign cannot be excluded. Only a coup d’etat or Saddam’s assassination would be likely to avert a war against Iraq. 14. Within the Administration, views differ on whether to focus narrowly on deposing Saddam and eliminating Iraq’s capacity to threaten its neighbours, or to opt for a highly ambitious plan that would turn Iraq into a second pillar of support for the US in the Persian Gulf and send a democratising shock wave through the Arab world; there appears to be increasing support in the US for the latter option. More cautious opinions are still being expressed, notably by Secretary of State Powell, but the general thrust of US policy is clear. American efforts to secure a new Security Council resolution on weapons inspectors should be seen in 15. this light. Washington has concluded that Iraq’s WMD programmes cannot be destroyed through inspections, and that the only way to reduce or eliminate this threat is to replace the government in Baghdad. In short, Washington is interested in the UN process mainly in so far as it can legitimise a war that will depose Saddam. Key partners: Our key partners are facing the same dilemma that is before us. UK PM Tony Blair has 16. come under considerable fire at home for his decision to back the US both politically and militarily. France and Russia are balancing their opposition to the current Anglo-American resolution against their broader bilateral relationships with the US; there are indications that both are nearing a deal with the US. China remains on the sidelines, and is expected to follow Russia and France. Germany is seen to have crossed a line during the recent election campaign. Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark are all fairly supportive of the US position, while other European states such as Belgium have voiced their opposition. Regional views: Arab states remain publicly critical of US moves toward a war with Iraq, seeing this 17. as unjust on its own merits and egregious given what they perceive as a double standard toward Israel. At the end of the day, pro-US states such as Jordan, Kuwait and Qatar will likely acquiesce to US use of bases or airspace in If a war against Iraq, though a new Security Council resolution emerges, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states may also provide quiet support. s.15(1) Regional impact: With or without the backing of a UN Security Council resolution, US action against 18. Iraq can be expected to provoke a strong backlash in the Arab world. Even if the US achieves a rapid victory with minimal Iraqi casualties, there will be a strong tendency in the Arab world to regard this as yet another “humiliation”. 000037 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -419. ^^NMOVIC situation: Talks held two weeks ago between UNMOVIC, the IAEA and Iraq went smoothly. Nevertheless, Dr. Hans Blix, the Head of UNMOVIC has said that he sees no point in returning to Iraq when the Security Council is still considering changing his mandate. Dr. Blix has been walking a careful line between asserting his own independence and maintaining good relations with the P5, especially the US. 20. He is known, however, to have serious reservations about some aspects of the initial US draft, including the question of armed escorts, the issue of removing Iraqi informants and their families from Iraq and the matter of direct P-5 participation in and tasking of the inspection teams. On the other hand, he does not underestimate the importance of resisting Iraqi duplicity and intransigence on key issues such as access to Presidential sites. Should a Security Council resolution be adopted, we would expect that UN and IAEA inspectors would be able to return to Iraq in short order, and begin their work. What is not clear, and will not be until a resolution is adopted, is how and on what timetable UNMOVIC will report to the Council; and, by whom and how a judgement of a breach of obligations will be reached. 2. SECURITY COUNCIL SCENARIOS: 21. We can foresee four broad possible outcomes from the UN Security Council’s discussion of Iraq: A. B. C. No new resolution is adopted One or more resolutions are adopted but the authorisation of force is ambiguous; One or more resolutions are adopted, the authorisation of force is clear, but gridlock in the Security Council prevents a finding of Iraqi non-compliance; or There is a clear authorisation of force and the Security Council agrees that Iraq is in breach. D. In considering each of these scenarios, we must bear in mind that US military planning is already well 22. underway. If Canada waits until the action in the Security Council is played out before deciding whether to participate in a US-led attack on Iraq, our decision will come so late as to severely hinder preparations for Canadian military involvement in a January campaign. However, the alternative, to begin participation in US planning now, or after the first of a two-resolution package is adopted, would commit us to joining a campaign regardless of the outcome of the UN process. This would be interpreted by the Canadian public as the discounting of diplomatic avenues. A. Negotiations in the Security Council break down and no new resolution is adopted. s.15(1) This could come about if the US loses patience with the slow process of adopting a new resolution or 23. fears a veto from another P5 state. In this situation the US would attack Iraq unilaterally, possibly with a limited “coalition of the willing”. The US would likely cite previous Council resolutions and/or (preemptive) selfdefence as a basis for its actions, while simultaneously criticising the Council for failing to rise to the present challenge. Factors influencing a Canadian decision: Previous policy statements: PM Chretien has said that Canada would not participate in a war against 24. Iraq without a new UN resolution. 000038 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acc&s a I'information -5- 25. ^Lcgal: A legal right to use force in self-defence will only exist if there is evidence that Iraq poses an “imminent” threat. Any acceptance of Iraq’s WMD potential as a basis for using force in self-defence would require careful scrutiny of the evidence, including a study of Iraq’s current and potential WMD capacity and its future intentions viewed against context of past conduct. 26. Alternatively, the U.S. as in its 1993 and 1998 attacks against Iraq may seek to rely upon past Security Council Resolutions which have expressly authorized the use of force. In particular they may attempt to rely on Resolution 678 (1991) which authorized the “use of all necessary means” to implement “all subsequent relevant resolutions” relating to the restoration of international peace and security in the area. Resolution 678 would provide, at best, a weak legal basis upon which force could now be used. 27. Communications/domestic considerations: Our government would not be able to say that all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted. Canadian public opinion is firmly against attacking Iraq without a Council mandate, and could further harden if the US gives the appearance of having been indifferent to the UN. Depending on the circumstances of the breakdown, we would be able to suggest that Council had failed to live up to its obligations, as we have been insisting. From a legal perspective any public statements must not compromise Canada’s past and future actions. For legal reasons it would not be prudent to make definitive statements on the lawfulness of using force in self-defence or with respect to the sufficiency of evidence asserted in support of that basis. This includes reference to the evidence publicly disclosed by the UK or the Bush doctrine of preemptive self-defence. 28. Military: While highly problematic from many perspectives, an early end to diplomatic manoeuvring could, in theory, allow us to join current US planning early enough to make a direct military contribution. Alternatively, we could backfill for the US elsewhere (for example Afghanistan), freeing up US forces for the attack on Iraq. These assignments tend to be low on recognition and long-term. 29. Diplomatic: With the possible exception of the UK, our key partners would likely not support US action. Short-term implications: A decision to participate militarily would instantly relieve US pressure on us. 30. Joint planning could begin immediately. Communicating a rationale for this course of action to the Canadian public, Parliament and to our non-US allies would prove a challenge. A decision to not participate would not pose these challenges, and should also be manageable with respect to the United States as it will be expecting this decision in view of the Prime Minister’s stated position. Longer-term implications: In the absence of clear evidence demonstrating an imminent threat, a decision 31. to participate could be viewed by some as a weakened commitment to international law. It would also signal a lessened commitment to the UN and to the multilateral system. A decision to not participate would leave us on firmer footing, but could exacerbate the view of some within the United States that Canada cannot be relied upon. This problem could be attenuated to some extent by the offering of political support and by providing military assistance in other areas (backfilling) to free up US forces for its campaign. Any Canadian support would gamer some respect from the US Administration and Congress, who would appreciate that Canada was an ally willing to take political risks. B. Authorisation of force is ambiguous. 32. The Security Council could adopt a resolution that only implies an authorisation of force, as it did in Kosovo. Council members could deliberately seek this outcome in order to avoid a confrontation. The US would use this resolution to justify an attack on Iraq. 000039 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information -6- Factors^^fluencing a Canadian decision: • Previous Policy Statements: In the Iraq context, we have been careful to avoid publicly addressing this scenario, except to reiterate the need for the Security Council to live up to its responsibilities. This scenario resembles that of the Kosovo war and the use of force against Iraq in 1993 and 1998 in the sense of the ambiguity, but not from the overwhelming humanitarian need. Legal: Unlike a resolution which expressly authorized “all necessary means”, the legal foundation for an enforcement action would be questionable and be based upon a weak controversial doctrine of “implied” authorization. In 1993 and 1998 various Security Council statements and resolutions used phrases such as “gravest consequences” and “serious consequences” in place of the familiar “all necessary means”. The US is currently using similar diplomatic code as possible wording within a new resolution. Communications/Domestic considerations: A great deal will depend on the wording of the resolution and any evidence of continued Iraqi non-compliance. Clear evidence of Iraqi non-compliance could make a decision not to participate difficult to explain. Similarly, if the evidence is not clear, a decision to participate would not be well understood. The legal problems that such an ambiguous resolution would pose would not likely be well understood. Once again, we will have available to us the message that we believe that the Council has failed to meets its obligations. From a legal perspective public statements on the type of resolution Canada is seeking should avoid use of terms such as “gravest consequences” or “serious consequences” given that the Government of Canada has not decided to support the use of force on the basis of an implied authorization. Military: Under this scenario, military action would likely following very quickly on the heels of a finding, whether by the US or UN, that Iraq is in breach. It would be extremely difficult for proper planning to take place in time for Canada to be able to make an extensive contribution. Diplomatic: Such a resolution would allow countries a much larger degree of flexibility in determining their positions, as each could interpret the resolution as it chooses. At the same time, US pressure on Canada and other allies would be much stronger in this scenario, as it would be looking for support in order to justify its own position. We would need to take into account the positions of others, especially of the P5, and should consult them as soon as possible following the adoption of such a resolution. Short term implications: Adoption of a resolution would almost certainly mean a return of inspectors to Iraq, which should push the need for a decision off by a short period of time. A decision to participate would be warmly received by the US and would be justifiable to others. A decision not to participate would not please the US but would still be justifiable to others. Clear evidence of non-compliance will factor heavily. Longer term implications: In the absence of clear evidence demonstrating an imminent threat, a decision to participate could be viewed as a weakened commitment to international law. It would also signal a lessened commitment to the UN and to the multilateral system. A decision to not participate would leave us on firmer footing, but could exacerbate the view of some within the United States that Canada cannot be relied upon. This problem could be attenuated to some extent by the offering of political support and by providing military assistance in other areas (backfilling) to free up US forces for its campaign. Any Canadian support would gamer some respect from the US Administration and Congress, who would appreciate that Canada was an ally willing to take political risks. C. Gridlock in Council 000040 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -733. ^In this scenario, the Council adopts a resolution which would clearly authorise force (or states that the Counci^pil authorise force in the face of continued non-compliance) but balks at finding Iraq in breach or at adopting the follow-on resolution. Of the scenarios which would place Canada in a difficult position, this is the most likely. Factors influencing a Canadian decision: Previous Policy Statements: We have been careful to avoid publicly addressing this scenario, except to reiterate the need for the Security Council to live up to its responsibilities. Legal: The legal foundation for military action would be controversial. The clarity of the language, in particular regarding the “reporting” and “trigger” mechanism and the way in which any authorized force is delegated to member states will be crucial. In the absence of express language the Security Council’s failure to act does not provide a clear legal basis to use force. Communications/Domestic considerations: A great deal will depend on the wording of the resolution and any evidence of continued Iraqi non-compliance. Reporting from New York suggests that the Council may adopt ‘one and a half resolutions, that is, it would authorise force on recognition of a breach, but would be unclear as to how and by whom that determination would be made, opening the door to the US deciding for itself. Clear evidence of Iraqi non-compliance could make a decision not to participate difficult to explain. Similarly, if the evidence is not clear, a decision to participate would not be well understood. The legal problems that gridlock would pose would also not likely be well understood. Once again, we will have available to us the message that we believe that the Council has failed to meets its obligations. In order to avoid communications difficulties, our messages from the beginning of a two-stage process should emphasise our insistence that the Council must live up to its responsibilities to find Iraq in breach of its obligations if that is what the evidence indicates. Military: Under this scenario, military action would likely follow very quickly on the heels of a finding, whether by the US or UN, that Iraq is in breach. It would be well-nigh impossible for proper planning to take place in time for Canada to be able to make any real contribution. Diplomatic: Such a resolution would allow countries a much larger degree of flexibility in determining their positions, as each could interpret the resolution as it chooses. At the same time, US pressure on Canada and other allies would be much stronger in this scenario, as it would be looking for support in order to justify its own position. We would need to take into account the positions of others, especially of the P5, and should consult them as soon as possible following the adoption of the first resolution. Short term implications: Adoption of a resolution would almost certainly mean a return of inspectors to Iraq, which would push the need for a decision off by at least two weeks. A decision to participate would be warmly received by the US and would be justifiable to others. A decision not to participate would not please the US but would still be justifiable to others. Clear evidence of non-compliance will factor heavily. Longer term implications: This scenario could be considered 'worst-case' since it could see Canada having to choose between helping to discredit the UN or vainly attempting to maintain its credibility, risking the anger of the US. A decision to participate may be viewed as a weakened commitment to international law and could leave us open to further legal challenges. It would also signal a lessened commitment to the UN and to the multilateral system. A decision to not participate would leave us on firmer footing, but could exacerbate the view of some within the United States that Canada cannot be relied upon. This problem could be attenuated to some extent by the offering of political support and by providing military assistance in other areas (backfilling) to free up US forces for its campaign. Any 000041 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -8Canadian support would gamer some respect from the US Administration and Congress, who would ^^ppreciate that Canada was an ally willing to take political risks. D. Council unanimity on the need for force Should the UNSC adopt a resolution authorising force and if it then finds Iraq in breach, the matter is 34. simple for Canada, politically and legally. Under these circumstances, the Prime Minister has said that Canada will participate in the military campaign. We would not find ourselves internationally isolated, and the legal basis would be clear. Domestically, the implications for the government will focus on explaining its position to the public and deciding on the role of Parliament. Our ability to participate will be severely limited by short times lines (we would expect an attack in these circumstances to follow very shortly after the finding Iraq in breach) and our non-participation in current US planning. 3, Options for military contributions (prepared by National Defence) A. Direct military support 35. Should the Government of Canada elect to provide direct military support, it could contribute the assets currently dedicated to Operation APOLLO: two ships, three Hercules transport aircraft and two Aurora maritime patrol aircraft. These assets are already in theatre and, with appropriate diplomatic clearances, could be maintained until December 2003. Deployment of additional military resources for operations in the Iraqi theatre would be dependent on 36. time as follows: Short term (Jan-Feb 2003): The resources dedicated to Op APOLLO plus six CF 18 fighters 37. (incremental cost of $50M) and two additional ships (incremental cost of S60M); Medium Term (March-April 2003): A squadron of Special Operations Forces (JTF2 would be 38. available by 15 March 2003, costs TBD); and 39. Long Term (June-July 2003): An infantry light battle group (incremental cost of S122M) or a mechanized battle group, complete with tanks, mine clearing equipment, etc., (incremental cost of S166M). A June-July deployment will alleviate the requirements for personnel waivers. Early access to joint planning with the US and other coalition partners is considered key in being able to 40. determine an appropriate Canadian contribution within an overall coalition force package. Although Canada has no detailed knowledge of US planning, a campaign would likely begin sometime in January or February 2003. Depending on the force package selected by the Canadian Government, varying degrees of warning time will be required to ensure timely and effective deployments. Sufficient time will need to be allotted for the negotiation of Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) or Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) and acquisition of the necessary equipment and supplies. v 41. Combat operations would also require the support of other high value CF assets that are always in short supply. These include engineers; a nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) countermeasures capability; medical support; linguists; and command and control assets. Operations against Iraq within the next two to three months would pose substantial logistical risk given the CF’s dependence on materiel already deployed in support of Operation APOLLO and the long lead-time for the procurement of materiel and ammunition. Problem areas range 000042 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'accis a I’information -9- from Unavailability of vehicle spare parts to a limited stock of precision-guided munitions and targeting pods for the CF^s. B. Indirect military support 42. One option could be for Canadian troops to backfill US (or possibly other coalition) troops that could be redeployed to support a campaign against Iraq. If the CF were to be used in a backfill role, Canada would risk an increased commitment in areas such as the Balkans or Afghanistan (with contributions to the International Security Assistance Force, a Battalion/Battle Group combat operation, such as in Khandahar and possibly further staff support to Headquarters such as Coalition Joint Task Force 180 in Bagram) for longer periods than we might wish. Moreover, such a measure could have a profoundly negative impact on the morale of CF members should the repetitive, low-intensity deployments to Bosnia-Herzegovina, or other such missions, increase. As well, “backfilling” troops would be from elements of the CF that are already under stress due to the personnel deployment tempo, which would be compounded by these traditionally longer duration missions with no clear exit strategies. Backfilling is, therefore, not recommended by National Defence. James R. Wright Assistant Deputy Minister Global and Security Policy Deputy Minister 000043 �Document disclosed under the Access to InformationAcf k . Document divulgue enj^tujl^lad^f - 1*1 a reformation SECRET(CEO) National Defence Defense nationale ^Vnal Defence Headquarters OHawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Ottawa (Ontario) Quartier general de la Defense nationals K1A0K2 Ki 'I S 2002 The Minister DND INPUT TO DFAIT MEMO ON IRAQ AND AIDE-MEMOIRE FOR MND Enclosed is an aide-memoire to the Minister of National Defence and DND input to a Foreign Affairs-led memorandum on Iraq, which will form the basis of discussion on 21 October. mZ R.R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff Margaret Bloodworth Deputy Minister Encl (2) Canada SECRET(CEO) 000044 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET(CEO) ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: DND INPUT TO DFAIT MEMO ON IRAQ AND AIDE-MEMOIRE FOR MND File #/Numero de reference: 3450-1 (Corri Barr, D PK P0I6) DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI Conoar: COS J3/CEM ‘J3 FROM/DE: Date: ftOclci D PK Pol/D Pol MP Date: \~7. \o. z ~ ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) FROM/DE: ^DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI Date: ^WSTC^lSfr Concur DCDS/SCEMD Date: /7 — o/oZ' DM/SM FROM/DE: ADM Pol/SMA Pol Date: )? SECRET(CEO) REF: 34423 000045 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET (CEO) DND INPUT TO DFAIT MEMO ON IRAQ Should the Government of Canada elect to provide direct military support, it could contribute the assets currently dedicated to Operation APOLLO: two ships, three Hercules transport aircraft and two Aurora maritime patrol aircraft. These assets are already in theatre and, with appropriate diplomatic clearances, could be maintained until December 2003. Deployment of additional military resources for operations in the Iraqi theatre would be dependent on time as follows: Short term (Jan-Feb 2003): The resources dedicated to Op APOLLO plus six CF 18 fighters (incremental cost of $50M) and two additional ships (incremental cost of $60M); Medium Term (March-April 2003): A squadron of Special Operations Forces (JTF2 would be available by 15 March 2003, costs TBD); and Long Term (June-July 2003): An infantry light battle group (incremental cost of S122M) or a mechanized battle group, complete with tanks, mine clearing equipment, etc (incremental cost of $166M). A June-July deployment will alleviate the requirements for personnel waivers. Early access to joint planning with the US and other coalition partners is considered key in being able to determine an appropriate Canadian contribution within an overall coalition force package. Although Canada has no detailed knowledge of US planning, a campaign would likely begin sometime in January or February 2003. Depending on the force package selected by the Canadian Government, varying degrees of warning time will be required to ensure timely and effective deployments. Sufficient time will need to be allotted for the negotiation of Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) or Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) and acquisition of the necessary equipment and supplies. Combat operations would also require the support of other high value CF assets that are always in short supply. These include engineers; a nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) countermeasures capability; medical support; linguists; and command and control assets. Operations against Iraq within the next two to three months would pose substantial logistical risk given the CF’s dependence on materiel already deployed in support of Operation APOLLO and the long lead-time for the procurement of materiel and ammunition. Problem areas range from the availability of vehicle spare parts to a limited stock of precision-guided munitions and targeting pods for the CF-18s. SECRET (CEO) 000046 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgud en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET (CEO) 3 AIDE-MEMOIRE FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE CANADIAN FORCES CAPABILITIES FOR ACTION AGAINST IRAQ • Should the Government of Canada elect to provide direct military support, it could contribute the assets currently dedicated to Operation APOLLO: two ships, three Hercules transport aircraft and two Aurora maritime patrol aircraft. These assets are already in theatre and, with appropriate diplomatic clearances, could be maintained until December 2003 (incremental cost - $150 million). • Deployment of additional military resources for operations in the Iraqi theatre would be dependent on time as follows: Short term (Jan-Feh-2003): The resources dedicated to Op APOLLO plus six CF 18 fighters (incremental cost of $50M) and two additional ships (incremental cost of $60M) Medium Term (March-April 2003): A squadron of Special Operations Forces (JTF2 would be available by 15 March 2003, costs TBD); and Long Term (June-July 2003): An infantry light battle group (incremental cost of $122M) or a mechanized battle group, complete with tanks, mine clearing equipment, etc (incremental cost of $166M). A June-July deployment will alleviate the requirements for personnel waivers. • Early access to joint planning with the US and other coalition partners is considered key in being able to determine an appropriate Canadian contribution within an overall coalition force package. • Any of the force packages could be deployed independently under operational control of the US or another Coalition partner. • Other considerations: Combat operations against Iraq would also require the support of other high value CF assets that are always in short supply. These include engineers; a nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) countermeasures capability; medical support; linguists; and command and control assets. Operations against Iraq within the next two to three months would pose substantial logistical risk. The limiting factors are the dependence on materiel already deployed in support of Operation APOLLO and the long lead-time for the procurement of materiel and s.15(1) 1/2 SECRET(CEO) 000047 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET (CEO) ammunition. Problem areas range from the availability of vehicle spare parts to a limited stock of precision-guided munitions and targeting pods for the CF-18s. • Secondments: About 200 CF personnel are serving on exchange with US forces and/or the armed forces of countries that may elect to join a coalition. A letter to the Prime Minister from the Minister of National Defence recommending that secondees’ status not change in the event of a conflict is being staffed. Minister Graham concurs with this recommendation. Prepared By: Consultation: Responsible Director: Responsible Director-General Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Col G. C6t6. DPK Pol. 992-1872 LCol J.R. Forcstell, DPK Pol 3, Corri Barr, D PK Pol 6 Col G. Cote, DPK Pol. 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross. DGIS Pol. 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder. ADM (Pol). 992-3458 16 October 2002 2/2 SECRET (CEO) 000048 �Q'/lf " 1*1 , t Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act de la Loi surVGIc/ia I'informatigp/'' |£-'Ji SECRET(CEO) National Defence Defense nationale National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 AUG 2 7 $$ The Minister BRIEFING NOTE ON IRAQ Enclosed is a briefing note that outlines the recent situation in Iraq and the developing Canadian policy position. You may wish to discuss this issue with Minister Graham and other Cabinet colleagues in advance of any possible US request for assistance and the Prime Minister’s scheduled 9 September meeting with President Bush. R.R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff 0 /\ Margaret Bloodworth Av Deputy Minister Encl (1) Canada SECRET(CEO) 000049 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I’information SECRET (CEO) BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ISSUE 1. To provide an update on the recent situation in Iraq and the developing Canadian policy position. BACKGROUND 2. The US Administration is clearly focused on Iraq and is edging closer to Presidential decisions regarding how and when, rather than whether, to begin military action. The European Allies (except for, perhaps, the UK) are struggling to come to terms with American policies and perceptions, some of which they do not share, and with their own sense of vulnerability and lack of clout. 3. Regardless of diverging views and objectives, fundamental trans-Atlantic political and security interests are essentially the same: the international community recognizes the security threat posed by Iraq’s failure to comply with United Nations resolutions and Iraq’s continued development of weapons of mass destruction. Although few allies will accept the notion of regime change as a basis for action, evidence linking Iraq to terrorist activity or increased efforts to enhance its chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological weapons capabilities may compel allies to act in concert with the US. 4. National Defence has been participating in an interdepartmental group, led by Foreign Affairs, which defined a range of policy options on Iraq for Minister Graham. Foreign Affairs has recommended continuing diplomatic efforts to try to convince Iraq to accept the unconditional return of UN arms inspectors and to engage allies and partners in seeking appropriate legal and political solutions to the Iraqi situation. In the event the US approaches Canada for a political endorsement and for forces to participate in military action, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has been advised to consider the following factors in making a decision about how to respond: the importance for bilateral Canada-US relations; the legal and political justifications used for the attack; the reaction of our allies and partners; and the implications for Iraq and the region. DISCUSSION 5. The US Administration has repeatedly expressed its goal of regime change within Iraq. Canadian Embassy officials in Washington, D.C., are reporting that working groups on issues such as military options, interim governing structures and global financial implications have been meeting for months and their papers have already been circulated to senior levels within the Pentagon, State Department and White House. Six of Iraq’s most prominent opposition groups, including the Iraqi National Congress and the Iraqi National Accord, met with US officials over the weekend of 9 August in an attempt to resolve their differences and unite in preparation for the end of Saddam Hussein’s rule. The US will not invade Iraq without having a credible plan on both the pre- and post1/5 SECRET (CEO) 000050 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgud en vertu de la Loisur facets d I’information SECRET (CEO) invasion phases of any action. There may be a role for an international stabilization force or other significant international presence in Iraq for several years after the cessation of any offensive military action. 6. Reports indicate that Saddam Hussein is convinced that Iraq will face a US-led military attack, to begin by the end of this year or early in 2003, and is personally focused on his own survival and that of his regime. In the coming months, Iraq will continue a multifaceted strategy of defensively preparing for the coming war. This will include a concerted effort to build and repair regional relationships, continuing covert development of WMD and ballistic missiles, sanctions-busting and encouraging a variety of distractions internationally to try and restrain the United States through its allies. Intelligence assessments indicate that with the exception of probable accelerated work on WMD programs, Iraqi war preparations will remain defensive, not offensive. 7. Iraq had advanced biological, chemical and nuclear programs long before the Gulf War. There is much evidence, both direct and circumstantial, that Iraq has retained and continued developing robust biological and chemical weapons capabilities. Recent intelligence reports suggest increased activity at several Iraqi facilities suspected of supporting the production, testing, and storage of WMD, including that of nuclear weapons. Saddam believes the asymmetric threat posed by Iraqi WMD is his best chance at deterring a regime-threatening conventional attack. His commitment to WMD has been demonstrated by his personal choice to absorb billions of dollars in economic losses from sanctions, rather than allow the return of the UN inspectors that were evicted in December 1998. 8. Within the international community, the US has received bilateral support for military action from allies such as the UK and Australia. Other countries, including Germany and Jordan, have publicly opposed direct intervention in Iraq, The support of regional partners, such as Kuwait, Qatar and especially Turkey, will be required to facilitate any decisive military action. The US has stepped up efforts to secure their agreement, as well as to gauge the support of Saudi Arabia, an essential partner in the 1991 Gulf War, which has been publicly hostile to the idea of renewed US intervention. Israel will also figure prominently; kcould well find itself a target for Iraqi retaliation in the event of military action - perhaps even with WMD. Unlike in the Gulf War, Israel has not promised to resist the temptation to strike back. s .15(1) 9. Fear of their own publics has increased pressure on other Arab regimes to avoid articulating open support of US intervention in Iraq, although at the end of the day, most regional governments will likely be unwilling to risk relations with the US and should be able to contain any popular dissent. Jordan, in particular because of its Palestinian population, will face considerable pressures in trying to reconcile US requests with popular opinion. Neighbours such as Syria and Iran will probably remain opposed to military intervention since they will not accept that a sovereign country could have its regime changed forcibly by the US. Additionally, US military intervention would likely 2/5 SECRET(CEO) 000051 J �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informotion SECRET (CEO) provoke a new exodus of Iraqi refugees - something that neighbours would be illequipped to cope with. Similarly, all Arab countries, and many European, are concerned by the potential impact on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. 10. There has been very little real multilateral progress towards bringing Iraq into compliance with UN resolutions concerning weapons inspections and the import and export of various commodities, including weapons components and oil. After numerous discussions with Iraq, the United Nations Security Council has decided that there will be no further high-level talks until there are concrete indications from Iraq that they are ready to accept UN weapons inspections unconditionally. Although any decision to resume the Secretary General’s participation in such talks would not be taken without first holding a full discussion of the situation within the Council, low-level technical discussions between the UN and Iraqi specialists will be permitted to continue. Russia and China support continuing the dialogue; Russia, in particular, fears that the US is seeking to close down diplomatic options to resolve the conflict. 11. The legal basis to use armed force exists under customary international law (e.g., humanitarian intervention and self defence) and the UN Charter. Article 51 and Chapter VII of the UN Charter provide two exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force. Article 51 preserves the inherent right of individual and collective self defence. Operation APOLLO is being conducted in exercise of self defence. Under Chapter VII, the Security Council can authorize the use of armed force by way of a Security Council Resolution upon making a determination that there exists a threat to or breach of international peace and security. For example, Security Council Resolution 678 provided a legal basis for states to use force against Iraq in the Gulf War. 12. Historically, the US. UK and, to a lesser extent, France have conducted a number of postGulf War military operations against Iraq while relying upon a number of asserted legal bases. These include the enforcement of No-Fly zones (humanitarian intervention); attacking the Iraqi integrated air defence system (self defence); attacking Iraqi intelligence facilities (self defence arising from a plot to assassinate the first President Bush); and destruction of suspected weapons facilities (enforcement of resolution 687 and subsequent resolutions relating to weapons inspections). Any future use of force by the US against Iraq, as with previous uses offeree in the Gulf since 1990, will raise complex legal issues. For example, questions concerning the nature and scope of the right of self defence arise from recent US statements regarding a doctrine of “preemptive self defence” and the use of force against states hosting terrorists. 13. Given the historical complexity of the issue, any determination of the legality of a future use of force will require careful scrutiny of the evidentiary bases upon which a claim to use force is asserted. For example, evidence that demonstrates that Iraq is producing WMD and intends to use them against the US or others, or to assist others in using them, would have to be analyzed to determine whether the requirements of self defence under international law have been met. 3/5 SECRET (CEO) 000052 I �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accds a I'information SECRET (CEO) CANADIAN POSITION 14. Canadian policy regarding Iraq remains consistent: the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs continue to reaffirm the position that Canada, as always, will assess the situation as it evolves and make a decision at the time. Both have noted Canada’s concern about Iraq’s WMD programs, but have indicated our preference that the issue be dealt with through the UN (i.e., through the re-establishment of the UN inspection mechanism). Canada’s primary goals remain to ensure that Iraq’s threat to international peace and security is eliminated and to re-integrate Iraq into the international community. Canada would also like to see a restoration of the Security Council’s primacy in dealing with Iraq. We will want to do (or be seen to have done) everything possible to resolve the conflict in a peaceful manner; however, consideration will have to be given to the effect of any policy choices on Canada’s overall relations with the US. 15. While it is anticipated that the US is prepared to deal with Iraq unilaterally if need be, military contributions from allies will be welcomed and, indeed, may be expected. It is anticipated that the US will deliver a formal demarche by the end of August; a Canadian military contribution may well be requested at that time. Condemnation or expressions of regret will not be well received in Washington. At the very least, allies will be expected to endorse the operation. Recent comments by the US Ambassador to Canada that the US wants Canada at its side if it attacks Iraq provide an indication of US thinking. US President Bush told the Prime Minister that the US would ‘consult’ Canada prior to mounting any military operations. At this stage, however, Canada has no direct • insight into US planning. Having already volunteered to commit forces, it is possible that the UK and Australia have been made privy to these plans. 16. Should Canada decide to both endorse US military action and to participate militarily in any intervention, National Defence will need to determine the extent to which the Canadian Forces can participate given competing demands on limited resources. Since 1991, Canada has periodically sent ships to participate in Maritime Interdiction Operations established to monitor and enforce UN resolutions. As part of our NORAD commitment, Canada also assigns Canadian Forces personnel to US airforce Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft in the US, who may be deployed for the monitoring of the No-Fly zones over northern and southern Iraq at any time. Canadian military resources available for new military action are essentially the same forces identified for the long term sustainment of Operation APOLLO (i.e., deployment to Afghanistan or Iraq, but not both): • two ships; • up to three Hercules tactical transport aircraft and two Aurora Maritime Patrol aircraft. Canada had also offered six CF-18 fighter aircraft at the beginning of the campaign in Afghanistan, however, the US did not request their deployment. Prior to the commitment of any type of aircraft (including those 4/5 SECRET(CEO) 000053 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET (CEO) currently deployed on Operation APOLLO) for use against Iraq, a detailed staff check would have to be completed based on the location and tactical tasks assigned in order to determine feasibility and to mitigate the risk inherent to operations in this area. Furthermore, the commitment of CF-18 aircraft would be limited to a single rotation given current commitments to Operation NOBLE EAGLE; • Given the current operational tempo, it was already confirmed that a Canadian Forces light infantry battalion would not be available for deployment until the summer of 2003 for a possible deployment to Afghanistan. Any commitment of ground troops to a campaign in Iraq would, therefore, be largely dependent on the timing of the campaign and the required force structure; and • headquarters and service support staff. The threat to Canadian Forces personnel and assets would vary according to the specific options selected, however, given the prospect of Iraq’s use of WMD, any deployment would entail significant risk. A military contribution would also require considerable diplomatic support from Foreign Affairs. 17. Irrespective of Canada’s military capability, any Canadian decision to support US action will ultimately be based on a number of legal and policy concerns, but will remain fundamentally a foreign policy issue. The decision will require a fine balance between the long-established principles of Canadian foreign policy and the realpolitik considerations of Canada-US relations. Should a decision to provide military support to the US be taken, consideration could be given to proactively approaching the US, rather than waiting to be asked, if it is assessed that doing so would be in Canada’s national interests. Prepared By: Consultations: Responsible Director: Responsible Director-General Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Corri Barr. D PK Pol 6, 996-1741 Col Grant, J3 Inti, 992-3400 LCol Abbott. D Law I, 992-0600 Col St-John. IDC/DFAIT M. Walma. IDR/DFAIT C. Hull. GMR/DFAIT Col G. Cote. DPK Pol. 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross. DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder. ADM (Pol). 992-3458 19 Aug 02 5/5 SECRET(CEO) 000054 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00008 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 27-08-2002 to 31-12-2002 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10025 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c6d1e3f350c75fffbdf9c4efe3e9f87b.pdf 762536d3077a7bd577c77786877dda14 PDF Text Text CONFIDENTIAL CANADIAN (UNCLASSIFIED Without Enclosure) -------- General Correspondence No^ber 19, 2002 " ’ v ccmMercury Manual Docket Slip Doc Date: 19/11/2002 BF Date: 3%? Document: 644913 Control: CDS2002-337834 File No.: 3000-1 Input Date: 19/11/2002 Due Date: Org/Gp: CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF Subject: BN FOR MND - ON CANADIAN ACCES TO US PLANNING Comment: Author: K CALDER XRef: DATE L1U CHG TO 50 Orf ^0 Grp/Sct: ADMPOL INTL REMARKS Az L C<^V\ \AT-l jyufu^ li ajkq a ^- CONFIDENT (UNCLAS: _______ . 000029 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information • CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: Briefing Note on Canadian Access to US Military Planning File #/Numero de reference: 3450-1 (Corri Barr, D PK Pol 6) DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI FROM/DE: J.J. Gauvin Cmdre Concur :COS J3_____ COS J3/CEM J3 Date: D PK Pol/D Pol MP Z Date: 1$ Al 2.COZ- ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) FROM/DE: Concur d g i S Po T/d g Poi Si (J Date: DCDS^CEMD Date: CDS/CEMD DM/SM FROM/DE: ADM Pol/SMA Pol Date: Sous-Ministre de la Defense Rationale CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) NOV 1 9 2002 Deputy Minister of Notional Defence REF: 34G63 000030 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ISSUE • Any delay in a Canadian government decision to engage in military-to-military planning on Iraq could seriously compromise Canada’s ability to provide an effective and timely contribution to any future campaign. BACKGROUND • With the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1441 on the situation in Iraq, the US is moving into a more active and public phase in its coalition-building and military planning for any possible future action in the event of Iraqi non-compliance with the terms of the inspections. DISCUSSION • The US Embassy has formally demarched Canada to engage in planning and to gauge what contributions - including combat troops and combat support - it could provide should military means be required to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. The US has indicated that it would prefer to act with the broadest possible international coalition and would welcome Canada’s support. • A delay in Canadian access to military planning would erode the Canadian Forces flexibility to participate should the international community determine that force is, indeed, required. Such access at this juncture would also serve to inform Canada’s decision-making process. If the Canadian Government decides to deploy Canadian Forces against Iraq, thus putting Canadian lives at risk, that decision should be informed by the fullest possible understanding of US plans. • The Canadian Embassy in Washington reports its interlocutors have said that, barring the outbreak of hostilities in the coming weeks, there is still adequate time for allies to volunteer and integrate forces into ongoing planning. However, US officials also stress that the longer a Canadian decision to engage in military-to-military discussions takes, the less relevant and credible any potential Canadian military contribution would be. • Rather than committing Canada to joining a campaign irrespective of the outcome of the United Nations inspection process, early participation in US planning would be extremely prudent - particularly if Canada could become involved in any action against Iraq (as the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs have both publicly suggested). Canadian Forces access to planning at this stage would not constitute acceptance of any specific task or the commitment of resources. Canada would simply be engaging in prudent military planning and preparation. 1/2 CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) 000031 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) Prepared By: Responsible Director: Responsible Director-General Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Com Barr. D PK Pol 6,996-1741 Col G. C6te, DPK Pol. 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross. DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder. ADM (Pol), 992-3458 15 Nov 02 2/2 CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) 000032 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00009 Title A name given to the resource Briefing Note for the Minister of National Defence Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 15-Nov-02 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10025 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/27f2feaef92bea01c35274accee6c012.pdf 85529a4817f66f276078cf67bbbb39b9 PDF Text Text Q'/lf " 1*1 , t Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act de la Loi surVGIc/ia I'informatigp/'' |£-'Ji SECRET(CEO) National Defence Defense nationale National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 AUG 2 7 $$ The Minister BRIEFING NOTE ON IRAQ Enclosed is a briefing note that outlines the recent situation in Iraq and the developing Canadian policy position. You may wish to discuss this issue with Minister Graham and other Cabinet colleagues in advance of any possible US request for assistance and the Prime Minister’s scheduled 9 September meeting with President Bush. R.R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff 0 /\ Margaret Bloodworth Av Deputy Minister Encl (1) Canada SECRET(CEO) 000049 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I’information SECRET (CEO) BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ISSUE 1. To provide an update on the recent situation in Iraq and the developing Canadian policy position. BACKGROUND 2. The US Administration is clearly focused on Iraq and is edging closer to Presidential decisions regarding how and when, rather than whether, to begin military action. The European Allies (except for, perhaps, the UK) are struggling to come to terms with American policies and perceptions, some of which they do not share, and with their own sense of vulnerability and lack of clout. 3. Regardless of diverging views and objectives, fundamental trans-Atlantic political and security interests are essentially the same: the international community recognizes the security threat posed by Iraq’s failure to comply with United Nations resolutions and Iraq’s continued development of weapons of mass destruction. Although few allies will accept the notion of regime change as a basis for action, evidence linking Iraq to terrorist activity or increased efforts to enhance its chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological weapons capabilities may compel allies to act in concert with the US. 4. National Defence has been participating in an interdepartmental group, led by Foreign Affairs, which defined a range of policy options on Iraq for Minister Graham. Foreign Affairs has recommended continuing diplomatic efforts to try to convince Iraq to accept the unconditional return of UN arms inspectors and to engage allies and partners in seeking appropriate legal and political solutions to the Iraqi situation. In the event the US approaches Canada for a political endorsement and for forces to participate in military action, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has been advised to consider the following factors in making a decision about how to respond: the importance for bilateral Canada-US relations; the legal and political justifications used for the attack; the reaction of our allies and partners; and the implications for Iraq and the region. DISCUSSION 5. The US Administration has repeatedly expressed its goal of regime change within Iraq. Canadian Embassy officials in Washington, D.C., are reporting that working groups on issues such as military options, interim governing structures and global financial implications have been meeting for months and their papers have already been circulated to senior levels within the Pentagon, State Department and White House. Six of Iraq’s most prominent opposition groups, including the Iraqi National Congress and the Iraqi National Accord, met with US officials over the weekend of 9 August in an attempt to resolve their differences and unite in preparation for the end of Saddam Hussein’s rule. The US will not invade Iraq without having a credible plan on both the pre- and post1/5 SECRET (CEO) 000050 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgud en vertu de la Loisur facets d I’information SECRET (CEO) invasion phases of any action. There may be a role for an international stabilization force or other significant international presence in Iraq for several years after the cessation of any offensive military action. 6. Reports indicate that Saddam Hussein is convinced that Iraq will face a US-led military attack, to begin by the end of this year or early in 2003, and is personally focused on his own survival and that of his regime. In the coming months, Iraq will continue a multifaceted strategy of defensively preparing for the coming war. This will include a concerted effort to build and repair regional relationships, continuing covert development of WMD and ballistic missiles, sanctions-busting and encouraging a variety of distractions internationally to try and restrain the United States through its allies. Intelligence assessments indicate that with the exception of probable accelerated work on WMD programs, Iraqi war preparations will remain defensive, not offensive. 7. Iraq had advanced biological, chemical and nuclear programs long before the Gulf War. There is much evidence, both direct and circumstantial, that Iraq has retained and continued developing robust biological and chemical weapons capabilities. Recent intelligence reports suggest increased activity at several Iraqi facilities suspected of supporting the production, testing, and storage of WMD, including that of nuclear weapons. Saddam believes the asymmetric threat posed by Iraqi WMD is his best chance at deterring a regime-threatening conventional attack. His commitment to WMD has been demonstrated by his personal choice to absorb billions of dollars in economic losses from sanctions, rather than allow the return of the UN inspectors that were evicted in December 1998. 8. Within the international community, the US has received bilateral support for military action from allies such as the UK and Australia. Other countries, including Germany and Jordan, have publicly opposed direct intervention in Iraq, The support of regional partners, such as Kuwait, Qatar and especially Turkey, will be required to facilitate any decisive military action. The US has stepped up efforts to secure their agreement, as well as to gauge the support of Saudi Arabia, an essential partner in the 1991 Gulf War, which has been publicly hostile to the idea of renewed US intervention. Israel will also figure prominently; kcould well find itself a target for Iraqi retaliation in the event of military action - perhaps even with WMD. Unlike in the Gulf War, Israel has not promised to resist the temptation to strike back. s .15(1) 9. Fear of their own publics has increased pressure on other Arab regimes to avoid articulating open support of US intervention in Iraq, although at the end of the day, most regional governments will likely be unwilling to risk relations with the US and should be able to contain any popular dissent. Jordan, in particular because of its Palestinian population, will face considerable pressures in trying to reconcile US requests with popular opinion. Neighbours such as Syria and Iran will probably remain opposed to military intervention since they will not accept that a sovereign country could have its regime changed forcibly by the US. Additionally, US military intervention would likely 2/5 SECRET(CEO) 000051 J �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informotion SECRET (CEO) provoke a new exodus of Iraqi refugees - something that neighbours would be illequipped to cope with. Similarly, all Arab countries, and many European, are concerned by the potential impact on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. 10. There has been very little real multilateral progress towards bringing Iraq into compliance with UN resolutions concerning weapons inspections and the import and export of various commodities, including weapons components and oil. After numerous discussions with Iraq, the United Nations Security Council has decided that there will be no further high-level talks until there are concrete indications from Iraq that they are ready to accept UN weapons inspections unconditionally. Although any decision to resume the Secretary General’s participation in such talks would not be taken without first holding a full discussion of the situation within the Council, low-level technical discussions between the UN and Iraqi specialists will be permitted to continue. Russia and China support continuing the dialogue; Russia, in particular, fears that the US is seeking to close down diplomatic options to resolve the conflict. 11. The legal basis to use armed force exists under customary international law (e.g., humanitarian intervention and self defence) and the UN Charter. Article 51 and Chapter VII of the UN Charter provide two exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force. Article 51 preserves the inherent right of individual and collective self defence. Operation APOLLO is being conducted in exercise of self defence. Under Chapter VII, the Security Council can authorize the use of armed force by way of a Security Council Resolution upon making a determination that there exists a threat to or breach of international peace and security. For example, Security Council Resolution 678 provided a legal basis for states to use force against Iraq in the Gulf War. 12. Historically, the US. UK and, to a lesser extent, France have conducted a number of postGulf War military operations against Iraq while relying upon a number of asserted legal bases. These include the enforcement of No-Fly zones (humanitarian intervention); attacking the Iraqi integrated air defence system (self defence); attacking Iraqi intelligence facilities (self defence arising from a plot to assassinate the first President Bush); and destruction of suspected weapons facilities (enforcement of resolution 687 and subsequent resolutions relating to weapons inspections). Any future use of force by the US against Iraq, as with previous uses offeree in the Gulf since 1990, will raise complex legal issues. For example, questions concerning the nature and scope of the right of self defence arise from recent US statements regarding a doctrine of “preemptive self defence” and the use of force against states hosting terrorists. 13. Given the historical complexity of the issue, any determination of the legality of a future use of force will require careful scrutiny of the evidentiary bases upon which a claim to use force is asserted. For example, evidence that demonstrates that Iraq is producing WMD and intends to use them against the US or others, or to assist others in using them, would have to be analyzed to determine whether the requirements of self defence under international law have been met. 3/5 SECRET (CEO) 000052 I �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accds a I'information SECRET (CEO) CANADIAN POSITION 14. Canadian policy regarding Iraq remains consistent: the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs continue to reaffirm the position that Canada, as always, will assess the situation as it evolves and make a decision at the time. Both have noted Canada’s concern about Iraq’s WMD programs, but have indicated our preference that the issue be dealt with through the UN (i.e., through the re-establishment of the UN inspection mechanism). Canada’s primary goals remain to ensure that Iraq’s threat to international peace and security is eliminated and to re-integrate Iraq into the international community. Canada would also like to see a restoration of the Security Council’s primacy in dealing with Iraq. We will want to do (or be seen to have done) everything possible to resolve the conflict in a peaceful manner; however, consideration will have to be given to the effect of any policy choices on Canada’s overall relations with the US. 15. While it is anticipated that the US is prepared to deal with Iraq unilaterally if need be, military contributions from allies will be welcomed and, indeed, may be expected. It is anticipated that the US will deliver a formal demarche by the end of August; a Canadian military contribution may well be requested at that time. Condemnation or expressions of regret will not be well received in Washington. At the very least, allies will be expected to endorse the operation. Recent comments by the US Ambassador to Canada that the US wants Canada at its side if it attacks Iraq provide an indication of US thinking. US President Bush told the Prime Minister that the US would ‘consult’ Canada prior to mounting any military operations. At this stage, however, Canada has no direct • insight into US planning. Having already volunteered to commit forces, it is possible that the UK and Australia have been made privy to these plans. 16. Should Canada decide to both endorse US military action and to participate militarily in any intervention, National Defence will need to determine the extent to which the Canadian Forces can participate given competing demands on limited resources. Since 1991, Canada has periodically sent ships to participate in Maritime Interdiction Operations established to monitor and enforce UN resolutions. As part of our NORAD commitment, Canada also assigns Canadian Forces personnel to US airforce Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft in the US, who may be deployed for the monitoring of the No-Fly zones over northern and southern Iraq at any time. Canadian military resources available for new military action are essentially the same forces identified for the long term sustainment of Operation APOLLO (i.e., deployment to Afghanistan or Iraq, but not both): • two ships; • up to three Hercules tactical transport aircraft and two Aurora Maritime Patrol aircraft. Canada had also offered six CF-18 fighter aircraft at the beginning of the campaign in Afghanistan, however, the US did not request their deployment. Prior to the commitment of any type of aircraft (including those 4/5 SECRET(CEO) 000053 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET (CEO) currently deployed on Operation APOLLO) for use against Iraq, a detailed staff check would have to be completed based on the location and tactical tasks assigned in order to determine feasibility and to mitigate the risk inherent to operations in this area. Furthermore, the commitment of CF-18 aircraft would be limited to a single rotation given current commitments to Operation NOBLE EAGLE; • Given the current operational tempo, it was already confirmed that a Canadian Forces light infantry battalion would not be available for deployment until the summer of 2003 for a possible deployment to Afghanistan. Any commitment of ground troops to a campaign in Iraq would, therefore, be largely dependent on the timing of the campaign and the required force structure; and • headquarters and service support staff. The threat to Canadian Forces personnel and assets would vary according to the specific options selected, however, given the prospect of Iraq’s use of WMD, any deployment would entail significant risk. A military contribution would also require considerable diplomatic support from Foreign Affairs. 17. Irrespective of Canada’s military capability, any Canadian decision to support US action will ultimately be based on a number of legal and policy concerns, but will remain fundamentally a foreign policy issue. The decision will require a fine balance between the long-established principles of Canadian foreign policy and the realpolitik considerations of Canada-US relations. Should a decision to provide military support to the US be taken, consideration could be given to proactively approaching the US, rather than waiting to be asked, if it is assessed that doing so would be in Canada’s national interests. Prepared By: Consultations: Responsible Director: Responsible Director-General Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Corri Barr. D PK Pol 6, 996-1741 Col Grant, J3 Inti, 992-3400 LCol Abbott. D Law I, 992-0600 Col St-John. IDC/DFAIT M. Walma. IDR/DFAIT C. Hull. GMR/DFAIT Col G. Cote. DPK Pol. 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross. DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder. ADM (Pol). 992-3458 19 Aug 02 5/5 SECRET(CEO) 000054 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00010 Title A name given to the resource Briefing Note on Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 19-Aug-02 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10025 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/74c7d87ffbd282bc721281907e978426.pdf 397dd468bfeb3daa0863b3a217852bf7 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /‘information J -1- Michael Walma Defence and Security Relations Division 992-6205 Graeme McIntyre Middle East Division 944-5995 SECRET (Ct-O} 23 October 2002 IDR0360 Information Memorandum for: The Minister of Foreign Affairs c.c. Minister for International Trade c.c. Minister for International Cooperation and c.c. Secretary of State (Asia-Pacific) c.c. Secretary of State (Central and Eastern Europe and Middle East) c.c. Secretary of State (Latin America and Africa) (Francophonie) ISSUE: Memo on Iraq Policy Implications 1. This memo deals with Security Council scenarios and possible military contributions. It complements earlier broader analyses in memos GMR0595 (Aug 14) and GMR0589 (Aug 06). SUMMARY: 2. Indications that the Security Council may be nearing a decision on a draft resolution on Iraq will necessitate increased Canadian political and diplomatic management of the issue. Timelines for decisions will become shorter, the issues to be addressed more difficult and, equally important, the need for well-crafted communications lines more vital. This memo outlines four possible scenarios based on broad potential outcomes from the UN Security Council’s discussion of Iraq and identifies the legal, military, diplomatic and communications issues that each would present. The four potential outcomes are: A. B. C. D. No new resolution is adopted One or more resolutions are adopted but the authorisation of force is ambiguous; One or more resolutions are adopted, the authorisation of force is clear, but gridlock in the Security Council prevents a finding of Iraqi non-compliance; or There is a clear authorisation of force and the Security Council agrees that Iraq is in breach. With today’s indications that the Security Council may be close to agreeing on a resolution, outcomes B) and D) appear most likely, but outcome C) remains a lesser possibility. Should we face option B), we are almost certain to see the return of inspectors, which would delay the need for a decision on Canadian participation in military action for a short time. However, we would ultimately need to weigh the implication that participation could be seen as a weakened commitment to international law against the impact of non-participation on our relations with the United States. Clear evidence of non-compliance will factor heavily in our final decision. Option D), although unlikely to occur, would create the clearest conditions for Canada, politically and legally, as the Prime Minister has said that Canada will participate in a military campaign under these conditions. However, our ability to participate will be severely limited by short time lines and our non-participation in current US military planning. This memo reviews military options as comprehensively as possible, including that of 3. 000035 �4 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'accis a I’information * -2backfilling for the US in the Balkans or Afghanistan as a substitute for or complement to, direct participation. While does not favour backfilling due to resource constraints and possible troop morale issues, DFAIT believes possible backfilling scenarios must remain on the table to maximise the government’s future policy flexibility. BACKGROUND: 4. To date, with President Bush’s 12 September speech to the UN General Assembly and in the absence of any overt US pressure to support and contribute to a unilateral military option, policy options and the communications strategy for explaining our approach have been easy - uncomplicated and free of difficult issues. 5. This will soon change. For Canada, the political, legal and diplomatic management of the Iraq issue is about to enter a new, more complex and increasingly unpredictable phase. Timelines for decisions and, equally importantly, well-crafted communications lines, will become shorter and the issues to be addressed, much more difficult. 6. Whilst the situation in NY is too dynamic to predict, reports today (Friday) indicate that the US may well be nearing agreement with France on a draft resolution. This would be the first step in a consultative process to be engaged by the US with the other P5 and then the E10. The draft resolution is likely to be officially tabled quickly. 7. The compromise between the US and French positions will probably be reflected in a single resolution that essentially contains within it (a) the two stages that had originally be requested by France and (b) language that gives the US the trigger or automaticity elements they had been seeking. However, the use of force language may be weaker than that originally sought by the US. Rather than using the usual terms of art for military action (e.g. all necessary means), it may instead refer to the need for full compliance....in order to restore international peace and security. It is already becoming apparent that the US and France are reading the resolution in two quite different ways. 8. Although it is dangerous to make predictions on the outcome of the consultative process and eventual language of the resolution, it seems that intense consultations took place over the weekend and on Monday with the prospect of a tabling of the resolution for consideration, but no agreement has been found. For Canada, an approved resolution will mean we will be moving into another level of ambiguity and complexity in managing Canadian policy responses to Iraq. The UN Security Council will likely be unclear in terms of the key issues of determination of breach and the decision-making process regarding the use of force. At the same time, the global political environment is becoming more obscured and complicated with, inter alia, Korean nuclear weapons programmes revelations, the Bali bombing and the Yemen and Kuwait attacks. 9. The Government of Canada will soon have to move beyond easy appeals to the US and others to use the UN, and will face questions regarding possible Canadian political support for or military involvement in an eventual US-led military operation which may - or may not - derive its mandate and legitimacy from a UN Security Council decision. The political and legal uncertainties in the current situation require us to think through the options, possible responses and the way in which Ministers speak publicly about this issue. The following paper outlines the cunent state of play, some of the possible scenarios that we may be 10. faced with in the coming weeks and draft communications lines for dealing with these questions. 1. CURRENT SITUATION: 000036 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -X -3- 11. ^p.t present, the scenarios presented in our August memo (Ref:GMR0595, 14 August 2002) still largely pertain. Canada has been able to assert that concerns about Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council resolutions must be considered the continuing responsibility of the Council and that all action be directed to, and through, that forum. We have even been able to say that we have seen some success in this approach - the US has engaged the UN process, at least to now. 12. Canada has been able to accompany this overall UN approach with an active bilateral diplomatic effort (at the level of Ministers, the PM and officials) aimed at: engaging the US and encouraging them to work through the UN; working with other key allies such as the UK; encouraging the other P5 to live up to their responsibilities; and, pressing influential regional partners in the Middle East such as Egypt to engage Iraq directly in dialogue to encourage full cooperation and compliance with its obligations. We have clearly stated at the UN that we need an unambiguous resolution that would contain serious consequences for Iraqi non-compliance. 13. US position: The US remains determined to depose Saddam Hussein, working from the premise that Saddam’s government poses a fundamental threat to US strategic interests. While the Bush Administration has focused in public on Iraq’s WMD capacity and ambitions (and sought to connect Iraq to al Qaeda), a broader case for regime change is being pursued in Washington. Military action will probably begin in January-February 2003, although an earlier campaign cannot be excluded. Only a coup d’etat or Saddam’s assassination would be likely to avert a war against Iraq. 14. Within the Administration, views differ on whether to focus narrowly on deposing Saddam and eliminating Iraq’s capacity to threaten its neighbours, or to opt for a highly ambitious plan that would turn Iraq into a second pillar of support for the US in the Persian Gulf and send a democratising shock wave through the Arab world; there appears to be increasing support in the US for the latter option. More cautious opinions are still being expressed, notably by Secretary of State Powell, but the general thrust of US policy is clear. American efforts to secure a new Security Council resolution on weapons inspectors should be seen in 15. this light. Washington has concluded that Iraq’s WMD programmes cannot be destroyed through inspections, and that the only way to reduce or eliminate this threat is to replace the government in Baghdad. In short, Washington is interested in the UN process mainly in so far as it can legitimise a war that will depose Saddam. Key partners: Our key partners are facing the same dilemma that is before us. UK PM Tony Blair has 16. come under considerable fire at home for his decision to back the US both politically and militarily. France and Russia are balancing their opposition to the current Anglo-American resolution against their broader bilateral relationships with the US; there are indications that both are nearing a deal with the US. China remains on the sidelines, and is expected to follow Russia and France. Germany is seen to have crossed a line during the recent election campaign. Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark are all fairly supportive of the US position, while other European states such as Belgium have voiced their opposition. Regional views: Arab states remain publicly critical of US moves toward a war with Iraq, seeing this 17. as unjust on its own merits and egregious given what they perceive as a double standard toward Israel. At the end of the day, pro-US states such as Jordan, Kuwait and Qatar will likely acquiesce to US use of bases or airspace in If a war against Iraq, though a new Security Council resolution emerges, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states may also provide quiet support. s.15(1) Regional impact: With or without the backing of a UN Security Council resolution, US action against 18. Iraq can be expected to provoke a strong backlash in the Arab world. Even if the US achieves a rapid victory with minimal Iraqi casualties, there will be a strong tendency in the Arab world to regard this as yet another “humiliation”. 000037 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -419. ^^NMOVIC situation: Talks held two weeks ago between UNMOVIC, the IAEA and Iraq went smoothly. Nevertheless, Dr. Hans Blix, the Head of UNMOVIC has said that he sees no point in returning to Iraq when the Security Council is still considering changing his mandate. Dr. Blix has been walking a careful line between asserting his own independence and maintaining good relations with the P5, especially the US. 20. He is known, however, to have serious reservations about some aspects of the initial US draft, including the question of armed escorts, the issue of removing Iraqi informants and their families from Iraq and the matter of direct P-5 participation in and tasking of the inspection teams. On the other hand, he does not underestimate the importance of resisting Iraqi duplicity and intransigence on key issues such as access to Presidential sites. Should a Security Council resolution be adopted, we would expect that UN and IAEA inspectors would be able to return to Iraq in short order, and begin their work. What is not clear, and will not be until a resolution is adopted, is how and on what timetable UNMOVIC will report to the Council; and, by whom and how a judgement of a breach of obligations will be reached. 2. SECURITY COUNCIL SCENARIOS: 21. We can foresee four broad possible outcomes from the UN Security Council’s discussion of Iraq: A. B. C. No new resolution is adopted One or more resolutions are adopted but the authorisation of force is ambiguous; One or more resolutions are adopted, the authorisation of force is clear, but gridlock in the Security Council prevents a finding of Iraqi non-compliance; or There is a clear authorisation of force and the Security Council agrees that Iraq is in breach. D. In considering each of these scenarios, we must bear in mind that US military planning is already well 22. underway. If Canada waits until the action in the Security Council is played out before deciding whether to participate in a US-led attack on Iraq, our decision will come so late as to severely hinder preparations for Canadian military involvement in a January campaign. However, the alternative, to begin participation in US planning now, or after the first of a two-resolution package is adopted, would commit us to joining a campaign regardless of the outcome of the UN process. This would be interpreted by the Canadian public as the discounting of diplomatic avenues. A. Negotiations in the Security Council break down and no new resolution is adopted. s.15(1) This could come about if the US loses patience with the slow process of adopting a new resolution or 23. fears a veto from another P5 state. In this situation the US would attack Iraq unilaterally, possibly with a limited “coalition of the willing”. The US would likely cite previous Council resolutions and/or (preemptive) selfdefence as a basis for its actions, while simultaneously criticising the Council for failing to rise to the present challenge. Factors influencing a Canadian decision: Previous policy statements: PM Chretien has said that Canada would not participate in a war against 24. Iraq without a new UN resolution. 000038 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acc&s a I'information -5- 25. ^Lcgal: A legal right to use force in self-defence will only exist if there is evidence that Iraq poses an “imminent” threat. Any acceptance of Iraq’s WMD potential as a basis for using force in self-defence would require careful scrutiny of the evidence, including a study of Iraq’s current and potential WMD capacity and its future intentions viewed against context of past conduct. 26. Alternatively, the U.S. as in its 1993 and 1998 attacks against Iraq may seek to rely upon past Security Council Resolutions which have expressly authorized the use of force. In particular they may attempt to rely on Resolution 678 (1991) which authorized the “use of all necessary means” to implement “all subsequent relevant resolutions” relating to the restoration of international peace and security in the area. Resolution 678 would provide, at best, a weak legal basis upon which force could now be used. 27. Communications/domestic considerations: Our government would not be able to say that all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted. Canadian public opinion is firmly against attacking Iraq without a Council mandate, and could further harden if the US gives the appearance of having been indifferent to the UN. Depending on the circumstances of the breakdown, we would be able to suggest that Council had failed to live up to its obligations, as we have been insisting. From a legal perspective any public statements must not compromise Canada’s past and future actions. For legal reasons it would not be prudent to make definitive statements on the lawfulness of using force in self-defence or with respect to the sufficiency of evidence asserted in support of that basis. This includes reference to the evidence publicly disclosed by the UK or the Bush doctrine of preemptive self-defence. 28. Military: While highly problematic from many perspectives, an early end to diplomatic manoeuvring could, in theory, allow us to join current US planning early enough to make a direct military contribution. Alternatively, we could backfill for the US elsewhere (for example Afghanistan), freeing up US forces for the attack on Iraq. These assignments tend to be low on recognition and long-term. 29. Diplomatic: With the possible exception of the UK, our key partners would likely not support US action. Short-term implications: A decision to participate militarily would instantly relieve US pressure on us. 30. Joint planning could begin immediately. Communicating a rationale for this course of action to the Canadian public, Parliament and to our non-US allies would prove a challenge. A decision to not participate would not pose these challenges, and should also be manageable with respect to the United States as it will be expecting this decision in view of the Prime Minister’s stated position. Longer-term implications: In the absence of clear evidence demonstrating an imminent threat, a decision 31. to participate could be viewed by some as a weakened commitment to international law. It would also signal a lessened commitment to the UN and to the multilateral system. A decision to not participate would leave us on firmer footing, but could exacerbate the view of some within the United States that Canada cannot be relied upon. This problem could be attenuated to some extent by the offering of political support and by providing military assistance in other areas (backfilling) to free up US forces for its campaign. Any Canadian support would gamer some respect from the US Administration and Congress, who would appreciate that Canada was an ally willing to take political risks. B. Authorisation of force is ambiguous. 32. The Security Council could adopt a resolution that only implies an authorisation of force, as it did in Kosovo. Council members could deliberately seek this outcome in order to avoid a confrontation. The US would use this resolution to justify an attack on Iraq. 000039 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information -6- Factors^^fluencing a Canadian decision: • Previous Policy Statements: In the Iraq context, we have been careful to avoid publicly addressing this scenario, except to reiterate the need for the Security Council to live up to its responsibilities. This scenario resembles that of the Kosovo war and the use of force against Iraq in 1993 and 1998 in the sense of the ambiguity, but not from the overwhelming humanitarian need. Legal: Unlike a resolution which expressly authorized “all necessary means”, the legal foundation for an enforcement action would be questionable and be based upon a weak controversial doctrine of “implied” authorization. In 1993 and 1998 various Security Council statements and resolutions used phrases such as “gravest consequences” and “serious consequences” in place of the familiar “all necessary means”. The US is currently using similar diplomatic code as possible wording within a new resolution. Communications/Domestic considerations: A great deal will depend on the wording of the resolution and any evidence of continued Iraqi non-compliance. Clear evidence of Iraqi non-compliance could make a decision not to participate difficult to explain. Similarly, if the evidence is not clear, a decision to participate would not be well understood. The legal problems that such an ambiguous resolution would pose would not likely be well understood. Once again, we will have available to us the message that we believe that the Council has failed to meets its obligations. From a legal perspective public statements on the type of resolution Canada is seeking should avoid use of terms such as “gravest consequences” or “serious consequences” given that the Government of Canada has not decided to support the use of force on the basis of an implied authorization. Military: Under this scenario, military action would likely following very quickly on the heels of a finding, whether by the US or UN, that Iraq is in breach. It would be extremely difficult for proper planning to take place in time for Canada to be able to make an extensive contribution. Diplomatic: Such a resolution would allow countries a much larger degree of flexibility in determining their positions, as each could interpret the resolution as it chooses. At the same time, US pressure on Canada and other allies would be much stronger in this scenario, as it would be looking for support in order to justify its own position. We would need to take into account the positions of others, especially of the P5, and should consult them as soon as possible following the adoption of such a resolution. Short term implications: Adoption of a resolution would almost certainly mean a return of inspectors to Iraq, which should push the need for a decision off by a short period of time. A decision to participate would be warmly received by the US and would be justifiable to others. A decision not to participate would not please the US but would still be justifiable to others. Clear evidence of non-compliance will factor heavily. Longer term implications: In the absence of clear evidence demonstrating an imminent threat, a decision to participate could be viewed as a weakened commitment to international law. It would also signal a lessened commitment to the UN and to the multilateral system. A decision to not participate would leave us on firmer footing, but could exacerbate the view of some within the United States that Canada cannot be relied upon. This problem could be attenuated to some extent by the offering of political support and by providing military assistance in other areas (backfilling) to free up US forces for its campaign. Any Canadian support would gamer some respect from the US Administration and Congress, who would appreciate that Canada was an ally willing to take political risks. C. Gridlock in Council 000040 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -733. ^In this scenario, the Council adopts a resolution which would clearly authorise force (or states that the Counci^pil authorise force in the face of continued non-compliance) but balks at finding Iraq in breach or at adopting the follow-on resolution. Of the scenarios which would place Canada in a difficult position, this is the most likely. Factors influencing a Canadian decision: Previous Policy Statements: We have been careful to avoid publicly addressing this scenario, except to reiterate the need for the Security Council to live up to its responsibilities. Legal: The legal foundation for military action would be controversial. The clarity of the language, in particular regarding the “reporting” and “trigger” mechanism and the way in which any authorized force is delegated to member states will be crucial. In the absence of express language the Security Council’s failure to act does not provide a clear legal basis to use force. Communications/Domestic considerations: A great deal will depend on the wording of the resolution and any evidence of continued Iraqi non-compliance. Reporting from New York suggests that the Council may adopt ‘one and a half resolutions, that is, it would authorise force on recognition of a breach, but would be unclear as to how and by whom that determination would be made, opening the door to the US deciding for itself. Clear evidence of Iraqi non-compliance could make a decision not to participate difficult to explain. Similarly, if the evidence is not clear, a decision to participate would not be well understood. The legal problems that gridlock would pose would also not likely be well understood. Once again, we will have available to us the message that we believe that the Council has failed to meets its obligations. In order to avoid communications difficulties, our messages from the beginning of a two-stage process should emphasise our insistence that the Council must live up to its responsibilities to find Iraq in breach of its obligations if that is what the evidence indicates. Military: Under this scenario, military action would likely follow very quickly on the heels of a finding, whether by the US or UN, that Iraq is in breach. It would be well-nigh impossible for proper planning to take place in time for Canada to be able to make any real contribution. Diplomatic: Such a resolution would allow countries a much larger degree of flexibility in determining their positions, as each could interpret the resolution as it chooses. At the same time, US pressure on Canada and other allies would be much stronger in this scenario, as it would be looking for support in order to justify its own position. We would need to take into account the positions of others, especially of the P5, and should consult them as soon as possible following the adoption of the first resolution. Short term implications: Adoption of a resolution would almost certainly mean a return of inspectors to Iraq, which would push the need for a decision off by at least two weeks. A decision to participate would be warmly received by the US and would be justifiable to others. A decision not to participate would not please the US but would still be justifiable to others. Clear evidence of non-compliance will factor heavily. Longer term implications: This scenario could be considered 'worst-case' since it could see Canada having to choose between helping to discredit the UN or vainly attempting to maintain its credibility, risking the anger of the US. A decision to participate may be viewed as a weakened commitment to international law and could leave us open to further legal challenges. It would also signal a lessened commitment to the UN and to the multilateral system. A decision to not participate would leave us on firmer footing, but could exacerbate the view of some within the United States that Canada cannot be relied upon. This problem could be attenuated to some extent by the offering of political support and by providing military assistance in other areas (backfilling) to free up US forces for its campaign. Any 000041 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -8Canadian support would gamer some respect from the US Administration and Congress, who would ^^ppreciate that Canada was an ally willing to take political risks. D. Council unanimity on the need for force Should the UNSC adopt a resolution authorising force and if it then finds Iraq in breach, the matter is 34. simple for Canada, politically and legally. Under these circumstances, the Prime Minister has said that Canada will participate in the military campaign. We would not find ourselves internationally isolated, and the legal basis would be clear. Domestically, the implications for the government will focus on explaining its position to the public and deciding on the role of Parliament. Our ability to participate will be severely limited by short times lines (we would expect an attack in these circumstances to follow very shortly after the finding Iraq in breach) and our non-participation in current US planning. 3, Options for military contributions (prepared by National Defence) A. Direct military support 35. Should the Government of Canada elect to provide direct military support, it could contribute the assets currently dedicated to Operation APOLLO: two ships, three Hercules transport aircraft and two Aurora maritime patrol aircraft. These assets are already in theatre and, with appropriate diplomatic clearances, could be maintained until December 2003. Deployment of additional military resources for operations in the Iraqi theatre would be dependent on 36. time as follows: Short term (Jan-Feb 2003): The resources dedicated to Op APOLLO plus six CF 18 fighters 37. (incremental cost of $50M) and two additional ships (incremental cost of S60M); Medium Term (March-April 2003): A squadron of Special Operations Forces (JTF2 would be 38. available by 15 March 2003, costs TBD); and 39. Long Term (June-July 2003): An infantry light battle group (incremental cost of S122M) or a mechanized battle group, complete with tanks, mine clearing equipment, etc., (incremental cost of S166M). A June-July deployment will alleviate the requirements for personnel waivers. Early access to joint planning with the US and other coalition partners is considered key in being able to 40. determine an appropriate Canadian contribution within an overall coalition force package. Although Canada has no detailed knowledge of US planning, a campaign would likely begin sometime in January or February 2003. Depending on the force package selected by the Canadian Government, varying degrees of warning time will be required to ensure timely and effective deployments. Sufficient time will need to be allotted for the negotiation of Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) or Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) and acquisition of the necessary equipment and supplies. v 41. Combat operations would also require the support of other high value CF assets that are always in short supply. These include engineers; a nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) countermeasures capability; medical support; linguists; and command and control assets. Operations against Iraq within the next two to three months would pose substantial logistical risk given the CF’s dependence on materiel already deployed in support of Operation APOLLO and the long lead-time for the procurement of materiel and ammunition. Problem areas range 000042 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'accis a I’information -9- from Unavailability of vehicle spare parts to a limited stock of precision-guided munitions and targeting pods for the CF^s. B. Indirect military support 42. One option could be for Canadian troops to backfill US (or possibly other coalition) troops that could be redeployed to support a campaign against Iraq. If the CF were to be used in a backfill role, Canada would risk an increased commitment in areas such as the Balkans or Afghanistan (with contributions to the International Security Assistance Force, a Battalion/Battle Group combat operation, such as in Khandahar and possibly further staff support to Headquarters such as Coalition Joint Task Force 180 in Bagram) for longer periods than we might wish. Moreover, such a measure could have a profoundly negative impact on the morale of CF members should the repetitive, low-intensity deployments to Bosnia-Herzegovina, or other such missions, increase. As well, “backfilling” troops would be from elements of the CF that are already under stress due to the personnel deployment tempo, which would be compounded by these traditionally longer duration missions with no clear exit strategies. Backfilling is, therefore, not recommended by National Defence. James R. Wright Assistant Deputy Minister Global and Security Policy Deputy Minister 000043 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00011 Title A name given to the resource Memo on Iraq Policy Implications Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 23-Oct-02 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10025 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/7dd4cf9acbf843d03b7ce1c2344aba98.pdf 0c9508f6fa7386de0a14bb0464ce03c9 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lot sur I'acces a /’information — SECRET 8C0001 I 15G Sec 1 SEC 1812D-18-8 MS M. BLOODWORTH DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE International Plans and Operations Iraq CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS NIS1 Plans et operations r na1 n Iraq SSS/RDS _________ CIRCULATION TO A U o CD [d on CQ REMARKS REMARQUES Init B.F. RAPPEL Cancel Date Annular REGISTRY ONLY DEPOT CENTRAL JAN U IO r-1 r—I O’ co L| M 04 00 O ■ o 7 Q=t 04 c\jm o Jh 00 t- 0T cr> 1-1 04 O O CD csl I TT'n’- I . rH Q35 ■> OJ O '! • ■ ■ I— 4 _____ T7! § E rH H O o------- P I o O M 04 U »uija„ - k o CO 705A (7-94) 7530-21-902-0364 ■- I • I II Printed on recycled paper - Imprime' sur du papier recycle I ,I ' II ■ . ■_________ | Design - Dessin: DCA-D Admin M (2-2-2) 000055 I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgu^n \jfti^e la &st^fac^e^a /'information Y- 1*1 SECRET(CC) National Defence Defense nationale Deputy Minister Sous-ministre National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Canada K1A 0K2 Quartier gSndral de la Ddfense nationale Ottawa, Canada K1A 0K2 £>M'/$7cS- DEC 2 - W CANADIAN FORCES MEMBERS SECONDED TO ALLIED COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN A POSSIBLE MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST IRAQ The Minister Enclosed for your signature is a letter to the Chief of the Defence Staff on the Canadian Forces members seconded to allied countries in the context of a possible military operation against Iraq. This letter has been drafted in view of the Prime Minister’s response to your letter dated 25 October 2002, which was written in close consultation with Foreign Affairs. Margaret Bloodworth Encl (3) Canada SECRET(CC) 000056 �Document disclosed under the Access to information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accts a I'information SECRET (CC) General R. R. Henault Chief of the Defence Staff National Defence Headquarters Dear General Henault: Canadian Forces Members Seconded to Allied Countries Participating in a Possible Military Operation Against Iraq This letter forwards the Prime Minister’s concurrence with the recommendation that seconded Canadian Forces members be allowed to continue their duties in the event of a possible military operation against Iraq. These members would include those serving with the armed forces of any country that elects to join a coalition for future operations against Iraq, including the United States, the United Kingdom and France. If such a military operation were to take place, I am determined that the Canadian Forces be in a position to play a meaningful role within the context of a set of Canadian strategic objectives and scope of operations agreed jointly with my colleague, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. As the situation evolves, I will rely on your advice to assist the Governmental decision-making process. Sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence SECRET (CC) 000057 �----- Document d/sc/oM^ VffiSljthe Accfts to Informatton ATT Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I’accts it /'information SECRET OTTAWA, K1A 0A2 November 19. 2002 Dear Colleague: Thank you for your letter of October 25. 2002 on the Canadian Forces members seconded :o allied countries in the context of a possible military operation against Iraq. I recognize the potential negative impact on our bilateral relations and I concur with your recommendation that we should not recall Canadian Forces officers seconded to an ally which might elect to participate in such an operation. Thank you again for your letter and keeping me apprised of developments related to the Canadian Forces. Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum Minister of National Defence Room 110, Justice Building House of Commons Ottawa, Ontario K1A0A6 000058 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00012 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 02-12-2002 to 31-12-2002 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10025 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/2b05941fa51e9a12fb9ebe59c72956b2.pdf c1c386443bbd056a3e8c89139ff1ec2c PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I’acces a /'information SECRET FILE No. DOSSIER Sec SEC 1812D-18-8 8C0001 DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS M. BLOODWORTH international Plans and Operations Iraq ■ CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS M Plans et operations inte Iraq B.F JLATION u U w tu> CQ ARKS TO A HLOISIHY ONLY SArHtL Date Cancel Date Init. dEpOt central Inspected Date co _______ > rH -4” — ____ = — O’ — H CT) ...... mis -------- re t-i CM O o i as co a== id ==== ■. ------------ 7 Q= CM id — CO o t •H «= E- co H ■‘•'T'... . • CM o o m c -j TCiiiirM -r-srai=, — — II,1 : Q I r-i sissss —— •• r-t O g r-l O S=2S= O || o hl... !! _ M CM o ■MBS CO [X4 705 (03-00) 7530-21-894-4101 Design: Forms Management 993-4050 - Conception : Gestion des formulaires 993-3778 (11-02) 000001 �Documen^isclose^jnae^n^cces^^nformatior^c^^ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information ’3f.' •A- • - s:: Protect all files and records as official property. Protdger tous les dossiers et les documents comme dtant la propridtd officielle. Clean records prior to adding them to files. Nettoyer les documents avant de les ajouter a leur dossier respectif. Remove all envelopes, flags, tags, pins, spikes, clips and superfluous staples. Enlever tout articles inutiles (enveloppes, papillons, etiquettes, dpingles, trombones, attachesfeuilles, agrafes etc.). File papers and TDs chronologically, the latest date on top. Classer les documents en ordre chronologique, la date la plus rdcente sur le dessus. Prepunch holes at the top left corner of the papers. Percer des trous du coin supdriedr gauche du document. Attach papers to the file by a paper spike for easy handling. Pour faciliter la manutentien, attacher les documents au dossier au moyen d’une attache-feuille. When a file becomes thicker than 2”, a subsequent volume should be created. Lorsque le dossier a plus de 2" d’epaisseur, order un nouveau volume. Destroy duplicate material. Keep a copy only if it has additional information. Detruire tous les duplicates qui ne contiennent aucun renseignements suppldmsntaires. Verify the security classification of new documents added to the file. Verifier la cote de sdcuritd des nouveaux documents ajoute au dossier. Upgrade the file to the required level as required. Augmenter la cote de securite si ndcessaire. ! ’ n I t ! I I I I I i 000002 �Pages 3 to I a 5 are withheld pursuant to section sont retenues en vertu de Particle 15(1) of the Access to Information Act de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information �Document disclosed uhder^he Accystajnformatidd Act Document divulgue en vertu^^a tOi^um^accfs^tmf^rryation I DPK POL'fP' -b^g~C ^.€>02 3^^ DIRECTORATE OF PEACEKEEPING POLICY/ DIRECTION DE LA POLITIQUE DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX I Oso- n- D POL MP TO/A REMARKS/REMARQITS DATE INITIALS I ________ —-—*jaSCJII^BaiZWPA g-igr^t] 'frz^'x 3 : J ------ -------- 0 Co -g / E j fk u H *« ZES / 73 F 6' 7^- < ZI ' j i / - w^- iy ~r 3 Q^L. , : ■ 4s<9 dA7 I I A1 rt// nl 44—- ' 2^7- j ^//2- Ao I ~\xr/s—j zfu J )i AJL^ K^fO .nl44— | flriM ^P_iN zt^L E4oo i I 2__ j cz^S T_____ // ^p' /UA/A 4/'(71(012//^, i __ i I i; 000006 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information A •SECRET ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL)/ • 1 % Subject/Objet: STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS IN THE GULF REGION File #/Numero de reference: 3450-1 (Corri Barr, D PK Pol 6) / // .. / • i’- • ■■■ - v J DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI FROM/DE: J J. Gauvin Cmdre r D PK Pol/D Pol MP Date: . VL, 'L/L /Q_ Concur :COSJ3 COSJ3/ECM\J3 Date:^ ADM(Pol)/SMA(P,ol)' FROM/DE: DGIS Pol/D(\Pol SI Da,e: Concur:__ JAG Date: / Concur: DCDSZD8WT Date : c d s /c emM*v V DM/SM FROM/DE: ^AMPol/SMA Pol /Date: /2//Z/>Z. SECRET REF: 34762 000007 �Pages 8 to I a 13 are withheld pursuant to section sont retenues en vertu de Particle 15(1) of the Access to Information Act de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vjrtijQpi^loi tfrI'be&s ^information UNCLASSIFIED National Defence Defense nationale Deputy Minister Sous-ministre National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Canada K1A 0K2 Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa, Canada K1A 0K2 PfrlW -6-/9^. NOV 1 2 The Minister BRIEFING NOTE - UN RESOLUTION ON IRAQ Enclosed is a briefing note outlining the text of the final UN Resolution on Iraq. Margaret Bloodworth Encl (2) Canada UNCLASSIFIED 000014 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur facets a /’information UNCLASSIFIED !1 ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: UN RESOLUTION ON IRAQ File #/Numero de reference: 3450-1 (Corri Barr, D PK P0I6) DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI . FROM/DE: (? D PK Pol/D Pol MP Date: ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) FROM/DE; DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI Date: £^’7 DM/SM FROM/DE: - 0^ A W io £GLu -, ADM Pol/SMA Pol Date:^ O Z- UNCLASSIFIED REF: 34618 000015 �~Doc^nent disclosed under the Access to Information Act* Document divulgue en vertu de to loi sur faeces a /’information D PK POL I DIRECTORATE OF PEACEKEEPING POLICY/ DIRECTION DE LA POLITIQUE DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX & fe I D POL MP TQ/A s \MliU__ REMA RKS/REM ARQUES m PA! /;//?/A DATE INITIALS r/iW \ 16 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information V UPDATE FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ISSUE • A new United Nations Security Council Resolution on Iraq has been adopted. DISCUSSION • The United Nations Security Council unanimously approved a resolution on Iraq on Friday 8 November 2002 (text attached). The resolution sets out a number of specific deadlines: Iraq has seven days to accept the terms of the resolution; within 30 days (8 December), Iraq must send the UN a full and final list of its weapons; and within 45 days (23 December), Iraq must allow inspections to begin. • On 15 November, Dr. Blix, head of the UN inspection team, is expected to arrive in Iraq, with the advance inspection team arriving in Baghdad on 25 November. The first inspection report is not expected before the end of February. • The resolution stipulates that Iraq will give inspectors “unrestricted rights of entry” into and out of Iraq, the right to “free, unrestricted and immediate” movement to and from inspection sites, and the right to inspect any sites and buildings, including “immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access” to all sites, including'g Presidential Sites. • Following adoption of the resolution, the US administration reiterated that while it will consult the Security Council before engaging in any action against Iraq, its position is that the US does not require UN approval for US-led military action if Iraq fails to comply. The US Ambassador to the UN said Iraq will be disarmed “one way or another.” The UK believes that the resolution is clear and unambiguous and is showing UN resolve to compel Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions. • Both the US and the UK have categorically emphasized that the resolution provides for “serious consequences” if Iraq continues to violate its obligations. President Bush has said the resolution “presents the Iraqi regime with a final test”, and Prime Minister Blair indicated that the “consequences are clear”. • France, Russia and China will likely table a joint letter in the Security Council; this document may include a statement regarding the additional Security Council consultations expected prior to any action against Iraq. To this end, the letter may also encapsulate the concerns these countries had previously voiced regarding any hidden “automaticity” in the resolution with respect to authorization for use of force. 1/2 000017 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I’information I! • The Canadian position has not changed. The Government has been very much in favor of a strong resolution that addresses the need for Iraq to comply with all of its obligations to UN resolutions and that indicates that there will be serious consequences for non-compliance. The new resolution provides inspectors with the full backing of the international community to perform their duty without interference. It is now up to Iraq to fulfill its responsibilities without condition or delay. • A note analyzing the legal implications of the approved text is being prepared by JAG staff and will be forwarded separately. Prepared By: Responsible Director: Responsible Director General Responsible Group Principal: Date: 2/2 Corri Barr. D PK Pol 6. 996-1741 Col G. Cote, DPK Pol. 992-1872 MGen H. C. Ross. DG1S Pol, 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-3458 8 November 2002 000018 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /’information t Provisional text of the resolution on Iraq acted upon by the Security Council on Friday, 8 November 2002. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution The Security Council, Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, and 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements of its President, Recalling also its resolution 1382 (2001) of 29 November 2001 and its intention to implement it fully, Recognizing the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security, Recalling that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area, Further recalling that its resolution 687 (1991) imposed obligations on Iraq as a necessary step for achievement of its stated objective of restoring international peace and security in the area, Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material, Deploring further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), failed to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), and ultimately ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998, Deploring the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required by relevant resolutions, of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, in spite of the Council’s repeated demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the United Nations Monitoring. Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), established in resolution 1284 (1999) as the successor organization to UNSCOM, and the IAEA, and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people. Deploring also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its commitments pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) with regard to terrorism, pursuant to resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population and to provide 071101 EE 000019 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information t S/2002/1198 access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in Iraq, and pursuant to resolutions 686 (1991), 687 (1991), and 1284 (1999) to return or cooperate in accounting for Kuwaiti and third country nationals wrongfully detained by Iraq, or to return Kuwaiti property wrongfully seized by Iraq, Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein. Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions and recalling that the resolutions of the Council constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance, Recalling that the effective operation of UNMOVIC, as the successor organization to the Special Commission, and the IAEA is essential for the implementation of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions, Noting the letter dated 16 September 2002 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General is a necessary first step toward rectifying Iraq’s continued failure to comply with relevant Council resolutions, Noting further the letter dated 8 October 2002 from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq laying out the practical arrangements, as a follow-up to their meeting in Vienna, that are prerequisites for the resumption of inspections in Iraq by UNMOVIC and the IAEA, and expressing the gravest concern at the continued failure by the Government of Iraq to provide confirmation of the arrangements as laid out in that letter. Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, Kuwait, and the neighbouring States, Commending the Secretary-General and members of the League of Arab States and its Secretary-General for their efforts in this regard, Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq’s failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991); 2. Decides, while acknowledging paragraph I above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council; 3. Decides that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, in addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not 2 000020 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information t S/2002/1198 later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of ail aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, subcomponents, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material; 4. Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below; 5. Decides that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC's or the IAEA’s choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates; further decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi Government; and instructs UNMOVIC and requests the IAEA to resume inspections no later than 45 days following adoption of this resolution and to update the Council 60 days thereafter; 6. Endorses the 8 October 2002 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq, which is annexed hereto, and decides that (he contents of the letter shall be binding upon Iraq; 7. Decides further that, in view of the prolonged interruption by Iraq of the presence of UNMOVIC and the IAEA and in order for them to accomplish the tasks set forth in this resolution and all previous relevant resolutions and notwithstanding prior understandings, the Council hereby establishes the following revised or additional authorities, which shall be binding upon Iraq, to facilitate their work in Iraq: -UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall determine the composition of their inspection teams and ensure that these teams are composed of the most qualified and experienced experts available; - All UNMOVIC and IAEA personnel shall enjoy the privileges and immunities, corresponding to those of experts on mission, provided in the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA; -UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have unrestricted rights of entry into and out of Iraq, the right to free, unrestricted, and immediate movement to and from inspection sites, and the right to inspect any sites and buildings, including 3 000021 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'occes a /'information f S/2 002/1198 immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to Presidential Sites equal to that at other sites, notwithstanding the provisions of resolution 1154 (1998); - UNMOVIC and (he IAEA shall have the right to be provided by Iraq the names of all personnel currently and formerly associated with Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile programmes and the associated research, development, and production facilities; - Security of UNMOVIC and IAEA facilities shall be ensured by sufficient United Nations security guards; -UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to declare, for the purposes of freezing a site to be inspected, exclusion zones, including surrounding areas and transit corridors, in which Iraq will suspend ground and aerial movement so that nothing is changed in or taken out of a site being inspected; - UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the free and unrestricted use and landing of fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft, including manned and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles; - UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right at their sole discretion verifiably to remove, destroy, or render harmless all prohibited weapons, subsystems, components, records, materials, and other related items, and the right to impound or close any facilities or equipment for the production thereof; and - UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to free import and use of equipment or materials for inspections and to seize and export any equipment, materials, or documents taken during inspections, without search of UNMOVIC or IAEA personnel or officialor personal baggage; 8. Decides further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or the IAEA or of any Member Stale taking action to uphold any Council resolution; 9. Requests the Secretary'-General immediately to notify Iraq of this resolution, which is binding on Iraq; demands that Iraq confirm within seven days of that notification its intention to comply fully with this resolution; and demands further that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA; 10. Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by recommending sites to be inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews, and data to be collected, the results of which shall be reported to the Council by UNMOVIC and the IAEA; 11. Directs the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution; 12. Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for 4 000022 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I’information < S/2002/1198 full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security; 13. Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations; 14. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 5 000023 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information »• i November 8, 2002 Immediate STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER Prime Minister Jean Chretien today issued this statement on the news of the unanimous passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq : “Canada welcomes the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq and the decision to have inspectors return to Iraq. This is a key and constructive step by the international community and the United Nations to address the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Canada has long advocated the adoption of a resolution that spells out clearly what is expected of Iraq, both in terms of its international obligations and the consequences of continued Iraqi non-compliance. We are very pleased to see the Security Council speaking with one voice as well as the international community’s commitment to work together to address this serious issue. This is what Canada has been working for. The onus is now on Iraq to meet its international obligations. The adoption of this resolution affords Iraq a final opportunity to comply. We call upon Iraq to fulfill its responsibilities without condition or delay. Failing that, the Security Council will reconvene immediately to consider the situation and the need to secure international peace and security.” -SO- PMO Press Office: 957-5555 This document is also available on our Internet site: http://pm.gc.ca 000024 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00013 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 12-11-2002 to 31-12-2002 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10025 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a6e2b831f7ffe0a3161927f6c160fc7a.pdf 57ef09760e14422fa3dfdda31b522d78 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ CONFIDENTIAL I CONFIDENTIEL 8C0001 FILE No. DOSSIER | 1812D-18-8 DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS V Sec 3 CON 0 ODWi International Plans and Operations Iraq CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS MINISTRE - MME M. BLOODWORTH Plans et operations internationals Iraq »2 P.A. RANGER CIRCULATION *: o u o PC Q TO A I> ” REMARKS REMARQUES Date Init. Date B.F. RAPPEL_____ Date REGISTRY ONLY DEPOT CENTRAL Cancel Inspected Annuler Inspects Date MAN f QO I 00 -< g Q Eh CM <D oi s Is i 8 Uh CM oo UNO 703 (07-00) 7530-21-876-1638 Design: Forms Management 993-4050 - Conception : Gestion des formulaires 993-3778 (05-03) 000001 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information FILE MAINTENANCE CHECKLIST LISTE DE CONTRdLE POUR UENTRETIEN DU DOSSIER Protect all files and records as official property. Profeger tous les dossiers et les documents comme dtant la proprfete officielle. Clean records prior to adding them to files. Nettoyer les documents avant de les ajouter & leur dossier respectit Remove all envelopes, flags, tags, pins, spikes, clips and superfluous staples. Entever tout articles inutiles (enveloppes, papillons, etiquettes, dplngles, trombones, attachefeullles, agrafes etc.). File papers and TDs chronologically, the latest date on top. Classer les documents en ordre clironologlque, la date la plus rdcente sur le dessus. Prepunch holes at the top left comer of the papers. Percer des trous du coin supGrieur gauche du document Attach papers to the file by a paper spike for easy handling. Pour faciliter la manutention, attacher les documents au dossier au moyen d’une attache-feuille. When a file becomes thicker than 2", a subsequent volume should be created. Lorsque le dossier a plus de 2" d’epaisseur, creer un nouveau volume. .. Destroy duplicate material, keep a copy only if it has additional information. Detruir? tous les duplicatas qui ne contiennent aucun renseignement supplementaire. Verify the security classification of new documents added to the file. Upgrade the file to the required level as required.' a $ / , Verifier la cote de sdcuritd des nouveaux documents ajoute au dossier • Augmenter la cote de security si necessaire. * < 000002 �Document disclosed under theA ccess to Information Act f CONFIDENTIAL eh vertu d/iM^Tacces a /'information / Chief of the Defence Staff National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Chef d’etat-major de la Def Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 February 2004 The Minister POTENTIAL EXCHANGE OFFICER DEPLOYMENT TO IRAQ COL APPLETON (MAR - JUN 04) I I Reference: CDLS (W) 3350-1 (Comd) 26 Jan 04 (enclosed) Col Appleton is presently an exchange Officer at the United States Army War College (USAWC) in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Last year he attended the USAWC and was asked to remain on staff as part of the Warfighting Department. Col Appleton is being considered by the USAWC for a potential 3-month deployment to Iraq starting in March 2004. I fully support this planned deployment but wanted to consult you prior to approving it because Col Appleton is in a training billet not an operational billet. The USAWC has for several years been dispatching selected Officers to active theatres as part of a Visitation program. These programs last between two weeks to four months and have three primary roles: it keeps the operational focus of the USAWC, assist staff in various theatres and assist other nations in their own strategic development. In the last year this program has been very successfully used in Iraq, Afghanistan and Macedonia. The USAWC usually do not ask Foreign Officers to participate in this program. The USAWC Commandant has personally selected Col Appleton because he brings a powerfully unique perspective to the College and the combination of his experience and intellect make him an excellent choice for this program. Col Appleton would be stationed at the Coalition Force Land Component Command (CFLCC) in Baghdad, Iraq, where Canada maintained an Op ATHENA Liaison Officer until his redeployment in December 2003. His intended employment will be with either a Special Initiative Group or in the Operations and Plans cell. His position may require his movement to other parts of Iraq on a periodic basis. The risks involved with this type of deployment are known and manageable. The duties and responsibilities intended for Col Appleton do not envision command over United States military personnel. E dfe S National Defense @ * E Defence nationale CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Canada 000003 �CONFIDENTIAL Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information >7 This deployment is an excellent opportunity for the Canadian Forces and will serve to advance Col Appleton's own professional learning and development. [ Concur)/ Do Not Conciu^ R.R. Henault General Enclosure: 1 cc: DM Hon D. Pratt MND £</ Feb 04 2/2 CONFIDENTIAL 000004 �^information Act icces a /'information Document disclosed under the Document diwlgue en vertu de l<u Confidential / Confidentiel Unclassified Without Enclosure / Non-Classifi6 sans les Documents DCDS DMCS Transit Document ublished ■canned File Name: Sequence Number / Numero de Sequence ----------------- --------------------------- -| 35614 ate oF Document / Date du document: 3=EeteB4* UaO'J r >ject / Sujet: [E: Feb-04 fEXCHANGE File # / # de Filiere: 5380'^ ,3pfO©- 4 ^os) SW I Precedence / Priorite: ROUTINE PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT TO/A DCDS: For Concurrence (Please rtn doc to Cos J3 CR for further processing once signed) Action Comments / Commentaires F<>, z. INIT CR me co -n-^. a /^I^D pt//b ^FC/oieJ- (P>pt & pp 000005 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00006 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2004-01-01 to 2004-07-31 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10028 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c8ad8e91f68b51b6dae8f9f71d589300.pdf f043a94a3edd15970c39873a75b6b221 PDF Text Text — Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act _______ CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIEL FILE No. DOSSIER ir~=2G 8C0001 1812D-18-8 2 Sec CON DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS International Plans and Operations Iraq .. .. ’.... W Plans et operations int Iraq 8 gU RA. RANGER CIRCULATION TO A O cl REMARKS REMARQUES Date Init. Date B.F. RAPPEL Init. Date REGISTRY ONLY DEPOT CENTRAL Cancel Inspected Annuler Inspects Date CM cr £ 9 o QO I 00 . X ° § N O H CM 0© 43 ? § 9 E S O c o O CM ■ OO == DND 703 (07-00) 7530-21-876-1638 Design: Forms Management 993-4050 - Conception: Gestion des formulaires 993-3778 (05-03) 000006 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information FILE MAINTENANCE CHECKLIST LISTE DE CONTRdLE POUR L’ENTRETIEN DU DOSSIER □ □ □ □ Protect all files and records as official property. Protoger tous les dossiers et les documents comme dtant la propriety offidella Clean records prior to adding them to files. - Nettoyer les documents avant de les ajouter & leur dossier respectit Remove all envelopes, flags, tags, pins, spikes, clips and superfluous staples. . ° Enlever tout articles inutiles (enveloppes, papillons, etiquettes, eplngles, trombones, attachefeullles, agrafes etc.). Hie papers and TDs chronologically, the latest date on top. Classer les documents en ordre chronologique, la date la plus r6centesurle dessus. Prepunch holes at the top left * comer of the papers. Percer des trous du coin supdrieur gauche du document Attach papers to the file by a paper spike for easy handling. Pour faciliter la manutention, attocher les documents au dossier au moyen d’une attoche-feuille. When a file becomes thicker than 2", a subsequent volume should be created. Lorsque le dossier a plus de 2" d’epalsseur, creer un nouveau volume. .' - Destroy duplicate material, keep a copy only if it has additional Information. Detruire tous les duplicates qui ne contiennent aucun renseignement supplementaire. Verify the security classification of new documents added to the file. Verifier la cote de sdcurite des nouveaux documents ajoute au dossier Upgrade the file to the required level as required. . Augmenter la cote de securite si necessaire. ' ■ 000007 �Document disclosed urjfia- tb^Accfss tadnforfnatipaAct Document divulgue en vertMe'J^La^Jr,l^^e(j^'igI$rmation CONFIDENTIAL " I 7 CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) CDN EYES ONLY ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D'ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: Possibel Press Article on Location of Camp Mirage File # I Numero de reference:) J? aI ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) I 05 1§ DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI Date: Apr 04 DM/SM Xto c<yvYvrHvv^.a*.- |_jt_ ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) Date: «TYAo <Aa a _ Apr 04 CONFIDENTIAL CDN EYES ONLY CDN EYES ONLY CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) WJDENHAL ATN0SM3W yfr000008 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) POSSIBLE PRESS ARTICLE ON LOCATION OF CAMP MIRAGE BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE DEPUTY MINISTER ISSUE • The intention of the Globe and Mail to publish an article that includes information about the UAE being the country in which Camp Mirage is located. BACKGROUND • In reaching an agreement with the UAE for the establishment of Camp Mirage, the Government of Canada officials assured the UAE that Canada would not disclose the location of Camp Mirage. While this condition is not recorded in the cunent Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), or the draft Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), it is the UAE expectation that we will continue to avoid public linking of the UAE and their support to the Operation Enduring Freedom forces, including by not revealing our camp’s location. • Canadian policy is to respect the UAE’s wish. The success of the CF in the campaign against terrorism and in ISAF owes much to the UAE’s generous provision of bases and port facilities, and to the excellent relations we have enjoyed at all levels in our dealings with the UAE Armed Forces. For the foreseeable future, the Arabian Gulf will present significant challenges to Canadian security interests, likely requiring a continued ability to operate or be based in the region, principally from the UAE. • On 23 April 2004, a reporter from the Globe and Mail enquired why Canada, in spite of what he described as the many slips and mistakes made by senior Government of Canada officials that revealed Camp Mirage’s location, still refused to disclose that Camp Mirage is in the UAE. This inquiry was made in the course of writing an article about those occasions when the camp’s location has been accidentally revealed. • Also on 23 April 2004, the MND spoke to the Globe and Mail’s Foreign Editor to encourage the paper to refrain from publishing the camp’s location. The reporter still intends to see his article published. Although as of 30 April the article has yet to be published, it most likely will be in the near term. DISCUSSION • Deliberate public disclosure of the UAE’s support by the Government of Canada would likely have a negative impact on ongoing relations, especially if publicized by the Government of Canada in the region. Such revelations might negatively impact the renewal of the MOU (every six months at NDHQ’s request), the negotiation of the SOFA and the continued presence of CF members in the UAE. • On the other hand, the UAE understands that Canada cannot prevent public disclosure of the UAE’s ongoing support by the media in Canada. Over the last week our 1/2 CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) 000009 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) embassy in Abu Dhabi briefed the UAE General Headquarters, and FAC briefed the local UAE embassy, about the possibility of a national newspaper article revealing the location of Camp Mirage. The UAE officials indicated their appreciation for our efforts to prevent the information from being published, and for our having kept them informed. They appeared unconcerned by the possibility of such an article at this time. CONCLUSION • Canada should continue to respect the UAE’s desire that we avoid having any Government of Canada official link the UAE with our operations in the region. Prepared by: Director: Director General: Responsible Group Principal: Date prepared: J. Cloutier. DPK Pol 6.996-1741 Col R.V. Blanchette. D PK Pol, 992-1872 RAdm D. Robertson. DG1S Pol. 992-2769 Dr. KJ. Calder, ADM (Pol). 992-3458 29 April 2004 2/2 CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) 000010 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00007 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2004-01-01 to 2004-07-31 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10028 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b368c3fa1a051ffaa798ee9e7e768ee3.pdf 3c0902050bf9271f774be1efce14f61b PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces d /'information 8COOO1 1812D-18-8 10G Sec i SEC DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS M. BLOODWORTH International Plans and Operations Iraq © CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS MINISTRE - MME M. BLOODWORTH SSS/RDS Plans et operations internationals Iraq P.A.. RANGER CIRCULATION TO A ■ REMARKSi REMARQUES pate Date- Init. I Init. B.F. RAPPEL Cancel Annular REGISTRY ONLY DEPOT CENTRAL Inspected Inspects Date g- f - f mi CT - 00 I 00 < § A CT H O 00 o 1 2 o CT Ll - §H co 4D 70S (0360) 7530-21-694-4101 DesIon; Forms ManaoementSSMOSO - Conception —I— ) 000001 �^^DoajmentdiscTosedijndertneAccesst^nfomwtionAct^ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information -az ;.$<• :JL ‘ .' -‘..L jUAI; ,.-» , - A. •. 'L-. -..'-(.'A • i'uf? . 1 Protect all fibs and records os ( official proparty. ’ i. j Protegsr tous Ise dossiers St las 1 docurnonts comms Etsnt la . pzopriito official's. 1 . ______________ _________ 1 i Clean records prior io adding them : L.l | 1____ L-_________ _______ __ | ' to.t-j|S3> I----- 1 ____ • Clacser Isa docurr.snto an ordre 1 chronolcgiqus, 'a deto la plus • r.'oonta cur !e dessus. * w >w ifeikvwk v nw I > »V|rf« • ! 'A't.pn e fils becomes thicker then ,T, uHJubaequent volume ehoulci •! beersated. . ■ ______ DeelvOy duplicate materiel. Iteap e copy only if it hes additional information. 9 | Verify the security .classification of | new documents added to tine the file. fils. 1_____ ‘ I L I_ _J 1 o r our tecllilar la manuianuon, ailacher les.,documents .. . au . dossier ... -j cu moyen d una atiacns-feullls. > I Lorequa le dossier a plus de ?" d’fipaisseur, crier un nouvaau t volume. 1 Ditruiretoue Iso duplicates qui ne J corrilannsni uucun ransoignamenls ‘ si'polimei <iciren. . *1 1 ’ ’----- 1 I. Fere ar des Irous du coin supirieur | gr.uone du document . , Aitech papers to tha filo by a paper spike for eery handling. 1 ■. papara and TDe ;, File r Icaily, iiie laiest datachror.eloon top. <<*»Z*** m.^w ) ;3.3purch holos ci St s top (sit comer of ths papers j— - . I . Enlever tout articles inuiiles (enveloppoe, paplllons, Etiquettes,. eplnglcs, trombones, ailaches13011133, agrflfca sic.) f,amove ell envelopes, ficoc, tegs, pnj-i uy ii Pina, aplksu, clips and superfluous , atopies. | ! CL _______________________________________________________ _________ — _ . to. to .■ I i i } •*•**•* wvj| i <° Mcitoyar las o’oeumants avarri ds rS • -------- -- • ----------loo pouter 6 Isur dossier rsspsctli. ' ’ • . | Upgrade the filo to the required | tev-jl au required. I Virifi-jr. la cola d3 s6cur(l6 des houveaux documents ajouti au I dossier. Augmsntar la cote da sEcuritE si n&cas'scfre. r o 000002 �Document disci i£nt divulgu SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) SECRET / h CDN-USEYESONLt^x Chief of the Defence Staff '3 Chef d’etat-major de la Defer? Of JJce National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 September 2003 The Minister UPCOMING EXCHANGE OFFICER DEPLOYMENT TO IRAQ BGen Natynczyk is presently one of the Deputy Commanding Generals of III Corps in Fort Hood, Texas. He has been asked by US authorities to deploy to Iraq for one year, likely commencing in Jan 04 although this could change. Ill Corps HQ will form the nucleus of the Land Component Commander’s staff working alongside the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. BGen Natynczyk would be employed as the Corps CJ5 Strategic Plans and Policy, rather than his present position of Deputy Commanding General, because the US intends to increase.the rank of the senior Corps HQ staff by one rank, with the Deputy Commanding General positions being filled by MGens. V. I 10 8 2S S3 § Of significant note, under US war planning, III Corps is identified for contingency operations in the Korean Peninsula and the decision to deploy them to Iraq would ' be a significant strategic shift in policy. Their deployment to Iraq is a very sensitive issue and has yet to be announced. As a CF exchange officer employed with III Corps, BGen Natynczyk plays a critical role in the planning and execution of operations conducted by the Corps in both garrison and in tactical environments. Under the Foreign Military Exchange program, our exchange personnel are expected to participate in all activities and I or tactical operations conducted by the host unit. I have authorized his deployment. R.R. Henault General /~cc'DM^j ~ « 1*1 National Defence q pc ppt * SECRET MUS EYES ONLY Defense nationale rrAN/i is; p v p s c imi vi Canad'a' 000003 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00016 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003-01-12-31 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-100289 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/3c89c2176341edba4942720675e2c0f2.pdf ee3e8493876af6db0cadb4ec9205eaee PDF Text Text >sea under the Access to Information ArtH I Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a I'informa^^^ A 8C0001 1812D-18-8 15G Sec 2 SEC DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS M. BLOODWORTH International Plans and Operations n i Iraq CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS MINISTRE - MME M. BLOODWORTH U ^n Iraq et CWRDENCES SSS/RDS CIRCULATION • RANGER --- ---------------- 1’ TO . A • REMARKS REMARQUES Date • ' -■ * .1 InM ln* I Date Init B.F.' RAPPEL JJRY T CE n. FtBWW <Z1 O I ' “------- :—■—4--------- - -------------------- k> J ■! r X, I -X —------- 1 I 4 1 QO CN 00 mI '< £> Q o o 2 H o w J, 00 -r-r «■ - io = — oo 705 TSJO^I <94-4101 □00004 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulgue en vertu de ia Loi sur I'acces a /'information FILE MAINTENANCE CHECKLIST USTE DE CONTR6LE POUREENTRETIEN DU DOSSIER Protect all files and records as officialproperty. • ■ Clean records prio(te adding them to files. Remove all envelopes, flags, tags, pins, spikes, clips and superfluous . staples. ProtEger tous les dossiers et les documents comma Etant la propriety officielle. Nettoyer les documents avant de les ajouter a leur dossier respectif. \ '* Enlever tout articles inutiles (enveloppes, papilloris, Etiquettes,. Epingles, trombones, attachesfeuiRes, agrafes etc.). ■ □ File papers and TDs chronologically, the latest date on top. Classer Jes documents en ordre chrpnotogique, la date la plus rEcente sur le dessus. Prepunch holes at the top. left corner'of the papers. Percer des trous du coin supErieur gauche du document. Attach papers to the file by a paper spike for easy handling. Pour faoiliter.la manutention, attacher les documents au dossier au moyen d’une attache-feuiHe. . When a file becomes thicker than 2", a subsequent volume should Jje created. Lorsque'le dossier a plus de 2” d’Epaisseur, crEer un nouveau volume. Destroy duplicate material. Keep a copy only if it has additional information: DEtruire tous les duplicates qui ne contiennent aucun renseignements supplEmentaires. Verify the security classification of new documents added to the file. Verifier la cote da security des houveaux documents ajoutE au dossier. ; Upgrade the file to the required level as required. Augmenter la cote de sEcuritE si nEcessaire. - a I ■ 1 SK-? 000005 ’I .'a �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information \j c _Aa a j e_c-v~\ v> 'JCl't X Ki-' c c. ot-\ \s. >—A-\ Va v ~*s .-€_ 3> v^<=^ VA\^S.C- \s»s»'_A e_c\ . A S>e.c_c=> w cX-x4xvx^e_ 'ZXZX CK<X 'Ajcxs Ca v x v x o x av x c - e-wx«yx\ CT.\<=. c^=i'xx^:> • C_-^-.vv -e_v\V- v <_v &xOv-x \s o j tvr\ s» • O.\-O.x.000006 xr \ ----- ' V« - ic. �Document disclosed under the Acc^ss.to.lnfofmgtion Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lcf^ur !jacf& OjiJnf3^!S)ion\zl SECRET National Defence Defense nationale National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 SECRET (CC) JUN 0 9 2003 The Minister DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN FORCES’ EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION 1. On 18 March 2003, the Prime Minister approved continued Canadian Forces participation in Operation Enduring Freedom in light of the imminent US-led military operation against Iraq. Within the context of this direction, restrictions were imposed that Canadian Forces transport aircraft operating in the Persian Gulf region were not to be used to support, directly or indirectly, military action against Iraq. In addition, all Canadian operations were to be undertaken within the existing Operation Apollo area of responsibility, excluding Iraq and that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North). 2. On 22 May 2003, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1483. Resolution 1483 lifted all prohibitions related to trade with Iraq under previous Security Council Resolutions with the exception of prohibitions concerning arms and related material. Further, Resolution 1483 calls upon all member states in a position to do so to respond immediately to the humanitarian appeals of the United Nations and other international organizations. Consequently, Resolution 1483 provides a framework within which Canada and other non-occupying power states may work with the US and British occupying powers referred to as “the Authority” Subsequently, the Prime Minister directed that Canadian Forces transport aircraft 3. were to be offered to the Authority to provide airlift in support of stabilization and reconstruction missions. The first mission to Iraq was flown on 2 June. These aircraft, deployed in the United Arab Emirates, are tasked in support of the upcoming deployment to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul. These aircraft will also be used to provide the agreed support to the UN mandated mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This UN mission will nominally employ two of the four aircraft in theatre. Therefore, support to the Iraq mission will be subject to operational priorities and aircraft serviceability. In order to facilitate operational and logistical arrangements, Canadian Forces 4. participation in stabilization and reconstruction activities will continue to be conducted under the operational control of “the Authority” as defined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483. At all times, Canadian Forces members remain under the 1/2 Canada SECRET SECRET (CC) 000007 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET command of the Chief of the Defence Staff. Additionally, the previous geographic restriction on Canadian Forces operations meant that Canadian Forces aircraft had been unable to accept transport taskings to and from Kuwait under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom. 5. To enable the Canadian Forces to execute the Prime Minister’s direction, the restrictions in respect of airlift by Canadian Forces transport aircraft in support of Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction missions and the geographic restrictions on Canadian Forces operations in Iraq and in that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North) have been removed. The removal of the restriction permits Canadian Forces aircraft to conduct missions through Kuwait for the delivery of loads exclusively in support of the campaign against terrorism and in accordance with Canadian national objectives. 6. Finally, the removal of the geographic restriction has also permitted the Canadian naval task group to conduct Operation Apollo missions in the Northern Persian Gulf in accordance with Canadian national objectives or other missions as may be directed by the Government of Canada. 7. If you agree, we recommend that you sign the enclosed letter to the Prime Minister. Foreign Affairs and the Privy Council Office have been consulted and concur with this approach. a/ R.R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff Margaret Bloodworth Deputy Minister Enclosures: 1 APPROVE Date: The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. 2/2 000008 SECRET �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information 1 SECRET (CO The Right Honourable Jean Chretien, P.C., Q.C., M.P., LL.L, LL.D., Prime Minister of Canada Langevin Block 80 Wellington Street Ottawa ON K1A0A2 Dear Prime Minister: This letter seeks to confirm your verbal direction of 22 May removing certain restrictions in respect of Canadian Forces operations in the Persian Gulf region. Within the context of existing direction, which you approved on 18 March 2003, Canadian Forces transport aircraft in the Persian Gulf region were not to be used to support, directly or indirectly, military action against Iraq. In addition, all Canadian operations were to be undertaken within the existing Operation Apollo area of responsibility, excluding Iraq and that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North). On 22 May 2003, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1483. Resolution 1483 lifted all prohibitions related to trade with Iraq under previous Security Council Resolutions with the exception of prohibitions concerning arms and related material. Further, Resolution 1483 calls upon all member states in a position to do so to respond immediately to the humanitarian appeals of the United Nations and other international organizations. Consequently, Resolution 1483 provides a framework within which Canada and other non-occupying power states may work with the US and British occupying powers referred to as “the Authority.” Further to your verbal direction of 22 May 2003, Canadian Forces transport aircraft were tasked to provide airlift in support of stabilization and reconstruction missions to Iraq. The first mission to Iraq was flown on 2 June. These aircraft, deployed in the United Arab Emirates, are tasked in support of the upcoming deployment to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul. These aircraft will also be used to provide the agreed support to the UN mandated mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This UN mission will nominally employ two of the four aircraft in theatre. Therefore, support to the Iraq mission will be subject to operational priorities and aircraft serviceability. In order to facilitate operational and logistical arrangements, Canadian Forces • participation in stabilization and reconstruction activities will continue to be conducted under the operational control of “the Authority” as defined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483. At all times, Canadian Forces members remain under the command of the Chief of the Defence Staff. Additionally, the previous geographic restriction on Canadian Forces operations meant that Canadian Forces aircraft had been 000009 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lbi sur I'acces a /'information unable to accept transport taskings to and from Kuwait under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom. To enable the Canadian Forces to execute your direction, the restrictions in respect of airlift by Canadian Forces transport aircraft in support of Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction missions and the geographic restrictions on Canadian Forces operations in Iraq and in that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North) have been removed. The removal of the restriction permits Canadian Forces aircraft to conduct missions through Kuwait for the delivery of loads exclusively in support of the campaign against terrorism and in accordance with Canadian national objectives. Finally, the removal of the geographic restriction has also permitted the Canadian naval task group to conduct Operation Apollo missions in the Northern Persian Gulf in accordance with Canadian national objectives or other missions as may be directed by the Government of Canada. Minister Graham has also been apprised of your verbal direction and concurs with the present conduct of operations. Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. r-3.-V- 000010 �SECRET (CC) Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information * Zip Sid SECRET C C (UNCLASSIFIED Without Enclosure) ccmMercury Routing Slip W'/ £ General Correspondence Wednesday, June 04, 2003 Document Date: 5/1/2003 BF : Input Date: 5/2/2003 Due Date: 6/5/2003 Org/Gp: CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF Document: 674270 Control No: CDS2003-366036 File No: 3451-6 Subject: DIRECTION CF TRANSPORT OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES TO IRAQ - DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION Author: Sect/Dept: Org: DR. KENNETH J. CALDER ADM POL Assigned Date: Inti: Task: Routing BF: Assigned To: REC’D 5/2/2003 CDS SO 5/2/2003 SODM FOR SIGNATURE 5/2/2003 DMEA FOR DM SIGNATURE 5/5/2003 MCU DM HAS SIGNED 6/3/2003 CDS SO 6/3/2003 SODM TO BE RESIGNED 6/3/2003 SODM FOR DM SIGNATURE AGAIN (AMENDED BY CDS) 6/4/2003 ADMPOL REC’D FROM DPK POL WITH CORRECTIONS FYA/PICK-UP BY LCOL THOMPSON SECRET C C SECRET (CC) (UNCLASSIFIED Without Enclosure) 000011 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET (UNCLASSIFIED Without Enclosure) / Sous-/M ccmMercury Routing SiiPfeni General Correspondence 3-Jun-03 / Document: 674270 Control No: CDS2003-366036 File No: 3451-6 ® 0 3 Zt-'J Document Date: 01/05/£00§epufy (vJ(. BF : Input Date: 02/05«GC^21*£na/>• Due Date: 05/06/2003 Org/Gp: CHIEF OF THED?FEn £| STAFF Subject: DIRECTION CF TRANSPORT OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES TO IRAQ - DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION Author: Sect/Dept: Org: DR. KENNETH J. CALDER ADM POL Assigned Date: Assigned To: Task: Inti: Routing BF: 02/05/2003 CDS SO 02/05/2003 SODM FOR SIGNATURE 02/05/2003 DMEA FOR DM SIGNATURE 05/05/2003 MCU DM HAS SIGNED 03/06/2003 CDS SO 03/06/2003 SODM REC'D REC'D FROM DPK POL WITH CORRECTIONS TO BE RESIGNED SECRET (UNCLASSIFIED Without Enclosure) 000012 �^Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act D^cyment divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information 1*1 Director Asia Pacific Policy Directeur des Politiques Asie Pacifique 22 Hy o3 KJlF [i^iOvx '$ T’cc Iv-i5 ;• /- (JC-CCC 'fit iU Lo. t-vx 4 V' * IV1 Co w \w a *>'*^3 T) PACT* ftrkr Cc^^tkvv, "^itr ij;\ rCv P.D. McFadden Capt(N) DAP Pol 995-9059 .v'i<r^A rL'ir (-. j IbC. (BUoJ? •< 2S ^3 000013 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information , SECRET ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN FORCES’ EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION File #/Numero de reference: 3450-1 (Corri Barr, D PK Pol 6) DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI FROM/DE: r MLm V” D PkPol/DIpol MP Date: W Concur: COS J3/CEM J3 Date: 4J ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) FROM/DE: /^GlW/DG Pol SI I V Date: 22_^u\^5 Concur: -xigj JAG/JAG Date: Concur: I >" J I) d c d s /s Cemd Date: ^.£<4J CDS/CEMD DM/SM FROM/DE: ADM Pol/SMA Pol Date: SECRET REF: 35538 000014 �MAY.26.2003 2:21PM DLAWOPS OTTAWA Document discf^Q'tl^ffir the to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de Io Loi sur I'accis a /'information EUHBI ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVO! DE SMA(POL) -----------Subject/Objet DIRECTION-REGARDINGCANADIAN-FORCES'EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION File #/Num6ro de reference: 34S0»1 (Corri Barr, D PK Pol 6) DGISPol/DQ Pol SI FROM/DE: Date: 'ol/D fol MP IXol loo * Concur1 COSJ3/CEMJ3 * Date: ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) • FROM/DE: il/DQ Pol SI V Cats: 22.4, Concur i~r/^4^- JA3/JAG . . „ Date:^/9^0’ Concur ■ DCDS/SCEMD Date: CDS/CEMD DM/SM FROM/DE: ADM Pol/SMAPol Date: SECRET REF: 36538 • -.'Jftte. 000015 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET MINUTE 22 May 03 MCU Direction for CF in the Gulf Region 1. An amended version of the “Direction Regarding CF Employment Restrictions in the Gulf Region” (ref: MCU2003-02923C). 2. The file had already been signed off by both the CDS and DM, however, subsequent direction from the PM and the adoption of a UNSCR lifting sanctions on Iraq necessitated a number of cli&nges in the document. Isl J.R. Fofestell Cq /Co I x D PK Pol 992-1872 SECRET 000016 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divtigif: egnertu d&Ja Loi sur I'accis a /'information 7 jo X D PK POL % DIRECTORATE OF PEACEKEEPING POLICY/ DIRECTION DE LA POLITIQUE DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX D POL MP TO/A REMARKS/REMARQUES ^ CA GO s &Or>ZoG- Dg Dj OC.&5 c VSJ&O3 -3 (,6 ottfo q^o} <^^./MX-AAL^-C-g -Ox^e «., ■» ^ < ■ 7^ DATE INITIALS / Li /1^>A n Oj^. 43 yO^ ft/r<Xz0' yex^ Gpp-o->il. 23 S Za I-x _____ APf£o\jAL DM fe_ Go I3P /(, fa? S’/ZA/AT<J£i> o3 <03 63 To 000017 �S*l Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET National Defence Defense nationale National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 MAY 0 5 20© The Minister DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN FORCES’ EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION On 18 March 2003, the Prime Minister approved continued Canadian Forces 1. participation in Operation Enduring Freedom in light of the imminent US-led military operation against Iraq. Within the context of this direction, restrictions were imposed that Canadian Forces transport aircraft operating in the Persian Gulf region were not to be used to support, directly or indirectly, military action against Iraq. In addition, all Canadian operations were to be undertaken within the existing Operation Apollo area of responsibility, excluding Iraq and that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North). 2. With the active phase of the armed conflict in Iraq at an end, Canada is about to participate in humanitarian relief operations and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The use of Canadian Forces assets will provide visible Canadian assistance to US-led or other internationally directed relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and will reinforce the multidisciplinary nature of Canada’s overall approach to the crisis. 3. It is therefore recommended that the restrictions in respect of delivery of humanitarian aid by Canadian Forces transport aircraft to Iraq and the geographic restrictions on Canadian Forces operations in Iraq and in that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North) be removed. Such removal will permit the Canadian Forces to action any requests for support in the delivery of humanitarian relief assistance and reconstruction materials by Canadian Forces transport aircraft to Iraq in accordance with normal staffing procedures requiring policy, operational and legal sign-off. Requests will be individually considered given that legal issues exist as a consequence of the United Nations sanctions regime against Iraq remaining in place at the present time. Additionally, the current geographic restriction on Canadian operations means that Canadian Forces aircraft have been unable to accept transport taskings to and from Kuwait under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom. Given that it is possible to distinguish between loads intended to support Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, the removal of the restriction will permit the Canadian Forces aircraft to resume missions through Kuwait for the delivery of loads exclusively in support of the campaign against terrorism and in accordance with Canadian national objectives. 1/2 Canada SECRET 000018 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'accis a I'information SECRET 4. The removal of the restrictions will also permit the Canadian naval task group to conduct Operation Apollo missions in the Northern Persian Gulf in accordance with Canadian national objectives or other missions as may be directed by the Government of Canada. 5. If you agree, we recommend that you sign the enclosed letter to the Prime Minister. &R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff Margaret Bloodworth Deputy Minister Enclosures: 2 APPROVE The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. 2/2 Date: iiiingiiiiiiiiiiniiiiiiiiM -cuass-reK?: ~ • ENTERED: 09:21.2003-05-06 (DM). Doc #70399 SECRET mc u # MCU2003-02923C 000019 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET (CO The Right Honourable Jean Chretien, P.C., Q.C., M.P., LL.L, LL.D., Prime Minister of Canada Langevin Block 80 Wellington Street Ottawa ON K1A0A2 Dear Prime Minister: This letter seeks your direction to remove certain restrictions in respect of Canadian Forces operations in the Persian Gulf region. Within the context of existing direction, which you approved on 18 March 2003, Canadian Forces transport aircraft in the Persian Gulf region are not to be used to support, directly or indirectly, military action against Iraq. In addition, all Canadian operations are to be undertaken within the existing Operation Apollo area of responsibility, excluding Iraq and that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North). With the active phase of the armed conflict in Iraq at an end, Canada is about to participate in humanitarian relief operations and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The use of Canadian Forces assets will provide visible Canadian assistance to US-led or other internationally directed relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and will reinforce the multidisciplinary nature of Canada’s overall approach to the crisis. Therefore I recommend that the restrictions in respect of delivery of humanitarian aid by Canadian Forces transport aircraft to Iraq and the geographic restrictions on Canadian Forces operations in Iraq and in that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North) be removed. Such removal will permit the Canadian Forces to action any requests for support in the delivery of humanitarian relief assistance and reconstruction materials by Canadian Forces transport aircraft to Iraq. Requests will be individually considered given that legal issues exist as a consequence of the United Nations sanctions regime against Iraq remaining in place at the present time. Additionally, the current geographic restriction on Canadian operations means that Canadian Forces aircraft have been unable to accept transport taskings to and from Kuwait under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom. Given that it is possible to distinguish between loads intended to support Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, the removal of the restriction will permit the Canadian Forces aircraft to resume missions through Kuwait for the delivery of loads exclusively in support of the campaign against terrorism and in accordance with Canadian national objectives. 000020 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information The removal of the restrictions will also permit the Canadian naval task group to conduct Operation Apollo missions in the Northern Persian Gulf in accordance with Canadian national objectives or other missions as may be directed by the Government of Canada. [Minister Graham has been consulted and concurs with this approach. If you agree, I have also enclosed a draft letter of reply for your signature.] TBC Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. 000021 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET OTTAWA, KIA OA2 May, 2003 Dear Colleague: Thank you for your correspondence of May XX, 2003, in which you sought the removal of restrictions with regard to Canadian Forces operations in the Persian Gulf region. I agree that if an appropriate role in assisting the delivery of humanitarian relief or supporting Operation Apollo objectives in an expanded area of operations is identified, the Canadian Forces should be in a position to consider the request in a timely manner. I therefore concur with the change in direction sought in your letter. Thank you for continuing to keep me apprised of these very important issues. Yours sincerely, 000022 �»3 I. z^W *j Z • ZU c -t- co 3. c^4-\OfO-<.cxxX. _<^v 'KAl'T icvCfi.-pzcooLc.cl un=U- Jbhu^4 AA/iUfl 6 t-vvczAzizvvvv-ejz— arrceo- <?i?6 -/V1-/! 000023 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /’information © .SECRET ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN FORCES’ TRANSPORT OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES TO IRAQ File #/Numero de reference: 3450-1 (Coni Barr, D PK Pol 6) DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI FROM/DE: Concur: D PK Pol/D Pol MP Date: COSJ3/CEM J3 Date: - ADM(Pol)/SMAi FROM/DE: i DGIS PolJDG Pol SI Date: . )3> CDS/CEMD DM/SM FROM/DE: ADM Pbl/SMA Pol Date: / ^3 SECRET REF: 35538 000024 �nor HTK. oo. tiocu r-w-rs^i SECRET Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Sublect/Objet: DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN FORCES’ TRANSPORT OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES TO IRAQ File #/Num6ro de reference! 3450-1 (Corri Bair, D PKPol 8) Concur: Date: V SECRET . 4/^ o REF: 35538 000025 �7 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information * D PK POL sr o DIRECTORATE OF PEACEKEEPING POLICY/ DIRECTION DE LA POLITIQUE DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX o 4, ,'*o. 3 vr/ - £ D POL MP TO/A REMARKS/RE MARQUES '”/(A C’c->v^uu'Vuvvcc_ '■MA. <_Xoc DATE c'’ D ?v 4l g | L-evtZ- '^PcA, D PkPo) OCOJ Stj INITIALS 26/r c^-JCs^ficX £A/AbM(&) -ccl ; £S &A- QCQZ . ^n,. A u ^/u ^k jz / 9o frM 000026 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00017 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003-01-12-31 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-100289 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/1b122d3e75ea86ebaa5797fc99688088.pdf bbc2577c5ce093d4f3df3caca08921c8 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 8C0001 18G Sec 1 SEC 1812D-18-8 DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS M. BLOODWORTH International Plans and Operations | L.J Iraq LZZ) /7 f CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS MINISTRE - MME M. BLOODWORTH Plans et operation^^d^^^i^sjj Iraq '"S/Rd s TO- REMARKS ■ REMARQUES A init. D&te Date Init. < Date lc*,ncel ’ ' Annuler REGISTRY ONLY I IDEPOT CENTRAL Inspected -ti w Inspect^ ■ Date . IT ' . .'' I II - — ■ RAPPEL ?no' ?00l[ -+-FS o 00 - U aF < RwiSfeR-.'' CIRCULATION’ -- ----■ ■it - ’.yi: -< 7 ■& ■ §r ■ • -?— 00 ■ 00 ,= |.< 2a eg I 3 H 8 er I . ■ BS I -; -- -■ <u ■ o ■, ■ ° =— la£ !s :_____ ______. jL_ 00 = Fenns Management 893-4C > des tonnulaires 993-3 000027 V.v - �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information " FILE MAINTENANCE CHECKLIST USTE DE CONTR&LE POUR HENTRETIEN DU DOSSIER Protect all files and records as official property. ProtEger tous les dossiers et les documents comme Etantla propriEtE officielle. / Clean records prior to adding them to files. Nettoyer les documents ayant de lesaj'outer E leur dossier respectif. Remove all envelopes, flags, tags, pins, spikes, clips and superfluous staples. Enlever tout articles inutiles (enveloppes, papiHons, Etiquettes, Epingies, trombones, attaches: feuilles, agrafes etc.). File papers and TDs chronologically, the latest date on top. Glasser les documents eh ordre chronologique, la date la plus. recente sur Je dessus. : Prepunch holes at the top left corner of the papers.. Percef des trous du coin supErieur gauche du document. Attach papers to the file by a paper spike for easy handling. Pour facilrter la manutention, attacher les documents au dossier , au moyen d’une attache-feuille. When a file becomes thicker than • 2’, a subsequent volume should be created. Lorsque le dossier a plus de 2” d’Epaisseur, crEer un nouveau volume. Destroy duplicate material. Keep a copy only If it has additional Information. DEtruire tous les duplicates qui ne contiennent aucun renseignements supplEmentaires. Verify the security classification of. new documents added to the file. Verifier la cote de sEcuritE des nouveaux documents ajoutE au dossier. Upgrade the,file' to the required level as required. Augmenter la cote de sEcuritE si . nEcessaire. 000028 — �Docupteqt disclosed under the Access to Information A Docum([rt djju^tejm^r^ie la Loi sur faeces a /’inform □>fr\ ) T'\^€io jx-z^x GW-n 000029 �L Document disclosed under the Access tojnformation Act '.wffeDtdiyjjIgu&en vertuAe latyi s&l'acc& cfl'inQpmation SECRET (CEO) SECRET (CC) -iSia-oChief of the Defence Staff National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Chef d’etat-major de la Defense SECRET (CO CBN EYES OMY Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 O WtS2-' JAN 3 0 » The Minister DEPLOYMENT OF A CANADIAN FORCES LIAISON TEAM TO QATAR 1. For operational security, and to ensure that appropriate attention continues to be paid to the campaign against terrorism, US Central Command is dividing its headquarters into two staffs: one focused on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and one dedicated to planning for possible action against Iraq. To further reinforce this division of responsibilities, the US has now deployed its staff focused on Iraq planning to Qatar. As such, Canadian Forces officers currently in Tampa have now lost access to knowledge of planning for any eventual action against Iraq. In order that they may maintain effective contact with US forces, we recommend that you agree to the deployment of a team of Canadian Forces liaison officers to Qatar. We also wish to emphasize that a decision in this regard is considered a matter of urgency - the train may literally leave the station, without the Canadian Forces, if the recommended deployment is not authorized at this time. 2. Deploying the Canadian liaison team to Qatar to interface with all staff functions of the US deployed headquarters is essential, at least initially, to allow maximum exposure to all facets of operational planning for a possible campaign against Iraq. This deployment would in no way prejudge the final decision to be made by the Government of Canada with respect to possible military participation in any potential campaign against Iraq. It would, however, preserve the Government’s ability to make an informed decision and to ensure that the required information is available both to the Government and, in the event that Canada elected to participate militarily, to Canadian Forces military planners. We have been informed that both Australia and the United Kingdom intend to deploy liaison teams to Qatar and have already pre-positioned equipment within the region, notwithstanding the fact that their participation in any eventual military action will still be subject to national decisions taken at the appropriate time. A decision to simply retain a liaison presence at CENTCOM in Tampa would severely compromise the initial progress made in gaining insight into US planning efforts. Additionally, our liaison officers attached to the US Component SECRET (CO EYES ONLY 1/2 1*1 National Defence Defense nationale SECRET (CEO) SECRET (CC) Canada 000030 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET (CEO) Commands in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are in discussions regarding the military capabilities Canada is considering. 3. Time is of the essence. If you approve, we will so inform the Privy Council Office and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. We further recommend that you sign the enclosed letter to the Prime Minister. R.R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff Margaret Bloodworth Deputy Minister Enclosures: 2 Approve John McCallum Minister of National Defence Date 2/2 SECRET (CEO) 000031 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET(CC) The Right Honourable Jean Chretien, P.C..Q.C., M.P..LL.L, LL.D., Prime Minister of Canada Langevin Block 80 Wellington Street Ottawa ON K1A0A2 Dear Prime Minister: Deployment of a Canadian Forces Liaison Team to Qatar For operational security, and to ensure that appropriate attention continues to be paid to the campaign against terrorism, US Central Command is dividing its headquarters into two staffs: one focused on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and one dedicated to planning for possible action against Iraq. To further reinforce this division of responsibilities, the US has deployed its staff focused on Iraq planning to Qatar. As such, Canadian Forces officers currently in Tampa have now lost access to knowledge of planning for any eventual action against Iraq. This is to inform you that I have authorized the deployment of a Canadian Forces liaison team to Qatar to preserve access to US military planning for possible action against Iraq. This deployment will in no way prejudge the final decision to be made by the Government of Canada with respect to possible military participation in any potential campaign against Iraq. It would, however, preserve the Government’s ability to make an informed decision and ensure that the required information is available both to the Government and, in the event that Canada elected to participate militarily, to Canadian Forces military planners. We have been informed that both Australia and the United Kingdom intend to deploy liaison teams to Qatar and have already pre-positioned equipment within the region, notwithstanding the fact that their participation in any eventual military action will still be subject to national decisions taken at the appropriate time. Minister Graham has been advised and concurs. Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence Cc The Honourable Bill Graham, P.O., M.P. ^CRET(CC) SECRET (CC) 000032 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET (CEO) BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ISSUE • Whether a Canadian Forces liaison team be deployed to Qatar, and currently deployed liaison officers at Coalition Forces Land, Maritime and Air Component Command headquarters continue to conduct liaison with respect to potential military action against Iraq. BACKGROUND • On 4 December, Canada responded to a US request regarding a possible Canadian contribution to a potential coalition against Iraq by suggesting that military authorities begin discussions on a possible Canadian contribution. For Canada, the purpose of these military-to-military discussions was to seek information for use in developing options for the Government and to ensure that the Canadian Forces are well prepared for all contingencies and for cooperation with other partners in the event of future military action, if approved by the Government of Canada. • US operational planning is well-advanced and continues to be refined daily in order that US forces are prepared to implement any political decision to commence initial operations against Iraq as early as mid-February or early March. The Canadian liaison team, which arrived at CENTCOM in Tampa, Florida, in late December 2002, has been made privy to much of the planning process and has been instrumental in assisting National Defence Headquarters’ development of plausible options for governmental consideration. j DISCUSSION • For operational security, and to ensure that appropriate attention continues to be paid to the campaign against terrorism, CENTCOM is dividing its headquarters into two staffs: one focused on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and one dedicated to planning for possible action against Iraq. To further reinforce this division of responsibilities, CENTCOM has deployed its staff focused on Iraq planning to Qatar. Additionally, operational planning for possible military action against Iraq is being conducted at the Coalition Forces Land (Kuwait), Air (Saudi Arabia) and Maritime (Bahrain) Component Command headquarters. • Canadian Forces officers currently in Tampa have now lost access to planning for any eventual action against Iraq. In order that they may continue their liaison activities in an effective manner, consideration should be given to sending a small liaison team to Qatar in conjunction with the CENTCOM deployment. We have been informed that both Australia and the United 1/2 SECRET(CEO) 000034 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET(CEO) Kingdom intend to deploy liaison teams to Qatar and have already prepositioned equipment within the region, notwithstanding the fact that their participation in any eventual military action will still be subject to national decisions taken at the appropriate time. • The deployment of a liaison team to Qatar, and having the currently deployed liaison officers at Coalition Forces’ Land, Maritime and Air Component headquarters continue their discussions on Iraq, would in no way prejudge the final political decision to be made by the Government of Canada with respect to possible military participation in any potential campaign against Iraq. It would, however, preserve the Government’s ability to make an informed decision by ensuring that the required information is available both to the Government and, in the event that Canada elected to participate militarily, to Canadian Forces military planners. A decision to simply retain a liaison presence at CENTCOM in Tampa would severely compromise the initial progress made in gaining insight into US planning efforts on Iraq. • The incremental cost for deployment of the Canadian liaison team to Qatar over a six-month period has been estimated at $250,000 for a team comprising 14 planners and 11 communications/support staff that would be capable of continuous operations, i.e. 24 hours per day, 7 days per week (24/7). • The deployment would also be contingent on Canada seeking appropriate diplomatic clearances. If you agree, preparations for deploying the liaison team could begin immediately. • The Department of Foreign Affairs has been consulted and concurs. A letter to the Prime Minister is enclosed for the Minister of National Defence’s signature. Prepared by: Consulted: Responsible Director: Responsible Director General: Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Corn Barr, DPK Pol 6, 996-1741 LCol J.R. Forestell. DPK Pol 3, 992-3976 J3 Int'l Col G. C0t6, DPK Pol, 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross, DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM(Pol), 992-3458 16 January 2003 2/2 SECRET(CEO) 000033 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00018 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003-01-12-31 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-100289 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/3c059bad852418ea5f4d98f127575104.pdf fd3bc3dc029295fa3d10ea0ebec80b16 PDF Text Text ao.rtosedmeAcci- ■■■ to Infcrntohtn A Sec 8C0001 1812D-18-8 2 SEC £©©[>© DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS M. BLOODWORTH International Plans and Operations 44 Zz ___ ____ Iraq □ CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS MINISTRE - MME M. BLOODWORTH LT i U Plans et operations internationals SSS/RDS Iraq a TO A CZ> REMARQUES Date InH Date tret. REGISTRY ONLY DEPOTCENTRAL B.F; ' RAPPEL P.A. * RANGER Date I Cancel sr I Annular Inspected Inspects F ' I ■- ■■ 71 <4 rt 4=^ ______ - l— ---- F" ~lr~ I EI ___ r ___ •____ ■ r f 4 4 I coI 04 j- - QO ■ QO ■< 4 Q 2H 4s 22^^ > 00 — ---------Q <D O ' _ - — \ I' '■ 4 __ t °o §■ ; J - j 4_2Z1___ u- ID 705 7530-21-894-4101 ■ DesIgrt.Fomw Manasament 893^050.-Conception ■■ Geslion des ft 000035 ’.'I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en ve'rtu de la Loi sur facets a {'information >a FILE MAINTENANCE CHECKLIST USTE DECONTR&LE POUR IIENTRETIEN DU DOSSIER □ Protect all filesand repords as. , official property. Clean records prior to adding them to files. □ Protdger tous les dossiers et les , documents comma dtant la proprldtd ofticielle. . t Nettoyer les documents avant de les ajouter & leur dossier respectif. Remove all envelopes, flags, .tags, pins, spikes, clips and superfluous ■ staples. ,. Enlever tout articles inutiles (enveloppes, papilldns, dtlquettes, dpirigles, trombones, attachesfeuilles, agrafes etc.). ’ File papers and TDs chronolo, gically, the latest'date on top. . Classer les documents ert ordre ohronologique, la date la plus rdeente sur ledessus. Prepunch holes at the top left corner of the papers. Percer des trous du coin supdrieur gauche du document. Attach papers to the file by a paper spike for easy handling. ■ Pour faclllter la manutention, attacher les documents au dossier au moyen d'uneattache-feuille. When a file becomes thicker than 2", a subsequent volume should be created. Lorsque le dossier a plus de 2” d'dpaisseur, order un n&uveau volume. Destroy duplicate material. Keep a copy only if it has additional information. Ddtruire tous les duplicates qui ne coptiennent aucun renseignements suppldmentaires. Verify the security classification of new documents added to the file. Vdrifier la cote de sScuritd des nouveaux documents ajoutd au dossier. . Upgrade the file to the required level as required. ' Augmenter la cote de sdcurite si ndeessaire. ■ • . i S' 5 - ■? 'Cl “ ■■ J ■ I sit _____ 000036 �Pages 37 to / a 39 are withheld pursuant to section sont retenues en vertu de Particle 15(1) of the Access to Information Act de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information 4504 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF CABINET DU CHEF DE L’ETAT-MAJOR DE LA DEFENSE Date 13-Aug-O3 To /Destinataire SO DM c.c. Sous-Ministre de la ' Defense Nationale AOUT AUG 1 3 2003 Deputy Minister of National Defence From / De SO CDS APPROVAL SOFA KUWAIT □ □ [_J l_! I i Li S?; Acknowledgement / Accuse de reception Reply for CDS’s signature I Reponse pour la signature du CEMD Reply with cc to CDS I Reponse et cc pour le CEMD Briefing Note / Note de synthese For your information / A titre d’information For action, as appropriate / Pour execution, suivant le cas For action, as per remarks / Pour execution, selon les observations Remarks / Observations !For signature i I Reply in I Repondre en CZ English / anglais i_ French / fran^ais 000040 �- Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'acces a /'information (39 --- - 1DPK POL DIRECTORATE OF PEACEKEEPING POLICY/ DIRECTION DE LA POLITIQUE DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX BP 4W D POL MP REMARKS/REMARQUES TO/A J3 t’oiC DATE Qo<2 c uiZSfij C O ''■foOK INITIALS V <3 S-d^.ol &Jo? ^ufPuzAua,—ex--------- ---------------- (I .oT-o-s Daos gThfa? OS 6<s> Grr 0)5 I f~~ S/> bM I ___________ i I OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADV0C.A7? >T?.AL Directorate »f Law Inttrnafei 3 1 2^ Sous-Ministr de la Defense NariknaU u <h :. ■ Directors! '.-i *C>KAL national ® 1 j 2003 Deputy Minister of National Defence 000041 �r Document disclosed talnfprmation Act Document divulgueen WtiMJtoTfurMfas it /‘information I - ' CONFIDENTIAL ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA) WITH KUWAIT : BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFFENCE File #/Numero de reference: 3450-1 (Joey Cloutier, D PK Pol 6) DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI FRj l/l Cj- DPKPol/DPoIMP Date: 26X1^3 ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) FROM/DE: DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI Date: ■ Concur tOS"J3/CEM J3 Date : e> 3 Concur: I'M fit* JAG/JAG Date 3 fy-f fc-) 7k/ o Concur: / / yOCDS/SCEMD Date Q'b DM/SM CDS/CEMD FROM/DE: ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) Date: 7OX CONFIDENTIAL REF: 36130 000042 •J �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act “rrrtnmt djynlqyA pn vprtu de la Loi sur I'acces a {'information Sn j’f'Ministre de 'a Wag J^£C£.e -L_ zgj-a<ioiral-mT^rr i <<.___ -dLcc^i^—^Q^ui^Qji. c<--'. ru _____ — 4=0 (Lf JLO- -Z-xZV^/g^A -f . l AJL f/ji. _jazwa4_i Lo 2^^<x £0 000043 �1 VI------ .-Lj-V r Document disclosed under the Acces&tW thfb'riMlftfbn Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information A w . * P ft < M E Mi (-> ( S T Z « ?R EM i C« M l H I ST RE OTTAWA, K1A 0A2 July 21, 2003 Dear Colleague: I am writing to clarify my letter of July 3, 2003, which dealt with the strategic objectives of Canadian Forces (CF) contingent deploying to Afghanistan and the removal of certain restrictions with respect to CF operations in the Persian Gulf region. I wish, therefore, to confirm my agreement that all CF assets, including naval and ground, be allowed to conduct operations north of the 28“30' of latitude North, through Kuwait, when required and in accordance with authorized CF objectives. Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum Minister of National Defence Room 110, Justice Building House of Commons Ottawa, Ontario K1A0A6 & => SECBET 000044 J �Document disclosed under the Acfft^ftMcicoiation Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Li*2UfltPHf[ffiJJ$Jmation CONFIDENTIAL Sour MEMORANDUM 2200-1 (DNATO Pol 4) Iv D<?fe a pr 2 8 20Q^ Apr 03 Dist List SITREP: POSSIBLE NATO ROLE IN POST-CONFLICT IRAQ 1. While NATO awaits the 28 April release of NATO Secretary-General Robertson’s Food-For-Thought paper on possible NATO involvement in Iraq, the US has begun approaching selected Allies on a bilateral basis to request involvement in the stabilization period in Iraq. Canada has been approached by the US to contribute to stabilization/ reconstruction efforts in Iraq, and has prepared its response, to be delivered to the US Embassy on Monday, 5 May. Most European countries have also been approached, though notably, not France or Germany. 2. The US is interested in NATO playing a role in reconstruction efforts. However, discussions in the NATO context are at a very early stage, and though rhetoric for NATO involvement has been positive, there is clearly no great enthusiasm on the part of our Allies for concrete NATO involvement at this time. Further, discussions will be limited in scope until the level of UN involvement in post-conflict reconstruction is clear. 3. Given Allies’ troop commitments in the Balkans, Afghanistan, to the UN and to Iraq (already committed on a bilateral basis), it will be difficult for most NATO states to make a further contribution to a future NATO mission in Iraq. 4. We expect that NATO will continue to discuss involvement in Iraq, as a “fence mending” exercise, but this is not an option that is being seriously considered in most capitals. 5. Based on the Canadian response to the American request, we have consulted with DFAIT on this issue. Canada’s intervention in the NATO context will emphasize that we would not want any NATO role in Iraq that would undermine the NATO support already committed and essential to the Canadian deployment this summer to IS AF. Col J. Michael Snell D NATO Pol 995-9155 CONFIDENTIAL 1/2 C0WFmSoo45 �CONFIDENTIAL Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information I Dist List EA/MND EAZDM EA/CDS EA/DCDS EA/VCDS EAZADM(Pol) EA/DG Pol Plan EA/DGIS Pol EA/COS J3 DPK Pol CONFIDENTIAL 2/2 000046 I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document^iv^gue^e^/ertu ^^a Loi^urJ^rces a Information e :M\s igoi JAPAN ^^255 SUSSEX DRIVE OTTAWA. ONTARIO K1N 9E6 TELEPHONE: (613) 241-8541 FAX: (613) 241-7415 f/V ^7/5?/ Sous-Ministre de la Defense Nationale 1 6 2003 Deputy Minister of National Defence April 14, 2003 Dear Sir or Madam, Please find enclosed a complimentary copy of the April 2003 issue of the Japan Echo journal, published bimonthly by Japan Echo Inc. in Japan. Each issue of Japan Echo contains significant articles and essays by prominent commentators. In this month’s issue, we would like to draw your attention to the article by Japan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kawaguchi Yoriko, on page 24. The article, entitled “A Foreign Policy to Consolidate Peace”, calls on the Japanese people to ponder and debate the question of Japan’s role in global security in light of the present situation in Iraq. We hope that you will take the time to read it as well as the other pieces in Japan Echo. We hope that you will add this publication to your collection and that it will be useful to you in the future. Sincerely, Information and Culture Section Embassy of Japan 000047 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Memorandum 1560-1 (D Strat A) . 14 Mar 03 H Sous-Ministre de la Defense Nationale z Deputy Minister of National Defence Dist List POTENTIAL WAR IN IRAQ For your information, please find attached an updated briefing note on “Allies’ contributions for a potential intervention in Iraq” prepared by Dr. Nebojsa Bjelakovic, D Strat A, 992-4532. Daniel L. Bon DG Pol PlarT~ 992-0799 Dist List [d m f CDS ADM (Pol) SA/MND (Del Bianco) DCDS DG Pol Plan DG Pol Coord DGIS Pol D Pol Dev DAPC Pol DPK Pol D Pari A DFAIT-IDC (St. John Geoffrey) 000048 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information ALLIES’ CONTRIBUTIONS FOR A POTENTIAL INTERVENTION IN IRAQ BRIEFING NOTE AIM To provide a summary of selected contributions, firm and conditional, to an American-led intervention in Iraq. Our data are compiled from open sources and, therefore, may be freely used in public forums. Whenever possible, these data have been checked against classified information to ensure their general accuracy. BACKGROUND United States Diplomatic efforts to achieve UN-sponsored disarmament of Iraq are approaching a stalemate and an American -led military intervention seems very likely in weeks, if not in days. As of March 14, 2003, an estimated 230,000 American personnel are deployed in the Gulf region, while 30,000 additional troops are en route. Although Washington has frequently expressed readiness to fight Saddam on its own, it has approached almost 50 countries for potential troop and other contributions. So far, only the UK has indicated that it would join US-led offensive operations in Iraq. Many U.S. allies have units deployed in the area serving in various missions. However, most of the allies, to a lesser or greater extent, remain reluctant to commit troops or treasure to a possible intervention. FIRM AND CONDITIONAL COMMITMENTS NATO Allies Belgium: The government has not offered any comments on potential Belgian participation in an intervention in Iraq, but has stated that it aims to concentrate its military assets on the missions in Afghanistan and Africa. Czech Republic: Prague has deployed its anti-chemical warfare unit to Kuwait. The Czech government is also considering providing other troops, such as a field hospital or a rapid reaction brigade. Denmark: Denmark is prepared to offer a submarine and troops were the UN to authorize an intervention in Iraq, but the government has not yet decided whether Danish soldiers would be sent into combat. France: France favours allowing for a longer and more thorough arms inspection process and has frequently indicated that it might use its Security Council veto to oppose a military action against Iraq. 1 000049 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Germany: Germany allowed the U.S. to use its airspace and bases, but has indicated that it would commit no troops to an intervention against Iraq. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder asserted on January 21, 2003, that Germany would not vote for, nor go to war under any circumstances. However, in order to help contain any Iraqi threat Germany has deployed two Patriot missile units to Israel and one to Turkey, and its servicemen will serve on board of the AW ACS. A German anti-chemical warfare unit has been in Kuwait since 1991. Hungary: Budapest has authorized the training of Iraqi exiles at Taszar military base in Hungary. American troops are training between 1,000 and 4,000 Iraqi opposition members primarily as translators and scouts. Hungary will send 2,000 gas masks and chemical protection suits to Turkey. Italy: Rome is willing to support the coalition indirectly, by allowing the use of air space and military bases. Netherlands: Government sources have indicated that Dutch participation, if any, would likely be limited to ships already in the region. On February 7, 2003, ahead of the NATO decision, the Dutch government decided to deploy, on a bilateral basis, three Patriot missile units for the protection of Turkey. Norway: The Norwegian PM has indicated that there would have to be a clear UN mandate before Norway would even consider joining an intervention in Iraq. Poland: On January 16, 2003, Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski stated that his country supports the U.S. intervention against Iraq and has promised to contribute troops to a possible war with Baghdad. Portugal: Portugal allowed the U.S. to use its airspace and bases. Spain: The Spanish government has repeatedly said it would back a US-led military intervention in Iraq, but has given no details of troop commitments. Turkey: Turkey would provide an excellent staging ground for an attack from the north were an international coalition to intervene in Iraq. The Turkish cabinet has agreed to allow 62,000 American combat troops and over 300 aircraft to use their territory. However, the Turkish parliament narrowly failed to endorse this agreement on March 1, 2003, but a second vote on the issue may be held soon. Turkey has had a few thousand troops in Northern Iraq since the early nineties. Reportedly, Ankara has been deploying troops along the border with Iraq. Some reports indicate that Turkey could contribute between 10,000 and 50,000 troops if the U.S. were to attack from the north. UK: Over 1,300 naval and air force personnel are already in the Gulf, serving in various missions, including the enforcement of no-fly zones over Iraq, and London is also offering its military bases in England and Diego Garcia for U.S. long-range bombers and tanker aircraft. 2 000050 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information On January 7, 2003, despite reported divisions in the Blair government, London called up 1,500 reserve personnel and dispatched to the Gulf an amphibious naval task force including at least 3,000 marines. This task force consists of the amphibious ship HMS Ocean, destroyers HMS Edinburgh and HMS York, supply ships Argus, Fort Rosalie, Fort Austin, landing and logistic ships Sir Galahad, Sir Tristram, Sir Percivale, and anti-mine ships HMS Grimsby and HMS Ledbury. The UK also sent 14 combat aircraft to previously scheduled exercise in Jordan. On January 12, 2003, Britain also sent to the region a carrier naval taskforce comprised of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, the destroyer HMS Liverpool, the frigate HMS Marlborough, the supply ship Fort Victoria, the tanker Orange Leaf, and a few submarines. On January 20, 2003, Britain announced a major deployment to the region of an additional 26,000 troops. These troops consist of Headquarters 1 (UK) Armoured Division, 7th Armoured Brigade, 16th Air Assault Brigade, and 102 Logistics Brigade. This deployment includes 120 Challenger tanks and 150 Warrior armoured personnel carriers, as well as mobile artillery units. These troops will be stationed in Kuwait by the middle of February. On January 30, 2003, London called up another 4,500 reserve personnel. On February 6, 2003, London announced sending additional 7,000 RAF personnel to the Gulf as well as 75 aircraft, including 27 Puma and Chinook helicopters, Jaguar and Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, E3D Sentry airborne command aircraft, Hercules transporters, VC10 and Tristar refuelling aircraft, Tornado F3's for air defence, Tornado GR4 and Harrier GR7 offensive jets. In all, Britain has decided to deploy 42,000 troops to the Gulf, including 29,000 ground troops. Other Like-Minded Countries Australia: The Australian government has dispatched forces to the Persian Gulf as part of contingency arrangements for a possible war against Iraq including a contribution of Special Forces, three warships, a squadron of up to 14 F/A-18 Hornet fighters, three C130 Hercules transport aircraft, a P3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft, CH-47 helicopters, and an air-to-air refuelling aircraft. On January 22, 2003, the government announced a forward deployment to the region of the amphibious transport ship Kanimbla, lead elements of a Special Forces Task Group, and a Royal Australian Air Force reconnaissance team. On February 7, 2003, Australia sent another 450 troops to the Persian Gulf. In all, Australia could reportedly deploy 2,000 troops there. Canberra prefers to have a new Security Council resolution authorizing an attack on Iraq, though it does not believe that a new resolution is necessary. Slovakia: Slovakia has deployed a 75-member contingent to complement the Czech antichemical warfare unit already deployed in Kuwait. Bulgaria: The parliament decided to make available a 150-member anti-chemical warfare unit and to allow the United States to use Bulgaria’s airspace and one base. 3 000051 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Romania: The parliament agreed to make available 278 non-combat troops and to allow the United States to use Romania’s airspace and bases. Albania: The cabinet decided to make available a commando unit and to allow the U.S. to use Albania’s airspace. Ukraine: The government is negotiating with Kuwait on the status of the decontamination battalion, which can be sent to the area. Middle Eastern Countries Israel: The current U.S. position is that Israel should not be part of the coalition against Iraq. The Israeli government has clearly stated, however, that it would launch aerial counter attacks if attacked. Syria: Most likely would remain neutral and eventually may grant the use of its air space for search and rescue missions. Iran: Most likely would remain neutral and eventually may grant the use of its air space for search and rescue missions. Jordan: Most likely will offer radar and special operations bases, but is unlikely to say so publicly. Saudi Arabia: Most likely will offer airfields, and sites for anti-missile batteries. More than 3,000 Saudi troops have deployed in Kuwait as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force. Kuwait: Kuwait would be one of the primary staging grounds for an attack from the south. Oman: U.S. troops already use air bases for maintenance and refuelling. Oman deployed one battalion as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force to help defend Kuwait. United Arab Emirates: U.S. troops already use air bases for refuelling. The United Arab Emirates intend to deploy tanks, attack helicopters, warships and about 4,000 troops as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force to help defend Kuwait. Bahrain: U.S. troops already use port facilities. Bahrain is the headquarters for the U.S. 5th Fleet. Bahrain government said that it was sending a frigate and ground troops as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force to help defend Kuwait. Qatar: U.S. troops already use several military bases. Qatar is the forward HQ for U.S. Gulf forces. It was also the locale for exercise “Internal Look,” simulating an attack on Iraq, in December 2002. 4 000052 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS FOR AN INTERVENTION IN IRAQ Military Air forces bases Ground troops Navy Financial contribution Postconflict deployment NATO Countr es UK* Not needed Not needed Not needed No___ Yes Yes Yes Not needed Not needed Not needed Yes Yes Most likely Yes U.S.* Yes Australia* Not needed Belgium* Czech Republic* Denmark* France* Germany* Hungary Italy*______ Netherlands* Norway* Poland* Portugal Spain* Turkey* No No No No No No 361 troops No Yes Likely Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering No No No No No No No No No No No_______ No_______ No_______ No_______ Considering No_______ No_______ No_______ No_______ Considering Likely Likely No______ Likely Considering No No No No Likely No No Considering No Considering No_______ Considering Most likely No_______ Considering Most likely No_______ Considering No No_______ Considering No Likely Considering Most likely Yes Most likely Yes Yes Yes Likely Yes Likely 2 aircraft carrier taskforces 600-1,000 100,000 to 5 to 6 aircraft 150,000 aircraft carrier troops taskforces Like-Minded Countries 3 ships 10-20 150 troops (special aircraft forces) 75 troops No No 100-140 aircraft 29,000 troops Not Slovakia* _____ needed * Countries that have forces in the region serving in other missions. Responsible Group Principal: Prepared by: Date: Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-4358 Dr. Nebojsa Bjelakovic, DG Pol Plan/D Strat A, 992-4532 14 Mar 03 5 000053 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur facets a /’information Sous-Ministre de la Defense Nationale 4 In ri32M3 Memorandum 1560-1 (D Strat A) Minister of ional Defence 21 Feb 03 Dist List POTENTIAL WAR IN IRAQ For your information, please find attached an updated briefing note on “Allies’ contributions for a potential intervention in Iraq” prepared by Dr. Nebojsa Bjelakovic, D Strat A, 992-4532. Daniel L. Bon DG Pol Plan 992-0799 Dist List [DM / CDS ADM (Pol) SA/MND (Del Bianco) DCDS DG Pol Plan DG Pol Coord DGIS Pol D Pol Dev DAPC Pol DPK Pol D Pari A 000054 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information ALLIES’ CONTRIBUTIONS FOR A POTENTIAL INTERVENTION IN IRAQ BRIEFING NOTE AIM To provide a summary of selected contributions, firm and conditional, to an Americanled intervention in Iraq. Our data are compiled from open sources and, therefore, may be freely used in public forums. Whenever possible, these data have been checked against classified information to ensure their general accuracy. BACKGROUND United States A military intervention in Iraq is possible in 2003. Most reports indicate that the U.S. would deploy between 200,000 and 250,000 of its own troops, with the entire coalition contingent totalling between 250,000 and 300,000 troops. Although Washington has frequently expressed readiness to fight Saddam on its own, it has approached almost 50 countries for potential troop and other contributions. As of February 21, 2003 an estimated 150,000 American personnel are deployed in the Gulf region including about 65,000 ground troops, most of them in Kuwait. The pace of the U.S. military build-up will see the number of U.S. troops in the area approach 200,000 by the end of February. So far, only the UK has indicated that it would join US-led offensive operations in Iraq. To a lesser or greater extent, all other U.S. allies remain reluctant to commit troops or treasure to a possible intervention. FIRM AND CONDITIONAL COMMITMENTS NATO Allies Belgium: The government has not offered any comments on potential Belgian participation in an intervention in Iraq, but has stated that it aims to concentrate its military assets on the missions in Afghanistan and Africa. Czech Republic: Prague seems to have committed its anti-chemical warfare unit currently based in Kuwait. The Czech government is also considering providing other troops, such as a field hospital or a rapid reaction brigade. Denmark: Denmark is prepared to offer military hardware and troops were the UN to authorize an intervention in Iraq, but the government has not yet decided whether Danish soldiers would be sent into combat. 1 000055 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information I? France: France favours allowing for a longer and more thorough arms inspection process and indicated on January 20, 2003, that it might use its Security Council veto to oppose a military action against Iraq. Germany: Germany allowed the U.S. to use its airspace and bases, but has indicated that it would commit no troops to an intervention against Iraq. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder asserted on January 21, 2003, that Germany would not vote for, nor go to war under any circumstances. However, in order to help contain any Iraqi threat Germany has deployed two Patriot missile units to Israel and one to Turkey, and its servicemen will serve on board of the AWACS. A German anti-chemical warfare unit has been in Kuwait since 1991. Hungary: Budapest has authorized the training of Iraqi exiles at Taszar military base in Hungary. American troops are training between 1,000 and 4,000 Iraqi opposition members primarily as translators and scouts. Italy: Rome is willing to support the coalition indirectly, by allowing the use of air space and military bases. Netherlands: Government sources have indicated that Dutch participation, if any, would likely be limited to ships already in the region. On February 7, 2003, ahead of the NATO decision, the Dutch government decided to deploy, on a bilateral basis, three Patriot missile units for the protection of Turkey. Norway: The Norwegian PM has indicated that there would have to be a clear UN mandate before Norway would even consider joining an intervention in Iraq. Poland: Polish officials have indicated that Warsaw might offer some token military support to an intervention in Iraq, but have not given any specifics. Spain: The Spanish government has repeatedly said it would back a US-led military intervention in Iraq, but has given no details of troop commitments. Turkey: Turkey would provide an excellent staging ground for an attack from the north were an international coalition to intervene in Iraq. The full extent of Turkish participation, including the use of bases and airfields, is still being intensely negotiated with Washington. Turkey has had a few thousand troops in Northern Iraq since the early nineties. Reportedly, Ankara has been deploying troops along the border with Iraq. Some reports indicate that Turkey could contribute between 10,000 and 50,000 troops if the U.S. were to attack from the north. UK: Over 1,300 naval and air force personnel are already in the Gulf, serving in various missions, including the enforcement of no-fly zones over Iraq, and London is also offering its military bases in England and Diego Garcia for U.S. long-range bombers and tanker aircraft. 2 000056 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgud en vertu de la Loi sur I'acc&s a /'information J On January 7,2003, despite reported divisions in the Blair government, London called up 1,500 reserve personnel and dispatched to the Gulf an amphibious naval task force including at least 3,000 marines. This task force consists of the amphibious ship HMS Ocean, destroyers HMS Edinburgh and HMS York, supply ships Argus, Fort Rosalie, Fort Austin, landing and logistic ships Sir Galahad, Sir Tristram, Sir Percivale, and antimine ships HMS Grimsby and HMS Ledbury. The UK also sent 14 combat aircraft to previously scheduled exercise in Jordan. On January 12, 2003, Britain also sent to the region a carrier naval taskforce comprised of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, the destroyer HMS Liverpool, the frigate HMS Marlborough, the supply ship Fort Victoria, the tanker Orange Leaf, and a few submarines. On January 20, 2003, Britain announced a major deployment to the region of an additional 26,000 troops. These troops consist of Headquarters 1 (UK) Armoured Division, 7th Armoured Brigade, 16“ Air Assault Brigade, and 102 Logistics Brigade. This deployment includes 120 Challenger tanks and 150 Warrior armoured personnel carriers, as well as mobile artillery units. These troops will be stationed in Kuwait by the middle of February. On January 30, 2003, London called up another 4,500 reserve personnel. On February 6, 2003, London announced sending additional 7,000 RAF personnel to the Gulf as well as 75 aircraft, including 27 Puma and Chinook helicopters, Jaguar and Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, E3D Sentry airborne command aircraft, Hercules transporters, VC 10 and Tristar refuelling aircraft, Tornado F3's for air defence. Tornado GR4 and Harrier GR7 offensive jets. In all, Britain has decided to deploy 42,000 troops to the Gulf, including 29,000 ground troops. Other Like-Minded Countries Australia: The Australian government has dispatched forces to the Persian Gulf as part of contingency arrangements for a possible war against Iraq including a contribution of Special Forces, three warships, a squadron of up to 14 F/A-18 Hornet fighters, three C130 Hercules transport aircraft, a P3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft, CH-47 helicopters, and an air-to-air refuelling aircraft. On January 22, 2003, the government announced a forward deployment to the region of the amphibious transport ship Kanimbla, lead elements of a Special Forces Task Group, and a Royal Australian Air Force reconnaissance team. On February 7, 2003, Australia sent another 450 troops to the Persian Gulf. In all, Australia could reportedly deploy 2,000 troops there. Canberra prefers to have a new Security Council resolution authorizing an attack on Iraq, though it does not believe that a new resolution is necessary. 3 000057 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information I Slovakia: Assuming there would be a second Security Council resolution, Slovakia has given indications that it would provide a 75-member contingent to complement the Czech anti-chemical warfare unit already deployed in Kuwait. Bulgaria: The parliament decided to make available a 150-member anti-chemical warfare unit and to allow the United States to use Bulgaria’s airspace and one base. Romania: The parliament agreed to make available 278 non-combat troops and to allow the United States to use Romania’s airspace and bases. Middle Eastern Countries Israel: The current U.S. position is that Israel should not be part of the coalition against Iraq. The Israeli government has clearly stated, however, that it would launch aerial counter attacks if attacked. Syria: Most likely would remain neutral and eventually may grant the use of its air space for search and rescue missions. Iran: Most likely would remain neutral and eventually may grant the use of its air space for search and rescue missions. Jordan: Most likely will offer radar and special operations bases, but is unlikely to say so publicly. Saudi Arabia: Most likely will offer airfields, and sites for anti-missile batteries. Kuwait: Kuwait would be one of the primary staging grounds for an attack from the south. Oman: U.S. troops already use air bases for maintenance and refuelling. United Arab Emirates: U.S. troops already use air bases for refuelling. The United Arab Emirates intend to deploy tanks, attack helicopters, warships and about 4,000 troops as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force to help defend Kuwait. Bahrain: U.S. troops already use port facilities. Bahrain is the headquarters for the U.S. 5th Fleet. Bahrain government said that it was sending a frigate and ground troops as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force to help defend Kuwait. Qatar: U.S. troops already use several military bases. Qatar is the forward HQ for U.S. Gulf forces. It was also the locale for exercise “Internal Look,” simulating an attack on Iraq, in December 2002. 4 000058 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information * POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS FOR AN INTERVENTION IN IRAQ Military Air forces bases Ground troops Navy Financial Postcontribution conflict deployment \'ATO Countries Belgium Czech Republic Not needed Not needed Not needed No___ France Yes Germany Yes Hungary Italy______ Yes Netherlands Not needed Not Norway needed Poland Not needed Spain Yes Turkey Most likely Yes UK Denmark U.S. Yes Australia Not needed Slovakia Not needed Responsible Group Principal: Prepared by: Date: No No No No No Likely No Yes 361 troops (chemical warfare unit)______ Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering No No No No No No No No No No No No_______ No_______ No_______ No_______ Considering No_______ No_______ No_______ No_______ Considering Likely Likely No_______ Likely Considering No No No No Likely No No Considering No Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering ’ No Most likely Most likely Most likely No 2 aircraft carrier taskforces 100,000 to 5 to 6 600-1,000 aircraft aircraft 150,000 carrier troops taskforces Like-Minded Countries 150 troops 3 ships 10-20 (special aircraft forces) 75 troops No No 100-140 aircraft 29,000 troops Yes Most likely Yes Yes Yes Likely Yes Likely Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-4358 Dr. Nebojsa Bjelakovic, DG Pol Plan/D Strat A, 992-4532 21 Feb 03 5 000059 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Sous-Ministre de la 1 0 2003 Memorandum Deputy Minister of National Defence 1560-1 (D Strat A) . 07 Feb 03 Di st List POTENTIAL WAR IN IRAQ For your information, please find attached an updated briefing note on “Allies’ contributions for a potential intervention in Iraq” prepared by Dr. Nebojsa Bjelakovic, D Strat A, 992-4532. Daniel L. Bon DG Pol Plan 992-0799 Di st List I I DM CDS ADM (Pol) SA/MND (Del Bianco) DG Pol Plan DG Pol Coord DGIS Pol D Pol Dev DAPC Pol DPK Pol D Pari A 000060 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I’information ALLIES’ CONTRIBUTIONS FOR A POTENTIAL INTERVENTION IN IRAQ BRIEFING NOTE AIM To provide a summary of selected contributions, firm and conditional, to an Americanled intervention in Iraq. Our data are compiled from open sources and, therefore, may be freely used in public forums. Whenever possible, these data have been checked against classified information to ensure their general accuracy. BACKGROUND United States A military intervention in Iraq is possible in 2003. Most reports indicate that the U.S. would deploy between 200,000 and 250,000 of its own troops, with the entire coalition contingent totalling between 250,000 and 300,000 troops. Although Washington has frequently expressed readiness to fight Saddam on its own, it has approached almost 50 countries for potential troop and other contributions. As of February 7, 2003 an estimated 110,000 American personnel are deployed in the Gulf region including about 40,000 ground troops, most of them in Kuwait. The pace of the U.S. military build-up will see the number of U.S. troops in the area approach 180,000 by the middle of February. So far, only the UK has indicated that it would join the US-led intervention in Iraq even without an additional Security Council resolution. Many U.S. allies remain more or less reluctant to commit troops or treasure to a possible intervention in Iraq. This would likely change, however, if Iraq were found to be in “material breach” of the Security Council resolutions. FIRM AND CONDITIONAL COMMITMENTS NATO Allies Belgium: The government has not offered any comments on potential Belgian participation in an intervention in Iraq, but has stated that it aims to concentrate its military assets on the missions in Afghanistan and Africa. Czech Republic: Prague seems to have committed its anti-chemical warfare unit currently based in Kuwait. The Czech government is also considering providing other troops, such as a field hospital or a rapid reaction brigade. 1 000061 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information Denmark: Denmark is prepared to offer military hardware and troops were the UN to authorize an intervention in Iraq, but the government has not yet decided whether Danish soldiers would be sent into combat. France: France favours allowing for a longer and more thorough arms inspection process and indicated on January 20, 2003, that it might use its Security Council veto to oppose a military action against Iraq. Germany: Germany has indicated that it would let the U.S. use its airspace and bases, but would commit no troops to an intervention against Iraq. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder asserted on January 21, 2003, that Germany would not vote for, nor go to war under any circumstances. Hungary: Budapest has authorized the training of Iraqi exiles at Taszar military base in Hungary. American troops are training between 1,000 and 4,000 Iraqi opposition members primarily as translators and scouts. Italy: Rome is willing to support the coalition indirectly, by allowing the use of air space and military bases. Netherlands: Government sources have indicated that Dutch participation, if any, would likely be limited to ships already in the region. Norway: The Norwegian PM has indicated that there would have to be a clear UN mandate before Norway would even consider joining an intervention in Iraq. Poland: Polish officials have indicated that Warsaw might offer some token military support to an intervention in Iraq, but have not given any specifics. Spain: The Spanish government has repeatedly said it would back a US-led military intervention in Iraq, but has given no details of troop commitments. Turkey: Turkey would provide an excellent staging ground for an attack from the north were an international coalition to intervene in Iraq. Ankara has reluctantly agreed to offer some bases and airfields to about 20,000 coalition forces, but the full extent of Turkish participation is still being negotiated with Washington. Turkey has had a few thousand troops in Northern Iraq since the early nineties. Reportedly, Ankara has been deploying troops along the border with Iraq. Some reports indicate that Turkey could contribute between 10,000 and 50,000 troops if the U.S. were to attack from the north. UK: Over 1,300 naval and air force personnel are already in the Gulf, serving in various missions, including the enforcement of no-fly zones over Iraq, and London is also offering its military bases in England and Diego Garcia for U.S. long-range bombers and tanker aircraft. 2 000062 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information On January 7, 2003, despite reported divisions in the Blair government, London called up 1,500 reserve personnel and dispatched to the Gulf an amphibious naval task force including at least 3,000 marines. This task force consists of the amphibious ship HMS Ocean, destroyers HMS Edinburgh and HMS York, supply ships Argus, Fort Rosalie, Fort Austin, landing and logistic ships Sir Galahad, Sir Tristram, Sir Percivale, and antimine ships HMS Grimsby and HMS Ledbury. The UK also sent 14 combat aircraft to previously scheduled exercise in Jordan. On January 12, 2003, Britain also sent to the region a carrier naval taskforce comprised of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, the destroyer HMS Liverpool, the frigate HMS Marlborough, the supply ship Fort Victoria, the tanker Orange Leaf, and a few submarines. On January 20, 2003, Britain announced a major deployment to the region of an additional 26,000 troops. These troops consist of Headquarters 1 (UK) Armoured Division, 7th Armoured Brigade, 16lfi Air Assault Brigade, and 102 Logistics Brigade. This deployment includes 120 Challenger tanks and 150 Warrior armoured personnel carriers, as well as mobile artillery units. These troops will be stationed in Kuwait by the middle of February. On January 30, 2003, London called up another 4,500 reserve personnel. On February 6, 2003, London announced sending additional 7,000 RAF personnel to the Gulf as well as 75 aircraft, including 27 Puma and Chinook helicopters, Jaguar and Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, E3D Sentry airborne command aircraft, Hercules transporters, VC 10 and Tristar refuelling aircraft, Tornado F3's for air defence, Tornado GR4 and Harrier GR7 offensive jets. In all, Britain has decided to deploy 42,000 troops to the Gulf, including 29,000 ground troops. Other Like-Minded Countries Australia: The Australian government has dispatched forces to the Persian Gulf as part of contingency arrangements for a possible war against Iraq including a contribution of Special Forces, three warships, a squadron of up to 14 F/A-18 Hornet fighters, a P3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft, and an air-to-air refuelling aircraft. On January 22, 2003, the government announced a forward deployment to the region of the amphibious transport ship Kanimbla, lead elements of a Special Forces Task Group, and a Royal Australian Air Force reconnaissance team. On February 7, 2003, Australia sent another 450 troops to the Persian Gulf. In all, Australia could reportedly deploy 2,000 troops there. Canberra prefers to have a new Security Council resolution authorizing an attack on Iraq, though it does not believe that a new resolution is necessary. 3 000063 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Slovakia: Assuming there would be a second Security Council resolution, Slovakia has given indications that it would provide a 75-member contingent to complement the Czech anti-chemical warfare unit already deployed in Kuwait. Middle Eastern Countries Israel: The current U.S. position is that Israel should not be part of the coalition against Iraq. The Israeli government has clearly stated, however, that it would launch aerial counter attacks if attacked. Syria: Most likely would remain neutral and eventually may grant the use of its air space for search and rescue missions. Iran: Most likely would remain neutral and eventually may grant the use of its air space for search and rescue missions. Jordan: Most likely will offer radar and special operations bases, but is unlikely to say so publicly. Saudi Arabia: Most likely will offer airfields, and sites for anti-missile batteries. Kuwait: Kuwait would be one of the primary staging grounds for an attack from the south. Oman: U.S. troops already use air bases for maintenance and refuelling. United Arab Emirates: U.S. troops already use air bases for refuelling. Bahrain: U.S. troops already use port facilities. Bahrain is the headquarters for the U.S. 5th Fleet. Qatar: U.S. troops already use several military bases. Qatar is the forward HQ for U.S. Gulf forces. It was also the locale for exercise “Internal Look,” simulating an attack on Iraq, in December 2002. 4 000064 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Lol sur I'acces a I'information POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS Military Air forces bases Ground troops Navy Financial Postcontribution conflict deployment ''lATO Countries Belgium Czech Republic Not needed Not needed Not needed No___ France Germany Yes Hungary Yes Italy______ Yes Netherlands Not needed Not Norway needed Poland Not needed Not Spain needed Most Turkey likely UK Yes Denmark U.S. Yes Australia Not needed Slovakia Not needed Responsible Group Principal: Prepared by: Date: No No No No No Likely 250 troops No Yes (chemical warfare unit)______ Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering No No No No No No No No No No No No_______ No_______ No_______ No_______ Considering No_______ No_______ No_______ No_______ Considering Likely Likely No_______ Likely Considering No No No No Likely No No Considering No Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering Most likely Most likely No 2 aircraft carrier taskforces 5 to 6 600-1,000 100,000 to aircraft aircraft 150,000 carrier troops taskforces Like-Minded Countries 150 troops 3 ships 10-20 aircraft (special forces) 75 troops No No 100-140 aircraft 29,000 troops No Most likely Yes Most likely Yes Yes Yes Likely Yes Likely Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-4358 Dr. Nebojsa Bjelakovic, DG Pol Plan/D Strat A, 992-4532 07 Feb 03 5 000065 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -j/ment divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 000 National Defence Defense nationale i^^Vate Deputy Minister Sous-ministre d6!6gu6e CanadS 000066 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act " ‘ * “jen vertuh^oi$r l^aa^^l'information Government of Canada Privy Council Office Sous-Ministre de la Defense Nationale/ Gouvernement du Canada Bureau du Conseil prive Ottawa, Canada K1A0A3 Deputy Minister of National Defence SECRET (with enclosure) Mr. Ken Dobell Deputy Minister to the Premier and Cabinet Secretary Government of British Columbia Parliament Buildings 272A West Annex Victoria, British Columbia V8V 1X4 Dear Mr. Dobell: I am pleased to provide you with a copy of the national threat assessment prepared by the Government of Canada on possible implications for Canada in the event of a war in Iraq. In distributing the assessment, the Government of Canada is committed to strengthening our partnership in the fight against terrorism by sharing relevant and timely data on threats to our national security. The assessment represents an analysis of the risks as presently known. It is designed to provide relevant information that can assist in briefing your Premier and selected Ministers and in setting the context for strategic preparations in your role as first responders to a terrorist incident. You will note that there are no specific threats to the security of Canada or Canadians identified at this time. The assessment has been classified as “secret”. Due to the sensitivity of the information, it is important that appropriate procedures be undertaken to protect its unauthorized distribution. The document must be kept in a locked cabinet and communicated on a “need to know” basis. Any unauthorized disclosure of the information could result in serious injury to the national interest. The document is being distributed because the prospect of war with Iraq warrants such action. It is critical that we continue to pursue security clearances for identified provincial and territorial employees. Your cooperation is acknowledged and appreciated, and will help ensure we have a future network of individuals with appropriate clearances to receive such information. Canada SBB 000067 �UM!1!1 M MJWMDWI ill1! Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis d /'information 4 . ’ *■ > * -2- SECRET (with enclosure) Our success to-date in fighting terrorism is the result of the close working relationships enjoyed between the law enforcement, intelligence and emergency preparedness communities at both levels of government. We will continue to monitor the threat situation in Canada. Future threat assessments may be sent to you if the situation warrants. Should an event require intervention, federal-provincial-territorial coordination will take place through well established protocols and practices. The intent of this threat assessment process is not to replace such processes or your role as first responders to an incident, but rather to contribute to more informed decision making at the highest levels of governments. It is important, as well, to emphasize that a coordinated approach to communications, both federally and provincially/territorially, is essential to avoid alarming Canadians needlessly and to emphasize that our enforcement, security and intelligence communities are working together to protect Canadians. If you have any questions or concerns about this document, please do not hesitate to contact Anthony Ritchie, Senior Policy Advisor, National Security, Security and Intelligence Secretariat of the Privy Council Office at (613) 957-5657. Yours sincerely, Ronald Bilodeau Associate Secretary to the Cabinet, Deputy Minister to the Deputy Prime Minister and Security and Intelligence Coordinator Enclosure 000068 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information SECRET February 6, 2003 This document is classified SECRET and is the property of the Government of Canada. It is provided to you in confidence, along with the covering letter, for official use with your Premier/Govemment Leader and selected Ministers. It must not be reclassified or disseminated, in any way, in whole or in part, without the consent of the originator. Contact: Security and Intelligence Secretariat, Privy Council Office, (613) 957-5657 i Implications for Canada in the Event of a War with Iraq SUMMARY: 1) An attack on Iraq would result in terrorist-related threats to Western interests throughout the world, including in Canada. Possible targets would likely be, in order of priority, U.S. interests, Israeli interests and then any Western country which actively supports the U.S. invasion. The threat could emanate from surrogate groups used by the Iraqi regime, including the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), or other groups which may use the conflict as an excuse to launch a terrorist attack. There is no specific information indicating that other terrorist groups will use an invasion of Iraq as a rationale for terrorism against the West. This could change should Israel be drawn into any hostilities with Iraq. 2) The response from AL QAIDA to an attack against Iraq is less certain, although AL QAIDA's ability to launch terrorist attacks on a global scale is unquestioned. The specific mention of Canada in a recording made by OSAMA BIN LADEN that aired on the Al Jazeera network on November 12, 2002, threatening future violence increases the possibility of potential threats to Canadian interests internationally. 3) There is currently no specific intelligence pointing to terrorist attacks against Western tarsets-hvJraq or to indicate that the Government of Iraq would target Canadians or Canadian interests in Canada or abroad. It is judged unlikely that SADDAM HUSSEIN would^attempt pre-emptive attacks against the U.S. or otheralignea countries prior to exhausting diplomatic and public relations options. Plots with the potential to disrupt coalition war planning efforts would likely receive first consideration for pre-emptive activity. 4) As there is only one Iraqi diplomadn-Canada. this will limit the Iraqi government’s capability to conduct intelligence activity in Canada, including its ability to monitor d i ssi dentsi ' ' : ‘ 000069 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information -2- SECRET 5) Iraq has aggressively and covertly pursued the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the past. SADDAM HUSSEIN may use them if the collapse of his regime is imminent. Attacks with chemical or biological weapons are plausible, although such operations would require significant logistical support. 6) In Canada, there will likely be a renewal of protest activity at the U.S. and coalition embassies, the Iraqi Embassy, Parliament Hill and provincial legislatures. Protest activity will be determined by events as they unfold. Recent anti-war demonstrations across Canada have taken place without reported incident. Protests will likely continue in the short term. These demonstrations could be highly emotional and acts of spontaneous or premeditated violence may take place. The RCMP is in active contact with provincial and municipal police forces as part of regular operations to anticipate and provide law enforcement at demonstrations, where necessary. 7) A military intervention in Iraq might trigger multiple hoaxes (eg. anthrax). There could also be media reporting rumours and claims from unnamed sources speculating about threats can also be anticipated. A coordinated approach to communications, both federally and provincially, is essential to avoid alarming Canadians needlessly and to remind them that our enforcement, security, and intelligence communities are working together to protect Canadians. Premature responses can also disrupt intelligence gathering activities. 8) Actions taken over the last 15 months by the federal and provincial governments have enhanced information sharing, investigative and intelligence gathering tools as well as response capacity to a number of contingencies, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents. These areas are all covered by federal-provincial contingency plans, agreements, protocols and/or agency arrangements. Any information about specific threats should be directed immediately to local police or RCMP. BACKGROUND: 9) The prospect of a U.S.-led military strike against Iraq raises a concern about the possibility of terrorist reprisals against U.S. and other participating nations' interests. SADDAM HUSSEIN’s regime has demonstrated its willingness and capability to mount operations against its opponents. In addition, there is the possibility that the regime may support terrorist groups that are active against Iraq's enemies. On the eve of the 1991 Gulf War, the SADDAM HUSSEIN government used select groups and teams to mount terrorist attacks against coalition forces and the interests of those forces' countries. 000070 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -3- SECRET IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS): 10) The primary responsibility of the IIS is to protect SADDAM HUSSEIN’S regime. The ability of the IIS to mount operations against perceived or real enemies of the Iraqi regime is a major concern. However, the willingness of IIS officers and their agents to carry out attacks against the U.S. or coalition countries is uncertain. 11) The primary focus of IIS activity in Canada is locating and monitoring oppositionists, dissidents, expatriate scientists, defectors or resettled diplomats and military officers. 12) There are three diplomatic positions at the Iraqi Embassy in Ottawa. However, only one is currently occupied. AFFILIATED TERRORIST GROUPS: 13) Iraq is known to directly support numerous terrorist groups, including the Iranian dissident organization, the MUJAHEDIN - E - KHALQ (MEK), and several Palestinian groups engaged in terrorist activity against Israel. 14) The MEK is based in northern Iraq from which it launches military and terrorist attacks into neighbouring Iran. The MEK has held public demonstrations in Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. 15) Iraq's support of numerous Palestinian groups stems from one common denominator: the mutual hatred of Israel. The SADDAM HUSSEIN regime has been active in providing select Palestinian groups with financial backing (including payment to the families of suicide bombers). In the event of a war with the U.S., it is likely that a request could be made by the Iraqi regime for further assistance. The reaction to such a request will likely be mixed, with individuals, not necessarily groups, responding to the call. AL QAIDA: 16) Historically, Iraq and AL QAIDA have viewed each other with disdain. In the past several months, however, AL QAIDA has relocated an indeterminate portion of its operations to the Kurdish-held region in Northern Iraq with the knowledge of the Iraqi regime. The regime, using the IIS as a conduit, has courted AL QAIDA commanders / members in northern Iraq. In the event of military hostilities with the U.S., AL QAIDA would likely strike at the U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq or conduct terrorist operations against the West. 000071 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information -4- SECRET 17) There are individuals in Canada who are believed to support OSAMA BIN LADEN, AL QAIDA and other international Islamic extremist causes. Although many Islamic extremist supporters have been deported, arrested on immigration charges or extradited to foreign countries, others who remain are believed to be committed to the extremist cause. 18) On November 12, 2002, the Al Jazeera network aired an audio tape attributed to BIN LADEN in which he praised recent attacks, including those in Bali, Yemen, Kuwait and Moscow. In an address to countries participating in the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism, including Canada, he went on to say that 'just like you kill us, we will kill you' and threatened further violence should the U.S. declare war on Iraq. The specific mention of Canada in this recording increases the possibility of potential threats to Canadian interests internationally. 19) Although the Government of Canada has no specific information regarding any particular threats, Canadian interests have become a focus of direct AL QAIDA threats worldwide. In the past, after the release of video or audio tapes, attacks have occurred. After the release of the last OSAMA BIN LADEN videotape a series of small attacks took place culminating in the bombing in Mombassa, Kenya. AL QAIDA's history has shown that it typically strikes when ready and when there is a good chance of being successful. REACTION WITHIN CANADA: MUSLIM COMMUNITY: 20) Not unlike the 1991 Gulf War and the current "war on terrorism," there would be a perception within some quarters of the Canadian Muslim population that an attack on Iraq is in fact an attack on Islam. This could be particularly evident within Canadian Arab circles. 21) The continuing presence of a significant number of Maghreb Islamic extremists in Canada is of particular concern. Montreal remains the primary centre for these individuals, many of whom are Canadian citizens or permanent residents. In Europe, there is evidence that Islamic extremists are using the structured presence of Maghreb networks in Europe to stage terrorist attacks. In Canada, similar patterns are emerging. KURDISH COMMUNITY: 22) We are currently unaware of any serious expressions of concern within the Canadian Kurdish community in anticipation of a war in Iraq. If Kurdish groups are dislodged from their sanctuary in Iraq, they would not hesitate to blame the West and the U.S. in particular. As a result, demonstrations could be expected in Canada, and such protests would have the potential to become violent. 000072 �, Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information » -5- SECRET DEMONSTRATIONS: 23) In the event of military hostilities with Iraq, demonstrations are likely to target coalition diplomatic establishments both in Canada and abroad, as well as businesses and other high-profile entities throughout the world. They could also be aimed at other countries' facilities or personnel, particularly those involved in the military campaign or who are strongly supportive of U.S. actions. Should the military campaign inflict large numbers of Iraqi civilian casualties, demonstrations are likely to intensify. 24) Should the U.S. launch an attack against Iraq, there will likely be local protests in major Canadian cities by a wide variety of groups, among them, anti-war and anti-globalization groups. Demonstrations around the U.S. Embassy or Consulates General can be expected. 25) It is possible that demonstrations by anti-war groups, in conjunction with elements of anti-globalization groups, will result in violence. Anti-globalization activism continues to be directed primarily against multinational corporate power, international monetary institutions and global economic agreements. Since September 11, 2001, there have been indications that elements of the North American anti-globalization movement have begun to add an anti-war and anti-violence message in reaction to the American military response in Afghanistan. During the last year, anti-globalization supporters protested in cities such as Vancouver, Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal and Halifax. These demonstrations occurred without violence. In the past, certain anti-globalization groups have indicated they would target various government buildings and establishments, although this did not occur to any great extent. CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS ABROAD: 26) The Government of Canada regularly updates travel reports for countries assessed to pose security, terrorism or other threats to Canadians. On November 15, 2002, Canadians were advised to leave Iraq immediately. A global security advisory was also issued warning Canadians that demonstrations, strikes and civil unrest can occur worldwide, and urging Canadians to exercise extreme caution. 27) In the event of a war with Iraq, there will be a significant risk to coalition forces in the Middle East and worldwide. This risk could take the form of traditional terrorist attacks (assassinations, suicide bombings) or chemical or biological attacks. 28) Iraq has aggressively and covertly pursued nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs in the past. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq used artillery, tactical fighter aircraft and helicopters to deliver chemical agents, loaded in bombs and rockets. 000073 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'accds d /'information SECRET February 6, 2003 ___I Le present document est cote SECRET et est la propriete du gouvemement du Canada. 11 vous est envoye avec une lettre d’accompagnement et seuls le premier ministre/chef de votre gouvemement et certains ministres selectionnes ont aussi le droit d’en prendre connaissance. Le document ne doit etre ni recote ni diffuse de quelque faqon que ce soit, en tout ou en partie, sans le consentement de 1’auteur. Contact: Secretariat de la securite et du renseignement, Bureau du Conseil prive (613) 957-5657 Repercussions sur le Canada d’une guerre eventuelle contre 1’Irak , EVALUATION : 1) Une attaque contre 1’Irak pourrait faire peser des menaces terroristes sur les interets occidentaux partout dans le monde, y compris au Canada. Au nombre des cibles possibles figureraient vraisemblablement, par ordre de priorite, les interets americains et israeliens, puis ceux de tout pays occidental qui soutient activement les projets d’invasion des Americains. La menace pourrait provenir de groupes a la solde du regime irakien, par exemple le service de renseignement irakien (SRI), ou d’autres groupes qui pourraient se servir du conflit comme pretexte pour perpetrer un attentat terroriste. Il n’y a pas d’information qui laisse croire que d’autres groupes terroristes invoqueraient 1’invasion de 1’Irak pour justifier une campagne terroriste contre 1’Occident. Par contre, la situation pourrait changer si Israel participait au conflit. 2) On ignore comment Al-Qaida reagirait a une attaque contre 1’Irak, mais nul doute que cette organisation est en mesure de perpetrer des attentats terroristes partout dans le monde. Les interets canadiens a travers le monde sont d’autant plus menaces qu’Oussama Ben Laden mentionne precisement le Canada dans son message diffuse le 12 novembre 2002 par la chaine Al-Jazira, et laisse entrevoir que d’autres actes de violence pourraient etre commis. 3) Il n’existe a 1’heure actuelle aucun renseignement precis qui autoriserait a croire que 1’Irak commettra des attentats terroristes contre des cibles occidentales ou visera les Canadiens ou les interets canadiens au Canada ou a 1’etranger. On estime peu probable que Saddam Hussein commette des attentats terroristes preventifs contre les E.-U. ou d’autres pays alignes avant d’avoir epuise tous les recours sur les plans de la diplomatie et des relations publiques. A cet egard, il envisagerait vraisemblablement en premier lieu de perturber les preparatifs de guerre de la coalition. 000074 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information -2- I SECRET 4) Comme il n’y a qu’un seul diplomate irakien au Canada, cela limitera la capacite du gouvemement irakien a mener des activites de renseignement au Canada, ainsi qu’a surveiller les dissidents. 5) Dans le passe, 1 ’Irak a poursuivi activement et secretement le developpement d’armes de destruction massive (ADM). Saddam Hussein pourrait les utiliser si 1’effondrement de son regime est imminent. Des attaques et des attentats irakiens a 1’arme chimique ou biologique sont plausibies, mais ils exigeraient un important soutien logistique. 6) Au Canada, les manifestations reprendront vraisemblablement devant 1’ambassade des Etats-Unis et les ambassades des pays membres de la coalition et celle de 1’Irak ainsi que sur la colline du Parlement et devant les assemblies legislatives provinciales. Ces activites seront organisees suivant le deroulement des evenements. Au Canada, les manifestations recentes centre la guerre se sont deroulees sans qu’aucun incident ne soit signale. Les manifestations se poursuivront vraisemblablement a court terme. Toutefois, etant donne que les passions y sont souvent exacerbees, la possibility d’actes de violence spontanes ou premedites ne peut etre exclue. La GRC travaille etroitement avec les corps policiers provinciaux et municipaux dans le cadre d’operations regulieres, afin de prevoir et d’assurer, s’il y a lieu, la presence de forces de 1’ordre lors de manifestations. 7) Une intervention militaire en Irak pourrait declencher toutes sortes de canulars (p. ex. charbon). On pourrait aussi lire et entendre dans les medias des rumeurs et des affirmations de sources inconnues speculant sur diverses menaces. La coordination des communications, a 1’echelle federate et provincial, est essentielle pour eviter d’alarmer inutilement les Canadiens et leur rappeler que nos collectivites de la police, de la securite et du renseignement travaillent de concert pour les proteger. Des reactions prematurees pourraient en outre perturber les activites de collecte de renseignements. 8) Les mesures prises ces 15 demiers mois par les gouvemements federal et provinciaux ont permis d’ameliorer les outils d’echange d’informations, d’enquete et de collecte de renseignements ainsi que la capacite a parer a differentes eventualites, notamment des incidents chimiques, biologiques, radiologiques et nucleates (CBR.N). Ces secteurs sont tous vises par des plans d’urgence, ententes, protocoles federaux-provinciaux et/ou des arrangements entre organismes. Toute information sur des menaces precises doit etre communiquee immediatement a la police locale ou a la GRC. 000075 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -3- SECRET CONTEXTS: 9) L’eventualite d’une attaque militaire contre l’lrak par une coalition dirigee par les Etats-Unis souleve la possibility de represailles terroristes contre les E.-U. et d’autres Etats participants. Le regime de Saddam Hussein a montre qu’il est pret a mener des operations contre ses adversaires et qu’il en est capable. En outre, il est possible que le regime appuie les groupes terroristes qui operent contre les ennemis de l’lrak. A la veille de la guerre du Golfe en 1991, le regime de Saddam Hussein avait choisi des groupes et des commandos bien precis pour perpetrer des attentats terroristes contre les forces de la coalition et les interets des pays membres. SERVICE DE RENSEIGNEMENTS IRAKIEN (SRI): 10) Le role premier du SRI est de proteger le regime de Saddam Hussein. Sa capacity de mener des operations contre des ennemis reels ou potentiels du regime irakien constitue une preoccupation majeure. Toutefois, la volonte des officiers du SRI et de leurs agents de perpetrer des attentats contre les E.-U. ou les membres de la coalition est inconnue. U) Au Canada, le SRI cherche avant tout a reperer et a surveiller les opposants, les dissidents, les scientifiques expatries, les transfuges ainsi que les diplomates et les militaires reinstalles. 12) L’lrak compte trois postes de diplomate a son ambassade a Ottawa, mais seulement un est occupe actuellement. GROUPES TERRORISTES AFFILIES: 13) Il est connu que l’lrak apporte un soutien direct a de nombreux groupes terroristes, dont les MOUDJAHIDIN DU PEUPLE (MEK), 1’organisation dissidente iranienne, et plusieurs groupes palestiniens qui menent des activites terroristes contre Israel. 14) Les MEK sont bases dans le nord de l’lrak, d’ou ils lancent des attaques militaires et terroristes contre I Tran voisin. Ils ont organise des manifestations a Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal et Vancouver. 15) Un denominates commun amene l’lrak a appuyer de nombreux groupes palestiniens : la haine d’lsrael. Le regime irakien apporte un appui financier a certains groupes palestiniens (dont le versement d’une somme d’argent aux families des kamikazes). En cas de guerre avec les E.-U., le regime irakien demanderait probablement davantage d’aide. Or ce sont vraisemblablement des particuliers qui repondraient a cette demande, pas forcement des groupes. 000076 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue.en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information -4- SECRET AL-QAIDA: 16) L’lrak n’a toujours eu que du dedain pour Al-Qaida et inversement. Depuis quelques mois toutefois, Al-Qaida mene un nombre indetermine d’operations depuis la region du nord de l’lrak sous controle kurde, au vu et au su du regime irakien. Ce demier, par 1’intermediaire du SRI, courtise les commandants et les membres d’Al-Qaida dans le nord du pays. En cas de conflit avec les E.-U., Al-Qaida attaquerait probablement les Americains et les forces de la coalition en Irak ou menerait des operations terroristes contre 1’Occident. 17) On croit que certaines personnes au Canada soutiennent Oussama Ben Laden, Al-Qaida et d’autres causes de 1’islamisme mondial. Bien que de nombreux partisans de 1’extremisme islamique aient ete expulses, arretes pour des inculpations liees a 1’immigration ou extrades vers d’autres pays, ceux qui restent sont censes etre engages dans la cause extremiste. 18) Le 12 novembre 2002, la chaine Al-Jazira a diffuse un enregistrement dans laquelle la voix, qui serait celle de Oussama Ben Laden, fait 1'eloge des recents attentats, dont ceux perpetres a Bali, au Yemen, au Koweit et a Moscou. S'adressant aux pays membres de la coalition contre le terrorisme dirigee par les E.-U., dont le Canada, la voix declare : « Nous vous tuerons, comme vous nous tuez ». Elie affirme que d'autres actes de violence seront commis si les E.-U. declarent la guerre a 1'Irak. La mention precise du Canada fait davantage craindre la menace de represailles contre les interets canadiens dans le monde. 19) Meme si le gouvemement du Canada ne possede aucune information precise sur quelque menace que ce soit, les menaces d'Al-Qaida sont maintenant dirigees contre les interets canadiens partout dans le monde. Par le passe, des attentats ont ete commis suite a la diffusion d'enregistrements audio ou video. Apres la diffusion de la demiere bande video de Oussama Ben Laden, une serie de petits attentats ont ete commis, atteignant un sommet avec celui perpetre a Mombassa au Kenya. Al-Qaida a generalement 1'habitude de frapper lorsqu'il est pret et lorsque ses chances de reussite sont bonnes. REACTION AU CANADA: COMMUNAUTE MUSULMANE: 20) Comme cela a ete le cas lots de la guerre du Golfe en 1991 et comme aujourd’hui dans la « guerre contre le terrorisme », certains secteurs de la communaute musulmane du Canada pourraient croire qu’une attaque contre l’lrak equivaut a une attaque contre 1’islam. Cela pourrait etre particulierement evident dans les cercles arabes du Canada. 000077 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accts a /'information -5- SECRET 21) La presence au Canada d’un nombre important d’extremistes islamistes maghrebins inquiete tout particulierement. Montreal demeure leur principal point de convergence, et bon nombre d’entre eux sont citoyens canadiens ou residents permanents. En Europe, il est evident que les extremistes islamistes utilisent les reseaux maghrebins structures pour commettre des attentats terroristes. L’amorce d’un phenomene semblable a ete constatee au Canada. COMMUNAUTE KURDE: 22) Nous n’avons jusqu’ici constate dans la communaute kurde du Canada aucune expression d’inquietude serieuse au sujet d’une eventuelle guerre en Irak. Si les groupes kurdes etaient chasses de leur sanctuaire en Irak, ils n’hesiteraient pas a blamer 1’Occident et les E.-U. en particulier. Le Canada pourrait done s’attendre a des manifestations sur son territoire, et celles-ci pourraient devenir violentes. MANIFESTATIONS: 23) En cas de conflit militaire avec 1’Irak, des manifestations seraient vraisemblablement organisees contre les etablissements diplomatiques des membres de la coalition au Canada et a 1’etranger, de meme que contre des entreprises et d’autres organisations importantes dans le monde entier. Des manifestations pourraient egalement etre organisees contre les installations ou le personnel d’autres pays, surtout ceux qui prennent part a la campagne militaire ou appuient sans reserve les E.-U. Les manifestations s’intensifieront vraisemblablement si la campagne militaire fait un grand nombre de morts et de blesses parmi la population civile en Irak. 24) Si les Americains lancent une attaque contre 1’Irak, des groupes de toutes sortes, dont ceux qui sont opposes a la guerre et a la mondialisation, manifesteront vraisemblablement dans les grandes villes du Canada. Il faut s’attendre a des manifestations devant 1’ambassade ou les consulats des E.-U. 25) Il est possible que des manifestations des groupes opposes a la guerre, en collaboration avec certains elements des groupes antimondialisation, degenerent en violence. Les militants antimondialisation continuent de s’en prendre surtout aux multinationales, aux institutions monetaires intemationales et aux accords economiques mondiaux. Depuis le 11 septembre 2001, il y a lieu de croire que des elements du mouvement antimondialisation nord-americain ont commence a ajouter a leurs propos des messages centre la guerre et la violence en reaction a 1’intervention de 1’armee americaine en Afghanistan. L’an demier, des partisans de 1’antimondialisation ont manifesto a Vancouver, Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Calgary et Halifax, sans qu’aucun acte de violence ne soit signale. Dans le passe, certains groupes antimondialisation ont exprime leur intention de prendre pour cibles divers immeubles et institutions du gouvemement, mais cela ne s’est pas concretise sur une grande echelle. 000078 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information -------------- -■ V ' -6- SECRET CAPACITES ET INTENTIONS A L’ETRANGER: 26) Le gouvemement du Canada actualise regulierement les renseignements consulaires aux voyageurs afin de les sensibiliser a tout ce qui pourrait menacer leur securite. Ainsi, le 15 novembre 2002, les Canadiens ont ete informes de quitter l’lrak immediatement. Un avis de securite mondiale a egalement ete publie afin d’avertir les Canadiens que des manifestions, des greves et des troubles civils pourraient survenir a 1’echelle du globe, et de les inviter a etre extremement prudents. 27) Si la guerre est declaree a l’lrak, les forces de la coalition au Moyen-Orient et ailleurs courront un grave danger. Par exemple, elles pourraient faire 1’objet d’attaques terroristes traditionnelles (assassinats, attentats suicide a la bombe) ou d’attaques a I’arme chimique ou biologique. 28) L’lrak a poursuivi activement et secretement par le passe des programmes de developpement d’armes nucleates, chimiques et biologiques. Durant la guerre avec 1’Iran, l’lrak a utilise 1’artillerie ainsi que des chasseurs et des helicopteres tactiques pour lancer des roquettes et des bombes contenant des agents chimiques. 29) On estime que si l’lrak a des armes nucleates, sa capacite de lancer une attaque nucleaire est faible. L’lrak a par ailleurs demontre sa capacite de mener une attaque a I’arme chimique et biologique. Il existe peu d’informations indiquant que l’lrak a mis au point des applications et des methodes destinees a 1’utilisation d’armes chimiques et biologiques a des fins terroristes. Il existe en revanche des renseignements qui autorisent a croire que Saddam Hussein compte utiliser des agents chimiques et biologiques contre ses voisins, dont Israel, le Koweit, I’Arabie saoudite, la Jordanie et la Turquie, mais seulement en cas de defaite imminente. Il pourrait utiliser a cette fin des lance-missiles mobiles. Le charbon demeure 1’agent de menace de guerre biologique le plus plausible. Bien qu’il n’y ait pas confirmation que l’lrak possede des stocks de variole (s’ils existent), la variole constitue une autre menace importante. 30) Sans 1’exclure completement, le risque d’exposition a la variole en meme temps qu’un conflit possible en Irak est tres faible. Sante Canada negocie 1’achat de vaccins antivarioliques pour immuniser les Canadiens contre une eventuelle attaque bioterroriste et mieux preparer le Canada a faire face a une telle urgence. 31) L’une des strategies qu’emploiera peut-etre l’lrak dans sa guerre contre une coalition dirigee par les E.-U. consistera, comme cela a ete le cas lors de la guerre du Golfe, a attaquer Israel au moyen de missiles Scud. Israel a dit qu’il ripostera si l’lrak 1’attaque, ce qui accroitrait les tensions et pourrait influencer les pays arabes a former une coalition. Il existe aussi une possibility que des groupes terroristes opposes aux Israeliens, dont des extremistes palestiniens et le Hezbollah, profitent de la situation pour lancer contre Israel des attaques terroristes ou militaires a partir du Liban. 000079 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Lol sur I'accds d /'information 1 -7- SECRET 32) Le regime irakien envisage aussi de mener des operations informatiques en cas de guerre. 11 y a lieu de croire que des pirates pourraient mener des actions independantes ou communes dans le cadre d’une attaque coordonnee contre les E.-U. et la coalition occidentale. Divers groupes terroristes, dont Al-Qaida et le Hezbollah, maitrisent de mieux en mieux Internet et les autres technologies informatiques. 33) Un « appel » adresse aux opposants a la guerre et aux E.-U. circule actuellement sur Internet, les invitant a s’unir et a lancer une cyber-attaque centre les E.-U. et leurs allies. Selon certaines informations, ces opposants, particuliers et groupes, preparent des cyber-represailles a une agression contre 1’Irak. 000080 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00019 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003-01-12-31 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-100289 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f0496a5e483995faa7daa93c0c053395.pdf a741aaf55a2774c7f1536471a90a41cf PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Acc^ss.to.lnfofmgtion Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lcf^ur !jacf& OjiJnf3^!S)ion\zl SECRET National Defence Defense nationale National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 SECRET (CC) JUN 0 9 2003 The Minister DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN FORCES’ EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION 1. On 18 March 2003, the Prime Minister approved continued Canadian Forces participation in Operation Enduring Freedom in light of the imminent US-led military operation against Iraq. Within the context of this direction, restrictions were imposed that Canadian Forces transport aircraft operating in the Persian Gulf region were not to be used to support, directly or indirectly, military action against Iraq. In addition, all Canadian operations were to be undertaken within the existing Operation Apollo area of responsibility, excluding Iraq and that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North). 2. On 22 May 2003, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1483. Resolution 1483 lifted all prohibitions related to trade with Iraq under previous Security Council Resolutions with the exception of prohibitions concerning arms and related material. Further, Resolution 1483 calls upon all member states in a position to do so to respond immediately to the humanitarian appeals of the United Nations and other international organizations. Consequently, Resolution 1483 provides a framework within which Canada and other non-occupying power states may work with the US and British occupying powers referred to as “the Authority” Subsequently, the Prime Minister directed that Canadian Forces transport aircraft 3. were to be offered to the Authority to provide airlift in support of stabilization and reconstruction missions. The first mission to Iraq was flown on 2 June. These aircraft, deployed in the United Arab Emirates, are tasked in support of the upcoming deployment to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul. These aircraft will also be used to provide the agreed support to the UN mandated mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This UN mission will nominally employ two of the four aircraft in theatre. Therefore, support to the Iraq mission will be subject to operational priorities and aircraft serviceability. In order to facilitate operational and logistical arrangements, Canadian Forces 4. participation in stabilization and reconstruction activities will continue to be conducted under the operational control of “the Authority” as defined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483. At all times, Canadian Forces members remain under the 1/2 Canada SECRET SECRET (CC) 000007 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET command of the Chief of the Defence Staff. Additionally, the previous geographic restriction on Canadian Forces operations meant that Canadian Forces aircraft had been unable to accept transport taskings to and from Kuwait under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom. 5. To enable the Canadian Forces to execute the Prime Minister’s direction, the restrictions in respect of airlift by Canadian Forces transport aircraft in support of Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction missions and the geographic restrictions on Canadian Forces operations in Iraq and in that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North) have been removed. The removal of the restriction permits Canadian Forces aircraft to conduct missions through Kuwait for the delivery of loads exclusively in support of the campaign against terrorism and in accordance with Canadian national objectives. 6. Finally, the removal of the geographic restriction has also permitted the Canadian naval task group to conduct Operation Apollo missions in the Northern Persian Gulf in accordance with Canadian national objectives or other missions as may be directed by the Government of Canada. 7. If you agree, we recommend that you sign the enclosed letter to the Prime Minister. Foreign Affairs and the Privy Council Office have been consulted and concur with this approach. a/ R.R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff Margaret Bloodworth Deputy Minister Enclosures: 1 APPROVE Date: The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. 2/2 000008 SECRET �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information 1 SECRET (CO The Right Honourable Jean Chretien, P.C., Q.C., M.P., LL.L, LL.D., Prime Minister of Canada Langevin Block 80 Wellington Street Ottawa ON K1A0A2 Dear Prime Minister: This letter seeks to confirm your verbal direction of 22 May removing certain restrictions in respect of Canadian Forces operations in the Persian Gulf region. Within the context of existing direction, which you approved on 18 March 2003, Canadian Forces transport aircraft in the Persian Gulf region were not to be used to support, directly or indirectly, military action against Iraq. In addition, all Canadian operations were to be undertaken within the existing Operation Apollo area of responsibility, excluding Iraq and that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North). On 22 May 2003, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1483. Resolution 1483 lifted all prohibitions related to trade with Iraq under previous Security Council Resolutions with the exception of prohibitions concerning arms and related material. Further, Resolution 1483 calls upon all member states in a position to do so to respond immediately to the humanitarian appeals of the United Nations and other international organizations. Consequently, Resolution 1483 provides a framework within which Canada and other non-occupying power states may work with the US and British occupying powers referred to as “the Authority.” Further to your verbal direction of 22 May 2003, Canadian Forces transport aircraft were tasked to provide airlift in support of stabilization and reconstruction missions to Iraq. The first mission to Iraq was flown on 2 June. These aircraft, deployed in the United Arab Emirates, are tasked in support of the upcoming deployment to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul. These aircraft will also be used to provide the agreed support to the UN mandated mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This UN mission will nominally employ two of the four aircraft in theatre. Therefore, support to the Iraq mission will be subject to operational priorities and aircraft serviceability. In order to facilitate operational and logistical arrangements, Canadian Forces • participation in stabilization and reconstruction activities will continue to be conducted under the operational control of “the Authority” as defined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483. At all times, Canadian Forces members remain under the command of the Chief of the Defence Staff. Additionally, the previous geographic restriction on Canadian Forces operations meant that Canadian Forces aircraft had been 000009 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lbi sur I'acces a /'information unable to accept transport taskings to and from Kuwait under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom. To enable the Canadian Forces to execute your direction, the restrictions in respect of airlift by Canadian Forces transport aircraft in support of Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction missions and the geographic restrictions on Canadian Forces operations in Iraq and in that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North) have been removed. The removal of the restriction permits Canadian Forces aircraft to conduct missions through Kuwait for the delivery of loads exclusively in support of the campaign against terrorism and in accordance with Canadian national objectives. Finally, the removal of the geographic restriction has also permitted the Canadian naval task group to conduct Operation Apollo missions in the Northern Persian Gulf in accordance with Canadian national objectives or other missions as may be directed by the Government of Canada. Minister Graham has also been apprised of your verbal direction and concurs with the present conduct of operations. Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. r-3.-V- 000010 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00020 Title A name given to the resource Direction Regarding Canadian Forces' Employment Restrictions in the Persian Gulf Region Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 09-Jun-03 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-100289 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/15433743f7245a7f1be65f35a29bf33e.pdf 36c90ed30bdf52124608f1c43af220f9 PDF Text Text L Document disclosed under the Access tojnformation Act '.wffeDtdiyjjIgu&en vertuAe latyi s&l'acc& cfl'inQpmation SECRET (CEO) SECRET (CC) -iSia-oChief of the Defence Staff National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Chef d’etat-major de la Defense SECRET (CO CBN EYES OMY Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 O WtS2-' JAN 3 0 » The Minister DEPLOYMENT OF A CANADIAN FORCES LIAISON TEAM TO QATAR 1. For operational security, and to ensure that appropriate attention continues to be paid to the campaign against terrorism, US Central Command is dividing its headquarters into two staffs: one focused on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and one dedicated to planning for possible action against Iraq. To further reinforce this division of responsibilities, the US has now deployed its staff focused on Iraq planning to Qatar. As such, Canadian Forces officers currently in Tampa have now lost access to knowledge of planning for any eventual action against Iraq. In order that they may maintain effective contact with US forces, we recommend that you agree to the deployment of a team of Canadian Forces liaison officers to Qatar. We also wish to emphasize that a decision in this regard is considered a matter of urgency - the train may literally leave the station, without the Canadian Forces, if the recommended deployment is not authorized at this time. 2. Deploying the Canadian liaison team to Qatar to interface with all staff functions of the US deployed headquarters is essential, at least initially, to allow maximum exposure to all facets of operational planning for a possible campaign against Iraq. This deployment would in no way prejudge the final decision to be made by the Government of Canada with respect to possible military participation in any potential campaign against Iraq. It would, however, preserve the Government’s ability to make an informed decision and to ensure that the required information is available both to the Government and, in the event that Canada elected to participate militarily, to Canadian Forces military planners. We have been informed that both Australia and the United Kingdom intend to deploy liaison teams to Qatar and have already pre-positioned equipment within the region, notwithstanding the fact that their participation in any eventual military action will still be subject to national decisions taken at the appropriate time. A decision to simply retain a liaison presence at CENTCOM in Tampa would severely compromise the initial progress made in gaining insight into US planning efforts. Additionally, our liaison officers attached to the US Component SECRET (CO EYES ONLY 1/2 1*1 National Defence Defense nationale SECRET (CEO) SECRET (CC) Canada 000030 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET (CEO) Commands in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are in discussions regarding the military capabilities Canada is considering. 3. Time is of the essence. If you approve, we will so inform the Privy Council Office and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. We further recommend that you sign the enclosed letter to the Prime Minister. R.R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff Margaret Bloodworth Deputy Minister Enclosures: 2 Approve John McCallum Minister of National Defence Date 2/2 SECRET (CEO) 000031 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET(CC) The Right Honourable Jean Chretien, P.C..Q.C., M.P..LL.L, LL.D., Prime Minister of Canada Langevin Block 80 Wellington Street Ottawa ON K1A0A2 Dear Prime Minister: Deployment of a Canadian Forces Liaison Team to Qatar For operational security, and to ensure that appropriate attention continues to be paid to the campaign against terrorism, US Central Command is dividing its headquarters into two staffs: one focused on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and one dedicated to planning for possible action against Iraq. To further reinforce this division of responsibilities, the US has deployed its staff focused on Iraq planning to Qatar. As such, Canadian Forces officers currently in Tampa have now lost access to knowledge of planning for any eventual action against Iraq. This is to inform you that I have authorized the deployment of a Canadian Forces liaison team to Qatar to preserve access to US military planning for possible action against Iraq. This deployment will in no way prejudge the final decision to be made by the Government of Canada with respect to possible military participation in any potential campaign against Iraq. It would, however, preserve the Government’s ability to make an informed decision and ensure that the required information is available both to the Government and, in the event that Canada elected to participate militarily, to Canadian Forces military planners. We have been informed that both Australia and the United Kingdom intend to deploy liaison teams to Qatar and have already pre-positioned equipment within the region, notwithstanding the fact that their participation in any eventual military action will still be subject to national decisions taken at the appropriate time. Minister Graham has been advised and concurs. Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence Cc The Honourable Bill Graham, P.O., M.P. ^CRET(CC) SECRET (CC) 000032 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00021 Title A name given to the resource Deployment of a Canadian Forces Liaison Team to Qatar Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 03-Jan-03 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-100289 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en