1 20 39276 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/55e358524a71e03d2e87b0d18bc89dd2.jpg 1f4655aff761286198365f3239517574 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Convoy assembling in Bedford Basin, Halifax, N.S. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1941 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Canada. Dept. of National Defence / Library and Archives Canada / PA-128093 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Copyright: Expired Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dept. of National Defence https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/0252536f6ec87c6b066575d054b458b3.png a7595ae3220a66a65d55c0200c20bcac Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Playfair grid Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canada Declassified https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5d2476683d384374ee1e041adf814b7e.png f14ec6fce4d22cdd8c3bbb6df445d8db Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Cover of Field Service Pocket Book Pamphlet No. 2: Orders and Intercommunication Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1939 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/05c5fb4a59740750e030ed0ab63621b1.png 65c04f6f74d8115a2e1e5578829a13e9 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource FCC D/F Chart (taken from CDWI00315) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 8-Jul-42 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Screenshot from CDWI00315. RG24-C-1, Microfilm reel number: C-5258, File number: 8706, vol. 1, Library and Archives Canada. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/7cfe1c17e05fbdb2cf38ce89f337c906.jpg 0c2f0bc782af8fce23c3f9e80bfb990e Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource War Office: Main Building Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource [n.d.] Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource War Office Second World War Official Collection Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Image: IWM (H 42536). Imperial War Museum Collections, https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205513833. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource IWM Non Commercial License: https://www.iwm.org.uk/corporate/policies/non-commercial-licence. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/e8822f312729ada33a978ce7d7d1ed55.jpg fd292edb1012626e641575ddfca063fb Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Joachim von Ribbentrop welcoming Vyacheslav Molotov in Berlin, November 1940 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 14-Nov-1940 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived German Federal Archive. Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-1984-1206-523 / CC-BY-SA 3.0. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/de/deed.en. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-1984-1206-523,_Berlin,_Verabschiedung_Molotows.jpg. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Some rights reserved by German Federal Archive. See this page for instructions on image use: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/de/deed.en. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/1f67b2bf58cdc60d6fed0e5d8b5515a6.jpg a1b35bcae23672ab9710065c5f5b3491 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Aerial View of Lower Manhattan in 1940 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 11-Mar-40 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource War Department. Army Air Forces. 6/20/1941-9/26/1947. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:New_York_-_New_York_City_-_NARA_-_68145636_ed2.jpg. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Public Domain https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/591e2fedea1d2c9d995e3627ec09a2e1.jpg e793bbd50e21a57b6fdc394169ca0a48 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Americans in Britain: the Training of the Civilian Technical Corps at RAF Radio School, Cranwell, England, 1941 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1941 Description An account of the resource Paul Hand, from Woodhaven, Long Island, New York, at work on a radio as part of his training at No. 1 Radio School, RAF Cranwell. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Ministry of Information Second World War Official Collection Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Image: IWM (D 5286). Imperial War Museum Collections, https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205198855. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource IWM Non Commercial License: https://www.iwm.org.uk/corporate/policies/non-commercial-licence. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f4f49d462af8bfd23de118f9dbb16ed3.jpg 80dca6cf84f9351150c6e429e9725d08 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Laurel, Maryland. Monitoring at the United States Federal Communications Commission listening post Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource July 1944 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Lewis Walker. Farm Security Administration - Office of War Information Photograph Collection (Library of Congress) Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Laurel,_Maryland._Monitoring_8d42303v.jpg. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Public Domain https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/68c79aff75a56d585a3c9c4e5782f3ed.jpg 88c8231979020bbe5950950068238284 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource National Geographic World Map 1935 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1-Dec-35 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource National Geographic Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NatGeo_World_map_1935.jpg. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Public Domain https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b5ae8787c2379cdc5ac0caea30b21d37.png 6d8745c53e3d7e58fbb96c1c208c4816 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource W/T Room Interior - [No. 4 Wireless School Burtch] Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 13-Nov-41 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dept. of National Defence Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Canada. Dept. of National Defence / Library and Archives Canada / Box [1996-212 NPC] 107 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Copyright: Expired https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/7ec5589acddb64be1bfc9455a6e55863.pdf 70ec619ab062a639a827bc9431ee9b64 PDF Text Text GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'informc5on a I. - Presentation to the Minister November 2006 "'d (/) I (/) ' '""Cl ~ g 00 TOP SECRET Canadian Eyes Only (CEO) I 0 0 '° O', 0 V\ N .j:>. l♦I Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada Securite publique et Protection civila Canada Canada 000010 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Enhancing Canada's Foreign Collection Capacity Deck Description An account of the resource A-2023-03407 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GAC Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/7c0a1d4269755611235652f7098e2684.pdf 8da2b9c87b6ec715f09757d3708a484e PDF Text Text CAG — Released under the Access to Information Act / AMC — Divulgue (s) en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a(' information A-2019-00531 - Pages 1121 IDS,29-1 1-CANADA vo1.2 011 F: •r• TOP SSCBET October E3, 1951. MUMANDUIii ON A CANNADIAH SLCB>sT INTSLLIG-12 1 3 ,MMIM "Sector, my heart and manful spirit urge me to go near. the swift-raring ships, and spy out all ... To thee I will prove no vain spy ... for I will go straight to the .camp., until I may ooze to the ship of Memnon where surely the chiefs are like to hold council." - Iliad, Book Z. "It seems to us to boil down to this: when all the mystery and glamour Is- removed, espionage consists simply of finding a guy who knows sanething you want to know and having him tell'you about it." - The Nett Yorker. I INTRODUCTION It may be assured that, for an indefinite period, the first intelligence requirement of Canada and other Western powers will be a knowledge of the potential of Soviet armed might and the intention to use it. Closely allied with this requirement is a need for intelligence on the Soviet.oapability of causing internal disruption within the borders of non-Communist States, and . the particular targets within- Canada against which these weapons may be directed. Through diplomatic missions and service attaches abroad, Canada enjoys the usual facilities for the overt collection of intelligence. But the intelligence which can be obtained by observers .of this.kind is limited. Valuable intelligence is to be obtained by clandestine methods, and,this nay be more valuable.precisely because it is protected from the passive observer.. At present we obtain'somie .olandestine intelligence'through countere1 spioaage.; but have -so- tar. made. no. attempt to collect intelligence by the use of a secret intelligence service •• :that ie, a servioe-'uaacknouledged by the. governnent but devoted on itim- behalf to the collection or intelligence by secret agents working where inch intelligence is to be -found. The purpose of these notes is to ezamine in what way such a service is - a. unique ,. provider of Utelligenoe s' how it might'benefit the Government of Genada, and ho*- such a service could be 'established and operated. , ', 000063 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 23 October 1951 Description An account of the resource A-2022-00326 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GAC Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived GAC Special Registry File 29-1-1-Canada Part 2 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Title A name given to the resource "Memorandum on a Canadian Secret Intelligence Service" Cover, 23 October 1951 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/233fd3980a34e727b5738c313f10aab0.pdf 2c4d66e6f109e275bcb58fca451c5cb4 PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project GAC ATIP A-2023-03407 GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Public Safety Hurtubise to Day "Enhancing Canada's Foreign Intelligence Capacity" Note: This undated draft memo was prepared sometime after August 2007. �GAC-ReleasedundertheAccesstolnformationsAct/ AMC-D1vulgueenvertudelalo1surl'accesal'informat1on 4, s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO 6915-9 / 18328 I 34 7930 MEMORANDUM TO THE MINISTER ENHANCING CANADA'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE CAPACITY UPDATE (For Information) SUMMARY " Deputy Ministers and Agency Heads - the Director of CSIS, the Chief of the CSE, the Deputy Ministers of National Defence and Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, and I - met on August 15, 2007; to discuss possible approaches to enhancing Canada's foreign intelligence capacity. • Deputies and Agency Heads agreed that the foreign intelligence col!ectionl ~ight best be addressed by enhancements to age~rtmenta! capacity and improved interagency coordination (as opposed to moving ahead with legislation or proposals for a new agency). BACKGROUND • The Conservative Party's 2006 Federal Election Platform included a commitment to: "Create a Canadian Foreign1nt~lligence Agency to effectively gather intelligence overseas, independently counter threats before they reach Canada, and increase allied intelligence operations. " • In October 20.06, I met with Deputies and Agency Heads to •review possible approaches, including: the establishment of a new agency dedicated to the collection of foreign intelligence abroad; amending the mandate of an existing agency or department to include foreign inteUigence collection abroad (e.g., CSIS, DFAIT or CSE); and, increasing capacity of departments and agencies and inter-agency coordination within existing mandates. • In August 2007, Deputies met again, with the benefit of having completed the national security and intelligence priority setting exercise. We reviewed again the possible approaches to enhancing Canada's foreign intelligence capacity, and arrived at a consensus on -shared advice in this regard. 000034 PS-SP A-2008-0096 1364 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - o,vulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information s.15(1) - Defence s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO CONTEXT Security Intelligence and Foreign Intelligence Collection I • ,0.ome intelligence activities.relate to addressing thrieats to the security of I I• (Deleted:, Canada, such as terrorism or foreign influenced activity- security intelligence. Other intelligence activities are carried out to protect or advance Canada's economic.,_,p~litical ()f <lefonce _in.t_er~sts -- foreigp intelligence'. __ Both security and foreign intelligence are currently collected within Can~da and abroad~ consistent with the mandates of departments and agencies as conferred in-statute;;: thr~~gh .th; exer~ise·of c;;.,;~; Prerogative: ••••• ( Deleted: s [ Deleted: and • Deleted: The colk:ctinn ofb-oth $ccurity intclllgence nnd foreign inte!ligenct!' tnk.:s place within Canada Md abro&d CSIS has primary responsibility for the collection. of security intelligence pursuant to section 12 of the CSIS Act. It does so within Canada and abroad; often this is carried out with support from or in collaboration with other departments and agencies, and in concert with Canada's allies. CSIS also collects foreign intelligence pursuant to section 16 of the CSlS Acrbut the Act allows csrs· to do so only within Canada. It does so at the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of National Defonce, and with your approval, Intelligence is also collected by other departments and agencies, for example: - DFArr collects intelligence relating to the conduct of the external affairs of Canada; - DND and the Canadian Forces collec~intclligcnce regarding,Canada's defence interests; • - CSE is the lead agency for all technical collection (signals intelligence) for security and foreign intelligence; and, . the RCMP collects intelligence related to its criminal investigation mandate. I ·( Deleted: s Deleted: in respect Deleted: of Gaps in Current Collection Needs I of the Government's priorities (i.e.: CSIS has the mandate and auttJ.onty to collect intelligence related to threats to the security of Canada both within and outside Canada). ·1 I and focused on collection abroad and the assessment of intelligence mformation. • 000035 PS-SP A-2008-0096 1365 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO A New FPreign~ntelJ{gi;TJce Agency or an Expanded Mandate for CSIS? • The establishment of a new agency to collect foreign intelligence abroad is judged to be very costly, a very long-term endeavour, and likely to be controversial in the current Parliamentary context • Expanding the mandate of CSIS to collect foreir inte!lirence abroa~p In terms of opening up the CSJS Act, further assessment has also suggested that legislative changes required to the Act may be more complex than initially contemplated, and go well beyond simply removing the "within Canada" provision of section 16 of the CSIS Act. .Enl1,mdng_Caoacitv Within Existing Mandates • There is consensus among key departments and agencies that the full potential of current foreign intelligence collection activities is not realized, and that shortfalls in our existing intelligence collection 2ft: related principaliy to capacity and coordination, not gaps in mandate. • By enhancing capacity within existing legislative frameworks and mandates, departments and a encies could ex and their activities. This could inciude, for exam ie, •• • , more resourfle~ for intelligence assessment and dissemination, and new mechanisms lo coordinate acttvlties and the assessment and application of inteiiigence at home and abroad. • In this regard, receni steps taken by Deputies to improve and streamHne the section ! 6 application and renewai process wiii certainly improve both coordination within the inteiHgence community and assist in identifying ciearer foreign inteWgence prioritles . •3- 000036 PS-SP A-2008-0096 1366 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO NEXT STEPS ~ In light of the shared assessment of the key Agency Heads and Deputy Ministers, I would propose to consult departments and agencies on what proposals might go forward to Ministers at an early stage to support enhancement of Canada's foreign intelligence capacity. • If you believe it would be useful, I would be pleased to organize a briefing for 'you involving key Deputies and Agency Heads. f am available at your convenience to discuss this matter. Suzanne Hurt6bise Prepared by: NSPD -4 - 000037 PS-SP A-2008-0096 1367 37 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDFI00026 Title A name given to the resource Suzanne Hurtubise, Memorandum to the Minister, Enhancing Canada's Foreign Intelligence Capacity Update, Undated After August 2007 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource Undated-07 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Foreign Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource A-2023-03407 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access to Information Request Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/70fdf97a10864606c6e953e2dfdf185e.pdf cb8aa041e5b6742b2b2f5e90670bcf9d PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project GAC ATIP A-2023-03407 GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Public Safety presentation to Day "Enhancing Canada's Foreign Collection Capacity" November 2006 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'informc5on a I. - Presentation to the Minister November 2006 "'d (/) I (/) ' '""Cl ~ g 00 TOP SECRET Canadian Eyes Only (CEO) I 0 0 '° O', 0 V\ N .j:>. l♦I Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada Securite publique et Protection civila Canada Canada 000010 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information . a TQP SECRET CEO 5 69 1 • ( )(g)re(d) Enhancing Canada's Foreign Collection Capacity • Issue: - The GoC's electoral commitment: "Create a CanadianForeign Intelligence Agency to effectively gather intelligence overseas, independently counter threats before they reach Canada, and increase allied intelligence cooperation." • Objective: • Decision: Ministers will have to consider potential policy, legislative and financial implications. "O ~ ► ~ ~ \0 0\ 0 V1 10 V1 2 000011 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'info~tion a TOP SECRET CEO Types of Intelligence • Under existing legislative frameworks, statutory mandates, and the exercise of Crown Prerogative, Canadian intelligence agencies collect intelligence within Canada and abroad. • Intelligence can essentially be divided into two broad categories: Threat-related: Intelligence concerning threats to the security of Canada (e.g. can relate to terrorism and public safety; espionage and the security of government information; sabotage and the security of government assets and key infrastructure; and foreign interference in Canada's democratic process.) Non-Threat-related: Intelligence on international issues that serve to protect or advance Canadian interests and objectives (e.g. political, economic, defence and security) "tl C/l ' C/l "tl ► t!..> 0 0 QC ' 0 0 I.O 0\ 0 '-" tv • Threat-related and non-threat-related intelligence collection are not mutually exclusive, and can at times overlap. For example, foreign government intentions or state-sponsored activities may be threat-related (e.g., terrorism) or could advance Canadian political, economic or defence interests 0\ 3 000012 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'infor~n a TOP SECRET CEO Threat-related Intelligence "'C {/l C/l "'C ► I • CSIS is the lead agency responsible for the collection of intelligence regarding threats to the security of Canada (pursuant to section 12 of the CS/S Act). The Service collects threatrelated intelligence within and outside Canada, often with support from or in collaboration with other departments and agencies, and in concert with Canada's allies. • Distinctions between domestic threats and international threats are increasingly blurred and have become operationally synonymous .. As a result, effective operations are more and more dependent on close cooperation among agencies (both with domestic partners and with our allies). N 0 0 00 I 0 0 I.O °'0 Vl N --.J 4 000013 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'infor•n a s.15(1) - Defence TOP SECRET CEO Non-Threat-related Intelligence 'i:! Cl) I Cl) 'i:! ► I N 0 0 00 b 0 \0 0\ 0 V, N 00 • There are several departments and agencies involved in the collection of non-threat related intelligence (both in Canada and abroad): - DFAIT collects intelligence relating to the conduct of the external affairs of Canada; - DND/CF collect intelligence regarding Canada's defence interests; and, - CSE is the lead agency for all technical collection (signals intelligence) against foreign intelligence targets • CSIS also collects non-threat related intelligence (pursuant to section 16 of the CS/S Act) in relation to the defence of Canada or the conduct of the international affairs of Canada - but the Act allows the Service only to do so within Canada. It does so on the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of National Defence, and with your approval. 5 000014 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act( __ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'infor~on a TOP SECRET CEO Non-Threat-related Intelligence (continued) • Canada's economic and political objectives are more and more conditioned by international considerations in an increasingly integrated, dynamic and competitive global economy. • Canada's relationship with allies/foreign governments are also increasingly relevant - must continue to demonstrate our ongoing c~mmitment to addressing shared issues of concern. • -0 ~ ~ 0 b 0 Currently there is no department or agency with the legislative or statutory mandate to collect non-threat related intelligence regarding Canada's political and economic interests, through the use of human sources abroad. '-0 °' 0 VI N '-0 6 000015 �s.15(1) - International s.15(1) - Security GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act} AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'infor~ion a TOP SECRET CEO s.16(1) RISKS • There are serious risks associated with any intelligence operations undertaken abroad, and the level of risk increases commensurate with·the degree to which Canadian agencies are operating abroad and with the of the intelligence operations. • • The risks associated with the collection of non-threat related intelligence (political, economic or defence intelligence) are generally more acute, for example: • '",j Cl) I Cl) '",j > I N 0 0 00 I 0 0 \D °' 0 V, l,,J 0 7 000016 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'infor~n a TOP SECRET CEO Potential Enhancements • Enhancing threat-related intelligence collection and operations abroad: - There are currently no legislative/statutory impediments or limitations to the collection of threat-related intelligence collection. Intelligence collection currently occurs both in Canada and abroad; and, >-;:I C/l ' C/l >-;:I > N' 0 0 00 '. 0 0 \D °' - Additional funding could however increase foreign operations and foreign collection efforts as well as enhance collaboration among Canadian Intelligence agencies and with allied partners. 0 \.I\ w 8 000017 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'infor~n s.15(1) - Security a TOP SECRET CEO Potential Enhancements (continued) • Enhancing non-threat related intelligence collection abroad would: - Increase Canada's capacity to pursue its own political and economic interests in a more direct and focussed way than has been possible to date; and, >-tj en I en >-tj ► ' Iv 0 0 00 I 0 0 '°0 °' u, \.,.J I'-) 9 000018 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'inforl<ISation a TOP SECRET CEO s.15(1) - Security Possible approaches A. Give the mandate to collect non-threat related to an existing agency abroad B. Enhance capabilities within existing frameworks and arrangements C. Create a new "Canadian Foreign Intelligence Agency" • ~ These approaches are not necessarily exclusive and could be pursued simultaneously or incrementally. en '"'O ► I Iv 0 0 co I 0 0 \0 °' 0 V1 l_,_J w 10 000019 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'inform~n a s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO A. Give the mandate to collect non-threat related abroad to an existing agency • Amending section 16 of the CS/S Act, to remove the "within Canada" limitation, would substantially contribute to addressing Canada's current and future needs. • This would permit CSIS to collect, within Canada and abroad, political, economic and defence intelligence and to seize upon future opportunities in that regard. • CSIS could use its existing infrastructure, at home and abroad, in building a new intelligence capacity consistent with such an expanded mandate. • There would be greater opportunity for integrating threat related and non-threat related collection operations, both within CSIS and in relation to CSIS's cooperation with other Canadian agencies '"d C/) I C/) '"d >I N 0 0 00 I 0 0 'Cl °' 0 lll L,J .j:,. 11 000020 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'infor~ion a s.15(1) - lnternation~I TOP SECRET CEO B. Enhance Capabilities Within Existing Frameworks ',j en [./J '""d ► I N 0 0 00 I 0 0 \0 0\ 0 • Many of the gaps in our existing intelligence collection activities may be attributed to capacity, not mandate ( e.g: both threat and non-threat related intelligence are currently collected in Canada and abroad). • Departments and agencies could expand their activitiesincluding CEO collection-and leverage existing relationships under existing authorities. Liaison and Foreign Collection • Additional resources to any or all of DFAIT, CSIS, CSE, DND/CF and RGMP to enhance liaison relationships and our diplomatic capacity could have a strong positive effect on the quality, quantity and timeliness of intelligence and open information we collect ( VI l,J VI 12 000021 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations ActL I AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'inforrh~on a s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO B. Enhance Capabilities Within Existing Frameworks (continued) Signals Intelligence • Additional Canadian SIGINT capacity for CSE would support self-directed Canadian intelligence operations (and supporting CSIS, OFAIT, ONO, the RCMP and other agencies generally in their operations) . • Assessment and Analysis • -0 Ul I Ul -0 ► I N 0 0 00 I 0 0 Increasing it to the users applied to priorities. and disseminate cannot be used and Coordination • Enhancing alliances and partnerships with other countries' intelligence agencies as well as ensuring optimum collaboration and cooperation among Canadian intelligence agencies is increasingly important. \Q 0\ 0 V1 w 0\ 13 000022 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'inforntl0on a s.15(1) - International s.15(1) - Security ' ~ TOP SECRET CEO C. Create a new "Canadian Foreign Intelligence -Agency" • Establishing an Agency dedicated to the collection of nonthreat related intelligence would: - Address the key gap in current arrangements, regarding the collection of abroad; - Provide a capacity for Canada to pursue its own political and economic interests in a more direct and focussed way than has been possible to date; and, -i:, VJ (/) -i:, ► t'.J 0 0 00 I 0 0 I.O 0, 0 Vl w --..J 14 000023 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/'S AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'inform~n a s.15(1) - Security C. Create a new "Canadian Foreign Intelligence Agency" • -0 /'fl if) -0 Considerations: • > N 0 0 00 I 0 0 \0 0\ 0 V, vJ 00 15 000024 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'infor~ion a s.15(1) - International ~ TOP SECRET CEO Other Considerations • -::; (/J [fJ -::i ► N' 0 0 00 ' In making a decision on how to enhance Canada'$ foreign intelligence capacity Ministers will need to consider: - Whether enhancements should focus on increasing threat-related or non-threat-related intelligence collection abroad, or both; and how far the Canadian Government wapts to go - Whether enhancements are consistent with Canadians' values; - Impact_ of legislative changes: • Would be controversial (e.g. amending CS/S Act or creation of new legislation for a new agency): • Would impact on Ministers' existing ability to use Crown Prerogative to collect intelligence abroad - Resource implications (financial and human resources); - Linkages to national security review arrangement$; deciding on Canadian intelligence priorities, etc. 0 0 \0 °' 0 V, \J.J \0 16 000025 �it::rf. GAC - Released under the Access to Informations AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'intor?i\ation a TOP SECRET CEO Next Steps • Clarification is required on Government's commitment to enhance foreign intelligence capacity (e.g.: threat or non-threat related intelligence). • Further study is required to determine viability of options and associated costs. ~ --0 ~ 0 i • Any enhancements should include provisions to enhance collaboration and cooperation among Canadian intelligence agencies and include enhancements to intelligence analysis. 0\ 0 V, .p. 0 17 000026 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDFI00025 Title A name given to the resource Public Safety Presentation to the Minister, Enhancing Canada's Foreign Collection Capacity, November 2006 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 01-Nov-06 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Foreign Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource A-2023-03407 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access to Information Request Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/3c677b4e03fba36a1054677b25151d93.pdf 6f99721d43eeaa3f14ebeca2a95eae61 PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project GAC ATIP A-2023-03407 GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Public Safety memo to Hurtubise "Enhancing Canada's Foreign Intelligence Capacity Update and Next Steps" Note: This undated memo was prepared sometime after October 2006. �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO TD No. - 342201 MEMORANDUM TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER ENHANCING CANADA'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE CAPACITY Update and Next Steps ISSUE: Enhancing Canada's foreign intelligence capacity. BACKGROUND: • The Conservative Party's Federal Election Platform for 2006 includect·a commitment to: "Create a Canadian Foreign lntelfigence Agency to effectively gather intelligence overseas, independently counter threats before they reach Canada and increase allied intelligence operations. " • Further to direction received from the Minister's offi~e in this regard, the Department led interdepartmental discussions·on options to enhance Canada's foreign intelligence capacity starting in spring 2006 and continuing through the fall. • • Following briefings provided to the Minister late in the summer and early fall, • and consideration of options, the Minister • In October 2006, you met with the Director of CSIS, the Commissioner of the RCMP, the Associate Clerk of the Privy Council Office, the Deputy Minister of National Defence and the head of the Communications Security Estabiishment, to review options. The creation of a senarate a12encv dedicated to the collection of foreign intelligence was discussed, While various other options were discussed at the October meeting, Deputies did not agree on a specific recommended approach. 000044 PS-SP A-2008-0096 1476 L/_L{ �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - Defence s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO CONTEXT: • There is a wide range of intelligence work currently being carried out by the federal government,._ So~e_ intelligence ~~t_iyijLe_? !~l_a!~ !~ ~44r~§~ipg_tlu:ea!s_ !O. _ ..... -~eleted_,_.-~------< the security of Canada, such as terrorism or foreign influenced activity, while • •• -[oeleted:, other intejlig«:ru;_e_activities are carried out to·protect or advance Canada's economic,._political or defen,;:e interests. All kinds of intelligence cat! be, and - ·,..o_e_le_te_d_,_,n_<l_ _ _ _ _ _--< are. collected ~ithin Canada ab~~?~~ ~on~isieni with th; ~arious ~andates . . .. Deleted: The collection of both sccudty of departments and agencies as conferreli;-sl~hlt; by- -P·a-rl1;a-m·· -en-t- o-r- t-hr-o-u··g-h- •• - •• intelligence and foccign intelligence wkcs place within Canada and abroad the exercise of Crown Prerogative and • The co!lection of intelligence regarding threats to the security of Canada is the primary responsibility of CSIS pursuant to section 12 (s.12) of the CS!S Act. . The Service collects security intelligence within Canada and abroad, often with support from or in collaboration with other departments and agencies, and in concert with Canada; s allies. • The Service also collects foreign inte\\fa.ence_pursuant to section 16 (s.16) nf the CSJS Actin relation to the defence of Canada or the conduct or the internationai affairs of Canada - but the Act allows the Service o n l y ~ within Canada. It does so atJ.he..request of the Minister of roreign Affairs or the Minister of'N'ational Defence and with the Minister of Public Sa:fety's approvai, .• Intelligence is aiso collected by other departments and agencies, for example; the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade coliects intelligence relating to the conduct of the external affairs of Canada, the Department of National D'efence (DND) and the Canadian Forces collect intelligence, regarding.(a_I),:,J.4a:~ _\i~ft,p._c~__lnterests,_a_n_d_(J-i_e_(:'.9rrJ~llrJi9a_tforJs_ Security__ . ___ _ Establishment (CSE) is the lead agency for aii technicai coiiection (signals intelligence) against intelligence targets • oeieted: ! • Oe:fei:eci: in respeci Deiete& of A key gap in current iegislative arrangements is !! lack of capadty for Canada At this time, there is no department of agency with the specinc statutory authority in this regard. ANALYSIS:· Based 6i'i interdepartmental discussions, the following approaches Wefe considered to address this gap: -2 .. PS-SP A~2008-0096 1477 '-{S 000045 �GAC- Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC- D1vulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'accE's a !'information s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO o The creation of a separ~te agency reporting to a responsible minister to provide a clear focus for foreign inte!Jigcnce collection (as is the approach in the United Kingdom and Australia, for example, where an agencv responsible for intelligence collection abroad reports to the Foreign Secretary); or o The expansion of the existing mandate of one or more departments or agencies, build.ing on existing legislation and operational arrangenients (e.g.: amending the CSIS Act to allow the Service to collect foreign intelligence abroad). Creation of a separate foreign intelligence agency • •• Establishing a new agency dedicated to ■ collection abroad would address. the key gap in Canada's current arrangements and capacity. It would provide a capacity for Canada to pursue its own political and economic interests in a more direct and focussed way than has been possible to date. It would also align Canadian arrangements more closely with those of our key allies, who have agencies dedicated to collection of intelligence abroad. • The creation of a dedicated agency would require new legislation and a substantial fiscal investment (both in terms of one-time and ongoing costs). The precise costs, time considerations to establish such an agency, and legislative implications are difficult to assess in the absence of preliminary guidance as to .how much intelligence is to be collected (based on GoC priorities), using which collection methods, and how the activities of the new agency would he reviewed. • • That said, the "one time" costs for the creation of a new agency would include acc~mmodations for headquarters and associated infrastructure, including IT costs. 1 These would be higher than most start up Government departments or agencies due to the requirement for greatly enhanced securityand infrastructure to support foreign operations. Parallel investments in other departments or agencies would almost certainly be required, for operations support and coordination purposes. • Considerable thought would have to be given to the exact mandate of a new agency, particularly in terms of how it would interact with Canada's existing intelligence collection efforts. At a minimum, every effort would have to be 1 It is estimated that the CSIS building (which has the required security and IT features). '!'ould cos ■ ,r more today. That building currently supports roughly! ~ -3 - 000046 PS-SP A-2008-0096 1478 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO taken to ensure optimum coordination and cooperation between departments and agencies, to make the most effective use ofresources and avoid parallel or conflicting tasking. • The question of to what Minister a· FI agency would report would also be important, and there would likely be a variety of strongly held views on what would be most appropriate. • Although the option of creating a dedicated foreign intelligence agency was discussed■■l■■■■l■■■■■■I■ • Expansion of the e~igi11_g mandate of one Or more departments or a~nciefu. Q!!ihl.i.ng on existing legislation and operationalai-rangements Another approach to enhance Canada;s foreign intelligence capacity would be to amend existing legislation to give the mandate of collecting - • • •• • • abroad lo an existing body. ; lt WOUlct provide a capacity ior Canada to pursue its own political and economic interests in a more focussed way;, • The potential costs of establishing of increasing a dedicated non-threat-related foreign inteiligence capacity within afi existing department of agency are difficult to assess. Costs would naturally depend ofi how great a capacity wouid be estabiished, and that would relate back to the priorities that are to be addressed. Further study in this regard is stlii required. Preferred approach • Based- em interdepartmental work and our assessment to date there are three recommended proposals: i. Amend s. f 6 of the Esls Act lo fern5V6 the "wlthin Canada;; prov1sion to aliow Cs Is to collect foreign intelligence outside of Canada, with appropriate supporting res5Urces. -4- 000047 PS-SP A-2008-0096 1479 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO 2. Seek resources to expanding the capacity of other departments and agencies involved in intelligence collection abroad and in analysis/assessment (e.g.: CSE, DF AIT and PCO). These resources could increase both foreign intelligence and security intelligence capacity. 3. Identify mechanisms to ensure effectiveness and optimum collaboration among Canadian intelligence agencies regarding the collection of intelligence abroad (e.g.: to ensure that work is complementary, and avoid duplication or unnece,;sary overlaps). It should be noted that these approaches could be pursued independently, incrementally or simultaneously. That said, the Department is of the view that every effort should be made to pursue all approaches simultaneously. CONSIDERATIONS CSIS Mandate • CSIS could use its existing infrastructure at home and abroad in building a new foreign intelligence capacity abroad. There would be greater opportunity for integrating and coordinating foreign intelligence and security intelligence operations within CSIS, and in connection with CSIS cooperation with other Canadian agencies and foreign partners. • Because of the structure of ministerial decision making set out in s.16 of the CSIS Act, the Minister of Foreign Affairs or Minister of National Defence would likely still be required to request CSIS to undertake operations, with the approval of the Minister of Public Safety (and possibly also the approval of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, since operations are occurring abroad). The current Tri-ministerial MoU on s. 16 operations could be updated to address specific new considerations that would arise, such as coordination of work. One consideration in any expansion of the s.16 program would be possible impacts on security intelligence collection efforts. Any enhancements to the s.16 program should be implemented while ensuring security intelligence collection efforts are not compromised. • CSIS believes that woulO ne1p ruma currem govemmem msKmg rcqmrerm:ms; anu mnner, ll!at the removal of the "within Canada" restriction alone (even without new resources) would see an immediate in.crease in foreign intelligence provided. -5- PS-SP A-2008-0096 1480 000048 �V,C - R.•l-■ ud und•r th ■ Acc ■11 to Information, Act/ AMC - D1vul1u• ■ n v•rtu d• I ■ lo, 1ur l' ■ ccll1 i, l'inform ■t,on s.15(1) - Secur.ity General .. . .. . •As discussed, the,½_eJ:i,rSCll,isence ~,;e f~i::.9~i.;!!4a.~o_d_ay_i§ J~f:c~JZ1!.C}!Y_~o- _. __ ... go!lecVpEC,igp};;iteJiJg~~c.e_r_e!~t~ }<.'.9P!1~tl! p_oJiJtc11!~nd economic interest,:. ' • •• .•• • • •. • • . • Although som. .. ....... _ .... . ,there is inadequate focus in thill 11~ Jo inoet'Canaaa's" • . strategic needs today aild in the future. . . • •Prior to moving ahead.,the G()vem111ent wlli needto decide ·now imp9rfamt the collection of foreign .inte!liger;<;e is· and how . far it.wants to, ii • go. tp minimize gaps and/or enhance exi!ting co!!ectlon effods.J:art of the process to determine priorities must include an assessment <Jf risks and benefits, and of potgntlal !imitat!ons on what Canada may be Vliliing to take: !(e.g;, - •• • •• • .The Government ..pust. decide. wheth~r the benefitiof creating a foreign. intelligenc~ capa9ityabroad outweigh3 ili~ risks and to what! . ex.tent the .Government wants to enhance its existiµg 'capacity. There are a number of;jskiassociat~d.wiUi theMllectiotlof foreign inte1ligellcr, whether it it1 in Canada or,abroad.. The activities associated with forei •intelli ence collection . .· , • .. ·' ',. :_- '·.,·. ',, ',, •• ;' • A relat~ ,md potentially cntiqal, fact6~,f'or $1/G~vemmcrit to coosid~ is whether. the ~artadfan public will. v~ew Jh~ eollectio.;i,of foreign intemgence abroad a& _beiµg coqnter tc:i 9ilnadil¥! valUCiS l!Ild ettucs. 1J,ie c;anaqian' public may view the colfoction of . . • . . . .• fbreign intelligence abroad, as being ''un~Canadian'.'; or,it may be viewed It as a practical necessity for Canat:la gi tli() ~ri<i today. •• •••• Inaddifion, furth~ to discussions among Deg.ill(!$ inQpt<lbet '.2006dtJs by no t11eans clear th4t enba1tdng foreign inte!Hgence capacity (i.e., p9litical, military and ~noµtie intellige11ce to iidva;ice C11nadi.lnfo.terest$Jis actually the key interest of the Govem;n.ent. Tiie platform commitment of the Q.ovemmen~ wzis to create a nt:w agency to ''effectively gather intelligenc(!. overseas, .• .··.... . independently counter threatsbeforetheyreachCa!7ada, tinfincr.·ease ~llied intelligence operations", TheGovemment ma)'preforto incr9115e and £.!}l'l~nce PS-SP .Aa200S-0096 1481 000049 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - o,vulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information s.15(1) - Security s.69(1 )(g) re (a) TOP SECRET CEO Canada's involvement h foreign operations to ensure the safety and security of Canada and Canadians at home and abroad. Should the Government prefer to enhance foreign operations abroad, discussion should perhaps instead focus on whether the National Defence Act should be revised to allow the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) to target Canadians engaged in threat-related activities abroad. Interdepartmental Issues While most departments and agencies will likely agree that much is to be gained by enhancing Canada's foreign intelligence capacity, it must be emphasized that consensus on a recommended approach has not been reached. Further work with departments and agencies are required prior to presenting • There is recognition among departments and agencies that any enhancements to existing foreign intelligence collection capacity should also provide for increased coordination among Canadian intelligence agencies and departments, including for example: • .Q_Increase / expansion of secondment and liaison arrangements; .Q_Ncw administrative mcchanisms/MoUs for coordination within the community; o Consideration of the role(s) of the National Security Advisor, or ofa new "National Security Commissioner" as discussed in the Government's election platform (this may b"'. a longer term issue); or o Government-wide interoperability of secure communications (this is a longer tenn lss11e, with work ongoing). ·{ Formatted: Svl!ets and Numb~rlng \ Departments also agree includmg policy makers an t osc wit 1 respons1bil!ties tor intelligence, military, diplomatic or law· enforcement operations. This is a subject under aetive discussion among ADMs. Increasing Canada's intelligence analysis capability is essential to allow government departments to make use of information collected whenpreparing assessments on the dimension, scope and impact of threats and our interests, and in detennining our approaches to address them. PS-SI' A-2008-0096 1482 St> 000050 �GAC- Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC- D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's ii !'information s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO Resources • The precise costs associated with amending the CSJS Act and subsequently implementing CSIS's new mandate are difficult to assess in the absence of well defined objectives (presumably GoC priorities). • The recent decisions on security and intelligence priorities by Ministers provide general guidance. The five priorities identified are: countcr-terrorisn1, supporting the Afghanistan mission, counter-intelligence, organized crime, and weapons of mass destruction. It is v1orth noting that the priorities are predominantly micnted to security intelligence. Parallel investments in departments/agencies other than CSIS would be reguired in connection with an expanded foreign intelligence mandate for CSIS, for operations support and coordination (e.g., DFAIT, CSE, Justice). /,fore broadly, if there is a desire to expand capacity of other departments and agencies for the collection of intelligence (potentially all types) abroad, resources for a range of functions should be considered, including: I •••• -. .- j _suppo_rt; analysis and asses'sii'iem. Con'siliera.ole farther mterdepartmental d1scuss10n and analysis ofrequirements is required. Parliament Amending the CSIS Actto remove the "within Canada" provision from s.16 would be contentious and could lead to a complex review of the entire Act, initiating debate and discussion on a broad range ofissues relating to CSIS' mandate, powers and activities. <;:oncems could be raised over a perceived "concentration" of intel1igence powers arid capabilities in the hands of one agency. Conversely, opening up the CSIS Act would provide a potential opportunity to address other issues (e;g. CSIS sharing of classified information with provincial governments or the private sector). In light of Justice O'Connor's recent reports, somehow addressing ove_rsight and review in the context of CSIS and other departments and agencies' operations abroa,1 would be important. Establishment of a committee of parliamentarians to review national security matters would be one way to do this. PS-SF A-2008-0096 1483 000051 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDFI00024 Title A name given to the resource TD No. 342201, Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, Enhancing Canada's Foreign Intelligence Capacity (Update and Next Steps), Undated After October 2006 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource Undated-06 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Foreign Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource A-2023-03407 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access to Information Request Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4025f185047bdb95bd697a6d9abc543b.pdf 6cff532297466a722f34a79de22b5f69 PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project GAC ATIP A-2023-03407 GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Public Safety "ADM Meeting on Foreign Intelligence Capacity" 15 September 2006 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - o,vulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information s.15(1) - Defence • - , s.15(1) - Security s.24(1) ADM MEETING ON li'OREIGN I.NTELIGENGE CAPACITY AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE OF PARLIAMENT ARIANS RECORD OF MEETING September 15, 2006 Participants: PSEPC.- James Deacon (AJSADM - Chair) - Josee-Anne Renaud - Jason Cormier PCO - Greg Fyffe - Gerard Normand DOJ - Josee Desjardins - Mona Browne RCMP - Anna Gray~ Paul Bateman CSIS • FAC - John Di Gangi DND - BGen Nordick Toni Moffa CSE - General Discussion: James Deacon infonned participants of the Minister of Public Safety's mandate to provide options to the Prime Minister on how to enhance Canada's foreign intelligence capacity and provided a quick update on the status of the FI Capacity Working Group. James Deacon then asked each department/agency to provide their views on the FI Capacity Paper. General Views on FI Paper: a) FI and SI Definition: While some participants noted that the definitions for SI and FI needed to be clarified, others indicated that the paper should focus on enhancing Canada's foreign collection capacity more then FI capacity. Making this change would eliminate the confusion associated with the blurring lines of FI and SL • Most agreed that the Gap is about lnot SI or FI. b} Gaps All agreed that the gap should be clearly spe!led out. and that we need to elaborate on what is missing from a knowledge perspective Paper should identify what What is the nature of the info we cant get now Info that doesn't fit in current definition Links to our security hard to make 000027 PS-SP A-2008-0096 0574 2..7 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - Security s.15(1) - International Vlhcn justifying enhanced collection it is difficult to prove that we need FI to survive Reality is that the world is interdependent We have responsibility as a middle power. Gap To be an active member of the international community to be leaders we need to protect our international interests ... Need to clarify what intel we cannot collect, what is currently missing and what are the consequences of this ... Should demonstrate how we use in tell,,. Comparitevely to other nations, Canada is quite isolated from threats but due to interdependability we are there Canada needs to enhance capability to protect our interests and our allies, If we enhance FI policy how do we do it. .. Flesh out gap in example. And justify reason for enhancement c) Consequences and Risks d) Why do We need to enhance capacity? Need to spell out eonsequenees / risks and complexity Need to nsse~g Canadian Values and emmre privacy issues are balanced We are in a growth industry everymw claims to be collecting Fr people are going beyond Need to clearly identify core intelligence communHy Coordination Issue Intel priorities Spell out reality tn !en11S ofmandate and legislation ej Intelligence Collection :Process CSE: i'on1: Need to provide 1nost details rn intelllgence collection process from collection to · readership. Need lo spell what kind of intel ls collected who we :share with for ·what I3Uf!501lt'!. What dept collect for internal U§@, what they collect for the Community FI Gap does not Hne up wHh conclusions • . Need to spell how addldonal Intel, how enhanced capacity would ~HVe OUf interests Should highEght prngr@m; made In this regard OV@f the last 5 Of 6 years. Paint it positively and comment in context 000028 2 PS-SP A-2008-0096 0575 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1 s.15(1 ~ Security f) Options . ..··. . ·•···.. Need ctearer linkstoJl Gaps Structures .• . • .· •••. ... . •• Cpordirlation has itnpro"'.ed and•. progr~ssed thi; should also be reflected. ; ; -. '.." ', -·;, ,' ,_,. ' ,"' > . ..:., .. , ·;·:··-·:····-···-·--····,·.·::-:·~-~---·---~-"-"'~••>"".~, .• bNb Nord1ck • .L;gislatiortsneedtohannonized . ·•Currently operatfog· under d.isttnct la,w.s; •!'evfijtv mechanism .... This is a serious policy and oversight issue. • FACJohriD Need to· be cautious ofapproa Need•to work.rifore cooperativ N~e4 more tltenl\ tee ••• · • • g) DirectAction •• " · DND: Nordick Need exampl~ olcollaboration1 . .· .. . . .... •. . . Need: to .J.ook direct action a.pd bfyfuore explic:ite(n.eed ex_ll.mples) •• Neea. to identify domestic and internatiorihl implii:;atio11s • ••Tednt/ rnd} equipr11ent coUectio11 scfontific data ·•!ts notjust;abtmt.•·intel, vveo. t!lso. reedfo. 1;on~id~r di.rect.acti§n; tjo(Just about •.col Iectirig what3:boutdoing .. ,·.how.far:do,.we,want.to . szo.:. •N,eedJ.o. clai:ify the i,:o!e oft. vye need to link this exercis~to pri?ritiesand wh;tJ is .bei11gasked'. ·•.What is heing dorie. outside Canada am{coiild bepone • •Need examples to show whafis there and what. 1s not., . . . Hovi do we measure the gap ... in tenn Spell out e~{sting capacfty ••. • Clarify what we do outside.C~nada Should focus 011 foreign· c<>Uection a need to explafo and darify the ri . fncreasing·c~pacity withoutundiilrj Govefl1.rnent needs to decide " • We 000029 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.13(1 )(a) s.16(1) CSIS has a role .. • . : . . .. . What is our FI requirement, how <ioJoumeasure this .. •. RCJ\1P; Paul .. lmpact on RCMP; Jncludin~ Issue of PCO:Greg CIA: .ASIS: :ollection only; dii;rnption,1i • Need to speH oufri:lofe clearly theJ5fc§s and cons of eabh options ,., ,..... "'•, , .. ,..... --'-c ,· .·,, :.· ''"'"', ·.•·,· ·'· .,,, ··<- h)J;,egaland Review Need toconsid~r1eg~I thmiewC>rk (not just ab91.1tamending s..16 oftheAft,wewi!l nee~ toadjt;st s7.21 and ?ot to mention othef Ie~is\ation) . ...., Needto discussi111pact •·· . . .. . ortfeview. . .. ' • . . Need to include historical context vis.:a-vis :NZ, Netherlands arid Spain choice to tombine agencies. and this needs to be reflected jn lhe paper they are hoth 000030 PS-SP A~_2008-0096 0577 • �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - International . Need to clearly demonstrate that the Intel community is closely interconnected working in collaboration Need to review free agency vs capacity within an existing agency FAC: • Need to consider option from a strategic point of view .. , perhaps a separate stand alone agency is the way to go in the long run.,. This shouldn't stop improvements in each department and agencies CONCLUSION: nix SI and FI debate and focus on capacity abroad.,. 5 PS-SP A-2008-0096 0578 31 000031 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDFI00023 Title A name given to the resource Record of ADM Meeting on Foreign Intelligence Capacity and NSICOP, 15 September 2006 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 15-Sep-06 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Foreign Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource A-2023-03407 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access to Information Request Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/942dae6c0d609116fa2db0ad990970dc.pdf 99bf065239d85da1bb957430797e86ee PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project GAC ATIP A-2023-03407 GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket DFAIT Wright, Harder to MacKay "A Canadian Foreign Intelligence Agency" 17 May 2006 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a ... l♦I Foreign Affairs Canada Affaires etrangeres Canada John Di Gangi Foreign Intelligence Division 996-0861 TOP SECRET-CEO May 17, 2006 ISI-061 Information Memorandum for: The Minister of Foreign Affairs ISSUE: A Canadian Foreign Intelligence Agency CURRENT SITUATION: 1. Minister Day's recent speech has focused media and public attention on the government's campaign commitment to establish a foreign intelligence agency. He said that Canada should enhance its intelligence activities abroad, either by creating a new "spy agency" or by expanding CSIS' powers. 2. The question is whether the government should establish a new, stand-alone agency or graft that role on to a domestic security agency--or whether it could get better value and avoid public controversy by exploiting existing mandates, improving interdepartment/agency coordination, and demanding greater accountability. 3. Whatever the outcome, DF AIT should be a central player, not only in terms of your prerogatives as Minister of Foreign Affairs but the Department's role as the principal consumer and a key collector of foreign intelligence. DFAIT's role: 4. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is ultimately responsible in law for the conduct of Canada's activities abroad and its relations with the international community. As the Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and National SecurityIF ANS, you will play a critical part in shaping the government's approach to foreign intelligence. 5. The Foreign Intelligence Division (ISI) works closely with other elements of the Canadian security and intelligence/S&I community, and has resources dedicated exclusively to the collection, assessment and dissemination of foreign intelligence within DFAIT and to missions abroad. 000053 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) - International s.15(1) - Security 6. partners TOP SECRET-CEO -2- As you have been briefed, ISI is engaged with domestic (CSE) and foreign 7. ISI is currently in discussions with CSIS aimed at concluding a comprehensive The memorandum of understanding/MOU covering the outcome could go a long way toward 1 Options for consideration: 8. Against the above background, you may wish to consider the following options. The first two would be consistent with the Westminster tradition of checks and balances, your responsibility for the conduct of Canada's activities abroad and DFAIT's established role. A~ Create a new, stand-alone foreign intelligence agency • • • • Seek a legislative mandate for a new foreign intelligence agency from Parliament, reporting to the Minister of Foreign Affairs-the UK and Australian model Separates foreign and domestic intelligence, mitigating public acceptability concerns, eg civil liberties, human rights Has the advantage of legislative and legal clarity, with an understood mandate and its own lines of authority. Downsides are many, including public visibility, heavy start-up and infrastructure costs, and a significant learning curve before expectations can be met B.Build on existing mandates, structures and capabilities • • • • Delivers on election commitments without having to enact new legislation, incur significant budgetary costs or face public controversy Takes advantage of the existing structure for managing the S&I community, running down from ad hoe meetings of ministers and FANS through the National Security Advisor and the ADM's, assessments and collections committees Recognizes the Minister of Foreign Affairs' and DFAIT's central role in managing Canada's foreign intelligence activities Realizes the synergies of a cooperative framework, with clearly defined missions and lanes in the road 000054 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.15(1) - International s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET-CEO -3- • Eases the way toward creating a stand-alone foreign intelligence agency, should the government decide to take that route C.Expand CSIS' legislated authority • • • Creates a single point for Canada's domestic security and foreign intelligence activities, which is also its greatest disadvantage Will trigger public controversy and concerns over civil liberties, with CSIS still dealing with the fallout from the O'Connor Commission and the Air India enquiry ahead Deviates from the experience of the US, UK, Australia and other Western democracies, which have gone to great lengths to sep~ the domestic security and foreign intelligence functions • • • Perpetuates the conflicted and competitive relationships within the Canadian S&I community, which are fed by the perception at CSlS that it should be Canada's sole intelligence agency Builds in distortions from the outset as CSIS will continue to be driven by threats to Canada and Canadians-"securitv intelligence" • • Implications for DFAIT of option B • • • Establish an integrated and fully transparent relationship with CSIS, including a joint mechanism for managing activities abroad, eg Leverage existing relationships with CSE, DND and other domestic partners and allies, minimizing turf issues, run-in costs and Restructure ISI to reflect its enhanced role, including putting the on a sound financial basis so it can continue to grow • NEXT STEPS: 9. However the government ultimately proceeds, you will be facing critical decisions bearing directly on the question of whether DF AIT should play an enhanced foreign intelligence role-- in its own right and in managing Canada's activities abroad. 000055 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) - International s.15(1) - Security s.69(1 )(g) re (d) s.69(1 )(g) re (e) TOP SECRET-CEO -4- 12. We are available, if you wish, to discuss the issues raised in this memorandum, the way ahead, ant Peter Harder will also be engaging Jim Judd on how DFAIT and CSIS can move forward together. James R. Wright Assistant Deputy Minister International Security Branch and Political Director V. Peter Harder Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 000056 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDFI00022 Title A name given to the resource James R. Wright & V. Peter Harder, ISI-061, Information Memorandum for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, A Canadian Foreign Intelligence Agency, 17 May 2006 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 17-May-06 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Foreign Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource A-2023-03407 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access to Information Request Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/e4c6adbe855336402872a1a8c93a1d8e.pdf ecc3f7b472f47582cdfabb627492a1be PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project GAC ATIP A-2023-03407 GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 Part 2 DFAIT "Foreign Intelligence Collection Abroad" 25, 26, 27 May 2004 (Drafts) �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information s.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) - Defence a s.15(1 f- International ( DRAFT DRAFT MAY 25/04 TOP SECRET Foreien Intellieence Collection Abroad Issue: Canada lacks a capability to collect foreign intelligence abroad. In light of many new challenges to Canadian interests at home and abroad, some, but not all in the field of national security, the question of whether Canada now needs such a capability needs to be reconsidered. Among the issues that need to be examined are: what are Canada's FI needs; what are the mandates, capabilities and activities of existing members of the Canadian intelligence community in the foreign intelligence field; and, what options are available to meet any unfulfilled needs for FI? Foreign Intelligence Requirements: Within the government there are several agencies cunently involved in foreign intelligence c?llection, both in Canada (CSIS) and abroad (CSE, ONO and DFAIT), but Canada depends on its Allies for the largest pai1 of its foreign intelligence information. And by and large, we have no independent means to verify or cotToborate the information we receive. Allied intelligence _ • - - - If we are to remain competitive in the emerging world economy we need more foreign intelligence focussed on Canadian needs. Canadian interests will always take second place to those of our Allies, and may occasionally mn counter to theirs. Our heavy reliance on our Allies also means that foreign policy decisions may be taken on the basis of infotmation which could be to infmm policymakers. A couple of recent examples underscore this point. l There are other examples where the reliance on Allies has left gaps in our knowledge, 000320 v•v �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.15(1) - Defence s.15(1) - International ( s.15(1) - Security DRAFT DRAFT One TOP SECRET May 26,2004 Existine Structures and Mandates Within the existing Canadian intelligence community, several agencies are cuITently involved in foreign intelligence collection. Although there are a few single-issue collectors (e.g., Transpoti Canada and CBSA) the major collectors are: CSE, DND, FAC and CSIS. The activities and mandates of these organizations are described below. Communications Security Establishment CSE's foreign intelligence mandate is as follows: 11 to acquire and use info1mation from the global info1mation infrastructure for the purpose of providing foreign intelligence, in accordance with Government of Canada priorities. 11 (Section 273.64(1) of the CSE Act) Foreign intelligence is defined in the same Act as follows: 11 Info1mation or intelligence about the capabilities, intentions or activities of a foreign individual, state, organization or te1Torist group, as they relate to international affairs, defence or security. 11 CSE collects SIGINT :SE also from time-to-time engages m Depaiiment of National Defence ONO is responsible for defence intelligence on issues involving the use or potential use of the Canadian Forces abroad. It is also responsible for imagery analysis and for collecting defence and force protection intelligence abroad in suppo1i of deployed Canadian Forces. Foreign Affairs Canada 000321 v• - �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.15(1) - International s.15(1) - Security s.15(1) - Defence ( In addition to diplomatic repmiing, which is a form of foreign intelligence, FAC md in Canada Slt- i openly throughjhe Interview Program Historically, DFAIT took the lead on all intelligence matters except those directly relating to threats to the security of Canada, which were the province of the Security Service of the RCMP until the creation of CSIS in 1984. Since 1984, FAC's role has been gradually reduced by resource constraints and by an increasingly activist CSIS which has expanded its mandate to fill a perceived gap in Canadian intelligence collection. FAC's legal authority derives from Section 10 of the DFAIT Act which provides in paragraph 1: "The powers, duties and functions of the Minister extend to and include all matters over which Parliament has jurisdiction , not by law assigned to any other department, board or agency of the Government of Canada, relating to the conduct of the external affairs of Canada .. ". Paragraph 3 of that section provides: "The Minister may develop and can-y out programs related to his powers, duties and functions for the promotion of Canada's interests abroad ... " Canadian Security Intelligence Service CSIS 's principal function is to collect and analyze info1mation and intelligence "respecting activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada." CSIS can also collect foreign intelligence "within Canada" under the provisions of Section 16 of the CSIS Act, which enables the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Defence to seek assistance from CSIS in the collection of info1mation or intelligence in relation to the defence of Canada or the conduct of the international affairs of Canada. The intelligence which CSIS may collect pursuant to Section 16 relates to the "capabilities, intentions or activities of any foreign state, or group of foreign states ... " It is clear that the legislators who passed the CSIS Act intended to differentiate between intelligence relating to threats to the security of Canada and intelligence relating to the capabilities, intentions or activities of foreign states (i.e., foreign intelligence), and to limit collection of the latter within Canada. In recent years CSIS has 000322 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.15(1) - Security ( TOP SECRET DRAFT DRAFT May 27 Options for Enhanced Foreien lntellieence Collection Abroad The creation of a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service was considered by the Meeting of Ministers on Security and Intelligence (MMSI) in 2002. Ministers decided not to pursue this option at that time. Rather, they directed that enhanced efforts be made to augment existing foreign intelligence collection mechanisms. In response to those instructions, and in light of the new threat paradigm where asymmetrical threats such as ten-orism have become the twenty-first century's 'cold war', CSIS has felt the need t FAC's response to the Minister's directions was the creation of the Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP). This program entails the assignment of foreign service officers to key missions with a mandate to report on issues relating to Canada's intelligence priorities. They were 'fenced off and thereby not required to undertake the routine, non-reporting functions that consume much of their peer's time. These initiatives have met with md FAC believes that there continues to be a need for more "made-in-Canada" tore1gn 1merngence. While an expansion of the GSRP program could fill some of the gaps, the need for a foreign intelligence capacity • needs to be re-examined. If a decision were taken to create a foreign intelligence agency, there are a number of models which could be adopted. The foreign intelligence agencies of our closest Allies fall into two categories: the stand-alone agency repo1iing to the executive which is found in the USA with the CIA; and a stand-alone agency reporting to the Forei1m Minister which is the model adopted by Britain and Australia. Another model, known , , 1s not recommenctect. utner western democracies do : l 000323 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D1vulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information s.15(1) - Security ( DRAFT DRAFT May 27 collection collection • • TOP SECRET • •• • • ······pg,,,,,!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! regarded by most countries as potentially dangerous. More information on the various models described in the preceding paragraph can be found in the attached document, which also outlines some of the advantages and disadvantages of each. 000324 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.15(1) - Security f SECRET Foreign Intelligence Canada lacks a capability to collect foreign intelligence abroad --- -- --- -- We rely heavily on our allies for intelligence to inform our foreign policy decisions. There is a risk that the intelligence we receive, in addition to informing us, may occasionally be intended to influence Canada to follow a particular course of action. In light of the many new challen_ges to Canadian interests at home and abroad, and the prospect that we could increasingly be on major foreign policy issues, consideration needs to be given to the question of whether or not Canada needs a greater capability to collect foreign intelligence abroad. If it is detem1ined that Canada needs a foreign intelligence capability deployed abroad, the question that needs to be carefully considered is how to proceed in the short tenn. While the eventual (and possibly logical) objective, over time, might be the creation of a separate foreign intelligence agency, somewhat akin to the British SIS or the Australian SIO, full "agency" status' might be years away, given the considerable lead time required to get such a capability up an running. It may also be detennined, after some experience that a modest capability suffice for Canadian requirements, thereby precluding full agency status. A step-by-step approach should be taken over the next year or so working towards a foreign intelligence "capability" within the context of current institutions. This could evolve easily into a foreign intelligence service should the government of the day so decide. Over the short to medium tem1, what is essential is presenting Ministers with the full array of policy issues involved, a considered time-line and decision points as we consider this issue carefully. Foreign intelligence is a complex area and among the first items to be detem1ined are the following: accountability and reporting arrangements to Ministers; reporting and consultative arrangements to and with clients; relationships among and within the key Canadian foreign policy agencies and Departments; the role of the Coordinator in PCO; methods of operation; priorities for collection; logistics and support. Each of these items wi 11 need to be considered in the course of preparing a Memorandum to Cabinet on this subject. A realistic assessment of costs will also need to be prepared, providing a longer-tenn appraisal of the possible costs of a full foreign intelligence agency, and a short to medium-term assessment of the costs of a graduated approach to a Canadian capability in this area. The goal at this time should be to obtain a mandate from the group of Deputies examining Canada's National Security, that FAC should take the lead in evaluating this issue, both as the principal user of foreign intelligence, a collector of it and the Department mandated by Parliament to manage Canada's international relations- of which foreign intelligence is manifestly a part. 000325 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) " s.15(1) - Defence s.15(1) - International f DRAFT DRAFT MAY 25/04 TOP SECRET Foreign Intelligence Collection Abroad Issue: Canada lacks a capability to collect foreign intelligence abroad. In light of many new challenges to Canadian interests at home and abroad, some, but not all in the field of national security, the question of whether Canada now needs such a capability needs to be reconsidered. Among the issues that need to be examined are: what are Canada's FI needs; what are the mandates, capabilities and activities of existing members of the Canadian intelligence community in the foreign intelligence field; and, what options are available to meet any unfulfilled needs for FI? Foreign Intelligence Requirements: Within the government there are several agencies currently involved in foreign intelligence collection, both in Canada (CSIS) and abroad (CSE, DND and OF AIT), but Canada depends on its Allies for the largest part of its foreign intelligence information. And by and large, we have no independent means to verify or corroborate the information we receive. Allied intelligence If we are to remain competitive in the emerging world economy we need more foreign intelligence focussed on Canadian needs. Canadian interests will always take second place to those of our Allies, and may occasionally run counter to theirs. Our heavy reliance on our Allies also means that foreign policy decisions may be taken on the basis of information which could inform policymakers. A couple of recent examples underscore this point. There are other examples where the reliance on Allies has left gaps in our knowledge, 000326 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.15(1) - Defence • s.15(1) - International s.15(1) - Security DRAFT DRAFT One May 26.2004 TOP SECRET monitored, because they are trouble spots where the involvement of Canadian peacekeepers is contemplated. Existing Structures and Mandates Within the existing Canadian intelligence community. several agencies are currently involved in foreign intelligence collection. Although there are a few single-issue collectors (e.g., Transport Canada and CBSA) the major collectors are: CSE, ONO, FAC and CSIS. The activities and mandates of these organizations are described below. Communications Security Establishment CSE's foreign intelligence mandate is as follows: " to acquire and use information from the global information infrastructure for the purpose of providing foreign intelligence. in accordance with Government of Canada priorities." (Section 273.64(1) of the CSE Act) Foreign intelligence is defined in the same Act as follows: "Information or intelligence about the capabilities. intentions or activities of a foreign individual, state, organization or terrorist group, as they relate to international affairs, defence or security." CSE collects SIGINT pursuant to Section 16 of the CSIS Act. CSE also from time-to-time engages in Department of National Defence ONO is responsible for defence intelligence on issues involving the use or potential use of the Canadian Forces abroad. It is also responsible for imagery analysis and for collecting defence and force protection intelligence abroad in support of deployed Canadian Forces. 000327 ✓-~ �s.15(1) - Defence .. s.15(1) - Security GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.15(1) - International f roreign Affairs Canada In addition to diplomatic reporting. which is a form of foreign intelligence. F AC §_i1d in Canada openly through the Interview PrograniJ c, TI::--[ Historically. FAC took the lead on all intelligence matters except those directly relating to threats to the security of Canada. which were the province of the Security Service of the RCMP until the creation of CSIS in 1984. Since 1984, FAC's role has been gradually reduced by resource constraints and by an increasingly activist CSlS which has expanded its mandate to fill a perceived gap in Canadian intelligence collection. FAC's legal authority derives from Section I O of the DFAIT Act which provides in paragraph I : "The powers, duties and functions of the Minister extend to and include all matters over which Parliament has jurisdiction. not by law assigned to any other department. board or agency of the Government of Canada, relating to the conduct of the external affairs of Canada ... ". Paragraph 3 of that section provides: "The Minister may develop and carry out programs related to his powers. duties and functions for the promotion of Canada's interests abroad .... '· Canadian Security Intelligence Service CSIS's principal function is to collect and analyze information and intelligence "respecting activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada." CSIS can also collect foreign intelligence "within Canada'' under the provisions of Section 16 of the CSIS Act, which enables the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Defence to seek assistance from CSIS in the collection of information or intelligence in relation to the defence of Canada or the conduct of the international affairs of Canada. The intelligence which CSIS may collect pursuant to Section 16 relates to the "capabilities, intentions or activities of any foreign state. or group of foreign states ... " It is clear that the legislators who passed the CSIS Act intended to differentiate between intelligence relating to threats to the security of Canada and intelligence relating to the capabilities, intentions or activities of foreign states (i.e .. foreign intelligence), and to limit collection of the latter within Canada. In recent years CSIS hm 000328 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information s.15(1) - Security a TOPSECRET DRAFT DRAFT Ma:y27 Options for Enhanced Forei&n Intelli&ence Collection Abroad The creation of a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service was considered by the Meeting of Ministers O.Jl Security and Intelligence (MMSI) in 2002. Ministers decided not to pursue this option at that time. Rather, they directed that enhanced efforts be made to augment existing foreign intelligence collection mechanisms. In ~sponse to those instructions, and in light of the new threat paradigm where asymmetrical threats such ~terrorism have become the twenty-first century's 'Cold War\ CSIS has felt the neec - FAC's response to the Minister's directions was the creation of the Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP). This program entails the assignment of foreign service officers to key missions with a mandate to report on issues relating to Canada's intelligence priorities. They were 'fenced off and thereby not required to undertake the routine, non-reporting functions that consume much of their peers' time. These initiatives have met witl and FAC believes that there continues to be a need fQr more "made-in-Canada" foreign intelligence. While an expansion of the GSRP . program could fill some ofthe gaps, the need for a foreign intelligence capacity - - . · If a decision W<;re taken. to create .a fore,ign intelligence agency, ther~ are a number of . mociel.s W;hich cot1ld be adopted .. The foreign iµtelligence agencies of ow: closest Allies fall into twc.f categories: the stand~~lcme agen.cy n:porting to the executive which is found in the USA with the~~A; an:ti a,statid-alori.e agency reporing tQ tlie Foieign Minister whichis the model adopt~d , by Britain aridAustrtdta. Another model, known 1 .s not recommended, Other western ' • -,, ' • /, ' ,_ < ~ - 000329 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'acces ii !'information s.15(1) - Security uRAFT DRAFT May 27 TOP SECRET - collection abroad, and for good reason. Foreign intelligence• (and the different safeguards and controls that this would require) are regarded by most countries as potentially dangerous. More information on the various models described in the preceding paragraph can be found in the attached document which also outlines some of the advantages and disadvantages of each. 000330 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDFI00021 Title A name given to the resource DFAIT, Foreign Intelligence Collection Abroad (DRAFTS), 25-27 May 2004 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 25-27-May-04 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 Part 2 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Foreign Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource A-2023-03407 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access to Information Request Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/0208a2c77179d1abe5cfbbf742c36015.pdf 91bde0feef515a9231ce7264b0a14068 PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project GAC ATIP A-2023-03407 GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket DFAIT Livermore to Graham "Expanding Canada's Foreign Intelligence Collection through CSIS" March 2004 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - o,vulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information b-~~,;/i,.(~, s.15(1) - Security SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY Information Memorandum for: The Minister of Foreign Affairs Expanding Canada's "Forei1::,>n lntelligence Collection" through CSIS \ SUM.t\1ARY: 1. The issue of a Canadian "foreign intelligence agency" is a longstanding one, having been considered at the time of the fonnation of CSIS in the early 1980s and most recently in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Cabinet has never been willing to contemplate the entry of Canada into what is a controversial area of activity. 2. Among the recent initiatives currently under discussion as part of a future "National Security Policy" is the proposed "expansion" of CSIS activities abroad in the area of foreign iritelligence. There has not been serious inter-departmental discussion of this proposal. 3. We continue to see serious difficulties with this proposal: no significant Western country allows its domestic security-intelligence agency to conduct foreign intelligence; this is t h e - - because the legal constraints under ,vhich a domestic a g e ~ e totally absent when Ill . s no role :for the Foreign Minister; unlike the situation in the United Kingdom (the closest parallel to Canada), where the British Secret Intelligence Service reports to the Foreign Secretary, there is no reporting or accountability structure; - - - - - - as defined by the Prime Minister ,ma t n - t e r . 4. While there are advantages and disadvantages in pursuing a "foreign intelligence option" for Canada, the current process for securing this objective are we would advocate: • that the Government refrain from any action on this type of recommendation and omit any reference to "foreign intelligence" in a :future National Security Policy; and 7b 000076 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC:.-On,ulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.13(1 )(a) s.1S(1) - Security SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY if this is something whichMinisters ,vish to discuss, that an inter-departmental group be authorized to prepare a set of recom111e11dations on this issue, having co11Sidered the fn11 range of options, including reporting structures and accountability procedures. BACKGROUND: There are both merits and drawbacks to moving into this area which have been ,veighed by previous governments. Since 9/11, the key driving factor fa1s been that our allies have intensified their intelligence efforts, while we have contribmed relatively little, except for increased diplomatic reporti11g. There is a risk that we win be cut Ollt of current shming arrangements, or possibly more difficult, that the intelligence passed to us will become According to p1:iblic statements by the Director of CSIS, CSIS has. attempted to fill this ga:p in foreign intelligence collection by e1_1j1ancing its activities abroad. CSIS's primm7 role is to collect intelligence relating to threats against the security of Canada, and it is considered a "domestic" security-i11te11igence agency. However, under Section 16 of its Act, it can collect foreign intelligence "within Canada" at the request of the l:Vlinister of Foreign Affairs. It also has "Ministerial Direction" from the former Solicitor General, drafted post 9/1 J, which give it To what we • We believe that, while CSIS's don1estic role is laudable imd folly accmmtable, its It is also clear that the types 01 acco11ntab1llty and reporting sb11ctures appropnate to a :rore1_gn mtel1igence agency were never put into place, l! tl1ere 1s to lx'. achange m tl11s approach, 1t warrants a se1ious Cabinet discussion and a complete review of accountability and reporting structures, as well as procednrns for working in a complex international enviro1,rnent. 000077 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - Security SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY TI1e argument used by CSIS to advance its claims are simple. It has a structure in place; its has trained staff; and this is the cheapest and fastest way to acquiTe a foreign intelligence capability. In the proposed National Secmity Policy, what is recommended is that CSIS be provided with increased resomces to pursue additional foreign intelligence collection abroad (on the fallacious asSUF1ption that this role has already been agreed previously). However, the pattern that CSIS is advancing Domestic secmity intelligence functions under careful ministerial and judicial oversight, is governed by a clear body of rules and is expected to produce materials which are subject to eventual scrutiny by oversight bodies or courts oflaw. Foreign intelligence ftmctions under no such constraints, and is by definition a Virtually every Western foreign intelligence agency works closely with its counterpart foreign ministry, and most, None of the pros and cons of an increased intelligence capability have been seriously addressed in the current discussions about a National Security Policy. Moreover, the issues inherent in this question are unlikely to be resolved over the short run. This is a serious public policy question, with many foreign policy implications, on which a fuU Cabinet discussion is nnavoidable. We believe that "short-term fixes", like expanding CSIS's mandate and pnwichng CSIS with additional resources, Moreover, as the Department ,v:ith the mandate and interest in foreign policy, the Department of Foreign Affairs In the short run, as a National Security Policy is drafted, this docume11t should omit all references to the controversial area intelligence. Should Canada wish to do more in this area, this is not an issue on which we vvish to our fuhtre intentions publicly, nor would it be appropriate in document devoted to domestic issues. a Jg 000078 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDFI00020 Title A name given to the resource Information Memorandum for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Expanding Canada's Foreign Intelligence Collection Through CSIS, 22 March 2004 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 22-Mar-04 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Foreign Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource A-2023-03407 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access to Information Request Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English