1 20 39362 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/9439df42981f6a180e86652471e0ab66.pdf bc824ce7e8a66d7b63c881138638f0c5 PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNE00073 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum to the Prime Minister from the Minister of National Defence [signed] Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource January 15, 2002 (signed January 30, 2002) Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Library and Archives Canada, RG24-G-31, 2006-0314 OFRC, 2008-00176-8. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2022-11502 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English IIIF Item Metadata UUID abc25547-c1e7-465c-80bd-2847d8a528e9 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4371462aaf97e7bcf8ef0f5479a7670c.pdf 0b210e115d115f6d7908be91bd37ded1 PDF Text Text � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNE00072 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum from Deputy Minister (Judd) to the Clerk of the Princy Council (Cappe) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 30-Jan-02 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Library and Archives Canada, RG24-G-31, 2006-0314 OFRC, 2008-00176-8. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2022-11502 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English IIIF Item Metadata UUID d6dec8cc-3788-4a7c-8a5b-12dc4af7caa8 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4c0e73c89bc9fd9c34afad52bf6e2284.pdf 3a36b12dd6881626cfee9e13be6e82d3 PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNE00071 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum to the Prime Minister (unsigned) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource undated [January 10, 2002] Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Library and Archives Canada, RG24-G-31, 2006-0314 OFRC, 2008-00176-8. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2022-11502 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English IIIF Item Metadata UUID 3e43b3cc-5267-4ccf-87d5-efad307cd4a8 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/61fb6e29c3f581d11650821255aa1853.pdf 05022c75049bea92896daa394e4e263b PDF Text Text � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNE00070 Title A name given to the resource "NORAD Rules of Engagement," memorandum to the minister of national defence from deputy minister Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 10-Jan-02 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Library and Archives Canada, RG24-G-31, 2006-0314 OFRC, 2008-00176-8. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2022-11502 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English IIIF Item Metadata UUID 1c8ac1c2-9cbb-40f2-8b15-b04c77956655 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/55e358524a71e03d2e87b0d18bc89dd2.jpg 1f4655aff761286198365f3239517574 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Convoy assembling in Bedford Basin, Halifax, N.S. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1941 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Canada. Dept. of National Defence / Library and Archives Canada / PA-128093 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Copyright: Expired Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dept. of National Defence https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/0252536f6ec87c6b066575d054b458b3.png a7595ae3220a66a65d55c0200c20bcac Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Playfair grid Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canada Declassified https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5d2476683d384374ee1e041adf814b7e.png f14ec6fce4d22cdd8c3bbb6df445d8db Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Cover of Field Service Pocket Book Pamphlet No. 2: Orders and Intercommunication Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1939 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/05c5fb4a59740750e030ed0ab63621b1.png 65c04f6f74d8115a2e1e5578829a13e9 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource FCC D/F Chart (taken from CDWI00315) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 8-Jul-42 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Screenshot from CDWI00315. RG24-C-1, Microfilm reel number: C-5258, File number: 8706, vol. 1, Library and Archives Canada. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/7cfe1c17e05fbdb2cf38ce89f337c906.jpg 0c2f0bc782af8fce23c3f9e80bfb990e Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource War Office: Main Building Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource [n.d.] Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource War Office Second World War Official Collection Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Image: IWM (H 42536). Imperial War Museum Collections, https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205513833. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource IWM Non Commercial License: https://www.iwm.org.uk/corporate/policies/non-commercial-licence. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/e8822f312729ada33a978ce7d7d1ed55.jpg fd292edb1012626e641575ddfca063fb Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Joachim von Ribbentrop welcoming Vyacheslav Molotov in Berlin, November 1940 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 14-Nov-1940 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived German Federal Archive. Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-1984-1206-523 / CC-BY-SA 3.0. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/de/deed.en. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-1984-1206-523,_Berlin,_Verabschiedung_Molotows.jpg. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Some rights reserved by German Federal Archive. See this page for instructions on image use: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/de/deed.en. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/1f67b2bf58cdc60d6fed0e5d8b5515a6.jpg a1b35bcae23672ab9710065c5f5b3491 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Aerial View of Lower Manhattan in 1940 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 11-Mar-40 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource War Department. Army Air Forces. 6/20/1941-9/26/1947. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:New_York_-_New_York_City_-_NARA_-_68145636_ed2.jpg. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Public Domain https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/591e2fedea1d2c9d995e3627ec09a2e1.jpg e793bbd50e21a57b6fdc394169ca0a48 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Americans in Britain: the Training of the Civilian Technical Corps at RAF Radio School, Cranwell, England, 1941 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1941 Description An account of the resource Paul Hand, from Woodhaven, Long Island, New York, at work on a radio as part of his training at No. 1 Radio School, RAF Cranwell. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Ministry of Information Second World War Official Collection Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Image: IWM (D 5286). Imperial War Museum Collections, https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205198855. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource IWM Non Commercial License: https://www.iwm.org.uk/corporate/policies/non-commercial-licence. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f4f49d462af8bfd23de118f9dbb16ed3.jpg 80dca6cf84f9351150c6e429e9725d08 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Laurel, Maryland. Monitoring at the United States Federal Communications Commission listening post Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource July 1944 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Lewis Walker. Farm Security Administration - Office of War Information Photograph Collection (Library of Congress) Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Laurel,_Maryland._Monitoring_8d42303v.jpg. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Public Domain https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/68c79aff75a56d585a3c9c4e5782f3ed.jpg 88c8231979020bbe5950950068238284 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource National Geographic World Map 1935 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1-Dec-35 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource National Geographic Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NatGeo_World_map_1935.jpg. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Public Domain https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b5ae8787c2379cdc5ac0caea30b21d37.png 6d8745c53e3d7e58fbb96c1c208c4816 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDWI (Wireless Interception) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource W/T Room Interior - [No. 4 Wireless School Burtch] Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 13-Nov-41 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dept. of National Defence Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Canada. Dept. of National Defence / Library and Archives Canada / Box [1996-212 NPC] 107 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Copyright: Expired https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/7ec5589acddb64be1bfc9455a6e55863.pdf 70ec619ab062a639a827bc9431ee9b64 PDF Text Text GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'informc5on a I. - Presentation to the Minister November 2006 "'d (/) I (/) ' '""Cl ~ g 00 TOP SECRET Canadian Eyes Only (CEO) I 0 0 '° O', 0 V\ N .j:>. l♦I Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada Securite publique et Protection civila Canada Canada 000010 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Enhancing Canada's Foreign Collection Capacity Deck Description An account of the resource A-2023-03407 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GAC Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/7c0a1d4269755611235652f7098e2684.pdf 8da2b9c87b6ec715f09757d3708a484e PDF Text Text CAG — Released under the Access to Information Act / AMC — Divulgue (s) en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a(' information A-2019-00531 - Pages 1121 IDS,29-1 1-CANADA vo1.2 011 F: •r• TOP SSCBET October E3, 1951. MUMANDUIii ON A CANNADIAH SLCB>sT INTSLLIG-12 1 3 ,MMIM "Sector, my heart and manful spirit urge me to go near. the swift-raring ships, and spy out all ... To thee I will prove no vain spy ... for I will go straight to the .camp., until I may ooze to the ship of Memnon where surely the chiefs are like to hold council." - Iliad, Book Z. "It seems to us to boil down to this: when all the mystery and glamour Is- removed, espionage consists simply of finding a guy who knows sanething you want to know and having him tell'you about it." - The Nett Yorker. I INTRODUCTION It may be assured that, for an indefinite period, the first intelligence requirement of Canada and other Western powers will be a knowledge of the potential of Soviet armed might and the intention to use it. Closely allied with this requirement is a need for intelligence on the Soviet.oapability of causing internal disruption within the borders of non-Communist States, and . the particular targets within- Canada against which these weapons may be directed. Through diplomatic missions and service attaches abroad, Canada enjoys the usual facilities for the overt collection of intelligence. But the intelligence which can be obtained by observers .of this.kind is limited. Valuable intelligence is to be obtained by clandestine methods, and,this nay be more valuable.precisely because it is protected from the passive observer.. At present we obtain'somie .olandestine intelligence'through countere1 spioaage.; but have -so- tar. made. no. attempt to collect intelligence by the use of a secret intelligence service •• :that ie, a servioe-'uaacknouledged by the. governnent but devoted on itim- behalf to the collection or intelligence by secret agents working where inch intelligence is to be -found. The purpose of these notes is to ezamine in what way such a service is - a. unique ,. provider of Utelligenoe s' how it might'benefit the Government of Genada, and ho*- such a service could be 'established and operated. , ', 000063 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 23 October 1951 Description An account of the resource A-2022-00326 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GAC Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived GAC Special Registry File 29-1-1-Canada Part 2 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Title A name given to the resource "Memorandum on a Canadian Secret Intelligence Service" Cover, 23 October 1951 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/233fd3980a34e727b5738c313f10aab0.pdf 2c4d66e6f109e275bcb58fca451c5cb4 PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project GAC ATIP A-2023-03407 GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Public Safety Hurtubise to Day "Enhancing Canada's Foreign Intelligence Capacity" Note: This undated draft memo was prepared sometime after August 2007. �GAC-ReleasedundertheAccesstolnformationsAct/ AMC-D1vulgueenvertudelalo1surl'accesal'informat1on 4, s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO 6915-9 / 18328 I 34 7930 MEMORANDUM TO THE MINISTER ENHANCING CANADA'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE CAPACITY UPDATE (For Information) SUMMARY " Deputy Ministers and Agency Heads - the Director of CSIS, the Chief of the CSE, the Deputy Ministers of National Defence and Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, and I - met on August 15, 2007; to discuss possible approaches to enhancing Canada's foreign intelligence capacity. • Deputies and Agency Heads agreed that the foreign intelligence col!ectionl ~ight best be addressed by enhancements to age~rtmenta! capacity and improved interagency coordination (as opposed to moving ahead with legislation or proposals for a new agency). BACKGROUND • The Conservative Party's 2006 Federal Election Platform included a commitment to: "Create a Canadian Foreign1nt~lligence Agency to effectively gather intelligence overseas, independently counter threats before they reach Canada, and increase allied intelligence operations. " • In October 20.06, I met with Deputies and Agency Heads to •review possible approaches, including: the establishment of a new agency dedicated to the collection of foreign intelligence abroad; amending the mandate of an existing agency or department to include foreign inteUigence collection abroad (e.g., CSIS, DFAIT or CSE); and, increasing capacity of departments and agencies and inter-agency coordination within existing mandates. • In August 2007, Deputies met again, with the benefit of having completed the national security and intelligence priority setting exercise. We reviewed again the possible approaches to enhancing Canada's foreign intelligence capacity, and arrived at a consensus on -shared advice in this regard. 000034 PS-SP A-2008-0096 1364 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - o,vulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information s.15(1) - Defence s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO CONTEXT Security Intelligence and Foreign Intelligence Collection I • ,0.ome intelligence activities.relate to addressing thrieats to the security of I I• (Deleted:, Canada, such as terrorism or foreign influenced activity- security intelligence. Other intelligence activities are carried out to protect or advance Canada's economic.,_,p~litical ()f <lefonce _in.t_er~sts -- foreigp intelligence'. __ Both security and foreign intelligence are currently collected within Can~da and abroad~ consistent with the mandates of departments and agencies as conferred in-statute;;: thr~~gh .th; exer~ise·of c;;.,;~; Prerogative: ••••• ( Deleted: s [ Deleted: and • Deleted: The colk:ctinn ofb-oth $ccurity intclllgence nnd foreign inte!ligenct!' tnk.:s place within Canada Md abro&d CSIS has primary responsibility for the collection. of security intelligence pursuant to section 12 of the CSIS Act. It does so within Canada and abroad; often this is carried out with support from or in collaboration with other departments and agencies, and in concert with Canada's allies. CSIS also collects foreign intelligence pursuant to section 16 of the CSlS Acrbut the Act allows csrs· to do so only within Canada. It does so at the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of National Defonce, and with your approval, Intelligence is also collected by other departments and agencies, for example: - DFArr collects intelligence relating to the conduct of the external affairs of Canada; - DND and the Canadian Forces collec~intclligcnce regarding,Canada's defence interests; • - CSE is the lead agency for all technical collection (signals intelligence) for security and foreign intelligence; and, . the RCMP collects intelligence related to its criminal investigation mandate. I ·( Deleted: s Deleted: in respect Deleted: of Gaps in Current Collection Needs I of the Government's priorities (i.e.: CSIS has the mandate and auttJ.onty to collect intelligence related to threats to the security of Canada both within and outside Canada). ·1 I and focused on collection abroad and the assessment of intelligence mformation. • 000035 PS-SP A-2008-0096 1365 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO A New FPreign~ntelJ{gi;TJce Agency or an Expanded Mandate for CSIS? • The establishment of a new agency to collect foreign intelligence abroad is judged to be very costly, a very long-term endeavour, and likely to be controversial in the current Parliamentary context • Expanding the mandate of CSIS to collect foreir inte!lirence abroa~p In terms of opening up the CSJS Act, further assessment has also suggested that legislative changes required to the Act may be more complex than initially contemplated, and go well beyond simply removing the "within Canada" provision of section 16 of the CSIS Act. .Enl1,mdng_Caoacitv Within Existing Mandates • There is consensus among key departments and agencies that the full potential of current foreign intelligence collection activities is not realized, and that shortfalls in our existing intelligence collection 2ft: related principaliy to capacity and coordination, not gaps in mandate. • By enhancing capacity within existing legislative frameworks and mandates, departments and a encies could ex and their activities. This could inciude, for exam ie, •• • , more resourfle~ for intelligence assessment and dissemination, and new mechanisms lo coordinate acttvlties and the assessment and application of inteiiigence at home and abroad. • In this regard, receni steps taken by Deputies to improve and streamHne the section ! 6 application and renewai process wiii certainly improve both coordination within the inteiHgence community and assist in identifying ciearer foreign inteWgence prioritles . •3- 000036 PS-SP A-2008-0096 1366 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO NEXT STEPS ~ In light of the shared assessment of the key Agency Heads and Deputy Ministers, I would propose to consult departments and agencies on what proposals might go forward to Ministers at an early stage to support enhancement of Canada's foreign intelligence capacity. • If you believe it would be useful, I would be pleased to organize a briefing for 'you involving key Deputies and Agency Heads. f am available at your convenience to discuss this matter. Suzanne Hurt6bise Prepared by: NSPD -4 - 000037 PS-SP A-2008-0096 1367 37 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDFI00026 Title A name given to the resource Suzanne Hurtubise, Memorandum to the Minister, Enhancing Canada's Foreign Intelligence Capacity Update, Undated After August 2007 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource Undated-07 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Foreign Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource A-2023-03407 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access to Information Request Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/70fdf97a10864606c6e953e2dfdf185e.pdf cb8aa041e5b6742b2b2f5e90670bcf9d PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project GAC ATIP A-2023-03407 GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Public Safety presentation to Day "Enhancing Canada's Foreign Collection Capacity" November 2006 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'informc5on a I. - Presentation to the Minister November 2006 "'d (/) I (/) ' '""Cl ~ g 00 TOP SECRET Canadian Eyes Only (CEO) I 0 0 '° O', 0 V\ N .j:>. l♦I Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada Securite publique et Protection civila Canada Canada 000010 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information . a TQP SECRET CEO 5 69 1 • ( )(g)re(d) Enhancing Canada's Foreign Collection Capacity • Issue: - The GoC's electoral commitment: "Create a CanadianForeign Intelligence Agency to effectively gather intelligence overseas, independently counter threats before they reach Canada, and increase allied intelligence cooperation." • Objective: • Decision: Ministers will have to consider potential policy, legislative and financial implications. "O ~ ► ~ ~ \0 0\ 0 V1 10 V1 2 000011 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'info~tion a TOP SECRET CEO Types of Intelligence • Under existing legislative frameworks, statutory mandates, and the exercise of Crown Prerogative, Canadian intelligence agencies collect intelligence within Canada and abroad. • Intelligence can essentially be divided into two broad categories: Threat-related: Intelligence concerning threats to the security of Canada (e.g. can relate to terrorism and public safety; espionage and the security of government information; sabotage and the security of government assets and key infrastructure; and foreign interference in Canada's democratic process.) Non-Threat-related: Intelligence on international issues that serve to protect or advance Canadian interests and objectives (e.g. political, economic, defence and security) "tl C/l ' C/l "tl ► t!..> 0 0 QC ' 0 0 I.O 0\ 0 '-" tv • Threat-related and non-threat-related intelligence collection are not mutually exclusive, and can at times overlap. For example, foreign government intentions or state-sponsored activities may be threat-related (e.g., terrorism) or could advance Canadian political, economic or defence interests 0\ 3 000012 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'infor~n a TOP SECRET CEO Threat-related Intelligence "'C {/l C/l "'C ► I • CSIS is the lead agency responsible for the collection of intelligence regarding threats to the security of Canada (pursuant to section 12 of the CS/S Act). The Service collects threatrelated intelligence within and outside Canada, often with support from or in collaboration with other departments and agencies, and in concert with Canada's allies. • Distinctions between domestic threats and international threats are increasingly blurred and have become operationally synonymous .. As a result, effective operations are more and more dependent on close cooperation among agencies (both with domestic partners and with our allies). N 0 0 00 I 0 0 I.O °'0 Vl N --.J 4 000013 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'infor•n a s.15(1) - Defence TOP SECRET CEO Non-Threat-related Intelligence 'i:! Cl) I Cl) 'i:! ► I N 0 0 00 b 0 \0 0\ 0 V, N 00 • There are several departments and agencies involved in the collection of non-threat related intelligence (both in Canada and abroad): - DFAIT collects intelligence relating to the conduct of the external affairs of Canada; - DND/CF collect intelligence regarding Canada's defence interests; and, - CSE is the lead agency for all technical collection (signals intelligence) against foreign intelligence targets • CSIS also collects non-threat related intelligence (pursuant to section 16 of the CS/S Act) in relation to the defence of Canada or the conduct of the international affairs of Canada - but the Act allows the Service only to do so within Canada. It does so on the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of National Defence, and with your approval. 5 000014 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act( __ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'infor~on a TOP SECRET CEO Non-Threat-related Intelligence (continued) • Canada's economic and political objectives are more and more conditioned by international considerations in an increasingly integrated, dynamic and competitive global economy. • Canada's relationship with allies/foreign governments are also increasingly relevant - must continue to demonstrate our ongoing c~mmitment to addressing shared issues of concern. • -0 ~ ~ 0 b 0 Currently there is no department or agency with the legislative or statutory mandate to collect non-threat related intelligence regarding Canada's political and economic interests, through the use of human sources abroad. '-0 °' 0 VI N '-0 6 000015 �s.15(1) - International s.15(1) - Security GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act} AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'infor~ion a TOP SECRET CEO s.16(1) RISKS • There are serious risks associated with any intelligence operations undertaken abroad, and the level of risk increases commensurate with·the degree to which Canadian agencies are operating abroad and with the of the intelligence operations. • • The risks associated with the collection of non-threat related intelligence (political, economic or defence intelligence) are generally more acute, for example: • '",j Cl) I Cl) '",j > I N 0 0 00 I 0 0 \D °' 0 V, l,,J 0 7 000016 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'infor~n a TOP SECRET CEO Potential Enhancements • Enhancing threat-related intelligence collection and operations abroad: - There are currently no legislative/statutory impediments or limitations to the collection of threat-related intelligence collection. Intelligence collection currently occurs both in Canada and abroad; and, >-;:I C/l ' C/l >-;:I > N' 0 0 00 '. 0 0 \D °' - Additional funding could however increase foreign operations and foreign collection efforts as well as enhance collaboration among Canadian Intelligence agencies and with allied partners. 0 \.I\ w 8 000017 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'infor~n s.15(1) - Security a TOP SECRET CEO Potential Enhancements (continued) • Enhancing non-threat related intelligence collection abroad would: - Increase Canada's capacity to pursue its own political and economic interests in a more direct and focussed way than has been possible to date; and, >-tj en I en >-tj ► ' Iv 0 0 00 I 0 0 '°0 °' u, \.,.J I'-) 9 000018 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'inforl<ISation a TOP SECRET CEO s.15(1) - Security Possible approaches A. Give the mandate to collect non-threat related to an existing agency abroad B. Enhance capabilities within existing frameworks and arrangements C. Create a new "Canadian Foreign Intelligence Agency" • ~ These approaches are not necessarily exclusive and could be pursued simultaneously or incrementally. en '"'O ► I Iv 0 0 co I 0 0 \0 °' 0 V1 l_,_J w 10 000019 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'inform~n a s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO A. Give the mandate to collect non-threat related abroad to an existing agency • Amending section 16 of the CS/S Act, to remove the "within Canada" limitation, would substantially contribute to addressing Canada's current and future needs. • This would permit CSIS to collect, within Canada and abroad, political, economic and defence intelligence and to seize upon future opportunities in that regard. • CSIS could use its existing infrastructure, at home and abroad, in building a new intelligence capacity consistent with such an expanded mandate. • There would be greater opportunity for integrating threat related and non-threat related collection operations, both within CSIS and in relation to CSIS's cooperation with other Canadian agencies '"d C/) I C/) '"d >I N 0 0 00 I 0 0 'Cl °' 0 lll L,J .j:,. 11 000020 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'infor~ion a s.15(1) - lnternation~I TOP SECRET CEO B. Enhance Capabilities Within Existing Frameworks ',j en [./J '""d ► I N 0 0 00 I 0 0 \0 0\ 0 • Many of the gaps in our existing intelligence collection activities may be attributed to capacity, not mandate ( e.g: both threat and non-threat related intelligence are currently collected in Canada and abroad). • Departments and agencies could expand their activitiesincluding CEO collection-and leverage existing relationships under existing authorities. Liaison and Foreign Collection • Additional resources to any or all of DFAIT, CSIS, CSE, DND/CF and RGMP to enhance liaison relationships and our diplomatic capacity could have a strong positive effect on the quality, quantity and timeliness of intelligence and open information we collect ( VI l,J VI 12 000021 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations ActL I AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'inforrh~on a s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO B. Enhance Capabilities Within Existing Frameworks (continued) Signals Intelligence • Additional Canadian SIGINT capacity for CSE would support self-directed Canadian intelligence operations (and supporting CSIS, OFAIT, ONO, the RCMP and other agencies generally in their operations) . • Assessment and Analysis • -0 Ul I Ul -0 ► I N 0 0 00 I 0 0 Increasing it to the users applied to priorities. and disseminate cannot be used and Coordination • Enhancing alliances and partnerships with other countries' intelligence agencies as well as ensuring optimum collaboration and cooperation among Canadian intelligence agencies is increasingly important. \Q 0\ 0 V1 w 0\ 13 000022 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'inforntl0on a s.15(1) - International s.15(1) - Security ' ~ TOP SECRET CEO C. Create a new "Canadian Foreign Intelligence -Agency" • Establishing an Agency dedicated to the collection of nonthreat related intelligence would: - Address the key gap in current arrangements, regarding the collection of abroad; - Provide a capacity for Canada to pursue its own political and economic interests in a more direct and focussed way than has been possible to date; and, -i:, VJ (/) -i:, ► t'.J 0 0 00 I 0 0 I.O 0, 0 Vl w --..J 14 000023 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/'S AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'inform~n a s.15(1) - Security C. Create a new "Canadian Foreign Intelligence Agency" • -0 /'fl if) -0 Considerations: • > N 0 0 00 I 0 0 \0 0\ 0 V, vJ 00 15 000024 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'infor~ion a s.15(1) - International ~ TOP SECRET CEO Other Considerations • -::; (/J [fJ -::i ► N' 0 0 00 ' In making a decision on how to enhance Canada'$ foreign intelligence capacity Ministers will need to consider: - Whether enhancements should focus on increasing threat-related or non-threat-related intelligence collection abroad, or both; and how far the Canadian Government wapts to go - Whether enhancements are consistent with Canadians' values; - Impact_ of legislative changes: • Would be controversial (e.g. amending CS/S Act or creation of new legislation for a new agency): • Would impact on Ministers' existing ability to use Crown Prerogative to collect intelligence abroad - Resource implications (financial and human resources); - Linkages to national security review arrangement$; deciding on Canadian intelligence priorities, etc. 0 0 \0 °' 0 V, \J.J \0 16 000025 �it::rf. GAC - Released under the Access to Informations AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces l'intor?i\ation a TOP SECRET CEO Next Steps • Clarification is required on Government's commitment to enhance foreign intelligence capacity (e.g.: threat or non-threat related intelligence). • Further study is required to determine viability of options and associated costs. ~ --0 ~ 0 i • Any enhancements should include provisions to enhance collaboration and cooperation among Canadian intelligence agencies and include enhancements to intelligence analysis. 0\ 0 V, .p. 0 17 000026 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDFI00025 Title A name given to the resource Public Safety Presentation to the Minister, Enhancing Canada's Foreign Collection Capacity, November 2006 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 01-Nov-06 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Foreign Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource A-2023-03407 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access to Information Request Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/3c677b4e03fba36a1054677b25151d93.pdf 6f99721d43eeaa3f14ebeca2a95eae61 PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project GAC ATIP A-2023-03407 GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Public Safety memo to Hurtubise "Enhancing Canada's Foreign Intelligence Capacity Update and Next Steps" Note: This undated memo was prepared sometime after October 2006. �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO TD No. - 342201 MEMORANDUM TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER ENHANCING CANADA'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE CAPACITY Update and Next Steps ISSUE: Enhancing Canada's foreign intelligence capacity. BACKGROUND: • The Conservative Party's Federal Election Platform for 2006 includect·a commitment to: "Create a Canadian Foreign lntelfigence Agency to effectively gather intelligence overseas, independently counter threats before they reach Canada and increase allied intelligence operations. " • Further to direction received from the Minister's offi~e in this regard, the Department led interdepartmental discussions·on options to enhance Canada's foreign intelligence capacity starting in spring 2006 and continuing through the fall. • • Following briefings provided to the Minister late in the summer and early fall, • and consideration of options, the Minister • In October 2006, you met with the Director of CSIS, the Commissioner of the RCMP, the Associate Clerk of the Privy Council Office, the Deputy Minister of National Defence and the head of the Communications Security Estabiishment, to review options. The creation of a senarate a12encv dedicated to the collection of foreign intelligence was discussed, While various other options were discussed at the October meeting, Deputies did not agree on a specific recommended approach. 000044 PS-SP A-2008-0096 1476 L/_L{ �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - Defence s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO CONTEXT: • There is a wide range of intelligence work currently being carried out by the federal government,._ So~e_ intelligence ~~t_iyijLe_? !~l_a!~ !~ ~44r~§~ipg_tlu:ea!s_ !O. _ ..... -~eleted_,_.-~------< the security of Canada, such as terrorism or foreign influenced activity, while • •• -[oeleted:, other intejlig«:ru;_e_activities are carried out to·protect or advance Canada's economic,._political or defen,;:e interests. All kinds of intelligence cat! be, and - ·,..o_e_le_te_d_,_,n_<l_ _ _ _ _ _--< are. collected ~ithin Canada ab~~?~~ ~on~isieni with th; ~arious ~andates . . .. Deleted: The collection of both sccudty of departments and agencies as conferreli;-sl~hlt; by- -P·a-rl1;a-m·· -en-t- o-r- t-hr-o-u··g-h- •• - •• intelligence and foccign intelligence wkcs place within Canada and abroad the exercise of Crown Prerogative and • The co!lection of intelligence regarding threats to the security of Canada is the primary responsibility of CSIS pursuant to section 12 (s.12) of the CS!S Act. . The Service collects security intelligence within Canada and abroad, often with support from or in collaboration with other departments and agencies, and in concert with Canada; s allies. • The Service also collects foreign inte\\fa.ence_pursuant to section 16 (s.16) nf the CSJS Actin relation to the defence of Canada or the conduct or the internationai affairs of Canada - but the Act allows the Service o n l y ~ within Canada. It does so atJ.he..request of the Minister of roreign Affairs or the Minister of'N'ational Defence and with the Minister of Public Sa:fety's approvai, .• Intelligence is aiso collected by other departments and agencies, for example; the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade coliects intelligence relating to the conduct of the external affairs of Canada, the Department of National D'efence (DND) and the Canadian Forces collect intelligence, regarding.(a_I),:,J.4a:~ _\i~ft,p._c~__lnterests,_a_n_d_(J-i_e_(:'.9rrJ~llrJi9a_tforJs_ Security__ . ___ _ Establishment (CSE) is the lead agency for aii technicai coiiection (signals intelligence) against intelligence targets • oeieted: ! • Oe:fei:eci: in respeci Deiete& of A key gap in current iegislative arrangements is !! lack of capadty for Canada At this time, there is no department of agency with the specinc statutory authority in this regard. ANALYSIS:· Based 6i'i interdepartmental discussions, the following approaches Wefe considered to address this gap: -2 .. PS-SP A~2008-0096 1477 '-{S 000045 �GAC- Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC- D1vulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'accE's a !'information s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO o The creation of a separ~te agency reporting to a responsible minister to provide a clear focus for foreign inte!Jigcnce collection (as is the approach in the United Kingdom and Australia, for example, where an agencv responsible for intelligence collection abroad reports to the Foreign Secretary); or o The expansion of the existing mandate of one or more departments or agencies, build.ing on existing legislation and operational arrangenients (e.g.: amending the CSIS Act to allow the Service to collect foreign intelligence abroad). Creation of a separate foreign intelligence agency • •• Establishing a new agency dedicated to ■ collection abroad would address. the key gap in Canada's current arrangements and capacity. It would provide a capacity for Canada to pursue its own political and economic interests in a more direct and focussed way than has been possible to date. It would also align Canadian arrangements more closely with those of our key allies, who have agencies dedicated to collection of intelligence abroad. • The creation of a dedicated agency would require new legislation and a substantial fiscal investment (both in terms of one-time and ongoing costs). The precise costs, time considerations to establish such an agency, and legislative implications are difficult to assess in the absence of preliminary guidance as to .how much intelligence is to be collected (based on GoC priorities), using which collection methods, and how the activities of the new agency would he reviewed. • • That said, the "one time" costs for the creation of a new agency would include acc~mmodations for headquarters and associated infrastructure, including IT costs. 1 These would be higher than most start up Government departments or agencies due to the requirement for greatly enhanced securityand infrastructure to support foreign operations. Parallel investments in other departments or agencies would almost certainly be required, for operations support and coordination purposes. • Considerable thought would have to be given to the exact mandate of a new agency, particularly in terms of how it would interact with Canada's existing intelligence collection efforts. At a minimum, every effort would have to be 1 It is estimated that the CSIS building (which has the required security and IT features). '!'ould cos ■ ,r more today. That building currently supports roughly! ~ -3 - 000046 PS-SP A-2008-0096 1478 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO taken to ensure optimum coordination and cooperation between departments and agencies, to make the most effective use ofresources and avoid parallel or conflicting tasking. • The question of to what Minister a· FI agency would report would also be important, and there would likely be a variety of strongly held views on what would be most appropriate. • Although the option of creating a dedicated foreign intelligence agency was discussed■■l■■■■l■■■■■■I■ • Expansion of the e~igi11_g mandate of one Or more departments or a~nciefu. Q!!ihl.i.ng on existing legislation and operationalai-rangements Another approach to enhance Canada;s foreign intelligence capacity would be to amend existing legislation to give the mandate of collecting - • • •• • • abroad lo an existing body. ; lt WOUlct provide a capacity ior Canada to pursue its own political and economic interests in a more focussed way;, • The potential costs of establishing of increasing a dedicated non-threat-related foreign inteiligence capacity within afi existing department of agency are difficult to assess. Costs would naturally depend ofi how great a capacity wouid be estabiished, and that would relate back to the priorities that are to be addressed. Further study in this regard is stlii required. Preferred approach • Based- em interdepartmental work and our assessment to date there are three recommended proposals: i. Amend s. f 6 of the Esls Act lo fern5V6 the "wlthin Canada;; prov1sion to aliow Cs Is to collect foreign intelligence outside of Canada, with appropriate supporting res5Urces. -4- 000047 PS-SP A-2008-0096 1479 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO 2. Seek resources to expanding the capacity of other departments and agencies involved in intelligence collection abroad and in analysis/assessment (e.g.: CSE, DF AIT and PCO). These resources could increase both foreign intelligence and security intelligence capacity. 3. Identify mechanisms to ensure effectiveness and optimum collaboration among Canadian intelligence agencies regarding the collection of intelligence abroad (e.g.: to ensure that work is complementary, and avoid duplication or unnece,;sary overlaps). It should be noted that these approaches could be pursued independently, incrementally or simultaneously. That said, the Department is of the view that every effort should be made to pursue all approaches simultaneously. CONSIDERATIONS CSIS Mandate • CSIS could use its existing infrastructure at home and abroad in building a new foreign intelligence capacity abroad. There would be greater opportunity for integrating and coordinating foreign intelligence and security intelligence operations within CSIS, and in connection with CSIS cooperation with other Canadian agencies and foreign partners. • Because of the structure of ministerial decision making set out in s.16 of the CSIS Act, the Minister of Foreign Affairs or Minister of National Defence would likely still be required to request CSIS to undertake operations, with the approval of the Minister of Public Safety (and possibly also the approval of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, since operations are occurring abroad). The current Tri-ministerial MoU on s. 16 operations could be updated to address specific new considerations that would arise, such as coordination of work. One consideration in any expansion of the s.16 program would be possible impacts on security intelligence collection efforts. Any enhancements to the s.16 program should be implemented while ensuring security intelligence collection efforts are not compromised. • CSIS believes that woulO ne1p ruma currem govemmem msKmg rcqmrerm:ms; anu mnner, ll!at the removal of the "within Canada" restriction alone (even without new resources) would see an immediate in.crease in foreign intelligence provided. -5- PS-SP A-2008-0096 1480 000048 �V,C - R.•l-■ ud und•r th ■ Acc ■11 to Information, Act/ AMC - D1vul1u• ■ n v•rtu d• I ■ lo, 1ur l' ■ ccll1 i, l'inform ■t,on s.15(1) - Secur.ity General .. . .. . •As discussed, the,½_eJ:i,rSCll,isence ~,;e f~i::.9~i.;!!4a.~o_d_ay_i§ J~f:c~JZ1!.C}!Y_~o- _. __ ... go!lecVpEC,igp};;iteJiJg~~c.e_r_e!~t~ }<.'.9P!1~tl! p_oJiJtc11!~nd economic interest,:. ' • •• .•• • • •. • • . • Although som. .. ....... _ .... . ,there is inadequate focus in thill 11~ Jo inoet'Canaaa's" • . strategic needs today aild in the future. . . • •Prior to moving ahead.,the G()vem111ent wlli needto decide ·now imp9rfamt the collection of foreign .inte!liger;<;e is· and how . far it.wants to, ii • go. tp minimize gaps and/or enhance exi!ting co!!ectlon effods.J:art of the process to determine priorities must include an assessment <Jf risks and benefits, and of potgntlal !imitat!ons on what Canada may be Vliliing to take: !(e.g;, - •• • •• • .The Government ..pust. decide. wheth~r the benefitiof creating a foreign. intelligenc~ capa9ityabroad outweigh3 ili~ risks and to what! . ex.tent the .Government wants to enhance its existiµg 'capacity. There are a number of;jskiassociat~d.wiUi theMllectiotlof foreign inte1ligellcr, whether it it1 in Canada or,abroad.. The activities associated with forei •intelli ence collection . .· , • .. ·' ',. :_- '·.,·. ',, ',, •• ;' • A relat~ ,md potentially cntiqal, fact6~,f'or $1/G~vemmcrit to coosid~ is whether. the ~artadfan public will. v~ew Jh~ eollectio.;i,of foreign intemgence abroad a& _beiµg coqnter tc:i 9ilnadil¥! valUCiS l!Ild ettucs. 1J,ie c;anaqian' public may view the colfoction of . . • . . . .• fbreign intelligence abroad, as being ''un~Canadian'.'; or,it may be viewed It as a practical necessity for Canat:la gi tli() ~ri<i today. •• •••• Inaddifion, furth~ to discussions among Deg.ill(!$ inQpt<lbet '.2006dtJs by no t11eans clear th4t enba1tdng foreign inte!Hgence capacity (i.e., p9litical, military and ~noµtie intellige11ce to iidva;ice C11nadi.lnfo.terest$Jis actually the key interest of the Govem;n.ent. Tiie platform commitment of the Q.ovemmen~ wzis to create a nt:w agency to ''effectively gather intelligenc(!. overseas, .• .··.... . independently counter threatsbeforetheyreachCa!7ada, tinfincr.·ease ~llied intelligence operations", TheGovemment ma)'preforto incr9115e and £.!}l'l~nce PS-SP .Aa200S-0096 1481 000049 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - o,vulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information s.15(1) - Security s.69(1 )(g) re (a) TOP SECRET CEO Canada's involvement h foreign operations to ensure the safety and security of Canada and Canadians at home and abroad. Should the Government prefer to enhance foreign operations abroad, discussion should perhaps instead focus on whether the National Defence Act should be revised to allow the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) to target Canadians engaged in threat-related activities abroad. Interdepartmental Issues While most departments and agencies will likely agree that much is to be gained by enhancing Canada's foreign intelligence capacity, it must be emphasized that consensus on a recommended approach has not been reached. Further work with departments and agencies are required prior to presenting • There is recognition among departments and agencies that any enhancements to existing foreign intelligence collection capacity should also provide for increased coordination among Canadian intelligence agencies and departments, including for example: • .Q_Increase / expansion of secondment and liaison arrangements; .Q_Ncw administrative mcchanisms/MoUs for coordination within the community; o Consideration of the role(s) of the National Security Advisor, or ofa new "National Security Commissioner" as discussed in the Government's election platform (this may b"'. a longer term issue); or o Government-wide interoperability of secure communications (this is a longer tenn lss11e, with work ongoing). ·{ Formatted: Svl!ets and Numb~rlng \ Departments also agree includmg policy makers an t osc wit 1 respons1bil!ties tor intelligence, military, diplomatic or law· enforcement operations. This is a subject under aetive discussion among ADMs. Increasing Canada's intelligence analysis capability is essential to allow government departments to make use of information collected whenpreparing assessments on the dimension, scope and impact of threats and our interests, and in detennining our approaches to address them. PS-SI' A-2008-0096 1482 St> 000050 �GAC- Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC- D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's ii !'information s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO Resources • The precise costs associated with amending the CSJS Act and subsequently implementing CSIS's new mandate are difficult to assess in the absence of well defined objectives (presumably GoC priorities). • The recent decisions on security and intelligence priorities by Ministers provide general guidance. The five priorities identified are: countcr-terrorisn1, supporting the Afghanistan mission, counter-intelligence, organized crime, and weapons of mass destruction. It is v1orth noting that the priorities are predominantly micnted to security intelligence. Parallel investments in departments/agencies other than CSIS would be reguired in connection with an expanded foreign intelligence mandate for CSIS, for operations support and coordination (e.g., DFAIT, CSE, Justice). /,fore broadly, if there is a desire to expand capacity of other departments and agencies for the collection of intelligence (potentially all types) abroad, resources for a range of functions should be considered, including: I •••• -. .- j _suppo_rt; analysis and asses'sii'iem. Con'siliera.ole farther mterdepartmental d1scuss10n and analysis ofrequirements is required. Parliament Amending the CSIS Actto remove the "within Canada" provision from s.16 would be contentious and could lead to a complex review of the entire Act, initiating debate and discussion on a broad range ofissues relating to CSIS' mandate, powers and activities. <;:oncems could be raised over a perceived "concentration" of intel1igence powers arid capabilities in the hands of one agency. Conversely, opening up the CSIS Act would provide a potential opportunity to address other issues (e;g. CSIS sharing of classified information with provincial governments or the private sector). In light of Justice O'Connor's recent reports, somehow addressing ove_rsight and review in the context of CSIS and other departments and agencies' operations abroa,1 would be important. Establishment of a committee of parliamentarians to review national security matters would be one way to do this. PS-SF A-2008-0096 1483 000051 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDFI00024 Title A name given to the resource TD No. 342201, Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, Enhancing Canada's Foreign Intelligence Capacity (Update and Next Steps), Undated After October 2006 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource Undated-06 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Foreign Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource A-2023-03407 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access to Information Request Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English