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FM NATOPARIS SEP29/61
TO EXTER-4AL 2486
REGl'STRY
OPIMMED
INFO LDN WASHDCEMBPARIS CCOS PRIORITY
DM/lliD PRIORITY FM CCOS
REF OURTEL 2458
SEP28
BERLIN-CON TIN GENCY PLANNING
OFOLLOWING IS A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF GEN NORSTADS
ATLANTIC COUNCIL THIS MORNING ON LIVE-OAK PLANNING.NORSTAD BEGAN
BY POINTING OUT THAT HE HAD REVEALED MUCH OF LIVE-OAK PLANNING
BEFORE WITHOUT REFERRING TO IT BY THAT NAME AND WITHOUT SPECIFIC
AUTHORIZATION TO DO SO.HE SAID THAT ANNEX A TO P0/61/765(PARA4
OF
OUR REFTEL)COVERED LIVE-OAK RATHER WELL.LIVE-OAK HAD NOT RPT NOT
EXTENDED TO PLANNING OF OPERATIONS WHICH COULD BE SAID TO BE OF A
MAJOR MILITARY SCOPE ON THE BASIS OF THE SIZE
INVOLVED.WIDER PLANNING,IE
OR NUMBER OF FORCES
PLANNING WITH A MAJOR MILITARY SCOPE,
TOOK PLACE ON A NATO,NOT RPT NOT A TRIPARTITE,BASIS.IT
IS TO THE
WIDER PLANNING THAT ANNEX B(PARA5 OUR REFTEL)REFERS.
2.THE
LIVE-OAK ORGANIZATION STARTED IN THE WINTER OF 1958-59
THE 1958
CRISIS
OVER BERLIN,ON A TRIPARTITE
WEST GERMANOBSERVER HAD PARTICIPATED.THE
AFTER
BASIS.MORE RECENTLY,A
TERMS OF REF FOR LIVE-OAK,
AS DESCRIBED ON A CHART DISPLAYED AT THE NEET ING, WERE: ( 1 )RECOMMEND
QUIET PRECAUTIONARY MILITARY MEASURES;(2)ASSIST
IN BClJN IN AIRLIFT
PLANNING:(3)PLAN
INITIAL
TIOOS IF ACCESS TO BERLIN WAS DENIED; (4)PLAN
THE THREE E~!BASSIES
PROBE OF SOVIET INTENFOR SUPPLEMENTARY
MILITARY EFFORTS.
3.IN
AN AMPLIFICATION,NORSTAD SAID THAT INCLUDED IN ITEM(l)IN
THESE TERMS OF REF WAS INTENSIFICATION
MAINTAINING SUPPLIES
OF NATO PRACTICE ALERTS;
FOR THE BERLIN GARRISON AT A TWELVE-MONTHLEVEL;
INCREASE PATROLLING OF EAST GERMANBORDERS BY UK AND USA;/-,$
8,:43--
SE IN AUTOBAHNTRAFF IC.
4.RE
ITEM(3),NORSTAD
SAID THAT LIVE-OAK HAD DEVELOPED PLANS TO DETER-
MINE WITHOUT QUESTION WHETHER THE ENEMY INTENDED TO USE FORCE TO
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PAGE TWO 2486
FEB2 7 1985
PREVENTACCESSTO BERLIN.THECHARTTHATNORSTADDISPLAYEDAT THIS
POINT UNDERTHE HEADINGQUOTEPROBEOF SOVIET INTENTIONSUNQUOTE
PROVIDETDIN THE AIR FOR A PROBEBY ONE MILITARYTRANSPORT
FROMEACH
OF THE THREENATIONSANDFOR CIVILIAN TRANSPORTS
TO BE MANNED
BY
MILITARYCREWS;a-J THE GROUND
THEREWERETO BE SMALLTRIPARTITE CONVOYS.THE QUOTEGUIDINGPRINCIPLE UNQUOTE
SHOWNON THE BOTTOMOF THE
CHARTFOR THESE PROBESWASGIVENAS QUOTEWILL NOT RPT NOT FIRE
WNLESS FIRED UPONANDTHEN ONLYAS NECESSARYTO EXTRICATEITSELF
UNQUOTE.
SPEAKINGOF THESE PROBES,NORSTAD
SAID QUOTENONEOF THESE
PROBESHAVEENVISAGEDSUSTAINEDCOMBATUNQUOTE.HE
THENWENTON,
HOWEVE~TOWARNTHE COUNCILAS HE HADDONEIN THE PAST THAT,WHILE
FORCE WASIN CONTACTWITHFORCE,THEREWASALWAYS
DANGEROF LARGER
INVOLVEMENT
EVENTHOUGHINSTRUCTIONSSOUGHTTO MINIMIZE THIS DANGER.
THE DANGERREMAINED
NO RPT NO MATTERHOWSMALLTHE FORCE.WHILELIVEOAKPLANS HADNOT RPT NOT BEENCOORDINATED
IN A TECHNICAL
SENSE WITHNATOPLANS,THEYHADBEEN DEVELOPED
TO BE CONSISTENTWITH
THEM:THEFACT THATNORSTADHADLIVE-OAK UNDERHIS CONTROLWASA
GUARANTY
OF THIS.
5.TUR-JING NEXT TO ITEM(4),SUPPLEivJENTARY
MILITARYEFFORTS,NORSTAD
POINTED OUT THATTHIS WASBASEDON RATHERLARGERFORCES.HIS CHART
SAID THATTHE PURPOSEWOULD
BE TO QUOTETEST THE RANGEOF FORCE THE
USSR WASREADYTO APPLY UNQUOTE,AND
STATEDTHATTHE OBJECTIVEWAS
QUOTETO DEMONSTRATE
DETERMINATION
TO REACTWITHFORCE OR TO TEST
THE RANGEOF FORCE THE SOVIETS ARE READYTO APPLY UNQUOTE.FOR
THIS
PURPOSE,IN THE AIR NORSTADENVISAGEDTHE USE OF FIGHTERS TO SUPPORT
AIR PROBESANDTHE USE OF FIGHTERS TO SUPPORTGROUND
OPERATIONS.CN
LAND,ATRIPARTITE BATTALIONPROBEWOULD
BE INVOLVED.STUDY
HADTAKEN
PLACE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF EMPLOYING
A TRIPARTITE DIV.NORSTADALSO
SAID THATCONSIDERATION
HADBEEN GIVEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPANDINGTHE NUMBEROF COUNTRIESINVOLVEDBEYONDTHREE,BUTHE THOUGHT
THIS PROBLEMFELL UNDERANNEXB.NORSTADREMARKED
THATHE THOUGHT
••• 3
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PAGE THREE2486
FEB2 7 1985
THERE WASA BASIS FOR MAINTAININGTHE LIVE-OAK GROUP:THEREWERE
LEGAL AND OTHERREASONSWHYTHERE MUSTBE A BASIS FOR A TRIPARTITE
EFFORT.HE DREWATTENTIONTO THE FACT THAT ON THE PROBE LEVEL
PLANNINGWAS NOT RPT NOT ON A NATIONALBASIS BUT TRIPARTITE,GIVING
IT AN QUOTEALLIED FLAVOURUNQUOTE.
6.TURNING TO AIRLIFT OPERATIONSCITEM
2 IN HIS TERMS OF REF)NORSTADS
CHART SHOWEDA NUMBEROF ALTERNATIVES:Cl)A GARRISONAIRLIFT;(2)A
CIVILIAN AIRLIFTCSUBSTITUTINGMILITARY FOR CIVILIAN TRANSPORT);
(3)QUOTE TRIPLE PLAY UNQUOTE<THE
AIR EVACUATIONOF ALLIED NONCOMBATTANTS
AND OTHERSFROMWEST BERLIN IN 36 HOURS);(4)QUOTE Q-BALL
UNQUOTE<FULL
ALLIED AIRLIFT IN SUPPORTOF WEST BERLIN).NORSTADSAID
THAT THE THREE AMBASSADORS
IN BONNHADSPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY RELATING TO AIRLIFT PLANNING,BUTOBVIOUSLYIT WASTHE MILITARY COMMAND
STRUCTUREWHICHWOULDHAVETO CARRYOUT THE OPERATION.
7.CONTINUING WITH HIS ORAL PRESENTATION,NORSTAD
SAID THAT IN RECENT
WEEKS HE HAD TAKENSTEPS TO INCREASEPREPAREDNESS,FOREXAMPLEBY
.
ESTABLISHING A LIVE-OAK OPERATIONSAND INFO CENTREWHICHCOLLECTED
INFO CONCERNINGINCIDENTS AND OTHERMATTERSOF INTEREST TO THE LIVEOAK PLANNERS,FOLLOWED
TRENDSAND COULDMAKERECOMMENDATIONS.IF
NECESSARY,THEOPERATIONSAND INFO CENTRECOULDASSUMESOMEOPERATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY OR AT LEAST ASSIST WITH IT.NORSTAD EMPHASIZEDIT AS
HIS PERSONALVIEW THAT IF A PROBE WERENEEDEDIT WOULDBE BETTER TO
CONTROLIT THROUGHNATOCOMMAND
CHANNELS.HEHAD ALSO ACTIVATEDAN
AIR COMMAND
POST,SITUATED AT RAMSTEIN,ANDSTAFFED BY TRIPARTITE REPS,
WITH THE DUTYOF EVALUATINGTRAFFIC IN THE AIR CORRIDORSAND ASSESSING INCIDENTS.IT TOO WASCAPABLEOF EXERCISING OPERATIONAL
CONTROL.AFEW TRANSPORTANDFIGHTER AIRCRAFT WEREKEPT ON THE ALERT
TO REACT QUICKLYTO ANYRELOCKINGOF AIR TRANSPORTARRANGEMENTS.
THERE WASA CAPABILITY TO USE MILITARY OR CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT WITH OR
WITHOUTFIGHTER ESCORT IN SUCH A REACTION.HESPOKE OF THE INTRODUCTION RECENTLYOF A NEWFIGHTER AIRCRAFTWHICHWOULDBE QUOTEUSEF'UL•••• 4•
000208
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FEB2 7 1985
PAGEF'OL:R2486
IN THIS OPERATIONUNQUOTE.THE
EXACTIMPLICATIONOF THIS TERMWAS
NOT RPT NOT CLEAR;BUTSIGNIFICANCEMIGHTBE ATTACHED
TO IT BECAUSE
HIS REF WASSO POINTEDBUT AT THE SAMETIME SO VAGUE.THESEAIRCRAFT
ARE KEPT ON CONSTANTALERT,SOMREOF THEMON FIFTEEN-MINUTENOTICE,
SOME ON THIRTY-MINUTE,SOME
ON ONE-HOURANDSOMEON SIX-HOUR.THEY
WEREREADYTO MEETA SITUATION QUICKLYANDEFFECTIVELY.
8.LIVE-OAK IS CONSIDERINGANDREVIEWINGEAST GERMAN
MEANSOF INTERFERENCEWITH GROUND
ANDAAIR TRAFFIC ANDMEANSOF REACTINGPROMPTLY
TO SUCH INTERFERENCE.NORSTAD
SAID THAT EXPERIENCETHIS SUMMER
HAD
CONVINCEDHIM THAT IT WASPOSSIBLE TO REACTAT ONCEMORESAFELYAND
ON A SMALLERSCALE THANAFTER A DELAY.HEWASTHEREFOREKEEPING
FORCES IN POSITION FOR RAPID RESPONSEHO ANYACTIONBY THE OTHER
SIDE.REFERRING TO THE RELATIONSHIPOF LIVE-OAK TO NATOPLANNING,
NORSTADASSUREDTHE COUNCILTHAT IN HIS DUALCAPACITYHE HAD
ALWAYS
MADESURE ANDWOULDALWAYS
MAKESURE THAT LIVE-OAK PLANS
WOULDCOMPLEMENT
ANDSUPPLEMENT
NATOPLANS,NOTRPT NOT CONFLICT
WITH THEM.NATOMUSTBECOMEFULLY INVOLVEDIN°ANY LARGERPLANS FROM
THE FIRST MINUTE.
9.THE DISCUSSION WHICHFOLLOWED
THIS PRESENTATIONANDNORSTADS
QUESTIONOF A NEWEXERCISE TO FOLLOWUP QUOTEOPERATIONLONGTHRUST
UNQUOTEWHICHWASCANCELLED
LAST MAYARE THE SUBJECT OF SEPARATETELS.•
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REF OURTEL2458 SEP28
BERLINCONTINGENCY
PLANNING
'1.
COUNCILGAVEPRELIMINARY
CONSIDERATION
TO DOCUP0/61/765
AT A R STD ,..../
MEETING CH SEP29. GEN NORSTAD WAS PRESENT.HE BRIEFED THE COUNCIL
~Ji/
ON THE SCOPE AND PRESENT STATUS OF LIVE OAK PLANNING.FOR SAKE OF
,J_,
/
COOVENIENCE
WEARE REPORTINGHIS FORMALBRIEFING IN A SEPARATEMSG.
2.IN INTRODUCING
THE DISCUSSIONSECGENSAID THATHE REGARDED
TODAYS
SESSIOOAS ONEDSIGNEDPRIMARILYTO ELICIT FURTHERINFO.HE THEN
SET OUTHIS OWNINTERPRETATION
OF THE TWOANNEXES
TO THE DOCU.ANNEX
A,THE REPORTOF THE THREEGOVTS,WAS
NOT RPT NOT IN HIS ESTIMATION
00 E
WHICHCOUNCILCOMMENT
WASNECESSARILYREQUIRED.
IT WAS
REPORTING
ACTIONOF THE THREEGOVTSTO PLANFOR THE DEFENCEOF THEIR
OCCUPATION
FORCESIF ATTACKED
IN BERLIN.HETHOUGHT
THE THREEGOVTS,
AS ANYOTHERINDIVIDUALGOVTREPRESENTED
IN NATO,HADTHE RIGHTAND
THE DUTYTO PLANFOR THE DEFENCEOF THEIR OWNFORCESIF ATTACKED.
\
ANNEXB, IE INSTRUCTIONS
TO NATOMILITARYAUTHORITIESWASDIFFERiNT
\\
\
;
J
IN NATURE.
IT WASSECGENSUNDERSTAND.nm
THT IF IT OR SOMEVERSIONOF
!
IT WEREADOPTEDBY COUNCILALL EARLIERINSTRUCTIONS
TO NATOCOMMANDERSWITH.RESPECTTO BERLINWOULD
BE WITHDRAWN
ANDTHEREAFTER
ANY
CHANGESWHICHMIGHTBE DESIREDIN LIVE OAKPLANNINGWOULD
BE DEVELOPEDIN NATONO RPT NO MATTERFROMWHERETHE INITIATIVE FOR CHANGE
MIGHTCOME.IF THIS WASTHE CASE WECOULDFORGETTHE PROBLEM
WHICH
I
HADBEENPOSEDBY THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AMBASSADORIAL
STEERINGGROUP
IN WASHOC.HE
MADETWOFURTHERGENERALPOINTS.POLITICALDIRECT:VEAND
STRATEGICCONCEPTWERETHE GUIDINGDOCUSFOR NATOMILITARYPLANNING
ANDNO RPT NO PLANSINVOLVING
NATOFORCESSHOULDBE MADEWHICHDID
NOT RPT NOT COMEWITHINTHE AMBITOF THESETWODOCUS.HEDID NOT RPT
NOT THINKTHATTHE PLANNINGTOUCHED
ON IN EITHER ANNEXA ORB HAD
••• 2
000210
/
/
:~
\
�N
PA GE TWO 2483
IN FACT
OF THESE BASIC
GONE BEYOND THE LIMITS
BELIEVED
THAT THE MILITARY
PLANS
SEEMED NECESSARY
TICAL
DIRECTIVE
AUTHORITIES
CONCEPT.NO
CRISIS
PRIMARILY
FOR PLANS TO DEFEND THE ALLIANCE
THE MILITARY
RPI
NO MATTER WHAT
COlvJMANDERS WERE RESPONSIBLE
WITHIN
THE TERMS OF THE
DOCUS.
3.AFTER
THIS
ARISE,
TO MAKE WHATEVER
THE BROAD CONCEPT OF THE POLI-
IMMEDIATE
BASIC
MIGHT
HAD THE RIGHT
TO THEM WITHIN
AND THE STRATEGIC
DOCUS.SECONDLY,HE
NORSTADS
POINT,A
WHICH MIGHT
BRIEFING
SERIES
ON LIVE
OAK PLANNING
OF QUESTIONS
BETTER
WERE RAISED
BE REPORTED IN
WHICH TOOK PLACE AT
BY COUNCIL
MEMBERS
SEQUENCE RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING
TO GROUP THEM UNDER GENERAL HEADINGS.
4.ITALIAN
MILITARY
ACTION
CONSULTATION
WOULD IN THE THREE .POWERS VIEW
WITH NATO. DID THE IDEA
FOR EXAMPLE, THE SMALL SCALE
REPLY WAS TO THE EFFECT
OF PLANS
OF PREVIOUS
THAT THE QUESTION
PREVIOUS
CONSULTATION
HE DID
ON THIS
SUBJECT
INVOLVED
HIS
THE IMPLEMENTATION
SCOPE OF RESPO.'J
HE WOULD CERTAINLY
ANY PLAN OF MILITARY
NOT RPT NOT KNOW OF ANY DECISION
BY ANY POLITICAL
HOPE THAT
ACTION
IF
GOVERN
PARA 3 .N ORSTADS
HAD BEEN CHARGED ONLY WITH DRAWING UP PLANS.HE
TO SAY HOWEVER THAT
BEEN TAKEN
REQUIRE
PROBES REFERRED TO IN
WHICH WAS NOT RPT NOT PROPERLY WITHIN
SIBILITIES.HE
MIND
OF
REP REFERRED TO PARA 8 OF ANNEX A AND ASKED WHAT SIZE
AUTHORITIES.
HE WAS REQUIRiD
HE COULD BE EMPOWERED TO
IN
WENT ON
THAT
HIS
HAD
OWN
TU IMPLEMENT
DO SO
THROUGH
NATO COMMAND CHANNELS AND NOT RPI NOT THROUGH SOME OTHER CHANNELS.
SEC GEN SAID
PLANS
1
THAT
IT
AT THE POINT
WAS HIS
VIEW
THAT
AT WHICH THEY MIGHT
PARA 8 WAS MEANT TO COVER ALL
HAVE TO BE HiPLEMENTED.USA,
FRENCH AND UK REPS AGREED.
5.SECGEN
THEN ASKED WHETHER IT
POSSIBLE
USE OF CORPS FORMATIONS
AT THE MOMENT.NORSTAD
THAN A DIV
WAS BEING
SAID
THAT
WAS TRUE THAT PLANNING
WAS BEING
THE
DONE ONLY ON A USA BASIS
ANY PLANNING
DONE ON A NATO BASISCAS
INVOLVING
INVOLVING
DISTINCT,WE
UNITS
LARGER
PRESUME,
••• 3
000211
�PAGE THREE2483
FROMLIVE OAKOR TRIPARTITE BASIS).
6.1 PUT MYFIRST QUESTIONSIN THE CONTEXTOF A FEW GENERALREMARKS
EMPHASISINGIN THE FIRST INSTANCETHAT IT WOULD
BE IMPOSSIBLEFOR
MY AUTHORITIESTO CONSIDERTHE ISSUES INVOLVEDANDBE IN A POSITia~
TO GIVE DECISIVE COMMENTS
UNDERTHE PROPOSEDTIMETABLE,IE BY NEXT
WEEK.THEPLANS REFERREDTO IN THESE PAPERS HADBEEN IN GESTATION
FOR SOMEMONTHS.
OURAUTHORITIESWOULD
REQUIREMORETHANA FEW DAYS
TO DIGEST THEM.TURNING
THENTO PARA8 OF ANNEXA I SAID THAT SINCE
IT WASA REPORTBY THE THREE POWERSWE WOULD
NOT RPI NOT PROBABLY
BE EXPECTEDTO CONSIDERREDRAFTINGIT.WE MIGHTHOWEVER
EXPRESS OUR
VIEWS 00 ITS SUBSTANCE.
IT STRUCKt'iE,FOR EXAMPLE,
THATTHE FIRST
SENTENCEOF PARASHOULDBE PUT IN MUCHMOREPOSITIVE TERMS.THETHREE
GOVTSWOULD
RECOGNIZETHATTHE IMPLEMENTATION
OF LIVE OAKPLANS
WOULD
UNDOUBTEDLY
HAVEPOLITICAL AS WELLAS MILITARY IMPLICATIONS
FOR NATO.INDEEDTHE PROBINGHADALREADYSTARTEDWHENUSA GARRISOO
IN BERLIN WASINCREASED.THISPROE HADALREADYHAD ITS POLITICAL
EFFECT ON THE SITUATION.WEMIGHTASK AS WELLWHAT·
WASTHE SIGNIFICANCEOF QUOTETIME PERMITTINGUNQUOTE
IN THE SECOND.SENTENCEOF
THE PARA.TIMEWASALWAYS
A FACTORWITH RESPECTTO MILITARYACTIVITIES.
NOOEOF US WOULD
WISH TO PREVENTNECESSARYACTIONSBUT WE MUST
CLARIFY AS MUCHAS POSSIBLE WHATTHE INTENTIONOF ALL CONCERNED
WAS.
WASIT SATISFACTORY,FOR
EXAMPLE,TOALL MEMBERS
OF ThE COUNCILTHAT
THIS ESCAPECLAUSESHOULDEXIST.WOULDIT NOT RPI NOT BE BETTERTHAT
COUNCILMEMBERS
SPOULDBE BETTERINFORMED
CONCERNING
THE ~UOTECATALOGUEOF PLANS UNQUOTE
REFERREDTO IN ANNEXBIN ORDERTHATTHEIR
GOVTSCOULDPERHAPSTAKEDECISIONS IN ADVANCE
WITH RESPECTTO SOME
OF THESE PLANS.IT WOULD
NOT RPT NOT OF COURSEBE PROPERFOR ME
TO RESERVE THE C DN GOVTS POSIT ION WITH HESP ECT TO A REPORT CONTA IN ING
THE VIEWS OF THE THREE GOVTS.I COULDHOWEVER
WARNTHE COUNCILTHAT
THEREWERECOMPLICATIONS
AHEADIF IT WASINTENDEDTHAT TH£
•••
4
000212
\ \
�PAGE FOUR 2483
IMPLEMENTATION
OF PLANS WHICHCOULDAFFECT THE ALLIANCEDEEPLY
WASTO TAKEPLACEWITHOUTTHERE HAVINGBEENCONSULTATION
ANDCONSENT
IN THE COUNCIL.
6.SECGEN ANDREPS OF USA ANDUK TOGETHERGAVEA FAIRLY SATISFACTORY
ANSWERTO THIS LAST QUESTION.THEY
ALL AGREEDTHATTHE INTENTIONOF
THE PHRASEWASTO PROVIDEFOR THE ABILITY SITUATIONSWHEREIMMEDIATE
ACTIONWASFORCEDUPONA MILITARYCOMMANDER
BY EVENTS.FOREXAMPLE,IF
AN AIRCRAFTWASFIRED ON PLANNINGWOULD
HAVETO PROVIDEFOR THE
ABILITY TO RESPONDIMMEDIATELY.USA
REP EXPLAINEDHIS THINKINGIN
THIS REGARDBY REFERRINGTO A PEARL HARBOUR
TYPE OF SITUATIONWHERE
NECESSARYDEFENSIVEACTIONHADTO BE TAKENIMMEDIATELY.PARA
8 WAS
NOT RPT NOT INTENDEDTO LEAVETHE IMPRESSIONTHAT THEREWOULD
BE TWO
KINDS OF CONSULTATION, a'J E BETWEEN
THE THREEPOWERSANDTHE OTHER
WITH THE COUNCILAS A WHOLE.THISLAST COMMENT
MADEBY USA REP WAS
IN DIRECT RESPONSETO BELGIANREPS POINT THAT IF THEREWASTIME
FOR THE THREE GOVTSTO CONSULTTHERE WASTIME FOR THE COUNCILTO BE
CCNSULTED.
?.NETHERLANDSREP LED OFF THE QUESTIONINGWITH RESPECTTO ANNEXB
IN ASKINGWHETHER
IN NORSJADSVIEW THE THREECIRCUMSTANCES
OUTLINED
IN PARA6 D FITTED WITHIN THE POLITICAL DIRECTIVE ANDTHE STRATEGIC
CONCEPT.NORSTAD
SAID THAT BEFOREREPLYINGTO THIS PARTICULARQUESTION
HE WOULD
LIKE TO FIT THE DOCUIN SOMEPERSPECTIVE.HEHADHEARD
ABOUTTWOMONTHSAGOOF A POSSIBLE DIRECTIVE WHICHMIGHTBE PREPARED
ANDHADTAKENTHE VIEW THAT HE DID NOT RPI NOT NEED A NEWDIRECTIVE
SO FAR AS HIS MILITARYRESPONSIBILITIES WERECONCERNED
AT LEAST.HE
UNDERSTOOD
THATOTHERFACTORSHOWEVER
HADMADESUCHA DIRECTIVE
NECESSARY.HEHADSEEN A DRAFTDIRECTIVE SOMETWOWEEKSAGOAND
COULDSAY THATTHE PRESENTDRAFTWASA VAST IMPROVEMENT
OVERTHAT
ORIGINALDOCUEVENTHOUGHHE WOULD
HAVEWRITTENIT DIFFERENTLY
.THE
IMPORTANT
THING IN HIS MIND WASTHAT DOCUAS DRAFTERPERMITTEDA
••• 5
000213
�PAGE FIVE WRIE
BROADRANGEOF INTERPRETATIONANDHE WOULDBE THE ONE WHOWOULD
HAVETO INTERPRET IT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.HECOULDASSURE
COUNCILTHAT ANY INTERPRETATIONHE WOULDGIVE IT WOULDBE FULLY
WITHIN THE TERMSOF THE POLITICAL DIRECTIVE ANDWOULJSE CONSISTENT
WITH ESTABLISHEDSTRATEGICDOCTRINE.HEWOULDOF COURSEGO FURTHER
IN HIS MILITARY PLANNING.FOREXAMILE,MEASURES
OUTLINEDIN PARA 10
WEREIN HIS VIEW ONLYSOMEOF THE MEASURESWHICHHADTO BE CONSIDEREDTO PUT NATOFORCES IN A POSITION TO COPE WITH A MILITARY
EMERGENCY.HE
HADALREADYDIRECTEDHIS SUBORDINATE
COMMANDERS
TO
PREPARESUCH PLANS AS THEY THOUGHT
WERENECESSARYFOR A MILITARY
EMERGENCY
ANDWHILE THEY INCLUDEDTHE MEASURESOUTLINED
N!PARA 10
THEY WERENOT RPT NOT LIMITED TO THEM.HEMADEIT CLEARTHAT HE WAS
SPEAKING IN TERMSOF PLANS WITH A NATO-WIDEAPPLICATIONANDNOT
RPI NOT IN TERMSOF LIVE OAKPLANNING.SOFAR AS THE SPECIFIC QUESTION
PUT BY NELHERLANDS
REP WASCONNERNED,HE
COULDONLYSAY THAT AN INCONSISTENCY WITH NATODIRECTIVES AS HE UNDERSTOOD
THEMWOULDONLYEXIST
IF PARA 6D WEREREADAS BEING RESTRICTIVE IN
•
THE PLANNEDRECOURSE
TO NUCLEARWEAPONS.INOTHERWORDSIF THE SUBPARAMEANTTHAT ONLYUNDER
THESE THREE CONDITIONSCOULDNUCLEARWEAPONSBE USED HE WOULDTHINK
SUCH AN INTERPRETATIONRESTRICTIVE AND INCONSISTENTWITH THE STRATEGIC CONCEPTAS HE UNDERSTOOD
IT.
8.I
FOLLOWED
UP WITH THE QUESTIONSPECIFICALLY CONCERNING
SUBPARA
6DEMDIDTHIS IN GEN NORSTADSMINDSPECIFICALLY FALL WITHIN THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT.I WASTHINKINGIN TERMSOF POSSIBLE EFFECT OF USE OF
A QUOTENUCLEARSHOT ACROSSTHE BOWUNQUOTE.ONE
POSSIBLE OUTCOME
WAS
THE RAPID ESCALATIONSUGGESTEDEARLIER IN THE PAPER INTO A NUCLEAR
EXCHANGE.THISWASA RESULTWE DID NOT RPT NOT WANT.ONEOTHER
POSSIBLE RESULTWASTHAT THE"OTHERSIDE WOULDNOT RPT NOT RESPOND
ANDTHEN THE WESTWOULDBEARTHE ODIUMBEFOREWORLDOPINION OF THE
FIRST USE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS.
: MMY,T.JT
T '
'
•
000214
�PAGE SIX 2483
9. GENNORSTADSAID THAT HE THOUGHT
FIRST OF ALL THATTHE ACTION
COVEREDIN SUBPARA6 D3 WASCONSISTENTWITH NATODIRECTIVES.HE WENT
ON THENTO TRY TO ADDSOMEPERSPECTIVE.IT WASHIS VIEW THATUSE OF
NUCLEARWEAPONS
EVENSELECTIVELYCOULDBE CONSIDEREDONLYWHEN
EVERYTHING
ELSE HADFAILED,WHENPOLITICAL NEGOTIATIONSHADBROKEN
DOWN,
WHENECONOMIC
PRESSURESHADFAILED,WHENMINORPROBESHAD
FAILED TO CHANGETHE SITUATIONANDWHENFORCES HADACTUALLY
BEEN
FI RED ON.NO RPI NO MATTERHOWf1UCHWASSAID ABOUTTH:C::SE
PROBLEMS
EVENTUALLY
WECAf'1EBACKTO THE SAMEROOTPROBLEl'<l,
WHENGOV
TS WOULD
BE FACEDWITH A DECISION TO ACCEPTDEFEATOR TO TAKENUCLEARACTION.
HE HOPEDTHEREFORETHATWHENCOUNCILWASCONSIDERINGTHIS PARTICULAR
ASPECT THEYWOULD
CONSIDERIT IN THIS LIGHT,NAMELY
THATALL OTHER
CONCEIVABLE
STEPS HADBEEN TAKENTO REMEDYTHE SITUATIONAND HAD
FAILED TO HAVETHEIR EFFECT ON THE OTHERSIDE.
10.I
FOLLOWED
UP WITHTHE QUESTIONSET OUT IN PARA 12 OF YOURTEL
DL1223,IE WASIT INTENDEDTHATTHERE SHOULDBE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN
THE CIRCUMSTANCES
IN WHICHA POLITUCALDECISION WOULD
BE REQUIRED.
NORSTADSAID HE ACCEPTEDTHIS PARAAS A GENERALFRAMEWORK
FOR
\
;
PLANNINGAS HE WOULDINDEEDACCEPTTHE WHOLEDIRECTIVE IF IT CAME
TO HIM.HE DID NOT RPT NOT REGARDTHE DIRECTIVEAS GIVING HIIvlANY
OPERATIONAL
CLEARANCE;THAT
WOULD
HAVETO COMEFROMHIGHERAUTHORITY.
SECGL~CONCURRED
ANDDREWCOUNCILSATTENTIONTO THE GENERALPROVISO
MADEIN PARA8 OF ANNEXB THATALL PLANS WOULD
BE SUBJECT TO
DECISICNS BY GOVTS.
11.ITALIAN REP SOUGHTFURTHERCLARIFICATIONAS TO WHENPOLITICAL
DECISIONS WOULD
BE TAKENANDBY WHOM.SECGEN
ADMITTEDTHAT U GOOD
DEALMORECLARIFICATIONWASREQUIREDON THIS POINT.REVERTINGAGAIN
TOXTHEISSUE DEALTWITH IN PARA6D SECGENSAID HE UNDERSTOOD
THAT
BY SELECTIVEUSE WASMEANTUSE OF A SMALLWARHEAD
WITH GREATPRECISION ANDNOT RPT NOT,FOR EXAMPLE,
THE USE OF THE STRATEGICAIR
•••
7
000215
�PAGE SEVEN2483
COMMAND.NORSTAD
AGREED.FURTHERMORE
SECGENTHOUGHT
THAT SO FAR AS
POLITICAL DECISIONS WERECONCERNED
CONSIDERATION
HADTO BE GIVEN TO
THE FACT THAT BILATERALAGREEMENTS
WEREINVOLVED,!£ BETWEENUSA AND
OTHERINDIVIDUALGOVTS.COUNCIL
HADNOT RPI NOT MADEMUCHPROGRESS
IN ITS STUDYOF THE CONTROLANDUSE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS.AGREATDEAL
OF FURTHERCLARIFICATIONWASREQUIRED.UNTILTHAT ISSUE WASCLARIFIED THE PRESENTSYSTEMOF CONTROLWOULD
CONTINUETO EXIST.CSECGEN
WASREFERRINGIN THIS INSTANCETO USA CONTROLOF WARHEADS>.
12.BELGIAN REP,REFERRINGTO PARAS9 AND 10
OF
ANNEXB,ASKEDWHETHER
WE WEREJUST BEGINNINGTHE PROCESSOF PLANNINGOR HAOTH£ MEASURES
OUTLINEDALREADYBEENCONSIDEREDIN THE TRIPARTITE CONTEXT.NORSTAD
RPTEDWHATHE HADSAID EARLIER TO THE EFFECT THAT HE HADALREADY
ISSUED INSTRUCTIONSTO HIS COMMANDERS
TO PREPAREPLANS ON THESE
MEASURESANDON OTHERS.NATO-WIDE
PLANNINGTHEREFOREWASBEING UNDERTAKENcx,;J A NATO-WIDEBASIS ANDNOT RPT NOT ON A TRIPARTITE BASIS
EXCEPTFOR THOSESPECIFIC CONTINGENCY
PLANS WHICHHADHERETOFORE
COMEUNDERTHE LIVE OAKLABEL.
13.THERE FOLLOWED
SOMERATHERCONFUSEJDISCUSSION ON WHATWASMEANT
IN PARA6 B BY TERMQUOTEPOLITICAL AUTHORITIESUNQUOT£.FRENCH
REP
SAID THATTHEYWERETHE COMPETENT
POLITICAL AUTHORITIES,WHICH
WAS
NOT RPI NOT PARTICULARLY
ENLIGHTENING.USA
REP SAID THATTHE TERMUSED
IN PARA6 B HADTHE SAMEMEANINGAS THE TERMINOLOGY
OF PARA8.NORSTAD
WASAS USUALSTRAIGHTFORWARD
ON THE SUBJECT.IT WASCLEAR,HE SAID,
THATSOMEBODY
HADTO DIRECT HIM TO IMPLEMENT
PLANS WHICHHE HAD
DRAWN
UP. UNTIL HE WASTOLDDIFFERNTLYPOLITICAL AUTHORITESNEANT
TO HIM COUNCIL.HEWISHEDEVERYONE
TO UNDERSTAND
HIS POSITION CLEARLY.
IF AN EMERGENCY
WERETO ARISE TOMORROW
HE WOULD
SEEK COUNCILDIRECTICN. IN INTERPOSEDTO SUGGESTTHATFOR CDN AUTHORITIESIT WAS
DIFFICULT AT SUCHA DISTANCETO SEE GENNORSTADSUSCINCEURHAT.FOR
THEMANDFOR THE CDN PUBLIC GENNORSTADWASCOMMANDER
OF NATOTROOPS
•
• ••8
000216
�PAGE EIGHT 2483
NORSTADACCEPTEDTHE POINT WITH GOODGRACEBUT DID SUGGESTTHAT
INSOFARAS ANNEXA WASCONCERNED
ANOTHERAUTHORITYDID EXIST.S£CGEN
ONCEAGAINAGAINMADETHE POINT THAT IN HIS MINDTHE THREE GOVTS
HAD THE RIGHT ANDTHE RESPONSIBILITY TO TAKEACTIONTO DEFENDTHEIR
FOR:;ES IN BERLIN AGAINSTATTACKJUST AS EACH GOVTOF THE ALLIANCE
HAJ THAT RIGHT.I THOUGHTIT WISE TO LEAVENO RPT NO DOUBTON THIS
POINT IN THE MINDS OF THE COUNCILAND I INDICATEDTHEREFORETHAT I
WASSURE MY AUTHORITIESWOULDHOLDTHE VIEW THAT IF ANDWHENNORSTAD
ORDEREDFORCES INTO ACTIONHE WASSACEURANDNOBODYELSE.THAT HE
MIGHTPLAN WITH DIFFERENTHATS WASONE THING,BUTFOR PUBLIC OPINION,
CNCEHE ENGAGEDIN MILITARYACTION IT WOULD
BE DIFFICULT TO MAKE
LEGALDISTINCTIONS.FINLETTERSAID HE DID NOT RPI NOT WISH AT THIS
POINT TO COMMENT
FURTHERON PROBLEMANDNORWEGIAN
REP URGEDTHAT
FURTHERDISCUSSIONSSHOULDBE RESTOTO A MUCHMORELIMITED GROUP.
DISCUSSIONTHEREFOREBROKEOFF FAIRLY ABRUPTLYANDWILL BE RENEWED
ON TUES OCT3.
14.IT
IS FULLY RECOC¾JIZED
THAT NO RPT NO DECISIONS CAN BE REACHED
NEXT WEEKANDTHAT WE SHALLCONTINUETO ATTEMPTTO CLARIFY THE
MEANINGOF PAPERS BEFOREUS.THE ANSWERSTO SOMEOF THE QUESTIONS
POSED IN YOURTELDL1223 WILL BE APPARENTFROMTHE BRIEFING GIVEN
BY NORSTADON LIVE OAKPLANNING.I SHALLPURSUETHE OTHERQUESTIONS
AS COUNCILDISCUSSIONCONTINUES
LEGER
000217
�
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NATO
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Berlin Crisis / 29 SEPTEMBER 1961
Date
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1961-09-29
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en
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CDTT00032
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NATO Paris to External Affairs, ‘‘Berlin-Contingency Planning,’’ 29 Sept. 1961, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-1-40, part 1.
air lift
Berlin contingency
Lauris Norstad
Live Oak
tripartite
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/de20d3d12f919449dc84054a49de020c.pdf
c35e89933f5635c5555aea8c138b2048
PDF Text
Text
.•
.,
•...
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J)L(,)Yl'l~i..t>,q
(-J...'i '(, '1
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October
11, 1951.
BERLIN - CONTINGENCY
PLANNING
Following repeated requests
from other members
of the Council for information
on contingency
planning,
the French, United Kingdom and United States authorities
presented
a report to the Council on their contingency
planning for Berlin on September 27. The information
contained
in this report was supplemented by a briefing
given by General Norstad on September 29. Additional
information
was also obtained during recent meetings of
the Council and from conversations
which General Kitching
had with Major-General
Baker of the United Kingdom who is
responsible,
under General Norstad,
for the preparation
of
"Live Oak" plans,
Following is a summary of the main
features
of "Live Oak" planning on the basis of the information currently
available .•
2,
As explained
by General Norstad, the "Live Oak" :
organization
started,
on a tripartite
basis,
in the winter;
of 1958-59,
More recently
a West German observer had
participated.
The underlying
purpose of the "Live Oak"
planning is to enable the Three Powers most directly
concerned to carry out their special responsibilities
regarding
Berlin in all contingencies.
It is primarily
directed
at readying appropriate
immediate responses
to
possible
Soviet Bloc interference
with Western rights
of
access to Berlin in the air or on the ground.
3.
According to the Three Power report,
General
Norstad has been responsible,
in his capacity
as.Commanderin-Chief
of United States forces in Europe, for developing
these plans over the past two years on the basis of
instructions
received
from the French, U.K, and U.S.A.
governments.
Although the Three Power report appears to,
be clear in this regard,
the discussion
in NATOCouncil ·
indicated
some difference
of view between the Permanent
Representatives
of the Three as to the origin of General:
Norstad's
precise authority.
It was the U.S. Permanent 1
Representative's
under·standing
that General Norstad. had
been given a special
capacity which was neither
that of,'
USCINCEURnor that of SACEURbut was one which gave him,
planning and command responsibilities
with respect
to the
Three Powers' troops in Berlin.
That capacity had been:
given to him in order to create a better
relationship
between Three Power planning and NATOplanning,
••• 2
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4.
"Live
NATO activity:
\~) ft~ 2? \(3?>5
Oak" planning
covers
three
main areas
of
(1)
The development of small-scale
military
probes
to determine Soviet/GDR intentions
with respect
to the denial of ground or air access by force;
(2)
The use of air lifts
as appropriate
essential
requirements
in the event
access is interfered
with or ground
denied;
(3)
The readying of limited
ground forces and
tactical
air forces to be employed, if necessary,
to demonstrate
tripartite
determination
to use
force.
'.1
to meet
civil air
access is
Ground Access
5,
The plans provide that a minimum of ground forces
are to be used and they must be composed of troops of the
three countries
most directly
concerned.
According to the
Three Power report,
the plans call for the use of "small
tripartite
convoys of various
configurations
designed to
test the access routes and overcome physical
o'ostacles".
The plans also include supplementary
military
efforts
(3
above) which would be designed ''to supplement the probe
efforts,
to demonstrate
the determination
to react with
force,
or to test the range of force the Soviets
are
prepared to apply".
The plans for these supplementary
efforts
provide for a total
of three battalion
group_s,
each comprising troops of the United States,
the United
Kingdom and France.
These groups would form approximately
one thousand men each and would form up as convoys to probe
the normal access roads to Berlin._. General Norstad has
indicated
that study has also been given to the possibility
of employing a tripartite
division.
According to 1/iajorGeneral Baker, such a larger force might be used, if
necessary,
to extricate
any Western forces in the corridor.
6.
All the information
available
indicates
that,
whatever the size of the forces used, they would operate
on instructions
to remain within the previously
defin°~
corridors.
i,,oreover,. they would be instructed
not to
open fire first~
if fired upon, they may fire but must then
withdraw.
Under no circumstances
would a force continue
to advance if fired upon.
7.
The French authorities
have agreed to plan for
such battalion
convoys but because they have not allocated
any forces for this purpose or agreed to decentralize
any
authority
for the employment of these convoys before the
event; it is estimated
that it would take at least three days
to assemble the initial
battalion
groups.
It is also clear
that these ground forces will be armed with conventional
000478
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weapons only and full warning will be given to the Soviet
and East German authorities
before any convoy route crosses
the East-We st German border.
It is also intended that
maximum publicity
should be given in the Western press so
that it will be clear that the movement of limited
ground
forces is not a part of a surprise
offensive
operation.
Air Access
8.
It is considered
that the first
interference
with
the Allied rights
in air corridors
will consist
of a refusal
by the Soviet and East German officials
to acknowledge the
·
agreement for service
of West Berlin b11Western airlines.
In the circumstances,
the present
plans provide for military
air crews to fly empty civil aircraft
to test Soviet reaction.
Five complete air cr&ws have been trained
on civil
aircraft
by both the United States
and the United Kingdom and are
standing by at all times.
In the case of France,
civil air
crews will continue to fly the aircraft
under an administrative
arrangement whereby such crews can be quickly
converted
to "military"
status
by a system of "call-up".
9.
In addition,
the United States,
the United Kingdom
and France have each agreed to provide up to twenty-five
fighter
aircraft
to be available
to act as escort for the
civil aircraft
which fly to test Soviet intentions.
The
present
thinking
in the planning group is that fighters
should not accompany the first
civil aircraft
but would
be held ready in case one of these civil aircraft
is
attacked
or forced down. If such should happen, it is
intended that four or five fighter
aircraft
will act as
escorts
for each succeeding
aircraft
which may be sent
into the corridor.
The original
authority
given to General
Norstad contemplated
the immediate despatch of fighter
aircraft
to escort the first
civil aircraft
travelling
in the air corridor
following
interference
with normal
access.
Because of a difference
of view which has developed,
however, it seems likely
that the authority
currently
given
to General Norstad in this respect
may be changed to maim
it clear that the first
civil aircraft
to be sent in would
be without fighter
escort.
No definite
information
is
available
on the question
of warning to the Soviet and
East German authorities.
Apparently
the "Live Oak"
military
planners
have recommended that such a warning be
given in the event it is intended to send in fighter
escorts.
However, no final decision
has yet been reached
in this regard.
Air Lifts
10.
Two types of air lift
are envisaged.
The first
would be an entirely
military
air lift
designed to administer
to Allied forces in Berlin.
This would be put into
effect
immediately
if land access were blocked and these
military
aircraft
would continue to fly even if flights
by civil aircraft
were prohibited.
The second type would
..• 4
000479
�••
..;2:QVSECRET
be a larger
operation
for the support of the city of Berlin.
Because of existing
stocks of supplies
in Berlin,
it would
not be necessary
to institute
such an air lift
immediately.
11.
Although the proposed relationship
between the
various measures is still
not entirely
clear,
the latest
report from the Delegation
(Telegram 2564 of October 6)
indicates
that tho immediate reaction
to the blocking of
land access would be the flying in of a comparatively
small
number of military
aircraft
for the support of the military
garrison.
Other Measures
-·--- ·12.
In his oral briefing
to the Council on September 29,
General Norstad referred
to the "Live Oak" planners'
responsibility
for recommending "quiet precautionary
military
measures".
According to his explanation,
the terros
of reference
for this aspect of planning include:
(a) intensification
of NATOpractice
alerts;
(b) maintaining
supplies
for Berlin garrison
at lG-month level;
(c) increased
patrolling
of East German bordors by U .K. and U .S .A. forces;
and (d) an increase
in autobahn traffic.
He did not
elaborate
on these plans nor did he indicate
whether any of
them may have already been implemented.
Relation
of ''Live
Oak" Pl~nning
to N,ATO
13.
It is clear that the Three Power report on "Live
Oak" planning is not being forwarded to NATO Council for
approval but for information.
Progress has, however, been
made in the sense that,
for the first
time, the other
members of NATOhave been given a general outline
of the
planning of the Three and a promise that General Norstad
can provide additional
details
on request.
In addition,
the report
contains
a commitment on the part of the Three
that,
insofar
as possible,
the Council will be consulted
before any of these contingency
plans are implemented.
14.
Apart
which additional
areas requiring
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
from a few details
on "Live Oak" plans on
information
would be helpful,
the main
clarification
are:
how these plans relate
to non-military
currently
under consideration
(e.g.,
counter-measures);
measures
economic
the possible
sequence in which the various
and non-military
measures might be applied;
military
the eventual
relationship
between existing
"Live
Oak" plans and the: proposed Nl\TO military
plans
which are expected to be drawn up if agreement on
the necessary
guidance is arrived
at in the NATO
Council.
The report of the Three and the remarks
of General Norstad clearly
imply that the "Live
Oak" plans will continw" to remain separate
from
••• 5
000480
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the NATOmilitary
plans although the latter
will
be co-ordinated
with and will complement the more
limited
"Live Oak" plans.
On th_e other hand, a
statement
by the Secretary--General
on Septer;;ber 29
was open to interpretation
that at some later
stage, once the Council guidance to the NATO
military
authorities
is approved,
"Live Oak"
planning would be reviewed and would become completely
a NATOresponsibility;
(iv)
the expected relationship
between "Live Oak"
plans, the proposed N,~TOplans and the "general
overall
strategy,
.. on a world-wide
scale"
referred
to in the draft instructions
to the
NATOmilitary
authorities.
These instructions
go on to refer to the selective
application
of a
wide variety
of measures "agreed upon both in
Europe and on a world-wide basis (which) would
contribute
to the purpose of arriving
at a
settlement
on the problem of Berlin while
progressively
malcing the Soviets
aware of ttie
danger of general war".
000481
�
Dublin Core
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NATO
Dublin Core
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Title
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Berlin Crisis / 11 OCTOBER 1961
Date
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1961-10-11
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en
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CDTT00033
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Memorandum, ‘‘Berlin - Contingency Planning,’’ 11 Oct. 1961, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1.
air lift
Berlin contingency
France
German Democratic Republic
Lauris Norstad
Live Oak
Three Power report
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/8638575bae0d855575a0a4f379bdc9d8.pdf
f8851044bcd2211b15b810459f0b3107
PDF Text
Text
1'4~(~
-=~EGATJON
TO ....
ORTH
DELEGATION
OF CANADA
ATLANTIC
COUNCIL
AU CONSEIL
DU
vv
cANAoli, ..
DE L'ATLANTIQUE-NORD
SECRET AND PERSONAL
p a-..:
Dear
.
George,
-
C,
50
.,
1
-
i9 1
\
oJe:>-vl-tf--1
0
---
,rf'
It was thoughtful
of you to send me under cover
of your letter
of October
12 the set of papers
relating
to
Berlin
Contingency
Planning.
I shall
meditate
over these
papers
during
the week-end.
Since the discussion
was held
yesterday
on Annexes A and BI would like
to make one point,
however,
which will
also likely
occur to you when reading
the
report
of the Council
meeting.
You will
notice
that
all
other
delegations
have indicated
yesterday
a willingness
to
go even further
in agreeing
to Annex B than I was authorized
to go under the paragraph
retained
in my instructions
as a
result
of the Prime Minister's
decision.
We can only conclude
to the unreality
of other
fall
back positions,
I am troubled
about this
because,
as you kriow,
I had raised
in Council
a series
of objections
to Annex B
and I think
that
you had made-valid
points
in your "suggested
amendments
to suggested
instructions
to NATO military
authorities",
Naturally
we can conclude
that
all the others
are
out of step,
but this
is not a tenable
position
in the
Alliance
at this
particular
time when such serious
events
have to be considered
jointly
if they are to be considered
effectively.
Time permitting
I shall
send you further
views on
this
documentation,
but I thought
I should
make these
comments
immediately.
There is a sense of urgency
about Berlin
in
Council,
This sense
of urgency
must be shared
at home if
we are to be on the same wave-length
as other
delegations
are.
The pity
of it all is that
we spend too much time considering
George Ignatieff,
Esq.
Assistant
Under-Secretary
for External
Affairs
OTTAWA
of State
• ••
000609
__/,L:
2
�r
2
what are the negative
aspects
of the Berlin
crisis
and too
little
on the positive
aspects
of it.
I am somewhat
consoled,
however,
by the fact
that
the Secretary
General
has now submitted
a plan of his own for Berlin
which has
a few positive
elements
in it and which,
I hope,
can form
the basis
of our discussions
from now on.
T
1-J. c............,
z ,,,_,.·
Yours
~-
sincerely,
000610
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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NATO
Dublin Core
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Title
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Berlin Crisis / 18 OCTOBER 1961
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1961-10-18
Format
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PDF
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en
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CDTT00034
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Léger to Ignatieff, 18 Oct. 1961, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1.
Berlin contingency
George Ignatieff
Léger
North Atlantic Council
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/d4b711ec8c45023a6be83d6d2f785e45.pdf
4d71f9245b7403d58b80f42adacffa5d
PDF Text
Text
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S E CRE T
ANNEXB
SUGGESTEDINSTRUCTIONSTO NATOMILITARY AUTHORITIES
The parties
accordance
light
to the North Atlantic
with Articles
of the crisis
Berlin
taken
consulted
4 and 6 of the Treaty
provoked
together
threat
They have agreed
policy
in regard
a)
that
to 5erlin
the maintenance
the three
b)
with
regard
to decide
to meet the present
2;
Treaty
and in the
to the City
what steps
against
of
should
be
Berlin,
the basic
objectives
'
of NATO
are:
of the presence
Western
the maintenance
have in
garrisons
and security
of
in West Berlin;
of the freedom
and viability
of
West Berlin;
c)
the maintenance
of freedom
of access
to West
Berlin.
Every
3.
objectives
effort
if
application
possible
be made to attain
by negotiations
of non-military
sar;( to prepare
negotiations
so-called
for
German Democratic
Western.access
on the basic
rights
They are
military
posture
and will
to apply
They have agreed
comparable
It
the contingency
,that
may not in themselves
the
is however necessuch measures
deter
Republic"
to Berlin
the foregoing
and through
measures.
11
to block
4.
will
the u.s.s.R.
from taking
or otherwise
or
or the
action
to infringe
of the ',{est in Berlin.
therefore
detennined
as a clear
to improve
allied
indication
of their
capability
military
measures
if need be.
appropriate
to undertake
individually
programme:. to bffild
and collectively
added military
strength
for
Europe.
PURPOSE:
5.
The purpose
preparation
of these
by the major
instructions
allied
'
commanders
is to initiate
of NATOmilitary
000601
the
�•
<
'
SECRET
2
plans
with
in order
actions
to put the
alliance
by the Soviet
in a position
Bloc in a Berlin
to cope
crisis,
GENERALCONSIDERATIONS:
The following
6.
preparation
of all
a)
general,
actions
overall
strategy
scale
diplomatic,
measures.
measures,
agreed
is desir;ned
b)
psycholo3ical,
upon both
access
appropriate
increasing
the
of access,
At the
same time,
implemented
should
leave
as possible
of continuing
c)
political
Soviets
on a dangerous
any military
pre-emptive
objective
access,
of ai.,d be consistent
strategy.
Alliance
They must,
with
military
current
therefore,
members as a central
in continued
plans
denial
would be
as many oppor-
the desirability
of action.
risks
actions
authorities
unmistakable
Government
Therefore,
of all
with
and re-assess
operation
from·which
aim of applying
the way these
course
enemy action,
to re-open
the
risks
the Soviet
to pause
of interference
by political
enormous
making
but determined,
of plans
and with
at a
war.
in case
which vtoulcl present
to the Soviets
tunities
of general
be selected
basis,
progressively
be graduated
of circumstances
pressure
of arriving
while
a catalogue
could
of these
and on a world-wide
measures
should
be available
action
light
clarity
military
to Berlin
should
of Berlin
on a
and para-
application
to the purpose
a
political,
military
in Europe
of' the danger
appropriate
the
into
as appropriate
as appropriate
The selective
aware
underlie
have to be integrated
applicable
of the problem
the Soviets
in the
will
to contribute
settlement
should
plans:
and including
economic,
military
There
military
military
world-wide
with
considerations
rapid
escalation
while
the
will
i.rlli--nediate
be to induce
plans
must
defensive
retain
consideration,
and/or
take
concepts
the d'efence
the
account
of NATO
of the
_and they must not
000602
�.•
~
•
•
SECRET
3
commit
to
capabilities
defend
to
the
NATO territory,
crisis
created
on the
periphery
resources
Soviets
of Allied
might
capacity
risk
of a possible
by way of a diversion
Conunand Euro~.
in
to Soviet
NATO build-up
overall
in mi:-id the
be committed
:•·. reaction
of the
of the
!ceepin;,;
by the
which
initiative
prejudice
as well
at
The magnitude
operations
moves
any point
at
the
wouJ.d depend
as circumstances
of
West
1
s
on results
existing
at
the
time.
{ct) the
all
times.
Alliance
will
However,
planned
these
operations
three
circumstances
of:
to
defeat
necessity
(3)
can
avoid
a specific
selectively
Alliance
order
to use
ready
(1)
prior
nuclear
under
use
to
demonstrate
in
one of the
enemy;
(2)
the
operations,
employ
the
at
weapons
any
by the
milite.ry
decision
action
to nuclear
only
of major
to
for
recourse
be envisaged
political
in
stand
nuclear
will
or
weapons
and ability
of the
them.j
PROCEDURE:
7.
The plans
appraisal
dance
Atlantic
8.
be sent
in consultation
with
nent
will
riith
established
Council
the
the
St&nding
Military
NATO ,;,:..ocedu.re
approval
Committee
and forwarded
0
for
Group
by Go·,-~:-:~,:.,"'ts
for
in
accor-
to the
through
the
North
perma-
representatives.
~
The execution
decisions
of approved
by Governments
at
SP:ii:CIFIC INSTRUCTIONS
Under
9.
the
to
United
1'/orstad
the
Kingdom,
in his
contingency
to carry
out
'I-here
must
their
be full
'j'()
and
the
will
special
of the
Unit.ed
(LIVE
Governments
States
of
li
betv;een
of France,
of America,
OAK) to
responc.il:>i
coordinR-!;ion
subject
tLme.
as USCINCEUR has
plans
be the
EA70 I/iILT'.l'ARY Au"l'HORI'rIES
instructions
capacity
military
the
plans
General
made certain
tripartite
enable
Governments
-\;2P-9
this
these
con.corning
Berlin.
LIVE OAK planning
and NATO planning.
000603
�SECRET
4
10.
For the purpose
of providing
possible
of supplementary
alternatives,
coverinG
broad
the major
land,
advantages
specific
terms
a)
or naval
lli.'IO commanders
expected
provide
air
for
appropriate
initiation
plans.
should
alert
for
non-nuclear
air
c)
expanded
non-nuclear
ground
air
support;
selective
use
of nuclear
and ability
be set
of the Alliance
to
naval
prior
to
measuros;
operations;
operations
weapons
out in
plans
NA'I·Oforces
and/or
the
ur,;ently_:
military
expanded
necessary
should
be studied
of any tripartite
plans
be prepared
In particular,
measures
as
In each case,
risks
b)
will
should
as appropriate,
to accompany
a choice
l,A'I"O military
measures
and estimated
the following
as great
with
to demonstrate
to use
them.
000604
the
by
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
NATO
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Berlin Crisis / 19 OCTOBER 1961
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1961-10-19
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
A language of the resource
en
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CDTT00035
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Memorandum for the Prime Minister, ‘‘NATO Military Planning - Berlin,’’ 19 Oct. 1961, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1.
Allied Command Europe
German Democratic Republic
John Diefenbaker
Live Oak
Norman Robertson
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/529d778113c760fe75b99e06565f3a10.pdf
23e52ef7a291e7d6a9de805b45ac1195
PDF Text
Text
I'
I
SECRET
SECRETARY
November
MEMORANDUM
FOR:
OF STATE
FOR
, 1961.
THE PRIME MINISTER
NATOPlannin
for
In giving your approval to he guidance for Mr.
Leger on October 19, reserving
t
Canadian position
on
paragraph
6 of the instructions
or the NATOmilitary
authorities
(annex B to P0/6lb 65, copy a~tached),
you
expressed particular
concern
hat careful
attention
be
given to the need to clari
the 11circumstances
of and the
authorities
responsible
f
the
specific
political
decision"
to employ nuclear weapon selectively
to 11demonstrate
the
will and ability
of th Alliance
to use tl,em 11 (sub-paragraph
6(d)(3)).
For exempl,
~ould the decision
be taken by
_ all of the NATOgove nments or by the Three or by a
restricted
group,
rhaps a majorityl
;f~~~..,_
•
2.
instructions
for the NATOmilitary
authorities,
w h some minor amendments (underlined
in
attached
copy of annex B), were approved on October 25
and sent for ard.
Partially
because of our reservation
in connect·
n with paragraph
6 and because other members
considere
that more consultation
was required,
it was
agreed tat
there would be further
discussion
of the
cµ estio
of what "politic al authori ty 11 VD uld take the
decis·
ns required
when the plans are drawn up.
The
ques on you raised,
therefore,
will be discussed
at
an arly meeting of the Council.
The discussion
will
b related
mainly to the_attached
paper P0/61/8O9
epared by the Secretary
General.
• •
000569
• 2
_
�- 2 -
It is clear from Mr. Stikker 1 s paper that he feels
all references
to the "political
authorities"
in paragraph
should be considered
as referring
to the NATOCouncil.w'"1--l~
"the wilJ. of governments will be expr!3ssed by the
Permanent Repres enta ti ves 11• In addition,
the 11spec • c
,.,...1./
political
decision"
referred
to in paragraph 6~d)
annex B would be a_decision
to be taken by the y,(l,uncil_,~JIt is also evident that the interpretation
p
ed on the11...u<• K;
draft instructions
by the Secretary
Gener
s that the rul~'l'."-'
.
of unanunity must apply in respect of an
ATO action which
may be taken in accordance with these
structions.
of=·;::/:::
4.
In the circumstances,
ould recommend that Mr.
Leger be authorized
to accept
. e interpretation
contained
in the Secretary
General's
p er.
While, as Mr. Stikker
suggests, _it may be necess
in the future to consider
amending the agreed rule of unanunity covering such decisions,
the type of situation
ich is likely to arise in relation
to Berlin is one w
e full consultation
and agreement would
be essential
befo e any decision were made to take military
1
action involv
NATOforces.
5.
would also recommend that Mr. Leger be instructed
to raise
e question of the adequacy of existing
arrangements
enabl
the Council to deal effectively
and expeditiously
with
portant matters in the event of an emergency.
A
te gram setting
out these points is attached for your_
nsideration
and comment.
000570
�SEEN BY THE Mtf,Jc;JEl-11'
•
9~•·''·"1
:
SECRET
SECRETARY
November
OF STATE
21,
FOR EXTERNAL
A
I
1961.
I
I
I
•").,
I
I
MEMORANDUM
FOR:
.:::cTH=Ec...=.P.:.:Rc=IME=c.....:::Mc::r,'~:=.S.:::cT=E:::R
NATO Planning
for
Berlin
f
~z=l-
o oJ c -
)>
'
.· J
\
In giving your approval to the gui :ance f'or Mr.
Leger on October 19 1 reserving
the Canadian position
on paragraph
6 of the instructions
for the NATOmilitary
authorities
(Annex B to PO/61/765 1 cppy attached),
you
expressed particular
concern that ca· eful attention
be
given to the need to clarify
the cir umstances of and
the authorities
responsible
for the 1specific
political
11
decision
to employ nuclear weapons selectively
to
•~emonstrate
the will and ability
the Alliance
to
..use them 11 ( sub-paragraph
6( d}{
• For example, would
the decision
be taken by all of the NATOgovernments
1
or by the Three or by a restricted
group, perhaps
;
a majority
of the governments represented
in the Council,?
2.
The draft instructions
for the NATOmilitary
authorities,
with some minor amendments (underlined
,
in attached
copy of Annex B), were approved on October 25
and sent forward.
Partially
because of our reservation!
in connection
with paragraph
6 and because other members
considered
that more consuJ.tation
was required,
it was/
agreed that there would be further
discussion
of
the
1
question
of what 11political
authority 11 would take the 1
decisions
required
when the plans are_drawn up.
The
I
question you raised,
therefore,
will be discussed.at
an early meeting of the Counci~.
The discussion
will
be related
mainly to the attached
paper P0/61/8O9
prepared by the Secretary
General.
• • • zl
I
I
I
'
I
I
I
I
000532
:i /.//.1~/J~)
I
'
�--
•
1..- -·
- 2 -
3.
It is clear from Mr. Stikker 1 s paper that he
regards all references
to the "political
authorities"
in paragraph
6 as referring
to_the NATOCouncil, where
"the will of governments will be expressed by the
Permanent Representatives'.'.
In addition,
the "specific
political
decision"
refer:red
to in paragraph
6(.dJ(3)
of Annex B would be a decision
to be taken by governments,
expressed
through the Council.
It is also evident that
the interpretation
placed on the.draft
instructions
by
the Secretary
General is that the rule of unanimity
must apply in respect
of any NATO action which may be
taken in accordance with these instructions.
4.
In the circumstances,
I would recommend that
Mr. Leger be authorized
to accept the interpretation
contained
in the Secretary
General 1 s paper stressing
that the execution
of all plans re*atmgto
the emergency
in Berlin "will be subject
to decisions
by governments
at the timE1"• While, as Mr. Stikker
suggests,
it may
be necessary
in the future
to consider
amending the
agreed rule of unanimity covering such decisions
the
type of situation
which is likely
to arise in relation
to Berlin is one where full consultation
and agreement
would be essential
before any decisions
were made by
governments to take military
action involving
NATO
forces.
5.
I would also recommend that Mr. Leger be
instructed
to raise the question
of the adequacy of
existing
arrangements
enabling
the Council to deal
effectively
and expeditiously
with important matters
in the event of an emergency.
A telegram setting
out
these points is attached
for your consideration
and
comment.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
NATO
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Berlin Crisis / 21 NOVEMBER 1961
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1961-11-21
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
A language of the resource
en
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CDTT00036
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Memorandum for the Prime Minister, ‘‘NATO Planning for Berlin,’’ 21 Nov. 1961, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1.
Léger
NATO planning
Stikker
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5003b08bcc9240d886ebf4641f8d1274.pdf
af20c641e012e15ff438ad6e9feb08aa
PDF Text
Text
--
.
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5-1'
FM NATOPARIS
OEC4/61
TO EXTERNAL 3273
SECRET
OPIMMEO
INFO CCOS LON WASHOC EMBPARIS PERMISNY BONN BRU HAGUE ROME PRIORITY
TT OM/ONO PRIORITY
OM/FIN
FM CCOS
OTT DM/DDP OTT PRIORI TY FM OTT.
'
BAG ANKARA ATHENS COPEN OSLO LISBON
FM LON
REF OURTEL 3249
NOV30/61
DEC MINI!:.1'ERIAL
MTG:GERMANY AND BERLIN
i
THERE SEEMS TO BE LITTLE
WILL DOMINATE THIS
IT
IS
IMPOSSIBLE
DOUBT THAT THE PROBLEM OF GERMANY AND BERLIN
YEARS DEC MINISTERIAL
MTG.AT THIS
PARTICULAR
TO BE SURE WHETHER THE EFFECT ON THE ALLIANCE
BE TO MOVE TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT ON COPING WITH THE BERLIN
OR WHETHER IT
wILL
AGREE, IT
ALSO DOMINATE THE PUBLIC-RELATIONS
WILL
BE TO REVEAL THE INABILITY
BECAUSE THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS
AND WILL
EITHER
TO THE NATO MINISTERIAL
IS
WILL
PROBL£M,
OF THE ALLIANCE
TO
ASPECT OF THE MTG
HAVE MET PREVIOUSLY
ON OECtl,
HAVE ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE OF SUBSTANCE WHICH WILL
REQUIRE NATO FOLLOW-UP ACTION
IT
WILL
TIME
OR,AS WE HOPE,WILL
HAVE DEFERRED
MTG THE ISSUANCE. OF A COMMUNIQUE OF SUBSTANCE
THESE VERY FACTORSCTHE PRE~EMINENCE OF THE SUBJECT,THE
MTG OF THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS,
SURROUND THE SUBJECT)WH!CH
MAKE IT
BY WAY OF A USEFUL PREDICTION
POSSIBLE THAT FURTHER BILATERAL
AND THE PUBLIC
DIFFICULT
OF THE LIKELY
INTEREST
PRIOR
WHICH WILL
FROM HERE TO GIVE MUCH
COURSE OF EVENTS.IT
PROBING AT THE STATE DEPT,THE
IS
FO,
AND THE QUAI DORSAY MIGHT CONTINUE TO PROVE ILLUMINATING.
2.0NE
FACTOR WHICH CAN BE EXPECTED TO REMAIN CONSTANT,AT
LNTIL
HIS MTG WITH ADENAUER ON DEC9 AND POSSIBLY THEREAFTER,IS
OPPOSITION
OF DE GAULLE TO ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS,OR
FOR SUCH NEGOTIATIONS,
WHILE HE C<NSIDERS
A THREAT FROM THE USSR.<THE
, LON TEL
4283
LEAST
PREPARING
THAT THE WEST IS, UNDER
SECGEN AGREES WITH EMBPARIS TEL
NOV30 IN MAKING THIS
THE
1588
ASSESSMENT. )SEEN FROM HERE,
000497
AND
�...
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--
PAGETWO3273
THEREIS A MEASURE
OF UNCERTAINTY
AS TO THE REALGERMAN
POSITION.THE
KROLLINTERVIEW
WOULD
SEEMTO SUGGESTTHATNEGOTIATIONS
HAVENOT RPT
NOT BEENRULEDOUT;THERECENTEMPHASISON AN INTERNATIONALIZED
AUTOBAHN
SUGGESTSHOWEVER
THATTHE GERMAN
STARTINGPOSITIONFOR
NEGOTIATIONS
MAYNOTRPT NOTBE A VERYFRUITFULONE.USAADOPTION
OF
THIS IDEA,ANDTHE EMPHASISON THE RETENTION
OF OCCUPATION
RIGHTS
AS A FALL-BACK
POSITIONCSOTHATANYAGREEMENT
BETWEEN
USA,THEUK,
FRANCEANDTHE USSR WOULD
MERELYBE SUPERIMPOSED
ON THESEEXISTING
OCCUPATION
RIGHTS)MIGHT
SUGGESTTHATUSA ATTITUDEIS NOWSOMEWHERE
.
BETWEEN
THOSEOF GERMANY
ANDTHE UK.EVENTHE LATTERMUSTNOT RPT
.
.
.
NOTBE EXPECTED
TO TAKETOOEXPOSEDA POSITION IN FAVOUROF NEGOTIATIONS IN VIEWOF UK NEEDOF FRENCHANDGERMAN
SUPPORTWHILESEEKING ADMISSIONTO EEC.WHAT
THIS ANALYSISSEEMSTO SUGGESTIS THAT
PRESSUREAMONG
THE FOURPOWERS
MOREDIRECTLYCONCERNED
IN F'AVOUR
OF'
NEGOTIATIONS,OR
AT ANYRATEFOR NEGOTIATIONS
ON A BASIS WHICHMIGHT
BE MEANINGFUL
TO USSR,HASDECLINEDDURINGTHE LASTMONTH.THE
NATO
COUNCILRESOLUTIONS
NOV6AND15(0URTEL2914 NOV6ANDP0/61/840;
OURTEL3060 NOVIS ANDP0/61/864)SEEM IN RETROSPECT
TO HAVEREPRESENTED
THE HIGH POINT IN THE COUNCILSPRESSUREON THE FOURTO AGREEUPON
A NEGOTIATING
POSITION ANDRESUME
THE INTERRUPTED
CONTACTS
WITHUSSR
TO DETERMINE
A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION.SINCE
THENTHE ONLYVISIBLE MOVE
HAS BEENKROLLSCONVERSATION
WITHKHRUSHCHEV.
3.THE LINE OF ACTIONWHICHTHOSEFOREIGNMINSTERSwiio'ARENOT RPT
NOTOF THE FOURMAYWISHTO ADOPTWILL.PRESUMABLY
BE DETERMINED
IN
PARTBY THE SORT OF REPORTCOR
REPORTS)THE
FOURMAYMAKEAT THE
BEGINNINGOF THE NATOMINISTERSDISCUSSIONOF'BERLINANDGERMANY.
THEREIS ALSOA POSSIBILITY THATTHE ALLIANCE
WILL HAVEMADEAVAILABLE
TO IT A PAPEROR PAPERSPREPARED
BY THE AMBASSADORIAL
WORKING
GROUP
IN WASHDC
F'ORDISCUSSIONBY THE SENIOREXPERTS,AND
THATTHE SENIOR
.
EX?ERTSTHEMSELVES
MAYBE MOVED
TO GIVE A BRIEFINGTO COUNCIL
••• 3
000498
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BEFORE.DEC13•.IF.,HOW.EVER,ASIS SUGGESTEDIN ,PARA5 OF LDN TEL 4283
u .... .., .......
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...,_
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AGREEMENT
pAND TO CARRY.THEIR LACK.OF .AGREEMENTINTO_THE NATO MINIST•
c..
,.'
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.BY THIS PROSPECT AND.,AS
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YOU \HLL .KN.OW
.F:ROM.MYTEL 32.72 DEC2
dl.:n,
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au••
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GIU•
POSITION ,WHICH .SEEMS TO.•BE THE. CRUCiAL ONE FOR.ACHIEVING SOME SORT1 .
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COUNTERMEASURES
ASAA~'-'EXCUSE,,F,OR
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iiTO THEr r·
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COUNCIL LAST AUG AND WHICHHAS BEEN RE-ITERATED BY THE SECGEN AS
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[~:-~IEW .THE ,BE~LIN'
_
3;1
ASPECTS FOR NATO.THERE IS A GENUINE FEELING ON THE PART OF: THE SECGEN
.,uJI\V .1..11n:: 3•111 ,3,"
11·•tlil .i• 1
AND USA THAT,.P.RPGRESS_
ON ANY ONE~OF{THESE THREE ASPECTS SHOULDNOT ,
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RPT NOTO~E~1h~o~~r.:1ioJYiiuJ~Ol~ ~R·i3E~~!?itt8G~;~s=-~NT'!'~E: °,TH~~ 1~':~CTS.
THERE SEEMS TO BE SOMETHINGCLOSE TO SATISFACTION WITH PROGRESS IN
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THEi'.IELD lOF ,MILIJA,R'(~PREPAREDNESS.IN THE ~EM~IN~NG Tw9 FIE~DS -,,1'1, !> r.J ii
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PROGRESS AND MOREOBV_IOUSDIVERGENCEOF 1INTERESTS.,THE NON-FOUR,AIDED
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IN THE PAST BY TW0 0f THE FOUR,HAVE PREVIOUSLY SHOWNAN INTEREST
h ~(;IJ cir..i1 1 AiTu:;.,~ 1u , IJJl6!.;:;cl.l'1 _.,11, ,:.;;,.1,,,; o, ;t_;<11Jj.1 •-"" =:
IN GETTING ON WITH NEGOTIATIONS~SOMEOF THE NON•FOUR,HOWEVER,HAVE
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PAGE FOUR 327 3
WHILE THE FOUR HAVE BEEN ABLE TO UNITE ON COUNTERMEASURESEXCEPT
-
.
··~
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r
FOR ONE IMPORTANT POINT WHICH IS DEALT WITH IN MYTEL 3272.THUS
RPT
NOT
wouLo Not
't
BE roo
suRPRisrNG
r·
r
j_~
TO.SEE. THE FouR,.iF
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.
t.
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IT
cRITic-fzto
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_
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FOR LACK OF AGREEMENT OVER NEGOTIATIONS, COUNTER-'ATTACK OVER ECONOMIC
COUNTERMEAsuhE:S.THIS WOULD BE .AN
_
.
IMPO.RTANT
_
, 1: ·
to"KEEP.. IN
FAC1'0R
•T
· .,
· -.
MIND f ·-
'-,
t .
': -;·
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tt,
IN EXERTING PRESSURE FOR THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS.
1
5. THE BRITISH,
•
t.
.
l
.,
•" . ,
-
. '
., __ ,._
- ... -
.
WE KNOW FROM MSGS FROM LDN~TEND TO THINK ·or NEGOTIATI CNS
r •
IN TERMS OF a'ROADE; GERMAN QUEST! ONS( AS THE DEPT' DOES), INV0Lv'1Na'•
1
sucH ·MATTE~s AS RECOGNITION or THE • ooiR-NEissE
;j
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NON
•.AGGREss·xaN""
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PACT OR ARRANGEMENT OF SOME SORT BETWEEN THE NATO AND THE WARSAW. '
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POWERS,AND SOME SORT. OF DEALINGS WITH THE- EAST GERMANS.THESE ARE ' '7 • ; r, , ) ~~.. : •. (""•.-'
, .'..~.
• • ••:-- _.._, .~f : .
SUBJECTS ON WHICH NATO EXAMINATION HAS NOT RPT NOT PROGRESSED VERY - .
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FAR, BUT. AGAIN THE BRITISH ANALYSIS OF THE FRENCH 'APPROACH APPEARS
"'J'f'" _• ..., •
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TO BE SIGNIFICANT<PARA3
LDN TEL-4283):THERE
WOULD°CLEARLY"BE SOME
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RISK IN TOO MUCH READINESS ON OUR PART OR ·oN THE PART OF ANY MEMBER
... • fO .
f'""'-.
... -•
OF THE ALLIANCE
M> .-
....
AT THIS
~-T.
·- _.
GERMANS-FEEL STRONGLY WHILE
1
RETICENT:THE
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THAT
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THERE ARE AS YET NO RPT NO SIGNS OF THE COUNCIL BEING ABLE TO
"'
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t
DEVELOP AN AGREED POLiCY
MOSTLY\1s
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A RESULT oF"DE
"'"
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FORTHCOMING,MTG WITH,
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RPT No LoNGER ro' BLOCK THE poss1B1L1rY'
r•
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&
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RESPECT.IF
~EM~DE 1N· 0k1NoiNG rHEFRENCH ~ROUND-No~
PERCHANCE PROGREss•foGu;:,
'.
·"t
.,.
ADENAUER WILL -THEREFORE BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT IN THIS
·
--,
QN NEGOTIATIONS OVER BERLIN IN ANY DETAIL,
-,,·":1--
•
;•-C, 1
-•
-
·
REMAIN.
AND THINK THEY - ARE STILL VALID. '
., •
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6. OUR CONCLUSION ON SUBSTANCE AT THE 'PRESENT TIME,THEREFORE;Is
,
·' ..
THE UN 'i1£Lo1wE
iHE.SUGGESTIONS MADE
IN"T~rs-Fi'ELD
,
r
.,,1~-"t"_,.. .~ •
..
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0
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'
ATTHE .FORTHCO'lING
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MT; MI GHT' THEREF'6RE' SEEi/'ro
RE~EXAMINED'
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1
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OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE
JAIN";'LINE ..·F'OR
MINISTE~I~c'
M'
••
STAGE To BARGAiN AWAY 'i>oINTS' ON WHICH THE·
· .-
' "'\
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n .• -
-
-
¥
oF NEGOTIATIONS
t,_
:'"'
r- •
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_
QUADRIPARTITE
.-:..
oN
·A
i
, .
..
BASIS,THE SITUATION WOULD LOOK MUCH MORE HOPEFUL THAN
_·-, _ - .. · ; . ,. • ":0 n :·· •
;;,- -· ·
- · r ,,-,, , ,. -·
· '.' · rIT DOES NOW.IT. IS T'OO'EARLY TO SUGGEST WHETHER ANY ALTEfiNATIVE
000500
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.... -,
PAGEFIVE 3273
TO QUADRIPARTITE
NEGOTIATIONS(EG
USA-USSREXCHANGES>COULD
BE CONTEMP•
LATEDo
7.IF ONEPASSESFROMSUBSTANCE
TO PUBLICRELATIONS,THE
PROBLEM
WILL
BE A RELATIVELY
SIMPLE If THE FRENCHPOSITIONCANBE CHANGED.IFIT
•
CANNOT
RPT NOTTHENSOMEEFFORTWILL HAVETO BE MADETO AVOID
LEAVINGTOOOBVIOUSAN IMPRESSIONOF A SPLIT WITHINTHE ALLIANCE.
THIS EFFORTWOULD
HAVETO BE IN VERYGENERAL
TERM~.ATTHt VERYBEST,
IF THE FRENCHPOSITIONWERENOT RPT NOTALTOGETHER
UNYIELDING,THE
COMMUNIQUE
MIGHTBE ABLETO BALANCE
ON THE ONEHANDEMPHASISQN
'
ADHERENCE
TO PRESENTRIGHTSANDFREEDOMS
COMBINED
WITHPREPAREDNESS,
WITH,ONTHE OTHER,ASTATEMENT
OF READINESSTO NEGOTIATE
UNDER
SUITABLECONDITIONS.DEPENDING
UPONTHE DEGREEOf DIVERGENCE
Of THE.
FRENCHPOSITION,READINESS
TO NEGOTIATE
MIGHTHAVETO BECOME
A TENUOUS
ELEMENT
IN THE COMMUNIQUE.IF
THERECOULDBE NO RPT NO OFFERTO
NEGOTIATE
IN THE COMMUNIQUE,THE
POSITION OF THE ALLIANCEWOULD
BECOME
DIFFICULT INDEED.
LEGER
000501
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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NATO
Dublin Core
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Title
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Berlin Crisis / 4 DECEMBER 1961
Date
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1961-12-04
Format
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PDF
Language
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en
Type
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Text
Identifier
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CDTT00037
Source
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NATO Paris to External Affairs, ‘‘Dec Ministerial Mtg:Germany and Berlin,’’ 4 Dec. 1961, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1.
de Gaulle
France
Léger
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/965774cd5fe665536181fb0cd0eaf143.pdf
63c748eb62928c2b71c568d358880e77
PDF Text
Text
D.L.
de If. Mathewson/TP
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
•
MEMORANDUM
;===/.............
TO..... MR•. -IG.NA!J.?~
................................................
FROM= ..
( 1)/A.
~~\t.\r.,~\\~,
er· ~--t
.
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... ."l. ·f.· ·$.;.1.J
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......
REFERENCE: .........................................................
lltte
cJ30,,
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t/4-'tf
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.
l
......................................................................
SUBJECT: ......
. .......... .
S.EC.J.'iE!r
.
I
F.~D.r.\lP.:rY
.. \l.~. l9P.2 •.....
.--.
J'\Eff_),iA;
... 9.'?J?-.~tA8!3.J?-~Y.
J'.~~-~J?-_g~................................................
.
I
To refresh
your memory concerning
contingency
planning
over Berlin and the relationship
of tripartite
( "Live Oak" )
planning
to NATO planning,
we attach
the following
papers:
1
A.
______
CIRCULATION
A Departmental
memorandum of October 11, 1961
summarizes, · the main features
of "Live Oak" and
touches·
on some of the difficulties
and obscurities
in
B.
the text of the "Instructions
to NATOMilitary
Authorities"
in connection
with NATOplanning
for a Berlin eme~gency
(circulated
as Annex B to NATODocument P0/61/765).
These instructions
were approved by Council on
/
October 25 and have bean circulated
by the Military
Committee as NATO Document C-M(61)104.
Canadian
approval was,however,
only given subject
to a
reservation
as set out in
c.
telegram DL-1325 of October
Prime Minister.
_,D.
19, approved
by the
Telegram DL-1521 of November 20 contains
com~entsj
approved by the Prime Minister
on an interpretation
given by Secretary-General
Stikkar
of certain
phrases which occur in Annex B to NATO Document
P0/61/765 (see B above).
The text of this inter-
1
I
• • • 2
Ext. 326 (6/56)
000475
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L .• J ,.,,..,
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the
statement
substance
is contained
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t~, ,.__Ji.'I o. '}
~h ")<'av-..J.
~tl.k
a....&.
Liaison
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P"-"'--~
&.~
FEB2 7 t98
3
(1) Division.
( o..~d, .. & ) e.o-...<.>.;.
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~ \\l<M....e-~~ (:'.J,. , ,a .,...
',. ;_t;._t..;,._,_le;, ~
,Jf-1.-,-c,
&~! R.)
)..I..S
in
of NATODocument P0/61/809,
Defence
f <_;.
r•
. : .•.
. •
'-
REBD:T
A SECR,
f
- 2 -
pretative
,
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A-rt=l..w......t
October 11, 1951.
BERLIN - CONTINGENCY PLANNING
Following repeated requests from other members
of the Council for information on contingency planning,
the French, United Kingdom and United States authorities
presented a report to the Council on their contingency
planning for Berlin on September 27. The information
contained in this report was supplemented by a briefing
given by General Norstad on September 29. Additional
information was also obtained during recent meetings of
the Council and from conversations which General Kitching
had with Major-General Baker of the United Kingdom who is
responsible, under General Norstad, for the preparation of
"Live Oak" plans, Following is a summary of the main
features of "Live Oak" planning on the basis of the infor
mation currently available.•
2,
As explained by General Norstad, the "Live Oak" :
organization started, on a tripartite basis, in the winter;
of 1958-59, More recently a West German observer had
participated. The underlying purpose of the "Live Oak"
planning is to enable the Three Powers most directly
concerned to carry out their special responsibilities
regarding Berlin in all contingencies. It is primarily
directed at readying appropriate immediate responses to
possible Soviet Bloc interference with Western rights of
access to Berlin in the air or on the ground.
3.
According to the Three Power report, General
Norstad has been responsible, in his capacity as.Commander
in-Chief of United States forces in Europe, for developing
these plans over the past two years on the basis of
instructions received from the French, U.K, and U.S.A.
g overnments. Although the Three Power report appears to,
be clear in this regard, the discussion in NATO Council
indicated some difference of view between the Permanent
Representatives of the Three as to the origin of General:
Norstad's precise authority. It was the U.S. Permanent 1
Representative's under·standing that General Norstad. had
been given a special capacity which was neither that of,'
USCINCEUR nor that of SACEUR but was one which gave him,
planning and command responsibilities with respect to the
Three Powers' troops in Berlin. That capacity had been:
given to him in order to create a better relationship
between Three Power planning and NATO planning,
••• 2
000477
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2 -
r,;~
4.
"Live
NATO activity:
\~) ft~ 2? \(3?>5
Oak" planning
covers
three
main areas
of
(1)
The development of small-scale
military
probes
to determine Soviet/GDR intentions
with respect
to the denial of ground or air access by force;
(2)
The use of air lifts
as appropriate
essential
requirements
in the event
access is interfered
with or ground
denied;
(3)
The readying of limited
ground forces and
tactical
air forces to be employed, if necessary,
to demonstrate
tripartite
determination
to use
force.
'.1
to meet
civil air
access is
Ground Access
5,
The plans provide that a minimum of ground forces
are to be used and they must be composed of troops of the
three countries
most directly
concerned.
According to the
Three Power report,
the plans call for the use of "small
tripartite
convoys of various
configurations
designed to
test the access routes and overcome physical
o'ostacles".
The plans also include supplementary
military
efforts
(3
above) which would be designed ''to supplement the probe
efforts,
to demonstrate
the determination
to react with
force,
or to test the range of force the Soviets
are
prepared to apply".
The plans for these supplementary
efforts
provide for a total
of three battalion
group_s,
each comprising troops of the United States,
the United
Kingdom and France.
These groups would form approximately
one thousand men each and would form up as convoys to probe
the normal access roads to Berlin._. General Norstad has
indicated
that study has also been given to the possibility
of employing a tripartite
division.
According to 1/iajorGeneral Baker, such a larger force might be used, if
necessary,
to extricate
any Western forces in the corridor.
6.
All the information
available
indicates
that,
whatever the size of the forces used, they would operate
on instructions
to remain within the previously
defin°~
corridors.
i,,oreover,. they would be instructed
not to
open fire first~
if fired upon, they may fire but must then
withdraw.
Under no circumstances
would a force continue
to advance if fired upon.
7.
The French authorities
have agreed to plan for
such battalion
convoys but because they have not allocated
any forces for this purpose or agreed to decentralize
any
authority
for the employment of these convoys before the
event; it is estimated
that it would take at least three days
to assemble the initial
battalion
groups.
It is also clear
that these ground forces will be armed with conventional
000478
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weapons only and full warning will be given to the Soviet
and East German authorities
before any convoy route crosses
the East-We st German border.
It is also intended that
maximum publicity
should be given in the Western press so
that it will be clear that the movement of limited
ground
forces is not a part of a surprise
offensive
operation.
Air Access
8.
It is considered
that the first
interference
with
the Allied rights
in air corridors
will consist
of a refusal
by the Soviet and East German officials
to acknowledge the
·
agreement for service
of West Berlin b11Western airlines.
In the circumstances,
the present
plans provide for military
air crews to fly empty civil aircraft
to test Soviet reaction.
Five complete air cr&ws have been trained
on civil
aircraft
by both the United States
and the United Kingdom and are
standing by at all times.
In the case of France,
civil air
crews will continue to fly the aircraft
under an administrative
arrangement whereby such crews can be quickly
converted
to "military"
status
by a system of "call-up".
9.
In addition,
the United States,
the United Kingdom
and France have each agreed to provide up to twenty-five
fighter
aircraft
to be available
to act as escort for the
civil aircraft
which fly to test Soviet intentions.
The
present
thinking
in the planning group is that fighters
should not accompany the first
civil aircraft
but would
be held ready in case one of these civil aircraft
is
attacked
or forced down. If such should happen, it is
intended that four or five fighter
aircraft
will act as
escorts
for each succeeding
aircraft
which may be sent
into the corridor.
The original
authority
given to General
Norstad contemplated
the immediate despatch of fighter
aircraft
to escort the first
civil aircraft
travelling
in the air corridor
following
interference
with normal
access.
Because of a difference
of view which has developed,
however, it seems likely
that the authority
currently
given
to General Norstad in this respect
may be changed to maim
it clear that the first
civil aircraft
to be sent in would
be without fighter
escort.
No definite
information
is
available
on the question
of warning to the Soviet and
East German authorities.
Apparently
the "Live Oak"
military
planners
have recommended that such a warning be
given in the event it is intended to send in fighter
escorts.
However, no final decision
has yet been reached
in this regard.
Air Lifts
10.
Two types of air lift
are envisaged.
The first
would be an entirely
military
air lift
designed to administer
to Allied forces in Berlin.
This would be put into
effect
immediately
if land access were blocked and these
military
aircraft
would continue to fly even if flights
by civil aircraft
were prohibited.
The second type would
..• 4
000479
�••
..;2:QVSECRET
be a larger
operation
for the support of the city of Berlin.
Because of existing
stocks of supplies
in Berlin,
it would
not be necessary
to institute
such an air lift
immediately.
11.
Although the proposed relationship
between the
various measures is still
not entirely
clear,
the latest
report from the Delegation
(Telegram 2564 of October 6)
indicates
that tho immediate reaction
to the blocking of
land access would be the flying in of a comparatively
small
number of military
aircraft
for the support of the military
garrison.
Other Measures
-·--- ·12.
In his oral briefing
to the Council on September 29,
General Norstad referred
to the "Live Oak" planners'
responsibility
for recommending "quiet precautionary
military
measures".
According to his explanation,
the terros
of reference
for this aspect of planning include:
(a) intensification
of NATOpractice
alerts;
(b) maintaining
supplies
for Berlin garrison
at lG-month level;
(c) increased
patrolling
of East German bordors by U .K. and U .S .A. forces;
and (d) an increase
in autobahn traffic.
He did not
elaborate
on these plans nor did he indicate
whether any of
them may have already been implemented.
Relation
of ''Live
Oak" Pl~nning
to N,ATO
13.
It is clear that the Three Power report on "Live
Oak" planning is not being forwarded to NATO Council for
approval but for information.
Progress has, however, been
made in the sense that,
for the first
time, the other
members of NATOhave been given a general outline
of the
planning of the Three and a promise that General Norstad
can provide additional
details
on request.
In addition,
the report
contains
a commitment on the part of the Three
that,
insofar
as possible,
the Council will be consulted
before any of these contingency
plans are implemented.
14.
Apart
which additional
areas requiring
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
from a few details
on "Live Oak" plans on
information
would be helpful,
the main
clarification
are:
how these plans relate
to non-military
currently
under consideration
(e.g.,
counter-measures);
measures
economic
the possible
sequence in which the various
and non-military
measures might be applied;
military
the eventual
relationship
between existing
"Live
Oak" plans and the: proposed Nl\TO military
plans
which are expected to be drawn up if agreement on
the necessary
guidance is arrived
at in the NATO
Council.
The report of the Three and the remarks
of General Norstad clearly
imply that the "Live
Oak" plans will continw" to remain separate
from
••• 5
000480
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.
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the NATOmilitary
plans although the latter
will
be co-ordinated
with and will complement the more
limited
"Live Oak" plans.
On th_e other hand, a
statement
by the Secretary--General
on Septer;;ber 29
was open to interpretation
that at some later
stage, once the Council guidance to the NATO
military
authorities
is approved,
"Live Oak"
planning would be reviewed and would become completely
a NATOresponsibility;
(iv)
the expected relationship
between "Live Oak"
plans, the proposed N,~TOplans and the "general
overall
strategy,
.. on a world-wide
scale"
referred
to in the draft instructions
to the
NATOmilitary
authorities.
These instructions
go on to refer to the selective
application
of a
wide variety
of measures "agreed upon both in
Europe and on a world-wide basis (which) would
contribute
to the purpose of arriving
at a
settlement
on the problem of Berlin while
progressively
malcing the Soviets
aware of ttie
danger of general war".
000481
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SDG~EST·E:D INSTnUC'I'IONS TO :•U.'1'0ivlILITA?.Y AiSI'iiOliI'l'I;<;S
Tho parties
• acco,danco
to
'.'.'ith Articles
of: the. crisis'
l~r)1t
5:::rl tn consulted
tnl:en
the
to rne;;t
North
Treaty
4 and 6 of the
provoked
toi;;other
the
Atlanti&
,lith
rei;ard.
to decide
present
t•n•eat
to ~erlin
~re:
Treaty
to
·ahat
ac;:inst
have
and in
t"he CitJ
in
the
of
ste[;S
s• .cc.ld be
Borlin
•
,
0
•
in r~~ard
. '
"
n)
tho ~1nintcnance
of' t::ie [':cesc!"1ce and sec:..:rit/
of
o/
t,10 1:;r;.intcnar,co
o:: tllG
ot
\·iest
c),
freedom
s.nd viabilit:1
•
. ,j
Eerl in;
t.h0 ma:intenonco
of' froodom
of accesi.i
to
.iest
~·
Derlin.
•~.
3ve::.y_ effort
oL ·j ectives·
if
a,.o;,l :cr.tion
•' sarJ
to
s o-c'.,ll
y1.tll te
of non-military
for•t};e
::ms :::ay not
~;ac.o to attain
b:r nef;otiations
pos:.;ible
prepare
:1or:otiati
/
,
tu :)J.ocl~ Jest•Jrn
It
c:mtin,:;ency
ed ".German Domocra tic
a..::c1..3s.:.:to
~~
that
is· however
such
deter
the
Re';h.i:,li ~" from
~e1~1:i.n or
nee es-
u,easures
U,J.S,rt,
'
or
O:::'
t~,c'
ac t.i.on
tddn:;
ot!""1erv.:ise to
i.n1'rii1.ge
.
f:.,,d c::,lloctivoly
,
indivituall·J·
~uropc.
foregoing
and throu;;h
measures,
i!'l them:ielves
the
'
d
F'.JJPGSE:
,
:3.
"
The purpose
,n'ep,u•ation
by
or the£e
tho major
0
allipd
L1strL\Ct,_ons
com~:.anders
i .... .a,.,_
000482
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"
plans
in
·.., i th
order
actions
to
put
the'alliance
in
a position
by the ·Sov 1:et 1?loc. in a Berlin
to
eris
cope
~
is,
Gl:,.SR.AL CCll3IDErtA'I'IONS :\
~
G.
The following
pro;:,aration
of' all
oonsid.er&tions
military
military
actions
:,:c;icral,
overall.
strate;;y
.
::orld-wide
•
'
:-,ave to be
'
\
<\ff<i-Jpropriate
and includin<;
"l:ilitary
measures-;
1
to
l
.
.
contr.iu:.ite
..
political,
imd p<1.1'a-
a~plics.tion·o1·
V
l
,
a
these
. -
'in, s~r:~'pe and -on ~ world-\•tide
o..~;reed upon both
:,Gsi::~1cd
into
.
military
,,_ii
'
.
is
·i~al,
The selecti~~:''
.
r:ies._:..1
tll'GS,
I
on a
.
.
t
psyc1t,10
economic,
in.tcgrated·
as aprropriute
appli'2abie
1
C:~plamutic,
.
the.
,
will
.
scale
uncterlie
plans:
J
a)
should
to
.
.
\
basis,
.
t':;e ;)U,"pose
of' arriving
at
a
'\
r,Jt·t'··~,·,,,t
..L.t:.:•• v.~
•oi' ~ tl•c
.1.
..,,_.
Soviets
t:Hi
aware
':',·,are
to
should
appropriate
Berlin
111
cl::,ri t:;r to
.
of access,
.
•···---·--
Ern
ic:,
'!ii
Soviets
At the
in. caso
bi n,lans
·, bY:\pbliticnl
\
.
...
'
-'
prese1t
sr,o'.lld
.
. on
\1th
1.1nn:ist(J.kable
risks, 1 :;.n contiaued
to
c)
t:i.e Soviet
• I .
~
sos s'i the
course
.
-\
pbl'itical
' ,.
qf' act\i.o;i.,
.
Soviets
oporiltion
enemy action,
objective
to ro-opon
of all
access,
risks
rapid
TLorufore,
2,etions
military
will
.
i
escalation
·.1hile
h:10 immediate
!At
.
p~ans
str~3,te,sy.
'l'hoy must,
with
cu:·ront
thorofore,
.
musi\.' tako
defens.ive
r0tr,in
and/or
1.
to ;.induce
b0
the
ty ... ·
·
-~\
of' r;nd be consist0~t
be
des ira.bili
\
l
pl'o-E:mptive
denial
us m,my oppor-
::Covern\ont
paus o a:1d re-as
a dangerous
any military
.
'
....
'
.
\~•
oner.nous
·
.
______,. __----·"··-.-----------·--•·•······
.
of continuin;-'
authorities
\ ·1. .
.
feav0
as possible
tuni ties
which
.
tis110, tb~ vray ,t'beso.,. nlu.z1_s ·:;ould
sa:ne
•
ttho r1im of appl;ring
I
im::,lornonteci
from
.
. \.--··-·.
z.nd v:i!h
\:o.ild
th~
.
of interference
; . 1 ..but detorrr,ined.
. .·
be solsctei
c~1ld
pressure·
.1.naJ.-.1:n,,
·~
be gradt!t0d
of circw:-,st.:.ncos
-
I
w&.r, ·
a catalot~ue
-·~---···
t~ns li;ht
iime1·al
m0~ure,s
s,,ould
bo o:.n:i.ilable
action
incref,sin,;;
danc;er\of
military
.
.in
0 ,"el•f
m ·of' J....,"""._--·\".1..A..
,Jr11•nt"'n' ., 10 t·ro·~r,,,~
.
:.;;~....,,:,,..-:i...
v.;
of' the
a:;>prppriate
3.ccoss
0
~~-
~--'-'-'
.
b)
with
""··•bl
•
.,~
ac;,ount
.
concept:<i
"
defr,ncc
.
the
of NATO
und
tr..e·;:J must
....",.. .
...
'-.
of tho
000483
.
not
•
�"·, .
"''
.
-·----•-~--·---•·-·'!it
... ,--•--
----
S_ E C }~ JZ·'.·,:T
3
co;::1rr:i
t c'.lpabili'ti.93
to
the
prejuci.5..cv of tLc
in mi~1r::tho· risl:
l~~~i~l?
to ,:e.f',J:icl 1-L"
..1io territory·:,
0T10rall
_C(.'.pacit~r
of
n possible
~
r~sc
1
'IV.rJ.ichmight
:rec0
ini t'..E 1~i·1 CJ
o:· t:10
'. ••
rvacti
bu conr.:it"..:od in
Sovie ..t mov cs ·;:ouJ.d de pond
on to
;;,:::o l:iuild-up
a.t the
op0ro..tions
on results
existine
a3 wol::. u~\.circur,tstc.nco~
Jest's
at
the
\
d) . t:10 Alliance
'st1:.nd \ ror.dy
.~
r1ill
.
for
nuclear
action
at
•
'7 •
oxocu ti on o'f ·aµp!'ov ;;(:
.........
Govurn:nont.:i
0'F··,,-·,rc
.!..C:.1......
s.
I"'•"Ru~n-o"S
-~t.i.tl
•1'(
'Jndcr the
tho
UnJteci
::orstad
'
1~ilitnry
Kincdom,
in
his
at
--1
:"-"-··· •rn ".,...',J. l
th-v - tlrno.·
~,,,
;\,
·o,;,sr,
!.·,I'" l•J
· bo · v-.
.. 0 Subj UC t of
\i
.
\
'"""-lo,-··•1;;"
·,,·,-1T,T~,-_
..,,,"''
..
...
_,J,.
2.nd• tho
Unit·e:i
Stc,tos
I
.,-,.,.1..::
__.r-:_-!:J
__,,.,,_
ofatf,iorica,
:\
.'
as USCLJC.3Ui1 h2.s maC:0 certr.in
plans
(LIVZ
6AK) to on~ble
"',,
these
cEci'ry out
'Il1or0. n:u::;t !>·, full
\
,
Sh:.d llA.'IO r.lr:..n.ning •
1i.
re::ipo,,~1hilH;:
thoi.r ·;, spociul
.
.coordin~';ion
...
.
.-
~
~-
0
0.
1.Jot;-:oon this
~
!
GcnC~al.
tripr\rtito
Gov ern.mof1t"~
,,,-
conc::irn.lng
Berlin,
LIVE. OAK planning
'
· 000484
·
I
~
..
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;
to
.'-.-
1n·struc ti"on~ o:'' ·-the Go~10rrur1Gnts of ?ranee,
capacity
contin~nncy
,,,
'
�•
•
4
10.
For t~·1.c.1:,urpos o Of ::1·ov:"t.din..: · .cs gr8~ t :i· c:"ioic c as
,'•)'.J~i'blc.: of s_:~pplo:;i_;;1ti...i·y ::lt~rn-tivus;
'
c:Vv,i1'i:1~·-·bl;O,l<l l&nd,
''
;'
;;;sc, :nilit:1ry
plans
·-•{ ..
,
.
.
.
air
or nhv.:.l
..
'. .
- '
sl-,oul~ D(; ;:rc,pared
I,!(l<!SUl'OS
\
l . .:J ',r::·.:...~or
];.:~o·.
com11·-io.l1dorn
a.s G.!:'p·rop?'i:.:;.to
•. In oG.ch cc..su,
C
..,,
by
tl:0
-,
:,x:J'ac_t-ccl°
·:.,dv.c,ntt,:~e,s an-cl osti.11at,:,d r·isks.
co
s;;ould
s·3t :;out in
Jn'.purticular,
for
a)
the ·follo·.-:in:;
·;;.ppro~riate
initiation
alert
'c)
d)
.
.
\· .
0:xpandod ·non-nuclear
.
.
.
non-nucloE:.r
suppott;
selective
use
of nuclear
oporations-;
I
oporations
'
weapons
'
of th0 Allii.\.ncll
... t
.
.
\
.
,I
(
v;i th
,.
\
arid ability
to
mec,suros;
l~
,;round
jir
,:rior
..
. \le'
n~coss~ry
•.'/ill
n:llit"ry
'
.
air'and/or.n&val
. .. .
expandod
ur:;:intly:
i'or ;.;;,:r-o
i'orcos
~oasur':is
of a:1:1 ~i.i~ar~lto
.
b)
should
.
. . ·,
I bo studio~_
to
pl,:ms
\
to domonstrate
to use
tllom,
"\\
~
\ \\
t • '
tho
·,
.·
:,
,..
•
. ,• ~
~.,.
~
,
'
•
•
'
•
'•
t
·,· • --~
'
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-~-· .....- ... ·-_......-·---~-- - ....-
-
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• •
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.
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.,'
,
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FI1 EXTERNAL OTT OCT19/tS1 SECRET
TO NATOPARIS DL1325 OPHli-lED
INFO CCOS DM/DND OPIM~1EDWASHDCCJS WASHDCPERM!SNY LDN E!'l'lBPARIS
BON BRU HAGUEROMEPRIORITY
Bi\G ANKARA ATHENS COPEN OSLO LISBON FM LDN
REF YOURTEL2687 OCT18
NI\TO MILITARY PLANNING •
PRIOOEMINISTER HAS APPROVEDTHE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
PROVIDED YOU ~!_AKE
IT CLEAR THE CON AUTHORITIES WISH TO RETAIN THEIR
RESERVATIONIN RESPECT OF GENERALCONSIDERATIONSSET OUT IN PARA6
.
-.\
PENDING FURTHER STUDY AND CLARIFICATION IN COIJNCIL,YOUARE _AUTHO~
fEZED TO AGREE TO DESP OF ANNEX B AS A DIRECTIVE TO MAJOR
MILITARYCOMMANDERS
FOR PLANNING f'URPOSESo ~~c
2. THIS APPROVALIS GIVEN ON UNDERSTANDINGTHAT DETAILED PLANS
WT.THC<l-1!4ANDERS
ASSESSMENTSOF RISKS AND ADVANTAGESARE AD
RE:FERENDU[1
TO GOVTSAt-JDPENDING RECEIPT OF SUCHPLANS,THE WAY
WOULDJ:3ECLEARED FOR:COUNCIL TO TAKE UP,AS
A M!\TTER OF FIRST PRIORITY
.
~~
S'F.CGENS
INXT!ATIVE FOR POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS ON A WESTERNNEG0°
'
TJ.ATING POSITXON.
S. IN APPROVINGTHIS TEL PRIMEMINISTER EXPRESSEDPARTICULARCON•
CERN THAT CAREFULATTENTION BE GIVEN TO NEED TO CLARIFY CJ:RCUM
0
l>lANCESOF AND AUTHORITIES .RESPQ'IISIBLEFOR QUOTE SPECIFIC POLITICAL
DECISION UNQUOTEREFERREDTO IN PARA6CD)3.
DECISXOM!';:'.
Ti.::::::, -; ..LL
FOR EXAMPLE,WOULDTHE
,:,. NATO GOIJTSOR BY :,. RZC!D G,ROUP
0
PERHAPS A MAJORITY OF COUN,Cit.
000486
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.
DEPARTMENT
OF EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS,
•
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·
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l;'ILE
DIARY
OUTGOIN~ MESSAGE
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--'ffi'JW-l'filHir-~,--"---·------J¾ h.,--{·r- •-- ~ C U_I(TJ)~
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NUMBER
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.
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··.
-
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_____ r __
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___
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IN illilf..ATION2;0 'l'H,,i;SECRi..'U.i-iYGENJ.Q'!AL
WtiICH"
IVE \THflli!H::ITAND\11.J.,i_,
BE Ul! FOli DISC!Ji.l:ION DJ TBE C,.Ulrn;a. ll
'tlm 1,EAR PUTOREo fiHJ.$.E GOJ4,1BN1'8ARR BAS}])
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'fiiA'to Di REGARD'tO Al!r! DECISIONS 'J.:OBB TMqnf; 111 ·
R1IiS?1i:CT
OF !{ATO PLAHS VffllCIIARE-·'DRAiliifUI10 'rdE "RULi: OF!
.
.
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ll'l'IAUDII'l'YFOR NATO AGTlOH IS THE PRf..SENTfllSJ.TIOir' •
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11 AS FARASl'IA1'0,
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1-0· TEE UA'l'O a::i1niort as
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IN .ll.D.DI'l'IOU.p
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BEFORE IMPLEDN'l'AT10!1 RAV"~'J.'O BE APPROYEDBY OOVf.RNM.@~TS
.
.
AND T:tAT THE EXECU'lIOli OF AP.i'RCVEDPLANS WILL BB "'l'H.E
.
3'.JB,L,CT OF' DEOISIOJS BY GOVEh'lilUillTSAlf THE Tll!!E.11•
a.
.FOR THE:PURPOSEOF
lti ,'.;:)ll!r;ECTIONl\'I'l'li 'l'H¼
Di!.ALINO\llITa 'lt!ILITAR\'. PLANNING
'
BE.RI.n,
Sii'U/1.T'l:cl;J,
IT IS. IM1'0HTANT
,,
'i'l:1lT IT IS OLEARLY WDERS'l'OGD THAT THE lrINAL HJ,;~HVtlSIBILITY
,
\
.B,;•rHPOH APfHOVAL OF FLA.NS AND F'GR DECISIONS TO IMl'LEM.li.1fT
·;:~!EUSiiO-JLD illj;Sf }7I'J.'HO-OVERli.lllmTSVldO i'iILL IDIPRESS TIJEIR
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VlEW5 '.'1'fffiOUG:H
THEIR PE!lMAREN'fREP.IGSENTATIVES IN THE tlATO
c::;:nlCIL
AtlD fliAT NO DELEGA'l'IOHOF GOYEKHIIBNTALAUiHORiff
IN s1:CI! CUUCIAL MA'l''.tERSCAN DE OONTEW>I.ATED
Pl'{OVIDEP
0
T.t:iIS IS UliD.ERSTOOD
0 CANADAaABAfJCEPT.THB INTARPl{E'rATlQli
'
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0
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TB.AT "I'l' 18 DI 'l'RE COUNCIL 'r.liA'l' THE WILL
01'' GOVERNl&ENTS.
WILLBE EXPRT.SSSDBY THE PEHiiANEUTP.El'R£SEllTAT·IYE8• 0
WE BELI':~VE THAT Tlill COU'lfCIL SliOULD CONSIDER \'illAT iU::.t.SUiIBS
ARE P.EQ.UXRED
TO EN/IDLE IT TO DEAL EFF~CTIVELY /,l~D f..xTEDITL1tlSLY
Wl;tH SUCH D,U>ORTANTQUESTION&Iii ':raE EVENT OF AN EHEF!GENCYo
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The ..Council will remember th.it durin[( its discussion.
of ~'Q/61/765, . .nnox .C, if was recogni sod tha."t. some. slightly,
cl.1fferent
wording ror;nrding
·p.ol i t'ic;:il uu thori tics,·
governments,,.
Coui1cil etc.,
wns" to ho found in four.pnrt.s
of' this document:.
•
..
,
.. .
of
I
•
~
(1 )• Tho e:stnbiishment
n cct:.;toguo
of plans nsked for• in pcrogrnph
G(b) is intended
to enabJ.c the
.ll.OJJ
ti..9.c.l _g_u_t)1oy_l;ti.o_s.
to select
the sppropriate
·
aotioh .in the ligh't of circumstnnces..
.. ·
(2).
In 6(d)(3.)
it. is st~,ted that there v1ilJ. have
·bei "a specific
i2,.<1,l_i_i;J,.£-aj.
__dccision
to employ
,nucl"ear weapons ••.•• •
to
In. pc.ro.grai)h 7 ..upproval
of the. plans is in.tended
to .. ~
be obt:iinod
through the 'following
procedure:
·t_he
i/
• plans. will ··be sent; to the Standing
Group for.
•·1 ·
appro:i sol in c onsulta.tion
11'.ith t~e Mili tnry Committoe,/
.•
in accordtmcc ·with established
NI.TO,procedure,
and
ff
will be fo.rwarcicd to .the North :.tL·.ntic
Counsil
for
f
:ipproval
by _gpvernments throuE,h the Permanent
(,
B._0prcscn_t.£,t).y_e_§..,.
~
·
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·,•,..
(3)
(4)
The executio;
~f.tll'e j:lans,
upprov~d o.ccor.ding to
this proceclurc,
\vill bu the' subject
of :ie<Cj_s.i_ons_~
,&oyo:rn_ments o.t :thcftime
(purogrcph
cl).
-~ . _ .· ..
C
. 2.
· It seems' to me that these diffcrpnt
,wordings h.:ive .not
been deli bcro. tely, us.0d for the purpose of cs tabli shing reo.lly
clear-cut
di st inc tioris :and, special'
tren tmo)1ts as regards
tl:le
·severecl h,ypotheses
covered
in. the relevunt",pur,ts
of __nnox B; I
c.malso _convi_nccd trot.we i~ight be faced with·grcat
difficulties
it' wu <lid not try ,t,o polish
up' the drafting
and t'o (;Ct a more
orde1•ly text.
·
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· On _the other hand, 1 think I _cp.n ~,_ssurnc that there
i,s
agreement among us ·that the _!_n:s_ty_u_c_:tions
should be
sent. to the Military·
Comtic.nders.
1'urthcr
delo. 0' wciuld be
unc:c.ceptablf.;. right
now·.
~
.
a complete.
~
.
'
'
4 •. _. \"iould it, therefore•,
be p.ossibJ.·e that we upprove the
_·.nnexes ;. and D as they· stdnd i1t -this morrient, it being
uridcre,tood
that .we must,ritill
find ,c.· butter
understanding
of.
the .r1uestion:
_wha~tpo;J.i.tico.l, authority
hCls to mClkc decisions.
I am sure .tho.t discussions
on-that
matter will still
take a
·Jong time :ind this wi.11 bocoine c,uite-clear"whcin
w0 com0 to
· discuss
·the ,,uestions
ro.iscd in ·-my P0/61 /785. ··
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· · ·.5, · >-During our. disqussions
· stat-ements
huvc been ..,,mude, und
• . I think .£1,gJ'.ccmont...ho.s beim roe1ched; -th.it .until
we t_C:ke another
clcci cion,. tho i?gli t_!.g::_it_g~j;l)ori~ "meant in 6(b) and 6(d) 3, is the
8ouncil,
· ·we h:lVC not· yet ·discussed
pt,r::gruphs
7 and 8.Hero
tho position
might be slightly
clif'ferent
because,
ncccrding:o to
::irticl o 5 of the Tro~:-ty, each member hns the right
of individual
.
sclf"'-dcfcnce.
Therefore,
if nttacked,
cc.ch individual
member can
dee Jde how it is going to defend itself
and .. take~ those ac tiohs
which it deems necessc.ry.
On the other
hahd; if collec'£1ye·N..TO
. c.c tion is to, be ·to.ken, I think tlm t in that cnsc also the
expressions
used in pnrctgraphs
7 .:tnd 8. 'will .1i1ply c. clec·i_sion by
. the C9uncil.
.
· · · ·
·
· '~~"
··
·
'
' 6.
It nby be ·thl,t in •tho future· the presently
agreed rule
'.of unc.nirni ty wil1 'h:;Ye to be umended, bu,t we· h~-:vc not yet
reached
the. sfuge at' which such ·ch..,nges ·can ou ll)ade to this rule.
· Hence, "wo must take it for grantee. that this rule of imnriimi ty
..
for, lL'.L'O .tiction is the present
posi tiof! and c~:nnot be nl t-ercd.
'
..
.
.
. ·:- / , . ''· ,,,..·,,
.
.
.
. 7,
·The inter'pretc.tion
I suggest,
o:ccording
to. which
decisions
·w1'J.1 be tc.kcn· by· the ·Permanent .council
under . tho J;'ule
of unanirni t:,r, seems· to be ..in. line with' tho Tre., ty • · -'-rticle
9•
stc.tcs
th.,t the P-..irtics· t.o the Treaty
"estoblish
a Council,
on.
y.,hich each of them shc.11 bQ repros.entod,
to conqider
matters
cone crning , the i mpl cinen tn ti on of this Treaty" •
:. s c.n armed
atto.ck. agc'.inst one or more .of the ,.llied
,countri·cs
shnll be
COJ'\Siclcred Lm r:ttcck· ~,g~:inst them all (.'.rticles
5 r,nd 6),, it
scc\ns norm-,1- to c onsidor
thb. t ~my Ni.TO action
to be t:::kcn in cr,se
of such c,n ,ittc.ck would be discussed
and decidud i,n the Council.
Tho · governments
nc. turr,:ll'y will .send instructions
to their
·
Pe:rrr,nhent Rcpresen tati vei;:;.,··c.nd, therefor,,,
it would s,c,c:m the. t
whc11 the text . of .".nnex· B spcolrn -of. ·"dc,c i sions by governments"·
and
of·H·pc,11 ticc.l c.uthoritics;',
there .. is ·no contrc.diction
b0tween
this wording and the ''fu.ct thc:t -it is·in
the Counci1 .that the will
of g9vernP1entsi)Vill. .
be:-cxprossod
by
the
Permanent
Representotives.
.
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,r 000490
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
NATO
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Berlin Crisis / 9 FEBRUARY 1962
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1962-02-09
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
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en
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CDTT00038
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Defence Liaison (1) Division to Ignatieff, ‘‘Berlin: Contingency Planning,’’ 9 Feb. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1.
air lift
Berlin contingency
France
George Ignatieff
Lauris Norstad
Live Oak
SACEUR
Stikker
Three Power report
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/2b212a9c4192e96d407b7dbeb1812e3f.pdf
7e19cde3d1a3f0d50e1ee73e0d2ca379
PDF Text
Text
BRIEFINGWASA PRELIMINARY
OULINEOF NATOMILITARYPLANSWITHRESPECT
..
TO A BERLINCONTINGENCY
WHICHHE HADBEENINSTRUCTED
TO PREPAREIN
PARA10
or
COUNCILS
DIRECTIVECM(6!)104.A WRITENREPORTON THESE
PLANSWOULD
BE SUBMITTED
IN ABOUTTWOWEEKS
TO THE STANDING
GROUPFOR
CONSIDERATION
THROUGH
NORMAL
NATOCHANNELS
IE BY THEMILITARYCTTEE
ANDEVENTUALLY
BY THECOUNCIL.HE
ASKEDTHATTHEMATERIAL
BE GIVEN
' SECURE
THE HIGESTCLASSIFICATION,THAT
ITS CIRCULATION
BY BY THEMOST
MEANS
or TRANSMISSION
ANDTHATCONTENTS
BE 'RESTOON A NEEDTO KNOW
BASIS.
2.NORSTAND
EMPHASISED
THATWHAT
HE WASABOUTTO DESCRIBEWASTHE
QUOTECATALOGUE
OF PLANSUNQUOTE
MENTIONED
IN PARA6(8 >or CM•(61)104
FROMWHICHAPPROPRIATE
ACTIONCOULDBE SELECTED
BY THE POLITICAL
AUTHORITIES
IN THELIGHTor THECIRCUMSTANCES.HE
WASNOTRPT NOT
HIMSELFPRESSINGANYPARTICULAR
.PLAN.INADDITIONTHESEPLANSWERE
7
MEANT
TO APPLYONLYWHEN
THE IMPLEMENTATION
or LIVE OAKPLANSHAD
FAILED.THEY
WEREMEANT,IFTHIS STAGEor A CRISIS WEREEVERREACHED,
•
TO PROVIDE.THE
POLITICALAUTHORITIES
or NATOWITHSOMEOTHERCHOICE
THANALL..OR. NOTHING•
THE•-EXISTENCFQOF
THEfLANS
DID NOTRPTC.NOTNECES.
;
,
SARILYIMPLYAT THIS STAGEAN ABILITYTO CARRYTHEMout.NOR COULD
IT BE ASSUMED
THATIT WOULD
BE POSSIBLETO CARRYOUTPLANSIN THE
STAGESWHICHHE WASABOUTTO SKETCH.NEVERTHELESS
THEVERYEXISTENCE
OF PLANSGAVEDESIRABLE
FLEXIBILITYTO THECHOICESWHICHMIGHTHAVE
TO BE MADEBY THEPOLITICALAUTHORITIES.INSUMMARY
HE WASINDICATING
PLANSWITHRESPECT
_TOWHAT
THEALLIANCE
SHOULD
BE ABLETO DO BUTNO'l'.
RPT NOTNECESSARILY
WHAT
THEPOLITICALAUTHORITIES
WOULD
DECIDE
TO DO.
••• 2 •••
000459
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PAGE TWO 506
3.THE NATO MILITARY PLANS IN THIS- CONTE°XT
HAD.BEEN GIVEN
THE NAME
..
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.
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OF QUOTE BERCONUNQUOTEPLANS.THERE WERETHREE MAIN SETS COVERING
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PLANS FOR AIR,GROUND AND SEA ACTION AND WITHIN EACH SET THERE WERE
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GRADUATIONS..
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4.THERE WERE THREE PLANS F
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:BERCON ALPHA 1,ALPHA 2,
,_ANDBRA~of ALPHAl,! 1~p;;;~;-;;O:;;-V-;I
D~E;;D;·
.~F~:;;_ ;::;;;;.:~_A~Tr,I~_O~N""'O;F~L~A;R;~~i-~S~C:~~_L;~~F~,1;-;G;i:H
ESCORTS IN THE BERLIN CORRIDOR ALPHA2/PROVIDED FOR A NON-NUCLEAR
0
,~ATT~E FOR AIR SUPERIORITY OUTSIDE THE C.ORRiDOR,EI OVER EASTGERMANY.
\~R~
PL~NNING PROVIDED FOR A NUCLEARDEMONSTRATION
ON A SMALL --
..
-~
.
NUMBEROF SELECTED TARGETS EACH ONE OF WHICH WOULDBE AT LEAST TWO
ADVANTAGES
OF LPHA 1 WERE THAT
,, .
THERE WOULDBE RELATIVELY SMALL FORCES INVOLVED IN A SMALL AREA,ALL
:.I,
--
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OF WHICH WOULDBE INSIDE THE CORRIDORS.IT THEREFORE INVOLVEDTHE
LEAST RISK OF ESCALATION.THE DISADVANTAGESWERE THAT IT WOULDBE
I.
t
..
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EASIL y FRUSTRATED,THAT ITS SUCCESS woui:D NOT RPT NOT NECESSARITY
.,A
,,
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AFFECT THE PROBLEMOF ACCESS AND THAT IT \iOULD HAVE TO BE CARRIED OUT
I
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IN AN AREA WHERETHE MAXIMUM
SOVIET CONTROLEXISTED.THE ADVANTAGES
~F fLPH~·J2 ,wERE ~HAT ITS INITIAL :succEss
~As HIGLY L,,I-KELYs~-NCE IT
WOULDINVOLVE ALMOST 1000 PLANES.IT W0ULDCAUSE SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE
f,
0
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TO THE sov IET AIRFQRCE. ITS PURPOSE WOULDBE TO GAIN AND MAINTAIN AIR
SUPERIORITY AND IT WOULDBE AN OFFENSIVE OPERATION.THE DISADVANTAGES
.
.
..
..,OF THE PLAN WERE THAT IT INVOLVED.A GREAT RISK OF' GENERALWARSINCE
~
~
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IT WAS A LARGE SCALE OPERATION WHICH WQULDPROBABLYINFLICT SUCH
·.,.
HEAVYDAMGESON THE SOVIET AIRF'ORCE THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT
RPT NOT ACCEPT THOSE DAMAGESWITHOUTRETAPIATION.THE' ADVANTAGESOF'
'THE \BRAV'ofPLAN WERE THAT IT WAS:s_IMPLE AND INVOLVEDTHE MOS~ LIMITED
.
USE Of NUCLEARWEAPONS.NORSTADINDICATED THAT ANY CUCLEARWEAPONS
.
I ' r ,,:
, ., .~ ~
ENVISAGED UNDER THIS PLAN WOULDBE UNDER !OKT IN YIELD AND WOULD
'
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BE DIRECTED AT PURELY MILITARY TARGETS MORETHAN TWOMILES FROM ANY
000460
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CENTREOF' POPULATION.AT
A LATERPOINT IN HIS BRIEF'itr<rHE GAVEAS
.SHORTRANGETARGETIN ORDERTO ACHIEVEQUOTERIF'LE ACCURACYUNQUOTE,
AT .A
. A~ EXAMPLEA NUCLEAR
WEAPON
OF' I, 5KTS F'.IREDFROMA HOWITZER
'
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THE DISADVANTAGES
OF' THE PLANWERETHATIT OF'F'ERED
NO RPT NO SIGN!·
'
FICANTMIJIIARY ADVANJ'AGE
ANDTHATIT PROVIDETHESOVIETS IF' T~EY
WISHEDWITHAN EXCUSETO REPLYWITHLARGESCALENUCLfARWEAPONS.
·-
THE RESULTCOULDFROMTHE MILIT ARY,POINT OF VIEWMEANTHE ACCEPTANCE
'
OF GREATMILITARYDAMAGE
ON OURS-IDE.
'
5. IN GENERAL
COMMENT
ON THESEPLANSANDIN RESPONSETO_._QUESTIO~S,
NORSTAD
INDICATEDTHATALL THREESTAGES·OF THE PLANSHADQUOTE
NUCLEAR
ANNEXES
UNQUOTE
IE THE SAMETYPE OF OPERATION
BUT USINGNU·
CLEARWEAPONS.SUCH
DOUBLEPLANSHADTO EXIST HE BELIEVEDIN THE EVENT
THATTHE SOVIET RESPONSEAT ANYPOINT WOULD
BE TO IMMEDIATELY
RAISE
THE THRESHHOLD,IE
TO RESPONDWITHNUCLEAR
WEAPONS.HE
INDICATEDAS
.
'
WELLTHATANYLOSSESSUFF'ERED
BY THE
WESTERN
FORCES
IN THE EARLIER
.
'
'
'
STAGESOF'THESEACTIONSWOULD
NATURALLY
DETRACT
FROMTHEIR MILITARY
ABILITYTO CARRYOUTMOREADVANCED
OPERATIONS.
6, PLANSWITHRESPECTTp--@OUND
5IoN
WERESUBDIVIDEDIN FOUR~
IE
BERCON
tHARLIE ttCHARLIE 2i:CHARLIE3\AND CHARLIE4• CHARLIE1 fROVIDED
F'ORAN ATTACKBY A REINF'ORCED
D.IV ALONGTHE AXIS HELMSTEDT·BERLIN.
CHARLIE2 PROVIDED
FOR A TWODIVISIONALATTACKIN FRONTOF'THE
CASTTLE
i
AREA.CHARLIE
3 PROVIDEDFOR A THREEDIV ATTACK
ON THE AXIS HELMSTEDT
TO MITTLELAND
CANAL-ELBE
RIVER.CHARLIE4 PROVIDEDFOR A THREEDIVISI·
'
ONALATTACKIN THE THURINGER-WALD
AREA.EACH
OF' THESEPLANSALSOHAD
_NUCLEAR~ANNXES,
I
I·
7.THE GENERAL
ADVANTAGE
OF ALL THESEPLANSWASTHATTHEYWOULD
DEMONSTRATE
THE SERIOUSINTENTOF NATOIN THE FACE OF SOVIETTHREATS
i
'
ANDTHE READINESSOF WESTERN
FORCESTO ENGAGEIN AN INCREASED
SCALE
OF'GROUND
ACTION.THEGENERAL
DISADVANTAGES
WERETHATSURPRISEWOULD
BE DIFFICULTTO ACKIEVE,THAT
CONTROL
OF THE AIR OVERTHE BATTLEAREA
'
' ALL
MIGHTBE DIFF'ICULTTO ACHIEVEANDMAINTAINANDTHATTHEYWERE
i
' ••
•• • 4
000461
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,
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PAGE FOUR 506
fEB 2 7 \985
SUBJECT TO RAPID DEFEAT.THE SPECIFIC
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
•
CHARLIE WERE THEN OUTLINED.THE
''-f
-
r,
I
ADVANTAGES OF CHARLIE I WERE THAT IT WAS
D_IRECTLY RELATED TO THE QUESTION OF ACCESS TO BERLIN, THAT IT COULD
BE EASILY MOUNTED,THAT IT HAD NO RPI NO MAJOR AFFECT ON NATO"s OVERALL
..
.
. ..
...
.
.
·~.
.
DEFENCES.AN~ I.HAT IT WAS EASIER TO JUSTIFY BECAUSE IT WAS DIRECTED
'
.·
~
,
(
~
_"':'.
r.
. TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS ON THE AUTOBAHN.ITS DISDVANTAGES WERE THAT
'f:.
1.
""'
THE C0.-'1BATAREA WAS FAR AHEAD OF NATO·s EMERGENCYDEFENCE PLAN' 'i>os'I.-
.
'
.I
<
TIONS AND. THAT IT WOULD BE EASY FOR THE SOVIETS TO CONTA.IN SUCH A
.. ' ' . i
•
\) ;
•
SMALL. FORCE.THE ADVANTAGES OF CHARLIE 2 WERE THAT IT WAS EASY TO
EXECUTE AND, THAT ITS INITIAL
=
f
•
r_•
f,
.
.,;. ..
SUCCESS WAS LIKELY, ITS DISADVANTAGES
·
· •
~
f'
•
~;
.'\.,
-WERE THAT IT ,WAS OFF THE AUTOBAHN AND THEREFORE PERHAPS MORE DIFFI•
.
CULT TO JUSTIFY IN RELATION TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS AND THAT IT
..
,
TOO COULD
BE EASILY CONTAINED
BY THE SOVIETS.THE
.
'
.
.
LIE
.·
ADVANTAGES OF CHAR•
..
0
3 WERE THAT IT WOULD BE RELATED DIRECTLY TO THE PRQ,ELEM0F GROUND
-
.
. .. _,
·:-ta ; ·,1-+
~t'
· ACCESS TO. BERLIN AND THAT IT WOULD PROVIDE A GREATER PENETRATION CA•
'
•.
~
PABILITY,ITS
.
'
OVERALL. DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY
i
LIE
•,•T~~~-~
..'
DISADVANTAGES WERE THAT IT WOULD BEGIN TO DEGRADE THE
- .•
..
.
.
'
~
.
OF NATO DEFENCES,THE ADVANTAGES OF--CHAR-
'
.
4 WERE THAT IT WOULD STRENGTHEN THE FORWARDDEFENCE POSTURE OF
.
'
1'1'1E7tLLIANCE IF
-
ITS WERE SUCCESSFUL.HOWEVERIF
.
I
IT WERE DEFEATED THE
..___,
VERY SUBSTANTIAL .LOSS OF FORCES INVOLVED WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN
SERIOUSLY IN TERMS ~TO
•1·.s,,NORS,TAD THEN. TURNE_~TO
DEFENCE,
.
. .·
_
~~~~·R _HIS DIR~CT
PLANNING FOR~
CONTR(l., T HERL WAS ONLY ONE PLAN OF A GENERAL ORDER IN THIS CONTEXT
KNOWNAS QUOTE BERCON DELTA UNQUOTE.IT INVOLVEDCA>SURVEILLANCE AND
-·
CONTROL
OF. .SOVIET
BLOC SHIPPING
......
- ,. •.
-•
IN QUOTE ALLIED CCl'lMAND
EUROPE
.
.,
_.,.
.
~.
FOCAL AREAS UNQUOTE;CB>THE Ci.l<TROL AND/OR MINING OF THE BALTIC
.
•
.
STRAITS;CC)THE
·r
CONTROL AND /OR MINING OF THE TURKISH STRAITS;AND
.
1: .
'• '
~'
l
~-
( D) BOARDING, SEARCH AND ARREST WITH RESPECT TO BLOC SHI PPING, THE AD,
VANTAGES OF,THIS
AND THAT IT
I
~
'~
•
~
PLAN WERE THAT THERE WAS A LOW_RISK .~F ESCALATION
ALLOWED FOR THE EXPLOITATION
OF Clli:Nli:RALALLIED
SUPERIO. ,
HITY IN SEA POWER.ITS DISADVANTAGES WERE THAT IT
WAS NOT RPT NOT
000462
�•..
•
(
..
- M;~n /H"<\-n
~
f ,,
.. t
.•
'
•
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l 1-S(i:,_%
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I
PAGE FIVE. 506
FEB2 7 1985·
'[ DIRECTL y R:LATED TO THE BERLIN SITUATION
AND THAT IT MIGHT PRECI-,
AGAINST ALLIED
PI TATE LARGE SCALE.. SOV!ET SUBMARINE ACTIV!TY
SHIPPING
'
·"
ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD.
9.GEN NORSTAD THEN .SUMMEDUP THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES IN
GENERAL TERMS. OF ALL BERCON PLANNING WHETHER RELATED TO AIR,GROUND
OR SEA, THE ADVANTAGES WERE THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PLANS
WOULD DEMONSTRATETHE WILLINGNESS OF NATO TO USE SIGNIFICANT
FORCE
TO COUNTER SOVIET ACTION.PREPARATION TO EXECUTE THESE PALSN WOULD
IMPROVE THE GENERAL FORCE READINESS OF THE ALLIANCE.SOME OF THE PLliNS
MIGHT PRODUCE REAL MIL IT ARY ADVANTAGES. THE IMPLEMENTAT !ON OF ANY OF
-<::--------
1
THE PLANS MIGHT LEAD THE SOVIET UNION TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE OR CAUSE
'
'
THE:i•l_TO REOPEN ACCESS ROUTES WHICH/THEY HAD BARRED.THE DISADVANTAGES
---
WERE THAT ALL OF THE PLANS INVOLVED THLP.J.S.K-OF_G.£,NERAL WAR,THAT
~
'
MANY OF THEM COULD Bi. CONTAINED AND FRUSTRATED AND THEY MIGHT LEAD
TO THE SEIZURE OF WEST BERLIN
OR
ro AGGRESSIVE sov IET
ACTI ON ELSEWHERE.
BE.RCONPLANS WERE MUTUALLY INDEPENDENT BUT TWO OR MORE COULD BE CARRI E.D
OUT SIMULTANEOUSLY.IMPLENENTATION
OF THE GROUND PLANS WOULD REQUIRE
'
.'UR SUPERIORITY AND IT
WAS PROBABLY INEVITABLE
'
THEREFORE THAT ,GROUND
I
A.ND AIR PLANS \IIOULD HAVE TO BE PUT INTO EFFECT AT THE SAME TIME,
10. THE NORWEGIAN REP SAID THAT HE WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE OBJECTIVITY
WITH !/.!.XP3
...i'
'.vlTH WHICH GEN NORSTAD HAD GIVEN THIS
PRELIMINARY OUTLINE.HE
WONDERED
IF THE. EXPLANAT ION OF' BERCON BRAVO DID NOT RPT NOT DEMONSTRATETHE
ZXTREME DIFFICULTY
OF' EMPLOYING THE SELECTIVE
USE OF N UCLE AR WEAPONS
c
T
• RATHER THAN THE OBJECT STATED
r,BILITY
ni/ cMr.01>104
IE
QUOTE THE WILL AND THE
OF THE ALIANCE TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNQUOTE.WAS IT 'CON-
CEIVABLE THAT ONE NUCLEAR WEAPON COULD BE USED WITHOUT BRINGING A
NUCLEAR RESPONSE?NORSTADSIMPLY SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO
DRA~J UP, PLANS BY THE DOCU IN QUESTION AND THAT HE
/'-
BEi TF:VFQ IT _WAS
DESIRABLE TO HAVE SUCH PLANS.HE ,WAS PERFECTLY AWARE HOWEVERTHAT
~GOVTS
ACTING TrlROUGrl COUNCIL 1-!ADNOT RPT NOT APPROVED ANY OF THESE
.. , • 6
000463
•
i
�DOVINGRADED
TOSECREJ·
REBUIT
AS,fCRET
;;.. 1 ....
l , -' .· •
k,'"'5
.i,
~
PAGE SIX, 506
·1
(!:1~1~)
FEB2 7 ,ss5
PLANS AND MIGHT NOT RPT NOT DO SO.THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION THERE~
FORE WAS PRIMARILY
POLITICAL
AND NOT RPT NOT MILITARY,ALTHOUGH
TURALLY WHATEVER DECISION WAS TAKEN HAD CERTAIN MILITARY
NA-
CONSEQUENCES,
THE DANISH REP ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE NORSTADS RESPONSIBILITY
TO
CHOOSE WHICH OF THE CONTINGENCY PLANS MIGHT BE IMPLEMENTED.NORSTAD
SAID HE BELIEVED THAT GOVTS ACTING. THROUGH COUNCIL MIGHT APPROVE
THESE PLANS AS PART OF THE CATALOGUE OF PLANS ENVISAGED IN CMC61)104
BUT HE FELT CERTAIN THAT THEY WOULD RESERVE TO THEMSELVES DECISION
WITH RESPECT TO IMPLEMENTATION.HE BELIEVED THAT BERCON PLANS WERE
OF AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT NATURE THAN LIVE
BK FFF~CTTVE.THIS
WAS NOT RPT NOT THE CASE HOWEVERWITH RESPECT TO
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BERCON PLANS.LIVE
+
OAK PLANS.THE EXPERIENCE
-,
OAK PLANS ENVISAGED ACTION
WHICH WAS ESEN'f IALL Y DEFENSIVE .BERCON PLANS ON THE OTHER HAND WERE
MEANT TO PROVIDE A DEMONSTRATION OF INTENT TO GO FURTHER AND THIS
WAS OBVIOUSLY A DECISION
TO BE TAKEN BY THE POLITICAL
AUTHORITIES.
THE ACTING SECGEN INTERJECTED TO REMIND THE MTG THAT PARA 8 OF DOCU
CM(61) i04
PROVIDED TH/\T QUOTE THE EXECUTION OF APPROVED PLANS WILL
Bf THE SUBJECT OF DECISIONS BY GOVTS AT THE TIME UNQUOTE.
J l oNORSTAD,WITH GREAT SERIOUSNESS,POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS SOME-
THH;G IN THE CHARACTER OF' HAVING TO TAKE EXECUTIVE DECISIONS WHICH
M~.DE A COMMANDEREJ(TREMF.LYCONSERVATIVE.HE HAD HAD THIS EXPERIENCE
IN THE PST TWO WEEKS.Hr: HAD BEEN THE TARGET OF QUOTE A GREAT DEAL OF
f;DVICE UNQUOTE IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS AND HAD. BEEN EXPOSED TO QUOTE
MANY BRILLIANT
IDEAS UNQUOTE AS TO HOW TO PROCfrED.IN RESTROSPECT
'
f1LL THE
ADVICE HAD BEEN BAD AND HE BELIEVED THAT COUNCIL WOULD AGREE
IF HE COULD EXPOSE SOME Of THAT ADVICE TO THEt'J.HE SAID HE HAD TO
1\ADNIT
THAT QUOTE HE HAD NOT RPT NOT HAD A BRILLIANT
\\HE
TOOK OVER THE
RESPONSIBILITY
IDEA SINCE
OF SUPREME COMMANDERUNQUOTE.
000464
�FEB2 7 1985
Pf-\GE SEVEN 506
12.FINALL Y IN RESPONSE TO A FURTHER,'QUESTIONNORSTAD INDICATED THAT
I
PLANS AFFECTING SPECIAL NATIONAL INTERESTS WOULDBE DISCUSSED IN·
GREAT DETAIL WITH APPROPRIATE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES IN ORDER THAT'
THIY COULDBE IN THE BEST POSITION TO TAKE SPECIFIC AND DELIBERATE
DECISIONS.HE MOVEDON THEN TO SPEAK IN MOREGENERALTERMS OF NATOS
l"ORWARD
STRATEGYAND HIS BRIEFING IN THIS RESPECT WILL BE DEALT
v'ITH IN A SEPARATE l1SG
IGNATIEFF•' •.
--
----
-~-
,_
I
I
I
000465
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
NATO
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Berlin Crisis / 24 FEBRUARY 1962
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1962-02-24
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
A language of the resource
en
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CDTT00039
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
NATO Paris to External Affairs, ‘‘NATO Military Planning,’’ 24 Feb. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1.
BERCON plans
Berlin contingency
Lauris Norstad
Live Oak
North Atlantic Council
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4476e95aafbee18d8e3892201e58e1b9.pdf
15cb384fb93346933d5d2bb20a3be401
PDF Text
Text
BEST AVAILABLE COPY
\
J.J.
•_)_
1
'.) \
FMMOSCOW
SEf,:16/62 SECRET
1U EXTERNAL
673 OPIMMED
INFO TT LDNCPMANDMINISTER)NATOPARIS
OPIMMED
BONNBRU HAGUEROME
WltSHDCPERMISNY EMBPARIS
PRIOR!TY FM OTT
TT DM/DND CCOS OTT FM OTT
PCO OTT FM OTT
.E~G BGRAD WARSAWOSLO VIENNAPRAGUEFM LON
~G BERLIN FM BONN
REF MYTEL672 SEP15
GERMANY
AND BERLIN
HEREWITHCOMMENTSON KHRUSHCHEVS
BERLIN PLANAS DISCLOSED IN HIS
CONVERSATION
WITH KROLL
REPORTED IN
MY
REFTEL.
2.KHRUSHCHEV
REALLYSEEMSDETERMINED,UNLESS
OF COURSEHE GETS HIS
~y
EARLIERBY WESTERN
CONCESSIONS,TO
BRING WORLD
TO VERYBRINK
OF THERMONUCLEAR
WARIN ORDERTO FORCEWESTERN
ABANDONMENTOF OUR
PLEDGEON BERLINERS SECURITY.THOMPSONWAS LONGCONVINCED THAT
KHRUSHCHEV
WASIN FACT SO DETERMINED
TO GO RIGHT UP TO BRINK.
KHRUSHCHEVS
STATEDPLAN IS CONSISTENTIN TIMING ANDCONTENTWITH
OTHERRECENT INDlCATIONSCEG
TO THOMPSON,U
THANT_,UDALL
AND IN SEPl 1
TASS DECI..ARATION)oDETAILS ARE MORE PRECISE AND MAY BE
DESIGNEDTO
MISLEADUS OR BE SUBJECTTO FLEXIBLECHANGES.ITIS FOR EXAMPLE
Sf ILL
P!)SSIBLE THAT.KHRUSHCHEVMIGHTTAKEBERLIN QUESTIONTO UN
BEFORERATHERTHANAFTER SIGNING PEACETREATYANDBLOCKINGACCESS.
1-0WEVER.
~ALCULATION
THATUN TENDENCY
IS NORMALLY
TO URGEPEACEFUL
ACQUIESCENCE
STRENGTHENS
PLAUSIBILITYOF KHRUSHCHEVS
DECLARED
PLAN
TO CREATEFAIT ACCOMPLI,AND
THENGO NOT RPT NOT TO UNGABUT TO
~CUHITY COUNCILWHEREHE HAS A VETO.FACTTHATKHRUSHCHEV
MADENO
CRPTNO MENTIONTO KROLLOF INTENTIONTO HOLDPEACECONFERENCE
OR
ATTEMPT
TO GET SOMENEUTRALS
TO SIGN MAYALSOBE RELEVANT.INTHESE
CIRCUMSTANCES
IT MIGHTBE DIFFICULT EVEN IF WETHOUGHT
IT PROFIT·
ASLE AFTERFAIT ACCO:i!PLIFOR WESTTO TRY TO TAKEMATTERTO
BEST AVAILABLE COPY
000142
�PAGE TWO 673
ASSEMBLY UNDER U~ITING
FOR PEACE PROCEDURES.
DANGER POINT LIES
3.CRUCIAL
I~ KHRUSHCHEVS APPARENTLY GENUINE
CONVICTION THAT IN LAST ANALYSIS
KE:~NEDY AND WEST wILL
SACK DOWN
'
AND ACQUIESCE IN SOME FACE-SAVING
FORMULA FOR RETRE~T~I
E:CONCJfrJY
SENDING BY DEFERRED MSG VIA
NEXT SEA PLANE ANALYSIS
PROBABLE. FACTORS CONTF'.181.IT
U-.G TO THIS
WELL SEEM PERSUASIVE.
CONCLUSION FROM THEM 15 IN PART
AT LEA.ST SHARED BY FRE.NCH GOVT,~JANY KEY GERMANS INCLUDING
AND I
~DERSTAND
4.NEVERTHELESS
MANY GLOOMY MZ~BEHS OF USACMISSION7HN
I NOT RPT NOT ONLY HOPE BUT BELIEVE
IS GRAVELY
MISTAKENIN
THIS
A~D THAT IN
WOULD NOT RPT NOT BACK DOWN ON VITAL
LAST
THAT KHRUSHCHEV
ANALYSISKENNEDY
WHAlEVERCHAPPENED?>
AND GRAVELY WEAKEN l"l I.ITUAL SELF CONFIDENCE At~D HENCE
COHESION OF F'REE WORLD.THIS
POSilION
BERLIN.
FOLLOWED BY SECOND THOUGHTS WHICH WOULD
WOULD BE INEVITABLY
JEOPARDIZE
KHOLL,
ISSUES OF FREE ACCESS AND
CONTit,.;UED AMERICA[\, PRESENCE IN bERLIN,SINCE
IT
OF
VEHY DANGEROUS IMPHESSION.
THESE FACTORS ARE OMINOUSLY NUMEROUS
ANOMAY
KHRUSHCHEV PROBABLY KtOWS THAT HIS
AM FOR
WOULD ULTIMATELY
AS AN AMERICliN POLITICIAN
DESTROY KENC-.EDYS
~iS WELL AS JEOPARDIZE
AMERICAS
ROLE AS LE.ADER OF F'REE WORLD.MOREOVER SUCH A STUPENDOUS VICTORY
FOR KHRUSHCHEV WOULD l THINK
SHIPS PROPENSITY TO THY
INE-VIT,'iBLY INCREASE COMMWIST LEADER-
FURTHEREXPP,NSION OF COM!":
UNIST
11',;FLUENCE
BY NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL. IT WOULD ALSO ENCOURAGE RUSS IAN TENDENCY TO
t:XPLOIT
GLOBAL MILITARY
POWER THEY hAVE AT LAST BUILT
GREAT COST OVER MANY YEARS. INCIDENT
MISCALC ULAT I~ G PUBLIC
AMERICA~ PUBLIC
f,LLYKHRUSHCHEV
OPINION
6.TO
OF THEIR
DO THIS
IS F'HOBABLY
REACTION Il'-l USA AND ROLE WHICH /\ROUSED
CAN HAVE 0~ POLICY
5.IT 1S I THINKTHEREFORE VITALLYI~PORTANT
LEADERSHlf'
Uf} AT SUCH
ILLUSIONS
OF USA ADMIN.
TO
DISABUSESOVIET
ON .FIRtv:NESS Of -WESTERN INTENTIONS.
WE MUST TRY TO CORRECT VARIOUS CAUSES OF' SOVIET
0
000143
••
.3
�PAGETHREE673
MISINTERPRETATION
OF
WILL
NOT RPT
WESTERN
WILL TO
DEFEND
ITS POSITIONoTHIS
NOT BE EASY OR PERHAPS VERY CHEAP.
7~WEMUSTRECOGNIZESTRENGTHOF
TEMPTATIONS
LURINGKHRUSHCHEV
ANDOTHERSOVIET LEADERS TO TAKERISK.COLD WARGAIN FOR THEMIN
FORCING A WESTERN BACKDOWNWOULDOBVIOUSLY BE ENORMOUS.
NATO( AND
CENTOAND SEATO)WOULD
BE WEAKENED
ANDTHEIR
PUT IN
QUESTIONvTHEY
EXISTENCE
CONTINUED
REASONABLY
EXPECTTHATLONG-TERM
MIGHT
PROBLEM
POSEDFOR COMMUNISTS
BY SUCCESSFULDEVELOPMENT
OF EUROPEAN
COM~ON
MARKET
WOULD PROBABLY
&iCK Ai'-lD PROBABLE DISILLUSION
BE
GREATLY MODERATED
BY POLITICAL SET
ING OF THOSE CONTINENTAL
WEST
EUkOPEANSWHOLOOKOUTWARD ANDFAVOURCLOSE TIES ALSO WITH NORTH
A"lE.R!CA AND
OTHERPARTS OF FRE£ WORLD.,KHRUSHCHEV MAYNEEDA
ALSO BECAUSEDORREGIMEIS NOT RPT NOT STABLE,ANDBECAUSE
~CCESS
OOMMUN!5T ai.oc IS
WELL
INCREASINGLY
;..oSING COHESION.KHRUSHCHEV MAY
CONSIDERHIMSELF UNDER VERY GREATPRESSURE TO ACHIEVESOME,,
THINGWHICH WILL REESTABLISH HIS ANf)MOSCOWS
DOM
!NANCE
ANDEXERCISE SPECTREOF
GROWING
IN BLOC
EEC PULLINGEASTEUROPEINTO ITS
ORBITs
~DESPITE
ALL THIS WEMUSTREMEMBER AND I THINK TAKEADVANTAGE
OF
POWERFUL FACTORS IN3IDE
WHENRISKS
ALL WE
CAN
SHOWNTO BE TOO GREAT.IMPORTANT
AMONG
THESE IS
CAN BE
PROBABLY SOVIET
SEE
PUBLIC OPINIOM.. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THATJUDGINGFROM
HERE. PUBLIC
ON CUBA AND BERLIN
QUIET.THIS IS IN
filANDABLE
COMMUNIST C.t1MPOPPOSED TO FOREIGN ADVENTURES
HA:3 BfEN
PtdT
TO RECENTTASS
DECLARATION
ONE OF :3HOCKED GLOOM AND PHOFOUND DIS~
BUT NOT RPT NOT EXCLUSIVELY
POPULAR FEELING
RUNNING WAR RISKS
REACT ION
THAT DISTANT
DUE TO UNDER=
CUBA IS NOT RPT NOT WORTH
FOR..BUT LAST AUTUMN WAR SCARE ON BERLIN
ALSO INDUCED SOME Pi\N [C AND I THINK
IMPORTANT PUBLIC
AND
ITSELF
PARTY
ffiESSURESON SOVIET LEADERSHIPTO BE MODERATEo
~WESTERNSHOW OF FIRMNESSLAST YEA2CNOT
RPT NOT MERELY IN
" •• 4
000144
�f'AGE FOUR 6 73
WORDS,BUT IN CO$TLY MILITARY AND ECON
Ott:IC ACTION, AND IN FSYCHOLOGIC/'.',L
PREPARP,TION OF WESTERN OPINION
FOR FIRt-;NESS IN A CRISIS)PAID
AND GAINED US POSTPOt--.EMENTOF KHHUSHCHE.VSDEADL!NE.MY
OFF
IMPRESSION
THEN WPiS ALSO THAT Jtv:FORTANT ELEMENTS IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP, IN-
ME~BERS AND SOME SATELLITE
CLUDING SOME PRESIDIUM
VERYCONCERhED
LEST
KHRUSHCHEV
LEADERS,WERE
GO TOO FAR,AND USEDTHEIR INFLUENCE
ON SIDE OF RESTRAINT AND BACKDOWN.
10.BUT ~y IMPRESSION IS ALSO THAT QUOTEFORWARD
UNQUOTE GROUP IN
COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP, INCLUDING
ON THIS
ISSUE KHRUSHCHEV HIMSELF,
HAVE INTERPRETED RESULTAf\T WESTERN EUPHORIA AND SUCH EVIDENCE AS
THEY CAN FIND
OF
WESTERNINDECISION
ANOThER ATTEMPT TO TEST
AND D!SARRAY,TO
WESTERtlNERVE,AFTER THIS YEARS FURTHER
MIL I1 ARY PREPARATIONS PART ICUL.ARLY
DDR B LIT ALSO IN SOV!ET ROCKET
}J,
AND THERMONUC!..EAR CAPA31LITIES,~iIGHT
lleKHRUSHCH[VS
SUGGEST THAT
THIS
TIME PAY OFF.
TO SETTINC
DISCLOSURES TO KROLL AMOUNT I~ EFFECT
At-lOTHER DEADLINE,EV£N
THOUGHNOT RPT NOl El\TIRELY PRECISE AND
THIS TIME. AS YET NOT RPT NOT IN PUBLIC.
12.CUR!OUS FACT THAT ~HRUSHCHEV
WOULD
DISCLOSE"HIS
OPPONENTS THIS
TACTICS TO
FAR IN ADVANCE MAY IMPLY EXTENT OF' HIS
CONFlDENCE,ESPECIALLi'
SELF-
SINCE WI::STERN
RESPONSES HAI/ETHUS FAR BEEN
MERELY DEFENSIVE REACTIONSTO SOVJ.ET INITIATIVES.ON
MIGH1 ALSO,OR ALTERNA1IVELY,SUGGEST
OTHER HAND IT
HIS UNCERTAINTY
AND DREAD OF
ACTUALLY PRESENTING WEST WITH SUCH FAIT
ACCOMPLI AND HIS HOPE
THATTHIS ADVANCE
DISCLOSURE IvlAYPROMPT KENNEDY
TO SEEK MTGBEFORE
NOV MD OF'FER FUHTHERCOJ\CESSIONSTO BUY HIM OFF •
. 1Z1.I TH Il\lK A F UffrHEH \\ESTERN DISPLAY
OF F'IRMNESS COHESION AND
GIRDl~G OUR LOI!\SCMATERIAL AND SPIRlTUAL)WILL
BE NECESSARY.WE
SHOULDPHOBhBLY RE.VIH. AND TIG:ffEN CONTINGENCY PLANS Af-.D OUR
hEADlNESS TO IMPLEMENT THEM.THIS wOULD INCLUDE PLANS FOR CAREFULLY
PHASED AND PROGRESSIVE MILITARY MEASURES,ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS IN
0
••
5
000145
�·-
PAGEFI.VE 673
INCLUDINGWESTGERMAN
READINESSTO CUT INTER-ZONALTRADE,AND
PROdABLY
AS DEGAULLEhAS URGEDOTHERMEASURESIN FIELDS OF OUR
OWN CHOOSINGSUCHAS
READINESSTO
CUT
OFF SOV!ET COMMUNICATIONS
FACILITIES IN ANDOVERFREE WOHLD
TERRITORYoABOVE
ALL IT MUSTBE
MADECREDIBLETO MOSCOW
THATWEST IS READYANDDETERMINED TO MAINTAIN ACCESS TO BERLIN BY
l"l IL IT ARY FORCE IF
NECESSARY•
l4oIF WE DO THIS KHRUSHCHEV
IS I THINK FLEXIBLE ENOUGH,AND
HIS
ros1TION STRONGENOUGH,TOLET HIM BPCK DOWNAGAINA KEY ELEMENT.
IN POSITION KHRUSHCHEV
HAS BUILT FOF HIMSELF,NOTRPT NOT ONLY
POLITICALLYBUT IDEALOGICALLY,ISTHATWARWOULDBE DISA5TROUSALSO
FOR
COMMUNIST
CAMP,ANDTHATCOEXISTENCEANDMUTUALRESTRAINT
BETWEEN
POWERS IS IN LONG=TERM
INTERESTALSO OF USSRoKHRUSHCHEV
IS A GAMBLER,AND
NATURALLY
SEEKS TO HAVEIT BOTH WAYS.BUTI
THINKTHAT IN LAST ANAtYSIS HE WILL SETTLE FOR WHATEVER
HE CAN
~FELY GET.OURTASK IS
ro
HELP HIM AVOIDMISCALCULATION,AND
TO LET
HIM DEMONSTRATE
ALSO T1 MOREOBDURATE
ELEMENTSIN SOVIET LEADER=
SHIP AND IN COMMUNIST
BLOC THATCUTTINGWESTERNl-\CCESSTO BERLIN
WOULD
INVOLVEHISKS TOO GREATANDTOO CERTAINTO BE ACEPTABLE
ARNOLD
SMITH
000146
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
NATO
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Berlin Crisis / 16 SEPTEMBER 1962
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1962-09-16
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
A language of the resource
en
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CDTT00040
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Moscow to External Affairs, ‘‘Germany and Berlin,’’ 16 Sept. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1.
Arnold Smith
Khrushchev
thermonuclear war
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/54e5a5aba8f85afd6a73d560e17a545b.pdf
3bc53c0337fa33d5f7f5746e25c32865
PDF Text
Text
DEPARTMENT
OFEXTERNAL
AFFAIRS,
CANADA
)
OUTGOINGMESSAGE
DATE
SEP18/62
EXTERNAL
OTT
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NUMBER
PRECEDENCE
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BERLINCONTINGENCY
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(CCMMUNICATIONS:
THIS MESSA~E
TO REACHPARISFOR
A MTGSEP19AM)
IH VIEWOF THESHORTNOTICEANDBECAUSE
WE HAVE
ONLYTODAY
RECEIVED
THEMAINDOCUMENTS
REFERRED
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TEL UNDER
REF, WESUGGEST
THATONSEP19 YOUCONFINE
YOURSELF
TO FAIRLYGENERAL
REMARKS.WECONTINUE
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IN
THERELATIONSHIP
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TRIPARTITEANDNATOPLANNING
AND
. ARESTILL CONCERNED
TO ENSURE
THATNATOPLANNING
IS MESHED
WITHTRIPARTITE
PLANNING
TO ENSURE
NATOCONTROL
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AT ANEARLY
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2.
IT APPEARS
TO US THATIF THENATOCOUNCIL
IS TO
BE ABLETO TAKEINFORMED
DECISIONSIN THEPOLITICAL,ECON()(IC
ANDMILITARY
FIELDAT DIFFERENT
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BERLIN
CRISIS, IT MUSTHAVEMOREDEFINITEINFORMATION
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APPROVED
SIG.,.,,
NAME,
BY
JJ~ttROBERTSON
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000410
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TO TAKEIN PARALLEL
WITHTHE"LIVE OAK"PLANS.
3.
WEREALIZETHATTHE TRIPARTITEANDNATOPLANNERS
AREAT A MILITARY
DISADVANTAGE
IN DEALING
WITHACCESSTO
BERLINANDTHATIN ORDER
THATTHEIRPLANSCARRY
CONVICTION
THEYMUSTDEMONSTRATE
THEEVENTUAL
DETERMINATION
OF THE
NATOPOWERS
TO STANDBY THELDNANDPARIS AGREEMENTS
OF
1954 "TOTREATANYATTACK
ONBERLINFROMANYQUARTER
AS
ANATTACK
UPONTHEIRFORCESANDTHEMSELVES".
WEARE
CONCERNED,
HOWEVER,
XTO ENSURE
THATTHEPLANSOF THE
MAJOR
MILITARY
C0~1MANDERS
CONTAIN
SUFFICIENTALTERNATIVES
SO THATTHESOVIETUNIONCANBE UNDER
NOMISAPPREHENSION
THATTHEINITIAL WESTERN
RESPONSES
RELATEDIRECTLY
TO THE
QUESTION
OF ACCESSTO BERLIN.
,.
4.
1S
WEWOULD
WANT
MOREINFORMATION·ABOUT
SACEUR
PLANFORTHE"SELECTED
USEOF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS".WEHAVE
GRAVE
DOUBTS
ABOUT
THEUSEFULNESS
OF SUCHA PLANANDWOUID
WISHTO HAVETHIS QUESTION
FULLYDISCUSSED
IN COUNCIL.
5.
WITHREGARD
TO THEIMPLEMENTATION
OF ALERT
MEASURES
WEBELIEVETHATANYPLANSSHOULD
INCLUDE
A STRICT
DIVIDINGLINE BETWEEN
MILITARY
ANDCIVILIANMEASURES.
MANY
OF THEENVISAGED
CIVILIANALERTMEASURES
AREFOR
DOMESTIC
REASONS
EXTRE)1ELY
DIFFICULTTO IMPLEMENT
QUICKLY
ANDIF BROUGHT
INTOEFFECTATTHEWRONG
TIMEARELIKELYTO
CR.~
INCREASE
THEDANGER
OF ESCALATION,
000411
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........................
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&te
File No.
REFERENCE: ..........................
Berlin
: ......•.........•..............
Contingency
SUBJECT: ••••••••••••....••••••••••.••.•.•..•.•••.•....••••.•.
Planning
l
,,.,
•. ·,·····················,•··••·•··,•·••
The NATOCouncil is due to discuss Berlin
contingency planning at a restricted
session on
September 19. The discussion
will be based on the
plans of the Major NATOCommanders and appraisal
of these·plans
by the Standing Group as contained
in SGM-479-62 of August 28, 1962 (copy attached)
and on a note by the Secretary/General
on Berlin
Contingency Planning P0/62/581 of September 11,
1962 (copy attached).
In telegrams 2125 of
September 12 and 2151 of September 15 (copies
attached)
our NATODelegation has asked for
guidance for this meeting.
CIRCULATION
2.
A letter
signed by Mx;:,Campbell enclosing
a draft telegram'of
instructions,was
sent to the
COOSand in a reply dated SepteITTber 17 (copy
attached)
the COOSraised a nU111berof questions and
asked that there be a meeting with officers
of the
two departments.
We have held a meeting with three
members of the Directorate
of Strategic
Studies and
have come to an agreement on the general tenor of
the instructions
to go to the NATODelegation.
c...t....-o
) DIVISION
Ext. 326 (6/56)
,
000412
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
NATO
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Berlin Crisis / 18 SEPTEMBER 1962
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1962-09-18
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
A language of the resource
en
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CDTT00041
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
External Affairs to NATO Paris, ‘Berlin Contingency Planning,’’ 18 Sept. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1.
BERCON plans
Berlin contingency
CCOS
NATO Council
Norman Robertson
nuclear weapons
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b45c5303d07d2fd99d91397739101fb9.pdf
14b74764879ad194906808fb5c8e7655
PDF Text
Text
FILE
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FEB2 7 1985
PRECISELY BECAUSETHIS POINT HAD BEEN SO CLEARLY MADEoNORWEGlAN
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PERMREPREMlNDED'COUNCII.-OF HIS GOVT$RPTD INSISTENCE ON THE
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SAME POINT.IN PRIVATE NITZE GAVE ME A STRIKING ILLUSTLATION OF
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
NATO
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Berlin Crisis / 21 SEPTEMBER 1962
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1962-09-21
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
A language of the resource
en
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CDTT00042
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
NATO Paris to External Affairs, "Berlin Contingency Planning,’’ 21 Sept. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1.
Berlin contingency
Nitzes
Norwegians
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c6e864fc3e4c2b811c253ec5cfb4a7f3.pdf
de5ce3044b19228551139a6e7e99a5ee
PDF Text
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2.•.XF A SIHT ABLE OPPORTUN!TY ARISES, I THINK IT MIGHT BE DESI FAE,_£
TO Mil.KEAT l,EAST HID POINTS IN THE DlSCUSSIO.N..PERIOD~!HE FlFS1
IS
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BELIEVE ll 1.tRM D!S1'INCTION SHOULDBE MI-\DEsiElwEEN MILITARY F.J_E:'<T
MEASURES WHICH ALTHOUGHEXPENSIVE f.1RE RELATIVELY EASY FOR Cl:A JO
H'PLEMEMT ;,tITHO!Jf Plf.,LIC COMMOTIONtND ClVIL ALERT MEASURE.$t_iHtCH
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BERLIN CO!lTINGENCY PLt,NNI!-lG.I THINK THERE MAY ALREADY HAVE EEEl-:
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OPERA!IONS :SUPPOSEDt:Y~REt:ATEDJOIRECTLY.:.Toiit
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ING:.A NUCLEAR·RESPOOSEo
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•nc3
000365
�PAGE THREE 2307
.
. JEB.2 ? 1§§5
ON TJ:IE O'.J'HERHANDr.
USE:OF A. !)EMON.ST
RATION'NUCLEAfl BURST,.UNRELATEd'.·,
TO ANY SOVIET TARGET MIGHT-.FA!L TO CONVEYANY CLEAR MSG TO
sovu;r'.
AUTHOR!TIES~:lN \IHI\TEV~R WAY1THE· WEAPONS~ERE. l,ISE,REAi., RIS){ INVQ)..=.·
VED WOULDLIE··IN
1•
THE HIGH ·DEGREEOF',,UNCERTAINTYI\S TO WHATSOVIET
-
•
-"
•
r
~.
•,
-
'
•-
•
REACTION·MIGliT/BE;;·FOR TtlESE;1REA.SONS~l1E
.BELIEVE THAT A· CLOSER ..
El<AMOF·;THIS ·PART1CULARFEATURE Of BERLIN CONTINGENCYPLANNING
RAISES; DOUBTS,WHETHERIT APf'.ROf>RIATELYBELONGSIN THIS CATALOGUE
OF PLANS.DR)6,FTN01'ES END., !
~
•· ,
7. I nqNK ~llE ,SH0Ul,.D,,AV0IDGETTING. OURSELVESIN THE POSITION OF •
INSIST!NG THAT THE NUCLEARPAGES BE TORN OUT OF THE BERLIN CATA=
LOGUEAND J'HEN,HAVING SECUREDAGREEMENTON THIS, GOING ON TO INSIST
THAT OTHER.PAGES BE' TORN.OUT T.OQ.IF ·.THERE·ARE OTHER OBJECTIONABLE
-
FEATURES TO •THESE PLANS .l THINK WE,SHOULOSA"l
so· AS EARLY.AS
WECi',N.
IF T.HERE~~E NQ.1::·
RPT, NOT ;I THINK ,WE,Sl:I0l)l.,DBE PREP.ARED·TO .$EEK
APPROVAL,.f.ORAS,)<!UCHOF,,.THEPLANS~/\S,,,WECAN.AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE,
,
BE{IRING.'1N MIND:THAT THERE ~Il.L ALMOSTCERTAINLY BE PRESSUREIN·
-
COUNCIL TO DXSPLAY
THE MAXIMUM
SOLIDARITY
OF THE ALLIANCE
FOR NON~
.
.,.
.
-
'·•.
--·'.
.
·,
·,
MILITARY AS ~ELL AS MILITARY RESPONSESTO BACK UP
THE THREE
.
.
.
'
POWERSIN ;B~ALING WITH SOVIE! PRESSURESWHICH:ARE EXPECTEDTO
BE RENEWED
. IN N0V
i.;.;·.
IGNATlEFF
..
"\
000366
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
NATO
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Berlin Crisis / 5 OCTOBER 1962
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1962-10-05
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
A language of the resource
en
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CDTT00043
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
NATO Paris to External Affairs, "Alerts," 5 Oct. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 1.
BERCON plans
Berlin contingency
George Ignatieff
Marcon Series
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/711e0421d8da53f9f3cbf72a1933dbba.pdf
18f1389ea52d060beb2bdea960d80bbb
PDF Text
Text
TO EXTERNAL
2361 PRIORITY
~~
INFO CCOS EMBPARIS LDN WASHDC_2.1,n.,RU
YOURTEL
DLUJ7 OCT9. :t p~]\
vrc~~~BERLIN CONTINIIENCYPLAIIN1N13
t:,L . .(
,,,,
..
t,µr""'
/ ;J-r;y;f'/
-~,,,,,
.
--:1-,/ ~
(¼,~
.'fl'--=
/f
,
---
COUNCILS DISCUSSICN
IN RESTD SESSION OCT18 TOOK ACCOUNTO - 5 -,--·
.
~;AS
~--
.
UNFORTUNATE
tHlS USEFUL SµMMARY
OF TKE C -~ ---.
.
D
ACCUMULATION'6 PAPER ON THIS SUBJECT HAD NOT RPT NOT BEK~--c-I-ffG.-IJLA
TEO EARLIER.AS
IT
IS,DISCUSSION REMAINS.CONFUSED.NO RPT Nn--1DEe-t-.tU
-
HAVEBEENTAKEN.AFURTHERMTGWILL BE HILD OCT12,12. THE STANDING QROUPHAD NO RPf; NO REPLY
TO OUR QUESTION
ABOUT
NUCLEARWEAPONS.THEREFOREI GAVETHE STATDIINT I SENT YOO IN MYTEL
~07
ocr,, INCORPORATINGBOTHTHE AMEND,MENTS
YOU Sl:J'18ESTEDIN
PARA!
YOURRUTEL. THIS PRECIPITATED CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION.WE RECEIVED
SUPPORTFROMNORWEGIANSAND BELGIA~S,BUT A NUMBEROF
OTHERSARE
OPPOSED.THEIR CHIEF OBJECTION
IS TKATTO REQUEST
THE EXCLUSIONOF
THENUCLEARCONTINGENCY
PLAN AT THIS,STAGEWOULD
RE OPENA
QUESTION WHICH VAS DEBATED PAINFULLYA_NDAT LENGTHA YEAR AGO IN
COUNCIL.OTHERS UNDERSTAND
OUROBJECTIONS
VERYWELL;THE
DIFFICULTY
IS THEYDONOTRPT NOTSHAREOUR.VIEW.THEY
POINT OUTTHATUSEOF
NUCLEAR
WEAPONS,LIKE
ALL CONTINGENCY
PLANS,WOULDBE SUBJECT TO
A POLITICAL DECISION BY GOVTS AT THE TIME AND IF COUNCIL AGREED
TO PULLOUTONEPLAN OF THIS CAiA~OQIJE,INDIVIDUAL
OBJECTIONS
COULD
BE RAISEDTO ALLTHE OTHERSoFROM
PRIVATECONVERSATIONS
WITHA
NUMBEROF MYCOLLEAGUES,l BELIEVE TH.ISv,I[W TO BE STRONGLYHELDBY
SOMEDELS,NOTABLYFRENCH.ITIS TOOEARLYTO SAYWHAT
WILL EMERGE
FROMTHE DISCUSSION, BUTVE MAY HAVEA TOUGH
FIGHT.
3o THE OTHER I"PORTANT
POINT
DEALT,
VlTK OCT1~ WASTHEONERAISEDIN
PARA•OF YOURREFTEL.HERIAGAIN,THERE
IS A DEEPDIV OF OPINIONa
AT ONEEXTREME
IS BOYESEN,NORWEGIAN
PERMREP,WHOSE
PERSONAL
VIEWIS
THATWHOLE
IDEAOF APPROVALIS MISCONCEIVED.HE
LOOKSONCONTINGENCY
•oo2
000741
�.: ...-:
PAGE TWO 2360
PlANNING AS A CONTINUOUSPROCESS, IN WHICH IDEAS WILL 8£ SUBJECT TO
CONSTANT
REVIEWoHE
FEARSTHAT APPROVAL
OF PLANSIN SON£FOMIALSENSE
WILL TEND TO FREEZE FLANNINGoTHIS HE THINKS WOUJ..D
BE DANGEROUSBE•
CAUSE THE WHOLESERIES OF PLANS IS BUILT UP ON A SERIES Of ASSUMPTIONS ABOUTSOVIET REACTIONS WHICH COULDWILL BE FALSIFIED BY EVENTS,,
AT THE SAME TIME,HE EMPHASIZES THAT NORWEGIANAUTHORITIES ARI FIRtlLY
CONVINCEDOF THE NEEi) FOR CONTINGENCYPLANNING,SO LONG AS IT DOES NOT
RPT NOTLEADTO CLOS£DMINDSANDOVER-FORMAL
RESULTS.
4. NO RPT NO OTHER PERMREP GOES THIS FAR.EVEN DANE,WHOGENERALLY
SUPPORTS
NORWEGIAN,ANNOUNCED
THATHIS AUTHORITIES
APPROVED
PLANS
QUOTE IN PRINCIPLE UNQOOTEolTALIANUS£D A
SIMILARFOJIHLAoTHIS
WAS
DESPITE CLEARINDICATIONS
THATBOTHITALIANANDDANFSHAUTHORITIES
HAVESERIOUSRESERVATIONS
ABOUTTH£ PLANSANO.THER!:FORE
LNDERSTAND
APPROVAL IN PRIN CI PLE IN A BROAD AND LOOSE SENSE.DANES OBJECT TO
APPROVAL
BY GOVTSOF PLANSWHICH INCLUDE ACTS CONTRARY
TO INTER•
NATIONAL LAW.( AS LEGAL ADVISOR SUGGESTS IN P0/62/637
SOME OF THE
MARCON
PLANSWOULD
BE>.ITALIANSHAVESERIOUS DIFFICULTIESABOUT
ALERTS, A.~D LIKE US ARE ST ILL WORRIEDOVER THE QUESTION OF TRANSFER
OF CONTROL FROM TRIPARTITE TO NATO COMMANDo
5o DI SCUSSION OF TH IS POINT WILL HAVE TO BE PURSUED TOO.SOME DEl..S
HAVENOTRPT NOTRECEIVEDINSTRUCTICNS
YEToATTHE MOl'tINT,HOWEVER9
IT SEEMS THAT AT LEAST SEVEN Dr.LS-THE FOUR PLUS BELGILM,ITAlY AND
to
,.
DENMARK-WOULD
PROBABLYBE PREPARED TO SUBSCRIBE
SOME FOR4 ULA
APPROVINGTHE PLANS IN PRINCIPLEFOR PLANNING
PURPOSES AS A
CATALOGUE,
THE EXECUTION
OF ANY ONE PLAN110R ANY COMB
INATION, TO BE
SUBJECTTO A SPECIFIC POLITICALDECISIONBY GOVTSAT THE TIME.]
BOYESEN$ VIEW IS PERSONAL;HE IS NOT RPT NOT CERTAIN HIS GOVT WOULD
SHARE IT4MY OWN VIEW IS THAT,WHILE A N'UMBtR Of HIS COMMENTSARE WELL
TAKEN!)IT IS REALLY GOING TOO FAR TO EXPECT THAT TKE COUNCIL,HAVING
DIRECTED A YEAR AGO THAT PLANS BE PREPAREO,WOULDNOT RPT NOT REACT
IN SOMEFORMULA
OR ANOTHER
TO THE PLANSNOWTHEYHAVEBEENPRESENTEDo
••• 3
000742
�-PAGETkREE 2360
6.THIS DEALSWITH PARASl,2 AND4 OF YOURINSfRUCTIONS;?ARA3RAISES
DIFFERENTPROBLEMS.YOU
MENTIONALERTS.I WILL BE REPORTINGON THIS
A~PECT~EPAkATELY.YOUR
SECONDPOINT WASABOUTOURQUESTIONON THE
THANSfEROF CONTROL.ON
THIS,I UNDERSTAND
FROMPRIVATETALKSTHAT
TRIPAHTITEPLANNERS
ARE RELUCTANT
TO BUDGEF~OMANSWER
THEYGAVE
US EAKLIEReHOWEVER,NO
RPT NO ANSWER
TO OURSECONDPRESSINGOF THIS
POINT HAS liEEN RETURNED.CHAIRMAN
RECOGNIZED
AT OCTlO MTGTHATA
NUMBER
OF DELS COULDNOT RPT NOT BE EXPECTED
TO MOVEFORWARD
UNTIL
STANDINGGROUPHADREPLIED TO QUESTIONSDELS HADASKED.HEPRESSED
STANDINGGROUPREP STRONGLY
TO GET THE ANSWERS
QUICKLY.ATTHE MOMENT,
THE BALL IS IN THE Pl.ANNE
RS COURTON THIS POINTo
7.FINALLY,YOURPARA3MENTIONSECONOMIC
COUNTERMEASURES.IN
A
FORMALSENSE,THIS QUESTIONIS SEPARATEFROMAPPROVAL
OF BERCOM/MARCON
PLANS.THETHREEHAVENOWMADECLEARTHATECONOMIC
COUNTERMEASURES
WOULD
BELONGLARGELYTO PHASEII OF A CRISIS.ALL THE BERCOM/MARCON
PLANSBELONGTO PHASEIII.THUS IT WOULD
BE THEORETICALLY
POSSIBLE
TO APPROVETHEMWITHOUT
NECESSARILYACCEPTINGFURTHERDECISIONS
ON ECONOMIC
COUNTERMEASURES.HOWEVER
THE TWOFORMSOF RESPONSEARE
LIN~ED IN POSSIBLE PROGRESSION
OF MEASURES.IFWETAKETHE INITIATIVE
TO RAISE THIS QUESTION,THERESULTWILL BE IMMEDIATE
PRESSUREON CDA,
SINCE COAHAS THE MOSTRESERVEDPOSITION ON THE WHOLE
QUESTIONOF
ECONOMIC
COUNTERMEASURES.EVEN
IF WEDO NOT RPT NOT RAISE THE QUESTION OURSELVES,ITCANNOT
RPT NOT BE AVOIDEDMUCHLONGER;YOU
WILL
NOTICEPARA17OF P0/62/641
SAYS THE SUBJECTWILL BE PLACEDON THE
AGENDA
AT AN EARLYDATE
IGNATIEFf0 ~'
9
'
000743
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
NATO
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Berlin Crisis / 11 OCTOBER 1962
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1962-10-11
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
A language of the resource
en
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CDTT00044
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
NATO Paris to External Affairs, "Berlin Contingency Planning,’’ 11 Oct. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 2.
BERCON plans
Berlin contingency
Denmark
econmic countermeasures
tripartite
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a7ac2d07d8617038c92304e0162a674d.pdf
218bb2e84d575b63aa9386ecd8a3702e
PDF Text
Text
i:-otLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEME~T MADE ON THE BASIS o;· YOUR'"
IN. COU~CIL OCT23 ~
'EL DL1509
BEGINS:QUOTE I WISH TO !HANK THE MJLITARY AUTHORITIES fOR HAVII\JG
')ROVIDED AN A~SWER TO THE CD\! QUESTIO"J ABOUT THI SF~U:CTIVE
us,;-:OF
M UCLEr1R WEAPO"-JS.I SHALL PASS THIS A\JSW[R 0~ TO r1Y AlJf'HORITlES
M-10 TRY TD LET THF: COUNCIL HAVE THEIR REACiliOI\J AS OOiCKL'f AS POS.,,
S IBLE.FO~
!ffE MOMtNT I WILL CO~PIE
M't'SELF TO REMffOING
'fHE com1-
CIL THATTHE CD~ QUESTI"ON
A~D MYSUBSEQUENT lNTERVENtIONAT THE
LAST MTG OF THE COUNCIL O'l THlS SUBJECT' WERE ilESIONED TO QUESTION
:· HE APPROPRIATENESS OF T~E USE OF ~UCLEAR W[APONS;!'fOT
RPT ~OT IN
':HE CONTEXT OF THE GE~ERAL NtjCLEAR STRATEGY O'F THE AL·LIA~CF: t'.\S
DEFINED IN fHE /.\THE!'JSGUIDE LINES,BUT: IN THE CONTi:Xl OF ITS APPLI
0
'
CABILITY IN THIS CATALOGUE
OF PROBINGACTIONSDESIG~!O TO A~!RT
/\NO DEFEND WESTEfiN RT.GHTS IN BERLIN IN CIRCUMSTANCES SMORT OF A
GENERALWARANDfOR PRIMARILY
POLITICAL ANDPSYCffOLOOlC~L
PWRPOSESm
2., WE HAVE TALKED A GOOD DEAL ASOUT wHAT TH£ OUTCOME OF OUR DISCUSS!ON
SHOULD BE FROM A ?ROCF.DURAL POINT OF VIEW.A
NUPII-ER Of Sl/!3GES,.
T IONS HAVE BEEN PUT fORWARD.,ACCORD
I NO TO SOME 'IIE SHOUl.O QUtlTE AP?ROVY
UNQUOTE THt
BtRCOr-J/Mf1RCO'\i PLANS; OT:1ERS HAVE SUGGESTED WE
SHOULD QUOTE APPROVE THESE PlA"J6 IN PRI~CIPl.E
UNQUOTE;OTHERS HAVE
SUGGESTEDTHATWE QUOTENOTF UNQUOTE
THE PLANS;ORQOOTEAPPROVETHE
PLANS FOR
PLAi'JNHfGPURPOSESUf\lQUOTE;OR QUOTEAPf'ROVZETHE PLANS AS
1\ CATALOGUE tNQUOTE.,LEAVlt-,tGASIDE THE FACT THAT,IN
THE FORl''i WE HAVE
BEEN GIVEN THEM, THESE Aft£ t-fOT RPT \JOT MILITARY Pt..A.-.JSIN 1HE ORDH!~PY
SENSE OF THE WORO,I WOULDBE GREATLYASSISTED IF I COUL~·HAVE
SOME INDICATIO~ OF WHATSORT OF FORMULA
THE COU~CIL MIGHT JD0°T 'S
••• 2
000699
�·,.,
·,
,
....
·,
PAGE TWO 2467
THE AGREEDREACTIONTO THE PAPERSW~ICHHAVEBEEN SUBMITTED
TO US.
3.ANOTHER
STEP IN THE PROCESS
OF CLARlFICATIO~WILL,!
UNOERSTANO,
BE TAKENTOMORROW
WHENTHE COU~CILRESUMESDISCUSSIONOF ECONO•
MIC COUNTERMEASURES.WHILE
I HAVEASKEuFOR NEWINSTRUCTIONSON
THIS SUBJECTI HAVENOT RPT NOT YET RECEIVEDANY.NEVERTHELESS
I
LOOK
FORWARD
TO THE OPPORTUNITY
TO OBTAINFURTHERCLARIFICATION
ON THE RELATIONSHIPBETWEE'\1
ECONOMIC
CONTINGENCY
PLANNINGMW MILITARYCONTINGENCY
PLANNING.
4.THE SAMEAPPLIES TO PARALLELPOLITICAL PLANNING.ATOURLAST MTG
IT
SEEMED TO ME
THATALL
THE
OTHERMEMBERS
OF THE
ALLIANCESTRONG-
LY URGEDTHE THREE TO PROVI DE. US Wl TH INFO ON POLITICAL CONTINGENCY
PLANNING
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
I THINK
THlS
WOULD HELP A GOOD NUM•
BER OF US TO CLARIFYTO OURGOVTSWHATIT IS THAT IS BEING ASKED
OF THEMUNDERTHE HEADINGOF MILITARYCONTINGENCY
Pl.ANNING.I THINK
WE ALL RECOGNIZETHAT IT IS NOTRPT NOT POSSIBLE TO HAVEDIPLO AND
POLITICAL CONTINGENCY
PLANNINGI~ THE SAMESENSE AS TKEREHAS BEEN
MILITARYCONTINGENCY
PLANNING.~EVERTHELESS
THOSEOF US WHOARE NOT
RPT NOT DIRECTLYCO~CERNED
WITHco~tINGENCYPLANNINGARE PLACED
AT SOME DISADVANTAGE
BECAUSEOF THE CONTINUING
FLOWOF ~EWSPAPER
COMMENT 0;-~ POSSIBLE POLITICAL PHTIATIVES.OF
COURSE THERE MAY BE
NO RPT NO SUBSTANCE
AT ALL I~ THESENEWSPAPER
STORIES.SOMEOF THEM
HOWEVER
SEEMTO HAVEBEE~ WRITTE'JBY RELIABLEJOURNALISTS.OVER
THE
PAST FEWWEEKSTHEY HAVEDEALTWITHA VARIETYOF POSSIBLE POLITI•
CAL ANDDIPLO INITIATIVES OF CONSIDERABLE
IMPORTANCE
WHICHHAVE
NEVER EVEN
BEENDISCUSSEDIN THE COUNCIL.WHAT
AFTER ALL THE MEMBERS
OF THE COUNCILNEEDIN DALINGWITHTHIS HEIGHTENING
OF I~TERNA•
TIONALTENSION IS A CALMJUOOME~T
BASEDON AN UNDERSTANDING
OF THE
TOTAL ISSUES WITHWHICHWE ARE DEALINGWHICHWECANONLYGET FROM
SEEING THEMIN A PROPERPERSPECTIVE~UNQUOTE.TEXT
ENDS
IGNATIEFF
000700
�RlECOff
503J/J ./1--~ 1/o
f's-o
·~
.·~-3
,;'
.P-
TO EXTERNAL
2466 OPIMED
l
,_L
INFO CCOS EMBPARIS LDN WASHOC PRIOfiITY
I
REF OURTEL 2464 OCT24
2
3
~.1/U/
4
/
•
,.L
BERLIN
CONTINGENCY PLANNING
6
H
---
7
1(
FOLLOWING
IS THETIXT OF THEREPLYOF THEMILITARYAUTH0RITTES
9
THECON~UESTIONABOUTTKE SELECTIVEUSE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPO~S~ _!9,_
TEXT OF ANSWERBEGINS; IN RESPONSETO THE R!Ql..€ST'OF, THE COUNCIL,
THE FO:.LCW ING ANSWERS TO QUEST IONS ON SELECT IVE
USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONSf'OSEP BY CDN DEl. ARE TRANlilU1TE·D TO THE stCG.tN FOR TM:&:NAC.
2.AS INDICATED IH I.HE STANDING 8ROUP APPRAISAL SGtt-479-62,SELEC--
TIVE USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
FORQENONSTRATION
PURPOSES
WOULD .BE
POLITICALAHD
PRIMARILY
SUADE THE SOVIETS
PSYCHOLOGICAL
lH NATURE IHT!N9ED
OF NATO D£TERM1HATIOH
LIT !CAL DECISION.THEY
lN
ORDiit
TO PER..
TO OBTAIN
A PO-
ARE NOT RPT NOT CURRENTLY DESIGNED TO HAVE
SIGNIFICANTLY M!L lTARY VALUE. HOWEVERSELECT.IVE USE OF NUCLEfR WEA·,.
P:JNS IN CONNECTION WITH A PARTICULAR PLAN FOR BOTH DEMONSTRI\-
TION PURPOSES AND DIRECT MILITARY VALUE,COULDBE AN OPTIONAL COUR.,.,
S~
OF ACTION.FURTHER
THE STANDING GFOUP HAS POINTED OUT THAT IN
THE CASE OF QUOTE NO RPT NO TARGET LNQUOTE DEMONSTRATION,NATO
IN~~
1RITIES
SHOULD BE C!..E:ARLY MADE MANIFEST TO THE SOVIET AUTHC
TENTIONS
INCLUDING
THE FACT THAT THIS
IS A DELIBERATE
USE AND NOT HPl' NOT
I\'~ ERROR..
3"ACCORDINGL Y THE GENERALCONCEPT FOR THE SELECTIVE
WEAPONSAS EXPRESSED IN THE BERCON B SERIES
BERCON BI
AS FOLLOWS;
PROVIDES A QUOTE NO RPT NO TARGET UNQUOTE AND TO THE
EXTENT POSSIBLE
TRATION
rs
USE OF NUCLEAR
A QUOTE NO
RPT
NO DAMAGE UNQUOTE NUCLEAR DE~:ONS,.,
DETONATED OVER SELECTED AREAS PREFERABLY NEAR MILITPRY
COMPLEX.'f'iE
OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO MINIMIZE DAMAGE1'0 PERSONS ?1ND/
OH PROPERTY AND YET ASSURE THAT THE EXPLOSION
BERCON BII
CONSISTS
OF AN AIR
IS
BURST ON A MILITARY
SEEN FROM THF. GROUND~
TARGET
000701
�•'.
FEB2 7 1985
PAGE TWO 2466
DETONATEDt,WAYrROf'l POPULATION CENTERS.THE SIR1CTLY MILITARY T1'r.iGETS INCLUDE AT:ACKIMG AIRCRAYT,AIRFIELDS,SA~l SlT[S,TftOOP
CONC'!:N•
TRATION ETC:.
•I
4. li'ROM .~
C•PERATIOMAL \' IEW POINT SELECT IVE USE OF TACTIC~L NU•
CLEAR WEAPONSIN 8ERCON f'LANS IS COVEREDSY SPECIFIC
PROCEDUR!S
_(\NDCOt-4STRAUiT8 WMICH PROVIO£ FOR l:P9,-L&WM!HTOF NUCLEAR WEAPCNS
EITHER SINGLY OR ffi Llt1ITED HtJtlBIRS
,oft
9PECir!C
PURPOS!:S,AND tN
SP~CIF IC AREAS.,
5.·to
MINIMIZE DANCJER
OF [SCALATICINT·O G!:lfERAL.WAR,SACEURS :>OLI~Y
IS TO EXERCISI QEtrl'fitALIZiD eOttTROL &F "UCL!AR V!:AP(Jtfs BY RF.:T/\I'HNG
FOR HIMSELF TJtE ~ Alft.KORifY '•IM:AC! F'OR &tM:et ING 11ftI T? EMF'LJ'f..
MENT IN co:\fOJlltlTY
WITfl A SP[CIFIC
TO EMPLOY NUC1.£AR 1WIAPMS
POLITICA'L D!CI'S'ION AT THE T !TW:E
SE!.!GTMLY/fm
.
'
··Erffls.·~
·.,
000702
�EllE-CoeY
-/0
FM NATOPttRIS OCT24/62
',"
;i
~SEC
Ip EXTERNAL2464 OP!MMED
2.',,WERECEIVED AN ANSWER
FROM
THE STANDING
GR.OUP
.IO
OUR
QlJESTION ABOUT
.
'
.
.
.;
:
. ' ;_
I(
l
'
•,
:.,
.
•
THE SELECJ'IVE USE OF NLICLEP,
R WEAPONS.,
1 ,,SHALL BE _S.ENDING
THE TEXT
.
...
'
·:
.
'
-·
'
'
,;
SEPARATELY.IAMALSO SENDING3EPARATELY
ThS TEXT OF A STATEMENT
I
1,; ..
-~},
!¥ADE AT MTG BASED ON YOUH REF'TEL.
:'
. j
'-:;'
'
... ,!,
.:,e.DISCUSlON CONGENTHATED ON
T)Wt~UCLEAR A~PECT
:·
PLANS ..F'ROM THE DISCUSSION
'
·
.
lHE CONCLUSION
1'0
THEYSHARE
NUCLEAR
,,
OF .J.HE
3ERCO.~,/MARCON
1
.~.
·,)
;.,
.
.;
.
~
~-;
•
;,
THAT,1~LTHOi.JGH A NUMBF;R OF DLS SAY, PRIVATELY
.
:
' < .
~
.: ·.J.·..
-.
THAT
PLANSFOR THE SELECTIVEUSE OF
INCLUDIN3
WEAPONS
IN BERLINCATALOGUE,ONLY
NORWEGIANS
WOULD
BE LIKELY
:
.
.
-:
.
~
.
SUPPORTUS
10
.
AND F'.iOM PJ?IVATE CONVERSATIONS I HAVE COME
I . •
'!N
.• A.H
VIEWSABOUT
OUR
i, ;J'
..
IF WE WERE TO INSIST
THAT ANY FORM OF COUNCIL APPROVAL
.
:,
.,.
';ff:'
• '
:,: ..,, "
~
r'
C
,,
"l
•
OF THE PLANSSHOULD SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDE PLANSFOR THE SELECTIVE
·
-.,r.
- ·
. -~
: . ·• :· , ·t
:t~·
.. ·r
~ .~:~::.if! .,;.,
·
USE OF NUQLEAR
WEAPONSmBELGIANS
ANDITALIANS
PARTICULARLY
SHOWN
. . '7.i._
. .
•
.: . ·,: -,, ., t.
.
r .') HAVE
...-...\."'
.'i'
SYMPATHYFOR AND UNDERSTANDING CF OUR POSITION
'.
,• f:
·t
?'I,.
•
•
THE CUJNCIL
BOTH IN
Ii
,,
:
ANDIN PRIVATE.HOWEVER
THEYWJULDNO[ RPI NOTCARRYTHIS TO THE
~
(
...
:i
POINT OF INSISTING THATTHE NJCLEARPAGES 3E FOR~ALLYTORNFROMTHE
"'J
CATALOGUE.,
,.
4." THE
ARGUMENT
Of
A CLEi~R MAJJRITY
OF THE MEMBERS OF THE C OJNCIL WAS
THATA DECISION WASTARENLAS~ YEAR{li C-M{61)104,TO ASK MILITARY
AUTHORITitS
TO PREPARE THESE PLANS,INCLUDING
PLANS:FOR THE
SELECTIVE
USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONSoIF -ONE AS?ECT OF THEM WERE NOW TO SE EXCLU~
DED THIS WOULD THROW DOUPT. ON THE CATALOGUEAS A WHOLE.BY ONE
~JEANS OR ANOTHER
SOVIET AUTHORITIESWOULDBECOME
A\IAREOF
THE CHAN~
G£D POSITION.JMTHEY
MIGHTDRA·w
THE l1.1RONG
CONCLUSION
FROMlHE·FACT
.
THAT,
.
~HEREAS NATO WAS PREPAR!:D TO HAVE CONTtNGSENCY PLANNING INCLUDE PLANS
FOR THE POSSIBLE USE OF NUCLEARWEAPONSIN 1961,THE ALLIANCEHADDEC!~
(J
~
2
000703
�,,.
PA81 ?VO 246'4
OED IN 19'1
NOT JIPT NOT TO INCLUD£ TNIS OPTION.Tia: PLANS CtNSTITUT!D
A CATALOGUI.Tltlllll
VAS NO Rftt NO QUESTION OF APPROVING PLAN IN DETAIL.,
I
INDUD SONI DELS.NOTABLY YRINCH,INSIST THAT THE ONLY VAY IN WHICH
THEY CAN APPIIOff THE ftl.ANS IS IN G!NtRAL TERNS AS A VMOL[CATALOGUE,
SINCE THEY COULD NOT RPT HOT AGREE TO THIii IN DETAIL. TH[ MAJORITY LAY
GRIAT EllaaHASIS<II THE FACT THAT TH[R! IS NO RPT NO QUESTION Of ANY
ADVANCE
D[L
~E
or
AUTHORITY IN ANYFORMWHATSOEVER.THEEXECUTION
or ANY
OF THE PLANS OR ANY C<IIBINATIONOF TH!: PLANS-ANDTHIS INCLUDES
TH! PLAIISFORTKI SELECTIVEUSE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPCIIS•WOULD
BE THE SUB•
JECT OF A SPECIFICPOLITICAL DECISIONBY GOVTSAT THE TIME.
5.AT TH[ SAMETINE I THINKTHEMAJORITY RECOGNIZE
TKATWHATIS BEING
CONTDIPLATED
ICIRI COULD INVOLVE A DECISION BY GOVTS TO USE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS801N8
IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES8!Y(Jf0 WHATWASFOftES[IN IN
ATHENS 8UIDE LINls.,uRTHEAIIORE
THE MILITARY CIIDRS HAVE POINTED
GUT THAT,FOR TNI PURPOSE OF PROTECTING TKEIR OWNF<R:ES,THEY MIGHT
FIND THIMS[LVISIN THt PSITIOO or HAVINGTO ASKFOR SPECIFIC POLITICAL AUTHORITYTO USl TACTICAL NUCL[AR WEAPONSIN CIRCUIISTANCES
NOT RPT NOT ENV!SA8£D BY COUNCILWH!N IT DRAFTED ITS INSTRUCT!
CNS
TO THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN C•MC61)10~.TO THE THREE SETS OF
CIRCUNSTANC[S [NVISA8ED IN PARA6C
D>TH! CNORS HAVE ADDED TWO
OTHER SETS o, CIRCUIISTANCES(9E[ PARA 15CC>CF SGM-479--62 AND PARA 7C81
OF ENCLOSUR£ ONE TO TKE SAME DOCU>,
5.NEVERTHILESS TKE FOUR TO~THER WITH ![LGIUM DENMARKGREECE ITALY
HilD THE NETHERLANDSHAVEINDICATED THAT THEY WOULDBE PREPARED TO
[f,QVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO AGR[EMiNT ~ SOME SORT OF APPROVALOF
THE BER;ON/MARCON PLANS, THE N~•FOlJR
WOUL.DPROBAE,LY AGREE OOLY ON
THE UNDERSTANDINGTHAT TH[R[ '3E' crnTINUOUS CatSULIATI~
ON PARAL-
LEL POLITICAL PLANNING.COUNCIL AGREEDTHAT A SMALLGROUP OF ?E~REPS
SHOULDMEET INFORMLLYTO TRY TO WORKOU'r SUCH A FORMULA.I SHALL OF
COURSE KEEP THE TE~S
•
0
.3
OF YOUR INSTRUCTIONS VERY fllUCHIN MIND IN
9 t
000704
�PAGETHREE2464
PARTICIPATINGIN THESEDISCUSSIONS.
IT MAYBE THATWHATWILL RESULTIS
A DECISIONBASEDON PARA8CB>OF
P0/62/641.THE FIRST SUB-PA~AHERE
APPEARSTO RAISE NO RPT NO DIFFICULTY.IT WOULD
SIMPLYAMOUNT
TO
SAYINGTHATIN DRAWING
UP THE PLANSAS T-MEY
HAVE,CMOftS
·HA0 DONE
1
WHAT
THEYVEREASKEDTO.WHETHER
WEARESATISFIED WITHALL ASPECTS
OF THE PLANSOR NOT RPT NOT, I DONOTRPT NOTTHINKWECANFAIL TO
AGREETHATTHE CMDRSHAVEONLYDONEWHATTHEYWEREASKEDTO DO
LAST YEARIN C•MC61)104.THE DIFFICULTIESWOULD
ARISE OVERTHE SECCND
SUB=PARA,THE
OPENINGWORDS
OF WHICH.WOULD
HAVETO BE MODIFIED.I
THINKSEVERALDELSMAYBE PREPARED
TO CONSIDERPRIVATELYSOMEFORMULA
WHICHWOULD
HAVETHE COUNCILQUOTEAPPROVE
THE MAJORNATOCNDRS
PLANSIN THE BERCONANDMARCON
SERIES IN PRINCIPLEFOR PLANNING
PUR...
POSES••• ETC.UNQUOTE.
7.,0N THE BASIS OF DISCUSSIONSO FAR HOWEVER
I STRONGLY
DOUBTIF WE
COULDOBTAINSUPPORTFOR A DECISIONTO ELIMINATETHE NUCLEAR
PAGES
FROMTHE CATALOGUE.IN
THESECIRCUMSTANCES
I THINKTHE BEST PARCTICAL
OUTCOME
WECOULDHOPEFOR WOULD
BE ONEALONGTHE LINES FORESHADOWED
IN YOURINSTRUCTIONS;THAT
IS,A FORMOF GENERAL
NON-COMMITTAL
APPROVAL
SUBJECTTO FURTHERPRIOR POLITICALDECISIONSBY GOVTSAT THE TIME
COMBINED
WITHA STATEMENT
FOR THE RECORD
REGISTERINGOURRESERVATION
ABOUTTHE INCLUSIONOF THE PLANSFOR THE SELECTIVEUSE Of NUCLEAR
WEAPONS.WE
COULDAT THE SAMETIME INSIST-AS INDEEDWEHAVEALL ALONGTHATWE MUSTHAVECONTINUOUS
CONSULTATION
ON PARALLEL
POLITICAL
PLANNING
SINCE THE MILITARYPLANSMUSTBE SEEN IN THEIR RELATI{:111
TO
THE WHOLE
COMPLEX
OF OTHERASPECTSOF CONTINGENCY
PLANNING.
8.I SHALLHAVEAN OPPORTUNITY
TO DISCUSSTHE FORMULA
QUESTIONPRIVA·
TELYWITHFINLETTERANDDE STAERCKE
ON OCT25oIF YOUHAVEANY
ADDITIONAL
COMMENTS
I WOULD
BE GLADTO HAVETHEMBY THEN
I GNATI EFFO
000705
O O V
<
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
NATO
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Berlin Crisis / 24 OCTOBER 1962
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1962-10-24
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
A language of the resource
en
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CDTT00045
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
NATO Paris to External Affairs, "Berlin Contingency Planning,’’ 24 Oct. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 2.
BERCON plans
Berlin contingency
Denmark
econmic countermeasures
George Ignatieff
Greece
Italy
Norwegians
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/945d1a8cd1896cd6b368fd917f4efd4b.pdf
3bc47d61b230c774cef1ccd00e1162e0
PDF Text
Text
TO EXTERNAL
2487 OPIMMED
REF OURTEL
2462 OCT24
BERLINCONTINGENCY
atl A F.ORM
OF APPROVAL
FOR BERCON/MARC~
PLANSWHICHWOULD
BE
CLOSETO WHATYOUSUGGESTED
IN YOURTEL
DL1509 OCT19.I HAVEDI~~~~
SUCHA FORMULA
WITHA NUMBER
OF MYCOLl.,.EAGUES
PRIVATELY
ANOBELIEVE
IT WOULD
BE GENERALLY
ACCEPTABLE.
2oCHANGES
OF IMPORTANCE
WOULD
BE CONFINED
TO PARA8CB)Cll>OFP0/62/641~
IN PARTICULAR
OPENINGPHRASES.SUGGESTED
REVISEDFORMULA
WOULD
READ
QUOTECOUNCILAPPROVED
IN PRINCIPLEANDFOR PLANNING
PURPOSES
MAJOR
NATOCMDRSPLANSUNQUOTE.REMAINDER
OF PARA8CB)Cll)WOULD
REMAIN
~CHANGEDSO WOULD
PARASB<
BH I> ANDSCBH III>.
3oFINLETTERLIKE BRIT FRENCHANDSEVERALOTHERPERMREPS,ISAUTHOR•
!ZED TO ACCEPTFORMULA
AS IT APPEARSIN PARAS<
B> TOF P0/62/641.
NEVERTHLESS
KE WOULD
BE PREPARED
TO ACCEPTOURFORMULA
SO LONG
AS HE COULDSAYTHAT,FORHIS PART,HEUNDERSTOOD
IT TO AMOUNT
TO
SAMETHINGAS VERSIONIN P0/62/641.HE UNDERSTOOD
THATIT WOULD
PROBABLY
BE NECESSARY
FOR US,ASSUMING
THIS FORNULA
IS ACCEPTABLE
TO MINISTERS,TOMAKEA STATEMENT
FOR RECORD
REITERATING
OURPOSIT•
ION ONNUCLEAR
WEAPONS
ANDPARALLEL
POLITICALPLANNINGoKE
APPEALED
TO MEHOWEVER
NOTRPT NOTTO CASTTHESESTATEMENTS
IN FORMOF
RESERVATIONS
ORCONDITIONS
FORMALLY
MODIFYING
OURACCEPTANCE.HIS
SOLEINTERESTHE TOLDMEBOTHONMILITARYPLANNING
ANDON ECONOMIC
COUNTERMEASURES
IS TO GETTHESESUBJECTSOUTOF THE WAYANDOFF THE
COUNCILSAGENDA
AS BONESOF COOTENTION.HE
RECOGNIZES
THATAS AN
EXERCISEIN ATTEMPTING
TO CONTROL
MILITARYPLANNING
THROUGH
COONCIL
BERLINCONTINGENCY
PLANNING
HASNOTRPT Na£ BEENVERYSUCCESSFUL.
WHILEUSAANDBRIT DLS AREREADY
ANDANXIOUS
TO PROCEED
WITHCON•
SULTATIONS
ONPARRALLEL
POLITICALPLANINGFINLETTEREXPLAINED
••• 2
000696
�ira,ub~f
~~~~J
PAGE TWO 2487
FEB2 7 JUI§
THATBECAUSE
OF FRENCHATTITUDETHEREHADBEENDIFFICULTYIN
BEINGFORTHCOMING
SO FAR. SINCE
CHANGE IT
WOULD
CREATE VERY
FRENCH ATTITUDE
WAS UNLIKELY
TO
GREAT DIFFICULTIESF CR USAAND UK
IN
CONTRIBUTING
TO DISCUSSIONONPARALLEL
POLITICALPLANNING
IF OTHER
MEMBERS
OF COUNCILINSISTEDON OPENING POLITICALDISCUSSION
ON
BASIS OF AGREED
TRIPARTITE POLITICAL PAPERS·EQUIVALENT
TO AGREED
TRIPARTITEMILITARYPAPERSWHICHHADBEENINTRODUCED
AS A BASIS
FOR DISCUSSION OF MILITARY CONTINGENCY
PLANNING.
4ol SHOULD
APPRECIATE
HAVINGYOURAUTHORITY
AS EARLYAS POSSIBLE
TO INDICATECONWILLINGNESS
TO ACCEPTCOMPROMISE
FORMULA
FOR APPROVAL
<F
BERCON/MARCON
PLANSINDICATED
ABOVE,AS
WELLAS AN INDICATIONOF
POINTS~HICHI WOULD
HOPEYOUWOULD
BE ABLETO AUTHORIZE
METO
STATEFOR RECORD
OF COUNCILAS AN UNDERSTANDING
OF IMPLICATICJIJS
OF
DECISION,RATHER
THANAS A CONDITION
OF ACCEPTANCE
OR A RESERVATION
IGNATIEFF
000697
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
NATO
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Berlin Crisis / 25 OCTOBER 1962
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1962-10-25
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
A language of the resource
en
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CDTT00046
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
NATO Paris to External Affairs, "Berlin Contingency,’’ 25 Oct. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 2.
BERCON plans
Berlin contingency
Marcon Series
Thomas Finletter
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/83c617b16c5ff2adc26725c775455125.pdf
42acae62988008dab1bf98151809b46a
PDF Text
Text
7
-----1
ti
9
Mr. Ignatieff
telephoned this
ve
some background to his tels.
2487 -- Berlin Contingency
Planning and 2475 on Berlin Economic Counter-measures.
Both telegrams stress
the urgent need to put an end to
a state of affairs
in which Canada appears to be an
obstacle
to further NATOplanning.
2.
position
Mr. Ignatieff
believes
that we should adjust our
to permit planning to proceed for two reasons:
(a) the present emergency urgently requires
new
Canadian decisions
if Canada is to avoid heavy
responsibility
for obstructing
what the majority
consider to be urgently needed planning;
(b) a NATOparliamentary
group, which will include
Opposition members, is scheduled to arrive in Paris
in the first
week of November (the date is not yet firm).
If, by the time they arrive,
we have not taken steps
to remove the impression that Canada is seriously
out of
line with its, allies,
particularly
with respect to the
two aspects of economic counter-measures
-- the mitigation scheme and partial
measures -- on which Cabinet
has declined to accept the majority views, the Government
will expose itself
to serious criticism
on the return
of the Delegation
to Canada.
3.
Mr. Ignatieff
is attempting
to obtain a postponement of the next discussion
of these problems until
at least November 1 in order to give time for a further
Cabinet discussion
in Ottawa but he is under great pressure to agree to an earlier
meeting at which Canada would
have revised instructions.
Mr. Ignatieff
pointed out that
at the discussion
on October 24, the Secretariat
brought
out the fact that it was at the Canadtan request that
the discussion
of economic counter-measures
had been
postponed repeatedly
since the beginning of the year.
cc.
Mr. Ritchie
D.L. (1) Division
Economic Division
Mr. Bow
Mr. Dier
~
.c.
·
000694
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
NATO
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Berlin Crisis / 26 OCTOBER 1962
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1962-10-26
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
A language of the resource
en
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CDTT00047
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Memorandum for the Under-Secretary, 26 Oct. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 2.
econmic countermeasures
George Ignatieff
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/84921482ba7db3abfd8d5e73a543428f.pdf
53d6126d175a7e9f4f560e70e215a6d2
PDF Text
Text
l
COPYJ'j
OF 23
DOWNGRADED
TL~1J.=--w~~,f~~....C~I
·~
REDUIT
ASE=c=RE~-i-..:~..JI
FMNATOPARIS
OCT27/62~SEC
'h.1'..-5
l~ tP-.)
}f
TO EXTERNAL
2515 OPIMMED
INFO CCOSEMBIARISLONWASHDC
PRIORITY
REF
OURTEL2487
~1
+-=--
(J
fEB 2 7 1
4
-
OCT25
BERLINCONTINGENCY
PLANNING
I HAVEREVIEWED
THE NUMEROUS
TELS ANOPAPERSON THIS Sl.13
AMSENDINGTHIS MSGIN ORDERTO CLARirYTO GREATEST
EXTENT
E
WHATWILLBE INVOLVED
WHENCO~CIL RESUMES
CONSIDERATION
OF MILITARY
ASPECTSOF CONTINGENCY
PLANNING
NEXTWEEK.PROCEDURAL
BASIS MAYBE
FOUNDIN P0/62/641.THERE ARETHREEPOINTSOF IMPORTANCE.
2.FIRST
IS
QUESTION OF APPROVAL
or
MAJOR
NATOCMDRS PLANS.ONTHIS
POINT,THEREIS GENERAL
SUPPORTFOR A FORM
ULAAPPROVING
PLANSQUOTE
IN PRINCIPLEAND FOR PLANNING
PURPOSES~QUOTE LNDERREVISEDVERSION
OF PARA8CB)OFP0/62/641 WHICHIS DESCRIBEDIN PARA2OF MYREFTEL.
3.SECONDQUESTIONHASTO DO WITHRELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN
NATO
AND
TRIPARTITEPLANNING
ANDC~TROL.I KAVEOBTAINED
VIEWSOF BELGIANS
ANDITALIANSON THIS POINT AS REQUESTED
IN PARA2OF YRTELDL1509
OCT!9. THEYLIKE US ARENOT RPT NOTENT!RELY SATI SFIEO ONTHIS POINT
YETBUT ARENEVERTHELES~
PREPARED
TO AGREETHATPLANSSHOULD
BE
APPROVED.DANES
ANDNORWEGIANS,ON
OTHERHAND,HAVE
PRIVATELYASKED
US NOT RPT NOTTO PRESS THIS POINT.WHILETHEYARE AS CONCERNED
AS
WETO ENSURETHATOTHERNATOGOVTSAREKEPTAS FULLYINFORMED
AS
VHu-JA!vLY
POSSIBLEDURINGA DEVELOP
ING CRISIS, THEYARECONCERNED
OVERRISK OF POLITICALESCALATION
WHICHMIGHTBE Rl)J IF NATOTOOK
OVERCONTROL
OF MILITARYRESPONSESAT TOOEARLYA STAGE.IT IS
AGAINSTTHIS BACKGRO~D
THATCOUNCILWILLBE ASKEDTO QUOTEAGREE
00 A DEFINITIONOF NATOANDTRIPARTITEPLANNING
RESPONSIBILITYAND
ONPROPOSALS
FOR TRANSFEROF CONTROL
FROMTRIPARTITETO NATOMECH•
ANISMCONTAINED
IN THREEPOWERPAPEROF SEP18 l.NQUOTECPARAllCC)
OF P0/62/641>.
4.THIRD QUESTIONHASTO DO WITHQUOTEPREFERRED
SEQUENCE
••• 2
000680
�PAGE TWO2515
';'
lJ.lQUOTE
PAPER.HERESUGGESTIQN IS CPARAl 2
OF P0/62/641
>THATCOUNCIL
QUOTEMAYWISHTO ACCEPTTHIS PAPERAS GENERAL
FRAMEWORK
FOR ITS
CONTINUING
DISCUSSIONOF OVERALL
PROBLEM
OF CO-ORDINATING
ACTIONS
ANDPOLICIES OF AL.LIES IN .EVENT OF A WORSENINGOF BERLIN SITUATION
~QUOTE.I TAKEIT THATYOUWOULD
WISHMETO JOIN IN A GENERAL
ACCEPTANCE
OF PVREFERRED
SEQUENCEPAPERFOR THIS PURPOSE,SINCETO DO
SO WOULDBE TO PROVIDE A PROCEDURALBASIS ON WHICH WECOULD CONTINUE
TO INSIST ONOBTAINING
INFO ABOUPARALLEL
POLITICALPLANNING
IGBATIEFF
ll
000681
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
NATO
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Berlin Crisis / 27 OCTOBER 1962
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1962-10-22
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
A language of the resource
en
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CDTT00048
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
NATO Paris to External Affairs, "Berlin Contingency Planning,’’ 27 Oct. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 2.
Belgians
Danes
George Ignatieff
Italians
Norwegians
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b784f39b7d38a0b393a64332bc56f91f.pdf
9ab92d347983757ef970c5b2ba0b4516
PDF Text
Text
D.L.(1)/EPBlack/ah
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MEMORAND.t.t·~
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The telegram on Berlin Coatiagency
Planning waa not aiped by the Minister,
who
baa aent it back through the Uader-Secretary
and asked that it be put up to the Prime
Minister.
CIRCULATION
Ext. 326 (6/56)
000673
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�DEPARTMENT
OF EXTERNALAFFAIRS,CANAD~:-.. , '
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DATE
CT29/62
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Ref.:
YOURTIL 24,87 OF OCT2S
Subject:
BULIN CONTillGDiCY
PLANHIIG
THBPRIMEMDISTD HASAQUIDTO THI FOD1OF APPROVAL
FORTHI BERCOI/MAitCCIIPL.US II THI TBIIISSIT 101TH II PAR.AS
or
P0/62/6'+1
or
OCTS/62 PROVIDED
P Ai.AS(b)(ii)
IS AMINDIDALOIG THI
LINESYOUHAVIllDICATEDNAMILY
'!HAT"THI COUJICIL
APPROVBD
II
PRINCIPLEilD POI PLAIIIIG PURPOSIS THI JIAJOI IATOCOMMAIIDDS
PLAHSII THI BDCOI ARDMAiCOISERIIS 01( THI BASISTHATTHBSI
REPRISIIITA CATALOGUE
OF PLANSFORPOSSIBLEACTIOiBYRATOFORCIS
IN THI IVEHTTHATTHI DFORTSOF THI THIEEPOWERS
TOMAINTAIH
ACCESS
TO BERLINII ACCORDANCB
WITHTHELIVI OAKPLAIS ARE
UNSUCCISSFUL
- THESELECTION
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PLAHSBEINGSUBJECT
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EXT.
18 (REV.
D. L.
(1)
PHONE
APPROVED
SIG,
NAME
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••••••••••••••••••••
12/61)
000674
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BIPRBSSIIG CDN AGREEMENT
YOU SHOULDMill
FOR THE RICORD.TNli
8!:A.TIIIUT SIIOIII,D BIAQ
"1:N-'fIBW Of i&R&£1J GtJIDELIN&'SON IA:?e
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J..S AMIIIDll)e THI CAIADill
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GIVEN TO THE IATO COUICIL BI THE TRIP ARTITI POWIRS
01 PARALLELPOLITICAL COITIIGDCI
PLANNDIG A.NDII
AGREEINGTO THI APPROVALOF THE BERCOI/MARCONPLANS
IN PRIICIPLE
AID FOR PLANNINGPURPOSES THE CDN
OOVDNMENT
ASSUMES
THATIN FUTURE
THEREWILLBE
CONTIIUOUS CONSULTATION
INC OUNCIL ON A PARALLBL
CATALOGUEOF POLITICAL PLAilIS.
/I
000675
,
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�..
THE PRIME :MINISTER
l
Berlin.
Coatiyenex
Planaiag
Last year the HATOGbllllcil iastructed
the
authorities
to prepare a catalogue of
plans for possible action by NATOforces in the
event that the efforts of the Tripartite
Powers
to maintain access to Berlin in accordance with
their own con.tingeney plus
(Live Oak} were uasuceessful.
It was agree4 that these plane were te
•• a eatalepe
and that there would be no questiea
of aay aclvance delegation of authority but rather
that the selectiea
and execution of one or •re
of
these plans would be subject to a speeifie political decision by Qovel"tllleats at the time.
NATOmilitary
These plans (copy attaohed) knolfll. as the
ancl air contingency plus)
/MARCON
(Maritille contingency plaaa) antl the Standiq
Group
appraisal of the plaas were cireulated
to KATO
mabers in the late SUllller and have been tile aubjeet
of a amber of restricted
meetings of the Couacil
in September and. October.
We have raised the
fellowing questions during the discussion in Couacil
on these plans:
BiRCON (growul
(a) We have been of the view that "the
selective
use of nuclear weapons" shc>ul4
not form part of the catalogue of Berlin
contingency plans since it appears
••• /2
000676
�- 2 -
contrary te agreed HA.TOguidelines on
nuclear strategy aad since SAGIUKhiaaelf
in hi• eoamenta oa the plan• haa expreaaed
the view that the aeleotive ue of aulear
weapoa• would achieve ao ailitary
advantage aad it is queatioaable
nether
it
would achieve the political
objective
ot deterriag the Soviet Union. While a
aaber
of other ••bera
of the Ceuacil
have agreed. with thia view it appear~_to
be the gaeral
coaa,:aaua that siace the
HATO• ilitary autaori~iea were •rigillally
asked to put· sueh a plan iR'their
catalegue and aiaee aay·or all of the plau
are subject to a speeitic,polit.ical
deciai•n by Gover•ata
at the tiae thia
particular
plan. should reaain in the catalogue. Mr.: Ignatieff' has informed us that/
we would be isolating
ourselves if we
insisted on having this item r•oved.
We
would recOlllllend that we agree to the it•
remaining in the catalogue but that whea
expressing our approval of the plans we
make a stateaent
for ~be record ~reaaiag
the view that "the·aelective
use of auelear.
weapoaa~ haa ao part ia Berlin Contin4aey
Planaing but iniieatillg
that••
would aot
wish tlua view te hold up Berlia Contiagency Planaiag.
l
(b) Meat ••b•r• of the Coacil
aave
expresaei to the Tripanite
Power• their
iissatiataction
at tie lack of iafomatien oa parallel
political
aeasurea which
the Tripartite
Powers would take in ease
the Soviet Union barred access to Berlill •
••• /3
000677
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ta11:.:
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in •
would wieh to laaow
tripartite
plan• with regard to action
in the U. If. and in case the SoTiet
Uaion aecidea to aiga a aeparate __pea••
treaty.
We wuleratuul that the Ult aad
the u. s. are williag ta cliacusa their
political
plan• ia Council but that the
French GoTer•u.t
objects.
We woul4
suggest that in making our stat•at
in
Council approTing the BBRCON/MARCON
plna,
we state that Canadiu GoTel"lllleat •••mes
1illat ill future there will be contiaw,ue
ooaslll.tatioa in Council on a parallel
eatalope
of political
plans.
The IIATO Couaeil was origiaally
asked te
appreve the BERCOH/MilOOlfplus but a aaber of MA.TO
power• inclwiing ouraelTea haTe expre•••• the Tiew tl:lat
ainee the plus are aot detailed military plans but
rather a catalogue of plans the choice ot one or more
ot which is subject to a specific political
decision
by GoTermaents, it is ditticult
to give f4r • al approTal.
It now appears to be the consensus of the Council that
a formula should be used whereby the Council will
approve the plans ia principle
and for planning purposes.
Mr. Ipatieff,
the Canadian Peraanea,
NATORepresentatiTe,
phoned this ••rniJlc to say that
this queatien will come up for ieciaion in tae NATO
Geuacil no later than Wednesday, October 31. Mr.
Ignatieff
said that he Blight be able to haTe the
aeeting postponed for a day or two but that in ·his
personal opinion, particularly
now that all other NATO
•••••rs
were in
we should. also indieate
Canadian agreement to the formula approviD.g the BDCON/
MARCON
plans "in priaciple
and for plannin& purpose•"•
acr••••t,
•••/4,
000678
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Attached to t ia memorandUlllis a copy
(°' of NATODoeuaat P0,62/61+1 paragraph 8(b) of
{!;>which CGntains 1'he text to be apprcm1d. by
t-V VA.~
Comcil.
Attached to thia aeaorancla is a
<'\,
"\
telegram which, if you agree, will be sent to
L~
the NATODelegation instructing
the Delegation
~v
to approve the plans according to the tomula
set out in Paragraph S(b) of P0/62/6~1, subject
to the uumclmeat to Paracraph S(b) {ii) whereby
the Council will approve the plans in principle
and for planning purposes.
The telegram also
instructs
the Delegation to make a stat•ent
with
regard to the "selective
use of nuclear weapons"
on the lines set out in Paragraph 2(a) of this
Memorandumand a statement on "parallel
political
contingency plans" along the lines of Paragraph
2 {b) 0£ this Memorand.lDll. The text o:r thia telegram has been cleared. with the Department o:r
National Defence.
"'~4~J',!:i-
~~~
~~-
The Minister has seen the attached telegram and has asked that it be suaaitte4 to you
tor your apprOTal.
N. A. R.
000679
�
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Title
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NATO
Dublin Core
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Title
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Berlin Crisis / 29 OCTOBER 1962
Date
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1962-10-29
Format
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PDF
Language
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en
Type
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Text
Identifier
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CDTT00049
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Defence Liaison (1) Division to Campbell, "Berlin Contingency Planning,’’ 29 Oct. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 2.
BERCON plans
John Diefenbaker
Live Oak
Marcon Series
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/3c27bb9bb07fe2610d7e6ea7625a0b28.pdf
5e22a0c874f4fd32819041cbbfa96a47
PDF Text
Text
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OCT31/62 ~SECr--s_ 1__
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25~1 OCT3i
'
.
BERLINCONTINGENCY
PLANNING
FOLLOWING
IS TEXTOF MYSTATEMENT
GIVENIN, COUNCILOCT311BEGINS1
.
.
,.
1 AMAUTHORIZED
TO AGREETO THE F:ORM
or AfPROVALJi'ORTH[ B[RCON/
.
t'
MARCON
PLANSIN THETERMSSET FORTHIN PARA8 OF P0/62/6~1 OF OCT8,
.
.
PROVIDED
THATPARAS<B>CII>IS AMEND~TO READTKAT1QUOTE
COUNCIL
....
APPROVED
IN PRINCIPLEANDFORPLANNING
ruRPQSESTHEMAJOR
COMMANDERS
.
•
·.
.,
. '
PLANSIN TH£ 8£RCONANDMARCON
SERIES ON,THEBASIS THATTHESEREPRE.
-.
SENTA CATALOGUE
or PLANSFOR POSSI~
.
.
·.
. ACTIONBY NATOFORCESIN THE
.
EVENTTHATTHE[ffORTS OF THETHRU PVERS
TO MAINTAIN
ACCESSTO
.
BERLININ ACCORDANCE
WITHTHELIVE .c1AK
-PLANSAREUNSUCCESSFUL-THE
'
or
SELECT
ION AND EXECUTIOHOF HY ONt
TH.ESE.PLANSBEING SUBJECTTO A
.
.
PRIOR POLITICALDECISION BY MEMBER
_GOVfS~T THE TIMI UNQUOTE
•
.
.
2.AT THE SA"[ TIMI I AM INSTRUCTED
,'.fO ~AY. THATTHE CONGOVT IS
CONCERNED
AT THELACKOF INFO GIVENTO.
COUNCIL
BY THETRIPA,: THE NATO
"'
RTITE POWERS
OF PARALLEL
POLITICAL~ONTIN8ENCY
PLANNING,AND
IN AGREEING TO THEAPPROVAL
or THEB[RCOH/NARCON
PLANSIN PRINCIPLEANDFOR
..
PLANNING
PURPOSESTHECDNGOVTASSll'ft&;_T,HAT
IN FUTURETHEREWILLBE
. '
,
CONTINUOUS
CONSULTATION
IN COUNCILON·A.PARALLEL
CATALOGUE
OF
POLITICALPLANS.
3. INDEEDWEVOULD
HOPETHATA8REEMENT
ON.THECATAL08UE
OF PLANSIN
~
THETERMSI HAVEMENTIONED
WOULD
CLEARTHEWAYFOR AN EARLYDISCUSSION
OF THE URGENT
ANDIMPORTANT
DIPLOPROBLEMS
WHICHCONCERN
THE
ALLIANCE
ANDWHICHSHOULD
BE THE OBJECTPF CONTINUING
CONSULTATION
IN THIS COUNCIL.TEXT
ENDS
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. . .
.
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000667
�ALEC
FM NATOPARIS OCT31/62
TO EXTERNAL 2544
SECRET
I
PRIORITY
REl• OURTEL 254 1 OCT31
BERLIN CONTINGEtWY PLA.NNING
R..ANS AS APPROVED BY COUNCIL OCT3UBEGWS:
1..THE couHCIL
BERLIN
TOOK NOTE or
THE srAND.U~G GROUP A?PRArsllP~F'
1~
962
GON'f!NGENCY FLANS PROPOSED BY THE MA,JOR tii/.\TO ;MDR::;f.D
;,ND AGREED THAT l'IY.:S:s WERE Rl::SPONSIVE
:·o
THE INS1'RUCTHm:::;TO THE:
NATO MILITARY AUfHORITIES CONVEYED IN GOUNC[L R:i:SOLUTION C M(c;DJ04.,
0
AND Sl-'APE/70/A/62
C PSACEUR:SHAPE/70/6'.2
SACLANT13011/C,'°982
CINCHAN:CH~00!107/8
OF :,EPlO
Ofi AUG 1\5
)F' APR2
1
2 ..THE COUNCIL APPFIOVEJ !1\1 PRINCIH..E '°'ND F'OH R...~rlNIN•3 PURPOSES THE
MAJOR NATO CMDRS PLANS IN TM!: DERCON AND MA!?GONSERL~S
mJ THE
BASIS
THAt THESE REPRESENT A CATALOGUE OF FLMJfi FOR POSSIB ..E ACTION BY
NATO FORCES !N THE EVENT THAf Tr£
MAINTAIN ACCESS TO BiRLIN
UNSUCCESSFUL T}£
0
EFFOHTS O? THE THR~E POWERS TO
IN ACCORDANCEWITH THE LIV~ OA1( PL.PiNS ARE
SELECTION t!ND EXECUTION OF ANY ONE )F THESE
FLANS BEING SJJB;JECT TO A PRIOR POLIT IC1'.),LDECISION BY MEt'P:SERGCVTS
AT THE TIME.,
3~ SHOULD THIS CATALOGUEOF FLANS REQUIRE R'.~VISION OR AMPLIFICATION
IN THE LJ.GHf
Or
CH1~N3ING ClRCUMSf ANCESi}ANY :3IGNIFICA\JT t:-:lENDMENTS
SHOL:LOBE SUBMITTED re THE COUNCIL BY TIB NiUO MILIT ~RY .~UTHOHITIES
1
FOR APPROVAL ON THE AME Bt.SIS
AS TtE
PRESEN'"~CATt~l.OGUE,.f],JOSo
000668
�Extract from HOUSEOF COMMONS
DEBATESVolume 107, No. 25
of Thursday, November 1, 1962.
r lease
put on Berlin
Co:itingency
- Inquiry
On the
orders
Hon. L.B.
as to Consultation
of the
Pearson
file
with NATOAllies
day:
(Leader
of the Opposition):
I should like to ask the Prime Minister
whether he
can assure the house that the government is being
fully consulted
by its major NATOallies
on any
measures which may have to be taken or any policies
which are to be followed in the event of a serious
situation
developing
over Berlin.
Right
Hon. J. G. Diefenbaker
Mr. Speaker, there
in respect of that
I
.
l
:.
i-iP~;~~:}
"EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Berlin
F lanning
(Prime Minister):
is full consultation
taking
matter from day to day.
000669
place
�FllECOPY
D
FM NATOPAHIS OCT3 l/62
.,....SE "L.,---1
TO EXTERNAL
2541 PRIO~ITY
8
INFO CCOSEMBPARISLDN WASH~---
BEHLIN
COUNCIL
~
11
~ ,J'
ll•
CONTINGENCY
PLANNING
..,1_:,~h
,,.....
~-,
~~I'll/
'~¼
1J
kEF YOURTELDL1544 OCT29
RESUMED
DISCUSSIONIN RESTDSESSION 0CT3
.
o
~~~~
6~
CTING SECGEN
..
.
CIRCULATED A DRAFT DECISION PROVIDING FOR APPROVAL Or" THE BERCON/
MARCONPLANS AS IN PARA 8 OF P0/62 /641. OF OCTB,AMENDED IN ACCOH~·
DANCE WITH THE PRIVATE
UNDERSTANDING
A.RRIVED AT OCT29 AND REPORTED
IN PARA2 OF MYTEL2532 OCT29..
2. I THEREFORE I!l4DICATEDTHE APPROV1~LOF CDN! GOVT IN A STATEMENT
BASEDON YOURREFTELINCLUDINGIN PARTICULA~THE UNDERSTANDING
IN
PAHA 2,,
2. PORTUGUESE AND TURKISH PERMREPS ·wERE WITH.OUTINSTRUCT IONS BUT
.
.
ARE EXPECTED TO ACCEPT THE DECISION SHORTLY.ALL OTHER PERMREPS,
.
t
[
\i
\
INCLUUING
ALL TXOS[
WHO HAD PREVI0VSL'(
·.·
HAD DJFF
PROPO~ED DECISION, SAID THEY COULD NOW-.APPROVE
ICULTY WITHTHE
IT .AT THE SAME
L
TIME A NUMBER MADESTATEMENTS FOH THE RECORD SIMILARTO OUROWN,
f·
i
TO COVER PARTICULAR POINTS OF DIFF'ICUl.TY
'·
.,
THUS ITALIAN
PERMREP HEFERRED
ro
ALEtns;
THEY MAD EXPERIENCED.
DANISH PERMREP TO LEGAL
,\'
,\
PH0BLEMS; NORWEGIAN PERMREP TO LEGAL PtWBLEMS, THE USE OF NUCLE.4R
WEAPONSAND THE DIFFICULTY
EVEN AS A
OF APPR0V'INIG ANY PARTICULAR SET OF PLANS
CATALOGUE;NETHEHLANDS
PERNREP TO THE IMPORTANCE OF EARLY
CONTlNUlNG DISCUSSION OF PARALLELPOLITICAL -PLANN!NG,ETC.I
WILL
NOTRPT NOTATTEMPTTO GO INTO THE OETAILOF THESE STATEMENTS
OF UNDERSTANDING.,
THEY1<l/ERE
FOHMAL .STATEM'ENTS
FOR
TH.E
RECORDDESI=
GNEDTO ACCOMPANY
ADHERENCE
TO THE DECISION.A DOCUCONTAINING
ALL
OF THEM INCLUDING OUR OWN WILL BE
CIRCULATEDuWE
WILL
DRAW YOUR ATTEN-
TION TO IT WHENIT APPEARS~
4 ..COUNCILALSO INDICATEDGENERALWILLINGNESSTO ACCEPTTHE TWO
000670
�j:
FEB2 7 1985
'. PAGE TWO 2541
;~ELATtD DOCUSON TH£ RELAtIONSHIP BETWEENTRIPARTITE ANDNATOCON=
TROLANDTHE ?REFERREDSEQUENCEOf MILITARYACTIONSON THE BASIS SET
'
_OUT IN PARA4 OF MYTEL2532 ANDPARA4 OF MYTEL2515 OCT27uAS YOU
KNOW
IHESE FORMULAE
PROVIDEFOR QUOTENOTINGUNQUOTE
ANDQUOTE
;ACCEPTING UNQUOTE THESE ASSOC IA TED PAPEHS AS A BASIS
FOR CONT!NUING
I
'.DISCUSSIONBur DO NOT RPT NOT INVOLVEFORMALDECISIONS OF APPROVAL
A~ SUCH~
5.IT
IS UNDERSTOOD
THAT IN FUTUREMTGSTHE COUNCILWILL CONTINUE
DJ;jCUSSIONON PARALLELPOLITICAL PLANNING,ONALERTS IN BERLIN CON=
!EXT,~ND
ON THE
INTERNATIONAL
LEGALIMPLICATIONSOF
SOME OF
THE
CONTINGENCY
PLANS~
6.ALTHOUGHNO RPI NO OTHERDEL TOUCHED
.ON QUESTION OF ECONOMIC
COUNTERMEASUHESr
I THOUGHTIT USEFULTD TAKETHE OPPORTUNITY
TO TELL
OTHERDELS OF THE RELATEDDECISIONS OF. WHICHYOUAUTHOHIZED
ME TO
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000671
�
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NATO
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Berlin Crisis / 31 OCTOBER 1962
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1962-10-31
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en
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CDTT00050
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NATO Paris to External Affairs, "Berlin Contingency Planning,’’ 31 Oct. 1962, LAC, RG 25, vol. 6080, file no. 50341-A-2-40, part 2.
BERCON plans
George Ignatieff
John Diefenbaker
Lester Pearson
Marcon Series
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/49a649e776339832f8d08411fe2921bc.pdf
11ae242bfca80027bc92a438c1e49d0a
PDF Text
Text
Document disclosed under the 15'Jii~
t'ciInformation Act D\ment
divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information
E. Reid/mp
TOP SECRET
f
December 8, 1950
The International
2
Crisis
In order to try to clear my own mind on some of the
problems which are likely to emerge as the result of the
defeat of the United Nations forces in Korea,!
have hastily
prepared two memoranda of today's date.
I attach a copy of
each.
The first
sets forth some basic considerations.
The
second sets forth some suggestions
on how the democracies
might respond in time to the challenge imposed by the defeat
in Korea.
The first
might, after revision,
a public speech by the Prime Minister
provide a basis
or the Minister.
for
A third memorandum is being prepared
in the Department on some of the more immediate questions of policy.
I should~
two attached papers
appreciate
your comments on the
and your suggestions
for revision.
E. R.
c.c.l.
E.R.
•. Mr. Heeney
o.Mr~Norman
Robertson
*Mr:; Pickersgill
6.Mr. Ritchie
14.:Mr.
Le Pan
-,.Mr. MacKay
<iMr. E.H. Norman
q_Mr. Flu.mitre
1 o spare
.t'
000437
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information
JI.Reid/a
SECRET
! 0 p
.,
DRAFT
.SOB BA.BIOOOJfSIDERATIOl'S
1.
During the three
a halt
&nd
years
between the •pring
ot 1947 and the autumn of 1950, the democra~io world was
aubj·eoted to tour major shocks or disasters.
or disaster
demonstrated
It ••
a.
a response.
forth
brought
too little
The deteat
Pirat
3.
The
to have_ been inadequate.
major ahock or
It the response
le likelfiee
inadequate,
t.o the
ohallenge
the result
m1t7
world war.
in a third
challenge
1n turn was
or came too late.
series.
· ot th1e disaster
be defeat
events
in Korea is the fifth
in this
and each challenge
Ea.ch response
by subsequent
either
disaster
a challenge;
constituted
Each shock
and response
disaster
first
was the bleak winter of 1946...47
in Europe which weakened an economy already debilitated
the war•
The response
to birth
till
twelve months later.
Second challenge
by
to th1a cbJi.llenge was the Kar shall
.It was conoeived 1n June, ~947, but was not brought
Plan.
4.
by
and response
The !nadequ•cy
ot this larsha 11 Plan was demons tra. ted
the Communist seizure ot power in Czechoalovakia in
P~bruary,
1948.
It n.e conceived
etteot
until
'?he response
in Jlarch,
Aug11.st, 1949.
was the Borth Atlantic
1948, but did not come into
The period ot gestation•••
seventeen months.
• ••• .a
Treaty.
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information
- 2 -
; ..
Under the· North Atlantic
began slowly to increase
capacity
Treaty,
their
the Atlantic
military
forces
powers
and their
for combined action.
Third challenge and response
The inadequacy of the combination
6.
of :Marshall Plan
and North Atlantic
Treaty was demonstrated
of the Nationalist
regime in China during 1949, clllminating
on October l of a central
in the establishment
government tor China.
to discover
against
by the crumbling
Communist
The Western powers were snocked
that while they had been holding
Russian expansion
the line
in Europe, the totalitarian
communist bloc had secured mastery over the four hundred
million
china,
people of China and was pressing
Malaya, Indonesia
thereby
7.
endangering
and the rest
the security
Alter waiting
in Asia in an effort
in 1950 to re-examine
further
by
by
their.safety
would be gravely
acceptance
of the thesis:
endangered by the
spread of Chinese or Russian communism in South
of µational
i
in January 1950. Another
the Western democracies
the West must ally
/
policies
One such
the spring of 1950 was general
and _South-East Asia; (b) that
/·
their
took place in Washington.
The result
(a) that
the
was made at the Colombo meeting of
re-examination
in principle
Asia,
what they could usefully
communism in Asia.
Commonwealth Foreign Ministers
8.
of South-East
of the whole Western world.
to discover
totalitarian
re-examination
Indo-
for some of the dust to settle,
Western powers began early
do to contain
against
itself
liberation
to prevent
such an advance
with the dominant local
and social
reform;
forces
and (c) that
•• 3
I
I
I
000439
\
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information
- 3 -
the West ·must .in 1 t,. own· interests
give· more economic
aseis:tance.
Asia.
Plan ·••
to :South end. South-Eaat
conoe1 ved 1n Ceylon in January,
months l&ter
Fourth
9.
it was at1ll
in process
The. Colombo
1950, but eleven
of gestation.
·cb.UleMt.and_responso
. The Oolotnbo ·Pl.an-and
other
sild.lar
plans
t_or 8011th
and aou th-Eaist Asia were baaed on the same philosophy
••
the a&xtshall' Plan tor Europe, . in order
weak national
it
wasnecess~J
the :larsha11
to: strengthen
.Plan cGe into
economies.
the1r
eff'ect,
Similarly
s1m1;t.ar plans
responses
that
1 t wa.s.
the Colombo and othe~
before
ef:t:~et,, the Cominform attack on
ca.me into
ltorea demonstrated
Before
. the Ccmintorm seµsure
ot. ,power 1n Caechoaloveld a delll()nstr•ted
inadequate.
or communism,
again, t the virus
-societies
to strengthen
that
they 'Wt;t:tte
likel't!fSe inadequate
to. the challenge
posecl by the victpry
of,
communism in China, .even though th~y were. buttressed
the 1l&rsba.ll Plan md the Borth Atlantic
10.
· The response
to .the che.llenge
Xore• on June 15, 1950_-,aa two~toldt
detenee· expenditures.,
w1th the t'a sk
their
o:t the invas;ion
of
1n the first
place,
an.d pressed
ot
on .more v1gorouly
ot co-ordina t1ng ·their detenoe efforts
and
tn the aeeQnd p1-.ce., the Worth
armed. forces.
Atlantic
Treaty.
powers doubled tll,e1r ~st1mates
the Borth Atlantic
by
powers took the .first
to organise
steps
.
the
..
.General Aaaembly of the lTn1ted Jrat1ona •• an agency tor
rallying
ani organizing
the whole democratic world &S$,1nat
Oominfornt. aggression.
P1tth
challenge\
11.. ~he defeat
&11
of/the
previous
the defS!&t in Xorea _.
in Eorea ht\a. d$lllonstrated
responses.
the S.nadequacy
They- hav~ been proved to be
•••• 4
000440
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information
- 4 -
.
I
either
or to have come too late.
too little
t
P1tth response
ia.
now 1a't
The question
In the light
inadequacy ot past responses,
world now to ake
The previous
the responses
am gravest
challenge!
have s'ucceeded each other
challenges
be made aoon; it
1• the democr•tic
what response
to the latest
and briefer
brietez-
of the proved
intervals.
The next challenge
the response
to previous
at
ma7
to 1t 1• a.a inadequate
challenges
a.s
the reaul t ma7 be
deteat 1n war.
lot only were the previous
13.
but the interval
its
between the conception
Atlantic
Plan,
1eventeen
and
twel-ve months
monthe tor -.the Borth
The, march of events ia now lo c,ast that
Treaty.
we cannot aately
this
contemplate
kind or d~lq.
If
the
to th& defeat in Korea ia to be eftective•it
response
be immediate.
14.
The following
aeem to be important
the democratic
are aome
policy
the cona1derat1ons
world should be to the ch&llenge
In general
those which would naturally
framing
or
in war.
posed by
the considerations
be taken into.--
account
•ueh of our present
di:t'ticulty
and danger has 1 ta source in our inability
the third
which
1n detel"Dl1n1ng what the reaponae of
1n Jtorea.
the defeat
15.
inadequate
ot a response
waa in :r:-etroapect unduly long\
birth
tor the •arshall
mst
reaponses
are
in
to act aa it
world war had broken out.
First.
The new response
considerations
- political,
must be based on global
economic,
military
and moral.
We must keep the whole world in view and see the world as
a whole.
The Russians can atrlke
at any point
on the
•••• s
000441
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information
- 5-
ot their
-circumference
strategy
a global
empire.
but which is warl!l,and which is being
waged around the world 1n the borderlands
,.
.
.
6f thlt~
frontiers
between the
I
empire '3-nd the democratic
· Russian
plan
a. global war:. which is no longer
for
·cold, not yet· hot,
We must therefore
world,
wherever the
worlds touch or border
on a buffer
zone.
16.
Second.
In framing the global strategy
·against
warm war, we must weigh carefully
. the competing
claims
sections
various
South-East
17,
of the ·frontier
between the two worlds -
the Indian
We ~t
to increase
sub-continent,
North America.
Asia, the Far East,
Third.
each other
res·ourc·es from the
on limited.
\Vestern Europe, Middle East,
take immediate and adequate
the resources
available
to hold in reserve.
Half measures will be worse than useless:
Fourth.
~8,.
'>
or security.
degree
We must take into acco~t
fa_qtorsa. the military,
; •
they will
economies but they
a heavy burden'on.our
···will not give us any tolet-able
•
•
I
all the relevant
especially > ' ! because
•,
''
steps
to us both for the
immediate defence of the frontier.and
constitute
for the
1
4
I
a third
'
,
•,
world
;
,
,
war may be upon us in .a few weeks or a tew months; the
•
•
•.
•
'
f
'
',
,
·,
'
:
'
•
•
'
ec,o:r;iomic,.becam~e we may, be in tor .a long period
,
., I
,
•
, ,
I
,
{
•
,
,
.. warm• war. or hot. war. and, unless
••
'
,
'•
•
,,
we are defeated
'
I
•
'
quickly,
•
'
,
ot
.,
,
I
the war comes soon and -
•
economic strength
1s essential;
: . the .poli tioal ' because we need : to.-in.orease the number of
our·allies
and our alliance
w~ need the' full.
alliance,
potentia+f
support of public
among potent11!3,l allies
the .moral because
opin:ton w1 thin. the
and in the buffer
zones,
••• 6
000442
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document d_ivulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information
- 6 ...
and we need tQ create
within
~s large
a f1:t'th column as possible
the empire of- our enemies - Russia and its· satellites.
· 19.
-fifth.
We must balance
term considerations.
present 'in wart
longer-term
shorter-
agains·t
This also is a problem always
thus in the iast
war the United Kingdom
had to balance
the short-run
home air force
into the defence of France or holding it
in reserve for a later
.
ministries
had to decide whether to concen-
maximum.production
months or maximumprodµction
even though this
it France fell;
defence of Britain
of munitions
on getting
trate
.
advantage of throwing its
meant less
in the next twelve
.
over_ a three-year
production
period
in the first
twelve months.
Sixth.
20.
weare
Since
weak now in relation
to the
Russian empire we must play for time in which to get
relatively
stronger
and we must use that
is worth to get stronger
politically,
an a~liancf
We must
creations
~s ~-precarious
"!
realize
how fragile
sensitivities
fair
.
in· strength
if
a thing it is;
all
realizes
its
to be
members
if they deter
of thei~ fellow allies;
to
it has almost
to the
if they bear their
share of the common burden. willingly
complaint;
secure
in mind that
It can only continue
'
strong and to increase
- stronger
and moral~y~
bearconstantly
be createdl anew eveiy·aay.
•
as possible
economically
militarily.;-,
Seventh.
21.
a~ rapidly
it
time for all
and without
if each member trom the strongest
to the weakest
that it is seldom, if ever, wise for him to_
the reluctant
acquiescence
whole programme· of action
an alliance
which he has put forward;
needs leadership
always be conciliation
of his allies -in the
but that
its
that
motto must
and compromise.
. ••• 7
000443
j
j
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information
- 7-
22.
Eighth.
wars like
remember that
warm
a means to an end.
The
'We- must constantly
hot wars are merely
purpose of waging war is not to win the war but to attain
..
.·
objectives.
',
certain
'
'
war is not. the subjugation
unconditional
surrender
,/ .
of
Xhe ~~jectiver~
of the
Com1nform ·empire
friction
of a
but the creation
;
warm
,or_its
world in
'
whioh the Comi~orm empire and the free
can live
·the present
democracies
side by side in peaoe - not peace wl tho·ut .
.
but peace without the threat of war.
'
000444
�· Document disclo ed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgu en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information
E.Re1d/RB
December a, 19;0.
TOPSEGRE!
DRAFT
THE DEFEATIN lCOREA
Some suggestions on how the democracies
might respond 1n time to the challen,ae.
1.
Recent events in Korea have demonstrated
that Russia and China are now prepared to run grave
risks
of precipitating
a third world war.
It is
that these two powers have by now decided to
possible
precipitate
The effect
that war during the next twelve months.
of Western rearmament will become increasingly
importlnt atter 1951; time 1~ beginning to be on our
side;
it therefore
the Cominform leaders
that war with the West 1s inevitable,
consider
that their
best opportunity
are convinced
they may well
will be in the twelve
months ahead.
The defeat
1n Ko~ea has also demonstrated
once again the military
. powers.
w1thin
It a third
weakness of the w·estern
world war should break out
the next three months or so, the only strong
weapon which the Western powers would possess is the
atomic weapon.
Even a successful
use of the
atomic weapon would not prevent Russia and its
allies
from occupying within three months all of eontinental
Em-ope to the P,renees
and after
East
and the whole ot South/Asia,
another three monthS or s:o, the whole ot
the W.ddle East.
Jluch of this
property
information
1s by now public
both in the West and in the Cominform world.
The grave risk
ot war in 19,1 has been stressed
by s:po,kesmentor various
governments;
publicly
1n Canada b1
••• 2
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information
r ;
Mr. Pearson in his. _address to the federal-provincial
conference
on December 4.
4.
The present situation-is-
parable
to that
answer at that
therefore
com-
a:tter Dunkerque in June 1940.
time was total
mobilization
The
in the
Commonwealth and partial
mobilization
States.
time 1s ot the essence ot
The motto was:
in the United
the problem.
;.
W'e are now trying
to buy time by making a
deal with the Chinese Communists and probably by reopening negotiations
with Rus~ia through the tour-
power Council ot Foreign Ministers.
be bought at the expense of sacrifices
and ot compromises with pr1nc1ples.
This time will
of prestige
These sacrifices
will be made in vain it the time is not wisely spent.
Moreover• .it
the time ~snot
wisely spent,
the con-
sequence may be the conquest py Russia ot a ruined
Western world.
theretore
6.
Not .to spend the time wisely would.
be an 'llilforgivable
fhe'present
of the North Atlantic
195'4.
sin.
date set tor the accomplishment
medium-term plan 1s July
Even the accomplishment of this
give us no guarantee
us in war.
situation,
1,
plan will
that Russia could not defeat
Because 0£ the urgency of the present
it would seem wise to change the date tor
the accomplishment of the plan from July 1, 1954, to
July 1, 195'2.
• •• 3
000446
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information
- 3 ...
....
,
·. In· a hot third world war, at least
7.
five
out ot every ten members or the working torce
be engaged on war work either
as members of the armed
1'oroes or 1n armaments production.
tha~ one
war less
tor the present
about half
During. the cold
in ten has been engaged in cold
war work. in the Atlantic
figure
The appropriate
countries.
warm war would probably be
way between these figures,
men in ten.
would
Setting
that
is,
three
the date of July 1, 19;2, for
the accomplishment of the medium-term plan would.
probably require
a semi-mobilization
of this
order
of magnitude.
8.
In order to save time, proposals
these lines
should be referred
to the North Atlantic
1n consultation
along
as quick~y as possible
Council Deputies
with the appropriate
and they Should,
military
bodies,
have a report ready for the Council when it meets
at the end of this
consideration
month or early
by the aouncil,
in January.
Pending
each North Atlantic
country should take immediate steps to increase
defence forces
9.
and its
· Similar
production
proposals
its
of armaments.
should .li_kewise be put
before the Commonwealth Prime Ministers
at their
meeting in London on January . 4.''
10.
. .Following the
meetings ot the North Atlantic
Council and of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers,
United States
should call
of American States
the
a meeting of the Organisation
in order to try to secure trom the
Latin American republics(the
utmost possible
assistance
•• • 4
000447
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information
- 4 -
in the task of preparing
of a world war in 195'1.
the possibility
11.
the democratic world against
Similarly
the North Atlantia
powers which
are members of the Council of Europe should call
special
a
meeting of the Council in order to try to
bring 1n Sweden, Ireland,
Turkey.
Greece and
Switzerland,
Yugoslavia should also be invited
meeting and possibly
Israel
to this
and the members of the
Ar ab League.
12.
fhis series
of meetings should be followed
by meetings of the Collective
Measures Committee ot
the General Assembly of the U.N. in an effort
and organize
to rally
the whole of the democratic membership of
the U.N. against
the imminent threat
of war.
The
Committee should prepare recommendations to be presented
to the General Assembly in March 195'1.
a particularly
March may be
dangerous month and it might be wise
to have the Assembly in session at that time.
13.
At the same time as these preparations
going forward,
a renewed effort
bring into effective
economic assistance
especially
the various plans for
to under-developed
thus diminishing
countries,
the plight
a souroe of
1n the Middle East, and (o) to remove all
the major sources of friction
Pakistan.
should be made ·ca) to
the Colombo Plan, (b) to relieve
of the Arab refugees,
friction
operation
are
between India and
...,
000448
�••
o
d under the Acces
Document di~ulgue n vertu de la Loi su
-,~
,.
14.
In order
to secure
"'
cause,
the democratic
,,
for their
make clear
their
as possible
nations
warm-war aims.
best to convince their
should also
They should
do their
own people and as many people
in the Cominform empire that the warmwar
on them, that they consider
has been forced
war not as an end in itself
and that
the utmost moral sup.port
but as a means to an end,
that end is not the subjugation
Cominform empire or 1ts unconditional
the creation
of
• world
the warm
of the
surrender
but
in which the Cominform empire
and the free demJ,oracies can live
peace - not peac;-e without
side by side 1n
friction
but peace without
tbrea t of war.
It
is not only a matter
of warm-war aims
but also of aims in peace and in war.
to form a strong
anti-Cominform world alliance
this a1i1ance cannot safely
empire.
values
doctrines
and practi~es
It must be catholic
1 ts living
lfa,1 th
be based·on
in that 1 t protests
It mu.st be protestant
the abhorrent
in that
in the belief's,
of the great civilizations
and defenders:·
Christendom,
It is necessary
Hinduism,
mere negation.
and repudiates
pf the Cominform
it r~-attirms
the.· virtues,
the
of whiQh •e are heirs
Western Christendom,
Islam,
but
<>rthodox
Buddhism, Confucianism
and Taoism.
...
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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NATO
Dublin Core
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Title
A name given to the resource
Warm War / 8 DECEMBER 1950
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1950-12-08
Format
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PDF
Language
A language of the resource
en
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CDTT00080
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
"The International Crisis and The Defeat in Korea," 8 Dec. 1950, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 25, vol. 4758, file no. 50069-D-40, part 1.
anti-communist
International Crisis
Korean War
Reid