1 20 34845 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/fbe4d33011f0aea4cee235751a5814a6.pdf 74b9296d1011b34948c6df92b02faabe PDF Text Text EJQCERPT FROM NOTE FOR;FILE 'DTD. F E B R I ] A R % ; 2 l / ^ : i ^ f l " ; , ^ .&• . - ' • ' ' " ' : ' • ™ . " ' • • ! ! • • , _ _ T L 1 % ft[i. ^ « < a -|S-^-+-d * i-:iro?!. Defence Liaieon (%), -tha iMer^eeretaxy said that Mr.'GG&rEO Glassetroofc had recently been given addltipnaX responeiMlitioB which vtould oeeuj!?' about hilf his time* fo met t h i s sitiaatioii i t las aeceaaasry for biii t o deeentralias the operational responsibility for. his Division and i t me. proposed that he have two assistants * one on the seetariiy side and one the .intelligence side* IJJ—^ifrw1* M h w u r m n t i i i n i i i i •• r r t r i f - ^ — ^ — y f g J f c ' i w ^ M ^ m f f r J h i i twn m_iiiiwiyi_,iii n in in m. i i n i • « i nil IIWII ^r*^j • I M H I I H s (e) thet a punier officer he assigned to Defence Liaieon (2) to aaalst in ths security work. _t£_ y. •r Sgd) E.W.T. G i l l «—i vvi, _. ^... 000151 �« Secret1 lT-ftA»v_>j-*>-M y:h REORGANIZATION OP DEFENCE LIAISON (2) Objects ill To free Head of Division for additional intelligence dutie J3J To maintain a connection between intelligence organization t3) To maintain a connection between intelligence and security i I , i* HEAD OF DIVISION V .1 Chairman, JIC, other Intelligence duties, member Security Panel, personnel security, general supervision of Division. 1; Security Officer (alternate Security Panel, Chairman CPC, immigration and passports, all routine security questions, War Books) Intelligence Officer' \ (alternate on JIC, defectors, genera !., intelligence questions) - • * ; • • • International Commission 1 Officer 2 Assistant Security Officers (1 could J»e probationary officer) a Clerk t 1 ••".;• Joint Intelligence i Staff Ii 1 Officer a General assistance on intelligence policy and handling in Department \ a * Staff \ F.S.O.s \Adroin. Clerical tenos *• Officer. 8 1 l by Admin. Officer mmm. AFFAIRS REOG^S mis fi!(i.^%L. i s - * - * 1 FTT "000152 �/ft* tf REORGANIZATION OP DEFENCE LIAISON (2) '&0»—SiCft. firon.. V 9 ^O^ects: r;_. J 1} To free Head of Division for additional intelligence duties] •2) To maintain a connection between intelligence organizations .3) To maintain a connection between intelligence and security.' HEAD OF DIVISION /rc,^ £ Chairman, JIC, other intelligence duties, member Security Panel, personnel security, general supervision of Division. — Security Officer*^ 2? «*J^~ —" 5 N (alternate Security Panel, Chairman 3JPC, (immigration and passportsJT all " ~ routine security questions, War Books) «. 2 Assistant Security Officers ' (1 could be probationary officer)/^ \ ->> (alternate on JIC, defectors, generj intelligence questions) Internatlonal . CpmmigisJLor ' 1 Officer Joint Intelligence^ Staff 1 Officer ^i 7 F.S.O.s Admin .' Clerical Stenos : OH Intelligence Offices Clerk \Ur*MMAA/*A&<*>: ; General assistance on intelligence policy and handling in pepartment Officer SStaf^ # / • \ * iA 0 Admin. O f f i c e r fe> J (?) 000149 �TOP SECRET \ $ PRESENT MAIN TASKS OF DEFENCE LIAISON (2) Planning' ) Joint Planning Committee and J.P. Staff * Security (1) Departmental (Ottawa and all posts) a) Personnel jb) Physical ( c) Cyphers 'dj Bags War Book and other Emergency Planning (2) Governmental {a) Security Panel (b) Cypher Policy Committee (c) Immigration (d) Visas and passports Intelligence (1) Joint Intelligence Committee and J.I/ Staff (attendance'at COSC and VCOSC)/ (2) International * Communism (~ , t (3) Vulnerability Study, Panel (Occasional! y) Communications '* Security .a) Senior Committ Junior CommittJ Handling /J intelligence"! Department. i i Suggest t r a n s f e r t o D.L. 1 000150 v � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDDF00036 Title A name given to the resource Excerpt from Note for File Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 21-Feb-53 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Library and Archives Canada, Record Group 25, vol. 8433, file: 11365-15-A-40, part 1.1. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Government of Canada Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Cold War Defectors Description An account of the resource Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/9672a5f522d63c6ac7edb3be63058fab.pdf 417878d46cb87e3a78c05522491a52a6 PDF Text Text DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL A F F A I R S , CANADA. (DUPLICATE) DESPATCH f'« c r* ' T & THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, FROM; Security: SECRET. ' 8 i ;3^ M. '58 CANA~„. ~. '..a??.. . ?&8 .F.-STBWWJi .-ft WEWWtftl&X1?. .9$: .$-\*^.<Ja'Pate^7.7Aomry.. ~ ^~ .2.3*..1.958.... in. th-?.Hor.th A.UftnfeiP..Cpunoil.and,.the.;. QEEC, P a r i s * Enclosures: T*.*T Reference: Air or Surface Mail:. . . . A i r . , , . . . . , Subject:..... Row. .Wsap.QttB *. Pc;st File No; Ottawa File No, 5D030-A6-1-UO References I believe it Is desirable to review certain, aspects of th© introduction into HATO of new weapons. Including long-range missiles, because X have run across comments which appear to indicate that certain misconceptions are held in some quarters about these weapons* Internal Circulation Distribution to' Posts "VX- 2* One of these misconceptions relates to their cost. It has been said that the introduction of these weapons will place an intolerable financial burden upon the HATO countries. It is true that these weapons have led to the inflation of the already high United States defence expenditures but that is because they are still in tho research and development stage* The cost of this research and development has been placed upon the already high cost of producing and maintaining the more conventional types of weapons* Uhen w© really get into the missile age we should, in theory at least, bo able to see the possibility of reducing the proportion of national resources devoted to defence* Guided ground-to-air missiles cost less than fighters* atomic-powered missile-launching submarines less than aircraft carriers, and long-range missiles less than bombers* Military men, particularly if they are airmen, will say, however, that this is pure theory and wishful thinking* They will point out that anti-missile defence will bo costly and that when it Is proved effective the missile age will cancel Itself out* There will then be a return to manned aircraft or to the introduction of some even more costly form of offence and defence* 3* The estimates of the cost of installing IHBH's provided by the HATQ military authorities show that these weapons can be introduced into HATO countries at a cost which is surprisingly low in relation to the great deterrent effect of these weapons*. In fact, it Is difficult to envisage any other way in which peace can be assured so cheaply* A squadron of IKDM's consists of 15 missiles with five launching sites or, in other words, three missiles per launching site* The total estimated cost of installing a squadron Is given as ©50,000,000, the greater part of which Is accounted for by tho cost of the missiles themselves* Of this the cost of preparing the five launching sites is estimated at around |2,000,000 per squadron, although "*ttto*l&*M$mlt%G& that this does not include any additional costs for "hardening0 the sites to make them less vulnerable to counter-attack. Presumably, it is only this cost of .. * 2 Ext. 180C (Rev. 2/52) 000690 ' �t.JJJ'j •a* the launching sites that will be chargeable Poreparing HATO infrastructure, *** It is planned initially to introduce ten squadrons of IBBH's Into lurope. This Includes the four squadrons previously planned i&r tho United Kingdom* Twenty squadrons aro considered to bo the opti&asu Xf the estimates of the HATO military authorities are well-founded the total capital cost of introducing twenty squadrons into Europe would b« around one billion dollars* For this investment HATO would derive the deterrent effect of 300 missiles distributed at 100 strategic sites in the mountains of Scotland, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey and capable of reaching military targets in all parts of European Russia except the barren region in the extreme north-eastern corner. 5, It has also been said that the launching sites for IHBM*s will require a large amount of land* Tho estimates of the HATO military authorities, to which I have referred, give 6o acres as the amount of land required for one launching site* This works out at 3©0 acres per squadron* This compares with 3*30 acres or more required for a military airfield* Moreover, such an airfield usually has to be located on land that otherwise oould be utilized for agriculture or other productive purposes. On tho other ftand, the launching sites for XRM-s will be located for military reasons ia relatively remote and unproductive mountainous districts* (sgd) L.&.Vfilgress, Permanent Eepres^ntatlvo. x^ V 000691 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04021 Title A name given to the resource L.D. Wilgress, Permanent Representative of Canada in the North Atlantic Council and the OEEC, Paris to Secretary of State for External Affairs 391 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO Cooperation Regarding Nuclear Weapons And Missile Bases (IRBM)," RG24-B-1, vol 21468, file CSC 2108:1, part 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 23-Jan-58 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/683095eaaa72b8220e8030dcefefdfe2.pdf c34b182bb88431457b0d9d7cf734c0f5 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a Tinformation D E P A R T M E N T OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS Subject. Date i.^:.2-ll.§2. Publication %x- l}}1.3.?l.J.°l^...?Xmes ^7-//-7 Johnson Message: A Policy WeB% Spun From a Tangle of Advice) By MAX FRANKEL Special to The New YorK rimes WASHINGTON, Jan. 12—A Yet was more than a speech. White House aide said it was It was a collection of ideas, atlike playing a giant accordion: titudes, rulings and recommena great^compression to produce dations winnowed from millions one big sound—the State of the of written words and hundreds Union Message—followed im- of conferences, and gathered litmediately by a great pulling erally in dozens of typewrit-' apart. ten snippets. It was a process* Por months, a contentious bf decision, wide-range and inbureaucracy had squeezed from tensive. opposite directions on almost ^5^iBfin : ^K^ea^gil»^»<!HV every issue. For months to come, the Congress will now pull away. For the country at large, the speech was the first good look at President Johnson after weeks of seclusion and agonized brooding at his Texas ranch. For men of conviction and power around the Government, it was a sudden- unveiling of the order of the day, a mandate] for some and a bitter signal for] others to "regroup, for another battle another'day. L 'I f One "of the few sensations of .Congressional pressure at the jWhite House came on1 the sub-j Iject -jot an-anti-missile defense! (system. With evidence accumu-j flating t h a t the Soviet Union has istarted to_deploy such a system,* ,the Joint Chiefs of Staff recorrt-' amended unanimously that the] •Administration follow suit,- andj. jthe- many supporters of thei .armed services on Capitol Hill •made plain their determination Ito make an issue of the subject.] S | Defense Secretary Robert S.] 'McNamara and many others in and out of the Administration were adamantly- opposed. An anti-missile program of questionable value, built in response to disputed intelligence estimates of Soviet intentions, they' argued, would commit the na-^ tion to an outlay of at least $3-J billion and eventually to as much' as $40-billion. Inevitably* it would distort budgets and domestic programs for year's to come. The argument continued almost to the end of the year, and the pressures were so great that many White House aides believe Mr. Johnson's refusal to ibuy an anti-missile system now was the most courageous decision in the entire messageiwriting process. | He concluded that too much iwas at stake not to await another appeal to Moscow to curbthe arms race, despite widespread doubt among his advisers that the Soviet Government' would be hospitable to the V appeal. There' was doubt also that tlie Congress would heed Mr. Johnson's . request for further acts of East-West accommodation, despite the war in Vietnam and despite the arms- race. He failed to obtain authority to lift trade 'restrictions last year and failed for two years to get Senate' approval of a consular convention with the Soviet Union. i But behind renewed requests was the desire to demonstrate to his distant audience in the Kremlin that he remained eager, to get on withJhe business of debate. Behind them also was the Hope bf early agreement on a treaty to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons, a treaty, Jthati. ttiijght/prove , so popular] farourfd 'the country that it ;would' suddenly alter the mood j.of Congress. > 000190 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00049 Title A name given to the resource NYT Article (Forwarded by External Affairs) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1/13/1967 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 1, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource Atomic Energy Control Board Ottawa confirming agreement to the amendment to the agrrement on security standards and safeguards Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/df4540a7aec28d3413099a2e8b752530.pdf a2899838327b117ea64d83e04f5f123b PDF Text Text SECRET A tl.(tTO l';ult-.tlatersJ, Uuelejlt Fgree The eosential problem posed by the Uassau Agreement is ho"1 the United States is to share control of nuclear treapons 11ith its allies, particularly the Europeans. In recant years the United States has becooe noro vulnerable to a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. In these circuosta.nces som2 Europeans have come to doubt tJhether the United States 11ould risk its otm destruction in· a crisis in t7hich European interests trere pricarily at stake. Successive United States have atte:npted to devise l'Iays for rea::it.\"iJI'i.ng Europeans by assi.:;ning tJ. s. strategic foreet:; to IlATO and by proposing different for g!ving Europeans a ereater sense of participation in the strategic de£ence a.rrangeoents of the Alliance. The latest of these schemes has been the proposal for a oultilateral mixed-manned sea-borne or submarine force aroed with the Polaris missile. The proposal raises problems or great complexity · "Which td.ll take considerable time to clarify.. There is the question whether the United States Congress can be persuaded to amend the r.1acrlahon Act so as to the United States Administration to transfer the m·mership and control of nuclear 1·rarheads for such a force to some sort o£ multilateral legal entity undor llATO. There ia also the question tJhether satisfactory control arrangements can be devised trhieh t1ould permit a number of members of the Alliance to participate in collective decisions about the use of the weapons in the force. A cutting edge has been introduced into the discussions of tho paragraph 8 force by the U.S. "Oampaiening" for consideration of a force of surfnc·e ships armed \11th Polaris type missiles. This force eould bo multinationally otmed, controlled, and manned by G.:\TO in the 1960-70 time period. The concept of a force of surface vessels armed tdth s is not ne\1 and predates Ua.ssau. Hot!evcr, the main evolution in the characteristics of the multi· lateral nuclear force from those envisaged at the tlassau oeeting is the inclusion of this mixed-manned surface eleoent. Some confusion exists as to the composition of the proposed paragraph g multilateral force. This confusion in due in part 'to the SOtleuhat free use of oultiple tams. Hot·Jever,. all versions o£ the UA'i'O rnultilateral nuclear force comprise one or more of the follolting elements: (a) A British submarine Polaris force of as yet unspecified numbers to be equipped uith U. s .. Polaris missiles and armed British nuclear uarheads. 000040 �SECRET ... 2 - {b) least abovo. is termed 0 UJA forces at to those in paratt,raph (a) · PrL>Oumnbly these .forces could be either 'iolaris submarines or liinutenmn ICB::i• s ·or some othar. delivery system. (c) A oea based 100I,1 £orca. The tias.sau agreement only makes mention in parac;raphs 7 and 8. Hol1ever, the curre.."lt u. s. ·proposal for a surface ship force adds oultilateral ownership and oixed-oanning to the original plan • It should be noted in passina that this olernent is referred to by tho u. s. as ffThe I1ultilateral Foree (r.J.-F)n. ot a IJATO mUltilateral nuclear force AlthoU3h thero are reservations among sooo NATO members, on the eventual composition of a sea based force. the u. s. proposal env1saces a force or approximately 25 surface vessels equipped tdth 8 Polaris type missiles onCh. The u. s. has produced a detailed feasibility study of this force and has appointed special Ambassador Livincston I:IGrchant trlith a team to tour UA.TO capi ... tals on request and brief notional authoriti.es on tho major aspects of tho proposal. Ue understand that tho Uost German Govern- u.s. Government or its l·r.i.llingness to take part in a HATO !-1ultilateral lluclear Force. The British Goverrunent is reluctant to play other than a minor role in this foreo and the USA is ensnced in trying to porouade the British to take n larger role. Italy ho.s indicated an interest but it clear, af'ter the r3oent election results, this is otill ment has now officially ·informed the the ease. Greece and Turkoy have indicated a t·Iillingness to take but are not 1n t\ position to malce financial contribution. Tho Belgians have indicated an interest and, to a extent,. so have the Dutch but until a neu ·Dutch Government is formed tnere is no official Dutch position. The French do not tr.ish to talte part nor do the Danes and Horueeians. Some of the argumanta for and against Canadian participation in the J;aF are: tor Cang.d!in s:up:eort. l) Tho proposal to establish the ll.LF is an is.aginative idea tthich by eneourag:Lt\s _a oupra.. nationa1 force l'lithin the Alliance could go soma tray to creating a nel-1 basis for defence co-opera• t ion in the tJest. 2) The experionce gained in I.UJ? could have important implications for U. the peace-keeping machinery an4 the 'establishment o! the I·ILF could provide useful experience in any •.. /J 000041 �.. .. .-3future international arcs control organization. ; ) Canadian participation in the I!iLF might provide . Canada td.th a "1orth11hile military contri• bution tlithin liATO in the 1970' a. tJhether or not this '-rould be the case tJould require detailed l;ltudy by the Department of National Defence. 4) In vieH o£ the strong commitment to the establishment of the on the part of President Kennedy and the USA Administration, Canadian lack of interest in participating in the .force could have an adverse effect on other areas of Canadian-U.s.· defence co-operation. 5) German agreement to take part in the I!iLF and contribute substantially to it will encourage unity within the Alliance and o£tset to some extent French efforts to establish a n11ttle Europe" under French leadership. 6) has a requirement for a land• based HftBi.1 force and the HLF although not land.. based l1ould go some l'ray to meet this request. Argumep.ta aga!p.st Canf+<!!an SUJ2po[-,;. l) Since all nuclear weapons systems are extremely expensive, the sharing or the financial burden o£ a NATO force vrill raise a major issue for the Alliance. Even i£ a basis for financial arrang&"!lent s can be agrQed to in terms o£ current or knotm systems it is · increasingly difficult to forecast future requirements for modernization and replaceoent. Precise 1Y.formation is, on long ter.m costs but the current USA esttmate of total cost is 0500 n annually £or ten years; a national share is 05 z,l annually. · 2) It is by no means clear at this time bOlf the force tdll fit into the NATO Alliance nor indeed is there any assurance that this novel concept can be translated into an effective military force. 3) The French Government is quite opposed to the establishment of the MLF and it is questionable whether at this time it is l"lorth pro• ceeding rdth a policy t1hieh risks a further split in the Alliance. 4) t1est Germany's position in the will give it an extremely important say in the nuclear policy of the Alliance and it is for consideration whether it is in the interests of NATO to give the tlest Germans such an important role in the force. 5) The Soviet Union has indicated that it regards the )fi..F as an absolute increase in Uestern .•• /4 000042 �- 4- S ECRET strategic power which has in it the seeds of an independent German nuclear capability.. Extreme Soviet reaction to the establishment of the MLF is a risk that must be taken into account. 6) . · Participants in the MLF may be 'Ulltlble to spend the additional funds which be re• quired to meet their conventional force goals. ,, 7) It is for consideration 1fbether the l'lest is ready at this stage for the abandonment of national sovereignty to the extent vhat tdll be required if an r..lLF is established. June 3, 196.3. 000043 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW03692 Title A name given to the resource "A NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF)" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO - Nuclear weapons - Policy - NATO long term planning," RG25-A-3-b, vol 5960, file 50219-AL-2-40, part 9-1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 3-Jun-63 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/9ca226c202dcdb54bfdde48421b889c7.pdf e5cdb107647283b7691878f54a5d5dec PDF Text Text From: To: Date: Subject: Diane Chartrand \ Charette, Janice; Dickenson, Lawi ; Fit 10/1/01 5:50PM Ad Hoc Committee of Ministers on Public Security al lagh Anti Terrorism As you may be aware the PM approved the creation of this Ad Hoc Committee on Friday. You will attached a draft mandate letter to Minister Manley who is the Chaiy of the Ad Hoc Committee for, your comments. / / Please do not hesitate to contact me should you need more inform; Diane Chartrand Appareil gouvernemental/Machinery of Government 957-5236 CC: Fadden, Richard; Juneau, (CO 1 000001 �SECRET Dear Colleague. I am writing you concerning the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee of Ministers on Public Security and Anti Terrorism which I would like you to chair. The Ad Hoc Committee will be a forum for Ministers to consider the measures to address immediate challenges facing the government in the area of public security and in our relations with the United States and to develop a longer term strategy to deal with these on-going issues. The government acted rapidly in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States to ensure the safety of Canadians and to assist the American government and its citizens. Canadians’ confidence in their own safety and security has been shaken by this new threat. It has also called into question certain aspects of Canada's relations with the United States, including the issue of border safety. It will be important that the government finds means to address these concerns. The Honourable John Manley Minister of Foreign Affairs Room 418-N, Centre Block House of Commons Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0A6 000002 �-2- SECRET Consequently, I would ask yojzfo lead a review of policies, legislation, regulations am|Jprograms'across government, required to develop a public security and anti terrorism strategy: to address issues related to the safety and security of Canadians in a way that respects Canadians value; and to identify pressures in the Canada-US relationships, including appropriate measures to ensure a smooth flow of people and goods across the Canada-US border. More specifically, to address issues related to the safety and security of Canadians, the Ad Hoc Committee will need to, inter alia: review the nature and extent of the comprehensive threat to Canadians posed by terrorism; assess the current capacity to address this threat, identify gaps, and recommend options to fill those gaps; identify vulnerability of key institutions and infrastructure that might need enhanced protection, and develop proposals regarding how best, working with provincial and local authorities, to assure their security; assess opportunities to work in partnership with the voluntary and private sectors; monitor, through public opinion polling, the effect on Canadians’ sense of safety and security and public confidence, and develop recommendations on how to communicate with Canadians about those concerns; identify ways of keeping terrorists out of Canada, and preventing the financing and support of terrorism; and assess the differentiated impact of recent events on Canadians depending on their ethnicity or religious affiliation, and develop recommendations on approaches to promote tolerance and greater cohesion in Canadian society. 000003 �-3- SECRET In order to identify the pressures in the Canada-US relationship and the appropriate measures to ensure a smooth flow of people and goods across the Canada-US border, it will be necessary for the Ad Hoc Committee to: identify immediate US concerns, particularly on border management, track developments in their approach, assess extent to which Canada shares these concerns, and propose measures to address them; explore ways of increasing efficiencies within a tighter security framework; compare existing immigration and refugee policies of Canada and the US, and identify ways of ensuring comparable standards of scrutiny; and explore the current security and intelligence relationship between Canada and the US, and make recommendations regarding areas where Canada might develop specialized expertise/capacity. I would ask that you initiate the work of Ad Hoc Committee as soon as possible, so as to be able to provide me with a preliminary report and a briefing to full Cabinet by no later than December 2001. Thej^vTew of the existing policies, legislation, regulations „ ^ndTTrograms^cross government and the development of a strategy to* address issues related to the safety and security of Canadians and to Canada-US relations will necessitate dedicated and concerted attention from a considerable number of portfolios. Along with yourself, I am asking the following Ministers to participate: the Minister of Transport, given his responsibility to set and enforce security standards for Canada’s air, land and water transportation systems; the Minister of Finance, because of the fiscal implicate the strategy; of the Minister of National Defence, who has responsibility for the Canadian military; 000004 �-4- SECRET the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, given her responsibility for providing legal advice and services regarding security and intelligence issues and for her role in ensuring the legality of security and intelligence activities; the Solicitor General, given that his department is the primary policy centre for the coordination of issues related to security and public safety and is responsible for the National Counter-Terrorism Plan; the Minister of National Revenue, in light of his responsibility for the movement of goods across the border; the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, given the need to consider the relationship with the provinces and territories on these issues before the Ad Hoc Committee; and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration for her responsibility for the movement of people across the border. To give proper consideration to these security and antiterrorism issues will require significant commitments of time and energy by all members. I would encourage you to challenge your colleagues to devote the time commensurate with the level of complexity of these issues. I would also suggest that you challenge your colleagues to think broadly on these issues, with an open mind and a willingness to explore different options to develop a strategy to address the immediate challenges facing the government in the area of public security. Material will come to the Ad Hoc Committee^ft^r having been considered by a Deputy Minister level CommitteeTepresenting the same departmental portfolio. This will ensure that the material considered by the Ad Hoc Committee of Ministers has been properly developed and incorporates a range of views. In recognition of the enormity of the task and the large amount of information that the Ad Hoc Committee of Ministers will need to consider during a short time frame, and the coordination of Departmental efforts required, a dedicated team of officials has been established in the Security and Intelligence Secretariat within PCO to provide policy and secretariat support to you in your role as Chair. 000005 �-5- SECRET Owing to the extreme sensitivities surrounding these issues, I would ask that you treat all material handled by the Ad Hoc Committee with particular care. It may also be the case that some material might occasionally only be for the eyes of Ministers and Deputies. I am sending a similar letter to your colleagues who will be participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. Yours sincerely, 000006 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNE00046 Title A name given to the resource "Ad Hoc Committee of Ministers on Public Security and Anti Terrorism," email from Diane Chartrand to Janice Charette, Lawrence Dickenson, Oonagh Fitzergald. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 01-Oct-01 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived PCO A-2022-00398 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource PCO Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Global War on Terror Description An account of the resource September 13, 2001 Meeting - Planning for Day of Mourning and Motion in the House Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/109736304f1989e97867eacf849e4b7b.pdf 1c4fe63d978e231fa5fd54b6be134401 PDF Text Text Draft - Secret DRAFT - SECRET Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to Cabinet Presentation to Cabinet September 25, 2001 Canada •Bonjour. •J’aimerais brievement mettre les choses en contexte afin de faciliter vos discussions sur la maniere dont le gouvernement pourrait traiter la question de la securite publique qui figure dans son plan d'action. 1 000088 �Draft - Secret DRAFT - SECRET Advancing Public Safety ■ Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to Cabinet Presentation to Cabinet September 25, 2001 Canada •Bonjour. •J’aimerais brievement mettre les choses en contexte afin de faciliter vos discussions sur la maniere dont le gouvernement pourrait traiter la question de la securite publique qui figure dans son plan d’action. La (K VCf? f o 1 000090 �Draft - Secret DRAFT - SECRET Governmentobjectives • Overall Agenda - innovation, environment, Aboriginals and development assistance • Public Safety dimension • Balanced approach Canada 2 •The Speech from the Throne sets out an agenda for the mandate. September 11 does not change the agenda. For instance, •Innovation remains essential to Canada’s prosperity •Developing an integrated response to environmental challenges remains a governmental priority, as is addressing Aboriginal basic needs, and, •Improving development assistance effectiveness is essential to reducing impoverishment and contributes to a better, safer world •While Public safety has taken on a higher profile, progress on all aspects of the agenda is needed. •What may have changed is the pace at which the government can deliver on all its priorities. 2 000091 �s.15(1) Draft - Secret i; Aftermath of September 1J • Uncertain, evolving, volatile environment - Changing public safety threat • risk of further attacks, including in Canada - US and world response • scope of effort, friend or foe loyalty test, world reaction, regional instability - Public opinion • debate over implications for Canadians, and desired Canadian response - Economic repercussions • compound already weak North American economy, concerns about border access, fiscal pressure — - Canada - US relationship • both economic and political t < yTake time to fully understand changing environment. L 3 •The Canadian response to the new security environment will take place in a context of uncertainty and volatility. There is the possibility of further attacks,including in Canada. •There remains uncertainty about the scope of the US response, the nature of their loyalty test (which will vary by country), how world reaction will evolve in response to new events, and the impacts on regional stability (e.g., in Pakistan). •Among Canadians, there is a debate underway touching on core values. Canadians are asking what the new environment means for their personal safety and that of their families. •Unease stemming from the terrorist attacks and slowdowns at the border adds to the already high degree of uncertainty surrounding the short-term economic outlook. •The challenge in this environment will be to respond to immediate pressures for action without prejudicing longer-term responses. 3 000092 �s.15(1) Draft - Secret DRAFT - SECRET 8 Securite publique - Objects • Securite publique : aspect essentiel de notre qualite de vie • Societe vivant en securite - menace reduite de terrorisme • Maintien de notre cohesion sociale Canada 4 4 000093 �Draft - Secret DRAFT - SECRET • Mesures deja enclenchees • Securite accrue • Aide aux E.-U. Canada 5 •Les mesures prises en reaction aux evenements du 11 septembre ont ete immediates et bien coordonnees. •Les ministeres et les organismes responsables ont vite resserre les mesures de securite dans les aeroports, accru la vigilance aux postes frontiere et repondu aux demandes d’aide des Etats-Unis Qe pense ici a nos ingenieurs ayant une expertise structurelie). •Ces mesures sont toujours en place, mais on ne pourra pas maintenir indefiniment ce haut niveau d'alerte. •Nous nous concentrons maintenant sur I'adaptation de notre cadre de securite publique en fonction des nouvelles realites. •J’aimerais vous faire part de nos premieres reflexions a ce sujet. 5 000094 �Draft - Secret DRAFT - SECRET Fi’ --Z ‘ ■■ . .• ’ ' -a - : ■'''' r " '••.I ^•Measures tp Enhance Public Safety ’ ■fc • Legislation already in Parliament - Immigration and Refugee Protection - Customs - Criminal Code amendments • Legislation ready for introduction - Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act - Citizenship Act amendments • Operational measures Canada 6 • There is legislation now in Parliament to bolster Canada’s public safety environment. •The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act would include new grounds of inadmissibility, streamline the certificate process for removing security threats and provide front-end security screening. •Amendments to the Customs Act would facilitate economic flows while focussing on high risk areas, while changes to the Criminal Code will enhance the tools available to law enforcement officers to deal with crime and terrorist activities. •As well, there are new legislative initiatives that can be accelerated. •Amendments to the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act will provide clearer statutory authority to support security measures for foreign missions and intergovernmental meetings in Canada, and amendments to the Citizenship Act will provide the minister with new authority to annul citizenship obtained under false pretenses. •Other operational measures that could be considered include among others, extending a high level of alert at all ports of entry, the expansion of integrated border enforcement teams and stricter document control for passports. 6 000095 �Draft - Secret DRAFT - SECRET t v Med i u m Term Measures to Enhance PubIic Safety • New legislation (Omnibus?) - Could be ready before Christmas • Canada Evidence Act amendments and Official Secrets Act reform • Charities Registration Act and Proceeds of Crime Act amendments • Ratification of UN conventions - Could be ready in the New Year • Anti-terrorism provisions in the Criminal Code • Aeronautics Act amendments • Export and Import Permits Act • Other measures - At the border, domestic/inland and overseas Canada 7 •Ministers may want to consider other legislative initiatives that could be packaged as one or more omnibus bills to sustain efforts to improve public safety and support the fight against terrorism, including: •Amendments to the Canada Evidence Act to provide increased protection to sensitive information used in judicial proceedings; reform of the Official Secrets Act to address intelligence gathering activities by foreign states and terrorist groups and to deal with unauthorized disclosures of sensitive information; changes to the Charities Registration Act to address the abuse of charitable donations to fund terrorist activities; and, amendments to the Proceeds ofCrime Act to Fintrac to deal more effectively with terrorist financing activities. •Parliament could also ratify the U.N. Terrorist Bombing Convention, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing, and the Transnational Organized Crime Convention-, •The government might also introduce new anti-terrorism provisions for the Criminal Code, and amendments to the Aeronautics Act to increase ability to issue emergency orders, and tighter import and export controls. •Other operational measures could be considered including increased intelligence collection, and expanded activities for CSIS and National Defence to fight terrorism, as well as measures to improve information gathering and sharing at the border, enhance transportation security regulations, and support for a new fraud resistant permanent resident card and new passport document could be considered. 7 000096 �s.15(1) Draft - Secret DRAFT-SECRET r Considerations • Balance with the rest of the agenda - Need for comprehensive public safety framework to guide the response to the new public safety environment • Demonstrate federal leadership • Balance between individual rights and collective security - Canadian values of openness, tolerance and respect • Fiscal impact of policy choices Canada 8 •In deciding on how and when the government will want to move on these options, you may wish to take into account a number of important considerations: •There is a balance to be struck with the rest of the agenda. A comprehensive public safety framework might be necessary to effectively address the issues arising from September 11 and the new security environment. •This is a time when Canadians are looking for federal leadership to organize Canada’s response and to assure their safety. •Policy decisions may require balancing individual rights with collective security. • The fiscal situation will require careful choices to move forward on the government’s broader agenda while addressing public safety issues. 8 000097 �Draft - Secret Canada 9 000098 �Draft - Secret DRAFT - SECRET Advancing Public Safety Canada •Good morning. •I would like to provide a brief context for your discussions today on how the government might proceed with the public safety element of its agenda. (. 1 000099 �Draft - Secret DRAFT - SECRET Government Objectives • Overall Agenda - innovation, environment, Aboriginals and development assistance • Public Safety dimension • Balanced approach Canada 2 •The Speech from the Throne sets out an agenda for the mandate. September 11 does not change the agenda. For instance, •Innovation remains essential to Canada’s prosperity •Developing an integrated response to environmental challenges remains a governmental priority, as is addressing Aboriginal basic needs, and, •Improving development assistance effectiveness is essential to reducing impoverishment and contributes to a better, safer world •While Public safety has taken on a higher profile, progress on all aspects of the agenda is needed. •What may have changed is the pace at which the government can deliver on all its priorities. 2 000100 �s.15(1) Draft - Secret Aftermath of September 11 • Uncertain, evolving, volatile environment - Changing public safety threat • risk of further attacks, including in Canada - US and world response • scope of effort, friend or foe loyalty test, world reaction, regional instability - Public opinion • debate over implications for Canadians, and desired Canadian response - Economic repercussions • compound already weak North American economy, concerns about border access, fiscal pressure - Canada - US relationship • both economic and political Take time to fully understand changing environment I 3 •The Canadian response to the new security environment will take place in a context of uncertainty and volatility. There is the possibility of further attacks,including in Canada. •There remains uncertainty about the scope of the US response, the nature of their loyalty test (which will vary by country), how world reaction will evolve in response to new events, and the impacts on regional stability (e.g., in Pakistan). •Among Canadians, there is a debate underway touching on core values. Canadians are asking what the new environment means for their personal safety and that of their families. •Unease stemming from the terrorist attacks and slowdowns at the border adds to the already high degree of uncertainty surrounding the short-term economic outlook. •The challenge in this environment will be to respond to immediate pressures for action without prejudicing longer-term responses. 3 000101 �s.15(1) Draft - Secret DRAFT - SECRET Public Safety Objectives • Public safety is integral to the quality of life for all Canadians • Safe and secure society - reduced threat of terrorism • Maintain Canadian social cohesion • Reinforce our special relationship with US, including an open border Canada 4 •Public safety has always been part of the broader quality of life agenda for Canadians. The SFT referred to the importance of safe and secure communities. Canada’s objectives on public safety are clean •To address the threat to Canadians; •To act in a way that upholds Canadian values and social cohesion; and, 4 000102 �Draft - Secret DRAFT - SECRET Immediate Response • Actions Taken • Enhanced security • Assistance to the U.S. Canada 5 •Actions have already been taken to manage the situation arising out of the September 11 events. •Responsible departments and agencies moved quickly to tighten security measures in airports, increase vigilance at the border, and respond to US requests for assistance. •These measures remain in place, although it will be difficult to sustain high levels of alertness indefinitely. •We have now turned our attention to adapting the public safety framework in light of the new environment. •I would like to share with you some of the early thinking. 5 000103 �Draft - Secret DRAFT - SECRET Measures to Enhance Public Safety • Legislation already in Parliament - Immigration and Refugee Protection - Customs - Criminal Code amendments • Legislation ready for introduction - Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act - Citizenship Act amendments • Operational measures Canada 6 • There is legislation now in Parliament to bolster Canada’s public safety environment. •The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act would include new grounds of inadmissibility, streamline the certificate process for removing security threats and provide front-end security screening. •Amendments to the Customs Act would facilitate economic flows while focussing on high risk areas, while changes to the Criminal Code will enhance the tools available to law enforcement officers to deal with crime and terrorist activities. •As well, there are new legislative initiatives that can be accelerated. •Amendments to the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act will provide clearer statutory authority to support security measures for foreign missions and intergovernmental meetings in Canada, and amendments to the Citizenship Act will provide the minister with new authority to annul citizenship obtained under false pretenses. •Other operational measures that could be considered include among others, extending a high level of alert at all ports of entry, the expansion of integrated border enforcement teams and stricter document control for passports. 6 000104 �Draft - Secret DRAFT - SECRET Medium Term Measures to Enhance Public Safety • New legislation (Omnibus?) - Could be ready before Christmas • Canada Evidence Act amendments and Official Secrets Act reform • Charities Registration Act and Proceeds of Crime Act amendments • Ratification of UN conventions - Could be ready in the New Year • Anti-terrorism provisions in the Criminal Code • Aeronautics Act amendments • Export and Import Permits Act • Other measures - At the border, domestic/inland and overseas Canada 7 •Ministers may want to consider other legislative initiatives that could be packaged as one or more omnibus bills to sustain efforts to improve public safety and support the fight against terrorism, including: •Amendments to the Canada Evidence Act to provide increased protection to sensitive information used in judicial proceedings; reform of the Official Secrets Act to address intelligence gathering activities by foreign states and terrorist groups and to deal with unauthorized disclosures of sensitive information; changes to the Charities Registration Act to address the abuse of charitable donations to fund terrorist activities; and, amendments to the Proceeds of Crime Act to Fintrac to deal more effectively with terrorist financing activities. •Parliament could also ratify the U.N. Terrorist Bombing Convention, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing, and the Transnational Organized Crime Convention-, •The government might also introduce new anti-terrorism provisions for the Criminal Code, and amendments to the Aeronautics Act to increase ability to issue emergency orders, and tighter import and export controls. •Other operational measures could be considered including increased intelligence collection, and expanded activities for CSIS and National Defence to fight terrorism, as well as measures to improve information gathering and sharing at the border, enhance transportation security regulations, and support for a new fraud resistant permanent resident card and new passport document could be considered. 7 000105 �Draft - Secret DRAFT - SECRET Considerations • Balance with the rest of the agenda - Need for comprehensive public safety framework to guide the response to the new public safety environment • Demonstrate federal leadership • Balance between individual rights and collective security - Canadian values of openness, tolerance and respect • Fiscal impact of policy choices • Balance bilateral (Canada/US) and multilateral actions Canada 8 •In deciding on how and when the government will want to move on these options, you may wish to take into account a number of important considerations: •There is a balance to be struck with the rest of the agenda. A comprehensive public safety framework might be necessary to effectively address the issues arising from September 11 and the new security environment. •This is a time when Canadians are looking for federal leadership to organize Canada’s response and to assure their safety. •Policy decisions may require balancing individual rights with collective security. • The fiscal situation will require careful choices to move forward on the government’s broader agenda while addressing public safety issues. •Canada’s approach to public safety must maintain and enhance our economic linkages with the US and reinforce multilateral approaches that are key to advancing Canada’s foreign policy interests. 8 000106 �Draft - Secret Canada 9 000107 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNE00043 Title A name given to the resource "Advancing Public Safety" Clerk's Presentation Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 25-Sep-01 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived PCO A-2022-00555 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource PCO Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Global War on Terror Description An account of the resource September 25, 2001 Cabinet Meeting - Background Material and Briefing Book Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/3d4ba06c665d3b24c464ab9e656fa0a8.pdf 3f1d355970deda4c3d77aa2026e50d22 PDF Text Text A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 *' 0 " /< S _E C R E T cse isss=9 AIDE MEMOIRE Lead Times lo Decisions have been made to equip the Canadian Forces with various nuclear weapons carriers, namely? (a) Bomarc air defence missiles, in Canada (b) CF 104 strike aircraft, in Europe (c) Honest John surface-to-surface missiles, in Europeo In addition, aircraft now in service with the RCN and RCAF can be readily modified to employ nuclear anti-submarine weaponso 2-o To provide complete weapon systems of this nature it is necessary to° (a) Produce the carriers (b) Construct the base facilities (c) Provide and train personnel (d) Provide release and control communications (e) Arrange for provision of the warheads Cf) Provide administrative support. Considerable progress has been made in some of these areas„ However the point has now been reached where, in varying degrees, further progress is being impeded by the absence of a clear-cut understanding with the United States to acquire nuclear weapons, if required, for use by the Canadian Forces„ 3o Arrangements for the warheads require a formal government-to-government agreement with the US covering the general principles involved, and detailed technical agreements with the appropriate US field commander0 Such agreements are also necessary if we are to acquire the information we need to complete the other features of the weapons systemso Existing agreements with the US covering the exchange of nuclear information are based on the "need to know" principleo This is becoming increasingly difficult to establish in the absence of a definite understanding on Canadian intentions, and this in turn has resulted in the situation outlined hereunder„ 4o The first squadron of CF 104 aircraft will arrive at its operational base in Germany in December 1962= A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 wr* S E C R E T 5o The Bomarc bases at North Bay and La Macaza are planned to be operational'in July 1962 and December 1962 respectively^ 60 The HONEST JOHN battery launching equipment will be delivered in July this year, and is planned to become operational in Europe early in 1962. 7o The RON and RCAF now have aircraft in service whieh could be readily modified to use nuclear anti-submarine weaponso So However, in the case of each of these weapons systems, if they are in fact to be operationally ready, the following preparatory steps must be taken in addition to making arrangements for the provision of the warheads themselves s (a) Construction ofs (i) special ammunition storage sites (ii) special alert facilities (iii) assembly and maintenance buildings (iv) protective facilities <, •(b) Installation of special release and control communications for the use of the governments concernedo (c) Provision and training of personnel for protection, handling and use of nuclear weapons. (d) Incorporation, in the weapon carrier, of an approved capability for the carriage and release of nuclear weapons<, (e) Provision of facilities and administrative support for US custodial detachment on Canadian bases„ 9° The completion of the above steps is dependent upon the availability of more information than we now have, and o n the working out of detailed requirements with the US field commanders concerned0 Both of these things are in turn dependent upon our reaching an understanding with the US on the general principles which would apply to the question of nuclear weapons for the Canadian Forees0 It is clear that much time will be needed to acquire the necessary information, to work out the detailed technical arrangements, to train personnel, and to construct the various special facilitieso 10o In view of the planned operational dates given above it is stressed that any further delay in reaching a general o oo J A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 - 3 =• S E C R E T agreement will result in a corresponding delay in the dates when the Canadian units will in fact be operationally readyo 12o In addition to these direct Canadian interests, it should also be realized that the US financial commitments in respect of the BOMARC missiles, launchers and associated technical support amounts to approximately $71M0 exclusive of the costs of the warheads0 A lead-time in the order of a full year is necessary for the scheduling of production programmes for some of the weapons earmarked for Canadian use, and in fairness to the US authorities more positive assurance than now exists should be given to support them in these production programmes0 15 May 61 A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 000285 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00273 Title A name given to the resource "Aide Memoire: Lead Times - Nuclear Weapons" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Acquisition And Storage Of Nuclear Weapons For Canadian Forces In Canada And Europe," RG24-B-1, vol 21440, file CSC 1888:9, part 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 15-May-61 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/96165e737dd42173c4bd579bb7ef6bed.pdf 766e9e72eaf4d20f174a30c5b7830ebb PDF Text Text IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTI .CSC.?.,21.0$.0.1 department of JSattonal defence ATTACH?SECRET CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE CANADA ADDRE8S REPLY TO. SECRETARY CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE, OTTAWA. 20 October 1961 Chairman, Chiefs of Staff CAS CNS CGS CDRB Aide Memo-ire Provision of MRBMs for NATO Shield Forces 1, Attached for your information is a copy of a paper prepared by the JS/DSS concerning the above subject, dated 18 Oct 61, McPhee) lander, RCN Acting Secretary c c DM JS/DSS (less attachment) �SECRET as§c / i7 ¥e • •* -•*-• s-y ILSL. iXj/f-/ CSC 2195-4 (JS/DSS) 18 Oct 6 1 J o i n t Staff Aide-Memoire on PROVISION OF MREM-S'frQR NATO SHIEID FORCES 18 Sep 6 1 In the North Atlantic Cottneil9 the Secretary General urged Governments to take final positions on the end=1966 force requirements in order to give real meaning to the triennial review procedure. In the course of discussions on military strategy, Turkey in particular emphasized that the fringes of the Alliance were not expendable and must be defended from the outset with all possible weapons. UK proposed that the Council continue to work on the problem of whether or not the existing political directive and strategic concept were still applicableo It was argued that shield forces should complement strategic forces not duplicate them. UK authorities were not anxious to adopt weapons for shield forces which could reach deep into enemy territory and could affect the enemy's civilian population,. For that reason, UK authorities accorded very low priority to the provision of MRBMs. USA indicated that it believed the importance of long term planning had been overtaken by the urgent need to bring into being immediately the forces necessary to deal with the developing Berlin crisis. It was stated that **the USA has withheld its comments in the Military Committee on the proposed MC-96 requirements because these requirements call for major new weapons programmes. Particularly j, the MRBMs pose basic political, strategic and resource questions that are difficult to resolve and which require extensive further consideration. As soon as planning for the Berlin crisis has been completed, attention should again be directed to these questions'*a USA then proposed a resolution the operative portion of which reads as follows? North Atlantic Council oo°ooo.. requests the Military Committee, in its action on NATO Commanders proposed 1966 requirements, to develop an agreed statement of priorities to govern the development of country programmes by the NATO Military Commanders, in accordance with the triennial review procedure, which would accord high priority to enhancing NATO non-nuclear ground/air capabilities in the forward areas of Allied Command Europe. Pending further guidance from the Council, the Military Committee should defer action on the NATO Commanders proposed requirements for MRBMs and SSN(B)si o o o o o o o e DND supported the development of priorities but suggested that the resolution be amended so as to make clear that nuclear capability must not be neglectedo 26 Sep 61 Council gave further consideration to the problem of NATO planning. At this HBetiag, UK agreed to postponement of the discussions on long term aimso The question of provision of MRBMs was again raised. Norway indicated that it was confused by the USA wishing to defer consideration of NATO's military need for MRBMs, since a decision on this matter would have considerable influence on national defence programmes over the coming years. USA stated that its government simply wished to reserve judgement on land based weapons in the 1,500 mile range category. At the same time, USA was interested in seeking to find out what kind of force NATO needed over the next five years which, at one and the same time, would deter USSR attack and yet avoid offering 8/2 ' ]V001337 M ^ �- 2 - SECRET oo^y one"choice in the event of such an attack = the choice of a major conflict involving nuclear weapons. "USA believed that the Alliance needed great power in its weapons, that it should have the capability to prevent the overrunning of NATO territory and that its forces should be so disposed as to minimize the risk of accidental war. He also stated that the heavy sense of responsibility and problems of control of nuclear weapons required the attention of the "highest officials of the US government and they simply did not have the time required to devote their minds to this problem at the same time as they were dealing with the Berlin build-up. West Germany put the most pointed question with respect to the triennial review process* It asked if there would be any real value in discussing the end-1966 force requirements if MRBMs were to be removed from them0 and suggested that what would be left would be a torso without valueo 30 Sep 61 A draft revision of a proposed Council resolution (P©/6l/779) concerning end-1966 force requirements, prepared by the international staff to replace the US draft resolution, was passed to the Canadian representative. The operative portion read as follows? B The North Atlantic Council ........ requests the Military Committee, in its action on NATO Commanders0 proposed 1966 requirementss (a) to ensure that the end-1966 requirements are in line with the high priority which the Council considers should be devoted to NATO non-nuclear capabilities without prejudicing the continuing existence of an effective nuclear capability for NATO forcesj (b) to defer, pending further guidance ffom the Council^, action on the NATO Commanders5 proposed requirements for MRBMs and SSN(B)sJ- ......... DND suggested that (a) be amended to permit build-up- of nuclear capability in accordance with current programmes to which NATO is already committed. ay. KS>A6l This draft resolution (F0/6l/779) was considered by the Council in restricted session. It became clear, as a result of substantial amendments which were proposed, that much wider issues were in question than simply the end-1966 requirements. At the suggestion of the Secretary General, consideration of the subject was deferred until some more acceptable solution could be developed. In addition to amendments proposed by USA, UK and France, a West German amendment to para (b) was put forward reading as follows % w (b) to ensure that action is taken on NATO Commanders8 proposed requirements for MRBMs and SSN(B)s and at the same times (i) to investigate the problem which would result for the defence of the area of Allied Command Europe by a delay in the introduction of MRBMs, (ii) to examine if there is any alternative to the introduction of MRBMs, (iii) to request SACEUR again to give his views on the MRBM problem.® .../3 001338 �- 3 - SECRET In support of its amendment, West Germany argued that NATO Commanders required these weapons and any postponement of them would detract seriously from the credibility of the deterrent. The USSR was" increasing its nuclear potential? so too should NATO forces. MRBMs represented a decisive factor in the survival of "other NATO strike forces. The requirements put forward by NATO Military Commanders represented "a balanced entity. A statement of force requirements without MRBMs would be a hollow shell. 15 Oct 61 In order to clarify some previous External Affairs statements, the Canadian representative pointed out to that Department that it was somewhat misleading to suggest that NATO decisions on the positioning of MRBMs in Western Europe have been deferred. MRBMs are already in position in Western Europe (e.g. in Italy, Greece, Turkey and UK). It is not these MRBMs but the additional MRBMs proposed in the end-1966 requirements which are under discussion and on which the USA is proposing to defer a decision. The German representative has opposed deferral. Other representatives have gone on record that their support of deferral of decision is not to be taken as an indication that their governments would eventually decide against the provision of these MRBMs. All that could be said at the moment therefore was that the provision of additional MRBMs for Western Europe remained under consideration. In the same message, in reference to an earlier External Affairs suggestion, the Canadian representative concluded that there is'no reasonable basis for assuming that a bargain involving a prohibition on the stationing of MRBMs on both sides of the Iron Curtain could be struck at this time. He pointed out that the installation of such weapons on NATO European territory would provide a better balance of missile capabilities between the opposing sides. 16 Oct 61 The Secretariat produced a new draft resolution on end-1966 force goals which may be discussed early next week. The operative portion of this latest draft reads8 w The North Atlantic Council „..0.0... requests the Military Committee, in its action on NATO Commanders' proposed 1966 requirementss (a) to ensure that the end-1966 requirements take into account the necessary increase of conventional forces without prejudicing the development and maintenance of the nuclear capability essential to NATO forces % (b) to note that consideration of the proposals of the NATO Commanders for MRBMs and SSN(B)s has not progressed far enough for decision at this times w O . O O O O O O O This draft resolution does not reflect th® proposed West German amendment but it does remove any suggestion that consideration of MRBMs has been shelved.. DND finds this acceptable. The Secretary General has discussed with SACEUR the ramifications of deferral of MRBMs in relation to the revised force requirements and the financial implications. SACEUR has indicated that the need still exists for certain targets of concern to his Command to be engaged by missiles and that discussions are going on to decide if such targets could be taken care of by different agencies. There were three ways of dealing with the targets: (a) by use of SAC forces, (b) by forces available to US CINCEUR, (c) by NATO MRBMs. // 001339 �m - 4- SECRET A. preliminary attempt has been made by the international staff to estimate the cost of the total MRBM programme as'proposed by SACEUR in the end-1966 requirements. The estimate was in the region of $1.-5 billion but no expenditure would be required before late 1964 or early 1965. SUMMARY Of the three draft resolutions prepared for consideration by the Council since 18 Sep 6l, the first two recommended that action be deferred on the proposed requirements for MRBMs and SSN(B)s and the third, which is about to be considered, recommends only that the Military Committee wnote that consideration of the proposals of the NATO Commanders for MRBMs and SSN(B)s has not progressed far enough for decision at this time". The UK and USA have supported deferment. The majority of the remaining nations support deferment with considerable reservation. West Germany strongly advocates th® acquisition of MRBMs by shield forces as soon as possible. DND has been striving to ensure that MRBMs in so far as they represent build-up of NATO nuclear capability, are not shelved, although it is appreciated that action on the remaining end-1966 requirements should not be held up pending solution, of the complex political aspects of the MRBM question© 001340 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04396 Title A name given to the resource "Aide Memoire: Provision of MRBMs for NATO Shield Forces" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO Cooperation Regarding Nuclear Weapons And Missile Bases (IRBM)," RG24-B-1, vol 21468, file CSC 2108:1, part 4, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 20-Oct-61 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/38a0ca0e5f52d72c7457d18bcf4b4f05.pdf bf71873e7083e7b4a6d64b3854927d59 PDF Text Text 1600064 C#C01888!9 Pt. 3 SECRET COPY AIDE MEMOIRE 17 Dec 63 RCAF-USAFE N e g o t i a t i o n s on CF-104- Nuclear Agreement 1 Service-to-Service negotiations with USAFE were opened with the receipt by the RCAF of a USAFE-pre pared draft agreement. The draft was v i r t u a l l y the same as the agreement negotiated with other non-US forces i n Europe and contained much t h a t was not acceptable to the RCAF. In the main, the RCAF objections centred around lack of USAFE acceptance of Canadian standards i n the general support a r e a s . 2 Two meetings have now been held with USAFE and a large measure of agreement has been reached. There i s r e a l l y only one serious paint of difference and t h i s concerns the authorization for ., use of weapons. USAFE do not wish to have included i n the agr-oo~<^oco^e^ •.moat any reference to use; t h e i r argument being t h a t the-agreement covers- only provision and custody of the weapons. The sentence in question i s - "Such weapons w i l l be used operationally when authorized by both governments only i n accordance with procedures established by SACEUR". This statement i s from the Government-to-Government agreement and, of course, bears the endorsement of the US Government; a s i m i l a r sentence i s contained i n the Bomarc and 101 Service-to-Service agreements and was accepted without argument by USAF. 3 I t could be argued t h a t the sentence i s not required i n the agreement but External Affairs i n s i s t t h a t i t be part of the agreement. The RCAF must receive endorsement from the Minister of National Defence and the Secretary of S t a t e ^ S c t e r n a l Affairs _ / , before a Service-toService agreement on nuclear weapons can be u signed. A The RCAF position i n r e l a t i o n to t h i s sentence has twice been explained to the negotiating s t a f f a t USAFE but following both meetings advice has been received t h a t USAFE i s unable to agree with inclusion of the sentence i n the Service-to-Service agreement. In an attempt^to s a t i s f y both our own p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s and USAFE/^lie^re now proposing t h a t the sentence be moved from para 3 of Section I I of the agreement and be i n s e r t e d i n Section I - Introduction as a statement of f a c t as follows; "The two governments have agreed t h a t such weapons w i l l be used operationally, when authorized by both governments, only i n accordance with procedures established by SACEUR". SECRET l>* A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 3 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00355 Title A name given to the resource "Aide Memoire: RCAF-USAFE Negotiations on CF-104 Nuclear Agreement" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Acquisition And Storage Of Nuclear Weapons For Canadian Forces In Canada And Europe," RG24-B-1, vol 21440, file CSC 1888:9, part 3, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 17-Dec-63 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/9c8887a8de4e7297ba7f40fe9a6e7c1a.pdf 33a3d5177440cc5c35d79f3ae3908294 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la l o i sur I'acces a I'information RAFT S E C R E T ANNEX TO THE PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERNING THE STORAGE OF NUCLEAR AIR-TO-AIR DEFENSIVE WEAPONS AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON AIR FORCE BASE (In this Annex> unless the context otherwise requires, "Canada" means the Government of Canada, "United States" means the Government of the United States of America, "NORAD" means the North American Air Defence Command established by Canada and the United States in an Exchange of Notes dated 12 May, 1958; and "CINCNORAD" means the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD.) The weapons under consideration are such nuclear air-toair defensive weapons as may from time to time be made available to United States Forces under the operational control of CINCNORAD. 2. Ownership and custody of these weapons shall remain with the United States. They may be stored at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base, Newfoundland. The cost of the establishment, mainten- ance and operation of the storage facilities shall be the responsibility of the United States Government. 3. The United States shall provide and be responsible for the security of the storage sites in accordance with the terms of the existing agreements concerning the leased areas, i.e., the Agreement of 27 March, 1941, concerning Leased Bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base and the Exchange of Notes of 5 December, 1952, in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Goose Bay. 4. The safety procedures for maintenance, transport, loading, delivery and salvage of nuclear weapons will be at least equivalent to US standards, will conform with Canadian law and will be the subject of arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the United States and Canada, taking into consideration classified (atomic) information which can be transferred under existing agreements between the two Governments. 5- Authorization of transportation of these weapons in Canadian territory will be subject to the requirements of Canadian law. 000729 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T - 2 -• 6. The removal of these weapons for operational reasons from ihe areas utilized by United States Forces (as provided in the Agreement of 27 March, 1941, concerning Leased Bases In Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base, and the Exchange of Notes dated 5 December, 1952, in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Gosse Bay) will be in accordance with the conditions and procedures set out in the MB-1 Overflight Agreement dated 30 June, 1959, as amended by the Exchange of Notes dated 1 June, 1962. 7. The provisions of paragraph 6 above will be applied in such a manner as to permit the return of the weapons to the United States at any time at the request of the 8. United States Government. The terms of this Agreement will be reviewed by the two Governments at the request of either Government and after such review may be terminated by either Government upon six months' notice. 9. Supplementary arrangements or administrative agreements between appropriate authorities of the two Governments may be made from time to time for the purpose of carrying out the intent of this Agreement. 000730 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01836 Title A name given to the resource "Annex to the Proposed Exchange of Notes Concerning the Storage of Nuclear Air-to-Air Defensive Weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource [undated] https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/8c7c22c5761cd955f54ec0e39726506a.pdf 39e9394d9fa97d4a01c14fd79a97d9ed PDF Text Text TOP SECRET :^f 5 ) FIL: 9 / ^ . ^ . - 6 May, 1958. */*.£:/..... C.A.S. Atomic Stockpiling 1. With reference to your letter of 16 May and further to our conversation this morning, on rereading your note referred to above I find that there are no qualifications in it whatever. I would suggest that you make it quite clear to the Commander of the Air Division that no decision has been taken, or i s likely to be taken in the near future, on the r e organization of the Air Division a s proposed In MC 70. You -. will be well aware that in MC 70 the provision of the squadrons in the strike role i s not required for some y e a r s ahead, after 1960. You are a l s o well aware that we have indicated to SHAPE that we may not be able to have a decision taken this y e a r . I would draw your atteatloa to the consonants which were prepared by the Air Force oa the SHAPE Planning Guidance for 1958. I would therefore urge you t o Inform the Air Officer Commanding the Air Division of the fact that no decision has been taken, and until a decision i s taken nothing must be done which would prejudice the freedom of action of the Canadian Government in making such a decision. I fall t o see the n e c e s s i t y for informing the Commander of the Allied F o r c e s Central Europe of any intention at this t i m e . If the Commander of the Allied Forces Central Europe requires information regarding a proposed stockpile for this purpose, he should be told that no decision can be taken aad asked to Indicate where he proposes to have a stockpile, aad we would Indicate whether that stockpile would be suitable If and when Canada takes a decision. ••<?' vOriginal signed by V*Gen. Charles Foulkes %7 Copy t o : DM . (GharlorFoulhes) General, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, /-7 O 000622 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW03997 Title A name given to the resource "Atomic Stockpiling," to Hugh Campbell, Air Marshal, Chief of the Air Staff from Charles Foulkes, General, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO Cooperation Regarding Nuclear Weapons And Missile Bases (IRBM)," RG24-B-1, vol 21468, file CSC 2108:1, part 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 26-May-58 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b90605b8a9ad0d10be67a5b5bd0cca27.pdf 762ae9bbdf480e924963955cfabf3190 PDF Text Text SECRET BRIEF FOR THE CANADAIN DELEGATION TO THE NATO MEETING APRIL 1958 FILE? CSC 1764-1-15 DATE? 3 1 March 1958 5 COPY NOs SUBJECT: Intermediate Ranee Ballistic Missiles Background 1. A United States paper submitted at the time of the December 1957 meetings indicates that the United States is prepared to make available, under the United States Military Assistance Programme (grant aid or sales under terms to be worked out), several squadrons of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, to be deployed in accordance with his plans. Such deployment would, of course, be | agreed between SACEUR and the countries directly concerned. 2. The paper also indicates that the United States believes that the follow-up development and production of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles could advantageously be undertaken in Europe. If this were agreed the United States is prepared to make available, under appropriate safeguards, blue prints and other necessary data relating to the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile delivery systems. (The United States paper is attached.) Canadian Comment 3. A While this is primarily a United States/European problem Canada agrees that there is an operational requirement to deploy Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles in Europe. Canada also agtees that such deployment would be agreed between the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the countries directly concerned. �- 2 - 4-. SECRET The introduction of Intermediate Range B a l l i s t i c Missiles into Europe w i l l r a i s e the question as t o whether or not the cost of the missile s i t e s and/or the missiles themselves are e l i g i b l e for common financing. A decision i s going t o have t o be taken soon as t o the e l i g i b i l i t y of the cost of the missile s i t e s and/or the missiles for common financing - t h i s matter i s of concern t o Canada. 5. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe intends t o b r i e f the April meeting on t h i s matter. Re c ommendat ion 6. I t i s recommended t h a t Canada agree i n principle with the deployment of Intermediate Range B a l l i s t i c Missiles in Europe. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04009 Title A name given to the resource "Brief for the Canadian Delegation to the NATO Meeting April 1958: Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO Cooperation Regarding Nuclear Weapons And Missile Bases (IRBM)," RG24-B-1, vol 21468, file CSC 2108:1, part 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 31-Mar-58 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/63e03ab8faf8595a4ea211fa76542509.pdf f37003b06d87cac2a2580e382a28cb4b PDF Text Text S E C. R E T BRIEF FOR THE CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE NATO MEETING APRIL 1958 '.y FILES CSC 1764-1-15 v DATES 31 Mar 58 COPY NOs SUBJECTS NATO Atomic Stockpile Bad 1. A United States paper submitted at the time of the December 1957 meetings indicates United States willingness to deploy atomic warheads in Europe under American custody in accordance with NATO defence plans, and in agreement with the nations directly concerned. In event of hostilities these warheads, under authorization from the President, would be released to the appropriate NATO Supreme Allied Commander for employment by the nuclear-capable forces of NATO in accordance with NATO defensive plans. (The United States paper on NATO Atomic Stockpile is attached). 2. Irance also submitted a paper which indicated that decisions should be taken to accelerate implementation of the measures planned for strengthening the shield with atomic weapons, and to cover the constitution of integrated stocks of atomic warheads. The paper also advocated the distribution between members of the Alliance of essential weapons on the basis of their respective shares of responsibility. Canadian Comment 3. This subject is not of immediate concern to Ganada, however, we may have a requirement to supply missiles both to the Brigade Group and the Air Division. Canada agrees that the atomic warheads deployed in Europe should be under American custody. 4. It may be necessary for Canada to negotiate with the United Kingdom for the provision of these weapons for the Brigade Group in Germany, and with the United States for the provision of weapons fbr the Air Division. 5. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe intends to brief the April meeting on this subject. . . .2 000660 �yS - 2 1 -' •-S SECRET Re commendation 6. It is recommended that Canada should support the United States plan to stockpile atomic warheads in Europe* \ 000661 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04012 Title A name given to the resource "Brief for the Canadian Delegation to the NATO Meeting April 1958: NATO Atomic Stockpile" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO Cooperation Regarding Nuclear Weapons And Missile Bases (IRBM)," RG24-B-1, vol 21468, file CSC 2108:1, part 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 31-Mar-58 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/9fdebfea8521a05aec2dd2e71f20354c.pdf cc3ceb1a5beaaf573e391c106723d174 PDF Text Text * £ ^J /72S~-/-3 2) 3RIEFF0R THE CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMGTTEE IN CHIEFS OF STAFF SESSION JUNE 1964 SECRET CSC 2108-1 25 May 1964 COPY NO 5 REQUIREMENTS FOR BALLISTIC MISSILES IN NftTO BACKGROUND 1. In October 1959 SACEUR stated a requirement to the Standing Group> for Medium Range Ballistic Missiles to be deployed vdthin Allied Command Europe (ACE). In justification of this requirement SACEUR stated that *In face of the increasing Soviet missile threat the existing ACE strike forces will beeome increasingly vulnerable to attack and destruction on the ground before they can be brought into action. Moreover, those cruise missiles and manned aircraft which survive the initial attack will encounter increasing difficulty in penetrating the enemy defences. It follows therefore that it would be dangerous to place sole reliance upon those methods of delivery for our nuclear strike." The requirement was approved in principle by the Military Committee in March I960. 2. SACEUR's requirement has met vdth considerable opposition on the following grounds? (a) The political problems involved in control of MRBMs deployed within ACE are likely to be divisivei; (b) The deployment of such weapons within ACE could have a serious effect on East-West relations, (c) The task could be accomplished equally well by other types of strategic weapons systems deployed outside ACE. 3. As a partial alternative the United States suggested the formation of a sea-based ballistic missile force. This suggestion resulted in the current discussions aimed at the formation of the MLF which would consist of 25 surface ships mounting a total of 200 JEblaris type missiles as compared vdth SACEUR's stated requirement of 580 MRBMs. Ae The main arguments advanced in support of MRBMs within ACE as opposed to the sea-based alternative or other external forces ares (a) Such missiles provide quicker reaction to Soviet attack than would be possible if it was necessary to employ external forces; 090 0023 �SECRET (b) Such missiles have greater accuracy than other longer range missiles and can employ smaller warheads with lower weight to yield ratios which in turn would reduce the extent of collateral damage. 5. thats In contradiction of the above arguments it has been pointed out (a) Reaction time is governed not by the capabilities of the weapon system but by the time required for political decision;; (b) There is no certainty that the land-based MRBM, which is only in the early stages of development, will be any more accurate than the latest types of IRBM. HtESENT STATUS 6. At present it appears that only one member of NATO, Turkey, would be willing to accept MRBMs on its soil. Due to this lack of acceptance and the failure of the Alliance to agree on the requirement, funds available for the development of an MRBM system have been considerably reduced. 7. If the current discussions aimed at the formation of an MLF are successful this force would represent at least a partial alternative to an MRBM force within ACE. While there has been little outward progress in the formation of the MLF in recent months it is expected that United States will press the matter after the November elections. 8» In view of the above it is unlikely that any agreement on the provision of MRBMs to SACEUR could be reached at the present time. CANADIAN VIEWS 9* Canada has present at least. decided against participation in the MLF for the 0024 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04755 Title A name given to the resource "Brief for the Canadian Delegation to the North Atlantic Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session June 1964" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO Cooperation Regarding Nuclear Weapons And Missile Bases (IRBM)," RG24-B-1, vol 21470, file CSC 2108:1, part 8, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 25-May-64 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ff80f7f0e48081529490a8e65d5c71b3.pdf 05d58560a9a00f6b42713bf88a51bbd9 PDF Text Text BRIEF FOR THE CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE IN CHIEFS OF STAFF SESSION MAY 1962 . SECRET ffi PCSC 2108 ol (JPS/N) i6 Mhy 62 GOPY k) 6 MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE INTRODUCTION 0F: MRBM's pINTO'NATO '- References? In Briefs MC 99 (Draft) In Library? (a) MC 53 (Final) •(b) MCM, 8 8 ~ 6 o •(0) M C 95 BACKGROUND I, *P At their 2?th meeting,---the--MC/OS agreed? • ' -• • .* J a 0 --••^--"^edr^-"^tfe^^-"-r^<io^-^%-i-pii" of the importance from a military point of view of early Council action pn MC 95 (Military Aspects of the Control of Nuclear Weapons); bo For members of the Committee to emphasize the urgency of this problem to their respective governments in order to expedite handling\of MC 95 by; the Council; and c Directed the SGN to continue the study of the problem of the military aspects of the control of nuclear weapons after the Council has acted on MC 95. 2o This.subject has been studied by the S&N (MC 99 (-draft)) who have reached the following conclusions? a, Modernization i (i) The present organization of nuclear weapon's systems within n a t i o n a l forces i& satisfae'tqry from the m i l i t a r y point of view; (ii) The intr oduction of mobile MRBMs i s l i k e l y t o r e s u l t in complications, t h e degree of v/hich r e q u i r e s d e t a i l e d study. 000/2 .. . ? r _.,.,.. . , .. . . . . . . . ^r 000448 ^ �SECRET bo Multilateral Forces ,' ' E* "s •(•'•' (1) ,'-' Elf ari MREM. rcultilateral force i s tppbe fqrni^dsj t h e orgkni^ation a t ? l6^,v-y70,uldpp^ovide the b e ^ faiance between m i l i t a r y e f f e c t i v e n e s s and m u l t i l a t e r a l i d e n t i t y pf the fprqe; (ii) A ,mlxedfprce c o n s i s t i n g of land,.. and sea-based u n i t s WPUId offer the g r e a t e s t f l e x i b i i i t y and would have the added advantage of.allowing p c o u n t r i e s t o c o n t r i b u t e e i t h e r landbased orPsea^based u n i t s accprdingf to "their n a t i o n a l ; p r e f e r e n c e s ; (iii) M u l t i l a t e r a l c o n t r o l oyer thi^.use of MiRBMs including' m u l t i l a t e r a l ' c o n t r o l p v e r t h e r e l e a s e ( o f warheads, cajd, . only'be Exercised at p o l i t i c a l l e v e l . Co General (if The .greatest value of the MRBM weapons system ;wpuld be obtained by the brpadrest possible gepgraphic deployment, and national participatiph throughout NATO .Europe, including adjacent maritime area's;-' (ii) More detailed informations, including that on tbe, proposed, new missive,., particularly regarding methods ^ Of \eqnf* trpl and s&fegua|>ds,8v%ili -be' requ|re'q.:> before any final conclusions can be made 0. CANADIAN POSITION 3« This paper has been reviewed by the GhiefS, of Staff who are in general agreement with the conclusions contained therein. ,;,;.'• 4. The hest deployment of MRBM*s depends upon geographical considerations such as,density of road and. rail networks, and on the standard of enemy intelligence in different areas* As'a result.it is unlikely that the def>lpymerit which is best in one .country would jae; bpst in. all' ptherso In, particulara the vulnerability - pf ship bprneP.. missiles relative to^land based missives is an open questiprio pHoweyeiv, it is'; jmdP^btediy 'true "that an MRBil f pr|>e in any of th^se .depipyaentsEwould be' muph'l.ess vulnerable than the air strike force9 so it js perhaps not unreaspnable to design the MRBM force for convenience in design and control, rather than for the absolute minimum vulnerability o . 7 :':,....'.. \ • '• - ' . 5. The use pf MRBM?s against mobile tank and mechanized forces (Para 11) is quest!onedo .The. MRBM: is inherently an inflexible weappn at the tactical level pf pperations which, combined with the inadequacy of surveillance methods, lowers the probability pf its effective employment against tr.ansitery targetsc It wpu Id appear any casual capability in this regard should not be over-emphasized0 »„o/3 000449 �'$•.. It is agreed th^t any co]jpi|nIeat}ipns 'system serving the MRBM's must be fast, certain and secure. jfW p.. ' It is qohsidered that; the composition Cpf missiid units, should 'h§ asrna^£pnallyi.hpmpgenepus as^possiblep ' .. fbi|sih%entIwiibi" th£> ; pSl'ltical: requirement f pr'Ja!;;:i|u$ti|? p fiatipnal force. M.the'jihtereSts pf^economy;in manppwe^, * Ihd communications^ and^pf' military effidi'enc'y',.;^J would Support the organization" proposed in paragraph 16 (a) as the most desirable. We recognize9 however, that limitations in manpower, or technical skills-within some member natidns, coupled with the requirement for a multinational forSe, may require the establishment pin some areas of missile units staffed by mixed nationalities in accordance with paragraph 16(c)„ 000450 J � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04474 Title A name given to the resource "Brief for the Canadian Delegation to the North Atlantic Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session May 1962" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO Cooperation Regarding Nuclear Weapons And Missile Bases (IRBM)," RG24-B-1, vol 21469, file CSC 2108:1, part 5, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 16-May-62 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/841fa8283cfb7fdf5c11b86ce0fcd417.pdf 6b7a6ba7a0099b00b44c0ae7977be6a4 PDF Text Text Iw XbU%yfXkA& \ ?:'."-•:••.•-• K : ; S E C R E T XlZXXXX' ' ' .':'•••' ,• -'X' a November 19,' 1962.XX^' BRIEFING: BY U. 3. EXPERTS ON A MULTILATERAL SEABORNE sX: MRBM FORCE - NOVEMBER 15. 1962. ; 'fXl | The U. S. team, headed by Gerard Smith of • ;v..'•>. the State Department and Admiral Lee of the Department of{Defence, gave a briefing on November 15, 1962 to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and a group of senior~ service:officers and officials from the, Department of External. Affairs. The team also had an informal meeting! with the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Secretary to the Cabinet and the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff. The team covered much the same ground as in the briefing to the NATO Council and this account confines itself to those pointson which the U. S. team laid particular stress and to the answers to questions put by Canadian officials. -."-. X' • • ; ; • •'• :. '7 ' • ' • . • • • ' ' ' :'. • -- .• <''.."•. Reasons for U. 3. Policy with regard to a Multilateral .. Seaborjhe MRBM Force Gerard Smith made clear that the U. S. Goverriment would still prefer to confine the control of nuclear weapons to as few powers as possible and that,,ideally, control within the Western Alliance should remain in the hands of the U. S. The U. S., Government realized, however, that with the revival of Europe, the Europeans wished to have a say in their own fiate and wished to exercise some control over the use of the nuclear deterrent. In order to meet the pressure from its Allies and, at the same time, stop the proliferation of national nuclear forces and in the absence of international control arrangements with the Soviet Union, the U. 3. Government considered that some form of multilateral force as a part of the Western nuclear deterrent was the most responsible method of devolving U. S. nuclear power while keeping control over by far the largest segment of the Western deterrent. At the same time, it was firm U. S. Government policy to insist that the conventional forces of the Alliance be built up sufficiently so that the West would not be as dependent as it now was on tactical nuclear weapons„ The U. S. Department of Defence had been ordered to look into the feasibility of creating a multilateral seaborne MRBM force as a first class fighting unit given the will of the Alliance to take part in, to pay for and to supply the continuing logistic support for the force. The answer was that the creation of such a force was practical given the necessary will of the Alliance. In answer to a question, Smith said that there was no firm U. S. proposal to create the seaborne force but rather that this was one method of having a NATO MRBM force. Smith went on to say that it was his understanding that the type of force outlined by the o • . / «- A0012918_25-000181 \ �team was the only way the U. S. Government was '' willing to support an MRBM force for NATO. The<y; ;; U. S. Government was not prepared to support MRBM's for national forces nor was it prepared to meet SACEUR's request for 400 MRBM missiles as '" proposed in MC26/4. When asked if the British xyXy and French national nuclear forces would be required to form part of this new force as a •; X... condition of its formation, Smith said - No, the Xy U. S. realized that this would not be possible and American policy was designed to ensure that no further national nuclear forces (i. e. German) would be created. Mr. Smith was asked whether it was not a condition of U. S. participation in this force that NATO first complete its build-up of nonnuclear weapons. Mr. Smith said that, while this appeared to have been a prior condition in President Kennedy's speech in Ottawa in May 1961, it was his understanding that the build-up of conventional forces was not a pre-condition for the formation of a multilateral seaborne force and that the U. S. Government envisaged the nonconventional build-up and the creation of the seaborne force going ahead in parallel. With regard to timing, the U. S. team thought that, in view of the British negotiations with the European Six and the heavy financial commitments necessary to form a seaborne force, it would be premature to reach a decision now. Meanwhile, conversations within the Alliance should continue in order to educate the Alliance as to the commitments necessary to form such a force. Smith said that the more time the Alliance had to experiment with the multilateral aspects of such a force and to deploy the MRBM's in the most rational method possible the better, as the West must try to avoid the problems that arose from the "hurried and irrational deployment of IRBM's in Europe in 1957-5S". Pilot Multilateral MRBM Force in the Mediterranean The U. 3. team confirmed that they v/ere thinking of a small MRBM force in the Mediterranean in the relatively near future (possibly armed in the first instance with Polaris missiles) which would serve as a pilot project for the larger NATO force. Smith said that no policy decision had been taken in Washington though there was serious interest in this project in the Pentagon. Preliminary talks had taken place with the Turks and this pilot force would presumably include the Greeks and the Italians and any other member of the Alliance who .. ./3 A0012918 26-000182 �- 3wished to take part. One advantage of a pilot MRBM force in the Mediterranean would be that the land-based IRBM's in Turkey and Italy could gradually be phased out. Another advantage would be that this force would be designed to be as similar as possible to the eventual full NATO force so that the various international concepts of the multilateral forde could be tested. The Americans expected that the Headquarters for this force would be in the Western Mediterranean, (this Headquarters would eventually become the main Headquarters for the NATO force) that the missiles would be provided by the U. S, and that the ships, manpower and real estate would be provided, by the European countries. The U. S. team expected that if it was decided to go ahead with the pilot force there would be no objection on the part.of the Mediterranean countries who would indeed welcome such a move. The team thought it likely that the U. S. would maintain control (vdth the consent of its Mediterranean allies) over the nuclear components of this force but that this would not prejudice the working out of a genuinely multilateral system of control for the nuclear component of the full NATO force, if and when it was created. Control of the Nuclear Component of a Multilateral Force In dealing with the problem of political control over the use of the nuclear component of the MRBM force, the U. S. considered the two situations in which this problem could arise: (a) A full scale nuclear surprise attack (b) A period of limited war leading up to a nuclear conflict. In case (a) where reaction time is of the essence, the U. S. expects the Alliance to agree that advance authorization to determine the use of the force be given to an individual (presumably the President of the U. 3.) or a very small group. In case (b) when the non-nuclear shield should provide time for an Alliance decision to use the force there would be no advance authorization and the decision to use the force v/ould be one of the many decisions facing the Alliance after it was already at war and would be, in effect, an Alliance decision on the conduct of the war. The problem of military control of the nuclear key to the force would be dealt with in the following manner: The force itself would be controlled for everything other than its nuclear component by a civilian/military NATO MRBM agency with a director «• »/4 A0012918 27-000183 �- 4and international staff rather like a national ministry of the marine. Targetting for the force would be the responsibility of SACEUR/SACLANT and would be phased into the overall targetting of the Western deterrent. The actual order to fire would be given by the political control authority and would come to the various ships of the force from SACEUR. On the ship itself there would be a nuclear control element made up of a number of personnel which v/ould operate under a system that ensured that no one man could fire the missiles. The Americans evidently have this system on their Polaris submarines and are satisfied that it is , foolproof. (Comment: - Unfortunately, we were given no details as to how the system works but, if the U. 3. is willing, as it has stated, to not share in the manning of the MRBM force if its alliesso wish, this is a fair indication that the U. S. authorities consider that this system is satisfactory.) Vulnerability The MRBM force would consist of which would be classified as war ships and would not be camouflaged. They would operate in the busy sea lanes of the North Sea, Eastern Atlantic and Mediteranean. The U. S. team were of the opinion that the force would be relatively invulnerable and that, while the Soviet Union had the capability to trail and destroy the force, this would be an extremely difficult operation and bound to compound the Soviet defence problem. The Soviet Union could use nuclear submarines to track the ships (conventional subs would be too slow) but this was an extremely difficult and expensive operation, and the Soviet nuclear submarines had a strike role of their own. The Soviet Union could use planes (the U. S. team said at least 10 per ship v/ould be required) but the problem of overflying NATO territory thus compromising surprise v/ould have to be overcome. Probably the best method would be a fleet of fast fishing trawlers with mother ships but this would require a new Soviet fishing fleet as the present trawlers are not sufficiently fast. The U. 3. team appeared to agree that a combination of the above elements could be used against the MRBM force but pointed out that the NATO force itself would only be a small part of the overall Western deterrent and that the Soviet Union probably did.not have the forces to deal with the whole deterrent including this new element of it. (Comment: - These arguments do not entirely hold water as the Soviet Union has built up a combined air, surface and undersea force to counter the Western carrier strike forces and this force might be expanded to deal with the NATO MRBM ships). S 15 1 - <> a. eh A0012918 28-000184 �- 5The most convincing argument for the relative invulnerability of this force is that the Soviet Union is in a very difficult position to deal with Western surface forces which have a large numerical advantage and which control the main straits which give access to the.North Sea, the Mediterranean and the Western Atlantic. This means that in a period of limited war Western countermeasures could render ineffective any shadowing of the NATO force and in the case of an all out nuclear attack where surprise is essential, it is very unlikely that the Soviet Union could undertake a surprise attack against the force and be sure of destroying more than a segment of it. Reaction of the Western Allies to the NATO Force and Trans-Atlantic Aspects of the Force Gerard Smith recognized that the British did not wish to face up to the problem of a multilateral NATO force until their negotiations with the Six were concluded. The British were also not very enthusiastic about such a force and would prefer to maintain their present special relationship with Washington with regard to nuclear weapons, even if this meant including the French. Smith did not think, however, that the British would object to the establishment of a pilot Mediterranean force and he thought that with a sufficiently long period for education and once the EEC negotiations were concluded, the British might be convinced to take part in a NATO force. (Comment: - Since the British Vbombers and, therefore, the British nuclear force, v/ill depend on the U. 3. Skybolt air-to-ground missile for a prolongation of its life until 1970 and since there does not appear to be any future for the V-bornber force after that date, the U. S. appear to be in a strong position to convince their British allies that they should take part in a NATO force). The Mediterranean countries and the Belgians have expressed interest in the NATO force and the Germans also appear to realize that this approach could meet their desire for a European say in the use of the nuclear deterrent without creating concern that the Germans had nuclear weapons and without upsetting the Brussels Treaty which does not permit the manufacture of nuclear weapons by Germany. The U. 3. had been pleasantly surprised that the French were at least willing to listen to American suggestions with regard to this force and the U. 3. had some hope that, despite the French and British national nuclear deterrents, in time both countries could be persuaded to play a leading part in a multilateral force. .../6" A0012918 29-000185 �- 6The U. S. Government evidently consider that the minimum membership necessary for U. S. support of a multilateral seaborne force would be all of the Six European nations, though the U. S. hoped the force would be manned by the Six and the U. K. and would prefer manning by all members of the NATO Alliance. In answer to a question concerning the trans-Atlantic character of the force, the U. S. team said that it was hoped that the NATO force would be manned by U. S. and Canadian personnel as well as European. There v/ere obvious advantages to this politically and it would mean that the force could be co-ordinated as part of the overall Western deterrent rather than being a separate European force. Gerard Smith said that, unfortunately, in the light of present policies in Europe (and by Implication in Canada) he thought it much more likely that the multilateral MREM force would be a European one and the Western deterrent would, therefore, consist of separate European and North American parts. A0012918 30-000186 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW03160 Title A name given to the resource "Briefing by U.S. Experts on a Multilateral Seaborne MRBM Force - November 15, 1962" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO - Nuclear weapons - Policy - NATO long term planning," RG25-A-3-b, vol 5959, file 50219-AL-2-40, part 5-2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 19-Nov-62 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/478c60b98ffcf3f8804a587a9376c522.pdf 04115362ade1509c35a577c9db7fe488 PDF Text Text X.'Z Z; S E C R E T XX xXZ'ZXx'zXf':; :XX:XX , November 19, 1962.X.XX: BRIEFING. BY U. S. EXPERTS ON A MULTILATERAL SEABORNE Xy[ ; MRBM FORCE - NOVEMBER 15. 1962. 7. X -I The U. S. team, headed by Gerard Smith ofsZX the Statue Department and Admiral Lee of the Department offDefence, gave a briefing on November 15, 1962 to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and a group of senior service officers and officials from the Department of External Affairs. The team also had an informal meeting with the Under-Secretary of State for Exter- a nal Affairs, the Secretary to the Cabinet and the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff. The team covered much the same ground as in the briefing to the NATO Council and this account confines itself to those points on which the U. S. team laid particular stress and to the answers to questions put by Canadian officials. Reasons for U. S. Policy with regard to a Multilateral Seaborne MRBM Force Gerard Smith made clear that the U. S. Goverriment would still prefer to confine the control of nudlear weapons to as few powers as possible and that, ideally, control within the Western Alliance should remain in the hands of the U. S. The U. S.. Government realized, however, that with the revival of Europe, the Europeans wished to have a say in their own fate and wished to exercise some control over the use of the nuclear deterrent. In order to meet the pressure from its Allies and, at the same time, stop the proliferation of national nuclear forces and in the absence of international control arrangements with the Soviet Union, the U. 3. Government considered that some form of multilateral force as a part of the Western nuclear deterrent was the most responsible method of devolving U. 3. nuclear power while keeping control over by far the largest segment of the Western deterrent. At the same time, it was firm U. S. Government policy to insist that the conventional forces of the Alliance be built up sufficiently so that the West would not be as dependent as it now was on tactical nuclear weapons. The U. S. Department of Defence had been ordered to look into the feasibility of creating a multilateral seaborne MRBM force as a first class fighting unit given the will of the Alliance to take part in, to pay for and to supply the continuing logistic support for the force. The answer was that the creation of such a force was practical given the necessary will of the Alliance. In answer to a question, Smith said that there was no firm U. S. proposal to create the seaborne force but rather that this was one method of having a NATO MRBM force. Smith went on to say that it was his understanding that the type of force outlined by the /2 A0012918 18-000174 �- 2 team was the only way the U. S. Government was willing to support an MRBM force for NATO. The. .; U. S. Government was not prepared to support <; MRBM's for national forces nor was it prepared to meet SACEUR's request for 400 MRBM missiles as .X'-y proposed in MC26/4. When asked if the Britiah X-.-, and French national nuclear forces would be required to form part of this new force as a condition of its formation, Smith said - No, the U. S. realized that this would not be possible * and American policy was designed to ensure that no further national nuclear forces (i. e. German) would be created. Mr. Smith was asked whether it was not a condition of U. S. participation in this force that NATO first complete its build-up of nonnuclear weapons. Mr. Smith said that, while this appeared to have been a prior condition in President Kennedy's speech in Ottawa in May 1961, it was his understanding that the build-up of conventional forces was not a pre-condition for the formation of a multilateral seaborne force and that the U. S. Government envisaged the nonconventional build-up and the creation of the seaborne force going ahead in parallel. With regard to timing, the U. S. team thought that, in view of the British negotiations with the European Six and the heavy financial commitments necessary to form a seaborne force, it v/ould be premature to reach a decision now. Meanwhile, conversations within the Alliance should continue in order to educate the Alliance as to the commitments necessary to form such a force. Smith said that the more time the Alliance had to experiment with the multilateral aspects of such a force and to deploy the MRBM's in the most rational method possible the better, as the West must try to avoid the problems that arose from the "hurried and irrational deployment of IRBM's in Europe in 1957-53". Pilot Multilateral MRBM Force in the Mediterranean The U. S. team confirmed that they v/ere thinking of a small MRBM force in the Mediterranean in the relatively near future (possibly armed in the first instance with Polaris missiles) which would serve as a pilot project for the larger NATO force. Smith said that no policy decision had been taken in Washington though there was serious interest in this project in the Pentagon. Preliminary talks had taken place with the Turks and this pilot force would presumably include the Greeks and the Italians and any other member of the Alliance who .. ./3 A0012918 19-0001 �. 3 wished to take part. One advantage of a pilot MRBM force in the Mediterranean would be that the land-based IRBM's in Turkey and Italy could gradually be phased out. Another advantage would be that this force would be designed to be as similar as possible to the eventual full NATO force so that the various international concepts of the multilateral forde could be tested. The Americans expected that the Headquarters for this force would be in the Western Mediterranean, (this Headquarters would eventually become the main Headquarters for the NATO force) that the missiles would be provided by the U. S. and that the ships, manpower and real estate would be provided, by the European countries. The U. S. team expected that if it was decided to go ahead with the pilot force there would be no objection on the part of the Mediterranean countries who would indeed welcome such a move. Ths team thought it likely that the U. S. would maintain control (v/ith the consent of its Mediterranean allies) over the nuclear components of this force but that this would not prejudice the working out of a genuinely multilateral system of control for the nuclear component of the full NATO force, if and when it was created. Control of the Nuclear Component of a Multilateral Force In dealing with the problem of political control over the use of the nuclear component of the MRBM force, the U. 3. considered the two situations in which this problem could arise: (a) A full scale nuclear surprise attack (b) A period of limited war leading up to a nuclear conflict. In case (a) where reaction time is of the essence, the U. S. expects the Alliance to agree that advance authorization to determine the use of the force be given to an individual (presumably the President of the U. 3.) or a very small group. In case (b) when the non-nuclear shield should provide time for an Alliance decision to use the force there would be no advance authorization and the decision to use the force would be one of the many decisions facing the Alliance after it was already at war and would be, in effect, an Alliance decision on the conduct of the war. The problem of military control of the nuclear key to the force would be dealt with in the following manner: The force itself would be controlled for everything other than its nuclear component by a civilian/military NATO MRBM agency with a director ...A A0012918 20-000176 �- 4and international staff rather like a national ministry of the marine. Targetting for the force would be the responsibility of SACEUR/3ACLANT and would be phased into the overall targetting of the Western deterrent. The actual order to fire would be given by the political control authority and would come to the various ships of the force from SACEUR. On the ship itself there would be a nuclear control element made up of a number of personnel which would operate under a system that ensured that no one man cou3.d fire the missiles. The Americans evidently have this system on their Polaris submarines and are satisfied that it is , foolproof. (Comment: - Unfortunately, we were given no details as to how the system works but, if the U. 3. Is willing, as it has stated, to not share in the manning of the MRBM force if its alliesso wish, this is a fair indication that the U. S. authorities consider that this system is satisfactory.) Vulnerability The MRBM force would consist of which would be classified as war ships and would not be camouflaged. They would operate in the busy sea lanes of the North Sea, Eastern Atlantic and Mediteranean. The U. 3. team were of the opinion that the force would be relatively invulnerable and that, while the Soviet Union had the capability to trail and destroy the force, this would be an extremely difficult operation and bound to compound the Soviet defence problem. The Soviet Union could use nuclear submarines to track the ships (conventional subs would be too slow) but this was an extremely difficult and expensive operation, and the Soviet nuclear submarines had a strike role of their own. The Soviet Union could use planes (the U. S, team said at least 10 per ship v/ould be required) but the problem of overflying NATO territory thus compromising surprise v/ould have to be overeome. Probably the best method would be a fleet of fast fishing trawlers with mother ships but this would require a new Soviet fishing fleet as the present trawlers are not sufficiently fast. The U. S. team appeared to agree that a combination of the above elements could be used against the MRBM force but pointed out that the NATO force itself v/ould only be a small part of the overall Western deterrent and that the Soviet Union probably did not have the forces to deal with the whole deterrent inclining this new element of it. (Comment: - These arguments do not entirely hold water as the Soviet Union has built up a combined air, surface and undersea force to counter the Western carrier strike forces and this force might be expanded to deal with the NATO MRBM 3hips). .../5 s.15(1) A0012918 21-000177 �- 5 The most convincing argument for the relative invulnerability of this force is that the Soviet Union is in a very difficult position to deal with Western surface forces v/hich have a large numerical advantage and v/hich control the main straits which give access to the North Sea, the Mediterranean and the Western Atlantic. This means that in a period of limited war Western countermeasures could render ineffective any shadowing of the NATO force and in the case of an all out nuclear attack where surprise is essential, it is very unlikely that the Soviet Union could undertake a surprise attack against the force and be sure of destroying more than a segment of it. Reaction of the Western Allies to the NATO Force and Trans-Atlantic Aspects of the Force Gerard Smith recognized that the British did not wish to face up to the problem of a multilateral NATO force until their negotiations with the Six were concluded. The British were also not very enthusiastic about such a force and would prefer to maintain their present special relationship with Washington with regard to nuclear weapons, even if this meant including the French. Smith did not think, however, that the British would object to the establishment of a pilot Mediterranean force and he thought that with a sufficiently long period for education and once the EEC negotiations were concluded, the British might be convinced to take part in a NATO force. (Comment: -' Since the British Vbombers and, therefore, the British nuclear force, v/ill depend on the U. 3. Skybolt air-to-ground missile for a prolongation of its life until 1970 and since there does not appear to be any future for the V-bomber force after that date, the U. S. appear to be in a strong position to convince their British allies that they should take part in a NATO force). The Mediterranean countries and the Belgians have expressed interest in the NATO force and the Germans also appear to realize that this approach could meet their desire for a European say in the use of the nuclear deterrent without creating concern that the Germans had nuclear weapons and without upsetting the Brussels Treaty which does not permit the manufacture of nuclear weapons by Germany. The U. 3. had been pleasantly surprised that the French were at least willing to listen to American suggestions with regard to this force and the U. 3. had some hope that, despite the French and British national nuclear deterrents, in time both countries could be persuaded to play a leading part in a multilateral force. .../6' A0012918 22-000178 �- 6The U. S. Government evidently consider that the minimum membership necessary for U. S. support of a multilateral seaborne force would be all of the Six European nations, though the U. S. hoped the force would be manned by the Six and the U. K. and would prefer manning by all members of the NATO Alliance. In answer to a question concerning the trans-Atlantic character of the force, the U. S. team said that it was hoped that the NATO force would be manned by U. S. and Canadian personnel as well as European. There v/ere obvious advantages to this politically and it would mean that the force could be co-ordinated as part of the overall Western deterrent rather than being a separate European force. Gerard Smith said that, unfortunately, in the light of present policies in Europe (and by implication in Canada) he thought it much more likely that the multilateral MRBM force would be a European one and the Western deterrent would, therefore, consist of separate European and North American parts. A0012918 23-000179 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW03162 Title A name given to the resource "Briefing by U.S. Experts on a Multilateral Seaborne MRBM Force - November 15, 1962" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO - Nuclear weapons - Policy - NATO long term planning," RG25-A-3-b, vol 5959, file 50219-AL-2-40, part 5-2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 19-Nov-62 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5bf0efde385d4efecbdb3560f8ff4db2.pdf 620effcf34357cf4874cabaa1a048393 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - ^ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 9 September 25, 1962. Canada-United States Qinisterlal Committee on Joint Defence fhis CoBHsittee was established as a result of discussions la July 1958 botaoen the Frlrao minister and President ^Isenhotfer to enablo both gpvornsnoats to consult periodically at th© ministerial level on matters affecting th© joint defence effort and to review not only the military but also the political and economic aspects of defence questions. The most roc out mooting of the. Gossaltt©© was on July 12-13, 1960 at Contebollo, Quebec. On February 16, 1962 the following exchange took place in the House of Commonss 'Mon* L# B. Pearson (Loader of the Opposition) s £ir. Spoofcor, in the absence of the tJinlotcr of national Defence perhaps 1 should ask tho Secretary of State for External Affairs If there aro any plans to reconvene the Canada**United States Dinlsterial coacittee on defence, ohich last sot a year and a half ago* "Hon. Howard C* Green {Secretary of Stat© for External Affairs)! There are no plans at the raoaent." 000448 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW06985 Title A name given to the resource "Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Canada-US Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence - Establishment and activities," RG25-A-3-b, vol 6049, file 50309-A-40, part 4-2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Government of Canada Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 25-Sep-62 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/e19580ae27e99acb5519e74e5d405a72.pdf 9647d7fc0de2e8b0e5f288d7f969e708 PDF Text Text A201600064 CSC 1, *' - - \ * . 6 September, 1963 JAG Canada-US Agreement of 16 .August.. 1963 Implementing Arrangements - Export Permit Attached is a copy of a reply of 4 September, 1963 from the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce to our letter S-0029-106-1 of 20 August, 1963 enclosing an application for a permit to cover the export of nuclear warheads. You will notice that a change in the application, corresponding broadly to the change suggested by the Atomic Energy Control Board in the draft General Order, has been suggested by the Department of Trade and Commerce. If you agree with the change proposed, which seems satisfactory to meet our present requirements, would you please prepare a revised application and an appropriate covering letter to accompany it. Original signed ;>/ J. F. ANDERSON Attach. cc: CCOS*/ CPlansI J.S. Hodgson, Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance) .. % 3? -13 v f c£> m* A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 3 \1 /J 000602 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00443 Title A name given to the resource "Canada-US Agreement of 16 August, 1963: Impleementing Arrangements - Export Permit" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Acquisition And Storage Of Nuclear Weapons For Canadian Forces In Canada And Europe," RG24-B-1, vol 21440, file CSC 1888:9, part 3, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 6-Sep-63 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ef919bd764ebe0b1e02aabfd92a89eb2.pdf 71722363e45c0013a3de69ffb4d85bdd PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue eSj^rtu dffi^Loi sur I'afces a I'information CHRONOLOGY OF GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS REGARDING'- ' NEGOTIATIONS ON ACQUISITION AND STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1962 The Prime Minister February 20, 1959. a) "The full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads. The government is,, therefore, examining with the United States government questions connected with the acquisition of nuclear warheads for Bomarc and other defensive weapons for use by the Canadian forces in Canada, and the storage of warheads in Canada. Problems connected with the arming of the Canadian brigade in Europe with short range muclear weapons for NATO's defence tasks are also being studied. "We are confident that we shall be able to reach formal agreement with the United States on appropriate means to serve the common objective. It will of course be some time before these weapons will be available for use by Canadian forces. The government, as soon as it is in a position to do so, will inform the house, within the limits of sucurity, of the general terms of understanding which are reached between the two governments on this subject." Hansard, p. 1223 b) "It is our intention to provide Canadian forces with modern and efficient weapons to enable them to fulfil their respective roles." Hansard, p. 1223 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information c) 2 - "It is the policy of the Canadian Government not to undertake the production of nuclear weapons in Canada." Hansard, p. 1223 d) "We must reluctantly admit the need in present circumstances for nuclear weapons of a defensive character." Hansard, p. 1223 The Prime Minister March 10, 1959 "The government does not anticipate concluding a formal agreement with the United States government on the acquisition of nuclear warheads in the immediate future, I would draw the attention of the house to the statement I made in this regard' on February 20. I indicated then that it would be some time before nuclear weapons would and indeed' oould be available for use by Canadian forces. At' that time I stated that as soon as the government was in a position to do so it would inform the house, within the limits of security, of the general terms of understanding reached between the two governments on this subject. I believe that is about as far as I can go on this occasion." Hansard, p. 1775. e Prime Minister January 18, I960 a) "Eventually Canadian forces may require certain nuclear weapons if Canadian forces are to be kept effective. For example, the Bomarc anti- aircraft missile to be effective would require nuclear warheads." Hansard, p. 73. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information b) "Negotiations ere procweoiiiHg with the United States in order that the necessary weapons can be made available for Canadian defence units if and when they are required. I cannot comment in detail on these negotiations but I wish to state <} thut arrangements for tho safeguarding and security of all such weapons in Canada will be subject to Canadian approval and consent," "I want to make it abundantly clear that nuolear weapons will not be. used by the Canadian forces except as the Canadian government decides and in the manner approved by the Canadian government. Canada retains its full freedom of choice and decision. Furthermore, in order to ensure that any agreement entered into is kept up to date, it will be made subject to review at any time at the request of either government." Hansard, p. 73. The Minister of National Defence January 20, i960. "Nuclear warheads stored in Canada are the property of the United States until they are released for use by the Canadian forces. A/hen1 they are released to Canada, then Canada has the sole use and direction of use of tho'se weapons. As was explained the day before' yesterday by the Prime Minister, that will be a decision for the Canadian Government." Hansard, p. 133. The Prime Minister February 9, I960. "If and when Canada does acquire nuclear weapons it> will be in accordance with our own national policies and with our obligations under 000399 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - I, - the North Atlantic Treaty." Hansard, p, 867. The Prime Minister June 22, I960. "There have been discussions with the United States government regarding the possible conditions under which nuclear weapons for jet interceptors might be stored in United States leased bases in Canada. No agreement has been arrived at." Hansard, p. 5239. The Prime Minister July 4, I960. ..."On February 20, 1959> as reported on page 1221 of Hansard, I set forth the views of the Canadian government with respect to this matter, and they remain unchanged. At that time I set forth, as I say, that the full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads, and that of course was referring to Bomarc and other defensive weapons. "I followed that statement by' a complete statement on January 18, I960, in which I used these words, which are to be found on page 73 of Hansardi" (see above) "Since that time there have been continuing negotiations. By that I mean discussions between " the representatives of tho two countries. I am in no position to advise that there has been any determination made as a result of these discussions which would permit as yet of any negotiation taking place as between the Department of External Affairs and the Department of State of the United States." 000400 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 5 - '*... in so far as general policy is concerned we are always in this position. On the one hand we are desirous of attaining disarmament; on the other hand we have to discharge our responsibility of ensuring to tho maximum degree the security of the Canadian people. So far as that i3 concerned, discussions are taking place with respect to the Goose Bay and Harmon air bases, where an endeavour is being made to arrive at a formula which will i ensure that Canadians in those bases shall exercise joint control. ..." Hansard, p. 5653* The Prime Minister July 14, I960. a) "... it is a well'known fact' that United' States law requires that the ownership of nuclear weapons must remain with the United States and that the U3e of such weapons requires presidential authorization. That is the law as it now stands and as it has been in effect since 1945 or 19^6. "At the same time, as I have said before in the house, if and when nuclear weapons are acquired by the Canadian forces, these weapons will not be used except as the Canadian government decides and in the manner approved by the Canadian government. These two elements together constitute joint control, and joint control is consistent with the view I expressed in the house on February 20, 1959» that it is important to 11.lit the spread of nuclear weapons at the independent disposal of national governments. 000401 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 6 - "I think I.should add this, that negotiations and consultations with the United States, have been continuing for a very considerable time, and the reason for the continuance of the negotiations is in order to attain the objectives I pointed out in February, 1959, so that if and when an agreement is arrived at under the terms and on the conditions that I have repeatedly placed before the house, we shall be in a position finally to determine this matter." Hansard, p. 6271-2. b) "One determines a course by first taking the necessary steps as to the principles on whioh nuclear weapons would be accepted. Then when we have arrived at that point a determination will be made on the basis of international situations now existing, which are very grave, and in th© light of any subsequent circumstances that may develop between now and the time we would be in a position in any event to have atomic weapons." Hansard, p. 6272. The Minister of National Defence August 4, I960. "... We are, therefore, going ahead with the procurement of the vehicles which can use these nuclear weapons, but the decision as to the acquisition of the nuclear warheads depends on circumstances which might develop sometime in the future. ..." Hansard, p. 7557. 000402 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information _ 7 _ The Minister of National DefenceAufeust 5'. i960. a) "..• We are entering into and have been carrying on discussions at various levels, the official level and between Canadian ministers and United States ministers, aa to the sort of arrangement which could be made when nuclear warheads are made available which, as the.Prime Minister said, will be so if and when they are required, fie recognize, and I am sure the Leader of the Opposition does also, that by United States law these nuclear warheads whenever they leave the United States must still remain the property of the United States. So whether these warheads are placed in Canada or in the leased bases in Canada or in the United Kingdom, the United States still retain possession of them until such time as the President of the United States releases them for use to the authorities of the country concerned. "In the United Kingdom where these nuclear weapons are now stored a form of joint control is exercised whereby a United States officer has a key to the receptacle where they are stored and also a British officer has a key, and the door cannot be opened unless both keys are used. So you have a form of joint control not dissimilar to the method which is used by anybody having a safety deposit box in the bank where the banker has one key and the lessee Of the box has the other. "There would seem to be no difficulties in the way of reaching some sort of similar agreement regarding the storage of those nuclear weapons on 000403 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - a - -. Canadian soil. Then when the situation becomes such that thesd Weapons are to be used, the sole authority to authorize the uso of those weapons in Canada would be the Prime Minister of Canada who, having had them released by the President of the United States, would then give directions as to when aild how they should be actually used." Hansard, p. 7652, c) "... A question was asked whether our 104 squadrons would use nuclear weapons. All I can say there is that they would have the capability of using these weapons. Whether they would by allowed to operate with thelti from1 French bases I do not know. I am sure the Leader of the Opposition is aware of all the discussion there has been about that matter. That would have to be arranged by the NATO supremo allied commander with the French government and, in any event, we have air bases in Germany as well as in France. That is a problem which will have to be faced when the new aircraft become available. ..." Hansard, p. 7655. The Prime Minister November 23, I960. •• •" • '—"J ..——•« ••4-.-.,—...i. ,• "... there is nothing further to report in addition to previous statements made in this house. I would refer the hon. gentleman to what was said on January 19, 1959; February 20, 1959; January 18, I960; February 9, i960; July 4, I960 and July 14, I960." Hansard, p. 114. 000404 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 9 - The Prime Minister November.30, I960. "... the position of Canada is completely unchanged. We have made it perfectly clear that when and if nuclear weapons are required we shall not accept thorn unless we have joint control, and there has been no suggestion at any time of any watering down or diminution of that stand," Hansard, p. 338. The Prime Minister September 20, 1961 "I reiterate what has been made clear on a number of occasions, except to those who will not understand. No agreement has been arrived at between our countries with regard to nuclear weapons> and any rumour to the contrary has no foundation in fact." "The announcement of decisions of government .,...,. policy on this important issue will be made in the house. I might also say this 5 that the government, when placing such decisions before the house, will, naturally, at all times afford an opportunity for discussion. However, and I emphasize this, in each of the instruments that we have, the Bomarc and the Voodoos, nuclear weapons could be used. The defensive requirements of Canada and the need for preservation of security will bo the overriding consideration in the mind of this government. "No decision has been made. When a decision is made the house will be clearly made aware thereof, as I emphasized a moment ago.. Speculation which has been going on in the last few weeks is based on �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 10 - nothing more than tho views of those who, desiring one final stand to be taken, are not taking Into full regard the international situation nor in the event that it should worsen, the welfare, the future and the safety of Canadians." "The responsibility is one which the. government must take having regard first and foremost to the welfare of tho Canadian people. • I must add, of course, that in any stand it takes tho government must ask for the support of the house. That does not mean, however, that the decision would first be tentatively placed before the house. That would' be* a denial of responsible" government and a denial of the principles which1 tha hon. gentleman himself has so long advocated•" Hansard, p» 8596. The Prime Minister September 26, 1961 (Mr. Chevrier: "Can the Prime Minister say whether the government was consulted about the third principle for disarmament put forward by the president and which reads as follows: 'Prohibiting the transfer of control over nuclear weapons to states that do not now .own them.' If so, how can this be reconciled with joint control?") "Mr. Speaker, the Canadian government has continued to be in favour of a comprehensive 000406 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 11 ~ system of disarmament which will include measures for stopping the further spread of nuclear weapons, Last year at the general assembly the Canadian representative said this: '... we believe that tho spread of nuclear weapons to an ever increasing number of countries would pose a threat to mankind. We consider that the only satisfactory way to dispel the dangers inherent in the possibility Is through International agreement on a comprehensive and carefully verified system of disarmament,* "Consistent with this policy the Secretary of State for External Affairs and all Canadian representatives have worked for the recognition of the importance of including measures to prohibit the spread of these weapons as part of a disarmament programme. I am glad that they form part of these A' new proposals." Hansard, p. 8903. The Prime Minister January 22, 1962. "The hon. gentleman mentioned the question of nuclear arms, a problem which has affected all the nations in the western world. This is a subject which I hope will be debated and discussed at length. But I want to make this very clear: there has been no dilatory action on the part pf this government. We made our enunciation of policy as far back as 1959 clearly, definitely and absolutely. Since that time we have continued in that policy, and when the debate takes place on international affairs we shall doal with this matter and point out at the same �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 12 - time the tremendous cleavage and schism which exists on this subject within the ranks of the opposition despite the fact that in this regard the advertising represents the Liberals as having the answer." Hansard, p. 65 • The Prime Minister February 26, 1962. a) "The statement I made the other day . in no way represented a change of viewpoint on the part of the Government of this country and I hope the Leader of the Opposition would agree that if war came, should nuclear weapons be used against us Canadian troops participating should not be denied the right to use nuclear weapons. "What I stated was but a repetition of what has been said on previous occasions. I would simply refer the house to what I stated on November 24, I960, when speaking to the Canadian club of Ottawa; on August 15, 1961, when speaking in Halifax to the Canadian Weekly Newspapers . Association; and again, on October 6, 1961, when Dr. Thompson and those associated with him in the Canadian committee for the control of radiation hazards made representations to the government. "We take the stand that in the interests of disarmament everything must be done to assure success if it can be attained, and that the nuclear family should not be increased so long as there is any possibility of disarmament among the k (At a news conference al Edmonton on Feb. 24, 1962 the Prime Minister is quoted as saying, "Should war come we should have available the necessary instruments"). 000408 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information • '- 13 nations of the world. That has been our view throughout; that was tho reason for our vote on the Swedish resolution which came before the United Nations", Hansard, p. 12 50. b) (Would weapons be in hands of Canadian Forces before the outbreak of war?) "I referred' to the outbreak of war and said that in the event that nuclear war was launched, nuclear weapons should bo placed in the possession of Canadians", Hansard, p. 1250. o) (Could these weapons be used without the approval of the United States?) "Our views in that regard were set forth at length in February 1959» At that time I said— and I am simply summarizing the-remarks I made in the house—that in the event we should decide to make nuclear weapons available it would be necessary to have joint control on the part of Canada and the United States. That attitude, of course, has not been generally accepted. If I understand the Leader of the Opposition aright, some weeks ago he took the stand that he objected at any time to joint control but he would be willing to have the United States store nuclear warheads in Canada. "That view, we have never held. Our view is that at the moment this is hypothetical and will continue to be as long as disarmament is to the fore. But should it be decided in the light of Canadian armament needs and defence responsibility, that nuclear weapons are to be had at any time, 000409 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 14 - joint control is of the essence of the stand we have taken". Hansard, p. 12 50. d) (In view of the constitutional position of the United States and in view of recent statements of the President of that country, how does the Prime Minister propose to bring about this joint control?) "Mr. Speaker, the hon. gentleman knows very well that 30 long as the law of the United States is as it is at present, joint control is impossible." Hansard, p. 1251. e) (Then we cannot have the weapons). "What I have stated is exactly the position of affairs. 'We have stated that until the United States makes joint control available, we do not intend to go further than we have unless war breaks out, at which time we hope to have available to Canadians the necessary nuclear weapons. That is much clearer than the evasive policy of the Leader of the Opposition." Hansard, p. 1251. 000410 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 15 - The Prime Minister February 28, 1962 (Mr. Martin: "... Has any agreement been reached between the government of the United States and the government of Canada, or any agency or person thereof that would ensure delivery to Canada of nuclear weapons either before or after the outbreak of war?") "Mr. Speaker, the answer is in the negative. " The Prime Minister April 18. 1962 (Mr. Hellyer: "... Would the Prime Minister indicate to the Committee whether the government ha8 decided yet if it will or will not authorize the use of atomic warheads by Canadian troops?") "Mr. Chairman, the attitude of the government has been set out most clearly in this regard. There has been no change and there is no anticipated change". (Mr. Hellyer: "Can we take it then that the further authorization of additional funds for the F.104 programme in fact means that the government intends that they will be used for the strike attack role when the squadrons are ready to go to Europe?") "We have had very long discussions of that matter from time to time and there is nothing more I can add to my statement that there has been no change in our position whatsoever." 000411 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 16 - The Prime Minister October 17, 1962 (Mr. Pearson: "I should like to ask the Prime Minister whether the Government contemplates any change in the present position regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons or nuclear warheads for Canada's armed forces.") "Mr. Speaker, there has been no change in the attitude of the Government since I made a \_ statement in the House on February 26 last." question, Mr. Speaker. i| I asked the Prime Minister whether the Government contemplated any change in the near future.") "I said that was the policy at the moment. I am not going to contemplate the future. ; However, the position is as stated last February." I 000412 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01697 Title A name given to the resource "Chronology of Government Statements Regarding Negotiations on Acquisition and Storage of Nuclear Weapons" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 27-Sep-62