2 20 34875 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/aa2bb86e7e995905b65a490a5531d160.pdf c1c707cf29290ce887d29e9171809fff PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 UPDATE ON POSSIBLE ACTION AGAINST IRAQ SPEAKING POINTS Key messages • Canada remains committed to the UN Security Council process and an effective UN weapons inspection and destruction program and will assist that process where possible. • Canada strongly prefers that Iraq be disarmed peacefully. • Should Iraq fail to meet its obligations and the Security Council explicitly authorizes the use of force, Canada will participate in a military coalition to enforce Council resolutions. • Should the UN process ultimately fail and no explicit authorization of force is given, Canada will at that time decide whether to participate in a proposed military coalition. • Notwithstanding our ultimate level of participation, Canada will leave exchange and liaison officers in their present positions. • The Canadian Forces will undertake military-to-military discussions with US planners to gather information and discuss possible Canadian contributions. Issues • Determine what kind of military contribution Canada could most usefully provide. • An early US decision to begin military action could limit Canadian participation to post-combat operations. SECRET 000013 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET Desired outcome • US is comfortable with Canada’s efforts to seek additional information about US military planning without a firm commitment to make a military contribution at this stage. SECRET 000014 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00003 Title A name given to the resource Update on Possible Action Against Iraq (Speaking Points) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource January 8-10, 2003 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived BAN 2014-01289-X, Box 12, File no. MCU2003-00765 – Ministers Visit Washington DC 8-10 January 2003, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10029 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5e6f77dcb7eb1b4e2225ea654cb17fb7.pdf 99e803ba1230d70da91ddf6b75f8d749 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON, DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 UPDATE ON POSSIBLE ACTION AGAINST IRAQ BRIEFING NOTE ISSUE • To provide an update on the potential for unilateral or multilateral action against Iraq and the developing Canadian policy position. This remains a dynamic issue and events will continue to unfold rapidly. BACKGROUND • Iraq has thus far met the deadlines imposed by Security Council Resolution 1441: it has accepted the terms of the resolution and produced a 12,000 page declaration of its nuclear, chemical, biological and missile programs. In discussions between the Canadian and Iraqi Permanent Representatives in New York, Iraq indicated that although it disagrees with many of the premises of Resolution 1441, it will cooperate with United Nations weapons inspectors. • Both the US and the UK have categorically emphasized that the resolution provides for “serious consequences” if Iraq is found in violation of its obligations. President Bush has said Resolution 1441 “presents the Iraqi regime with a final test”, and Prime Minister Blair indicated that the “consequences are clear”. The US has stated that while it will consult the Security Council before engaging in any action against Iraq, its position is that the US does not require UN approval for US-led military action if Iraq fails to disarm. Most allies will likely accept efforts to disarm Iraq of proven weapons of mass destruction capabilities as a basis for US-led military action. DISCUSSION • On 19 December, in their first formal briefing to the Security Council following Iraq’s declaration regarding its weapons programs, UN inspectors indicated that they still require “much more cooperation” from Iraq. The inspectors also said that the declaration leaves many unanswered questions and contains very little by way of evidence concerning weapons of mass destruction programs. This briefing was merely a preliminary assessment of the content of the declaration; a full UN assessment of all data provided by Iraq will likely be completed by mid- to lateJanuary. Following the briefing, the US administration reiterated its view that Iraq remains in “material breach of Resolution 1441”, but that this failure to comply does not yet constitute a trigger for the use of force. 1/3 SECRET 000015 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET • Open sources confirm that the US is proceeding with a build-up of forces and logistics in the Persian Gulf area. It is estimated that the US already have 50,000 land-based personnel in the region and all of the key elements necessary to begin an air campaign and light ground force operations will be in place by the beginning of January. If the ground forces build-up continues at the current rate, armored forces could be ready for action by mid- to late-January during what is known as the best “campaign season”. While the first official UN inspection report is not expected until mid-May, inspectors are scheduled to provide an interim report to the Security Council on 27 January (in accordance with Resolution 1441). • On 5 December, Canada provided a preliminary response to the US request for a contribution of military assets to any possible action against Iraq. As a first step, the Canadian Forces will seek information for use in developing options for the Government while at the same time discussing possible Canadian contributions in detail. A command and control exercise, INTERNAL LOOK, occurred from 9 to 16 December, but Canada’s decision to engage in military-to-military discussions occurred too late for a Canadian officer to observe the exercise. The Chief of the Defence Staff has since spoken with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; subsequently three Canadian Forces officers have deployed to Tampa to begin initial discussions with US planners. Any decision to commit Canadian Forces assets would be predicated on a Security Council authorization of the use of force or, absent such explicit authorization, would be decided according to the circumstances at the time. The US has indicated that other allies, including Spain and Italy, have placed similar caveats on their participation in a campaign against Iraq. • US officials have said that while they would prefer unconditional military commitments from allies at this stage, Canada’s position is “understandable” in light of the evolving international situation. The US is looking forward to moving ahead with military consultations and, as such, welcomed Canada’s decision to engage in discussions regarding possible military contributions in the event that use of force becomes necessary. In discussions with senior officials from National Defence and Foreign Affairs, the US political director indicated that the US is not committed to military action at this stage; the President has yet to take a decision. CANADIAN POSITION • The Canadian position on the Iraq situation has not changed. The Government has been very much in favor of a strong resolution that addresses the need for Iraq to comply with all of its obligations to UN resolutions and that indicates that there will be serious consequences for non-compliance. Resolution 1441 provides inspectors with the full backing of the international community to perform their duty without interference. It is now up to Iraq to fulfill its responsibilities without condition or delay. • The Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have noted Canada’s concern about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs, but have indicated our preference 2/3 SECRET 000016 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET that the issue be dealt with through the UN (i.e., through the re-establishment of the present UN inspection mechanism). On 10 October, the Prime Minister indicated that if UN inspections determined that Iraq continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, Canada would support military action. • Canada is not privy to Iraq’s declaration of its weapons programs, which was submitted to the inspectors and the Security Council. As such, Canada looks forward to the Security Council’s full assessment of the documents. • Should Canada decide to participate in a military coalition against Iraq, Canada may contribute assets from among a range of sea, land and air capabilities, including, but not necessarily restricted to those currently dedicated to the coalition campaign against terrorism (2 ships, 2 maritime patrol aircraft and 2 to 3 transport aircraft). Prepared By: Responsible Director: Responsible Director-General Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Updated: 3/3 SECRET Corri Barr, D PK Pol 6. 996-1741 Col G. C6t6, DPK Pol, 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross. DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-3458 9 December 2002 2 January 2003 000017 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00004 Title A name given to the resource Update on Possible Action Against Iraq (Briefing Note) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource January 8-10, 2003 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived BAN 2014-01289-X, Box 12, File no. MCU2003-00765 – Ministers Visit Washington DC 8-10 January 2003, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10029 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/2192d959f220899aad29d34a8a4e6ed7.pdf c85580678107b3986a1cd8353b431d80 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'inforeflation From: Sent: To: Co: Subject: CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) FURTADO Francis -WSHDC -GR -C4 December 4,2002 11:13AM -EXTOTT -MML -C4 -EXTOTT -USS -C4; -EXTOTT -DMT -C4; -EXTOTT -DMA -C4; EXTOTT -MDM -C4; -EXTOTT -MJW -C4; -EXTOTT,-MDW -C4; EXTOTT -MJM -C4; -EXTOTT -CPP -C4; -EXTOTT -CPD -C4; EXTOTT -NAD -C4; -EXTOTT -IDD -C4; -EXTOTT -NUR -C4; EXTOTT -NUE -C4; -EXTOTT -NUB -C4; -EXTOTT -EAD -C4; EXTOTT -EAI-C4; -EXTOTT -EAT -C4; -EXTOTT -EAR -C4; EXTOTT -EPS -C4; -EXTOTT -IMD -C4; -EXTOTT -IMO -C4; EXTOTT -ISD -C4; -EXTOTT -ISI-C4; -EXTOTT -IDR -C4; -EXTOTT IDC -C4; -EXTOTT -IDA -C4; -EXTOTT -GMR -C4; -EXTOTT -GMD C4; -NDHQ OTT ADM (POL) -C4; -NDHQ OTT DG POL PLAN -C4; NDHQ OTT DGISPOL -C4; -NDHQ OTT D POL DEV -C4; -NDHQ OTT DWH POL -C4; -NDHQ OTT D Cabinet Ln -C4; Privy Council Office -C4R; Privy Council Office I Foreign & Defence Policy -C4R; BFALO -SFAX DE OTT; -CHCGO -SFAX DE OTT; -DALAS -SFAX DE OTT; -DTROT -SFAX DE OTT; -LNGLS -SFAX DE OTT; -MIAMI SFAX DE OTT; -MNPLS -SFAX DE OTT; -CNGNY -SFAX DE OTT; SEATL -SFAX DE OTT; -PRMOAS -HOM -C4; -PRMOAS -C4; KERGIN Michael -WSHDC -HOM -C4; COTE Berlin -WSHDC D/HOM -CDM/A -C4; BOEHM Peter -WSHDC -GR -C4; FORTIER Patricia -WSHDC -GR -C4; -WSHDC -CDLS(W) -DR -C4; -WSHDC EC -C4; -WSHDC -IM -C4; -WSHDC -PA -C4; -WSHDC -PL -C4; WSHDC -TD -C4; -WSHDC -GR -C4; CCATS UNGR0341: Canada-US Relations - Background Material DND: Please pass to DM/Bloodworth/Vigneault, Assoc. DM/Purdy PCO: Please pass to Assoc. Clerk/Bilodeau, Ops/Fonberg, Borders Task Force/Flack/Wiebe We have attached some background material on Canada-US relations that was prepared in advance of Ambassador Kergin's presentation to Cabinet on November 19th. CDA-US.1page.wpd Drafted/Consulted: Approved: CDA-US.text.wpd Embassy sections P. Fortier 000057 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /’information CANADA-US RELATIONS - OVERVIEW The mid-term Congressional elections were a triumph for the Republicans, underwritten by ongoing concerns about security, coupled with the voter’s endorsement of George Bush as a wartime leader. • The results reflect the lasting impact of September 11th on the US psyche. The US is a country already at war, and may be about to expand the conflict to Iraq. • At home, a far-reaching sense of insecurity pervades the US body politic, and the Administration is about to proceed with the most significant changes to US government since the Second World War to address this threat. • As far as Canada-US relations is concerned, Secretary Powell’s visit to Ottawa was encouraging in that it reflected a US desire to engage Canada, and resulted in usefully clarifying both sides’ understanding of key issues. • Nevertheless, the prevailing environment in the US dominated by the campaign against terrorism abroad and sweeping measures to strengthen security at home stands to challenge long-standing assumptions that have governed the way in which we manage our relationship with the US, both in North America and in terms of our approach to international issues. • The US no longer automatically factors allied concerns into its decisions simply because they are traditional allies. Influential allies will be those which self-select. We can choose to partner with them ^or not, but they will take note of our decisions. Our decisions on Iraq stand to shape US perceptions of ^Canada as a dependable ally. • At home, the US focus on homeland security has major implications for the border, and each country’s each country’s conception of the border may be diverging. For us, it is about preserving access for Canadians as well as Canadian goods, services, and investment. For the US, it is about ensuring security from the potential threats that come with access. • The prospect of the US taking action across a wide variety of sectors (immigration, law enforcement, defence) to support the strategic goal of strengthening homeland security could have far-reaching implications for Canada. Considered of itself, each US initiative might look like an incremental change in a discrete area. However, the initiatives will be part of a broader agenda, the cumulative effect of which could recast our personality as a North American country. • In the area of trade and energy policy, the advent of the 108th Congress may provide reasons for guarded optimism, allowing for the fact that our terms of reference are the outgoing 107th Congress. We should not expect the Administration or Congress to reverse itself on major environmental issues (Kyoto, the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge), but we may see progress taken at the local level and, to a lesser extent, by private enterprise. • Managing the operational aspects of the bilateral relationship in the post-election environment will require us to stay out in front of the issues, define our objectives, s.15(1) 000058 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information CONTEXT The political scene. The mid-term Congressional elections were a triumph for the Republicans, underwritten by ongoing concerns about security, coupled with the voter’s endorsement of George Bush as a wartime leader. Although the Republicans do not have a completely free hand with the social and economic aspects of their agenda, Americans have united behind Bush and the Republicans on security, which remains the dominant political issue. The election results were a remarkable achievement for the Republicans. Yes, voter turnout remained low (39%), and after the most expensive congressional election in US history (approximately $1 billion), less than two percent of the seats to be contested in the House, and 15 percent in the Senate, changed hands. Nevertheless, for the first time in over 100 years, the party of an incumbent Administration regained control of the Senate. The Republican win is all the more remarkable given the economic downturn, and financial scandals that have prompted questions about important aspects of the US economy - particularly in the area of corporate governance. Against this backdrop, the election clearly demonstrated the considerable political strengths of President Bush who made an exceptional effort -- in terms of time and fund-raising - on behalf of Republican candidates. In the electoral game, the Democrats chose not only the wrong plays (absenting themselves from the debate on Iraq), but the wrong game plan, by highlighting issues, (the economy or the future of social programs) where there was little in the way of policy to distinguish them from the Republicans. Policy Issues: Security First The elections underscored the abiding importance of security — domestic and international - on the US political scene. This is the issue that the Republicans on which the Republicans won, and one that will remain a key focus for at least the next two years. It is also the prism through which the country at large has come to view many issues. International security. Sometimes, it is strangely easy to forget this, but the US is at war. Its military personnel are engaged in ongoing operations in Afghanistan, other parts of South Asia, and the Hom of Africa, and Iraq may be next. All of this has produced a wartime mentality that is often lost on other countries. Eighteen months ago, it would have been fashionable to say that the US was ‘unilateralist’ - quite willing to impose its will on the world. Since then, the US has demonstrated a willingness to work with other countries. They have done this bilaterally (with various partners in the campaign in Afghanistan) and multilaterally (as evidenced by a 15-0 vote on the question of Iraq at the UN Security Council). All of this is encouraging, but we should bear in mind that the Administration (supported by sentiment in Congress and the public at large) continues to the evaluate the international response to current issues very carefully. Who is with us? Who isn’t? 000059 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgu# en vertu de la Loi sur I'acc&s a I'information Iraq will bring this way of looking at the world to the forefront. The US (led, within the US government, by Colin Powell) worked hard to gain a UN Security Council resolution that makes clear Iraq’s obligation to divest itself of any weapons of mass destruction, or face the prospect of being disarmed by force. The US regards us not only as a potential ally in this campaign, but as one of the countries that urged it to work for a UN resolution. So they are looking to us to support them, whether the resolution brings about the peaceful disarmament of Iraq or not. At the end of the day, our decisions on Iraq may have a significant impact on US perceptions of Canada as a dependable ally. Defence. The US is on a campaign to get all of its allies to spend more on defence. This may be less a matter of specific dollar figures (although more money is always nice) than the level of useful military capability that the US can count on allies to field. The US will be watching for indications that we will make the investments that will enable us to continue to play our historic role in international security. The new focus on homeland security has also raised the salience of Canadian geography as potential avenue of attack against the US - so the US will want us to be a reliable partner there too. Missile defence is the other major bilateral defence issue on the horizon. Although the deployment of a system is several years away, planning is underway now, and decisions on command and control are not far off. If we want to influence the development of a system that will have the potential to defend Canadian territory, the time is drawing near for us to indicate our interest in participation. Domestic security. Quite apart from the memory of September 11th and the possibility of war with Iraq, the ensuing anthrax scares, periodic security alerts, heightened security at all ports of entry, and the sniper attacks in Washington have produced a situation where domestic security has become a prominent, pervasive influence on the US agenda. With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and Northern Command, the US government is poised to embark on the most significant reorganization of itself since the end of the Second World War. With the founding legislation of the DHS now signed into law - and the resources there for the asking - the DHS stands to become a juggernaut that will sweep a lot of other interests, national and bilateral, aside. The Border. Canada and the US have a shared interest in the co-management of the border, and we’ve worked well on the issue so far. But the days of the ‘undefended border’ are over. What stands to become more significant, however, are the divergent conceptions that the two countries appear to be developing about what the border means. For the Americans, successful border management is increasingly about containing the potential threats that integration poses to their safety. For Canada, successful border management is about preserving the access that Canadians and Canadian goods, services, and investment have to the US. The first impulse of US officials when it comes to our border issues is to liken it to those which they face on their southern frontiers (Mexico). Moreover, there are competing views within the executive and legislative branch as to whether the border is about ensuring the free 000060 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information movement of people and goods (which benefits both countries) or about law enforcement and immigration policy. Taken together, this suggests that, as much as has already been done to tighten control of the border, the prospect of additional measures will remain on the agenda. With security holding the edge over trade in the battle for priorities, it is not at all clear that we will be able to secure exemptions from NSEERS or similar additional measures to come (as illustrated by the recent Congressional initiative to have a full-scale entry/exit program in place by 2005, which threatens the progress achieved on the Smart Border Accord, and the nature of border access as a whole). The need to ensure the safe and efficient movement of people and goods across the most economically valuable border is obvious - as are our shared objectives with respect to countering terrorism and crime. The individual sectors (customs, immigration, intelligence) work well together, and have done so for years. However, the current US political dynamic (security first) and growing bureaucratic momentum (the creation of the leviathan Department of Homeland Security) confronts us with a new situation. Indeed, the prospect of the US taking action across a wide variety of sectors (immigration, law enforcement, defence) to support the strategic goal of strengthening homeland security could have far-reaching implications for Canada. Considered of itself, each US imitative might look like an incremental change in a discrete area. However, the initiatives will be part of a broader agenda, the cumulative effect of which could recast our personality as a North American country. Economic, Trade, Energy and the Environment: Room for Guarded Optimism? Economic policy. President Bush has promised a new “economic stimulus” package early next year, which was widely expected to include significant tax cuts. Republican leaders have suggested that this package will include a number of relatively modest tax measures. While tax cuts remain high on the GOP agenda, they are competing with demands for higher spending on defence and homeland security as well as a politically-popular prescription drug benefit for seniors. The Republican tax strategy will have two key elements. The first will be a political push to make last year’s SI.35 trillion tax cut package permanent. The second will be a stimulus package tied to economic recovery. This could include an immediate increase in the child tax credit, a rise in contribution limits for retirement savings accounts and an expansion of tax breaks for business investment. Strategically, the Republicans will try to shoehom many of these tax cuts into the budget reconciliation exercise, which requires only a simple majority in the Senate rather than the 60 votes that are required for most measures. Even with modest tax cuts, private sector forecasters expect that the US budget deficit will rise from SI60 billion this year to S200250 billion in fiscal 2003. Trade policy. It will be useful to remember that the 108th Congress will not be more willing than the 107th to endorse changes to US trade laws. Nor will it deal away protections for entrenched agricultural sectors, the steel trade, textiles and lumber. And a Republican Administration will be anxious to demonstrate that the system of trade agreements is serving US interests and to show its determination to enforce those agreements. That said, the starting point for debate will be more positive than what we saw with the 107th Congress. 000061 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information In terms of the forward trade agenda for the 108th Congress, there are three dimensions of interest to Canada. First, the impact on bilateral trade files. Second, the implications for US compliance with WTO decisions. Finally, the prospects for future trade deals requiring Congressional approval. We anticipate that the prospects for a negotiated, long-term, policy-based solution to the softwood lumber dispute will improve. The results of the election help to create an environment in which the Administration is better able to defy extremist demands from the US Lumber Coalition in Congress. The change in Congressional leadership will assist an Administration that is eager to demonstrate its free-trade credentials, including a message that US trade laws do work to achieve market-opening and “fair trade”. Other contentious issues -- such as agriculture and steel — may also be easier to address. On wheat, the Administration’s earlier promises to pursue a WTO case against the Canadian Wheat Board will not have the same urgency. On steel, the US industry can continue to count on influential supporters in Congress. Canada’s decision on safeguard actions against steel imports will be watched closely, and we can expect a swift negative reaction from Congress if US exports are included in the action. That said, the Parliamentary Steel Caucus has established a good working relationship with its Congressional counterpart and this will generate support for a North American initiative on steel. Creation of a government-led, North American forum to discuss issues relating to the steel trade may help to shield Canadian producers from the numerous protectionist actions promoted by the US industry. Apart from bilateral trade issues, we will watch how the new Congress deals with major WTO decisions. These disputes will put to the test Congressional willingness to uphold the US Government position since the establishment of the WTO that the US will abide by WTO dispute settlement decisions. The 107th Congress saw much criticism of specific WTO decisions and the Trade Promotion Authority bill contains a negotiating objective calling for the Administration to “rein in” the WTO Appellate Body in instances where it is considered to have overstepped its authority (particularly in relation to decisions finding against US trade law). Looking ahead to further negotiations to liberalize trade, Ambassador Zoellick will see the new Republican-controlled Congress as more receptive to the Administration’s ambitions for trade agreements with a growing list of bilateral partners (Chile and Singapore first, followed by Central America, Morocco, Southern Africa, Australia and down the road, the ASEAN countries). Similarly, US leadership in WTO and FTAA negotiations is more likely in a Republican-controlled Congress with an Administration that has nailed its colours to the mast of open markets as the best hope to achieve economic, political and social development at home and abroad. Energy. Aided by a Republican-controlled Senate, an energy bill will be vigorously pursued in the new Congress and we are likely to face challenges to our interests similar to those found in the last bill (Alaskan pipeline subsidies, electricity policy). Advancing Canadian energy interests will benefit from a pro-active strategy that engages 000062 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information the Administration on our mutual energy objectives. More intensive work with the US on energy (whether in bilateral or trilateral fora) offers an opportunity to underscore Canada’s special relationship with the US in a vital economic sector and will assist in managing the inevitable problems that re-emerge in an energy bill. Environment. At first blush, the elections would not seem to have handed us a propitious climate for forward-looking environmental policy. And, to an extent, that’s true: we will not see the U.S. ratify Kyoto, and any future energy bill is likely to contain provisions for drilling in the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge. The Administration and Congress are also likely to move in favour of reducing the environmental regulatory burden on private enterprise and devolve more of the responsibility for environmental stewardship to the state and local level. That said, this dynamic could yield limited progress - at the state and/or local level (to which most eyes will be turned, as little is expected at the federal level) and possibly in terms of limited government funding for S&T or R&D advances by private enterprise (which may see money to be made in environmentally-friendly technologies). MANAGING THE RELATIONSHIP The ongoing challenge will be to manage the relationship in a way that balances security and prosperity, and shores up our image as one of a select group of American allies. Secretary Powell’s visit to Ottawa was encouraging in that it reflected a US desire to engage Canada, and resulted in usefully clarifying both sides’ understanding of key issues. However, the new environment challenges long-standing assumptions that have governed how we manage our relationship with the US. The US no longer automatically factors in the views of traditional allies when it makes its decisions on foreign and security policy. The countries that will influence US policy will be those that choose to engage with them - effectively, self-selecting allies and partners. We can choose to engage or not - but they will take note of our decisions, and deal us in or out of future decisions accordingly. In North America, the comfortable era of Canadian exceptionalism may well be over. The emergence of these factors will confront us with fundamental questions about how we manage the bilateral relationship, and what type of country we want to be. We will also be dealing with new partners (nine new border state governors, a leviathan Department of Homeland Security). The key for us will be to stay out in front of emerging problems, identify our interests, and take advantage of our small size to exploit our power of proposal: the opportunity that we have to be the first to propose solutions and set the agenda s.15(1) 000063 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00005 Title A name given to the resource Background Material on Canada-US Relations Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 04-Dec-02 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived BAN 2014-01289-X, Box 12, File no. MCU2003-00765 – Ministers Visit Washington DC 8-10 January 2003, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10029 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/6b4fca62d29f68494c34d31ae3b81c66.pdf c889f1633b10279b717352f687d0abca PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information JOHN HOLMES [HILL]* Good morning. Holmes. Holmes and we delighted are participate in this project. we NATO. interest in NATO NATO narrow one focusing document at NATO long-term and general in Canadian member of However, to know, what you as this of approach the Department of take the main example means of international peace and security. So senses, owing to us, External Affairs phases in your career, in each period, more or questions about as you saw as a your and as involvement explanation, and of as a researcher, less in chronological principal issues which the We a both interview is to them at the time described or assessed them since then. information a in both interests, The way we will approach this and to ask some not is particular that or work broader effort to look a for detailed the foreign policy and international affairs, writer and teacher. in our but rather you with very keen to have were of some of Canada's foreign policy pursuing the goal of we also drafting the on headquarters, at the development immediate and organization. the arose readiness your Professor Holmes, time over inside order, with today us engaging in here is an oral history of Canadian policy in We are trying to examine the development of Canadian are the morning is Professor John very pleased indeed that you could join We are Professor Our guest this are course, or as you have interested not only but in also your reflections about the specific issues or general themes of foreign policy or world affairs. First of all, for the sake of life as served normally start with a little bit of biography we reader. the English Master as Information at 1940 the CIIA from 1941 1943. and served first *Interviewers: as note that Pickering Secretary International Affairs to I to to 1941, You you College the and joined as began from 1933 Cox, to '38, Canadian Institute National Secretary of External of Affairs in 1943 secretary of the Working Committee Hill, working your on Post Pawelek. 000181 ������������������������������������������������������������������ Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNA00001 Title A name given to the resource John Holmes: "In Alliance" Interview Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived “Research - In-House Research - Oral History of Canadian Policy in NATO - Hill Roger,” RG154, Volume number: 13, File number: 2100-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/88cbf903312b454caf0355927d31a70e.pdf 6eee511998ee817779eb2b5c4782769d PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information ESCOTT REID (HILL]* Good Canadian policy in afternoon. NATO. This is a My is name interview is being conducted International Peace Reid. Escott you meet on Hill, Deputy Director Roger Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade. of the The further tape in the series especially in participate Security. and guest My Institute for Canadian the afternoon this is Reid, I'm delighted to have this opportunity to Mr. and for pleased project. this that Your you has name willing were to mentioned been constantly in the course of my work and interviews on this project, especially as one who played a particularly vital role in Canadian foreign policy-making at the time the North Atlantic Treaty established. if outline of when you First your of career working were all, wonder I with particular emphasis on setting the of up give could you on the an us periods those North was Atlantic Treaty. [REID] Yes. Oxford. the spent at grew up For six Canadian Institute year of a Rhodes scholar and attended National Secretary was I International for Affairs and also I teaching Government and Political Science Dalhousie University in Halifax. External Legation in Washington a I was during the 1930s years academic one Department at in Toronto and attended Trinity College University of Toronto. at the of I Affairs as and In January was 1939, posted Second Secretary. to In 1941 I joined the the Canadian to 1944 I was the Department in Ottawa and then posted again to Washington for year in aviation 1944. meetings [HILL] on on I was Chicago in Conference I at at the the international conference end of 1944, the UN in the Spring of 1945, the San on civil Francisco and the international the UN in London from August 1945 to February 1946. believe this early period in your diplomatic career is described partly in your book On Duty, where you describe the work establishing the United Nations, particularly in 1945 and 1946. It is not easy, of course, to develop a readable account of the of *Interviewers: Hill 000247 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information kind of committee meetings one attends in the course of practicing but I have to say that I found the account multilateral diplomacy, major international pursuit your back to outline of an Affairs. External your 1946 from promoted then was description of Well, [REID] machinery agreement and setting up international peace and security. of interrupt as It gave idea of the human dimension of the business of hammering out some a time both lucid and easy to follow. your work in that of Anyway, I'm sorry to Perhaps we career. could go life. 1947 to I served in Ottawa and Counsellor was Under-Secretary Assistant to I your for the in that capacity for of for State year and then a Acting Under-Secretary and Deputy Under-Secretary from 1948 to 1952. [HILL] as I believe that Pearson was powerful force very a Under-Secretary of State and as Foreign Minister in much of this period, was command for part time and that Canada set up a security. I the second-in- work know the on that diplomacy Canadian in his there this at played a not inconsiderable role in the effort system to help maintain Western and international new In were 1949. and 1947 between you particularly in this time, important figures other very were of that note also I not? he Atlantic Treaty North to Lester fact I think if one looks at the record, one is struck by the capability of many of the Canadians involved in this process. [REID] time, Yes, including Riddell, think there I Norman Doug Le Mr. Reid, Pan, were many Robertson, remarkable figures at that Wrong, Hume Charles Ritchie and, John of Gerry Holmes, course, Louis St. Laurent. [HILL] was your own carried out partly in the partly in elsewhere. international Of course, work the North Atlantic Treaty Department of External Affairs and meetings since on then, write books and publish articles on 68 in Washington,London you have continued this issue. In speak, to fact, and I think 000248 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information that, rather than try to obtain your Treaty here today in ideas impromptu fashion, an the North Atlantic on served in this project by asking you to refer works which you consider to be the most [REID] Obviously, establishment the start Treaty, Time of Fear Treaty, 1947-1949. foundation of the began by describing 1977. in Atlantic North atmosphere the be as well those of your in this area. from is my book of This published by was example, For up set a new the conceptual issue who became engaged in the arrangement for international security. simply involved, issues membership. of description of of the one in the book to tried account of the negotiations, than rather [HILL] study I policy. that is to say, something and to write a balanced scholarly certainly is valuable a contribution to the field, particularly for students of Canadian foreign Mr. Reid, of your works [REID] Yes. I wonder if I on could you North think the key ones Atlantic Alliance. Prophetic the They gave refer to us one are Vision It of is the as on follows. the The first is miraculous growth of included in NATO's 1940s, edited Anxious by Nicholas the essay second is "Strengthening the Alliance", which appeared in International Perspectives Impossible". The or two the North Atlantic Alliance. article in The NATO Review in 1980 Sherman. aim for this other Birth, extensive an careful a the Treaty should be whether the provide and collection of reminiscences. a book The of is military alliance or whether we should a Treaty the there 13 key issues, I work, of terms the chapter In more. the to talk on describe the organization of the discussions about the Treaty, also an I international in relations in the immediate post-war years and then went effort to issue of the whole Alliance. us the The Making pervading about the fears and hopes of those of on and Hope: discusses It to us important to and Stewart McClelland the of the Atlantic North place the might we the title "The Art of the North Almost Atlantic in the November/December issue, 1985. Thirdly, I'd like to cite my most recent discussion of the Alliance which is entitled "The North 69 000249 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Atlantic Alliance at Birth and in Middle Age". year, of opening at the [HILL] Thank you. chronology. our career Now wonder if I might we would simply like to obtain I briefly return to This 1957. was quite different a idea of your some I to shift one's different outlook after India I Germany, perspective sharply was on from the world appointed Ambassador to Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1969, 1965 to I bilingual arts Toronto. For served years after four for of College Glendon Director of Operations as Principal of First the as college, two that I was experimental an University York consultant a then continued international affairs, a both as and Fear to the Hope. to is One on book on and Hungary and Suez, Hungary and Suez of this year, am The and will was be World other 1956, а the I have of books and articles and conferences. the in discussion the I have written three two you have mentioned, Strengthening the World Bank. to Nehru, in active the writer of participant in a number of books in addition of be to from years, President of the Canadian International Development Agency. since Then the Federal Republic of Then, Middle East. and the Asia a Subsequently I went to the International from 1958-1962. South get to time to vantage point. new some diplomatic career a time from of operations area must say I believe it is very valuable in and as to After my years in Ottawa I was High Commissioner to India 1952 for this 20th of after the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty. [REID] from May on the United States and the Alliance. Canada, on conference in Toronto, a This is my address Duty, On Bank. two is called India, Envoy It on are and Time view from New Delhi. published in Canada at published in India this the The beginning summer. Now I working on my memoirs, which I hope will be published in 1989. [HILL] Thank you very you've taken the time to I'm much. see me very grateful indeed that today. 70 000250 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNA00002 Title A name given to the resource Escott Reid: "In Alliance" Interview Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived “Research - In-House Research - Oral History of Canadian Policy in NATO - Hill Roger,” RG154, Volume number: 13, File number: 2100-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/7fcb17c5a4ade87b3e1357ad8072380d.pdf 8ab76500e18e7a7d257045c3d40d9ac6 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information IGNATIEFF GEORGE Good afternoon. [HILL]* Representative NATO, to to pleased to have with are Ignatieff, George Ambassador We formerly United the Canada's Nations and today us Permanent to the Geneva Disarmament Conference also previously Provost of Trinity College, University of debate international on Ignatieff, Toronto and and we very security issues. delighted an oral that you history of Ambassador ready are to policy in Canadian to hearing what look forward much participant in the public active and peace participate in this project, NATO, an certainly are we now you have to say. [IGNATIEFF] project, I looking am which think I forward is participating to worthwhile. very were this teaching In international relations at the University of Toronto, there in found that I different perspectives in approaching just what very Canada's role had been. On the generation, whole the current I think, underestimates the importance of Canada's contribution not only in NATO but in the United Nations and the whole system of international institutions. [HILL] Ambassador Ignatieff, do in this project is to know, what as you obtain the examine the over look at the main policy developments and issues the years. We are developments. So periods of your career affairs or NATO-related issues: on the focus of when you our Interviewers: long term foreign trying to in our field were over affected by various discussions will be were directly on those involved in NATО for example when you were Canada's the working group that set up the consultative and defense planning structure for the * are fairly systematic fashion and to learn what happened and how Canada and the Alliance representative We importance of NATO membership to Canada and policy interests a trying to dealing with NATO. how well NATO has served Canada's immediate and the past 40 years in are views of those Canadians who have been most active over the years in trying to we Hill, new North Atlantic Treaty Pawelek 000251 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Organization and when you Council than a decade later. more get the real flavour of your the world Ambassador were and scene on interesting explain that One was far working with and reflections on So we will extensive, is concerned, NATO as also and if I may think that I Escott Reid in the negotiations was signed of the North April 4 on should I intervention. different stages of four Treaty itself, which Atlantic to career. really had I would also like Canada's foreign policy. say so, As we personal views own of the other periods of your [IGNATIEFF) the North Atlantic However, touch on some very to 1949; I was then sent to Washington to replace Tommy Stone on the international committee which was meeting, representative of all the members that had signed Treaty, the to set the up machinery consultative provided for under the Treaty and particularly under articles 4 and 2, and then liaison defense as dealing with the War, and Affairs. I Korean liaison in External then was later Washington in both officer as head keen when is sometimes overlooked signed we dispositions, involved in developing the there because had, the but deployments, I was very a should stage was where Crisis, other go to immediate into commitments. and the direct imbalance We of that back the part of any was all sparked on when It I was got involved Berlin Crisis, I '48 in stress military commitments. '66, nobody was extremely is that military all were in the security in Europe, Soviets had not demobilized the way the Western powers great enthusiasm fourth Treaty One of the demobilizing, which was one of the reasons why it seemed process of that the defense of military aspects really related more to the Korean War. factors that in things that went on, of the the such allies NATO, course to was go no into and then the between the as Greek-Turkish and then of there '49 by Korea, Ambassador to in things and Cuban crisis and '62 and Missile all the the whole question of nuclear weapons. [HILL] are We will look at those built in terms of your own various periods. career, so These interviews they are done in certain phases. And we have had the pleasure of reading your autobiography, 72 000252 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information The Making of Peacemonger. a international affairs, anecdotes. think I Not only was it I greatly but revealing about very enjoyed many your of it all helps to bring international affairs alive. Part I - Early Years, [HILL] If I to might 1939 start briefly with what very part 1, which would be the early years up to 1939, referred you to in your memoirs and then finding a University of Toronto studied at Jervis Collegiate and then at the and then subsequently won a Rhodes scholarship to Oxford. if you could just the main tell impressions us a made on by them, you thinking about international peace your [IGNATIEFF] Yes, ongoing interest was in a sense recollections not very rational, is going on, and child of World the age I. That when one was that. My begins to have, but at least some impressionistic view of what of the March revolution in 1917, was and my career on and then through the Civil War, which we encountered when the family moved down to to the Caucasus the - to Kislovoosk whole upheaval in then. We arrested rescued were a the brought and by in the to get away from the tensions and - capital city of middle before of a the revolutionary it was father was as My War. Civil a lot of escaped death. We were on attempt on life Lenin in Moscow, Russian aristocracy the without trial. counter Petrograd, tribunal. He was student who recognized him as the former Minister of Education who had brought forth or security. really is the fact that War four, of as diplomatic life and your in peace and security at wonder think particularly I think that the main effect war a first a I I little bit about those early years and they affected your later approaches to I Canada. home in new your lived in Montreal and Toronto, worked in the interior of в.C., You my cal1 experiences of the Russian Civil War, your in England, years at school could we of were an reforms, and execution list revolutionary activities 73 - whole a one way as a which he narrowly hostages after when put to death in Father was arrested as we or lot of an the another with hostage, charged with could not have been 000253 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information in, active very trouble, from but - University, Moscow tribunal. time the at he because say he I as bed, in was sick a rescued by was recognizing him he He said that if father was with man was heart student a of member a the shot he would raise hell with the teachers and the students in the town where this tribunal was sitting, a and as Bolsheviks the were relying then at that time good many of the students and teachers, that sort of thing in the him go. then We get through with the help of to able were White Russian movement to the So my very first recollection worse, was breakup many of saw Japan. World of end the at British war ship. a of civil war, of death. the end of, not defeat in of War war, which of in Germany and II to mutiny. the experience with water of bread; This to breakdown in society. electricity war a those England had a and found myself time in were as This was impressionable refugees. I years. position father tried farming. of the It was of as Bolsheviks; a financial which I had employment in crust of war. 74 as course we schooling there that most children of Bolshie, although my and we tried disaster, four, found Canada. of Then started my was chance result a then all between the years of four father better and by terrible bloodshed and would regard anybody from Russia a a first which in the west had been celebrated course little my elder brothers, as army running, lucky to get were in society in the equivocal persecuted by my was Trains stopped In Russia it was celebrated and that wasn't available gas or breakdown of sort breakdown of society. seven and Tzarism and scarcer until you the end of victory. the ; was that Then that Imperial mutiny in the the was of scarcer that It breakdown safe, wasn't food became a was and defeats in which whole to the Soviet army led to terrible led course Austria armies were surrounded and defeated and taken prisoner. that the and the failure to provide for munitions and losses led gradually to And only of war but Russia, what isn't perhaps generally realized, In supplies saw society as a result a terrible the that I was was the and were coast of the Black Sea, sea taken off the beaches of Novorossijsk by what they let democratic ranks rather than the Bolshevik ranks, social a on One farming and little - by that they had came over as a 000254 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information another harvester, came over as which labourers, Crows the bringing was Nest sent to engineer an when 15 was brought in on labour in came we a there an as axeman, well me to get university to win and certain a by the bohunk enabled scholarships, several on Trail with the intellectual; this experience and other jobs, as an but actually did get I so Canada intellectuals, not railroad construction crew, a to one colonization CPR amount of initiation in Canadian life as it was lived as another and joining the Crows Nest Line Pass, worked I as I and since I was I was Smelter. over mining engineer. a with my mother, scheme came one which culminated with the Rhodes Scholarship in 1930 for Ontario, which got me to Oxford. were living, were in in order to boarding little could in hotels, up one brought take was the financial burden off my parents, in farms father who had, Revolution, become emigrés and the He He felt was that to But, fact a quite upset were he In fact, years. I looking after the Cross, the Red that was get to away good for not that accepted I sort of that should be going back to Europe. I lucky very strange way this so that to be returning so much an was plunged was me of from sort distress honour into the and to our so on, replay of the I was in working on a Ph.D. in Eastern Europe in Bulgaria when the war I was my grandfather's crisis in 1877/78 working historical material relating to some on activities when he and the origins of the here same sort when I was at Oxford, I was of in a way, America. Mike Counsellor at Canada House and he brought a Pearson looking back enlarging and Eastern crisis North met 75 dealing with the Eastern myself, found I engulfing the whole of Europe and time Scholarships and threat, the German threat against Eastern Europe. broke out. on But it did lead when he recovered his health after the President of The thought it although in German Rhodes the the continent which had brought family. thing. refugees and setting up clinics and we background. soon for get whatever jobs I to and that sort of remember my thing. trying and here to Europe in the immediate pre-war me except very few I entering the competition to that these was way or another in financial straits. house on Everybody in Canada, Years. the Depression fortunates, a think the significance of that I I remember the who was then number of the Canadian 000255 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information together, students which students on We were very during this period of 1939, just after the Munich crisis. divided think the majority out of that stay should that try and to late was something do and found I it seemed to me, and France to chance of together work League the of a I in the perhaps not collective the This of Nations. League the myself was resurrect to before the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. was, provisions wars, Canada that felt at that late stage it even security provisions of may say Canadian students of European minority arguing too discussion a Canadian the among in Just what should Canada do? scholarships in Britain. I participating remember I interesting, very was and discussion I said that there getting the Soviet Union, Britain security under the collective to stop Czechoslovakia Covenant consumed by the Germans, but if we did not do that, there being every was likelihood that Germany would just move forward into Eastern Europe East as they had done before. And bigger threat in the end and Canada would [HILL] Just as a matter of curiosity, Bulgaria and Romania pro-German independent, I prejudices had to have Yugoslavia sovereign? I discovered, course, of Boris, of the then King of Bulgaria, Bulgarians fundamentally were have taken whatever side so, was more that the a was German, the pro-Russian Soviets would have The and were Hungarians, the Yugoslavs, you're quite right, I say and, I never to Eastern completed, popular opinion And that's what Tito But to return to the effects of on. I taken, would belonged to the Austro-Hungarian empire; definitely against the Germans. build and because they had but with of was who very unwilling victims of the German occupation. that of great deal to do with the German orientation of the Bulgaria a less in. come the alignment wasn't at that time? much a believe. What [IGNATIEFF] faced with be would we European politics going in my was back to was able to Europe, as Ph.D. project, which warned by British Intelligence would be among those candidates for early internment because the German because penetration I was into the Bulgarian government and military circles.-My grandfather had signed the Treaty which gave 76 000256 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Bulgaria independence its streets Sofia in regarded Part II England, - [IGNATIEFF] War I, after named so of the main one grandfather and he is my England at got back to I outbreak of World the decided to go to Oxford to join up. regiment which system, curious still returned, but never Russia, 1939-43 So, and local I with war of their patron saints. one as is result of the a hardly inconspicuous. I was the as was the "Oxford regimental I joined Bucks". and up with It headquarters was a you went to the Oxford and Bucks and were met by a recruiting sergeant and doctor and preliminaries of the over. The here". I regimental said: in Murmansk joining major sergeant Armed the said: "It comes from Russia". in the First World War". with mills bombs. and Forces "Oh," he said: He mills bombs up We threw the a queer name said: "I stream and was to fish used "We the quickly were "You got at the fish everything you had". Well, that was my introduction into the Armed Forces but then you were brought before up came a took Board which Armed Forces there was a Balliol and were you to were General they decide your to was and serve that And, in. which there branch was looked through my university record wondering which service suggested to as might I I the you fitted for. cavalry. I best was into go an you have all these languages, you're a natural an So they wrote out that I was see, extraordinary place, an notorious tourist spot. Bedford. At the intelligence, MI5 That intelligence for the to be made a cadet, outbreak and MI6 Woburn Abbey of war, and so on, in - a "Look, training which is quite historic and was and not officer in the Intelligence Corps and that was that and I sent to of Admiral, was but the head of Balliol said: as the Somebody particularly keen horseman course." of Force Group Captain and the head of Air an fate seat was now a of the Duke addition to the regular with the War Office, sir Campbell Stuart, who was incidentially a Canadian, was asked by the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, to set up a headquarters at Woburn Abbey which would combine spying in one form or economic another and against 77 political the warfare Germans, with in neutral 000257 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information countries. I interruption deal with the to and the supplies of Germany from Russia to Balkans. this But, Before the in 1940. was Bulgaria, from assigned to that part of the operation which had was in 1939, there had come back I for admission to External exams were Affairs and Mike Pearson urged war when to write them in London. me written and forgotten all about it and apparently I had I top of the was list of eligible candidates for the Third Secretary competition of had written who those in London. Under-Secretary, had sent of who the things short staffed with all very then was message to Vincent Massey who was Head a Mission in London begging for reinforcements, the were Skelton, Doctor because they that had to be done with the Canadian Armed Forces coming over, the agreements that had to be negotiated, and dealing with the evacuation of Canadian and children from the war being sent to Canada. House were an zone and problems. "Well, said: job. That was my first there that there said in The staff of Canada Vincent Massey, was to reply to deal with all appeal this George Ignatieff passed the and exam asked. that that would be way one menagerie strange appreciations, intelligence leaflets well as that and of the thrown But at my reply to you can get that was done. if so were and Abbey, were the where he could So I was get into we were in doing preparing propaganda also Germans war about making peace, as conducting intelligence activities in Switzerland and in Portugal. that Woburn at I these instead of being active service with the Canadian Armed Forces, the Léon understand we England, why don't you get him". thought there for help, that he is somewhere in I children, mean I Charles Ritchie and Hume Wrong, was all was Skelton So and children out women extraordinary group of people: Mike Pearson, Mayrand, Getting zones. and a whole lot of English people, of the was war women me out I Mr. Pearson, and transfer who me I approached me, was, willing to come, am arrived at Canada House just at the time collapse of the Western Allies in Europe, just after Dunkirk and then without any this whole business training or of how to Europe back to Canada, women and preparation I pitched right into get these Canadian refugees children. 78 from And then the immediate 000258 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information threat invasion of Canadians, Britain of non-combatants made England of out question the acute. more getting of So I was shoved right into this job alone, to people onto the troop ships that were going westward to bring was quite Division First and over that this and put these organize initiation an the into diplomacy. Particularly as the bombing started during the days as well nights, as the addition I and became rather given was job the complicated operation. a dealing of Canada saddled with arrested under the Alien Legislation. they had people of The Home Office and the War Office had just arrested people whether they were refugees they were declared to were shipped out be to torpedoed on the way, Canada Australia. and Some Italy. a we commission to us inquire into them. Baum, the interned lists of names. famous as an refuge taken in did We theologian, "enemy alien". and He he me again the victims of military it gave me, But take in over to give way and one of was was way just shipped another: or Britain period, it was ring a agreed that bell if within sight of we saw we flag Canada House, the bell and everybody would on with out had other Blitz, gave increasingly are the breaks out the war everything else has Then there on the roof the we air never the Air and watching. raids took place got any work would take turns to be the and turns, not During the so origin We all had to take being we took shelter, people these the Blitz the day, C.V.'s, was only in duties during If from as But that took some time When justice. in England and air raid precautions. during the days. among Jewish with their priorities and of people They had simply that together with the that includes Battle were people like Gregory was the civilians impression that war, well have their not turned out that It people; lots of people were just refugees. to sort out. as did the British. nor Catholic England not; months to discover this and to set up It took did not have any papers, given them of but we got this unsorted collection of which included all kinds of refugees from Nazism Fascism in or in the event of invasion and they threat a of because the British collection unsorted an internment with prisoners of war and that was quite a handful, In on roof and which was the Ministry, done, hoisted for danger. We would ring just fly down to the shelter in CMHQ 79 000259 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information which and door. next was encoding addition to that In with along of messages coming in. Some of them were military operations and others military had strange ideas. I sleep available Canada at door in the CMHQ and this was of pillows, "Instead Well aspects then, of our mission succumbed a a the bombing. was actually breakdown and the a I did at This directions. who who Massey and briefing the Prime provide a In in charge of sort of I was found I was happened while Mr. King Mr. Somebody myself "pinch- not only Minister but also trying to do all these jobs photographer at the first meeting That was providential London because Canada was (before the between Mr. He was the main we and the USSR on because this Canadian job Military full-time and had to look after Mr. King made Freeman of the City of ally undefeated and with troops available to support the USA from to take But even then, various capacities. supplies borrowed was Campbell Moodie, relieved of it. in his and the place, of satisfy Mr. Massey that I really could not be in three places once. was could take it, but I these King and Mr. Churchill. Headquarters, I man and most junior being the public relations liaison. between Mr. so all remember failing to remember I had the man who was looking after the coding We arrived and as the youngest I political and public relations had janitor the public relations had a breakdown. on it said: But We had several people break I was young, our attendant next cases". of in charge was encoding, he had in or dealing with of the things that One and hitting" telegram a diplomatic the course well. who who committed suicide. had to conference attended by Mr. King in 1940, and result of person, I the getting very annoyed once to amendment down under the strain of war. had again duties, these for pillows and pillow of as war official we there but had previously deciphered. I read the British as an had we well was the first the decipher an immediate top secret telegram for operations that naval all remember being woken up. bunker, and I remember at being woken up to operations, be to House of top secret dealings with not, were coding do the staff English couple a had to I came war effort based in Britain into the war). The meetings King and Mr. Churchill were extremely interesting, and 80 000260 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information very important in the the supply aircraft of priorities that the sense and which tanks that time were at Canada top given was priority to do and of course Lord Beaverbrook was another Canadian, who Howe in charge of the production put was turning in charge of was and- tanks Canada, in end American help. with and c.D. and producing aircraft the heat on in Britain "Chubby" Power, the Minister of Defence for Air, was in charge of the Commonwealth Air Training The other Plan American help the point easier. possible as of liaison. It of the war was was regarded our that much to get at that time as as things made much special relationship in the European time when that defeated and indeed there the headquarters was beginning of at thing Ogdensburg After happened all Canada and And that was the defence. were Canada. in serious discussion allies to whether as effort would be moved from London to Ottawa, including the question of possibly moving the Bank and reserves and [HILL] I Ogdensburg thing. It from the that sort of thing. think it was John Holmes who made the - that us witnessed strictly North American see Canada and was the situation where kind every it was out of boat of action, and defence day Canadians would The British Army had been, by it's peculiar situation which in 1940, which present There defeated. but to When I say this sometimes I find it had been rescued Dunkirk, a unless you go back to this believe myself. had been difficult is It hardly believe. to really not was point about beginning. relationships of it same really a device to get the United States involved, was [IGNATIEFF) some the the even all that the allies remnants of it and volunteer into difficult device at situation the Canadian First Division arrived with Andy McNaughton. And Andy McNaughton was greeted literally as a saviour and the Canadian First Division Britain. Canadian was on duty Canadian airmen Navy was fighting Britain supplied with food to were the as prevent the invasion, to defend in the Battle of Britain, and the Battle of well 81 as the munitions Atlantic, keeping of war. 000261 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [HILL} Canadian Army The in Britain at that time [IGNATIEFF] course They very adequate. not rifles, Ross we But thinking in terms of were in. of rest of it So It took the character of funny, make it sound but it people like not. was well period to be Charles Ritchie to Charles has in his memoirs you know, about his sleeping somewhere else when hit the place that he supposed was morning the ruins. remember going with him to I the ways in which one of by going to different the crux of it kept alive, places was Italy, kept dodging we when unless the United at that this site, bombs the could we was sleep. sometimes at home. moment was the only in spite of all of his brave words, way in which see any see this night Canada that undefeated ally and Churchill, could not at bomb suit hanging above one sometimes in Canada House, Sometimes in bunkers, But find nothing but we a sleeping in and he came to be back the next to first as and took snatches joke that The kind of some incredible an was day and you worked all night, You worked all sleep. it. as Home immediate an everybody was trained in and shipped the arm of were and we could to we defence and we all had to do air raid precautions aid and all the them of some Ross rifles There were we that time, at and shipped Ross rifles all Guard in Britain. invasion only ones, the that had any arms ones quantity. in any were only the were we could prevail States came in. over the Nazis and reckoning He was not on invading the Soviet Union, although interestingly enough, Churchill anticipated that possibility. It was that very immediate Hitler reaction on the part of Churchill, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union, allies. who had absolutely And, indeed Canada House not was we in saying that of the things that affected one that hesitation no were our we were work at engaged through Ambassador Mayski in only supplying Britain, but Canada began to supply food and various munitions to the among the escorts of the munition northern route to Murmansk. used to do with Mr. came back, because Massey it was attacked by German Stukas Union, Soviet and Canadian ships were supply and food which went up the I remember was greet one our of the things that we heroes when they naval the way they a dickens of as well as submarines. 82 a run, But were anyway the 000262 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information crux strategy at that time was that of the with the help of Canada, the United States would somehow be brought into the brought into the war effort. be were the was munitions, the production of course and the British survival, in the really engaged became in regarded this his as whole and the and tanks, undertaking of the done also with American 1940, in business of that first we Canada/U.S. the in Ogdensburg. And Mr. important achievement. There defence, most there course, it was through that threat effort, war the relationship in special was But, at least or provision of supplies to tremendous help and some American volunteers. of success aircraft, of Commonwealth Air Training Plan which to a loans of the destroyers and the to help Canada It war King was no doubt in his mind, and in Churchill's mind. The two characters were very I unlike. have King was Mr. met. ever remember when I Prestwick, he got out of ground, the parade around of the most one greeted him I Liberator bomber, a inspecting the troops he on, which was appreciated. end of the war, line, but that is another in those they booed him; was were early meetings about use the When he went and and he became introduce conscription short troops of in the McNaughton and Mackenzie King had reorganized. being under British command. over in had told been the that primary duty would be to stand on guard in Britain while the British Army or story. we to early meetings with Churchill, Canadian Army's in those when to do. the postal service was increasingly unpopular when he refused towards the arrival on much more interested in such was But characters backside foremost onto and did not quite know what essentials as how they were fed and what so un-martial question of anticipated by McNaughton. He discussion no was the Canadian Army in Europe developed The trouble that later reinforcements of There and conscription had had been in the First World been War and had noted that Canadians had been thrust by British commanders into situations such casualties were not commit as Vimy use and to of Canadian the Norway. the Somme likely to be highest, troops personally reconnoitred. any and He in any was so on, and he vowed situation He see where the that he would which went to Dunkirk to Canadian forces going in. He and he had not if there were also went to Calais also prepared to go to Russia before there 83 000263 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information would be any commitment of Canadian Forces, for while. a because But, an developed, argument had Forces Armed Canadian the of which there was talk not and it been in largely was while action British Forces were in action in the Middle East, that increasingly McNaughton lost out in my opinion. [HILL] did also He want not if piecemeal, be used to them I understand well. concentrate not want them down in happening, and go to wanted he generals. No, nationalist, and it he because inspect them and for himself what was he would have him McNaughton was at that appointed by Mr. King in was "That said great a time that to 1946 Italy and to relationship unprecedented an was see that kind of background, of He did sent think I and view Italy, and when they were Montgomery General arrested". was McNaughton's in liberation of Europe in the main attack. the on command Canadian under remain to piecemeal, they had He did not want them to be used [IGNATIEFF] I between national, think I got to know him and it that he asked for represent Canada, when me first of all, in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and then at the United Nations the on diplomatic advisor. got to know Massey. one We There not of me and I very General, the looking character. signs were and he asked In I 1944, close friends; might say, he moved to Washington, ways, but I was was we had come and see Mr. were all a formidable very that rather I shown had from Ottawa to replace D.C. to take John Holmes in Post Hostilities Planning. some we partly by the fact exhaustion, three people were sent was be his to me various other candidates but another during the war, he used to were frightened of Security Council, I over was the work with sorry to go in thoroughly exhausted by this whole business of not being able to get any rest at night and working during the day, day after day. [HILL] Well, it was a sort of theory that grew up that the Blitz had all been great fun, at but in afterwards, fact when you look it it had been pretty devastating 84 000264 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [IGNATIEFF] Sunday when I It was was on both climbed we devastating, duty and Pearson came there no roof, the on mentioned that I as was one scene into Canada House and electricity the water, was broken off, the mains had been broken and the Treasury building was on fire. files The White Hall. stand of this kind of thing". giving in, you As he say, I just keep escalating aerial warfare, society. but it breaks down it does not break morale military The reckon that way to intimidate the other side into giving in. giving of you got up, wanted to get those at into account is that civilized all so you numbed, you bastards. did not want to isn't What comes to end an bombardment of course, this is escalated to We well within the margin of were just occurred to down of essential same Dresden and Tokyo. Part III Ottawa - [HILL] services. thing about writing the wonder if I It the New we now can go on to at that time and partly in New York, wonder if you could say a time and also what part the [IGNATIEFF] King. He started because are on the that Britain few UN an and a under nuclear unacceptable degree. even coming of the out, then, it the break- people are bombing of Berlin, city take? the next part, which is Part You were partly in Ottawa mainly working on UN affairs. things about what you did in played in Canadian foreign that policy. again one goes back to the preoccupation of Here What You give up. 1944-mid-1950s York, can is III, that is from 1944 to the mid-1950s. I did not think city stand of a effects Just how much and the sufficiently taken acceptability but just how much can us, You this is gradually reduce society to a standstill, gradually life talking about not was civilization a can It crossed our minds that if anything of that sort. or being blown about were just how much "Well, said Pearson Treasury the of circumstances which brings simple proposition. was at war, but Mr. 85 Canada into war? We found ourselves at King insisted on Mr. war waiting for 000265 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information a and having the House of week declaration of to end, an But war. and discussions of security, Mr. preventing any kind of system the as began King Lord actually sent questionnaire Government, asking at war". was such thing a an as King, Empire, Meighen who had automatically be at following World remember and I I was proposals Cranbourne describe in my book, given the how instance we task to could not National Defence believed that it of the be at were one Crown who took their peace British be at war of come was was That unconceivable continuity and to Lord Cranbourne, I reply. Canada's relations this to it incident Carnak the point of departure an to answer National these Defence. I agreement because that one officers to the should be at peace and some brought answer And I that he was in the be yes, pointed out that Mr. looking for Well we up should careful to hold up the declaration, United Nations Security Council. on the to any in terms of collective security through the no and not Canada would not inconceivable if Britain is at war. been very was King had write with They argued that tradition. to break that there Canadian commitments in Canada while other officers with regiments which Canada is at war, King had as commission and oath to the Crown could intertwined, would be at war. should such imperial defense an that sort of conjunction in Mr. decided this was So I. War talk of and certainly in the system defense although he spoke very eloquently Mr. war saying considering whether there imperial to back goes Canadian the to would Canada consider itself war Bennett had not approved of the British Secretary, but in effect system. about with happening ever Mr. to had been to the imperial defense system, from Commonwealth of. Mr. R.B. collective a the Churchill dreamed There coming And the other thing was that the in the context of And this be could is at Britain was pre-occupied much whole lot of questions a the event that "In very was separate a or the question of on Cranbourne, through end, an automatic commitment British, a to came war certainly in his lifetime. again, decide to make Commons especially some solution new institution of the never did give any reply think it could be found in the archives that There was a very definite reply as far in defence to the USA was concerned. We as worked follow-up Mr. King's.exchange with President Roosevelt 86 000266 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information at Ogdensburg. would the accepted. of course revised to It was and Norman Robertson, but Defence. on word The America, but it would not be a treaty, it was addressed that the P.J.B.D. in Canada. That prejudices - wind them up because was he was as quickly a of his day. possible. as his opposite a politician, P.J.B.D., based the to London. that series Holmes us of is why it That John keeping much power circuit, would sent to up to smoothly because very realized that issue. But anyway the framework papers that was to came agreed soon after go to London. but and to U.K. some the Official Secretary and at the point same then I was we mainly through came back in 1944 I Office were big the extent France, about And John Holmes on. contact, of time so of us, Foreign The kind what accepted, was be these quite is, U.S., London think he wanted to closely informed of the thinking in more that and the first long as he had Fiorello La As the preparations for the United Nations and was defence of North wanted to wind He Ogdensburg, on side or he and on one Canadian national I number, things went sensitivities Canada had that was very far from NORAD. McNaughton's of Mel Hurtig as was turned a closing down of US bases the was war-time commitments with the USA. the for the continuing consultation on defence problems, It was a of prepared idea The joint staffs of and consider plans he We in up a Permanent Joint permanent. was the other would meet Guardia co-operation extent by Hume Wrong some proposed setting we without commitment to governments, the area of nature this in the Post Hostilities Planning Committee, which was on Board be between the United States and Canada? peacetime paper What and I was made also made Secretary of the Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee and the Secretary of the Tripartite Nuclear arrangements of and 1943, whereby participate directly, though, the the in usual as provide the materials, help incidentally of evacuated to actual bomb Canada, project Canada the on Quebec Conference to supply the uranium the agreed the nuclear reactions (not decision-making concerning the bomb). in his we cautious way, would continue British and and those or under research involved in However, Mr. King, would Agreement, who were the not the Manhattan project 87 agreed that we the research with French, who had been taking part in or in Montreal the were 000267 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information in then Chalk Secretary of [HILL] That that, [IGNATIEFF] dropping it as bomb Nagasaki on and I was well... it? was partly because of was project. reactor our when you were in Ottawa, was the on tripartite arrangement a Yes, of working River that that after the Hiroshima, Mackenzie King joined Attlee, the Prime Minister then who succeeded Churchill, and Truman, making in governments who had worked energy atomic developing safeguards to object this bomb project, on peaceful for the that declaration the only purposes ways find to develop to was three of And, this was a declaration this. ensure and the of which was made by the three governments and the very first decision at Energy Commission to work Atomic think is that stress to Committee Planning Committee Uranium on thing about the It was what did we know. Secretary I am the or emphasize this, C. sure D. the took level, place, a Dr. except C. I technologically I Post- Tripartite an be tremendously so of us knew President of planning which the that that am sure I Mackenzie, J. just have been asked great deal of relevance to the would atomic bomb. secret and none planned without knowledge we of knew, and Howe at That had point the of the of preparation King knew, but it was absolutely top N.R.C. The Secretary as Mr. official UN Secretary of the Advisory was and the up set to Supplies for Canada to the USA, I did not know would I I was project. this on well as Committee existence secret, so although Energy, Atomic on Hostilities a after San Francisco, United Nations, the whole by affected world this new method of warfare. Actually, that is [HILL] strongly in the about that about The period the atomic did not know what [IGNATIEFF] deliberate of Peace. and the fact that some programme. was Well, on Shaping point which a There Holmes makes is a very whole section people simply did not know Most of the people in Ottawa simply happening this was, the-part John of Mr. in the US. I think, King. 88 looking back Mr. Churchill on it, quite insisted on 000268 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information being a never quite partner of Roosevelt in all strategic decisions. satisfaction, his to correspondence has one realizes that he could issues. have enough never was all the Roosevelt, one from know and influence strategic on Quebec that Britain would be consulted at before the bomb was used. you Churchill between And he insisted but It Whether that agreement the two of them out of the presence of Mr. did not know that they made decision, made between was do not know, I Quebec and the proceedings in Quebec were not committed to paper. The there. That that I saw I in not was I and what all that. and purpose But do not think wanted to be consulted, King, Howe told both of the tests at Los Alamos and when dropped, but I I was Although, supply of uranium, the fact did I as know say, I what was think C.D. I the bomb absolutely in the dark about the bomb, know anything about it at all. with whole only papers the that Mr. was not was had to do with the supply of uranium and how it would partitioned be 1943; was a just and Mr. King King, did not I I was concerned uranium being was supplied and also the safeguards which were developed for it. I understood the situation, it was for radiation hazards and all the rest of it. York, New present was were we in were atomic about do Baruch: to know' what you are sharing it "Well we have been concerned. much. same thing very I if Canadians do not know with other the proceeding a have I the was three members thing. a the remember saying as 'need far as not needed to know Why don't you apply the to know. If bomb, why do you need to know. We damn make of the basis of on apparently the question is asked, why do you want to know how to are would this has been interpreted pretty narrowly and Plan Baruch Baruch raised it, Mr. conversations), the And when we by the course commission and particularly the Soviet Union. to Mr. is parties to certain shared knowledge about the governments who bomb confronted of first question that arose, and the very I that first Atomic Energy hazards, and was not related to military uses. came to (and The safety, As principally to the handling of uranium for purposes of Act related health health was you need gathered here to stop making bombs, to abolish the arsenals and so on". a scientific But this was the approach that was committee set up 89 of adopted, scientists and there who was exchanged 000269 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information information, that was necessary really to explain and to understand I only learnt the Baruch Plan. later that Americans only had the about five bombs in their arsenal and could have easily disposed them instead of the 25,000 they have to dispose of now. of But, the important development that I think relates to that UN Atomic Energy Commission was that whole, King and C.D. Howe Secretary of State as Mr. Laurent came in, anyway, they all Plan relations well so with the United prescience than myself, put and amendments that in and then Mr. 1947, I think, not in way any Strangely St. Baruch strain our with more enough, Reid felt that the Baruch Plan was Escott added himself, Baruch stil1 was of additions namely that breach any just the agreement would not be subject to the veto which had of been agreed Yalta at And, co-operation. we control we outlaw atomic insisting row, a which energy other the these were peaceful that way, then decide purposes, the Americans should we that acceptable up this set I not even St. Laurent to try Bevin, after I finished explaining that the dual uranium purposes, reactions said: if "What electricity for be in you were to England, day: he were monopoly had "Look here, of to Ernie military Bevin, and Ernie of reactors for peaceful use and by Mr. asked was and inspection of all stages prevent diversion to military would have happened government of the so could this and you had to have control of the process he explain and to and this proposal was British. to the how all the nuclear activities of in all countries that had nuclear capability, all was Baruch, up to and first weapons for He insisting on their proposal which international agencies with control in characteristic was insisted that we stand He that the Soviets saw that was the basic agreements for post-war had quite missionary in spirit. when he of one as both in his good aspects and his bad aspects. of Escott, a States. year, view that should support the we should King Mr. good faith, particularly the kind not forward which view that we time Prime Minister as that supported the I that at forgotten the had and - I've in principle, on the if, come when along this here use, Faraday discovered and source said to the of energy is dangerous it's got to be put under international control. Where do you think that electrification in the homes of Britain would be, 90 000270 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information where Britain would in Britain would still classes inspector." - but The ordinary stand? And he said: they went of examination be waiting all options just the Baruch Plan; international some principle on get up and say that we the for working the buy this at all". "I do not along in the vote Escott Reid urged that homes of So it was, like we did, and insist on we a international control for proper and not possibilities that we insist on examining the of international inspection without all the ready made provisions of the Baruch appealed take Treaty. Pearson, to Pearson said and advice," Ignatieff's argued this, We advice what Ottawa instructed anyway. that And I've always regretted advice more seriously, Reid's on finally the telephone: "Well, happened voted we in principle. McNaughton and that we in because coincide with to the Baruch Plan for did not take Escott fact we recovered the ground that could have been made before of weapons We had began. The Tripartite Agreement broke retention of down weapons, Truman, however, Hickenlooper, provided there they would privately by they Kennan did proliferation started. not go course the poisoned the as not And, and along with it. to use. Gouzenko atmosphere. The British All kinds of ideas Lorry meet the of course, Norstad, spy business were Air Soviet I put Force requirements; British the the followed in 1949; whether they had the bomb before, of 1947. under pressure from Senators like Vanderberg and said but consultation was decided then to make their own bomb. Then in said that they would not make the Quebec Agreement, nuclear general, proliferation meeting in Washington in which the British, pleading for a forward really never and counter-bomb do not know. broke in 1946, so that Plus the rejection by the Soviets of the Baruch Plan and the Soviet advance into, or threatened advance into Iran, and Turkey, and the Communist pressure on Greece, all led to the Truman Doctrine and the begining of the Cold War. Now, whether that coincided with independent Canadian appreciation of the events leading up to the Cold War, of the Soviet I do not know. There were two members Department who had rather strong or developed views on policy. They were Arnold Smith and Escott Reid. Arnold Smith wrote archives - me a series of letters from Moscow he started these letters 91 because I - was they are working in the on Post 000271 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Planning, Hostilities first the and letter "It's says: tremendously important what you are doing, George, and I thoroughly support what you are doing and your ideas would be very interesting And then, to me." that we sure count can it from Stalin. made in out And Escott went further. it as stress wrote much the drop the need to Union is not going to get as and going are be stressed. he that to George measures on this Kennan did against Stalin, Washington, based on the concept of the an ally Stalin and benevolent kind of dictator who Kennan he illusions which were very rife in certain parts of the political machine in Soviet signs of no direction of George Kennan military idea of so the undertakings he knew George Kennan well at the time. so see article I think for PAFSo an you "Are even non-co-operation Escott went in the -I I countries these all the was and of "containment" not Soviet co-operation. on Romania; satellites." I these letters: is not carrying out He Hungary, subject. come about elections in Poland; Yalta of before 1946, Harriman appreciations of the not against Soviet attitude Joe", "Uncle really was working were as that sort of danger in any way. a kind the some were of optimistic being put forward by Vice-President Wallace, who was quite openly sympathetic to the Union Soviet quite bit a and of continued to be. Truman the part of effort on to make Truman take Kennan, a was people like tougher attitude on it but not, took Forrestal and subject, and the the Truman Doctrine was the first sort of step in the direction of But the thing which really made all the difference, NATO. Canadian standpoint, Mr. St. Laurent took Mr. St. decency, was Laurent, was first all the seriousness with which of the whole Gouzenko spy business. who had horrified when he very a keen sense scientists Civil the who were working with Service. us, The Canadian Civil penetrated, it turned out, than very closely at that time. justice and not only in the Soviet Military Attaché's Office but through the various in the Gouzenko trial, of really confronted with the full was evidence of the espionage that was going on, revealed from the that were links to the British nuclear and some Service the links was British, penetration of the comparatively less but we were working People like Fuchs and Nunn May this put 92 000272 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information the joint effort whole Catholic, took argument that peril into strong view. a Escott ideological, cultural, economic, that we by argued Escott political military threat. begin To nobody's prepared for threat we'd with but be alike, and out France. the time, was the in not idea weapons. which Alliance Italy, Yes, When you say "He", [IGNATIEFF) community right interest, community of versions which Article Dean Acheson. shared States, of Britain, St. Laurent Portugal, Greece, the they belong to the He was thinking from the start policies Two referring you and in so were ideas, those who of it. institutions", in this is the community And on. of terms a various the a of very, very grudgingly by people in the State Department but Escott would have had were willing What bringing we our to take this us who unite approach seriously, ambassador in Washington, who would ended up with about a better was "strengthening free understanding principles on which these institutions were founded. mention of Laurent? religious mystique in defense of Christian values. but others like Hume Wrong, none St. to and through, went There were those Escott's around an almost idea of the sort was Greece he might have no. boiled down version which was finally accepted have have to You of are Escott. No, Atlantic There and war but not Turkey. [HILL] perhaps a a terms of because Atlantic area, but not Greece and Turkey, tolerated, United thought he with by nations who think that Canada the it Escott used to say you as having Spain, about keen Community". "Atlantic like dealt Reid, who was the chief advisor to Mr. Escott Turkey this came of the Atlantic triangle; pin linch of that an the kind of to through gone nuclear or cannons not a of And throughout, against them by combining the influence of work at could another war, ideas with kill cannot this that as with faced were values that Western civilization stands for. was anyway He was very amenable to the kind advanced; Reid Laurent, St. and "Judeo/Christian civilization" promoting conditions North Atlantic area. of Escott had - There of was the no but he retainded the stability and well-being in the a 93 great deal of influence on the 000273 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information thinking of Mr. Laurent. St. Pearson was pragmatic, He did not believe he was persuaded, Pearson was always pragmatic. in all this. high Wrong Hume positively skeptical about was it after all oratory, flown is self-defense in view of the proven because of the Council work to issues such He Iran Acheson, the son of and can back this, what on I Soviet aggression and expansion, a action. What's was of consultation, quickly followed by breakdown in One of the breakdown in consultations never can report of was the Three Wise Men. I 1955, in report Men's Wise in I afraid, in Europe, am consultation over on crass the Suez. This the US example led to worked with Pearson on the Paris. of the He, as one Italy and Norway, of realized how tremendously important it was for Canada, was basically consultation constant foreign ministers authors who worked with the But anyway, was forget the fact that the most side. They really weakened the Alliance started, and it buy cannot solidarity among allies around against unilateral and from solidarity to prevent a effective and lack on veto. the sell to Congress. through was Union get away "Let's policies strengthened Three of use is that Escott feel right in saying that what was required was the the going to buy this kind of messianic language". not looking as Soviet the Security UN Episcopalian Bishop, an this stuff, he wants something that he are of the of for it is not going down at all well in Washington. all this oratory, Even Dean inability correspondence saying: in all the kept, this all regional arrangement a attitude Turkey and Greece, as do not think I that if NATO to be the triangle which helped to resolve the continentalist pulls which to consultations Canada It was there had intra-Alliance to be regular differences and important this should not just military affairs but should be about economic policies as Of well. the resolving and trying to unite policies. be about exposed, was community unilateral course ran the whole movement right action across on it; Suez, towards the European economic and likewise the British and French and while the Wise Men's Report said everything that could be said about strengthening the consultative procedure, the fact USA that as it well was as is that it has too often been other major powers. But ignored -by the it should be considered the non-military cooperative provisions which really 94 000274 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information made the Atlantic Treaty North acceptable Parliament, to as a departure from peace time commitments for Canada. {HILL] You mean primarily on the economic side the political or side too? [IGNATIEFF] side, last Well, started by being it then began being ignored in - Libya, Union times, recent trade disagreements the and Poland and all the about Union united front. face a was anybody in Western Europe or North contemplate to a Soviets on with the Soviet deal of the essence, if idea that was sort the are the of Soviet behind the America they would have that There was not going to be any chipping world war. In that this attack the Those away as there had been by the Nazis. in experience. mean should know if they moved against was the I it. The Treaty, that how to economic the of rest realized to business, Reagan things which Canada was on the political side. on the on ignored sense, the There idea was that looking back that was there should be community which would act together and confront any adversary. This is what had been weakened. This is where the failure in 1947 a on the control of the atom and the Cold the Korean War combined to produce a War together new emphasis on the one weapon which seemed to give the West superiority and China. It started during the combined, and over the Soviet Union, Korean War. functions My Senior Counsellor of the Embassy in Washington were threefold. was to represent Canada the various bodies under the North Committees, The institutions and on say difference of opinion, whether Canada should in NATO. Group. But which would be We what One working out established Defense on. question Group the international committee Atlantic Treaty, the Council, the Military and so only on as or did which there the not any real, only matter of should not be happened proceedings, claimed was want was to that a any I would not difficulty, was member of the Standing be members Italy, of the very early Standing in the Standing Group which was to be reserved to the United States, Britain and France (the idea was a seat on the - 95 000275 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information they that working would act the as plans). out the strategic strategists main I so five members instead was that we quite happy were But, three. I Alliance, seat there was no a there would have to way in which Canada would stand down, of the simply told to say in the was Italy claimed international committee that if of if we weren't told at the it. on We same be time to the held policy of stressing the functional principle as viewed by Mr. King. economic power; it military power. It that sought the we he seat principle, functional being I asked as far he as military any about The commitment. concerned, was Canada's representative in I Commission Economic UN, the of Council was that we were supply food through UNRRA, and that sort of thing. to being remember Security the on principle basis of the functional Mr. King let Australia have it on the grounds leery very was on the was of Canada's assertion in any way the not was following Australia. that especially in terms of Canada's Laurent continued the same, St. Mr. 1947. given was Far the on Eastern absolutely no instructions whatsoever, and we were sitting around discussing what we would do and entirely an you as over cow a speaking must say, there and Canada is a place economic our for minerals that materials for Europe and been a report strategic the on material problem in time Americans were very alive would be cut off from to "no In use fact, resources, I we am not are not in having a will elect we what we and supplies in States United the Asia. Canada, But we were being sought al1 forward, particularly in terms of food another: was cow. chairman of this commission". the for this commission because on Somebody said country". dairy without "I why Canada is clear Asian said I could form or one wanted, put food and When I went to Washington there had of strategic supplies, Paley of war, the dangers in the supplies the of certain supplies of Report, event of and war; the they strategic materials and they wanted to get them from Canada on some assured basis, and they offered a deal turned that was role down, interested Nations. on free trade in on Mr. King and Mr. St. Laurent but in terms of the functional principle, in We were fact. its economic contribution, through the Canada United interested for instance, at the beginning, in our the Economic and Social Council 96 of the UN. This. turned out 000276 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information to be rather a disappointment, functions its agencies of each also especially expected, as that were set up. But founding Organization. establishing and ILO, The in right in the forefront the and a new framework Nations, with internationalism, diminution of a Union, quickly followed by the right the unilateral to cooperative approach already, and in the fifties, North Korea or invaded South assistance intervened. which the time At finds I power think, that who had the taken into account. time, began The go fact to On the on but the feel that one hand, the connivance Then Communist China the I am not sure dangerous more to if one looks back to the fifties, it that against was an advice the - was that China that was American commander of was India not and other sufficiently in Korea, and later the threat islands of Matsu and Quemoy, that brought Canada It was the war the deployment of and This was what I anything was We as insisted each in Washington, regarded was discussions about the possible first Soviet the Korean War. countries and cross the 49th parallel into the United States felt that it decided to to the offshore sovereignty, for. was on the whole, the greatest threat. or United with, apparently, when I realized we the support of the Soviet Union. Communist security. one or What around It hoped Korea were We multi-lateral, new big powers, other over Health important. built national action. had we World thought we would be setting up fact that when we of but Agricultural the also were and Food co-operative, approach to international affairs. gradually was the these influential member an the exponents of the as all being the host to ICAO, Geneva, Organization, under Dr. Chisholm, fulfilled never coordinating Canada was of the functional agencies, one in because the Council was use of nuclear weapons for the nuclear involved in, very much, Washington. in Japan, the Japanese Peace Agreement. over Canada. in the defense-liaison and the termination field That weapons of the war with That proceeded quite well, without any great friction with the United States, but we ran into immediate United difficulties States military threat was and Alaska and at sea, over persuaded the question that China they began to deploy of the fact represented nuclear the the main weapons into and we were involved in over-flights. 97 that Our first 000277 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information reaction was that over-flight, with requests be to there had indication of exact timing and direction an flight and all the rest of that. We had to have addition; agreement, and that each individual for first the was flight plan, in a think. I of The first involved in agreement indicated also that if we flights of Canadian territory would need to be consulted about the possible of use we against weapons nuclear to be were China, over- because we pointed out, if nuclear weapons were used against China, there was the Sino-Soviet not be military treaty at the time, in effect and we could retaliation, And it alerts. officials with agreed that there would in which I conditions, strict secrecy the kind of of there that States addition, be did not level the with Pearson; threat a affect a least at of of state be about it was Korea sovereignty, in consultation about but of these things when I met that the also was against in only the which Canada. at President the Foreign the would meet in And the that was the joint defense to was sent to of all Yugoslavia. in In initial the raised it basis of retention of to was clearance of be on-going an each flight possible use. senior officials came There up was from one or occasion Washington and in my presence with the Prime Minister and Mr. Pearson. under In consultation about the possible consequences in terms of remember that United Minister of Defence the on the strict the unlikely ministers, in a over-flights and deployments, that sense not I first continental defence and but the initial agreement deployment was or possible circumstances discussions relevant North America under NORAD stood when question of it that of nuclear weapons. use a then Boyce, nuclear alert a with people and and other senior in which the words Bob Secretary of State in the United States, which there might other periodic meetings alert an year, a once similar consultations would go to nuclear retaliation meetings be in kind of circumstances, the did recognize We would there ministerial state Canada. could that Minister, in alert involved and declaration of which might give rise to the Chinese discuss under the conditions of to was as be involved; was well as be was Secretary of the Cabinet, state Soviet be not Canada would least at and would it that sure Eisenhower, and the question had 98 been It was put to him 000278 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information by the Pentagon, of the possible Matsu Quemoy and crisis, adamant that this agree to the islands, war. St. and quite meetings and nuclear weapons over Mr. and the question. Pearson We right the out of question. We emphasized was the thing which I did that there was We agreed to programme a flights and deployments, subject to consultation, up at hours all of processing of every flight plan, of flights over a period of, the but night. no over- we would be they would give us a schedule let us say, which was the way month; a operating when I was sent to Yugoslavia. between 1956 and that so of There would not we were Now that happened 1958. Could I just interrupt at that point. like to check first, I would several of the sort exists under NORAD. [HILL] have deployment of nuclear weapons or anything that woken nuclear declaration or be a a of alerts not were would never risk of escalating into a automaticity, there was no blank cheque given about now the of nuclear weapons in the defence of the offshore use was of Laurent of out this would involve as It was uses that is, you There is point one somehow involved in were treaty itself, and then there was also the working group in Washington on the mechanisms that were set up afterwards. the work on the Could you distinguish between those two? This situation has treaty also done not [IGNATIEFF] It been unclear to me. done was in Washington the Ambassadorial level, Hume Wrong really the but in fact the Assistant international committee met articles, Pearson, to Secretary was was the then the dealing so to directly Now of the specific dealt with at were Escott official Under-Secretary, proposals and reactions and committee, which to discuss various drafts was time Tommy Hickerson. foreign minister level. Under-Secretary, who on Treaty was negotiated at but the main substantive of proposals the ambassador Assistant that the international on dealing with details; and at but was that the work in Washington? Stone was the representative with Was Reid, who was responsible prepare the under various on. 99 000279 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Now I temporarily brought This and was arrangements, institutional the from involved in the actual treaty negotiations distinct was in 1948. from The meetings of the and while I was think it was, in Ottawa, Escott who, brought instructions was to Paris, it was only for the three months, knowing that I had been small involved in the actual negotiations in the opinion the of various views, particularly whereby "the parties would in of of any them, the territorial the articles which we really thrashed You [IGNATIEFF] here; I UN went moved was in this in Ottawa Then Because there after that his I was to permanent Council would be, controversial or That of was one work time you were were back presumably. moved to Washington in 1948, place with the rank Committee I think and 2 independence and then you took out the of Tommy Stone Counsellor details of was on the what the the Defense Committee and the various And there was the and all the rest of on Article the was and so on. of dealing under Escott. in time for the signature in 1949. bodies and sense period? there I In other words there. then you went to Washington after that, International [HILL] out just prior to that, in New York; [IGNATIEFF] I also Working with him? [HILL] at the were sending together whenever, consult political security of the parties is threatened". [HILL] involved in group that worked within, these North Atlantic Treaty issues. 4, the would take his and I on Article normally was into with the exchange was had been moved to Paris, me the I in Post Hostilities and all the rest of defense matters in London, I UN because of the UN Division. it had been decided that Gerry Riddell who place, it, only New York to be head head of the UN Division, would go I later, question of the standing group it. that you mentioned earlier, that the only really issue in that period, 100 is really that of the standing 000280 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information committee, and its responsibilities and so [IGNATIEFF] on. There was some controversy about the question of the permanent Council. We did not move Council. Dana Wilgress was our Ambassador required but used to meet as idea of a regular meeting, immediate an and regularly. not but it to was at permanent time they the favoured But we an not until 1955 and the Report of the Three, that the full machinery for regular consultation adopted. would This provided that, first of all, the permanent Council meet at Counsellors of met, think, I least the on once the but discussed and strongly very what the previous day. We difficulties the maybe on or day and went the previous something on met, Wednesdays, on they met But they before would meet the Thursdays and they met agenda felt Canada week, a Ambassadors Tuesdays and Wednesdays. over was If were. disagreed and with something, the counsellors would report to the Ambassador that, you know, you going to have trouble are tomorrow and the position is course, get to delegations views. see But the if was not until the While 1955 struck me about to Market machinery really question of Particularly, the into action. came consultative Also, machinery reasons set up to there always was a Europe, you could solidarity of the in the concern Alliance. why I My it the dialogue about still maintain arms experience in we the North it European raise any Alliance. control and is of That should that thing is that while the relationship between defence and arms control. the was worked out the main framework, we really being was other change their did not include economic questions for the reason that the Common of also report from the Committee of Three that the consultative machinery that us, consult persuaded be consultative whole or agenda the on enabled It guidance or others could comparatively modest. this item follows. as instructions to over remain Atlantic one in the Council consultations is that the kind of discussions that take place are the very kind of discussions which those who advocate foreign policy to defence policy actually achieved Atlantic Council. smaller powers This raise is precisely political 101 what issues in relating the North has happened. The and the political 000281 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information military planning. implications of is that NORAD because My reservation and objection effect agreement established was in between the Pentagon and National Defence, St. the Laurent in the transition from the Diefenbaker regime. to by There was similar no provision made for the discussion of contingency plans under NORAD of the kind same that went on in regard reporting to the North Atlantic Council. to to come governments react Group, Planning discussion. can of it But alert an as contingency case there brings us That little of a we would How the North Atlantic of was report no without and no prior consultation. up to around the end of the you were at Defence Liaison and then Ambassador to spoke and plans Ottawa and Yugoslavia, in the 1950s - [HILL] The military would have President Kennedy did for NORAD at the time Cuban Missile Crisis, Part IV commands other NORAD did not report to NATO and the fact is that they declare the in the called, was the implications. political to this? as their with their for them discussed Council the to Co-operation, your but also fifties, when Yugoslavia. We involvement in the Report On Non-Military there was the famous visit to the Soviet Union. [IGNATIEFF) then called planning, visit to the the the in passing, Washington in 1953. Imperial then and Now 1955. to I left I London, back to be head of Defence Liaison was something which but it has United States, about the in alluded to only profoundly affected my attitude that that Pearson, was the increasing pressures following I on apart from the issue that came up, Canada/U.S. defence relations, and much concerned defence in came in my book, year at what was College Union, Soviet a Defence important most I had deployment of on Canada from the nuclear over-flights, wanted a statement to be prepared very weapons and by the equivalent of your institution in the present days, the Parliamentary Centre, Parliamentary for the (but there information elected was of not a parliament. What Centre he had responsible body should be given 102 in those in a mind days) was paper to that be the jointly 000282 �.Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information prepared by the departments of Defence and External Affairs, of the title it Foreign and Defence Policies Of Inter-continental Missiles". wanted short a The Advent Of Nuclear Weapons And the which would paper defence foreign policy and position of Canada, of - confrontation. of This for Laurent was of course in total agreement and such with paper Staff, and I said: General authority, if and Foulkes as I three by Mr. were not that Campney, I at least reply given by Foulkes an to was me have to be included in such parliament would a issue would have created final act US as a in happened if that I think in 1955, Bryce, the on as General you wish. letters were and the minister level and And the issue! information which would that the paper for of Minister by the Prime Minister effective discussion in an Army. National Defence's reaction simply not to reply to the Prime Minister. believe ever of of the Joint Chiefs in Washington and General Bradley, the head of the The he compromise the special relationships which he had with the Chairman issue. Chief contact Five absolutely basic such on be, And Mr. St. the will do I done". be two to then will Pearson to National Defence answered, then was certainly is what should recollect, who to was told to prepare I Minister writes this up and follow entirely agree written Ralph had a I cannot of course do so on my own "Well Prime the Defence, National I but Foulkes, General and long by then in were something that is geographic missiles by the House of Commons. thought, at least considered, a consequences both - range bombers between the two superpowers who state he that was strategic new route it and representatives in the the new the shortest the on of of essence inform parliament and the Canadian public on "Implications For Canadian recollect was: I as and Secretary this strange I had not on extremely important an play which been one - attend. had come to had a for Easter terrible automobile I of the would hardly players, was it was agreed that Bob the Cabinet, would call Foulkes would come and I would to Toronto Of course to press the it was Easter 1955 - to cabinet crisis was Anyway, a meeting at which in the meantime I visit my mother-in-law and had accident, nearly got killed. I came to this meeting on crutches and feeling extremely weak and vulnerable. I still remember that Foulkes bluntly said 103 that there would be no 000283 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information joint paper. It addition in pretences Foulkes was got who stone-walling to representatives of Canada. NORAD under false into us established the public would not believe The that is why Mr. Diefenbaker was so unreasonable, National a rage Defence and about the they that He misrepresented had it. And if you like, about its demand for nuclear war-heads. way elected was things in and brought him into this impossible position which finally ended up with the fall of his government. The himself a in was I on hospital from understand that unless issues, and cannot we relationships with Europe, - delayed reaction from said especially say, when I as not in External Affairs plan rationally our what on Campney to Foulkes, "General do Union Soviet Parliament the are the or have the guidance of we St. the you I United States the situation, In this report to Parliament. a came like failure to get National Defence under Laurent/Pearson move you if - trouble Mr. Diefenbaker found on with or these crucial of consequences our new position between the two super powers in the nuclear age. strategic are the out, not necessarily in and That we must know, consequences? What set them we must any detail about exactly who does what, but what are the essential factors and consequences of the situation". "First of all, He said: to prejudice the information that own "eggheads" from was it. Secondly, Well, when a reaction. crisis me in Moscow danger of war. Union in the I mean, new - which was was go not need run any defence get George". Pearson Pearson, and there a see typical a for - why don't you come himself danger of Pearsonian invitation which he an general sort of way to on Laurent, that he would not press He decided that he would pick up a you answer in my pass to how me I do I reported this to I in the cabinet, received from Molotov in and visit final the first of all decided to tell St. this to tell anything will not do I get and which I Affairs to External policy in Canada, and this is And that repeat that Minister. Prime the to way that I war strategic position to which we what was from the the Soviet in Canada were exposed? [HIIL] This was in some way related 104 to the NORAD issue? 000284 �Document disclosed underthe Access to Information Act Document divulgué en vertu de [IGNATIEFF] National part and parcel It was Defence a joint appreciation he said: "Well, So, consequences. say that not United States, war with a public. in crisis in the cabinet. not joy ride a in any should I have been, to the Soviet Russian. when I "I not go with that in my book, but this way used most of basic thing here an argument pursue Malenkov who against the means of came out Embassy of use promoting go I know I kept I is also in the was had nuclear Soviet policy. and If So, I be did I diary, the Peacemonger. a The nuclear successor war to named by secretary, was dead against war as indeed Now the a The engaged in themselves were private weapons ex- Trinity College archives. they could risk his an going to is diary and a expansion. been as I said to my wife there The Making of not or want of compromising me". way military of not impossible situation. an spirit. to whether policy a Stalin, as a And why concerned. was going to be trouble. was that the Soviets was I was certainly did I in my book, it as there which actually from day to day, I far as I could You importance was a that he quite definitely in a statement at lunch at the Canadian in Moscow. There were Molotov and Kaganovitch and Voroshilov and several others who seemed to disagree with Malenkov. particularly if they were threatened, They argued that, interests to were war. It in those circumstances anxious to see Khrushchev, who was to take power that Malenkov question said, as as did; that means of and war Pearson Khrushchev took the nuclear war and about same out were quite was obviously on the rise, Secretary. General that view of settling international disputes. But "You must understand that we do not go back in any way on concept of by a if their basically threatened, they would not hesitate to go was competition with the capitalist world. political concerned, if and economic you insist, methods. as you 105 have So far done We will security as just do a few - l'information preparing to are say blithe any me, I did not some a the would show that trouble, they will find am were it If I from tell not nuclear war". a get Again, coward. refuse, start faced with am what of if they see to Liaison, brought into this journey I knew there left: failure Defence as Union, the if they will will go and find out from Moscow and fight of la Loí sur l'accès à the he our so is months 000285 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information before, we bringing West Germany into on will do the with East Germany. same re-arming Germany, and NATO only circumstances in The which we will reconsider the security policies of Europe is under conditions of neutralization of the of what essence why Pearson went was said, but it is important USSR in 1955. the to and he spoke Atlantic Minister to go, And that the two Germanies. He to tie this first the was great deal about a was to North this, but nobody has related it to this stalemate in the cabinet and with National I instructions direct exactly what Eastern Europe. on the threatening Mr. from got back with the report, we related. as I St. Laurent, Khrushchev had said to That is, the to way [HILL] had sooner off to Yugoslavia, sent was No Defence. moving were was off with sent in effect in us to test out policies towards his by invading Hungary, Soviets, Yugoslavia into westward I than possibly and the West? to Yugoslavia When you went was that actually after the Hungarian uprising? [IGNATIEFF) Yes, Because, [HILL] again, there [IGNATIEFF) Yes, simply that this had the do not I is the occasion when I one opportunity like to say that in being of Minister and the Foreign Minister [HILL] That [IGNATIEFF] when was Which arrived, I a was the States. was Tito And while he finding ways in militarily sent directly told what I was the book, on I say mission a by the Prime had been sent to do. change. not had anyway. his up States, called himself which to experience. the usual followed getting aid from the United bloc, had not realized that I why you were sent to Yugoslavia. reason and just after. breach military aid a But, with in fact, Stalin from the by United Communist, he was already complete the breach with the Communist So, I had 106 a very interesting time in 000286 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Yugoslavia a but the say, I as purpose being of my sent really was follow-up on the mission to the Soviet Union and the concerns to know just where Because of what scenario", stood we in regard to the Foulkes course, from the Pentagon, as threat of was getting, one could was nuclear war. "worst a imagine. case The Soviets said to be massing here and massing there and doing this and were that with the massive capability they enjoyed. [HILL] What the foreign policy were that at conclusions time, you you while about to came Soviet in Yugoslavia? were I remember in your book you mentioned you had at least some meetings stage you actually briefed the NATО with President Tito and at Council one Tito's foreign policy thinking. on views on what the [IGNATIEFF) Soviets up to were Well, what I You must have had his well. as convinced of was, was first of al1 that the Communist threat should not be thought of in monolithic terms. There was not great one Communist threat or combination of a the Soviet Union, Communist China and the whole of the satellite world. They all had internal problems. The Soviets very severely from the effects of World War II, in the least bit anxious for still suffering were and They another war. they were not were very much obsessed about what to do about Germany and they were not inclined to push things to the point of nuclear war, method of war to eventually did in Egypt and Cuba. every [HILL] I uprising, short read the Czechoslovakia somewhere Soviets was at expand but would obviously their during recently that, some about to revolt point as influence, became well. the as they Hungarian convinced That use that really worried them. [IGNATIEFF] That it might spread, yes. That is I representing Canada on obvious to me that in the 1967-1968 period because the Security Council in the Czech crisis. that what economic the Soviets orbit of feared, central was the Europe, 107 was It was revival and so. that I go into that natural would include of 000287 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Austria and Hungary as well to extent, some these all countries had been Austrian/Hungarian/German imperial economic orbit. Romania as within the They prospered mightily in providing certain raw materials, having assured markets high quality goods instead of making Kalashnikov kinds of for all rifles to export to Africa which they get very little for, and such. That, I Dubcek. Because arriving at Germany. They had believe, is the as I understand, like a free Dubcek, something come very close real turfing out for reason with agreement trade point the on was aspirins of West it and the Soviets put their to foot down. [HILL] question Yugoslavia. on that you have the impression that I enjoyed particularly. there was one that you enjoyed the bilateral diplomacy. embassy first situation must have been very interesting. [IGNATIEFF) it was an Yes, with because, game. as for On the as one other hand the time you course was were political the and a Communist; a he would accept not what he On the Communist". having broken completely from the Warsaw Pact COMECON, head playing a very, very sophisticated Communist I will die a impression the he claimed that he was still hand, he said to me "Once Of period your extremely interesting time, to begin an Tito I say, I have yourself, the of just one final finish off this afternoon, Just before we regarded and from Soviet as monopolistic claims over the Balkan economies, especially shipping. He would not accept that COMECON industry would be developed of a Bulgaria wanted was should decide in Yugoslavia. some general on what What he and Dimitriev autonomy for the Balkans, minimum condition for remaining in the Communist bloc. be outside the direct control which he did not like at all. an extremely sophisticated the dictators of keeping sort of I have ever in touch with of central planning It would from across, politician. Tito had a I Moscow, mean public opinion; and he kept away there was some strike, 108 or if there of all much keener sense daily routine of Belgrade by living in Brioni. heard that as And the other thing was that he was and astute come kind of was even from the But if he unrest in 000288 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information university, the resolve - I it. used to say "You are situation and the only dictator the would really think would win I on and always in favour of the popular side, him: to know that". "I suddenly descend would decided, He across who I say: he I have come He would election". an "Why don't you go to the would say to him: step and allow an opposition". He said: "That is contrary to Communist doctrine, you cannot have an opposition, it affects next whole planning, our allowed he I a certain and opposition and tacit individual disputes managed to resolve sentiment. system on, so you opposition". cannot have an But rationing whole our mean, University the of in of favour I as say he popular the Belgrade, when they were having university trouble because they were expelling professors who not were Communists and students the in were of state a uprising and the police arrived with machine guns and all the rest students, Tito comes and says, "Since when have of it to subdue the you thought ever that educate you thing, students with machine guns, you". So whoever thought of such course the students all cheered Tito, danced protector". He did not anything, he did not fired. He simply resolved friend, our put the professors back, a get out, the particular confrontation in favour And likewise if there were some Solomon He would say: and half". He was favourable He, a around him, of the students, strike, he would judgment and buzz off. negotiate. of as of "our resolve who had been a all along and make come He would not and left. stay around and "That is the way it is going to be, half very astute politician and I got into a fairly position with Tito because of the Hungarian refugees. of course, was caught in this situation that he had broken with Stalin but was still concluding in Budapest, some a Communist, the Austrians and when had closed the the fighting was frontier and of the last freedom fighters had absolutely nowhere to go but to Yugoslavia. And the Yugoslav police and up and put them into concentration camps. military rounded them I heard about this asked the Foreign Affairs Minister whether this was they had never heard about it. I told at first that I was not true and let slip and was that just being curious but that Canada might be able to help. 109 000289 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information I get Sure enough, because they did Ministry of none said, I (I was would case, "Yes". and sent I a mission to got cable to come Yugoslavia. to He sent were And said: I for immediate an mission right away and we people who went to Yugoslavia people who fought to the last. They were the most convinced have they because fighters and I have into run forgotten how many we took but quite a lot. Once I of some them in Toronto, 500 or 600, would say governments then other and France took some. matter of months and Tito American aid and really anti-communist, there were shipped V - was The whole thing if he wound up was in a very grateful because if he had sent them kept he professors and professionals and he would have was really tough people. and afraid There some they were actors, were students and so They were very grateful. them out. The Diefenbaker years, 1959-62 Ambassador Ignatieff, from [HILL] it was Norway, and Sweden like them back to Hungary they would have been shot lost I took them and of course it became known that we there, were Britain Part that is hundreds of them and asked a if "Well, the freedom we many then Minister of camp?" the see Pickersgill Jack the best, of some were and went there the next day and there I good a In might be able to help you." we And they said: like to go you and through Austria, and it occurred to me that, Citizenship and Immigration). the - in this subject. friend of Jack Pickersgill at the time, a the from police accepted know Canada understand you have refugees, I but - other than the secret you "Well refugees from Hungary, as words their eat to Foreign Ministry from the not - "We understand you are interested way"? what like not Interior, the they said: call from them a 1959 to 1962, you were to be Deputy High Commissioner for one year in London and then you became Assistant Under-Secretary responsibility, advisor on to me believe, to I national defence if you could tell us to have been of acceptance or of a State for serve as External Affairs Mr. Diefenbaker's personal issues and nuclear affairs. something about those three years. period in which there not of nuclear weapons 110 with I wonder This seems was this whole question for the Canadian armed 000290 �Document disclosed under the Access to Informatión Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information forces. beginning the of And then this was the period of Howard Green, course his period. of I could just tell wonder if you us something about how you saw the crucial issues of that period, including the relationship of Canada's policies towards NATO? [IGNATIEFF] Well word, a perhaps on how I catapulted from was being Ambassador in Yugoslavia, appointed by Mr. Mr. Pearson, into the high ranks Conservative Administration. explanation, because I was known that Mr. Diefenbaker too closely with keen about them. Nor itself, regarded as those It under the think, needs some I Pearson and it was who had been associated "Pearsonalities" Drew. Laurent and Service Civil associated with Mr. Mr. was the That in Pearson Mr. of St. was and was too not interesting, of one those happenstances, that the first Secretary of State for External Affairs that Diefenbaker appointed the President of my brother, the University of to whom I appointed Warden of Hart House. as a veteran under veterans help to secondary education. the found He been He had university the policy the Toronto. It with too many massive details, stroke President as not not quite undergraduate children. their and disagreements died at apparently, Hart for of post- in frequent friction and the eyes of veterans who expected to be treated least, and was back came influx the financed government himself and overseas cope disagreement with the President who did the happened that so closely attached, Nicholas, very was Sidney Smith, who had been was grew House as things from adults, to say Without going into and all see my brother had of sudden. a a The tremendously affected by this. Hе sensed somehow this might have been related to the state of tension that had was in was, developed between the two, Washington. know at the friends, time, what from Belgrade I However, I found from happened. out and attended I did not the funeral, 1958, I but did not But to my great surprise, I was summoned by Sidney Smith to the meeting of heads of Canadian when there was a government level at NATO. assembled and as correspondence, through mutual missions in Europe, to Paris, in the presence of in know this I had taken meeting of John ministers Diefenbaker, at heads of And I was even more surprised when we'd a very meek 111 place at the back, expecting 000291 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information to be regarded with intense suspicion NATO which is not from within NATO. I on person best qualified Ignatieff". And I "And start to start an think the first discussion the with Mr. be would totally unprepared for this and I explained was from Yugoslavia the outlook would we appointment, Liberal to outlook that a like said: Minister the when as that of was non-aligned nation a which regarded both the Warsaw Pact and NATO as responsible for the They considered that the militarization militarization of Europe. on one side provoked militarization escalating pump, reciprocal other and the on situation. the acted like from outlook The a Yugoslavia therefore was one of extreme criticism of the policies of confrontation and accommodation or sides both Moreover, sides. both instead of - strategy were working out defence, of provoking they - mutual of kind a nuclear a both were subordinating strategy to nuclear weapons and this presented a very serious problem which, was not in arms negotiations. control for this of Tito attitude that he had not and come kind what Yugoslavs thought. the Sidney surprise intended to George Drew intervened to say bound by that therefore of Mexico had to then it was or of business this to say that the in relation Sweden: that the necessarily of very thought support the ringing assertion of Canadian What did that matter? intervened the commitments Well, to was He listening To my new the to to great Alliance, a position government was not the Liberal appropriate to government possibly consider for instance adopting to that Ignatieff a all pledged was look at all the options that we would similar Smith the but that government was would be I to listen to such neutralist talk. and what NATO thought I talk, Alliance, and that he had expected support for again, or neutralist Yugoslavia. Conservative the either between the alliances Well, of the non-aligned, view of point of being properly addressed, knocked down that from the government and listen what to Mr. say. I was introduced to the Prime Minister, which I found very surprising, and the Prime Minister asked me to introduce the various heads of Canadian missions. I returned to Belgrade Nothing more was said, and almost immediately received 112 a and telegram 000292 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Sidney Smith, from then Secretary of State for External Affairs, saying that they wanted me to return to Ottawa. said that they Minister he the anxious very were When I went to see accept the post of Deputy High Commissioner in London. Mr. Smith NATO in "You how Mr. Drew reacted to saw Paris, decide and he has decided putting me can into be of any and, in London use looked at Minister the me and up problems, need for because I not So, Mr. I said it is see how "Well, really can't Then by both hands and said me my brother who died. those grounds, across and all I asked Canada which I did to pick could about current Canadian internal I as on I knew Mr. Drew extremely conscious was of the diplomats to know more about Canada than about the country which they to chance to go information as much over was happy in Yugoslavia". am was refuse I could not very well given the I clutched "Do this for Nick's sake", which was to be will go". you very difficult position, a it appointment". this to and to it, and let it be for the Prime Minister Smith said "Well let's try I kindly take said I intervention at the head of missions meeting, likely that he would to my should that I were visit including one accredited. to where after And had worked I on a brief trans-Canada railroad construction in the Kootenay Valley, I arrived in London, and found my fears at first were more than suspicion, both on to send and because me concerned. the justified. Mr. Drew regarded me with grounds that the Prime Minister had chosen I was "Pearsonality" a far as Indeed jokes went on with Prince Philip. as he was Prince Philip reported to have asked Drew "How are you getting along with your Pearsonality"? Because I often filled in for Mr. Drew at was functions at Buckingham Palace. There pulling, and announced that at first Mr. Drew was a certain amount of leg I was to only do those things which he specifically assigned me, that it was not to be assumed that as his deputy, decisions in any degree. grew from two sources. became great friends. She was Johnson, a I I could act must say that One was that She had a great very remarkable woman. the great Metropolitan my 113 the wife and on Firenza make and Drew George Drew. the daughter of singer, or improvement really influence She was Opera in his place, head Edward of the 000293 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Metropolitan Opera, that the Prime Minister was I had this "bohunk" that I this was As so was too, she The other thing that happened was because Drew very clearly and whether it over, came and background, but he showed Mr. in his favour. was talent, great Italy and so on. being brought up in much the exception as far so the bureaucracy was concerned, he had to take that into account. as I of man a asked by the Prime Minister to be his sort of was liaison while he visited London and this was his first visit after he had won the election, I good and the election, and he wanted to meet all the the second mean great. had been in London with the Masseys, I As I knew some of these people and arranged meetings, and took the Prime Minister around. on Then he made speech great a the Empire sponsored by Lord Beaverbrooke. in the Albert Hall stood out à great He perhaps the last spokesman for the Empire at the time when the and British were retreating from the Empire and Commonwealth in favour Community. of the European Actually, [HILL] [IGNATIEFF] I It was attended that meeting. an extraordinary experience. But anyway, my stay in London coincided with the effort of Diefenbaker to divert, as you probably remember, percent 15 I think it the United States to Britain and the drive for It was a busy time, had you marketing Canadian products, Drew is a person who either liked or Then we became more than Mr. in a and fast friends good deal of the representing him in all and was not promotion of trade. as I too and I found particularly time in in social and saw Churchill to be any in England, incidentally. asleep and change visit to He was and And he 114 functions. had to fit I was there to represent that was De Gaulle, the last in time I in a wheelchair and was thought Macmillan came up to the General"? I to do functions which meant making kinds of Canada at the famous dinner given by the Queen for only official He by disliking myself having Canada, and because Mr. easy say he started going to Buckingham Palace. his speeches making intensely personal in his relations. thought was my share Drew was speeches, and it disliked you, me. I is around go to of trade from was, him and looked said: up and "Did you said: see "Yes, 000294 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information before he like was burgundy". bottle of hock; a Stroke or not, he also Mr. Drew's plan to was still was is like much on he now very bottle of a the ball. It High Commission's office from move the Canada House in Trafalgar Square to Grosvenor House in Grosvenor Square, and to buy the old negotiate this purchase and plan to I so asked to perhaps that nothing of the kind. arrived him. in London He and will I the of new forget never we go, busy time and had rather taken stop, would but Howard Green my first meeting with a your civilities few office tomorrow". Foreign Minister of and I but he and it will be two old ladies. this was, was in the provide just tea and biscuits, and you happened to going to be put out, am I understand, you Do you think you could What I elevation sudden would like to borrow "I "Only for tea too". a His successor was Howard Green. thought to myself, here come my So, into my office and exchanged came then he said: said was had we less than two years I Sidney Smith had died. course granted for and back to become Assistant Under-Secretary and come meantime of It move. surprised that after somewhat was Embassy, American the was Canada first official England and to can visit instead of going to see immediately Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary or the high people in Whitehall, his with the wounded two in nurses who had thought well we started to looked after in the First World War. 1917 ladies who had been his I first thought was that he would meet and nurses him when He invited after him looked he was first these two old in hospital. goodness, what a new and sincere approach. my talk and then of course it turned out that And while Howard Green had been educated in the University of Toronto he had been born and brought up in the Arrow Lakes which is close to the Kootenay district. War I. and on we I knew He had served in the exactly where his home was, where his mother the whole life Again, friends. part of, somehow or it was a in that part of the world. question that felt that I he to, his background. other related some smart alec bureaucrat that did not understand him. was that I Norman lived chatted about all these things and the old paddle wheelers Kootenay lake and became Kootenay Regiment in World when Robertson, came to Ottawa who was Under-Secretary I 115 found myself and as had I was was not The result Assistant been We to appointed 000295 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Under-Secretary by Sidney Smith. Sidney Smith's appointment that while Diefenbaker could not refuse Robertson, Norman of would he found him too intellectual. figure in the whole of not He patterned great a was politics his too on everyday". This could not no Howard say Green development believe for I all put me any in and said "I I Minister, The sakes you'd will whatever do think he particularly wants advice to you come on I went to them say, you I during the and came to think "I the Prime Minister wants, the question And that did turn out to NORAD and of be the happened What St. Laurent election: Pearson last months of the St. problem was, as said that this there were reflects was too many in his not to that been Minister Prime be decided until after political issues. memoirs, I Laurent, Pearson regime, just before the election, and Cabinet see not do described briefly in my memoirs, that the NORAD Agreement had drawn up I strange the they said: And Prime Minister's mind. in the would like told and better do what these nuclear problems." was "You are to feel that I could not. leap-frogging system." in this uppermost with Norman. on extremely difficult position. Robertson, Norman I time and an to the Prime and our office my to as strategies that, when I arrived, again to my great surprise I come can figured had and well summoned by the Prime Minister, and he said: you outstanding the He he incidentally, Diefenbaker admired. of deal Robertson; Norman obviously was Mackenzie King but he did not get result to warm Foreign Service. the advisor to Mackenzie King whom, He difficult situation was But the known, as It was did Pearson the not want а bilateral defence command, that he had argued with Dulles and with the State Department of the Alliance that he did not see why one should be bilateral and confined of to the commands America, North while all the others were subject to the North Atlantic Council and the consultative machinery which was faced with the adamant was involved. And related purposes on he that the nuclear That was the key issue, and they were insistent that this should be therefore be course position that the Americans had they would not allow any other ally to have a finger trigger. of as a separate command structure and that it would only nominally, being described to NATO the "North American Regional Planning Group". for NATO But in 116 000296 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information fact they did report not plans and so on. to But, that. submit did not their of any And the question of consultation with allies the rise of nuclear weapons to and NATO therefore unresolved. over will come the key problem from the Canadian standpoint was, was I that Mr. Diefenbaker in the early days of his Prime Ministership, when he still was Secretary also Defence with making decision. a Sidney Smith would have would and sticking have Prime Minister, of as I pals but He was in in intelligent an army), went which you know, It fact been to to literally Cabinet the was not only Foulkes, said: him and was one and had not fish But, self-confident very a think I particular this under the urging of General in the in the fish hook was Cabinet"; had up. because said, before Smith's appointment, State General Pearkes, old seen was by National confronted mention that I what seen was Affairs External for and would have warned the Prime Minister. out Secretary State appointed Sidney Smith) (before he had man of mood and (they were "This has been to of these half truths. approved. been But, Pearkes said: "It had been to Cabinet and it is just waiting for signature, Americans defence been the have signed arrangement for North America, working for on time. some Liberals have been working signed before the without looking into implications and later, this that strategy, the And it is you know the kind simply under comes NATO so joint a have we and the was not for years and it just this on election". It it, the Prime Minister signed it, background and without getting the the rest of it. And then he discovered, subordinated Canadian defence to American all the nuclear strategy, and that having signed the NORAD Agreement, which was what the Americans wanted, i.e. for purposes of defence, the Canada-US frontier was down. That was one of the reasons should overfly why, when I detailed be Canada in was in Washington, and consultations each case. I we insisted permission was to that there deploy instruction under and very definitely to say that the Canadian Government would not agree that the border did not exist for the purposes of defence. then this that purposes of would defence. be the This, end of Canadian together with the We realized sovereignty, for of trans- nationals in the economic field, very seriously affected us. NORAD 117 presence 000297 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information therefore represented a very major political decision regarding our sovereignty. explained in any way to Mr. Diefenbaker, This was not whose one great, think sincere, belief was in Canadian integrity, I unity and nationalism. [HILL] If interject, might I still think you get that sort of I situation now, where there are people who would like of "straight alliance", mainly anti-Soviet. to have a sort They would brush aside the whole sovereignty business. exactly [IGNATIEFF] This Pentagon view, that the enemy a was and Foulkes the Soviet Union, was in was that on the they were direct threat to North America and that for purposes of defending America North could there sovereignty. But this then told that he was British-Canadian weapon which needs - there he would take shape or no the explained build to purposes, Mr. to aircraft, Arrow of separation an all authority which to need for such of all care an aircraft, that and one case of fit Canadian NORAD, the United States because they would not buy the Arrow in any they had all kinds of aircraft and missiles and form; a interceptor weather designed under was in other words it was constructed, planned, or Diefenbaker, and told by National Defence after he had signed was no was was be not was consortium specially for Canadian a it, fury, we I think, Diefenbaker not only made the decision to scrap the Arrow, but he were going into the missile age anyway. said that made, had to every plane, even the few models that had been be destroyed. They were burnt, [HILL} [IGNATIEFF] given Arrow And in his Apart werent they? from the mounting cost of the explanation for scrapping it, the Arrow, which was was horrified when he found himself committed under the joint plan to the Bomarcs to be installed in Canada to as the industrial NATO we had defend, if you please, empire of the United States. also to Starfighter converted accept to he the heartland of We were told that in capable weapons, the 104 strike aircraft, and the Honest nuclear nuclear 118 000298 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information for Johns Army. the Suddenly Diefenbaker Mr. considering a Canadian defence policy, instead of tied to a defence policy subordinated to a certain type of weapons, weapons programme. policy. It Canadian unity witness, because I and I sovereignty Canadian and were which asked was attend, to for unusual saw the I of concepts all were nuclear a Canadian defence any about. by the Prime Minister asked was that is against all his absolutely went cabinet defence meetings, But Bryce question of There was no himself, found I attend to occasion he was Staff, of the Air me, time you outspoken he said you talk about face me had to with fait a intervene attacks, personal attacks minister responsible. of this crisis breakup of in the by misled accepting, Chief was deliberately misled bomber threat then you as on the could not accept such Defence staff, when he was the chiefs of the to understand the build-up cabinet, ended the say, that he say Harkness, It is difficult and a which the defeat of of course with the Diefenbaker the that Diefenbaker felt that he had terms National I accompli." to cabinet the government, except in been a who On missile threat, and that the Americans have to decide, a Minister, Campbell, to Hugh "You have misled me, and time again, say it is and so some fury with which Diefenbaker attacked the representatives of National Defence. one was servant. civil a what Defence, had he policy defence been for tricked which Canada into was subordinated to a certain type of weapons programme and also to the interest of a foreign government. in relation to the United States. his personal antipathy to a It affected his whole attitude I mean a lot has been said about young President such as Kennedy. But it had this background in the defence issues, where he felt he had been cornered into convictions. was he was Market. and subordinate position and contrary to all his The only solution that he could see was twofold, one to try to strengthen the ties with Britain and the Commonwealth and there he as a his ran into, concerned. The other various was the fact that the tide The to British were was going out as far about to enter the Common gain time by encouraging Howard Greene initiatives on arms control and disarmament negotiations. 119 000299 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [HILL] period of the European free trade area. That was the [IGNATIEFF] beginning, but he did turn on this tremendous It was effort to divert trade and it became almost you you could do know accomplished. percent 15 always not, questioned annoyed him extraordinary the Diefenbaker, things. wanted to It this, what he became clear, fact was real a in some felt was was of one was drive, but way another or report to the that rather similar We thing re-open. And great conviction, to with conviction. Howard thing world against is, war the the a he it who succeeded far as it when was review or it. In Foulkes, as I was path they were willing that through not had in a age what of hell a a absolutely was He He would have been for was the leader in the a given the chance. been think any I veteran in the First form. any to Howard Green accepted that convinced pacifist and elimination of nuclear weapons. peace movement if from there was no way in that Green having been commitment nuclear that he was him, and seen in his early was all kinds times with Bob Bryce and tried various follow wounded, didn't and front he chose, that on an position, there was nothing but so, World War and I extract himself to nothing to discuss was several met possible options there - that there was Things other Marshal Miller, the attitude of Air concerned. things the to experts Trade and fact was, the isolated an had to I as that But Finance of which the Americans would agree to re-open NORAD fact, was Furniture, costume jewelry, clothes, NATO use in what things sold in England. amount of expect to be sold. of that amazing was Department George Drew. and it and matter of faith, do not know if the actual diversion amounted I or it a In fact, his closest friend and colleague in the House of Commons was the member for Kootenay, Mr. his arm. He was Herridge, who also had been member of the CCF. Anyway, a Minister who decided. I advised him. And I a veteran it said: lost and Prime was the "The only sort of way that you can hold some kind of position in principle against nuclear weapons is to say: and control of these weapons that we Bomarks 'We are negotiating the Honest the position that he Johns the reduction in the multilateral fora, do not accept nuclear warheads and on and all even the rest though of and we it". pending have the This was held, and Howard Green rushed around starting 120 000300 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information with had very fertile area, which a namely stop to problem fallout testing nuclear in particularly was in the radioactivity, as was quite Marshall east noticeable Islands and in Western atmosphere. Calgary and also Canada when Prairies. coming the Soviet tests from the There was fallout, the British Columbia, in Because in But from it the the Chinese and So, he joined up with the Foreign Minister of Ireland, tests too. Aiken, far atmosphere. the serious testing was being conducted as good deal of public support a to lead the attack testing nuclear on at UN. the He organized the monitoring of radioactivity and our Air Force did the monitoring, were very considerable risk I may say, a flying through radioactive clouds and quite a suffered race at as for result. a the moon greater thrust, and danger of arms an This with the time of was all interestingly enough, Mr. race extending number of them and the the Sputnik missiles these because they with and greater a Green anticipated the into outer space. In 1962 meeting of the disarmament committee in when we both attended at ministerial level, without consulting the Americans and to their a Geneva great annoyance, Howard Green launched his campaign for a treaty excluding military uses of outer space. It came as a surprise both to the Soviet Union and to the United States, objected beyond very strenuously, tolerance any that and said Canada and the United States "This has that should have done really gone thing like a this, without even consulting its closest ally in NATO or anybody". It did result in the United States and least, having orbiting of nuclear to ban the because it was taken up the by other Governments Soviet Union, weapons in at space, of the United Nations and at that time the United Nations was still more influential than it is today least - signing weapons a treaty, which excluded ban, Canada did and initiative. in As I say, the show some, not say - it pressured into at orbiting as in monitoring, a of nuclear memorial to in the partial peaceful uses of outer space, only initiative, but some results. We the question of got support from other countries, able to were into outer space and that still remains Howard Green's test the two nuclear super powers and therefore Diefenbaker did not persuade National 121 Defence or was those who 000301 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information believed in the Canadian/American security there possibility a was affecting that - that the as jury was the first attack, heart conjunction Denmark addition, In the NATO forum Mr. Diefenbaker sent to the UN. try to to me out, of their soil. want to occupy, not even And he said that that the position. NORAD Leger had in Norway nuclear particularly Norway and Denmark, which would not on addition could I like countries proliferation the limit whatever do to accept used in was that reached be NATO when Jules and non-nuclear-weapon with to weapons still would agreement some to answer nuclear weapons which would enable Canada not nuclear weapons. his deterrent nuclear and weapons: allow nuclear position we is the The situation gave some ground for discussion because the Europeans had raised, themšelves, question the Americans understood, specific for the use the Americans agreements with information and having piles. of the nuclear weapons established by Alliance. it governments, mention this because that I But required this that both clearly was sharing on nuclear two-key basis to the stock the to access the was fling last from Diefenbaker side to try and avoid the crisis in the cabinet, that particular formula. possibility multilateral a weapons would be nuclear drawn based force nuclear warheads, use merchant on crews of willing to the and countries all from to the discussing the When I was in NATO we were being equipped with vessels these of 1958 in agreement an it very clear, made nuclear the control There had been be stock-piles of there would that and consult you within the Alliance. weapons the just how of participate. [HILL] that was to ask when you were and last one his all in the next phase, one if I know I could, have on to, and of Canadian policies. As you these problems with NORAD and is that didn't Government, they still they launch which was some agreed just wanted impression that Diefenbaker an committed part I the Diefenbaker period, remained impression fact to that government fundamental were I on actually Ambassador to NATO. question from what which is: 1 wonder if we could go I so on - saw mentioned, of by the 122 declaration, rest of a there but nonetheless my wanted to work through NATO. sort as, NATO the And in the Canadian allies in this 000302 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information period? [IGNATIEFF] way Yes, Diefenbaker looked to NATO rather in the the Liberals had previously, namely as same the other allies, that especially as far as Mr. Diefenbaker was concerned, would counterthrough the consultative machinery of balance the United States, He attended NATO ministerial meetings with satisfaction and NATO. was impressed by the fact that NATO had this kind of provision for consultation at various levels. of getting through NATO what he is what that indeed He thought he could see was not able bilaterally, namely that thought, Pearson had get to way some the NORAD arrangement, whatever the nuclear command and control arrangements, be should subordinate military commands. do. had We contribution; we had time a a that at we that basis, time of On effective we that while course sent to naval had an a of What was, So, equipped with agreement to have instance go on doing anything; and very unhappy about as a Honest training a allies in growing defect we discipline and of thing, but here had to weapons see the we had but no 104s for the motions going of to alert to these weapons, and similar situation that there were to be heavy but there were increasingly acute problem. about NATO. that symbol without any capability of actually warheads, there they were. talking and going through Johns, had at air force personnel, naturally, they were our likewise the army was in these terms being able to actually have access without we were a nuclear-capable the warheads, alert Canadian the excellent quality of personnel training, in maneouvres and that sort of division air we course, coula full brigade and a division and component. like other what I see weakened not in all these various contests in won performance an we was had an air division and we had reasonably good standing. was I commitment to build up to more Atlantic Council, the North to equipped howitzers, with nuclear They could go through the motions for not any warheads Things First of all, came the and so that to a head, became I am an now Europeans themselves had raised the question just what was in planning and control nuclear weapons and the Americans had tried, as I over to be the answer to participation say, this multilateral force idea, which Canada did not 123 000303 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information in. take any part motley crew would this weapons which and it merchant vessel, certain I, submarine armed with nuclear vessel in be plying the a oceans disguised were strange idea very a something that was was vessels merchant to be in this, what us be supposed to was want and it was "The Pirates of Penzance", he called that Diefenbaker did not as tried in fight to ordinary a World War German the But with modern methods of detection the Soviets menace. would have quickly nailed any of these ships by the presence of the missiles deck. on I part in these discussions, did not take seriously pursued, the key to that problem was really but they were relations the And, France between Germany Germany. and been had required under the Western European Union Treaty, and under the Paris Agreements that brought Germany into NATO, foreswear, access, course, having direct their to having mean I nuclear weapons on their territory nuclear weapons own have never up by as against de Gaulle the please, Germans really intended against was Soviets. to have a little were "Pirate" concerned, came things Here Crisis. was the Germans, in these forcibly to bring to and crews interested than some ships. end, rather to In the head a nervous about the attention of therefore of the as if the others to far as we were Cuban the over state of affairs where a very were much as and part of the MLF scheme was, Germans get on board these they anyway, But more weapons. nuclear whether the independent deterrent set sure idea of the Germans, the whole you been quite to allied, and the French were or particularly concerned about the Germans having I or of They could have American to nuclear weapons. access to Missile Khrushchev attempted the Americans the threat he felt the Soviet Union was exposed to by the positioning of American missiles in Turkey right reasons, such nuclear I gather, into missiles on its border, Khrushchev American Ambassador to Canada and Diefenbaker, just at the State for equipped same came with to see time that Foreign Affairs all kinds these of on was him and Dean in For move warheads and detected by who had been the showed him the photographs United photographs. 124 Italy. in reasonably good terms with Acheson, the the as were Livingston Merchant, reconnaissance aircraft. Mr. well decided to and Cuba, as former States, Secretary of came to NATO And the Council met at 000304 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information night and went we accepted had Council these photographs. over the evidence of reported I that the photographs these as sufficient proof that indeed Soviet vessels were on the way to Cuba with nuclear missiles. [HILL] just Can I ask question here. a Ambassador to NATO, I believe? [IGNATIEFF] I was already, '62. And in was Yes, the of fall acknowledges fact the in the summer, this gone Diefenbaker Mr. he that I had You at this time were did receive in his memoirs report. my But Livingston Merchant having shown him the photographs, which he did, received fine, say the is reply from do not accept in but I this following a direct nuclear this should be put before to establish the a exactly what are threat and This, in effect, to United Nations said. as Is there threat or is a course horrified when We were still discussing in NATO what the allied response to the Soviet action should be, of alert was President Kennedy, America only. the President Kennedy had authorized the declaration nuclear alert under NORAD. degree to Security Council". the of He was think that threat a you that this - I - is commission established to go that seriousness North America the facts. that should was what he he discovered that a threat and there should be an international there not of of such matter unilaterally by the United States. should be decided peace, a "Well, Diefenbaker: The NORAD alert, the highest degree and appropriate. was of The situation was that and what declared by affected North Diefenbaker, having taken the position that this had to go to the United and should be Nations, dealt with by an international commission, certainly was not in any mood to accept the implication that Canada readiness by the say-so of the US President. [HILL] in a And this state was of war done.... Without any consultation between.... [IGNATIEFF] did not was accept Yes, the and for that reason NORAD declaration President had failed to consult him. 125 Diefenbaker said that he of readiness And you see because that the provision, 000305 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information the power of the NORAD Without consultation, NORAD, of USA to make a by alert nuclear is still the most objectionable feature time reaction the because declaration of a of now missiles and computerized controls of these weapons has been reduced to a matter of minutes, should imagine it is questionable in any case now I so be consultative process to declare whether there NORAD. Anyway NATO consultations proceeded daily can a degree of danger and threat the beginning with France, Wednesday it was a state he historical and a as getting was half, Sunday, in his memoirs, based says NATO, that was think I not interesting An NORAD. from Tuesday, at least two days, on advice on the concerned that might there be authorized a in NORAD was concerned, by the Government, Maritime of maritime one Atlantic, asking that declare how were. known, me what I got the hell a unready, state of alert. in state a of using both Kennedy, as a as well gesture contacts the as UN the getting in until statement in the House alert, - between and our idly by, it as hemisphere, and this focused attention on But, war on instructions threat against the Western a direct through in Washington a was for Harkness. of course Canada could not stand After the crisis had been resolved Khrushchev, threat happening, what was was absolutely no when the Prime Minister made his in the face of must just the (since precautionary battle stations), had slipped did not know, I to the effect we Halifax immediately without even waiting touch with me and Thursday, been not SACLANT, the commander of the naval forces of the and left going on? far the Cabinet made the decision in Europe did not know what to do and kept forces were, in Command was taking up anchor and until as And this had been preceded by the fact that Canadian day later. ships But this had state of alert. a of state a mutiny, declared that Canadian Armed Forces were officially, as day a or final decision by the Cabinet and the Prime before the Harkness, Minister, he from fact on was I USA. Thursday before Diefenbaker finally accepted or alert, of with the think it started I exactly what on ally after another, one solidarity declared any instructions. without and was, alert in an the Canadian Forces in the way that is well President Kennedy Soviet Ambassador and Dobrynin direct communications with Khrushchev towards the 126 allies for - showing solidarity 000306 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi Loi sur s l'accès à l'information (we not excluded), were to Washington. of us with thanked in 1962, was silos, installations the nuclear and so board Command, Air military command units, on United the the us to States. headquarters, and the submarine nuclear submarine. a and invited This learned what all the installations were, the I Strategic the in one Office, in the Oval us solidarity that we had shown, for the visit all He received it. on names Atlantic Council North little tray which he gave each I still have the our us invited the whole bases. various the I actually was Now, while I was in Washington being thanked by the President, this business, particularly the role of the 104s (modified for nuclear-strike capability my on really important of the one no doubt about the in command, a and situation I Air our without subject possible to our the him. regarded attacks, here with in a we to see to take off McNamara, Robert the and get out Secretary of crisis. because the way. Defense, of Washington DC, and asked him what was his advice. to be the Chief of the Pentagon. that he took down one this is the Korean War that the North a on They they So my He was were So, all I went own, in supposed The curious thing about it was, of his black books, black reference books behind his desk, said, "Yes, faced nuclear- targeted as a nuclear-capable unit, but with no warheads. they could do was well and there was But equiped was communication missile a Air Marshal Dunlop was meet Division been was Alliance, airmen. used to constantly capacity aircraft, were The Air Division units of the quality of where worried about I because the Air Division had equipped for an interception role). as initiative, own he had a whole and looked up the lot 104 of and high level interceptor, planned and built for for the interception of the then advanced MIG types Koreans had use of from the Soviet air force". Their main characteristic was manoeuvrability at high levels; they were I speedy and manoeuvrable at high levels of interdiction. said: strike are "How aircraft"? totally levels, does this and He useless. they relate said: To have to conversion their nuclear "That should never have happened, they begin with, they to into And be for the are not role of aircraft, they have to fly under radar or nuclear strike at low levels to avoid radar and that is why there are a lot of accidents. 127 reliable at low I believe your 000307 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information luckier is division fliers, they are not supposed to be thing is that we have We are moving weapons. ; no perhaps Germans, the than flown at low levels. them for need as the missile into they're The other carriers of and we era, better nuclear will deploying missiles to take care of that particular thing". "What do do with the we I to be he "How do said: tell we nuclear-capable said "That know. would I background, in 1965, is I reported to a to make made "Are you it aircraft they knew mistake, cost these aircraft into this role. Hellyer that came do not I against that kind was I substitute different role, deadlock in Ottawa It was a very considerable a I This deadlock continued until 1965 with a He went directly to tell had delegation to meeting for the the SACEUR, got opposition what my own views the My only contribution subject. of to Canada's looking for a policy, the first defence policy, moving towards that functions, most of which our I Forces were we had trained and committed to Canadian look at was northern defence; to train re-open forces in Arctic weather; and And I possibly the British, or at doing I felt on the was that we were country every was striking peace-keeping situated in the really no plans and no forces or were northern defence and what we least some of Churchill and train at and work out an our forces for least part of our arrangement with Norway the Germans and some others of 128 him Canadian defence a said what either thoroughly supported, central area in NATO and that should were in NATO, responsibility and obligation of under the Alliance was self-defence. was role NATO from Diefenbaker, and this was accepted, that if I did stress to over convert to sum what he could have got from me, but did not get it from me. that of reported they and to take out or use them for a over parliamentarians. Well, photographs." National Defence did not want to admit they suspect that I it when said: I meeting of NATO parliamentarians photography or interception. a "Well, for diplomats, is decision, either a another aircraft, which we could, this. and said: that the 104 issue continued unresolved. really had even the to take that Well, them". said: possible role in photography". a only good business, scrap me at Soviets that the are your which it has "Yes, He said: looked try photography". if you want to keep the 104, serious". He 104?" I be reciprocal 000308 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information defence commitments with our European allies to undertake of North American defence, European partners would it and intended was in share the deterrent, defence of as share NATO. Our responsibilities the would in we under a of part in turn take our the defence of Northern Norway which was mostly exposed to the nuclear concentrations tried out, Arctic, the of indeed and it Soviets in the went I was a first the on success Kola that sense equipped and trained, even other. There occasion when Canadians matters as frost bitten, the ski-doos, was the we one least had with kinds of all limited our in the Northern manoeuvres the in things, And this was Peninsula. we better were resources, than any stood out in such most mobile, we had the skiis, and impressed the Norwegians even with our mobility; and we had helicopters. This was the direction which I still feel is desirable under an alliance, that specialization. change, but equipment, need you to changed, is not this is really that partly sheltering division a of on I worked to lack of standardization of is the scandalous a based labour big defect in NATO which The other it have state of affairs. It under the American nuclear guarantee, is but increasingly using defence as a means of developing high tech also industry, except role each country developed it's own weapons (I may American agreement). The that, which, as you know, merely assumed a subsidiary for Canada, to say industry defence result NATO, each country even for such basic was in that virtually had a under the maneuvers defence and sharing exercises in motley selection of equipment things as ammunition for quick-firing weapons. The ammunition was not standardized and therefore you not sure were if the lines of supply would even provide the basic amount required for days with the kind of rapid-firing weapons used in a matter of modern warfare. troops, trucks Tanks were were not standardized because what has happened has been make deals with industries. and therefore, in a way standardized, not and this the carriers has been for serious that governments have sought to And various firms bid for contracts, again, our strategy in NATO has been subordinated to commercialized trade in equipment. Part VI - Ambassador to the North Atlantic Gouncil, mid-1960s 129 000309 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [HILL] Can I in Government. in, and question In The Liberal under Lester Pearson irritant. equipment for the nuclear of there 1964 in Then Government degree of pull back. some that Canada was not in the future as was again. US, and Could a was decisions came the on that Defence White Paper, which the I mean not outside NATO but already see at that could One time perhaps going to play quite so prominent a role Germany example, For the past. in it had already becoming very strong, up there forces which resolved really looked in some other directions, at 1963 at the outset he took believe right I change ask you another point? was coming France was under De Gaulle and This was also the period of the McNamara strategy in the the move tell you us towards and defence forward flexible response. something about the changes in allied strategy period, and how Canada fitted What part did Canada play in thinking about both the conventional side and the nuclear in that in? side? [IGNATIEFF] that of course Pearson Well, "The government had up lived not to gone nuclear capable without getting the the warheads and But, I it's commitment, out the of it had He would get warheads". then negotiate Canada by saying the election won role. nuclear think it would be honest to say that the allies regarded this whole business as something that was peculiarly Canadian and not anything for them to interfere with. severely about what we I felt that interests. I briefings about the shelf which did may say that Mr. industry subordinate stated, defence, to not fit Again, our have always defence expenditures prevailed but he bought an any of the needs which Armed Forces and defence were again aircraft off were described made the victims our strategies of were than equipment made related to It has been it is not rather said, over but Hellyer came over and I attended the needs functions. began, taken out and the CF-5 contracting, equipment, defined I aircraft the by the military. defence were considerations commercial very going to do in the matter of the Air were Division because the 104s questioned We were in terms of GNP. 130 I so our main problem much weakness went over all of this in our sort 000310 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information of thing many times in our examination given all of kinds Conservatives, that had we transportation needs of the used to look at me and say, kind that try "You stuff, all of we big country. a we are want to see commitment to European defence". big boys know bring to but raise shown to the in their Unfortunately, environment. was is in we did Europeans Diefenbaker, and they were say the in Arctic did accept this never reciprocity. There is training of here, of air space is some use Canadian particularly those countries, contacts in the Arctic, have idea that interests and no should accept specific commitments the Canadian North defence of which we as course training of for aircraft and gunnery and all that sort of thing, but certain and take part, I as the Northern idea that there should be there your really this; operations defence the and do not what I raised it under the Armed Forces, of And they now is specialization under the Liberals and morale tops be of That did come out, it was approved it did degree some Arctic defence. and only constructive new element The that happened after the change of government effort Liberals in the CNR deficit and the cost count to by both arguments Highway and Air Canada and all kinds of things of the Trans-Canada in view of ingenious every year in NATO and I was have accepted for the in support of Norway. I would not apart from the Hellyer, NATO put fact found reasonable up by the time I left in 1965, say that that that, in you dealing with Mr. Pearson know, they were at arguments, they and had marked shift in fact, in Because NATO I my experience, subject realized that representative of Canada they did expect Although the weakened in support role a my there remained, opinion aircraft by decided - severe on certain but there was not much he immobilized, but the Pearson the air division from was 131 this not CF5, administration. was which regarded questioning. going after the use was in Diefenbaker the under Mr. because having which more that was in NATO little more brigade say to - Mr. and increasing Canada's commitment and we were, think it was true to people that, least willing to equipment in the direction of conventional weapons, no 1966, as definitely was an army a very big 000311 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information contribution to strengthening the NATO alliance. significant element new In NATO's attention while you devoted to was kept very busy in been have period, this of business say the only accepting the I Norway. commitment to support [HILL] this was As done, in the group of relations with time. that There think, working 14 I there, were good a France. was a of deal You must of work lot out the arrangements for Did Canada play a particular role in this negotiating with France. in helping to keep the French in the Alliance? area, [IGNATIEFF) Yes, first of all, was I pretty active in this operation because, and by this time Jules had succeeded Jules Leger, I Leger was Ambassador and we were very close friends and worked very closely with the French Government, French of series Ambassador de Leusse, came to head. a I chairman also was felt could not be course protection to France small. so had Gaulle institutions, as well of was reservations his "machins", "machins". were all He prejudices and peculiarities. remember Stikker telling go"? said: "Well, because of aura the because of the others. the of gave Distances une he NATO, all the the UN, (in He hardly it. me I two one received ever Once when he did, said: "Well, questions, French) '?" and one was 'Est- "No, Stikker said: be a deterrent and the United States; as long I do not think there "(In French) homme responsable"? Est-ce-que And a I how did it will Alliance. nuclear asked guerre international all Stikker. Dr. about me Gaulle said: un even This system it stays with the United States there will not be est NATO of restoring the monarchy, terms Secretary General of NATO, y in really did live in the 18th knew his ce-que'il committee something which about and thought in He the to the as Century, the with integrated command came as a great surprise. he called them all organizations, a My recollection was that the actual decision of France to leave the De particularly but easily destroyed. French all friends with also was the representative at the time when all this dealing with early warning, and this were I NATO, to Ambassadors and war". war, as Then de le Président des Etats-Unis Stikker said:"I do not discuss 132 000312 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information heads of state, I do not think Then the conversation ended. I I competent to respond to that". am But the strange thing say with all these eccentricities, it really did His often moves d'Orsay and came as to surprise a commanders. the Like the come shock. a as as officials, the Quai to his even that, was Missile Cuban affair: what happened was that he declared solidarity with Kennedy over the Cuban Missile Crisis. SACLANT, over Gaulle, came because of the highest Then afterwards, US naval orders of Lorry Norstad, SACEUR, one given Légion d'Honneur. the largely because Lorry Norstad was think that I he came over, to his great when he thanked the President, the President said: "What do you mean said: "Well, were the own". the French fleet it's you know was Gaulle said: agitated; and this I Légion d'Honneur. The Navy and said: "I under your integrated an French, the British, De was disagreement with President in Kennedy about missiles. So Admiral Dennison, when also expected to get the Légion d'Honneur. But, surprise, commander, by General de to Paris expecting to be thanked de Gaulle had - the heard some And heard from Robert Schumman. General summoned he was very was Dennison got the Admiral "Was it true that the Navy There Germans, and our it". of Dennison command. naval the Canadians, never command". of no French a under command of an American Admiral during the Cuban Missile Crisis"? "But, He said: do you realize that France could have been plunged into nuclear war by a decision of the United Nobody ever told me". a States integrated command. under this This is very interesting because there is parallel to Diefenbaker. always feel that there I is a certain parallelism, which is not sufficiently realized in Canadian reading of the situation, President that Kennedy integrated. He by "Absolutely, army, orders navy, only air will De leave force from the and on told briefed that NATO commands implications of Diefenbaker, and their reaction Gaulle flew into of today all as you will of learn France, immediately". 133 rage and an was said, integrated commands, that you will and that rule will and I want this carried out a by were the President authority to declare war, that he had been misled on been had nor similar. we being not had not integrated command, remarkably de Gaulle felt he alone receive has the be observed from now Well, as I say, this 000313 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information came as sort a of a reaction, but was not decision in any a if you like, tantrum it took some time not unlike Diefenbaker's filter down to the French. to favoured by the Quai d'orsay way They found themselves in the French Department of Defence. It by or very a difficult position because, you know, there were all the pipelines based France, the headquarters were in France, all the military on machinery was in France and this is what the to go. De And so it was that Leusse and confrontation, had it through gone was sort of something in not were on explained, I were in Anyway, we the of sort the and he came that mind would be changed. disentangle to would be External Affairs these that This was final, only question the other integrated in his how French And of thing that was negotiable, and this was worked out just between Canada and France but mentioned was the extent between all of us, France would remain in the North Atlantic Council; the President's whatsoever arrangements and to what Couve and way the of Paul Martin was in support of the military integrated commands. course the not by this time and no there was a suggestions. make or and had talks with Couve de Murville, over explained for on integrated command not explain to Diefenbaker with consultation, constant Secretary of State course so-called of hand-holding, and particularly as I able was form the parallel situation of the implications of being d'Orsay and with talks with the Quai our so immediately, everything had said, And here the General favoured. French establishment commands, leaving the the Alliance, that was that in leaving specifically President had and he persuaded that it was not interest, particularly in relation to Germany, was to remain in the Alliance. [HILL] So, in effect, the other allies did not confrontational fashion really towards the French. a matter of [IGNATIEFF] react It was in a rather .... Of trying practically in hysterics in sympathy too, and I to and hold their hands. they did not know what They to do. remember Admiral Dennison coming to and because I had got this direct from a French Minister, were I was see me he wanted 134 000314 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information to have explained, it thunderstruck at what he absolutely was happened. had And non-plussed explained I terms of my experience with the reaction of Mr. this irreversible and was this watch, business command. How [HILL] I then is of one decision-making of exactly you take "The Future Tasks of the Alliance", think Canada was already keen [IGNATIEFF] tied Yes, the Three Wise in questions to on I that phase? see in that direction. NATO Canada's role in this, Pearson's role to also a case? that the Was was which eventually, How do you moving on NATO working was think, turned into the Harmel Exercise. I integrated an sovereignty. period in Your period of detente in Europe, and NATO do with, under have to we wonder if I might ask two more questions about NATO and final wrap-up question. one that of political care in him Diefenbaker, that things the to and Committee of in 1956. Three of that exercise, and I knew what is course, directly military or political co-operation non- exercise, Men of contained in the Report of the had been his political advisor in behind was it. That had also been tied to his visit with Khrushchev which I had also been associated with, and since discussions, Green even very was detente. can truly in, and This can say reported to had detente. for Sidney Smith and that Canada played about our a is something which is still He was of was who has served longest also Belgium, position in the because Howard was Howard Green no opposition were a to thorough close friend later of what the other and important going was leading in NATO, De 135 in figures. that Canada stress the instance, the Dean Staercke, the Ambassador of Council and has influence. Spaak the former Prime Minister Secretary General. in urging the discussion on For on the Mr. one leading role in feeding views special relationships with certain allies to the North Atlantic Council Belgium, years, There non-military obligations of the Alliance. of much very was appreciation of in the Khrushchev period, have I in the political consultations about detente, so reports NATO during the Diefenbaker much Both detentists and Moscow I of We were detente. in In a very strong other words, 000315 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information while United States may have the not been European allies at the time, the we had keen about detente as as than more question. to press this in relation to dealing with the German in mentioned business book my shooting of frighten them, thing, I North Atlantic is that the quality of had Council bows to The other representation on the the deal great a with do to it. representative of the United States had been Secretary of and Truman under and Finletter had I our relationship embarrassing situation, as did I over the Cuban Missile privately to Tom and he never sort of Missile Crisis, knowing that of chiefs indeed our two there was never the on Defence Tom was had an Crisis, I I spot throughout the Cuban instructions and knowing that no governments attempt an The and tell him what the situation had I If very to go put me close. was simply used was, in Washington and he him known the Belgium and myself shot quickly that it was not raised again. may say, I with up came the Soviet nuclear weapon across a the Ambassadors of Norway, idea down so that military the when that opportunity our isolate to loggenheads. at were make to or me But me uncomfortable, and that had a great deal of importance in the North And I urged that NORAD Somehow Atlantic Council. or other be like all other commands be put under the North Atlantic Council, because the North Atlantic Council representatives that caliber of of are people, they are not just passive, they ask questions, they discuss things diplomatic political, in they terms, militarists and the particular trio in my days, of the led detente representative, also, of to keen was very the Soviet Norway, on and and that sort say, And Spaak had been difficulty that only the Belgian the myself. just not He himself detente. Union I Staercke, De was of Lange Halvard course, times several discussions as are really arose in my recollection, during the Diefenbaker period over political consultations, Howard Green was a was over the passionate supporter of the UN; and while Spaak was all for detente with the Soviet Union, as a former interest in considerable Union trying to interests the he could not of Belgium's, salvage whatever Foreign Minister Minière, its role in the Congo. UN and remained supply of in the uranium 136 take and direct very Belgium's very particularly the of Congo, a help but, the whole uranium 000316 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information industry. this He was He therefore wanted NATO to regard it similarly, since still claimed by Belgium at the time of the Congo crisis. support from wanted the Allies, support of in Howard Green would not have any of this kind of militarism. supporting Hammarskjöld He was and insisted that crisis, the Congo over And Belgium. Belgium had to get out lot, stock and barrel; and there was to be no NATO fiddling with "volunteers". parachute troops thing. in support of inherit, did the because most Howard Green. that Congo of said he He This exercise. UN under Leger, and for that reason Leger to who, as General, threatened to resign over Howard Green's NATO's Secretary I population and that sort of to save the European this did really create trouble with Spaak, Well, position There was some talk of sending was was something that was crisis took place more uncompromisingly hostile quite mad; he did not know what possible and not possible because he created great friction and was distress in the North Atlantic Council. By the time I arrived the Congo business had simmered down considerably, but Spaak was still agitated whenever Howard Green's say, Howard detente, never did anything but the effort not and resort understand exactly what the was Green crisis, without to name Soviet Union to But, support policy of the only to deal with the Berlin military action, but also to was and mentioned. In fact that Europe. Eastern was I Wall try and possible and not possible in relation That was examined and discussed in my time. [HILL] as what led on eventually to very fully the Harmel Report..... [IGNATIEFF] the Harmel Report, and also to the Ostpolitik of Germany, which was encouraged by NATO. [HILL] done on To There was it while you [IGNATIEFF] lot of a were discussion about it, and a lot of work there. only emphasize, as I say; that the Harmel and all those developments hinged on the Report on Political Co-operation, Yes, I would of the Three, that Pearson issued 137 in 1955. 000317 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [HILL] question second The dealing with the issue nuclear Multilateral Nuclear Force (the MLF) Nuclear Force (ANF) smokescreen or end what - NATo up a Harold Wilson's Atlantic or Power Directorate. De Gaulle's Three even with out two was which committees, In the the were Affairs Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group. Defence Nuclear set to end of way NATO's which always seemed to me to be a magnificent - came the in not was this: is NATO on What was the Canadian position on this question, and what role did Canada play in finding this eventual solution? [IGNATIEFF) would I the that say not role Canadian very was active, because we had hang-ups both in the Conservative Government the and part Liberal Government. in whatsoever meetings. I MLF I ANF. or instruction to have under was did I attend not any kept informed through the friendships was time, but we support of the nuclear planning device, the committee, the British representative at the of hopefully again trying get to strategy. on some There kind the was agreement of shift a means consensus the from in course as and the of had with I of were no massive retaliation schemes of Foster Dulles to the strategy of flexible response under MacNamara, now, really with forward strategy have to we thin red a never happy then, of nor happy namely is, NATO which would line the Canadian fact that The were basic strategy the what nuclear response. but the trigger brigade, while I a was there, quite often covered the forward positions of several British divisions, which in a way to the British as I say, or another Ireland, at the time and Lord whether it did not feel that it that I was Zuckerman interesting Army of the Rhine, else somewhere we did not help. things and We we felt were a Suez, viable or one the head of defence was his scientific advisor. One while Americans talked the in Also consensus. Mountbatten that, time wherever there, was was was was attached substituting British divisions which were either for several and there, not were of the about flexible response and forward defence and triggering this kind of nuclear response, was Zuckerman, saying that it was both in NATO and in visits to Ottawa, totally unrealistic, that the use of nuclear 138 000318 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information weapons on tactical a would level create such in havoc the battlefield as well as resulting in massive casualties in the civil population in in which the fighting took place, that it the areas would not be feasible to conduct had "limited" a very considerable effect I think. a in the nuclear remember Zuckerman's theories Part VII Ambassador to - I because time, to I confirmed. United Nations and the That defence college in at the was time from pretty well were battle. It certainly did, place which took took part in them when I London, exercises nuclear the ENDC late - 1960s and early 1970s [HILL] I Well, if will make sort of left NATO, then you might move I you went were for time a things you role in the Eighteen (ENDC). Looking back on fact that while you were at NATO that in which the Cyprus Cyprus, as that the Canada's crisis and arose that Canada and Nations, the United to which After you Ambassador in Geneva, where amongst other Disarmament Committee linking to be Ambassador to responsibility had comprehensive, overview one. very a to the very last question, on Nation period, and was the sent troops to could you say what value do you think NATO has to Canada, mechanism for promoting international and peace security, relative to the role of the United Nations, amongst other and the roles of like [IGNATIEFF] Well, assumptions measured groups is only that in somehow terms of military contribution. consensus about the disarmament conference? view my is or the that other about of the the contribution, it was my experience, that the number of troops that we of one Canada's quantity Because strategy, things, or role the in extent extraordinary nature of the I was sort of could muster up on mistaken the a NATO is of its lack of military "marked" certain on day. What is overlooked is the fact that the quality of the volunteer forces that Canada sends to Europe is much higher than that of most of the we conscript armies that the others produced, are there in Europe has political significance. 139 and the fact that I was told that 000319 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information many times many, Canada the on seriously. Atlantic North think, I was, I Council, because consulted, a Government and close. that at we "George, on one point, Council, support quite was was of remember that Greece the cat, the by me many sent do that indeed I found more to available our allied information I said: "All information, right, but him urge I am may you from your government. I liar. a I information is of reinforcements of if we are because the Turks will to try react am to in Since Tom say Palamas, who Palamas was flew into a and then I had to go with check to prepared not Of course often find own say that this to have his had the latest myself without Don't let's say simply saying that the latest be taken and and troops Government our having the latest information from my government. that I'm saying you are the and government. CIA. the in did not coincide with the of the Council chamber, and in fact, Council in the friend Ambassador my Finletter and Tom privately him government. account going discussion the in issue we am to take the lead because had to information given by fury, and walked out see you know say I I And others". intelligence information made available to given to is do you mind taking the look, secretly had I intelligence information and closely with the the Greek-Cypriot side than they admitted. the said I as of under Reagan's now, are worked very later became Foreign Minister of Greece, the happened, It the Greek-Turkish crisis, pressure I would not bell that a kind in dealing with the both Tom Finletter and his successor trouble with the in terrible there be and consult committed directly to both sides and whatever be was Atlantic North the to Cyprus one. the say: lead in the discussions to the Council opportunity to do not know what they I Finletter would are to very think that that do not be sent an but in those days representation, US. taken think the very highest officials should that my relations with very I found that I crisis that you mentioned, were be the representation that Canada has had has been of and very high order, before, I have do you should first person to go the particularly a good precedent, Canadian Council Under-Secretary. that had not been in the is that the representation of is important what that resolve the this has what is to threatening, figures which the alliance 140 000320 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information And we had to work has." both sides to reduce. but they did was an irony, Cyprus issue mentioned, not this and in the end we managed to get on That not actually go to that I got in NATO of course before war while I was because of the circumstances was supporting both and did say, leading part and this was on the Security Council. on directly, I the representative But there as that is the United States that in NATO. involved want to take found was they went to war, plate our very asked when to do us I to came in the which But so. be I I Canada's The three most serious crises in which I got directly involved were Six Day War the Crisis the Middle in East resolution 242; the Cyprus crisis; and the crisis and the incident. Pueblo active part. But in each Cyprus crisis, of In the himself and took the initiative to case, working over North Korea Canada course, set up and took Martin Mr. out very a down came peace-keeping force by a making personal appeals to heads of governments and prime ministers to contribute. We had to pay the peace-keeping forces and have had required money to ever since. that, initially, it did keep the two sides while NATO of put pressure the state of war, Greek can excitement Turkish passions or intervention in the is United situations under control. domestically such that Nations and the Canadian peace-keeping force, two communities going from realized the degree of Turkish persecutions. the and and massacres that and is aroused by really requires both keep such in NATO to very important part in keeping the a at mean and going to war, to go to the point other's each throats. passion which goes back I fact was though it has been expensive to I the had not memory of the Greeks feel about the Turks like Armenians, they think in terms of Century it But the is not contradictory to the other, One and very difficult, has played from both sides not on to produce these this all what sort happened in the 19th of thing, and their almost fight and all the rest of it. So, all these historical, tribal, ideological passions, and religious, Christian against Moslem, liberation which now have are to related be dealt to historical with on the rivalries and things basis the of inter- dependence of world communities, and through the United Nations and 141 000321 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information through NATO. The most serious thing that happened while I was on the Security Council of course, was the Middle East crisis, because it involved confrontation direct the between States United the supporting Israel, and the Soviet Union supporting both Egypt and Syria, which were in federation at of state a And the time. the climax came when the Israeli forces, having defeated Jordan and the Egyptians, were point the on would have brought them to headquarters all and was, defeating of Damascus the where the that Soviet Middle East ring and began bells alarm Syrians and the to immediate cease fires were negotiated and Kosygin came rushing over the Soviet delegation was fired for having given poor advice about the possibilities of Egypt to President see Syria's scoring and they diplomatic triumph a Israel, over by getting rid they might, thought of most and Johnson, Then UNEF. of in the way got we involved in negotiations, with Soviet participation, for about four months, work out to this adopted in the Council withdrawal for of Israeli territories, in exchange by neigbours. its Arab diplomacy, This provided virtually all occupied Israeli territory forces This agreements. international peace conference the from for the recognition of other have unanimously was basis for agreement. no been have which would to have from the peace agreement apart but the as 242, resolution We are based on still 242, negotiated be Egypt, with talking participation of the displaced Palestinians, there about which would have request of the was instance where I an Americans, in personal of course, ship keeping an on North North Korean waters, boarded, captured, and this water rights not getting I could accusing coastal water anywhere, to find release of about. The North I American spy an the other of rights breaking and the rest of out whether the the crew, Koreans that obviously We were to see what Koreans would they really what had territorial it. me North was captured managed to get hold (through- a Hungarian contact) 142 in brought to the was and the Americans then asked the equipment. the Pueblo was Korean activities and was caught each do quietly negotiate worried or The diplomacy, quiet diplomacy. was Security Council, to involved again at the was What happened there eye an which is the thing which is very difficult to accept for the Israelis. Pueblo business by the of 000322 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information the North Koreans, Panmunjom. in and establish the negotiations that took place The of crew Pueblo the that particular crisis resolved. western the in group I debate in fact was also was the over released, and lead the seizure of asked to Soviet Czechoslovakia and the expulsion of the Dubcek Government, and that only leadership role in the Security Council. That was my last and was because the Americans were changing their representative, after Goldberg, whom I worked very closely with. and his replacement underlines the ways, some had arrived, not they asked me to. so fact that while the United States threat to a affairs do other than work international be, can sovereignty, Canadian replaced, He was being This and is in in cannot we closely with them, very sharing the intelligence information and working on diplomacy. is relationship which state of a do not see that learned I that we was will ever that, as is not unlike in the absolutely frank and very firm. to the relationship, that if was, allows itself and partnership the I of If one to get does not a marriage you have to partner just gives in into sort a really work. alternative, some My experience I other or some stooge of said very so way of doing simply said no. or [HILL] in case and I My only lesson disagreed with my American partners, firmly and suggested it, marriage, quite get out of it. be other, a It So you would in effect say that continuing to participate some kind of NATO organization is a good idea, although the form of the organization might change significantly? [IGNATIEFF] think so, said, in NATO, what is still important is the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty, which are still there, I and and particularly as I Article 4, where it says "parties will consult whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened". the or There is an obligation to consult, and there is machinery to consult and Canada does not have to find itself, assume that particularly I it will be, advocate following reasons, that isolated with participation the alternative 143 in the the seems United States, Alliance to me that and for the we will 000323 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information simply, through NORAD, drift into which in fact all the positions by would cost Canada because have we States that our in threats territory, form within but the interests that is air and So do not I around common always all uniform. not And the West, and East between any see is that we say, I as alliance the United the would not be used sea other. which ability, our and Union our dialogue the of out are neutrality, beyond be and the other factor, groups own our interests, other our try to Soviet aggression against the or feasible alternative; can both the assure in will be taken without consultation, infinitely more, indeed to situation, fortress-America the alternative is Or, the Pentagon. a particularly in view of the new leadership in the Soviet Union that is seeking some kind of accommodation for only through the dialogue between the that I possible some see Alliance and the Warsaw Pact comprehensive more new it is internal reasons, security arrangements being worked out, with guarantees, such as was arrived at at Stockholm the Conference inspection and confidence building measures, and reductions of nuclear weapons. always be re-created after they reduced, to a minimum strategy which is related to [HILL] some Can I are deterrent, all do I completely devoid of nuclear weapons, Security, European on the rest not with being it see it, of because nuclear weapons destroyed. and we not subordinated to any still one can But they can be need to have a system, weapon but agreed function between the allies. ask you couple a more short questions, then we are finished. you When Conference there, Council. you In fact I the Ambassador Ambassador were in sometimes had Geneva to to Disarmament the reports make to the NATO attended one NATO Council myself where you were from Geneva. There were What do you think is the utility of that the that exercise? [IGNATIEFF] standard one for of the security was Geneva two one defects in it. One was thing for NATO and quite delegation. 144 It was a a ridiculous different state of 000324 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information affairs, that the did we not in Geneva have access to information about negotiations, SALT restraints weapons, information about So, it [IGNATIEFF) form, or biological about testing, nuclear on what to NATO to get that [HILL] things parallel negotiating shape any in but we were chemical weapons, did not have any we happening in SALT. was while We had go down was NATO to information. was Well, useful in that sense? it useful was in sense one it but policy to say that the standard of security governing the bilateral talks must be set on NATO's standards, and if a mission did not fulfill the standards and therefore it meant that all top secret to be up to whatever or it was, personnel had and the safes had to And yet, this way, the safe houses and all the rest. I as be pointed military knew where the Americans were, the state their nuclear balance, and so on. Who was kidding who, why out, the Soviet of these should excluded? what was going Council, the on [HILL] you be remember, in connection with the I because down went to the case in the was this, and that was clued up to of the security situation, and report seabed, said was we the to North it required all do not favour the Atlantic was that Canadian that. End of discussion. [IGNATIEFF] In the case doing the to in NATO, American representative position things parallel than the Geneva Conference more on when as negotiating were The NATO Council was not tuned in to what was going in Geneva, any therefore who went down to NATO, Treaty. Seabed on I people End discussion. of the seabed, same job; things these of I pointed out that there and how, being You did not persuade anybody. first of all, prohibited, if at were submarines did submarines relate all? and how was inspection to be carried out without interfering with the rights of the coastal resources, state and so on? to continental The Americans shelf and oil simply said they did not want to discuss those questions, either question. 145 mineral I learned later, from 000325 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information admiral an in Pentagon, the they that thought that I was questioning something which is now under current discussion, namely by submarines to our northwest passage the American access but question, creepy here that we prohibiting were crawlies, which nobody seemed to think were we said I tackling not operations, which in any the were directly raise that I did not Arctic and coastal waters of Canada. to the - something, practical, were way the restrictions real way of of conducting but submarine underwater nuclear operations. [HILL) So, effect, in that reporting fairly loose liaison; and that is about [IGNATIEFF] It restriction, the others [HILL] was because say, I as neither side One last This know I that NATO there were an "out of of those discussions? on high believe George I period of the consultations look at NATO in geographic terms. heard What Ball in NATO, level meetings area" and how you [IGNATIEFF] Yes, saw problem was the a on one report them was that the Americans would present their was on came case this was met by "embarrassed silences" for the most part. if that what on some if you number of occasions to I in was nature in clued was also the question, although for NATO this was it or definite very a was question, and it is in the period while you were at NATO and at the United Nations. this a it got. as was like doing. were Vietnam War. far as sounds NATO liaison, and it loose a to and I wonder it? that was And I may the case. say there was an embarrassed silence when Vietnam was discussed in NATO, there were questions about the diplomacy related to trying to find a peaceful settlement, in which Canada participated to was no discussion about the Vietnam War Security Council, - Arthur some prohibited multilateral from such. but there extent, When I was on the Goldberg wanted- indeed he was very keen to bring Vietnam before the UN, about as some to try and stop the intervention doing so by President to that Johnson, end, war and but and that was bring he was one of 146 000326 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information the why he nearly reasons told me that himself. allowed over No, to came there the Vietnam resign, was War. no It he was very upset, multilateral intervention was the classic example unilateral action, course the whole background involvement included the fact that our advice was of and to part take commission, the as Western our When we were representatives strongly advised against military we of of ignored at the time of the withdrawal of the French from Indo China. asked he on the advisors and military intervention on the part of the United States to replace the French. said, We you know, would that make it impossible to get any kind of settlement in Indo China, for under the Geneva Agreement. were I against it. and so on, United States Koreans and [HILL] I The Chinese were willing, as Soviet we think am the Well, we very to Union both on Vietnam and settle for neutralization in their thought in driving out both terms of have taken provided discovered, when accompanied Howard Green to meetings in Geneva Laos I China and the as almost The area. the North Chinese. I think we will close at this point. grateful to you for I up a lot of your time, and would just like to say that having participated in this project. 147 000327 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNA00003 Title A name given to the resource George Ignatieff: "In Alliance" Interview Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived “Research - In-House Research - Oral History of Canadian Policy in NATO - Hill Roger,” RG154, Volume number: 13, File number: 2100-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f2c6dc3969039f46a26844189a5adbba.pdf b814e28f5c722724a429381090b39da4 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information GEOFFREY PEARSON Good afternoon. [HILL]* the former Ambassador Pearson, Pearson, Geoffrey Our guest this afternoon is Mr. Executive Director of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, which is sponsoring agreed project. the present participate in this work, Mr. Pearson, to with your perspective own that you have We are very pleased and provide us to Canadian policy in NATO. on [PEARSON] I'm pleased also, because I don't think we've done enough in work Canada Canadian defence on point of view of the practitioners. history, of but done we've foreign policy from the and We've done little very which memories of those who participated, unlike done a great to know our be able to deal. own I think we need history better. help with this the lot is based we're going pleased to was forward look we the on Americans who have the Institute and the basis on this in Canada if So work, a to the additional work that will be done on the basis of grants we've made University and to others. to York [HILL] an Pearson, Mr. oral history. in interest We're NATO Thank you. what we're you know, as engaged in trying to trace the development over time. We taking are a here is of Canadian at look the development of Canadian foreign and defence policies since 1945, trying and example, We are have we see are trying NATO to fitted see how has into to NATO. ways in which Canada's national interests served by membership trying long These the the For the Canada's at framework. Canada contributed in determine how effective NATO has been are this at looking been how to term goals of and NATO as a we're mechanism for pursuing international peace and security. types of things we're trying to examine, various stages of to world development in the as last 40 we look years, through the eyes of those Canadian ambassadors and senior officers and officials, some retired and some still serving, who played key roles in the formulation of efforts inside *Interviewers: the NATO Canadian foreign organization. Mr. policy or in Canada's Pearson, the reason Hill Pawelek 000328 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information because Institute, but Department of External between 1973 and 1980, 1983, Emissary of as peace initiative of reflections on Canadian before focusing NATO-related people's interview. in may have As I or questions two or more closely look is to less their about their periods of directly on should remark here that the way I think I we will go on say will deal we that the NATO on be at period. I dealt with in the are we career later years of the to some focus more should also is that life and your own of the NATO period will I 1980 Mr. Trudeau's go along. careers one subsequently return to second NATо approaching these interviews more and then in fact most the of the Soviet Union in to first with the earlier years of your think the positions in Ottawa will be proceeding in these two interviews, and then in foreign policy, and the wider international activity. the Department, career and in those various other phases of posing order, the Minister during Prime the are the various phases of chronological we Ambassador as of member a 1961, then in various 1983-84, mentioned, the way we scene, as which we will touch on as we your career at notably Affairs, Director previous your only is not Executive as of because also Secretariat from 1958 to to position present your of project, in this we're keen to have you involved aiming, in these tapes, to be reasonably structured and disciplined in our approach, but without essential to discouraging good a oral spontaneity the history. We which are believe I looking is Canadian at policy in NATO in terms of political and defence issues which arose in the various phases, but we are also looking at things as a very human endeavour, which was experienced by those diplomats, officers and others who were actually carrying out Canada's policies in NATO over time. Part I If - Early we describe years, could as to turn 1952 now part to "the early years up 1 of 1952". to born in Toronto, and educated in Canada and completing school Ontario. your career at Subsequently, you went Mr. interview, Pearson, in England, Trinity College in to 149 the the I this you I were believe, Port Hope, University of Toronto and 000329 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information graduated with Oxford in 1952. 1950. in B.A. a wonder if you could tell I obtained you Then us a B.A. a from little about those early years and how they have coloured your outlook on life and on the international I scene. should remark, preface, of course, a as family as we all know is a diplomatic one, that your spent you must have and I suppose time in Ottawa and with Canadian missions some abroad, where international affairs and Canada's role in the worla part much very been would have wanted to ask how your perception of the world everyday life. experiences have of earlier especially and scene So really I your affected views your on international peace and security. [PEARSON] I did Well, my early life up in grow when quite formative a playing school I and age, suffering and up grew I in and the between young, was cricket typical of Canadians, not diplomatic family a England, was and 13, English school boy about of ages an cold, the educated partly in was as because in 9 English way the boys used to do, probably still do, and trying to adapt from being a Canadian, being to Englishman. an So I learned early some of the first rules of diplomacy, which are to do with imitating our surroundings, At the anyway time of same course, identity, of own sense own government's the to or point as else or who has lived in diplomat, a you won't be able to I was only, the express and they were foreign. very England and especially gone to school they understand I you or you them. think, them. understand you have to retain your would know that just because they speak the mean that can your But I quickly learned how to country's views. adapt to foreign surroundings, you that foreigner, same So, Anyone England, in language doesn't this was quite an certainly in the - boarding and I quickly learned how to speak and not quite think but speak the way they did with an English accent and learned school I went to, how to play their games. I great triumph for a But also that was a able to speak English. conscious then and that he in the was won a Canadian; so at afterwards of my in touch with various press and reading prize on, we home, I remember, and weren't supposed to be of father's people, and was very and the fact course, work, one I read about them like the Secretary to the Queen and the 150 000330 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information various politicians. lot a of English people and things That was at. He officialdom and I tremendous sort of occasion, a were coming the of the old enough to be was I missed the war. here, war years of background affairs, and because, an me years. there at were interest an That was were, of mainly as them but not as scholars, they [HILL] to good rarely and the all of that and Munich, But that kind in European certainly in, in the war, Then I went back much the course, were fellow students from other countries, of was that I spent the so a in same, more small as one some overseas in ways, students minority and most really, their especially the colonies, rowing and for that to Oxford undergraduates were English, who continued to ignore, thought I last, well not the England then, in what happened school, those of that and be interested in it; and aware interest although than there the and my father went back to London. two for King in 1938, I came home before the war, gave of I remember that vividly. in we were wouldn't have had growing up here. 1950, some somebody living there rather than here, struck home to I war, but he saw really still top nation Coronation was a tremendous celebration. And know to came like the Coronation of the but when the English last, the High Commissioner, not was and other sports, some scholars. Presumably by that time you'd more or less forgotten how play cricket. [PEARSON] where I going hadn't, I really, because I played cricket and I was good at cricket, to at least watch it. My before I went to Oxford, were more Canadian the schooling in Ontario had Toronto, at satisfying and environment undergraduate experiences. years enjoyed quite liked I so where for me. the usual I lived in residence at I I was preferred sort of Trinity, which tremendous experience, much better than living in some dreary rooming house which they seem to do now. I made a lot of friends. was a There was in the a very country, good history department at Toronto, then the best one Creighton, Underhill, influenced me because of the best and Martin. of his views 151 in the world probably, in particular relations pertaining Frank Underhill on the with 000331 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information between London and guess was I Canada, which bit of a radical then, because a I first hand. about at knew I didn't feel at all I sympathetic to English causes. [HILL] in this period. fairly You must have sizeable feature [PEARSON] Well, I been example, atomic weapons, and I scene. by. really didn't think much about, for period largely passed war they although the great were a and sense. for good Most people assumed that the war would not be répeated couldn't there that undergraduates, Europe Holland. of students and the the to the others that been born; but again, so didn't the at times when anything 1950, influenced although because sense, decided then sense to literature and I policy. knew almost we a as Europeans. very Canadian There External more war. nothing interest my NATO in had just great subject for anxiety. I I would suppose amount there Nor NATO Affairs. were in that Europe in any in England and we came weren't did to being don't remember it much. troops began in 1950, war it though but Dutch European the back to Canadians having to fight again. of join was the and I was taking I hadn't English interested in Shakespeare than in foreign job, and not having a it would have been hard to find a job teaching English. But doctorate, I me they went to Germany. didn't have any there, The Korean it might have expanded, which went questions, sharpen to me was time or I in European through much to learn; I don't think it seem were been didn't talk very much about war. it finished and was When I went to Oxford in 1950, anything affecting England So, who had who the So war. University Service Seminar in World experience helped foreign policy again. We accepted that this students German Young Canadians really had that; end to war That revived my interest, I guess, because about third a as therefore, was interesting but not vital. summer one be less, or more foreign affairs, to thing. new over suppose undergraduates probably accepted the war in it had been a of that; aware emergence me think the post undergraduate, and its NATO the international on I was an I of the consciousness about What joined I got married External and so Affairs, needed after 152 a doing my exams in London in 000332 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information 1952. that So sort of things. decided couldn't I and go back to some other career after that. really change wondered I have often what I would have done if I had gone back to University to teach English literature. started My father's by teaching history. diplomacy began with my career Anyway, was a bit like that; think my real I posting to Paris in 1953, he interest in to the Canadian Embassy. Part II - [HILL] The Embassy in Paris, I'd ask interview. like As I to later, about that you understand 1953-57 it, you spent a year in part or so 2 of the in Ottawa after joining the Department, and then were posted to Paris, to the Embassy. [PEARSON] Yes. assignments started I for three in six months to with Ottawa the usual round in various Divisions. of Work in Defence Liaison Division was of interest, especially vis-à-vis the United States. We were then beginning to negotiate the bilateral agreements with the United States which have since developed into panoply the whole wasn't of high enough later. North American defence co-operation. But I up to develop any great knowledge of them until Then I went to Paris. [HILL] You [PEARSON] '53 to country. Having had the awful experience of occupation with people were in Paris from '53 '57; at the time, France from amongst the same families who had De Gaulle. It was humiliating mood. a very There sour was a '57. to mood, very was still a very divided supported either Pétain or difficult, impatient and a live Communist party to take advantage of it. [HILL] It was the year also [PEARSON] And Algeria. they defeated in Indochina, and the opening were of Dien Bien Phu. '54 was a key year for the French, because 153 shots were fired 000333 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information in Algeria. These bandits who had to worry the FLN which in turn 1962. I in was truly divided. major differences [HILL] Plus, [PEARSON] And about NATO Russians; Disputes between UN NATO was time a countries now Turkey have conflicts of interest. of opinion and of course, But then, later, Suez Suez. added solidarity, and so it on was that was these long France as matter a a as time when [HILL] So was you were when we talk times when there That had nothing to do with the and different decolonization views and it divided the allies at tried to vote with could, certainly on the Algeria question. But questions. we forget We that there on, of that. to I think Soviet threat, the Canada as less concern than these internal of there Algeria in That although Greece and about what the right policies were, was Algeria. in town "few bandits" increased to The question of any solidarity. no the small few a policy in Indochina and in North Africa split the Alliance. French was some of work became the government of minor questions mostly, over are simply the Paris for most of that period. was when NATO in about. become be to trouble caused nothing There was taken were have come to call we it, allied problems. arrived there in the year Stalin's death and of the whole period of de-Stalinization. [PEARSON] That's right, and I took little interest in that, because of the greater problems the French own country. were having just running their Their governments lasted about a year party the Communist was the largest French party, on average, with 27 percent of the vote. The Christian Democrats also got about [HILL] They got to almost [PEARSON] They were how to keep them 30 percent, very close to out of or and 28 that. the Communists. that, and the whole problem was party was government. The Communist thought to be linked to the Soviet Union, and it was not the Soviet military threat, therefore, that people 154 were concerned about; it 000334 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information political the was below, Soviet a Italy, to speak. That invasion Soviet so because there still was a once a week and the Alliance would be That was still It was trying, simply, were worked political scene, in '53, seven years to sort and went to It must have been [PEARSON] I France, itself, itself out, man were as of of Europe. French politics and was one of political party conferences. the fascinating. much interest in Ottawa. Canadians had been for years and knew how to run things. we on (we weren't made to the two mother countries. It wasn't until De the decade that same time, difference of we learn there. We'd rather Canadians had no So the in early even though it Quebec was not active at the paid little attention to Quebec into office Gaulle came Lesage bilingualism French) and France sat up and began to take notice course, but electing Liberal the periphery of our foreign policy, time in foreign policy and Ottawa views. the domestic unreliable country which didn't know how an whereas in Ottawa to speak of rather politically both double standard in regard to the world; there was was eight years or reported solemnly on all these goings on in France, don't think they governments about country suffering from the effects a internal on meat duties at that time? your [HILL] run France in Paris. I on policy. country--we could only get [PEARSON] given up anyway poor What a change in Soviet a acute less was question of The relatively [HILL} to of force use in undermined from concern. economically; France was then the sick and I the main was hope then for was after the War. of war, or if you had the Communist party that or in France power threat Quebec years was in retrospect, because aside from Indochina, at the again. beginning Paris where were to end of At the make a strange, in after 1954 we sent peacekeeping troops, we did not have any common political/military interests outside Europe. We had the air division in the north of France in Metz, and I don't recall any major problems all. The only problems came when 155 we had our over that at differences with the 000335 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information French [HILL} on? colonial questions. these on What about the interest in the European movement and [PEARSON} Yes, in Ottawa in that? interest Was there much in the there was, so bring sense that German re-armament was Efforts to Community were very much France in 1954. the whole European movement, which the French an had issue. So, set back, was European a but defence '54 '54; In questions were its place protocols the to important an was the major not were when? But year. ones in treaty allowing our the whole on relations with It may well have been different in NATO. France at the time. [HILL] rejected by were and Germany took German accession to the Western European Union [PEARSON] Defence under different circumstances. negotiations and The into favoured in Ottawa, begun to lead earlier, in the Alliance [HILL] Germany Did you have any personal connections with other Canadian diplomats serving with NATO? rather different worlds, [PEARSON] Yes, different worlds; we then But think. I Was that the lots of connections, had the people in does tend one NATO but live in to case? did live in quite thought the embassy was unimportant. They quickly developed that superior mystique about international organizations compared to bilateral relations. at embassy the thought mattered what was bilateral the relationship, although Ottawa showed little interest in it. looked to international organizations foreign policy, both in NATO and Bilateral suffered External the very relations the for UN, that as and the leading in the of the seriously, future. because through NATO, through the The embassy in Paris in Ottawa UN or some 156 edge was they preferred of Commonwealth. Affairs had become thoroughly multilateralized. vision Ottawa Officials reason. We in That was never taken do things to other way. 000336 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information That's [HILL] fascinating comment, a living in England and that time because at I know everyone there, I think, took a I was close things like Dien Bien Phu and all French politics. I remember very clearly the night the French Assembly rejected the interest in EDC, which themselves M. broke out [PEARSON] the UN of Yes, after first in '58 the way one remember the election of another. or British you said, as the Algerian Then course... poor France, and of course France newly independent countries the think--it I I Not that time France had seemed to become, At that virtually ungovernable in war everybody. to ready to join in it. were Poujade. big shock a was time, especially over was Algeria. admitted, were the problem for France at the very real a outvoted in was The Algerian war was priority for a France, and it had almost nothing left for the defence of Europe. So it's helpful to keep a sense of perspective when we think today about whether we have enough troops to face this Soviet advantage weapons. in conventional virtually nothing. In the '50s, there was nothing there, The German army hadn't started yet, in Algeria, the British were not doing very much; were they had no alternative but to [HILL] That was also a turn period of NATO movement in [PEARSON] '56, a sense, was the France then and our Mr. St. while but also Very sensitive, which Laurent most of so nadir and in thought to nuclear weapons. some very significant changes in East-West relations, in terms of the developments in the Hungarian uprising, and the French forth. It was remained touchy a Poland, and period of forward in other ways. difficult, especially after Suez in inter-alliance relations. in I was relations very rapidly deteriorated after Suez. was outraged by what happened the problems British, the French were or also the part so, and with the the process of dispute. In and after-effects of said were fact, they were the main cause of the problem, because the Israelis had been negotiating with the French before the British. that in the Embassy, evidence we partly because of knew rumours, partly because of had been able to discover through contacts. 157 We We knew 000337 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information the Israeli Defence Minister had thing, and reported that. been in France and that sort of We didn't know they were going to attack Egypt, but we knew something was going to happen. with France recovered, but didn't matter all that Our relations they weren't very close any way, as It didn't which have much. affect our it forces in since the Europe. [HILL] of beginning, all that crises the one probably came closest NATO faced tearing to the Alliance apart. [PEARSON] think it did, I same time. very tough telegrams interesting Indochina the because of our involvement from everything about Our I ask for to In this report I a go to the So, that was spent I '54 map, a the from agreement to a French have out there, but good detailed your father was and spent time because he came to Paris to write most of in a trying to put hotel report him a fair and a lot of it by him personally. the Norwegian, much map good That was the of NATO? Yes thought into of involved in writing [PEARSON] who go One map. Did you have much contact with him then? amount. and Canada going down to the Ministère de [HILL] there on they didn't know Yes. did, very a time more French. [PEARSON] I were onwards with that. the remember period, also, improving on "Do : people had Indochina after got was they were going. la Guerre, Laurent St. of knowledge about Indochina was Paris, telegrams Vietnam?" the although there, commissions [HILL] replies. be first where the were so to learn control and time The main source had to addressed to Eden by telegrams The the American reactions at the because of a like he did. was written it together. The His main help came Italian, I saw mostly by Canadians from Lange, personal friend of his, good it, Martino, was and also a medical 158 000338 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information doctor, who questions but interested less was was easy whole it. about It before, original, at was a vital and had interest thought script, a Lange and my one Canadians. for was all new for of the Europeans, but for us it some normal way to go about the conduct of an alliance. much you seemed to be It in that don't think the report itself I so least Americans, and maybe a in NATO, just like writing out was learned years that of consultation process But it Canadians had political these of some cooperate with. to father who wrote the report. the in was just We put great emphasis on Article 2 again, on what NATO potentially could become. The emphasis reminder, French, the on non-military side of the Alliance was a helpful especially the the Alliance that weren't treated relevant. to more could equals. as always the problem But principles into practice; as NATO table, civil servants, special [HILL] common break up if It document is a the has been how or the smaller allies that still is translate those to really settled whether these people should have their governments sense, when you read the that the at home. For example, report. machinery basically is satisfactory and may that need what the section few adjustments a really was required but was implementation of consultative practices. [PEARSON] Perhaps that prepared really, any was more Canadian than common anyone vital to us. We weren't going else, to but sense, to consult them looks It without really sometimes being prepared to be careful about that. so consultation--the to though Canadians live up to the But nevertheless, realistic about these matters. for eight years as He he stopped short report was had of written 159 I weren't the NATO that we bilateral arrangements with the Americans, for example, questions. we give to Council decision-making authority about questions were and I think it smacks to me very much of good sound Canadian emphasizing proper British the whether you should have politicians around the to access and and you know they haven't such questions or Americans thought on on these defence are preaching sermon. We have think my father been the Foreign Minister laying down the law in were terms was which about not 000339 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de offensive the others. to But whether interest is which it considers of vital national we say anything, a not consulting". the Allies, point. moot the table on because we're us anything oppose it, which they didn't like to do, they'd be in trouble at home. us", consult "please The And often that was true, Mr. Dulles would consult and the Allies would be afraid to say they'd have to say, the because you're afraid to commit yourselves. don't put them on the table, you complain to said yes, expect ever if we put these questions "All right, Americans say: If can l'information in particular, to consult its allies about questions United States, you don't you la Loi sur l'accès à but It was they then, they if or well to all very might either - to have do something. III Part [HILL] We are Control and Disarmament, Arms on advisor III, Part 1980. to Advisor - on moving now arms and disarmament, control over the NATO we'll return period and phases in your career, and tape. From 1978 to 1980 you were advisor to the control and disarmament: public to arms in that issue [PEARSON] on Disarmament Special an race. the on government reaction of second on was for public interest widely covered by Mr. address It was arms Canadian the how interested - was the in Trudeau, were the Special one press, that attention, when he elaborated his strategy arms those other some they Session in 1978, which in fact led to my appointment. Session subject of to 1978 time? that trigger The the about and disarmament control at what 1978-80 of and was The the everybody's caught suffocation of the of the more innovative proposals put to the Special Session, and I think was widely supported in Canada amongst the public, although not by all officials in Ottawa, thought it was of following too radical up utopian. and that speech. on I the first disarmament since General Burns. greater authority, in that he special Minister, session whereas as I was was was I of whom left with the task appointed right after the advisor General able was some to on arms Burns control had and been given report directly to the asked to report through the departmental 160 000340 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Nevertheless, process. intention to try to Session. these. for We There formed organizations, non-governmental indication of an was Government's the implement some of the ideas that had been put forward in the Special support it was consultative a in good deal of public a order to with group have continuing a dialogue with the public, and we created the disarmament fund which small, was the beginning, in which grew over fifty thousand dollars, about time to closer to million a So, dollars. we but had the instruments in place for consultation and for help to research participation. and to public for these, And think, I the were bases subsequent Canadian policy in terms of initiatives and work on disarmament, especially in the realm of verification, which we have done now for ten years. some years that was an important beginning after inattention after General of Apart from being members years. in Geneva, attention we was Mr. things. other on '60s. the Committee of and there was resistance So this It wasn't over SALT, Carter Carter on and relations therefore fell there was therefore, into as period follow up to The Americans were the Soviet kind of vacuum which was a in a way, rejected the whole outlook Union. And in Washington. When I of proposals our As left hadn't been able to get the Allies to part of the strategy, [HILL] though, The tragedy was, decreasing interest in Ottawa. we The Government's embroiled in domestic problems became of course, with a ten Disarmament on return to the inside the government. presidency Reagan, a easy, not prepared to accept his proposals. the was almost They were difficult to implement anyway, ideas. Trudeau's that left, Burns hadn't contributed all that much. of initiative of the on So, a in result 1980, agree on any pity. Did you attempt to promote this through NATO consultation well? [PEARSON] Yes, we did. We promoted it especially the cut-off of production which was one of the four points of resolutions in the Assembly on allies to support. did, but Some that 161 through NATO consultations, of the fissionable strategy. We materials, introduced subject which we asked our NATО the major allies abstained-000341 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information the British, French and the Americans--which meant that they the weren't prepared to support it in of gradually died. cut-off a meaningful sense, and the idea a inspection and they weren't ready for that. it in principle about it. testing the on chance, and of but we wasn't really our fault; [HILL] This was the we didn't really stand We much Special the Second after continued to work we on had of verification before. It involved in any of that work? you directly. side than on the NATO introducing working more on the arms control I was side. I was mildly opposed Europe, idea of the to intermediate-range new weapons as you know, the Europeans were along. We didn't take any lead role in that; did the United States. So that but, weapons, the Americans went neither, at first, European show, into when it reason to and doesn't have much comes to new in favour of weapons stand out. So I in it, and actually a was Europe, think that Canada was a bit non-event for Canadians, who paid very little attention to it. every other defence in particular. But more my for year resolution interested in then were continental on two interested in were what was '78, years as subjects, I advisor, materials, fissionable verification questions, in So time of the famous NATO two-track decision. not We a think the whole climate changed. I No, We strategy involved the momentum that lost [PEARSON] a of strategic weapons and was bitterly new disarmament efforts our agreements of another part was Other parts of the Session in 1982 fizzled out. Were supported kept alive, but the Reagan Administration quickly was opposed by the United States. of The Soviets nobody really believed that they were genuine but abandoned that goal too. a kinds of The Comprehensive Test Ban, which the strategy, freeze all would have meant It we of did go down to the UN apart and took in the question of and questions an from interest our in military budgets. transparency and more publicity about more happening in arms control, and because of our initiatives we pushed for studies of these questions, more public the basis that if the public governments would find it more difficult&to involvement, happening more on 162 knew what was increase 000342 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information military spending. the UN Perhaps that was an illusion. give much to Disarmament Yearbook attention more was of that period, result one But we did help questions. these to and many UN studies which have since been done were partly interest from countries like Canada. followed the Alliance view allies there on were almost none that a result of we generally voted with our We stood out against. majority the from we alliance occasionally the Danes or the Greeks. a [HILL] think I There view good reason were interview by asking one very except then, There was always tremendous and you not to do so. like to close off I'd that think I together on major questions of security, pressure to vote had to have UN great a almost all the major nuclear weapons questions. dissidents few Aside from that, atomic weapons. on The further questions. two or part of this the seems to It me that in the mid '70s there was relatively little interest in Canada in disarmament, but then subsequently there interest in peace and so I do believe information is from Canadian there has that the public is going to take the more the been informed, more a long way to go. an I think we're contro1? arms information available, interest, especially if the And over the last few years information available, money more inevitably leads to greater public available for research, and this interest and or more sources. such more great growth of a How do you rate the constancy of the on. Canadian public's interest in disarmament [PEARSON] Well, was educated public. We still have a still under-developed when it comes to knowledge of these kinds of questions, compared to the Germans, the French, full-time the British, who defence correspondents, experts in these areas. major newspapers have We have only recently sent correspondents to knowledge than there greater knowledge ten will be towards the kind of was years ten are Canadian correspondents still in New York, which is remarkable when you think of now have editorial writers who and no that from now. There Moscow. years I ago, it. and And we have greater is there will be think the long-term trend asking difficult questions about nuclear weapons, questions that McNamara and others 163 have been asking 000343 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information since they retired. information, That's another officials; retired the officials mostly disappear gardens. But be, That's lot a public interest. terms of not are we evaluated point. the not writing about. to be. And involved than more see in is what are in be to used we of demonstrations basis The point can Canadian the scene and they cultivate their Their publications you retired although The peace movement cannot be, the on from advice and stream of possible and should the streets. they learning, are and than they used far better committee reports, it in parliamentary although the members of Parliament don't have the staff to do the research that they need. Senator Kennedy has more people staff than one-third of our M.P.s put together. be like staffs which of Kennedy, Senator can Commons. been have strategic analysis we do need now living for 30 years, off and it's question this, situation different States and or from is should lead to somehow of Britain that [PEARSON] Well, for you have parliamentary I think American only in the last few from to ask whether the of that This is a the United good sign, independent Canadian policies. more Is there change way? under the public is beginning to influence in ways that they didn't before; to go; don't have to of and Germany. or Could you explain further? [HILL] We capital the years that we've started to Canadian to his questions into the media and into the House feed We but on policy but we still have quite a long way don't see in the current defence debate enough analysis, example, of the need The British Press for things like would have chewed that if that had been the issue. We new submarines and for months so on. or years haven't really come to that point over yet. [HILL] 1978-80 Here's another period: how question linked to your experience in the valuable, in your view, is NATO as an instrument for the promotion of international peace and security, for example through arms control and disarmament? [PEARSON] think it's valuable. I still very It is theonly 164 000344 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information available to us to promote goals of instrument in a forum where impulses NATO. for values. have shared we One to was shore peace and security There were Western up original two Europe which everybody thought was about to collapse, not because of the Soviets but because of the Communist parties; hold of the United States, change American policies. valid, Western It is now a Europe and the other was to get and somehow be able to The first reason longer needs no is influence and obviously no longer be saved from Communism. to deterring any military threat from the Soviet matter of Union. But the second motive-- of maintaining influence States policy--has NATO had fact things would existed. So important. important. One on say that can different sense, I if think the it instrument, any other The public, too, there Alliance remains you have to tends to be academics and [HILL] Thanks, - [HILL] so on writing The NATO use to cover now. on on left out, with the one key in NATO If we as went to the Soviet 1958 and 1961, Union, your time that was had just previously served with you had there Ambassador between you issues that arose, I member of the NATO a and then the other period I'd like wonder if you could that your career I'd like might examine the first period, Secretariat, Paris, where I [PEARSON] what 1958-61 is when you were would be your time responsibilities the or correspondent in Brussels. there are two parts of The first from 1980 to 1983. Embassy. a Paris, Secretariat, from 1958 to 1961, course it to enough analysts, correspondents, the subject. Secretariat, Mr. Pearson, to touch hadn't think we will adjourn at this point. I Part IV in We don't have don't at this point have We but extremely and I don't think knows enough about how the Alliance works actually happens. United policy in Vietnam for example, been that It's like more even US on have in effective. keep it become influence no a as tell us of the something about the main in that time and also about some of you saw them. partly because I had 165 a French friend whom 000345 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information I had known while I Embassy who the at was serving was the NATо on Secretariat as the Chef de Cabinet of Mr. Paul Henri Spaak, who had just assumed his duties if So this I arranged, was and political the on My time there of side very interesting time NATO the same qualities that he brought to European is, institutions federal the West, Spaak's questions and strong supporter of a persuade the United States to involving matters was interesting feature of my time there operate with the Europeans just he all matters on Soviet the questions colonial of the the construction institutions for both Europe and common or and the most attempt That Market. Common his three years But and indeed Spaak brought to NATO, for working with Spaak only stayed In fact, NATO. Spaak Mr. after spent was he went back to Belgium in 1961. three years; a shortly there went I Secretary General. became were and he asked would be interested in working in the Political Section. me Spaak Secretary General, NATO as and of and common threat, but indeed global was Mr. to co- interest, not Canada economic also questions. A factor which prompted him to resign was his disappointment at his failure bring to that matter) main reasons States, to that. One but consultations the This was to objectives. the opposition also of others, particularly true, although able solve during my time there, question. that The consultations about Tunisia and reluctant to accept any NATO Morocco. for United the widening of course, of same to of Algeria NATO colonial so-called the include France, There were two was French refused to consult anybody; France; (and Canada and co-operate with these for territories. to United States particular, in political where the Algeria, of of part was De Gaulle was French view applied to course, The interference, as Belgians were also they might see different view it, in the Congo. The Americans, of took course, quite a colonial problems than the Europeans. The Americans, under President Kennedy, fixed had their eyes on of especially the global issues and were keen to disassociate themselves from the policies of their allies. these They rejected questions. The Spaak's wish to have was true of Canada. same 166 a NATO position Because of on our 000346 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information relations with the francophone Africa, matters. I take strong a in especially in respect of the Congo, which was of course problem. He Lumumba, who as thought was wanted to to be Soviet a NATO's support enlist you know was with Spaak He wanted NATO to. penetration Communist against views. own think, preferred the European views. line beginning We knew that such a position would the Europeans than to our that of himself, just and nothing to do with any so-called would have we NATO position on these be closer to Commonwealth, new a Africa, Belgian for resistance first Congo Prime Minister, the protégé to some extent. Spaak to and was a social-democrat but like many European social democrats, strongly anti-Soviet. He with Howard Green, nothing to (HILL] do into difficulties with President Kennedy and ran the Foreign Minister, who would have Canadian policy. with that kind of So then the colonial issue was felt very much inside NATо headquarters? Spaak felt that the NATO allies should take a global security and therefore of the implications of the end of [PEARSON] view of colonialism in Africa. It was of concern to NATO, in Spaak's view, because of Soviet threat to Africa. He foreign ministers a potential Soviet penetration of of Americans the the on Africa. at the to need work lectured NAТО together to And he failed; that was time, although it prevent not the view be may any now. That appalled the Canadians, especially, as I say, Mr. Green, who was busy cultivating new friends at the UN. The UN was where doctrine Mr. Green felt most UN in ways which he at home, justified support of the new countries, Allies in Europe, too attitude; they couldn't in the way [HILL] to vote at the if that meant have been more as '58 a couldn't different, and needed the split with our understand this those two men, significance of NATO. fair amount of decolonization by differences of viewpoint as and Spaak a far the grounds that we bad. I believe there was so on they approached the value or the progress of were and he went disappointment with by '60. But still there to how to proceed in this area. 167 000347 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information how NATO allies should still difficult a as you know. vote at the UN on Angola or or other Europeans, which the Americans rejected. other the of issues is Spaak's views, and the views of Mr. was The question of of those some whether it's Nicaragua one, In those days it places. some still are, and there Yes, [PEARSON] that the Americans and many others in the [HILL] It West were looking for rapid dis-entanglement from colonial empire seems period. in that would be able [PEARSON] Yes. [HILL] That comment to me Once that had been done, to concentrate much particulary felt was more it was on felt, the Allies security in Europe. the French. about you Could that? on [PEARSON] One question of of French French refused major the to issues policies in in NATO then Africa. North Of Algeria, although it discuss the was was whole course, voted major problems the at upon for the NATO allies, Canada in particular being strongly anti-colonial. Denmark the and UN. These Norway Europeans, votes or more pretty the UN caused at shared less well agreed, the country surface. They wanted involved not to stand by the French at them Spaak pressed the Allies the always were discussed openly unless the Belgium wanted the Congo discussed to of rest issues discussed. Belgium's efforts to bring about The At NATO these weren't question of the future of the But views. if least not to vote against them. under our a after the failure of peaceful transition agree to common policies of power. and that proved to be impossible. The other strategy, major issue at the time was the question of nuclear after short-range nuclear Europe in the late December, 1956. these weapons was '50s. weapons were introduced into The NATO Council took that decision in Thereafter the whole question of the control a of central policy issue, and it was never settled. 168 000348 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information retaining control of any decision to The United States insisted on such use weapons. allies wanted They were in their say a American use. the other But weapons. military objective The was obviously to have a decision-making process which was as effective and as rapid should be as possible, but the than finger on the trigger. The issue was of more one contradictory requirements. political issue was that there These were particular interest to Canada at the time because of the introduction into Canada of nuclear weapons as well, Should Canada have do? brought under with the control, allies shared or 1956, Union NATO on from at control. What use, should The be also issue remains wanted was shared The form today. of In that any attack by the Soviet use of nuclear That meant that the question of who vital. Because this of some alive forces in Europe should be met by the was less or more form some Canada they be should or agreed time, agreed the beginning. should really never could accept that. the the Council took the decision [HILL] their on there States Norstad NATO December weapons that but the United commander, NATO veto a The Canadian government NATO? other Bomarc missile. the But it was spelled never out. the time when De Gaulle also called for the Three-Power Directorate. {PEARSON] one, of That was the third issue which emerged because the French solution was to say, them and "We'll three will decide what to do we in indeed in matters of high policies generally". feasible, accept and it. I It proposed, so [HILL] Where don't think created a lot it didn't lead did forget the rest emergency an But that the United States of tension. It to NATO from the other was was decision of was never prepared never any to formally kind. discussions on these private sessions of the Council with the or issues take place inside NATO? [PEARSON] There were no staff present. There was also an arrangement under which the Standing Group could discuss some of these matters, but that was in the 169 000349 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information military net and weren't we to privy civilians working in the political concerned with consultations political questions and about especially Soviet policies. the time, new leader and inspired came to Paris in U2. the saying what good thing a NATO, Summits would happen, or thing did of for the Summit, 1960 we it Cuba took power in '59, and that Was this discussed [PEARSON] Well, Committee. letter more colonial in Council arose was was that of relatively a the was We couldn't be But that policies of what the sort Europe and was in discussed. in various committees? of Three Report in Committee Political report, But it greatly was where and we led '57 into questions of increased after real obstacles politics. global from that, helped I Secretary General. the head of German who were I was to over Economic the discussed all We the Deputy were Palais de Chaillot that result of working questions and under Kennedy were colonial for speeches an and in and scrutiny. to brief office; we had Head, two Frenchmen and an Italian Paris then We worked of - a we mainly in French and course... then at the Porte the Englishman who had been the political section in the foreign was a of Political interests to Alliance write quite an international group. English. as The Americans not prepared to submit their global Apart '56, the to Spaak was very keen that it should take place. and because ran Castro after course, for sure these issues and then recommended action to the Council. was He it broke down because, Soviet The Political Committee consultation at father at the time my to issue then too, Group the of establishment an were which broke down because of a analysis was we were these Krushchev dangerous. were elsewhere. [HILL] about how much we would be told. - so We certain amount of hope for progress. a remember writing I in us, section, questions that any other that. of any beginning Dauphine, just at the outside Paris. [HILL] So, it was a group of about ten, was it? 170 000350 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [PEARSON] Yes, about eight to ten of about or two on five six nationalities. the secretariat. When the Canadian representative with press jobs Secretariat, There was and on the conspicuous by their presence. We were the on whole there, dominated the military structure. but [HILL] think when I I people, they so British the and rather limited group, a others, directly were not They were mostly people only seconded there the Americans had was some were The Americans didn't have many still were competition for Canadians very few. as remember. job or He dealt mainly lot of a Europeans, I a D'Iberville Fortier became Secretariat. the on Canada usually had left, I information. and people in the Political Section, whereas, say, hired by the Secretariat. [PEARSON] say That's right, enjoyed I it, politics. And I because on we because did to his on or NATO, or like The UN great deal a a for three years. on more the I must about Alliance critic of Canadian policy, importance to the least so it seemed to me, than objected to that. the UN, and Mr. then was just becoming the UN was were so policies sheep. not on, and the greatest Belgian Portugal was the black importance of Green he tended to lecture importance of the UN and policies, French policies, especially of Portugal. about the on that. at and I disarmament and critic of British (Green's) learned I the UN, colleagues at NATO they didn't seconded whole tended to attach the Europe very strong was became somewhat of Commonwealth and to we I and His views reciprocated, except possibly by the Scandinavians. [HILL] What would you say about the NATO and the [PEARSON] sure that quality of analysis, for example We had the existed, tended to one or quality butter was to be NATO quality of consultation in to two good was act as a people on Soviet issues. high, anti-Soviet. on Soviet issues? though, That was the because our reason that I'm not bread we thought shield against Soviet aggression. interpret Soviet policies in a very cautious 171 - and not We to say 000351 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information aggressive manner, evidence Soviet good will, of [HILL] willing not were we whole the on Spaak certainly wasn't. and about analysis of Third World issues. What accept to not mean I necessarily directly related to the decolonization issue, but shall we in southeast Asia. of affairs say the state than of for some area which is other [PEARSON] affairs regional Europe, and we the Secretariat. were not familiar writing although, I so did try at attached Africa. view. thought of us said to me, a as being anything to give him he ever some much not had served in Asia. I don't Europe; Spaak why Canada sense like our think, I Canadian the and some way; always he he as once His successor, understanding of these questions, more more. of it, understood slightly disloyal in was on outside kind of North American "Yugoslavia". Stikker from Holland, although or experts relations with the emerging countries our sure not Africa us no of Commonwealth importance-- to matters I'm But of time to explain to Mr. one did my best I on had We Most with piece single a relations with India and of that. just looking interest to NATO. direct on remember was good at not were We I'm generally speaking, NATO's Secretaries General have not being very understanding of Canadian issues and views of the world; [HILL] Were there, Luns certainly wasn't. this time, at meetings experts of on, for example, South East Asia or Soviet policy? [PEARSON] were On Soviet policy, organized not in the there were way they've since become We'd just established matter. usually, of ministers, was They'd but otherwise only afterwards between certainly we come were from for pretty that consultation the officials and delegation, twos", and there were only rarely visits from Ottawa capitals. an The Political Committee from each NATO counsellors as Political Committee a with all questions of this kind. up, occasional meetings but they capitals. 172 the well it dealt was or our made "the number from other meetings on annual own. of So the it developed into consultation The Canadian delegation got 000352 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de their instructions from Ottawa, [HILL] The reason I there that I mean that in that because it does was capability research political issues. seem to meetings the of experts, NATо That's still the case. NATO where expertise from all the allied capitals. me inside could say that to some extent there's But of course one for on l'information each issue. on little very is headquarters, asked la Loi sur l'accès à a vehicle draw can on really wonders how But one effective that is. [PEARSON] Well, the think it helps to be able to speak directly to I experts, especially policy. issues of Soviet on immense analytical establishment in Washington, You have an example, for and somewhat less but still significant resources in London, Paris and Bonn. good And when deal. people these But available, with at some come, time that exceptions the kind that e. allies other g., learn can expertise of wasn't Laloy of France. Jean a I don't remember the Americans producing the kind of people they have since. There Kennan, I no was suppose, one had in particular that more interested in the rest of the very much a course they [HILL] to problem-solve, What viewpoint of about I a Kennedy statesman. global I the mean, we contributions Canadian the are Secretariat. Canada's contribution? [PEARSON] as world then; They was of And deeply anti-colonial. were consultations. George State Department by then. left the were man out. stood looking at would How it you a to from the little see And also what did Canada get NATO the value out of of it? think you have to think of that period, in particular, in terms of Howard Green; he was the Minister who dominated foreign policy after remember, crisis, death the critical for of deserting of the view; But, he he was previous Britain strange, because after he that Sydney Smith. in became And he was, as you government's role in the Suez its hour of need. Which Minister, Mr. Green did very critical of some really was Canadian policy, 173 as was not take aspects of British policy. far as NATO was concerned, 000353 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information and his over-riding goal that's where vote on we disarmament, on for example. got into trouble in the UN, We and would disarmament issues there, with a small minority in NATO--on tests, nuclear nuclear tests. who did. Before that, We That Testing example. for '63. in abolished of to make progress was was were Green's priority. weapons the whole and that Canada, into in the Alliance And the other preoccupation issues, of question not was was to abolish all UN few countries Canadians, aside from the colonial defence--NORAD--and atmosphere the voted in the we of the one in an was North American introducing nuclear great interest issue of to the other allies at the time. [HILL] Except equipping the Canadian the CF104 by this time? it that not We were the other nuclear There in serve last minute, can't remember Canada's weapons allies then, Only Norstad, the or but was with some a strange arrangement they had to go and pick something like that. big issue follow to in NATO. I don't through on equipping didn't poison the relationship with presumably? United the Commander, jumped States; into that conference in Ottawa which was regarded He in NATO, why. reluctance nuclear was role, that do not recall that being [PEARSON] affairs. role nuclear up the weapons at the itself with a in in Europe the aircraft was not equipped with whereby, to actually [HILL] great issue in NATO or step of stock piling the warheads. if I'm not mistaken? I a Diefenbaker Mr. least weapons, why. of prepared At Even know question the not last I to Hadn't Canada acquired Europe? accept to [HILL] [PEARSON] linked That was not prepared in North America. to take the bit a forces in [PEARSON] That's true. Canada. was said, "There is no as and, then, of argument with course, a press interfering in Canadian point in Canada accepting nuclear 174 000354 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- . Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information missiles, if they are prepared not a pretty logical statement, I recall, NATO in and that '61, [HILL] But then I Yes. I left later. came the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, In [PEARSON] but, that was the only direct incident role in our nuclear troubles. in NATO's It's accept the warheads". to during the wasn't there I think. Cuban Missile Crisis, by our allies as some kind of Canadian abdication of responsibility. We refused to go on alert, and so which, I think, was regarded I don't remember if on. bound by the NORAD agreement. we were in the early nuclear '60s weapons. impression is, some But Our ever went on developed that regarded was any alert, but The Canadian defence debate part of the NATO debate was Canada respects. after as left. I of kind a the control over military contribution was So my free of main rider, not very high, in and prepared to discuss any of the subjects that Spaak and we were not others the Europeans wanted discussed, and on. so It was a low period for Canada's reputation in NATO. [HILL] At the same time, not very much comprehension of of the there always had good wasn't, earlier, there was Canadian points of view on the part Scandinavians. We and those continued. The foreign troops was not a on reduce our Mr. NATO, a as extent, later, so there withdrawal centre We weren't Canadian leadership, some Canadian the accept nuclear Trudeau pulled forces, for Norway, their soil. time of That recovered to course, except relations with Norwegians had refused to of mentioned Europeans. [PEARSON] No, it you as and for us has indeed, any completely alone, but certainly not in in the sixties. back again with his been, return, our weapons or, and foreign over time, a withdrawal policy. If And NATO. then, decision to fairly constant and you return, to looked at the history of our NATO policies, you would be struck by the way that the graph goes up and down. clearly there is a tension in Canada whatever government is in power, between 175 our NATO obligations and 000355 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information our ourselves of sense NATO. In that [HILL] Of sense, course, was since Europe had particularly with it is early the percentage of good deal '60s we the of 1960s, the Arrow, Avro in the whole the already changing. was spending were by change the and budget and our major military power, Whereas yet. weapons, the situation a mid-50s, the in that, fact the cancellation nuclear strategic equation, In also recovered the our unique. position of being not about indecision higher are still in the Canada [PEARSON] we including countries outside the Commonwealth and with other with relations having global interests, as than we are reputation as a GNP defence, on more a In the now. '50s, a NATO's military role declined after about the mid '60s and into the '70s. then, Before contribution. And [HILL] We [PEARSON] We were We had NORAD So more. There and America, North and size the military? the of thought to be making a respectable contribution. was accentuated the process of Europe respectable a criticized for that. criticized for division there. a contributor to quite making were we weren't we not were our no great quarrel about that. splitting the interests between our Europeans did not take much interest in North America. [HILL] So, it's more question a of really, attitude, than of policy thrust? [PEARSON] think it was more a matter of attitude and I to be involved in European colonial policies, like. That rest, with, the others Turkey, and blacker as the was as I essential said, supported, so on. far as the more Portugal we were or which less, was of reluctance we did not Canada and the Norway and Denmark; all difference between exception a European the black polices sheep. Greece, - Only a little concerned. 176 000356 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information - [HILL] yet, And Diefenbaker when office to came the government Conservative in'57 inside NATO to drawing up '58, or they did and Mr. devote some declaration, or something of that kind, to reiterate allied solidarity and Canadian interest in effort But, NATO. as that impulse declined. [PEARSON] Well, as have varied that say, I Mr. Trudeau thought Mr. Green challenged NATO. the was that our challenged never Mr. took Trudeau military the political interest Green. of NATO addition, In him. he There were Norman Robertson was example. for What maintaining solidarity the only one. He was not disarmament, in view a contribution. in many in the Department that agreed with strong believer interests military contribution was redundant. with many of our NATO allies. a reading? incorrect an think Canada's reputation and I in that is very different from that of Mr. not was Or time over charge of Canadian foreign policy, Green took Mr. a this So is a Canadian phenomenon, if you like, that we back away from NATO every ten years and then so, or find it hard we expects. Alliance policies, which maintain to new interest, the kind show perhaps So this has global commitments but we we and resources between many Whereas for a one a solidarity that the pattern Canadian The United don't have. don't have global commitments. always been only is But we are in surprising when you think about it. is not the other side of the Atlantic. on of now. as of States is also, We have global We We are have but interests, to divide our time different kinds of interests. NATO has strands policy. the several country like Belgium, or involved in Holland, or Spain, to a lesser extent Italy and maybe Turkey, it's their major concern. [HILL] in general, expect Canada to behave I suppose if the Europeans, like the Netherlands, they are always going to be rather disappointed. [PEARSON] We but I could say we have priorities. think they've given that up. "All right, a we large country We would also We had a quid pro quo. will assist in the defence of and we have some of our own appreciate it if you would help 177 France, defence us from 000357 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information time to time"; nothing and of course, the only country ever in the Alliance which has with the United States for air defence, of continental engagement. policy... current, Europe, the are separate arrangement example, and this kind And this is going to continue to affect is now running away again from in my view, outlook term contribution, because of is for gradual a decrease in our increasing responsibilities for our our defense. own [HILL] In way, a there is never age [PEARSON] Yes, I to be more of continuity a think if you look back, probably, than our relations with India, for example, it will be seen in the '50s, relations outside NATO. Our it seems, pre-occupied with still we were going to be any return to a sort like the early 1950s. golden of We though we are reinforcing our forces there. The medium even longer and a for of that. came were because more even important in the '50s in some ways than our relations with France, which is extraordinary when think you of When it. was I Embassy, Paris the in our telegrams were not of nearly the same significance as the telegrams from between and Delhi. New our our So we have always Commonwealth and NATO commitments, of sense being ourselves a tension, this had and our country and new I think, aid programs one that is sympathetic to the problems of new countries, problems of identity, problems of colonialism. There are countries of Europe and of North America, break between more we were a centre 1956 and important 1986. a as political for respected and we had a It non-military side of NATO. What of that issue in the [PEARSON] side of about We NATO were and period proud to of I don't in the that any see great early days Our views were highly good diplomatic service. whole What just consultation. very so military power, and more important as the {HILL] was differences between the real question of Article 2 and the did Canadians feel about the state NATO? you were our contribution to political at consultations. 178 the non-military Even though we 000358 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loí sur l'accès à l'information dragged fully. feet our often about their policies, Kennedy we succeeded much, to some extent. that 2 Article with good made pool we we knowledge our 2. Dulles hadn't.consulted The progress economic policies and what should and under Eisenhower dialogue greater was in NATO and that only exports all was Soviet on In what way to the Soviet Union, what kind of trade relations should we have with them? we pretty should matters The well act as trying to convince an organization for economic consultation of trade and payments and Organization for so on others that NATO on between western countries. so in that respect, were we accomplish what we had hoped to do in the beginning, never able to that was to make the treaty into a basis for collaboration all on of western policies. [HILL] The somewhat, in comparison with the hopes of [PEARSON] It ran it. the European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) played that role and then the Common Market, aspects But up gave itself of aspect other do about them. military political on consultation was could of contributed bring the Americans So we were leaders in that respect, really do could Article there later but questions. we otherwise we We were one of the leaders in trying to to consult more and issues, colonial on whole idea out of of Community had Atlantic an an down run earlier time. steam because the Europeans did not want They had their own interests. [HILL] What about the Twin Pillars concept. when President Kennedy issued for call a a came new in, or effort to [PEARSON] Well, and did, the re-organize And of thought it seems to course, that had serious naturally we were opposed pillar, with the Europeans being the other pillar. history directorate. and experience. This was During 179 partly the he Alliance, to any arrangement which would imprison us in North America political that me maybe slightly afterwards, basically on a Twin Pillars basis. implications for Canada. we It as one We resisted any a matter of Canada's Second World War we were 000359 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information treated as minor partner, a armed forces. So none contradicting ourselves. though we had even of that would We directorate wanted Community. had as we be was preparing for in mind them, I is this: have been immediate post-war period, External Affairs us of future always out, and some on a long as it. want this period. interviews and these to be a Atlantic the did not we any showed by the fact that struck there seemed to if somebody else, but doing in which we concept our were either extent, some just a couple of other questions have I Americans, left or I have point Community we alliance direction, think, to the way, a in the men we wouldn't agree that about In strong a major role in its construction, like the French One in I ambivalent The Atlantic a [HILL] lead strong pillar. or to ourselves might which million accept. we involved both economics and politics but arrangement a the in group of people in other government departments, who had a very strong sense of wanting to do something about the state of the They world. they had a seemed be as to very have a strong sense What about this sense people there, they unified in their objectives, had that a people very capable people, [PEARSON] It's difficult in the early office. opportunity, statesman or now a period, while you were at NATO, did of how would or for me to comment, you because of was at telling him, at the time, that he in wasn't NATO, office, my father's he that and had he as an drawing on his experience, former statesman, He excitement of the early '50s '60s, we did to extent. lost later, was were some more of Department wasn't in the federation changed the and and there civil service, of withdrawal. at kind that time, the same the elder to put But the concerned about Leadership a of and with the bilingualism. was out was affairs, especially with Quebec and the whole question future senior that? assess I minority governments of the own especially the External, in forward initiatives and proposals. sense They something. do to period, but when remember I need a strong sense of a need to do something and that were role of but exactly; intellectually pretty capable people and very astute diplomats. you not were our of the in the There spark that we 180 000360 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information had had before. [HILL] ferment, and [PEARSON] and UN World categorize could One high a level There was. NATO, of another the Commonwealth, could, once of time again, of sort a intellectual early period of construction of the In the Now we they have served their purpose, facing as commitment. of put in place. were it pieces these beginning are of post-War the to wonder and you could argue that now reconstruction and contribute, but not in India, China. But now that have we the same [HILL] we also, intellectual input. You While it is true that they in their own way, on sometimes, mentioned are there Brazil Brazil, and as of one a China role and for so on. each the other hand they don't necessarily always impact on the rest of struck by something that world that they might the have. I Arthur of Our way. very major powers these days, have the China--and is and seem to was Canada still have influence. think, I are constitution in place, we our should be able to devote more time to these matters, the Summit Seven we thinking. new weight has changed compared to other countries: relative whether course, he knows China very Menzies well--that said about part of the problem with China is simply to keep them in contact with the rest of world. and they [PEARSON] They have a tendency to be off in a world of their own, find I the rest of the world very difficult to understand. didn't mention Japan and Germany as two of the powers leadership. take it, but, of the future who can be expected to show this kind of The role is there if Canadian governments want to until recently, we we have been haven't wanted it. expect we might find a so concerned with our own affairs that we new generation are into those shoes again, provided [HILL[ or moving Now there out of that phase, and I of officials who will step is political leadership. Before we leave the NATO period, are there any thoughts, recollections, that you would like to mention at this point? 181 000361 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [PEARSON] later Well, Policy Advisory Group term. which country. units of each in life, I became on met We made was once up policy/planning the of year and looked at the a reports didn't have much influence, Our the Atlantic member of a it but was longer very a useful way of thinking with our allies about common problems of the future. Allies the meet, to policy/planning in the Commonwealth, ways are public view, attribute. up quickly. which but vital are are, so that think in We the Summit meetings. the are hidden from the life of the most important almost every level and build be held very consultations interesting the with is don't have that continuing the it probably its at crisis, a of one to think, I exchange views can I don't have that at whether relations or of talking to each other which We contacts guises, continuing vitality. a we and which Alliance, conflicts regional or and informal capacity for different various in Soviets, which gives it There familiarity, NATO does have this can could be studies which made is how, through this process of consultation, crises have been avoided. tend to think about but We study it would be useful to place, because of crises that have taken place, the the crises that have not taken consultations and the role of the Alliance NATO in finding compromises amongst different views. potential crises that have been dealt with, in the Gulf, of substitute even in NATO But the point undertaking for if for So continuing détente with other Part V [HILL] - way of the and consultation, that lost, are Soviet and Union. there I wonder to the Soviet is no essential, remain will NATO there is a kind of imagine that these There is doing that. Ambassador to the I what will knows consultation and cooperation will continue. functions of no of think I subject and who that that the Alliance provides the vehicle is kind this it. on original purposes its potential crisis the instance--there must have been hundreds of hours for consultations happen. One could take the if we Soviet Union, could go on 1980-83 to your Union, which was from 1980-1983. initially which.is: looked at from Moscow, period I as have Ambassador one question of role do what sort 182 000362 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information think Canada should play within NATO in order to deal with the you Soviet Union in the best kind of way? [PEARSON] Well, should I think that opportunity to put forward Union, partly the Soviet we our own particularly the United States, consensus have to have need the future on views, We have tended and in the an views That that in Canada. to neglect to come some that we to express them. We an others, of means capacity to understand the our as happening in is attempt to willing forum NATO what on Soviet Union. the and we have to be strengthen to of views balance to the use Soviet We Union. don't have the kind expertise that some of our allies do. We are now beginning to develop that, but until we do, it will be hard for us to have real of influence Union. on the policy questions I hope that of how in five to ten years to deal with the Soviet who have served there two or three times in major a that you way this to learn overnight. can able to It's not leaders, analysis and (b) may be contrary neighbour. Soviet speaking the language, it It means have the political will those to of others, If you confront the policy, you are particularly true world: Communist touching over most a least States those on sensitive nerve, involving the others. Those Moscow, what it was a terms a kind of monolith and we've got to overcome that goes inside of the on. In of and this is rest of the addition, Soviet empire, the we At one of the point, bloc which included China, Chinese defection exploded that myth. in questions difficult, where some understanding tended to assume that our the questions that are relations inside the Communist world are important. think of Cuba, relations with Nicaragua, relations with troubling and to express views which at or United questions relations with Vietnam and the something So that I think we have (a) to improve our capacity etc. for we contribute keeping up with the Soviet press and with the speeches of the means are to be analysis. of process will have enough people we But with we still orders but tend to coming from image in order to understand have to understand land mass of the what happens Soviet Union, and future. And that requires understanding of Soviet Asia, the Baltic Republics, Trans-Caucasia, and the rest. what that means for the 183 000363 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information The major allies: Germans, ahead of are that is reason the Americans, in terms of this analysis. us universities our the French and the the British, of the produced enough yet not have Part scholars. Looking (HILL] at period in the Soviet Union, during your own the Brezhnev period, how would you of the Soviet Union, and how would you situate long-term development the see the years that you there? were [PEARSON] I was there at the beginning of the end of the Brezhnev therefore, time, speculation about era. It People tend to think that Gorbachev is a was change when of were signs that period was Andropov. died before he could I of a there was new as phenomenon, but there well. much of figure in key A period of change but He initiated the implement the future. wanted he what to do. Almost any leader after Brezhnev would have had to initiate change, because, the any of change facts growth, economic and he one stagnation the many who had been bound be to in some in there '84, and he wasn't alone. It was not a as even exaggerate Gorbachev phenomenon. everyone then, by the long. So there sudden transition; signs of change surprised face corruption of whom who had been for thirty in office almost change. the the agriculture, Gromyko had been made Prime Minister in place. still was reluctant to was in Soviet society--the decline in the rate of amongst the senior officials, years in he long in power, leader like there had to be. On was were almost there were think we tend to other hand, he has So I the There 1957, speed with which he is acting and that couldn't have been predicted. [HILL] I years, few think has been a thing I have been series of articles by over the last talking about the fact struck it is not just the senior leaders who have to be replaced in that the Soviet Union, whole been was one it is the entire middle management throughout the society, because it's simply the fact that many of them have in their present positions for nearly thirty bound to be a.generational change there. 184 years. And one So there wonders if 000364 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information obliged to run fast simply because otherwise the thing Gorbachev is get out of hand. can [PEARSON] who did not have any choice. He then in power were forgets that the people office in the '50s and to came One Stalin had killed off all the older people. '40s. in the even Gromyko became Ambassador to Washington when he was thirty-four, and other people generation assumed high office very young. That generation of that is now disappearing. they not are young as fifties now, their tended to be the first time, These a new a cycle of younger people, predecessors their as the new men, decade younger. men new There is and in the 1940s is important What the leaders are able owe nothing to Stalin, embark to They were. and in is that for now have are leadership the on but new a course. particular no loyalties to [HILL} You see quite a difference between the current situation, then, the time of and that at [PEARSON] Indeed, Khrushchev Kosygin, and was no they were there. called it different those all the renege the can system, which is Third Revolution. hope for permanent change. an educated élite, universities. accept a I don't that will see a do, never not real change. There members, political leaders. see any alternative It to Lenin's, was So in that sense, how they Somebody can go then one can back. They and university. they have a The are or if that, and be willing return to the past. party Stalin and got past grade 10, been to never by they are doing, and and could Now not be brought to only alternative is a military take-over and I don't think that is in the cards. loyal trained were all of whom have been to trade schools Khrushchev Brezhnev had certainly generation people, because disclaim responsibility-- or Stalin's and now there is the third one. are situation, positions of responsibility under What these people now is to de-Stalinize has and they could way Khrushchev. completely a Stalin and grew up in there system. Stalin's probably The incapable military are of becoming simply not in their genes. So I don't continuing change in the way Gorbachev is is 185 000365 �Document disclosed underthe Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information proceeding, except that if he against him and more look for It is change direction. won't I styles, life So I question of the kind of regime, whether--it is not it is a going to be democratic tolerate opposition in changes the productivity. who will be which is a some of living that is in it is about half of standards or four free sense standard for there. I've You can't eat meat get their the way for that said should we first term a borders begin may there is plenty that should NATO in the Soviet Union? on If we follow open, to policy a of the Reagan show ourselves willing by used exchange people and them and to communicate and to their can go all think you do South Africa. administration about to trade with not will basic resources. most limited degree, a How engagement, constructive 1living and, of enterprise. change Well, [PEARSON] leader comparable to they have--they they might who knows, respond to whatever is going on, some Unless they week. a if it was done in Even [HILL] room our education times system to work, kind of greater to things they expect, of accept the continuing lack of the than three economic lead which organization buy a decent pair of shoes in Moscow. You can't more not, and whether it will be prepared to make give them the kinds to able standard or sense--whether it will continue to our think the Soviet people will support any I given the high tolerate or in economic Right now, ours. so they But of the pace of change, matter a leader. they can't stop communication with the outside world. guess of cautious rather the others may turn fast, They can't stop the young from wanting western think. and a too goes they will allow more innovation and they won't put people in prison for political views. Gradually, Soviet Union all by the are they that we race in certainly willing to not are accepted this weapons systems about and arms the the pace of to affect policies turning back the ideas and that may be able we enemy China; to in follow. some That means deal old with We have to accept just as we've people. New sense, them everything which leads first of They have offered way. compromise. the change inside the to as greater military 186 000366 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information competition that. and us put arms control I list between of the process the and will agreements arms engaging them of Union Soviet on tend at the top of the They all fronts. block to are also talking about converting the ruble; they want to join the IMF, and they convert once should pursue the ruble there is so co-operation in all why they can't. reason enterprises of all kinds: common the Arctic, and no on. think there I these wants the USSR to become there are other kinds kinds of of constructive chance a things Gorbachev ways. we the oceans, space, exporter of wheat again. an of is We that he says In that case, could do in common. But all possibilities could be blocked by political developments in Eastern Europe: if Poland or East Germany, etc. reject the system these imposed There them, on is way, no leadership is, opportunities for détente would disappear. the what matter no Gorbachev does whatever or the they will allow, in the foreseeable future, the that countries of Eastern Europe to become allies of the West. [HILL] that the It puts particular a in Europe situation possible. In the past, were [PEARSON] Well, think will try to go its [HILL] I on as a when there the West, whole is also, managed explosions, were to make as sure well the ones as who the peoples of Eastern Europe. suffered the most I onus they continue to fear that Eastern Europe way. own wonder if you'd like to say brief word about Soviet a policy towards Eastern Europe and towards Germany. [PEARSON] One of the capacity or ability allied to the that West. keys to I to overcome in a policy is their Soviet their fear don't think there's They have to allow now. change of a united Germany, any way they will accept certain amount of creative freedom in Eastern Europe simply to prevent further revolt, and on our part we have to be careful particularly East not Germans join the Western alliance, would then, I think, encourage to to believe that Eastern they can, whatever form it has. abandon all Europeans in a and sense, The Soviet Union co-operation with the West, and 187 000367 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information and we would be back where we were in 1950. re-arm, of the process of of change in Eastern Europe is the key to the East/West relations. want become part of of a process of non-alignment, internal freedom but external purposes and serve future We must avoid the mistake of appearing to Eastern Europe to rather The management their encourage, and West, the Finlandization, constraints. would That is that serve our They have accepted Finland; purposes. there is no pressure on Finland in regard to its internal policies. is losing ground rapidly. Communist party the Indeed in Finland They have accepted Austria, and they run, couldn't accept a I see quite reason no different why, in the long Eastern in system Europe. Dean, an military? What about the attitude of the Soviet [HILL] a remarked in former US ambassador to the MBFR negotiations, article completed two in a years ago that three or matter of agreement could be MBFR an Jonathan months, provided that the Russians could be reassured about the situation in Poland, or themselves reassure perhaps, and also provided that the Soviet military was willing accept some reductions; a Gorbachev and do But people you to accept arms [PEARSON] I think the party able is willing to reductions in the Soviet armed forces, nuclear weapons). But Soviet and say a 50 percent reduction. of troops, not of that the West was not a threat to security, and they would have to be convinced of that. example, if the United States withdrew its German numbers, I army see no was in the under reason from Eastern Europe. sense the anything other than that I think they could provided they believe accept, except compromise, think they wil1 accept that (I'm talking I don't the persuade the Wil1 They will draw the line at deep military will have to go along. their to case? in Eastern Europe? deals control is the think that be like him military Soviet military being he clearly saw the major problem here. to some form of forces from constraint For Europe, and in terms of why the Soviet military would not withdraw They have no particular reason to be there, that they fear attack, defend their country outside their borders. 188 and would prefer to The big nightmare is 000368 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information that they would have borders. But again to defend security--then I agree to disarm up to [HILL] So, country inside they could be convinced that there if threat to their their see no reason was no their great why they shouldn'7 point. a for example, just to take instance, one Germany, where the Soviets have 20 divisions, if that of East you get something comparable in the west, would the Soviets be prepared to cut their there, do forces think? you [PEARSON] People have argued that they keep those forces in Eastern Europe control that to is not the reason is to want for as defence against attack, any attack on west as far they How would [PEARSON] I think Eastern Europe or their And can. this was no longer a threat, [HILL] of but I personally think primary reason for them being there. prevent themselves that the Eastern Europeans, then forward The primary defence. They homeland by defending they were satisfied if they would withdraw. they then control Eastern Europe? they are prepared to accept the Findlandization over time. Now that may be optimistic, but I think it is worth exploring. Part VI [HILL] like to - General One last question: make about Canadian in Canadian you would policy in NATO, and on the role of NATO policy? [PEARSON] Originally, United is there any last comment States into I an think, our alliance objective was to bring the Europe and to break the with isolationist tradition of American policy, and obviously that has been accomplished. In so far as NATO did not and has not developed into an Atlantic community, then I think we could accept, given relations with the Soviet Union which were relatively stable, that 189 000369 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information NATO become purposes mentioned have I Whether it purely political alliance, a could survive could live with that, such as help the UN as and in sense permanently such, I don't it would enable in my view Europe; etc.. for they expensive, and it distorts In the our Canada defence a non-military NATO, feasible concept I don't know. work us to towards, improve, then [HILL] Well, and I I for the co-operation. But I think we do other things, do our share of the long run that would be our to contribute with live could know. Certainly, from a military point posture. little and consultation in its peace-making tasks, defences of the continent, best of like, and if you of view, it makes have forces stationed very little, but priorities. though think it's So whether I think we is a that something it's we might if relations with the Soviet Union continue to think it's something that might become feasible. thank you very much indeed. 190 000370 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNA00004 Title A name given to the resource Geoffrey Pearson: "In Alliance" Interview Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived “Research - In-House Research - Oral History of Canadian Policy in NATO - Hill Roger,” RG154, Volume number: 13, File number: 2100-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a3877b0d5cdbdaf702d67bf7ea70c1a0.pdf c2cc53abcf68257914af8231fee0623f PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information ROBERT morning. CAMERON today [HILL]* Good Cameron, former Assistant Under-Secretary representative countries. and Poland to guest Our Ambassador Cameron, we of State, very are other of number a Robert Ambassador is and Canada's East European pleased that you can this morning and that you have agreed to participate be with us in this project. [CAMERON] been For my part I strong supporter a glad to participate. very am at the present is examining are 1945, to Cameron, Ambassador and oral an history development the trying to obtain Canadian We engaged in are foreign especially focussing are we policy We since insights into Canadian approaches international peace and security, East-West relations. very a Canadian Policy in NATO. of of some what know, you as it still has that Canadian foreign policy. valuable role to play in terms of [HILL] I feel of NATO and always I have NATO and on field of in the NATO-related on issues. [CAMERON] I [HILL] Ambassador Cameron, understand. about the main thrust examining the role of of just this project, on security. issues affairs, which for arose we are of for you were on questions example, *Interviewers: as Hill, during of aimed at course foreign policy and in interested in your views very were also keen to have your working Europe, you is policy goal of international working directly of NATO head the Department of which might be described were when example when American Division But So we will be further comments some it Canadian in NATO Canada's efforts to pursue its foreign peace and make to the External views on on and NATO North Affairs in 1969. developments in areas NATO-related. By this I mean when you dealing relations the with with 1970's when you held a Eastern series of Pawelek 000371 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information ambassadorial Ambassador posts there. the way Cameron, like to approach these two interviews is to examine your a series of 1947, Part phases. Part 1958-1968 from Washington and Bonn. and position you you Part will deal III serving in Ottawa, were Affairs; Permanent Joint. Board of believe in I and that Representative Affairs External the American North the of and then Director General of the Bureau Control Arms were when firstly head were Division of the Department, Defence in Part IV will consider your work in the years from 1969-1974 when you of career will briefly consider your early service with the II years the would will deal with the early phase up to I Department of External Affairs from 1947-1958, with we same on the Defence. [CAMERON] On two occasions in fact, two separate occasions. Part [HILL] V Ambassador to Yugoslavia, 1974-1977. In Part when you Republic and years VI the Romania years will Part VII we 1981-1983 when you were served you Bulgaria and and the examine your Poland to in when which Assistant German was as in 1978-1980 deal with the years from will we Ambassador were with deal will Democratic service during the Under-Secretary of State with responsibility for the Bureau of International Security Policy and Arms Control aspects of your Affairs. Of career: for course I am example, aware of when you think afterwards you had We into the discussion less or [CAMERON] Part I [HILL] - similar posting to the will try to work Toronto. more a as we some work two other Diplomat in 1977-1978 and were Residence at the University of British Columbia from I or one University of reflections from those periods through the different issues in a chronological order. That is fine. Early Years, Ambassador section is to give to 1947 Cameron, some idea the of your 192 purpose own of this particular background. 000372 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [CAMERON] of studied I which University of Toronto, law at the direction of at the School was under the a noted authority summers, to assist with the cost which my widowed mother could ill afford, I Law who was worked at I law. constitutional on etc.. received my law degree lake boat, a Service. Active Having served in the I was eligible to compete for a commission junior officer in Her Majesty's Canadian Forces. as a at Gordon Head, and B.C. the Like many of my colleagues at the time, on Officers Training Corps, Kennedy During variety of jobs, deck hand on a bell boy at a hotel, Professor W.P.M. from there I went to number a trained I of other training camps, and for a number of reasons I ended up probably training in more branches of the Canadian Armed Forces than any other officer at the time. and when I went overseas, in Southern Eventually I ended up in the infantry trained again at I battle drill schoo1 a England, and I arrived on the continent just at the end regiment called the of the war, and was which had very bad time at had a I was with the posted to a Dieppe, lost Essex most of their prospect occupation, I troops being men. Essex Scottish in Germany for about four months for the most part looking after surrendered German troops. the Scottish staying of chose the sent to longer in Germany option of volunteering fight the Japanese. with to We Faced with the army of join the Canadian were sent back to Canada, had all our innoculations to fight in the jungle, including malaria shots Hiroshima and and everything, Nagasaki and the and then war was something I over. happened in back to went University and I decided that I would not go into law. Having been abroad and having travelled sitting in one so a lot, I decided that place in Toronto in the lawyer's office, was law, not my cup of tea, enrolled as a M.A. student in Political Economy, under Professor Dawson. He was an exceptionally stimulating professor and I enjoyed very much working under his guidance as an instructor with one of his graduate seminars. early spring of 1947, when I continued these studies until the having passed the External Affairs entrance examination, I accepted their offer of employment at the huge sum of $2,700 per annum! 193 000373 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Part II - (HILL] 1947-58 So really leads that early career in the Department. t You Department; the which is your joined the Department in 1947 then you and to Part II, like everybody else, and you served first in Ottawa joins then us in Havana were suppose, who I 1948 from to 1950. [CAMERON] is something in there that is not mentioned in my There CV and that been there, I sent to York to the a New guess, demanding job, Social Council. great, I I during the with war, translators his Deputy, an months in a then went back no air all sat day which this in Economic and introduction to in the and summer now. The the survive, To cool all international That freezing was number temperature. three. That was after you [CAMERON] Yes, I on had a been the job; to do all of which you went to effect I guess was it We day in a taxi At night was we was nearly two my introduction to an conference. [HILL] trained in the George Davidson, to Lake Success every July and August, months. one-half in meetings into New York and sweltered in the hotel where there conditioning. is factory that was built and Arnold Smith out was matter was not very and Head of the Delegation; all the way had travelled the I Paul Martin was the Minister of fur coats. number two, was year, air-conditioning which was designed to wore Health and Welfare all, was building when they had machines going. women were three to subject the outside the city at Lake Success, were and delegation it but for there was a Nations to be Secretary, Canadian you, assure maybe or days there were no facilities like we have those and United the of of six months total a My knowledge of can conference. the appointment in the Department, having is that my first joined the Department? in only four you were virtually nothing. In those days you given a desk and a pile of things required action conference, months. you knew and you had to get busy. Or if nothing about the background at You had to read it up when you were there 194 000374 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information then you had to write and [HILL] Well, [CAMERON] I you went report. a from there to Havana? learned about Havana from who in addition to being Under-Secretary played first base our departmental soft ball team. our I was just married and luckily had found Hill. I he said streetcar with me. lately Secretary. I was of the conversation, In the course I coughed few times and a really have not heard anything about that", I "There must be postings pitchers. nice little apartment in Sandy "I hear you are going to Cuba". said "No sir, said a of the one on going to the East Block one morning and Mr. Pearson was on the was called Mr. Mike Pearson guy a some that And when I I know there have been so many mistake, you must mixed be and he up". got off the streetcar He was the Under- immediately went to I my boss Gerry Riddell and I told him about my conversation with Mr. Pearson and he said "Yes, true. been We did not many cases so Bob, I up old you phone McDermitt, Terry confirmed can the you know, postings been announced then, "So", he said, minute they had to change it". confirm it sorry to tell you that that is you because, like to tell of am up the head who meant with giving leaving for Cuba in about six weeks. up That is at the last "but if you want to Personnel." covered was decision which of there have So I phoned embarrassment but apartment and our just the way things worked in those days. [HILL} It was a [CAMERON] It was a I suppose, but point and it on smaller Department and everybody knew each other the other hand Administration was not its strong never has been. [CAMERON] Havana agreeable first post. countries, there are were never the had in those feeling days was, how shall was like very many It the minority and the Department. much smaller haves and the have-nots, the have-nots that the 195 were the have-nots I say, Latin very American and the haves majority. were a But we suffering very 000375 �Document disclosed underthe Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information greatly because of nature of through, the country. Socarras, who II. who country a strong During the time call it of turmoil in the amount of Communist party, not a problems were country, bilateral in relations. which was in man it there but sense, was period, a a very There I was strong general was large a important government Americans good reputation. The Cubans and they did like so they put not bigger there, There well. British. the than to American contingent but Canadians did not trust going way back put their money with the was a big also Canadian colony very large As interesting, and speak what called we Spanish ending. a involved some a of translation. [HILL} It as We And of long before we regarded. was one very language. week in At agreeable. first Quebecois to say, Havana Affairs External was we was It was used to French with a "muy bien". Talk worth three months You really had to communicate in Spanish, language school. translation new And the Cuban's used And you had to read the papers; you could not use English. was no Havana of "Spench", which was, about language training, in Department first post, established. a was very well insurance There had been trade relations with Cuba the before of own course the Canadian Trade Commission had been there had opened the Legation. the in their There were our Canadians their money in Canadian banks and companies which did very certain centre in the Caribbean banks, insurance companies and businesses. very a contingent for Canadian a We would not conditions Havana had Prio. Most of one. Canadians in an Latin traditional there It was reporting sense a Fulgencio Batista, particularly the sugar workers. unrest among the workers, was of President Prio regime were we political going then was President after the World War relations with the Cubans. had good which the man in charge was II authoritarian real the American fashion. There was the second elected was During World War was It second so-called democratic the and the very fertile the nature of the climate, had a translator but it was a there hopeless kind he did not know how to write English. had nothing to do with East-West relations at that time? 196 000376 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [CAMERON] It was quite a was more bit of bilateral, and in terms stuff. consular of the work, example, For some there consular work involved looking after seamen, visiting them in etc.. did There was in those Trade fair amount of that. a you had to do, But days, practically everything. and Commerce away was trade work, had to do the we jail, as you officer from the If the of if I or was away he would do our work. [HILL] From there you came back to Ottawa European and Economic Divisions. work with NATO? [CAMERON] Yes. any Was my equivalent desk, of all of that involved with at that time involved interesting period The most the question of German entry into NATO. was and you went into the in the NATO Division, things, having just come remember John Halstead I and I from Cuba. the on was German remember, I we had to work on the resolution presented to parliament where there was a debate reports on entry into NATO. German We the situation for Parliament, on Minister's statements; there was a also had to prepare for committees and for the long process which led up to the eventual resolution endorsing the admission of Germany to NATO. Each country, There was on the including Canada, had through this to go quite a debate in the House on the issue. European side, but a lot of the work in the NATO Division. We had to prepare a was I done process. was involved by the people lot of memoranda on the German attitudes and look after all the telegrams and the documents that came in from [HILL] Well, that is [CAMERON] It the I very, Embassy in Bonn. a sort very of very exciting period in interesting. For example, there was related, politically sensitive question of German rearmament. did have been in a was our a little bit of knowledge of the background as I had Germany for four months at the end of the war and I'd read good deal about those issues. long, long hours It was a very active period, with devoted among other things reports for Parliament and its committees. 197 to the preparation They had more of debates 000377 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information on foreign policy in those days than they do [HILL] That of interesting that because this, Parliament about in dissension in. that brought Germany [CAMERON] Well, not dissension, the there but negotiation of there that is of the having not always opposition there that probably lot of a there not understand the looking of the average them were The aware a lot Member probably had the time, of all its It was not very long after the war Canadian, many of [CAMERON] The of CCF, foreign but you policy well Germany in and so I very do not probably few really, so the average at say I was very just do not strongly opposed to remember how the much full prepared a lot of material for the debate We lasted Would [HILL] recall, I as Germany; think, I was them.... discussion there was. which, probably did time. and how much implications. [HILL] rearmament of a But I do not document before the House took little from it at lot of the Members a study it carefully complex and to think issue. treaties was regularly to the House, gone I think was. little My recollection is bureaucratic point of view and briefing the Minister. recall, the that so? think was very was modification the Isn't I but Assembly parliamentary aspect think that's probably true. I clear, very mention you impression my the French etc.. London and Paris agreements, is the of European Defence Community, rejecting the It period whole the was in the House. now least a day. that NATO served the interests of Canadian in that period, I mean as regards bringing on? the extent that Canadian foreign policy is served by the maintenance of international stability and especially East-West [CAMERON] To stability, I think that this action was very much required at the 198 000378 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Certainly the perception time. I think in Europe, this side of the Atlantic, on that the Soviet Union had not done was and anything in the way of reducing its huge forces which had been mobilized during the war, done nothing had their expansionist aims; to served reinforce retrospect, I and the events of these if do not think there was really any other if after World War I. attempt imposed after the First World War. democracy, Bonn later and I do not think - their forces, the in something they look forward to at all. time, a I in the positive development. But you do not think reunification, for German [CAMERON] Yes, conferences in as there were, remember in 1955 free I was in was It Roger, it is not know, a they pain. real And back of many people's minds that There were there was a My own view was that lot of worries at the for a because they put were conference German it any prospect of pushing, neutralized country? and there there was Geneva, a a a forward in Geneva, on subject so proposals. number of reunification elections and this became almost boring, I grant you that. [HILL] I forces. own same you they might sometimes become aggressive again. it was West certainly the young people were not impression is probably the always the worry in mean bit ambivalent about this; a happy about being there is I do not think that would have been I been required to have not Your and not to impose upon them introduce to that the Germans were not a prepared to take the lead in allowing was think were was mind, it was a sign of real statesmanship Germany, has been successful. happy about it. of Germany open To my the kind of sanctions that were possible had they option compare it with what happened to Germany United States German in it at you the Germans to build up their economy, the look you think that the reconstruction I remarkable event And in Czechoslovakia 1948 think fears. about concern I to the allies. that the to alleviate any many a basis of got kind of the that couple of times. But the Communist system does not work on the basis of free elections, and there was elected no way that government in the Soviets Germany. were The 199 going to experience accept in a freely Poland showed 000379 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information that their idea of freedom, and free elections, And there from ours. preparing were proposals. various ideas floating And they [HILL) were can remember about putting I shy not was Canada forward proposals about Berlin and all kinds of proposals; of number a quite different was unified Germany; a there were around. put forward inside NATO? [CAMERON] Yes, inside. there put forward later on in the 50's, you talked to another person that was involved in this, some were Peyton Lyon at later when I I on were of them having Germany Austria. side. the NATO these areas and there getting ahead of myself University, Carleton was am of sort a as would elections. It seemed clear that one point they actually that but at the [HILL] It was not from want of [CAMERON] No, no. [HILL] It was not that a the Professor German the neutral desk in many of ideas floating around, government elected doing think if I some along the lines of by the four powers, the big boys, and there an was and He was very active all kinds of It would be guaranteed be he bit but a on the basis Soviets would very close. came never of go free for trying, then? West approached thing this in a fossilized way? [CAMERON] a lot of No, that people proposition of a was that not my impression. probably were unified Germany on No I think there were of cynical about the kind the basis of free elections. The problem is that the kind of system they have in Eastern. Europe just does not such a [HILL] allow for any dissent. system just would It is introduce plurality into not work. interesting. remember the night that word had To Thinking came back on that period, I through that the French Assembly rejected the.European Defence Community. 200 It was a big event. 000380 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [CAMERON] And French fears those still alive today you know, are I think. [HILL] About the whole question [CAMERON] Well, They loved the Germans so much young French people and still a world, it part is more, travel of French the things seemed to happen in that 1945-55 period, already by nonetheless but inside, deep they feel. A lot of [HILL] Now that may be disappearing as the young Germans, meet is way down psyche, how they they would like to continue to have true. And it is the it joke about Germany. have heard the old French you two Germanies. of...? somehow, from 1955 was one different kind a post-war period. immediate the into To of many people in Canada, this was a kind of golden age of Canadian foreign policy and security policy. Canada was pursued some very effective diplomacy, crisis, was the Suez One keeps coming Diplomacy." and across would How strong member of NATO and a I think. The there "Golden Age of Canadian see it differently. I you Would it? see you 1956 inventing peace-keeping. Lester Pearson this phrase: Then in those in terms? [CAMERON] Well, me I it would put somewhat it was a time when Canada played a very active role commensurate with position our fact that we had a very a smaller combined with that Pearson, and II. we I mean a big part country, had a Gerry Riddell in very active. existence, a before think of this to people, another was period And Canada played it flowed from the in things, ever a one Escott that Reid, had, fairly and Lester you do not even prematurely from overwork, and you a play bigger, the the post-war settlement; number of hear about anymore because he died Laurent, I one large part in it, bigger than we We had after World War I. big part for War larger, the of one as participants in World St. think to are talking about, who big role in bringing NATO were into big role, and this is what makes me so mad when I hear 201 000381 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information like Gwynne someone Dyer talking about how Canada was dragged in by the Americans. The Americans were get involved in lot of this. Anyway, a a combination of circumstances plus people of who competent negotiation, at play at We were able to of our country would Escott He I apply could person, Whether come with up I remember Norman Robertson was on had he GATT, we about him was to the Unbelievable, and Under-Secretary with piles as piled up in baskets little pad that he would problems under the pad on enormous his desk. on But he technique for dealing with problems a when he could not make up his mind. a of GATT, rules the But he found out later, swivel chairs with remarkable mind. a these ideas which were incredible. things to deal with, also had, it the call you people like George Ignatieff and very unusual; had heavy responsibilities of things. think it began right I disarmament negotiations--this kind of thing. he would was but very dedicated whole series of a do not know, but experience the think that there only not normally warrant. Reid and Lester Pearson. another unusual no I who did not want to much greater role than the size a the War with the end of the ones very active and able group a at reporting that time Golden Age of Diplomacy, at and, dedicated were the on In those days they had those the seat. The stack the papers relating to those Later, when he moved out of his seat. they found his office in the East Block, recall story I pile of memoranda, a a thick wad of really complicated problems whose importance appeared to have diminished with the passage was our former there when I Ambassador was posted in time. city. At that key player Another Arnold Heeney, Washington, to that people and very influential. of All these time there were was who was exceptional an unusually strong group of civil servants who have written about by Professor Granatstein in his book "The coloured his account of what [HILL] in this Perhaps period was one Mandarins." was going do not think he on. of the most important things that Canada did to help to keep the United States involved with the world, and not go back to isolation It is not just the I as in the previous periods. bilateral relationship between Canada and US that is important. 202 000382 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [CAMERON] No, I [CAMERON] role we The agree. played in Washington in that period was much greater than most people are influence individuals. of aware Of of, I it course, think, was because of the smaller world a in those days. [HILL] The influence that Canada exerted at that time was not [CAMERON] No. [HILL] It was [CAMERON] That more United States much related to the bilateral relationship? in world affairs. right, is and I think that was because it was by the fact that we were more of a player on the global reinforced scene so the on than we are now in the security sense. Sure play we lot a of roles in other things, but proportionately we had a greater role to play then by virtue of [HILL] really One been our war operations. time point that John Holmes brought out, which I had never aware of, is the fact that on particularly in the immediate post-war period, helped maintain the British economy with a been almost forgotten these it Canada was major loan. days. they are [HILL] Britain state of Canada's help that was critical. going was in that is near-bankruptcy. [CAMERON] The British right. was [HILL] that That has [CAMERON] That is coming out in the documents which through right now. It was side, economic the There a economy lot of was in help given great difficulty, to Britain then. So, that sort of thing meant that Canada had in international affairs. 203 a major role 000383 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [CAMERON] touched these On often, headlines the people in charge, Do you have any [CAMERON] I [HILL] period, that and the of to mind comes the was the allies to think in Germany, it the was - mostly also in the day of a and on the Staff The question Germany to NATO. day the Canadian there were also in those days were somewhat But think re-armament. But I outside his even and - of Those and that Adenauer SPD did party and was able own by no means a simple was myself that we do not have now. in the Department of National Defence. Affairs guy a from the group. on fellow the from External; would do we was three people Intelligence Board There Joint I were a short report every main issues of interest. We would get into the greatest in DND and they of course would have their perspective world. guess the event daily briefing group preparing intelligence for arguments with the guys own CCF. parliament, who German Services, the (JIB), I certain amount of opposition, had in those days something have to External from that in NATO getting it through the Bundestag. the Chiefs the of every a was proposition through, to get the We used almost There command substantial support We anything else. admission the us German about ambivalent matter, relations with key question and still is, and the attitude attitude towards them. people another key player. the was sharply is the admission of Germany to NATO, so problems preoccupied I period? problems involved in the German re-armament. Berlin and He Canada's cannot think of I with any other comments? are there [CAMERON] Well, influence in those days. of terms in that further comments on that very key role But of lot a issues not are authority. remember Robert Ford. played a which have but in positions of [HILL] He issues, of kinds So we about got the what world you and what might call was a happening world view in the from an 204 000384 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information intelligence standpoint that about for Division and became immersed [HILL] some say that estimates US problems. German did think I dealing with China. a of them lot China that China had its terms. Like the could not particularly were, borne source empire in the old British out by events. regarded be I guess think I they did not like Nicaragua today. I Reagan is a a to as being get are no greys good example of that. of couple We used And We never got agreement. agreement. The the boys of one they have blinkers mean, not want to look at them; there white. simplistic position really was our want regarded Communist China Americans those to Washington went we to have long arguments on that issue. course the world. they called joint estimates. times and used to have what of in of they had basic problems which But In hindsight, division. of those aims, although clearly there was a close own association with the Soviets. a or The Americans used to argue that Red China was Communist bloc. the of argued were understand generally much exaggerated, were days, the bloc was coloured in red and covered most We I them were? of [CAMERON] Well, part joined the European I doing intelligence work, When you were to you in interesting and I did It was and one-half before year a job. in that bad and they do often, it is black or It is on nothing new with the Americans. [HILL] Well, I know that when we on security and disarmament, to put in two different situation, because you one sets could of did the parliamentary report the crucial issues there of estimates of the not simply get was world military agreement in the committee on [CAMERON] That is right, [HILL] And the information you take is basic, it tends to govern a lot of one set. we the rest of your had two different estimates. thinking. 205 000385 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [CAMERON] bomber gap. later then And we the had kind same problem of the on You remember that. [HILL] Yes, that is right. [CAMERON] So it is not a new phenomenon. just thought that would I be relevant. [HILL] sense undergoing were That a period when of change, deal great a was in started crisis. And there was plus then think, Then 1953. of there course a the there. that at state continuing problem with Germany and Berlin there was the of Were the Suez Crisis. That of the Scandinavians involved in thinking about NATO Well, very much. Not isolationists during World they were neutral, in involved their the Swedes were own interests, and up I The out. Norwegians the Swedes we were for involved, not were directly involved, were looked after The feeling between the Norwegians you know. into the between the two; at were not was involved to the extent that they forgive the Swedes country Norway I. War most Scandinavians all, of first Swedes the last war; and the Swedes when not But what security situation in Scandinavia while you were the was course time? [CAMERON] but Polish Hungarian the all somewhat to the south of where you were in Stockholm. were in the the were and then which brought Gomulka to power, troubles, was East that de-Stalinization was going further and further ahead; it had I in Stockholm. you were relations West - 1958, to 1955 would just like to finish up with the period when, from I there was very allowing the Germans North. There Norway would strong. was to go a lot through their of antipathy least that was my impression in those days and think it still exists to this day. The feeling the Swedes persists that money and allowed the Germans to go through their country into Norway, and Norwegians fought during the they sold iron ore factories prospered. on itself and to feed war and Hitler's war made machines. The Swedish My impression of Sweden is that Sweden is regarded by a lot 206 of the Norwegians in the looks same 000386 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information way world. by people in this part of the United States is regarded the as They are regarded as the wealthiest, the most prosperous, so on. Although Stockholm is not exactly the world, the Swedes and tend to Scandinavia is kind of a things; and they to Swedes The "Russia" are tend look it on world apart. look very proud from the Swedish word "Rus". came Russian Republic of the The USSR. Back in the late middle Swedish museums things that they brought back from that part they sort of for the As look themselves on Soviets, they do not them as their traditional enemy. whole population addition the remarkable full of world. So, in Scandinavia. They still look upon little defence own people but now They have selling aircraft I the issues. West million. 7 never They were Canada "SAAB". involved in involved role focus. Hammarskjöld when The UN was around was their focus. in lot a in that are are a Sweden was UN. in the those and and They impression that the of being sense in cars company, got airplanes, own The prosperous these of Their player was the Secretary General of the United Nations. of the guys Sweden has its They build their Swedish world player in - about Volvos they are to by built is industries. efficient East like them. the of are now which is quite remarkable for the size of the country. force a big the as run Apparently the word territory which is the Swedes conquered most of the ages, way, a their protectorate. as their history. of In And the Swedes like to Finland on such. as of the centre big That kind days, their was they played in the The role that humanitarian side, the role that they played through Hammarskjöld was their international marginally involved in, They focus. the other interested were issues. East-West in, but What they really liked to talk to you about was what they were doing on the UN Commission in Korea. We were on the Commission in Korea at that time so they were interested in talking about that. They would be interested, they would tell you a bit about their problems with the Soviets, you know they did not have submarines that kind. diplomat that they had problems of of the Swedish Wallenberg. few bilateral They had a questions They had the disappeared in those days, but perennial question during number of issues like that. with Canada 207 that were the war They had a quite important. 000387 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information There were investments in Canada, lot of Swedish a in pulp and paper and investments in shipping lot of money a coast; West the on that whole bilateral relationship has grown enormously since those days. There considerable working on where areas have we very a the was focus of your work, really you were not NATO-related issues. [CAMERON] No, not really, background. have this of interest with Sweden. common So that [HILL] number a are We Although it no. had as our was Minister, useful Jean for to me Chapdelaine, you may have known him. [HILL] No. [CAMERON] This predecessor was arrived and I a called Matthews, man in charge for was then Chapdelaine took over. And the other Finns the they considered it get very Finland is classes in Finland [HILL] are used of and he left Swedes the There stuff to do, apart very are and the almost like a paternalistic attitude of this Swedes, who 10 per cent to are the minority. of the population. to it compare a a Montreal one on with similarity. to the French I would We were fairly But, no, large. Minister would tootle off was was Finland. protectorate, as Finland, would I everything, including the information other officer who Secretary and I would do his work when he was my work when I they and Finland be in charge and have to run program. after we four months, that is not say that East-West relations loomed very Because just His Soviets do vis-à-vis Finland. Canadians and the English, there is busy. or Mission. bilingual country and the traditional ruling a Still about [CAMERON] They Head about three the annoyed with Swedes. as He was also accredited to about thing pre-occupied with what is part, position first his was holidays. You had from being Chargé; 208 a was a Commercial away and he would do very full and the Swedes, platter as I of say, 000388 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information were very good to deal with in the they would ask you "What that when you went down sense about?". want to talk do you would give you more than what you wanted to know, time to write down. it all down, ending: have the honour to be, know do not I a number Part III Ottawa, - [HILL] Division Washington to period. They it 1958 was a defence relations example in in and then very and very, are you you joined went to in the control us something if you could tell Canadian- relations, of wonder in further four a period Defence Embassy the Alliance problem a the UN. the in the in 1958-68 also of of people, they have but they important respect of is kind politically mostly through Cameron, in Ottawa but northern are Bonn, This I relevant, Canada, to us American development very your obedient servant." Counsellor for Political Affairs for as weapons. is Sir, Washington and Ambassador Liaison that problems similar of distant; related sense, year if You know, and complete it with the formal you Scandinavia. another world in than you had more You did not send telegrams in those days. had to write "I And they of for nuclear about Canadian-American defence relations in this the period, especially relating to NORAD and also to the question of equipping the Canadian Armed Forces with nuclear weapons. what kind impact did Canada's policies of on I am wondering the nuclear weapons issue have on its standing and influence in NATO for example. is in the period after 1958; I think it was [CAMERON] Would you like me to mention the [HILL] the Yes, if you would like to. to about This 1962. Canada-USA side first. This period after 1958 was period that NORAD was established, wasn't it? [CAMERON] Yes. These are as terms of I am just trying to get the events in sequence. they come to my mind but they may not be accurate the precise dates. I can mention a bit about in the relationship between the Department of Defence and the Department 209 000389 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information of External Affairs, business because, Staff a shall we there Charles Foulkes, influential, intelligent, say, but also very much, Forces tend to be, cards close to his chest'. I as who of military aspects very, very of the member many members of the we say 'he played his injustice an Ministers what he thought thought that the members of the Forces, and of a as security in the sense conscious of the security aspects, were was think without doing him my recollection is that he tended to give Ministers should have, who unusual in his outlook, very conservative to this whole very germane was in 1958 as Chairman of the Chiefs of was called General man Services, which I think various they should systems, weapon deal with that and the Ministers would have less interest in some of the equipment. different types of think, taken just before was who was dealing with this, side, the NATO I if The I joined I remember, the at that things, of series whole there on question the question of the over-flights Agreement, did in NATO, and particular period the was I Jim McCardle. was by SAC I The officer arrangements concerned with North American defence. a NORAD, on Division. is the things that were going that only indirectly involved was decision actual in the So, there was of the NORAD aircraft, the Agreement, Argentia, all these issues where I think your best On the NATO side, I think the issue source would be Jim McCardle. Bases in my mind the equipment that stands out with the 104s, which was in 1959. in any CF of the papers out doing a the aircraft were impression not that involved the was in equipment air division very little said it would the a I brought nuclear- important implications. Cabinet issue use. in which I expected to have number of a the Defence about the role the Minister for strike role which would have we There was got from National memorandum that the fact While of would have or the kind of weapons the aircraft remember we was was meeting not I had considered the very carefully or that the Ministers were aware that the aircraft would My recollection is that this aspect be carrying nuclear weapons. did not appear to weigh heavily in the minds of the of the decision people who advertised had by to DND. make It operated in those days. the was The decision typical of Department 210 and it the way of was the National widely government not Defence ran 000390 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information they tended shop, their keep to all these things to themselves. They would say: airmen, and we required." They did not provide any more information thought "We the are was necessary without [HILL] When the Diefenbaker initially in CF 104 in, came at that did. And the Honest John understand it, time it by DND. to I as NATO, to least it a was to in bit to Europe. What happened is that which were careful analysis, NORAD Agreement which was in a vague of sort not was way but certainly without the kind of consultative procedures there NATO. the on a decisions a or more sign it relates what It did not go through at or these took and what Canada wound up with was related than they think it was I the government less or to and far as government presented more well, as happened then, the government and then in 1958, line, which it dotted is actually hiding it. presented with the NORAD Agreement and asked less the 1957, best what know are in Plus, then, Canada acquired the CF-104 with the nuclear role and also the Honest John but in fact without nuclear warheads. Avro Arrow was scrapped in this time, but it did not acquire [CAMERON] Yes, there and Canada got The Bomarc, the warheads. the separate were agreements necessary the for warheads. [HILL] Some be know that there I closer to NATO accept the Agreement. and side. with the NATO to that are lot of just another case of the people who say NORAD should consultations should be that, I am aware of more in tune but I think you also have fact there has been too much written into the NORAD The North arrangement. The certainly, ever There at American air a time, of it as in prominence or deal of the Canada-US was Defence attempt an not, great involved the Minister of Defence, was defence forces political side given that essentially Agreement NORAD integrate the was was indecision. government's [CAMERON] people argue that this a to practical those days importance. Committee which the Minister of External Affairs 211 000391 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information their counterparts and Defence Production important part of an was bilateral relationship. our by the Secretary of side I think that was handled did they production. we have not while, But for held in this committee and think that there consultative I to look relationship, and a the it may be recollection, tendency a was my defense for shall Diefenbaker crowd and the people between the that--this is Us because Defense; responsible Minister Washington, fell into disuse. on of On the committee gradually, with the lack of, Now this rapport say, Cabinet a Minister The included because the defence production also was States. United the in that on NORAD as was in there were meetings tendency was to look faulty--but I think kind of political a not. It considered was to be more of an integration of the air forces for the air defence which made of North America, Soviet Union was developing have the the time, at there were consequently, in fairiness to the people and that thought given to the need my perception is, own considerable bomber force which would a capacity to attack SAC bases and other strategic points in North America, who given the perception that the sense, it to seemed there me was difficulties that the arose much But I think consultation in NORAD. for not largely out of separate worlds in which National Defence and External lived officials and the the dissimilar attitudes of and because of the ministers involved. As there recall I the Pentagon similar; -"a bunch of cookie pushers, A little bit people arms control. the World A similar ministerial War soldier. I He was I those are Americans diplomats, what they do know still does today. only beginning are a long Our defence now to talk about way ahead of us in this situation existed in the late fifties in Canada. side in hero who Howard Green, [HILL] officers The suspicious of the State Department- existed and that senior and regard. On of or We are the guys who are on the front line." problems. about these was rapport My experience in Washington consultation between the departments. was not much was won the DND you had George the Victoria Minister of Cross. Defence Pearkes our a very good Minister was He was and who was a believe. It was Sidney Smith originally. 212 000392 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [CAMERON] Well, I tell can something you Sidney. about recollection of Sidney Smith goes back to my time when division. The late Bruce Keith on Germany. Sidney Toronto and prepared Affairs External had Smith for him those documents? [HILL] No. [CAMERON] Well, to the been President a the GATT Germany in mixed up; hopelessly House instead was and on finished on and he got and University of very good speaker. We explain to Have you easy to ever and he admitting his confusion and worse. worse absolutely got to over to it. sense in NATO. It was my out I also went to first experience in Paris in the fall of After the Committee couple of nights a Secretariat and Bill Barton days. the That autumn Soviets having to State and very a Berlin. a mean the about speech, Council meeting. to blast of our Berlin crisis, a John Foster Dulles powerful, impressive guy. practically until preparing was NATO meeting and you may recall because the The question next was an fat would be in the fire. day that was he wanted 213 very Sidney Smith looked the Council meeting, where there it; a Sidney Smith key NATO armoured brigade, which would did like with the Americans threatened sat not the Secretary of We sat up all one night morning in the three their way through with at in the NATO division in those was draft and in was and it was threatening to prevent the American forces from were access there at a the head was it to meeting with Sidney Smith a Geoffrey Pearson 1958. the officials, his going over the manuscript of his remarks trying to correct make some read went he of Commons of the comprehend In any event, remember Bruce Keith and I spent I Berlin the and Berlin. Committee Chairman and turning the matter he went prepare the House of Commons Agreement is probably the in DLI of to those very complex agreements. Committee was to discussing was and have to briefing paper which attempted a Four-Power Agreements on compared which prominent Rotarian a used I appearing before papers for him because he was Committee and I My to over our change this and that. was quite a I heated 000393 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information debate about whether the Allies should their rights to Berlin were of access [HILL] This [CAMERON] That is right. course that sure protected. of the "free city", it not? was remember that John Foster Dulles in the I statement, his of time was the force to make use maybe or it the in was the of course discussion, implied that if the Soviets did not back down that they would maybe have to consider deploying the Strategic Air Command, good statement prepared. a Sidney Smith had had everybody was trying to avoid. the thing that He read about two paragraphs it, of pushed away his statement and in a very emotional voice said: Chairman, Canada will not support this action that the Secretary Chairman, and Mr. We hate nuclear weapons, of State is proposing. "Mr. is will not go along with this idea that John Foster Dulles we proposing". clearly. remember his outburst very I not in the record of the meeting because there kept of But what Dulles this exchange. American policy formal record no saying, was They had superiority time. the at was was probably is It in part of nuclear using their superiority as a deterrent, reinforcing their policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. weapons and Dulles favoured a means of Sidney Smith, psyche I which interpreted suspect, In any use event, one aspect of the Canadian to mean nuclear weapons Sidney Smith that the very, believe he died shortly afterwards. He seemed depth and I have heard this from other people. man, a but he just did not comprehend many of gut feeling about [HILL] in In fact particular, who had men, their a lot but they had particular to me a backed emotional; be out of He was a I his very fine issues although he had some people, like Sidney Smith degree viewpoints. Howard Green later They were very on, worthy difficulty dealing with some of these issues and particularly in relation seems you had was and perhaps to own getting Soviets very to was he them. of then, what USA unless the was believe I anti-nuclear. been statement Dulles' ready to start to down. always has reflecting was to good example. the Defence The 214 Air Department. Force had The CF-104 very clear ideas 000394 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information that they wanted the CF-104. [CAMERON] Oh sure, because as professional airmen, they wanted the best available which at the time politician or was average Canadian the the CF-104. did not As recall, I the understand that this aircraft was to take on a nuclear-strike role even though they were not designed for that kind of terrible time with them. role. a They But it because of the number of crashes. aircraft, it was the Cadillac Canada had the called later Force had German Air The it was a a widow-maker the high-performance Force in those days, it Honest John did not of the Air really was. [HILL] CF-104 and have the nuclear warheads for them, the nuclear [CAMERON] only did the and was not But I think the explanation rapport between served in the of had in was forces He disarmament, where I Green I and the lack of personal a champion of I and like most that have people think he was sincere but I think he in favour of general everything dealing with disarmament saw disarmament. world developed strong think his views did not reflect much also think he attitude between the views about he was naive when it came to the realities discussions with people who an or Not Smith and between Harkness and during wartime, strongly was of as World War Unfortunately, disarmement. naive. Sidney Pearkes and you Howard Green warfare. to do simple. for that is very this difference of view you have but really able role. Defence people and the people in External, Green, but were disarmament to sense was and to of complete the point realism involved in the business. some really in But I extent in political terms as issue popular among many Canadians especially on the West Coast. [HILL] So what you have policy towards NATO. is some degree of confusion in Canada's What kind of impact did this have on Canada's role in NATO? [CAMERON] Well, in this way. Howard Green believed that you.could 215 000395 �Document disclosed underthe Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information by not having anything to do with nuclear weapons. be sort of pure Therefore we gave serious consideration, and the Americans probably thought we were out of our minds, to an arrangement whereby the (e.g., Bomarcs) would be stationed in Canada, but warheads would be stored across the border and brought across delivery systems the the border when there was installed be the missiles to for And this included the warheads crisis. a on aircraft I air defence. for today they have a conventional warhead days for which is better than the nuclear warhead in use in those have forgotten the name, but the same purpose of shooting down bombers. missile they installed nuclear warhead. a missiles Bomarc), The the on only was the one with philosophy seemed to be that if we kept the in plane or Canada in the somewhere (it the was and had US same with the Howard Green's position seemed to be that "pure". we were the days, those air defence aircraft an in Colorado Springs warheads down the on In brought the warheads into Canada, you became part He tended to see things in simplistic terms. of the nuclear club. as soon you as On the other hand if we were really serious about it told Probably of the uranium." to that extent. was warheads in remember that approval every aircraft. A more Canada, the in another part over Canada, no in the I think that he really felt nuclear if club weeks overflights for of nuclear I on. later that insisted Conservatives had we role authority as for by SAC lack of lack of This was Canada implied SAC a the West's main deterrent. of the whole problem in that in senior levels of the Canadian Government I do not ever also obtain US the of people thought at the time that this SAC's export he did not want to annoy the Americans and that led to the crisis advance generous confidence us three lot flights give him credit, getting it that To bomber SAC "No Americans the should have we think anybody acknowledged SAC's except possibly in the sense it was generally regarded as the "Sword" or nuclear deterrent, with NATO's conventional forces being role the a "Shield". means Soviets classic of And as you know, the Americans did use the sword as pressure on the Soviets during the period before achieved nuclear parity. example underdogs, and The Cuban missile crisis Soviets of where the they backed down. 216 The knew they were was the the nuclear experience convinced the 000396 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Soviets to build [HILL] in And view, this Canada, and your impact unfortunate strength. then nuclear up on had a rather perception of Canada in NATO itself. ambivalence the on within NATO? [CAMERON] is just say NATOo. little difficult to a looked do not know how it was I incredibly naive. thought we were on think I some of the allies remember going to I It NATO one meeting and Howard Green spoke about the importance of dealing with the non-aligned and the developing world. of of time the sitting next think it was much. He the to to tell Council of one He took about his them African delegations the quite up in bit a experience of York. I New the Cameroon delegate who impressed Howard Green very proceeded then lecture the Ministers about to good will, and the importance of it in dealing with the developing countries, example. and using this as experience the UN; at an He talked enthusiastically about his many of Europeans, who regard themselves as pretty sophisticated, did not really think this was quite necessary for to a who had only been in office for Canadian Minister, Foreign Affairs, including of lecture the Ministers Minister. I think it was the Frenchman who something to the effect Africa he had, In as the view of of, if Howard not as long in he would not talk that way about the Africans. many the Europeans only strong the French aside, and said been Green had Europeans, the Howard unsophisticated, naive, and a do-gooder. among turned year, a on as Green There was to why Canada would have disarmament and on a was some seen as puzzlement Minister who was peacekeeping but did not have indeed he seemed to be unrealistic and much to say about security; naive about security. [HILL] was a So, between 1962 crucial beginnings of period the in issues at what was 1966 you were in Washington? inter-allied problem business of the MLF also. Particularly, and France. with What was your Canada's relations You of because have This this the whole impression of that period? influence in Washington on NATO this time? 217 000397 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information of all had the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, which we the first big crisis. I nuclear war. People were cellar. I do since then. in in Ottawa. First the state of affairs [CAMERON] Again, it reflects It was flames, acting in a restricted stocking up was goods canned on fear of real a was in the experienced anything like it a real worry that the world was going to go up think not remember there can guess I had I have a situation where ever the US government was and you way which kept all information in a tight little ball, to two three or in people Department did not know anything. Now the The Cabinet. State maybe the Secretary of State did, but there was certainly no information around, about what was They knew the Soviets were they were preparing. for putting in these missiles, because they had been watching Cuba Soviet relations with the United States were bad; a long time. going on or what Khrushchev thought Kennedy was naive, a Harvard Bostonian. He thought he could push him around because he had done that I think, in Vienna at the meeting before, and there relationship two. between the East-West relations were regarded as a result This went none of the allies on for two or the At same a very bad time, I do personal not think being at a critical point, and as were was informed of what three weeks resulting in going on. was real a build-up All kinds of people went down to try and pick up any of tension. little bits of information, Charles Ritchie used to have lunch with various people, and everybody was trying to find out what was going The on. to the Ambassador, along with his NATO colleagues, State Department an hour before was called in Kennedy made his statement television announcing what had happened, what they were going The former US Ambassador to Canada, Livy Merchant, was sent to do. on special emissary with photographs of the deployment It all happened within hours, the missile sites in Cuba. to Ottawa of the as a and then I guess the next thing that whole thing, Canadian side came was they accuracy announcement, I ought of came to out send with the a elsewhere many statement that said, United Nations these American photographs. 218 on the have forgotten exactly how it but I think it has been recorded out, that Diefenbaker that an happened That in to in times, effect, confirm the is what it sounded 000398 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information like in Washington, and of course Canadian Government statement of the President of really not accept, reaction the the was can commander-in-chief The the imagine what kind And then related to that, forces on a more You had the NORAD forces where you had of alert. defence forces. value, that the Soviets question of them putting their air defence advanced state the So you to that. Americans had face at United States, the deployed these missiles in Cuba. had of did immediately implied that the this of NORAD also commander the same man wears two hats but think I I US of air right am in saying that the US commander put their forces on what they call DEFCON 3, which is high state of readiness, a fairly high state, a and that Government did not take of debate; so I was involved. not another source of the statement by taken was am a matter was in Washington is that making this was First, irritation for the Americans. than more I I but Canadian the This is still by Canada. point The side, Canadian similar decision. a what action the on highest not the Canada which could have been the Prime Minister of read, although I do not think he necessarily meant it that way, but it could have been read or implying as a certain degree of questioning of President Kennedy's decision. Canadian Ministers, I think it reflected that the UN should have the UN event, should have and our a role to role a reaction to to play, play in that In fairness to the Howard more that event, situation. coloured In very good thing suggested that the Senate if Canadians Organization of American got their States. His fannies colleagues about a that much the House of be was public. the well not something like: was damn a joined nasty note to Diefenbaker, which became forgotten exactly what it said, but it and proposal received and in addition to that he wrote his really it would off So addition, President Kennedy came to Ottawa and in his address to the combined and idea Green's and a lot of people thought relationship between Washington and Ottawa. Commons distrust one I of have "This S.O.B. is from the backwoods." Well, relationship between governments. President who was very popular in Canada. the new look; his wife was popular and he seemed to bring new wave, a the two things coloured the all these And you had a Kennedy represented the completely different approach to Government. 219 here The amazing thing 000399 �Document disclosed under the Access to mjormation Act Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information despite catastrophes such as the Bay of Pigs--it was to me is that real a disaster Canada, a popularity which is still undiminished. relationship official between level probably did Kennedy's book, but you know it was death exactly I On not real hundred days, the Soviets would that find out And, leaks. to and Bobby really a They were they what you know, as the us read not have the tell allowed not in were NATO is sealed chamber. a Did [HILL} a they could were themselves. doing and they did not want any not They crisis. know even contacts but poor. very was However, they did not allow anybody into anything. tough time and to our Cuban the not governments the all had we anything during scared by Kennedy--his popularity remained high run that improve significantly with the advent of the Pearson Government? [CAMERON] Yes, (HILL] Then you have the Vietnam War. [CAMERON] Yes, I think it did I the Vietnam improve. War In 1965 started when I I was remember very well McNamara and his whiz kids computers It was in, and just a it beating would the Washington. in bringing all these they professed to have the answer to everything. matter putting of it in all the figuring how many tons of bombs had to be dropped then went to Germany. not very be long before the bad computer, and on the Viet Cong; would stop the North guys good guys. [HILL] A very un-Canadian [CAMERON] The standard line in those days would leave the South alone, [HILL] I [CAMERON] One remember thing in after Kennedy I was approach to things! some was that if everything would be all right. of that. do remember there is this: killed, that 220 was a when Johnson traumatic event. came Johnson 000400 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information in and--talk about Ronald Reagan being came a cowboy, traditional cowboy. a Johnson Pearson forgave ever mentioned Vietnam. For for making go to Pearson ranch. the on the American character, They do not. believe to into his dealing in unforgiveable. you could tell believe I improved think that relations because [HILL] you mentioned. But The Soviets partial test which presumably Canada Certainly down there some Soviets British in about acid rain, of That was the let off high were and for they had that rain an levels of the of atmosphere. Certainly, suggest he from the came an down in the naive. it their They national I I are lot a lot of it of after Coast to movement was doing Howard one to 221 agree the think I Green Canada. over test on a in the the arms disservice naive about how to get achieved because the countries interest talk radioactivity drifted a was You And there were clouds was think he and the biggest reached not was things done. West agreement was front, control content of which possibly as well, as Soviets tests. nuclear test, there on, forces because arms radioactivity and those in partly important considerations the high nuclear a enormous period front, not do well. as on moves one Columbia During that control I great phase of détente, a they have ever exploded in the atmosphere. with short, up their the extent to which there was nuclear fallout, came to In you had the movement towards ban, pushing was they were very important, to building were the Non-Proliferation Treaty. was was of Charles Ritchie also that time was a great period of détente because you had the [CAMERON] Cong Viet despite Vietnam, this was also true from 1962 But of Cuba. their railroad run that much with Pearson, all one. incident. that of those diaries one of about the relationship. more whereas force, the bastards those with is in It everybody is allowed to have carry guns and For a Canadian to come down and tell them how to especially much. of use he backyard, and own was too in the think do not I speech in which that him to stop bombing the bad guys to tell we You may have read these stories how he treated Pearson down about cowboy--this guy was a to it, but not find because 000401 �Document disclosed under the Access to mjormution Act Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information people was going around making statements in the are towards détente, and I think there was the beginning in a move NATO of based Also there UN. pillars of détente and defence the concept the study done by Belgium's Foreign Minister. on the twin of détente came really and recognition by the USSR of the from your time in NATO I am sure. after the Cuban missile crisis, You know It is true, need for accommodation with the West. [HILL] also and period when NATO was moving forward to détente This was a period a independent when France position. Did was Canada Washington, say in the early '60s? influence Washington, in moves with on détente, respect have the to in Canada's assess Government, not say pushing for more Liberal but after that, partly a influence much How would you say under talking about Howard Green, off moving towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty and also relations with France for keeping France within to the Alliance? Oh, [CAMERON] think I considerable part. Washington, as with were France bilingual was to lot a try to think I do not know whether you could say it as it was in the NATO forum. our there country, at ameliorate think. I the time, the but I of cannot relations with we even have NATO remember who France, we did do to try to of the military side of NATO. though their forces are no I think in the military As you know, on longer integrated. I think traditionally been more conscious of the French outlook on problems, reaction I with bicultural, think that I was a relations Our the practice they continued to co-operate pretty well side, played we serious situation did not develop when they decided a to pull out part, a always pretty good because nature of that ensure much Ambassador our I played we to an particularly when a lot of their positions aggressive American attitude to a lot are a of things. think it is rather difficult to distinguish between the influence we have with Washington, indirectly. Council, lot of opposed to the influence we might have As I recall we did play both before and these as a very active role in the NATо particularly after Pearson came in, on a issues. 222 000402 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [HILL] But rather than pushing Washington...? [CAMERON] Well, did what we could we higher political level, all of this the poor rather relations that bilaterally through them for in Washington. was coloured to had, we But some certainly the on extent by during the Diefenbaker period. [HILL] last I wonder if phase, Counsellor juncture degree which in Alliance the Americans. Germans and 1966 this affairs. De Gaulle had not know if Germans were that was American a guarantee Minister- certainly This was very important period when the between a the French to some and the confronted the Germans with this sort of already really in were You was caught were 1969. to particularly over the nuclear guarantee choice, the from is Bonn, in could just deal, before we break, with one we over by then; for to Germany. a I period there do the dilemma because they wanted to maintain they but did not want alienate to the French. [CAMERON] Are you referring to his proposal for the Three-Power Directorate? [HILL] Yes, that [CAMERON] I we were Gaulle from my say can very concerned was of thing. sort about pushing, and I the German concerns. experiences there and elsewhere that the Three-Power Directorate that I think that putting other proposals forward. I of it variations situations. to use or the theme For example, nuclear Council on sympathetic to guess our views were very And as we did all remember there might we could were apply who would have control de to over by number a practical the decision weapons, whether it would be all members of the NATO only those who had nuclear weapons. series of situations that were looked at, There were you know, a whole in terms of how do you arrive at this horrendous decision, to allow your forces to deploy, not only to deploy, but to use nuclear weapons, 223 given the 000403 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information fact that the American President had the ultimate decision organized It is an deal with this; to probably number issue is still current I dealing with was in pushing for one more consultation recall As I issues, NATO today. we a on were number including the question of consultative procedures things, the this extremely difficult question of consultation. throughout the time that of going to be How was the Council release of the nuclear warheads. the on for release of nuclear weapons. [HILL] Yes, and this Alliance had developped flexible response, Group strategy the and I think that of the was in Bonn. The forward defence and point when the Affairs Defence Nuclear were while you in 1967, was Nuclear Committee and the But, on the other combination of work done over quite a long time, and perhaps those issues resolved by the time Planning established. were [CAMERON] in the I more less or would say this is an hand, you were issue that will that you can work out all the sense this think I never were was а in Bonn. resolved, be plans or procedures you want, but when it comes down the crunch--and I think this was shown in Cuba--it is matter a of confidence between the governments at willing the time whether they importance. important thing is that they do not allow too much The are discretionary authority to procedures have to deal with I think, periodically. sense if commander you on to shoot down or Seattle. the mean those and am I are talking about Coast [HILL] you were was on That ought this, to to have power to is the serious But does it make the kind sense use of issue Are those the kind to give it to I do not of NATO defence, at for a nuclear weapons a or Vancouver commander think he has it was looked be but I think it makes American North do presidential bomber which is approaching Victoria forward front in Europe? that all, above not up to date the West a in advance. because they The emergency. an issue of such an on commanders; the field authority may have to be granted thing to consult now, on but I grappling with. things you were dealing with while in Bonn? 224 000404 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [CAMERON] No. thing is in done classified club. bilateral and had to NATO the Bonn, In report on had we divide to questions. what the German attitude attitude of still the Germans to a as thought the the where they co-habited, Forces De French; Gaulle, on the Rhineland--the issues in the UN and in of on what you heard from We covered Ottawa, everything. what you I did not in Germany. When I from northern Germany south down to moved they say, as for were period, brief a they did not When the French eventually left tidy establishment; they was Lahr with the leave a very for their house-keeping. not noted quite a bit of time was spent dealing with some of the problems related to the Germany is an also had is a small, so we We move. ministerial visits. a on the take the question of French forces the Canadian Forces there But between supervised most of the material; another big issue question of French. time You would have to sort of plot your important to report. was do it all but I was depending to what, have whole series NATO, and disarmament, etc.. week highly you was of a there were all these issues with the Germany--they in our If relations with between France and Germany, forces That sort Group, Planning Nuclear international international issues, we in that. would not get involved We Bonn important ally, losts of visitors and many quiet little capital, had a lot of work. but But it was good period. [HILL] that? You mentioned Were you [CAMERON] I came the about the German [HILL] But from Soest to Lahr, there when the troop cuts decision back. I was brought back at the I was move side, involved end of 1968 and I was a but when was was announced? little bit here in Ottawa. because I knew a little bit in Ottawa when that happened. they decided to move south anyway, prior to that, in other words? [CAMERON] Oh yes, it came was a move before that time. The troop cuts later, it was with Trudeau, and Trudeau did not come in until 225 000405 �Document disclosed underthe Access toimjormution Act Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information 1969. [HILL] wing was moved from And also, of course, the Canadian air Zweibrücken to Lahr. [CAMERON] Yes, in remember going to I which Zweibrücken, is a Festival. were extraordinarily good, Americans, day Anyway, them in they more all were detail all the of case with the night that we the the Germans he had this all day he would have to tell problems. staff who dealt our For example, Judge Advocate Generals' Office, Status the full of praise for the We had members of specific with representative, that the next going. its and he could not say anything. He had to go ahead with his speech which was population, knowing was Zweibrücken; information bottled up inside him, German base population German have to tell to leaving were Canadian just received a telegram from the commander had they that better than so much saying that he was going Ottawa, the with the number of reasons. a party, went to the next for at little town famous for beautiful The Canadian relations Rose the party a Forces problems. There was we had that dealt a with office that did an nothing but deal with problems arising out of a special arrangement between the Canadian and military attaché, and a altogether in addition [HILL] How would Air German naval attaché. to you Forces. There We totalled also was eleven officers the Canadian the Ambassador. the assess importance of presence in Germany to the Germans? To the German Government? [CAMERON] Very high. it very high, size the of relationship our as with the United as Canada. Germany, a They or position Forces, assess but as symbolic North American country, see They that see if they would view that the United States hawk, I would States. the US because of terms close an Canadians of our relationship it in context of the US the as our in not should pull as much out of event that could either affect Congressional attitude, which they it could affect a watch like a attitude toward their vulnerable in the East-West context. 226 000406 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [HILL] or thought Is there also the even more ground is small, relatively their thinking? see [CAMERON] I they see it that was their do not know whether more as symbol a Canadians and for fairly a high being the first part of as a war? they would ever of resolve, you think the for Canada generally. regard international issues where for our impact this that have West by know, There and a think I country a have Germans position our an say that. few commercial and investment links with Canada, have be Does I and enemy the along? come they Do on could there nonetheless larger Canadian presence in the event of regard crisis, a in a war, that although the number of Canadians reinforcements which would on in the event of that a high quite are a think they I on lot a of particulárly in the last ten views, years, have been closer to the Germans than they have been to any other country example, NATO we in NATO. much were lot a Really the German question security; how would I think Eastern Europe, Warsaw, I you assess larger other lies at the heart of European the importance of NATO in it is very, very important. From my time having been accredited to do not think you can dealing Germanys is not a East Berlin well as as issue. confrontation in a The existence of the two strictly military sense, confrontation in a wider political security context. so paranoid about their security, they rely maintenance a cordon Over the years, part of because the they in my view, Germans are why it to all economic front, and reasons sanitaire I makes there will be come together think that, for it a for It has Germans. sense which includes on the Germany. growing tendency on the natural already seems to me human reasons, started that Canada to continue 227 East it Because the Soviets are of in underrate the importance which NATO has in respect of that East-West a for the German question? [CAMERON] is issues, East-West the Germans than to to closer the of members. [HILL] with On is one on the of the to press for a 000407 �Document disclosed under the Access to Injormation Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information combination of détente and defence. to my mind, continue extent that to we and the Soviet Union, infinitum. this confrontation ad for world the partly think, I because amicably, more way which will take into account Germany, and German mind, will remain the raison d'être the for of this in more concerns a and that, to continuation of the relations they have with their neighbours and allies, my the To United States and Western Europe, the and the Until that is resolved German problem. any sense, ameliorate the relations between Eastern Europe can will be better it It does not make NATO. Part IV Ottawa, - [HILL] were of 1968-74 Ambassador Cameron, then you returned 1968 External Affairs. of promoted to Director General Arms Control Affairs. in that It was later, A year Ottawa and I believe, the Bureau of Defence and of capacity, also served as Canada's representative on to appointed Head of the NATO and North American Division the Department you were in on I believe, that you the Permanent Joint Board Defense. [CAMERON] in the Yes, that position of being External Affairs on This is right. the first time that I was representative of the Department of the Board. is represented by two the was The Department of officers. is the There External Affairs official External Affairs member who, traditionally, has been the head of the Defense and Arms Control Bureau, acting Chairman interesting job. as one of the is usually [HILL] a of and when the Chairman is absent, the Canadian section the Board. two Secretaries in the Canadian section chairman is a A fairly junior in rank and acts The second office is more military officer The of he is the (the other from DND). political figure normally, as I understand. [CAMERON] Normally, appointed by the chairman the Government of of the Canadian section is the day and it has not always been 228 000408 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information political. it for quite the while. a Cabinet, a John Aird later took it (HILL] Thank helpful. On the ran for you for that the world for Trudeau foreign policy carried out policy and also cut its troop also reduced were the Defence White Defence White Paper, could tell us your views a levels period, in that period of the publication 1971 Canada was as of not was a Commons. think I 1968-74 were the is for of the when Canada policy in numbers. and - years concerned, in Europe. that certainly very were foreign has Liberal member of House these They series of reviews of a the it and he over a I'm referring to - far so plain, general. in was So clarification. general more important years for Canada and office in never the he that sense first I He was former Secretary distinguished public servant. political appointee in the Senate who McNaughton had General recently Arnold Heeney, when More always been political. NATO days, Arnold Heeney was the chairman. took over, of back to the early Going and defence The Armed Forces This was the also Foreign Policy for Canadians, and in of Paper was the previous issued. It was was in 1964. one the second main wonder if you I little bit about the whole review process and what are on that process and also results the on of the it that Canada wound up cutting its Forces in 1969, and what lay behind the White Paper, and what do process. you For think hindered example, how about was whether, Canada's on efforts to the whole, promote those moves international helped or peace and security. [CAMERON] Well, that guess. First of all, is I a big question: Canada's foreign policy was Prime Minister, Pierre Elliot Trudeau, views personal about the questions I of think it is true that the period was one where own number a Canadian recollection is that dominated who position he tended very much came by the new in with his very world. in the to think that My own Canada's foreign policy was influenced too much by our participation in NATO and other international organizations and terms of Canada's national interest. Certainly he was very I not oriented enough in think that influential in developing 229 was the his thesis. thesis, that 000409 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Canadian policy foreign national policy, should he held naturally were very influential. held by a our Privy Council and these views had dramatic impact a the development of the various papers that were being produced. there Now frivolously different of two sets were set of papers a of the same views were But, number of his advisers who worked in the at that time and in the PMO, on projection direct a domestic policy and the views that national our be papers, each for because booklets multi-coloured colour you pointed out. There was foreign policy which we used to refer to rather on as as Then world. the of area there was the had we a Defense White Paper which came much later after the defence review in When 1969. back came in Government the 1968 security and foreign policy questions. seminar which was held over in Hull, professors prominent of various people who were interested briefing, there and was a attending a I remember days, where a for one or two and universities various from number the in was other people interested "consulting" with academics and process of in I policy were given a discussion of various issues in foreign long by That was followed up including Canadian participation in NATO. the position Canada was taking in NATO and discussions regarding NATO. My recollection of the a series of inter-departmental discussions procedures actual is little a hazy. will clarify there From the relevant just As point of this interview I think it would be more give to I recall, my impressions of the way the review that was going on Defence took place very often in reviews that were going the bureau in National in foreign affairs, and this was very of. We did we were we in everything we could to try to bring the two together since Arms Department that the of was was positions a Defence. that our very the essentially National consistent with This were link between the two departments. Control were position difficult conscious The link, Bureau on the it and Defence of liaison the Consequently, adopted on scene separate compartment, away from a on the something the а that they am sure I are when particular papers went to Cabinet and when they - did not. developed. think I articles that have been written and number of the on was defence the with important side were foreign policy and vice versa. task and there were a number of 230 000410 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loí sur l'accès à l'information bureaucratic obstacles in the way. departments and personalities. between often played was There were the usual rivalries practice the key role In by the Privy Council Office, partly because of the dominant personality of the Prime Minister and partly because the views of National Defence and the views of External Affairs did not always coincide. consultation [HILL] addition, In My impression to not only he himself, power, is that or as much Prime Minister Trudeau when but also in, that he had around him or that he brought PCO was origins of this Can I ask you then one question about the whole process? came there should have been. there as think don't I some of the people for example from the other agencies, had certain pre-conceptions about the world that they wanted to feed into Canadian foreign policy. one of these pre-conceptions they were not particularly that was And in fact impressed with the utility of NATO from Canada's own point of view; that they wanted to move more towards a foreign policy based on Canada's own national self interest. want was, as and they did they wanted to could comment move on affairs. They did not like like the helpful-fixer not to some new kind of idea very much system. I I wonder if you think that my recollection is that he did come in with very definite clear-cut ideas policy to be, and to as I think that he also what he wanted thought that this policy should be less influenced by our role in the Alliance, we should be much more independent in the would reflect our national alliance. have On played in his a part but mandate that diplomatic the I missions in the world than am a helpful fixer, not sure that think he also role of valuable in terms of on I that sense our the abroad it believed a major element the outset of his foreign service and less, how were much our think that may I was at that policy interests and less the interests of the question of thinking. and this. [CAMERON] Yes, certainly. Canada's thing they did not they did not like this idea which had developed of Canada the helpful fixer in international NATO Another partly the role of shall we the say, informing the Government about what was going I think he did later on. 231 There is a good deal 000411 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information that evidence of service, and changed he view of about of embassies abroad. usefulness the point his foreign You may recal1 that shortly after he became Prime Minister he reportedly said that if carefully a having of goes privileged a government is thinking, world, in the on access what to of view and think he was participation in NATO. My cut-backs in the Alliance It may be at one time he wanted to recall having seen any evidence of of Prime Minister reduction and in to even the Cabinet for the - very much on his mind. I do not was all forces. our part But certainly there of be In other words had to point out that this was that it by from a was very a just I think question view. There were other members of the not a influential, who felt this way. which from same thing. we We rather naive view of the world and and proposals its forces the would be the good boys and this, very this unlikely that if we cut back that you could expect elements within the Government was did voluntary action on comparable parallel action by the Soviet Union. it and NATO good that they would want to do the so reduction, memorandum which argued that a we a elements instance where we were given one the Soviet Union to withdraw one-half of of very large We had to prepare papers forces our a also There were strongly opposed to this would be followed Czechoslovakia. would half the intention on the part entirely. complete withdrawal. and I can recall withdrew voluntarily, any different point that actual an for comment and for briefing notes Canada reported is remove get out which were very Cabinet as recollection notably the Minister of Defence, Cadieux. if a a particular a elements in the Cabinet that were sympathetic to were but it is particularly strong on the question of question of the It is not not just what it may be doing But, certainly he did come in with Canadian know about what to was in the press. I Guardian Manchester Which is beside the point. simply knowing what matter of matter really find all there in the world. on the and Times York New could you going was the read you had been of that to the Prime Minister in my Cabinet, by some National consultation with External Affairs would be 232 sympathetic of whom were Often it would turn out that developed minute by people in the Privy Council. were So, there were Defence changed at the in last Among the papers that would 000412 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information to the go Cabinet command the support of, Secretary of the might be there - State the for External Prime Minister's Office. the as you could and also views to a [HILL] the other difficulty, The net result I I mentioned you mean, how Ross of all of this was, papers produced by the PMO and they go? they were on presume I PCO they were wanting to diminish Canada's input to side; [CAMERON] Yes, own papers in addition came those to you from External. my recollection is that there were papers which were separately by the PMO/PCO, putting into them suggestions for change in the role of the Canadian Forces, Forces. be Campbell. mentioned where they were modifying what done would there think, in conveying the government's far did Did they have their NATO. but from the Privy Council and/or out Ambassador in NATO, But, themselves; Affairs imagine, a fair amount of confusion in the bureaucracy great our say, Minister of National Defence and say, another paper which would come would, which paper one the size of the Canadian These were papers which came out of the PMO/PCO, without consultation with anybody else. Obviously, [HILL] there inside the Government. the mean Government as the Cabinet, I And debate a this particular debate understand External vigorous was it, Affairs, and when DND and I which was say PCO and went all on inside Government, so on. I And it did not involve outsiders particularly at this stage. [CAMERON] No, it was merely inside [HILL] A say it was or a vigorous debate, I the Government. mean to the point where you might fight over the question of whether or not to maintain to cut Canadian troop levels in Europe. [CAMERON] Yes, my recollection is there was a vigorous debate, and I mentioned, I think, that there were elements in the Government certainly sympathetic to cutting. There were also strong elements opposed to cutting. One argument which was used which particularly by were the Department of External Affairs 233 was that one 000413 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information should not look at defence contribution purely in terms of our our contribution to the security of Europe, but we should also look at it in terms Community. relations our The question of with our members the on trade with Europe, the question indicate that allies and our they agreeable to were type the of change This view, which was borne out by facts later that we had in mind. apparently did not carry much weight with the Prime Minister. He did not think influenced by the fact that our of particularly if the nature of the consultation level of our Forces, on, European undoubtedly be seriously affected by any change in the would did not the of whole overall relationship with Britain and all our so of in Germany. Forces later Government as withdrawal was the view the when on man necessarily German Government would the that we cutting back the the size of were relationship think Trudeau realized the I that Chancellor he was was dealing with Schmidt Minister of Defence. who at I think he in the time the German of the eventually accepted propounded by External Affairs which at this reduction in NATO could have be the time was that serious impact on our relations a with the European Community, and with the individual members of the Community. [HILL] believe I beforehand there in NATO about the troop cut consultation of the decision a sort. decision. question of consultative procedures. striking for came very anybody who was in Europe at shortly after Czechoslovakia. was But some the nature of others, most upsetting to the than the discussion There decision itself, It was the itself, which was preliminary some was what the time was The Europeans rather was most that this especially had not yet recovered confidence after the traumatic experience of August, 1968. But that did not impress those in Canada who were interested in Canada making cuts. [CAMERON] Those points that External Cabinet I Affairs discussions, were put and I made, as forward. do not I recall, in the submissions in the think many officials were. As We were not present mentioned, this particular memorandum that we had to comment was on prepared by one Minister who had no responsibility for External 234 000414 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Affairs. We comment to our would Minister. of the The memorandum, I Cabinet meeting to reflected the assume, particular gentleman who thought by doing this that view of that it morning given the were be such positive a step in international of terms relations that the Soviet Union would withdraw an equivalent amount from Czechoslovakia. of the world. not place had just a I mean to us it suggested pretty naive view a did So I would guess that the discussion in Cabinet great deal of weight the fact that Czechoslovakia on invaded by Soviet forces. been consideration main The Europe, that we should point out to was that we should cut back in Europeans we had been there a long time, we had other heavy responsibilities in North America and we had to look after our own the backyard as [HILL] I well suppose This on, also Trudeau's Mr. on, which was well as sort a on his experiences in his youth and own and his travels to China and all that sort of thing. of thing appear in these discussions of that sort [CAMERON] No, raised. in the interest of intellectually, toward a broader world scene. at least partly based was so there. over there was development and Third World, looking out, do something as at so Did any that time? being I think that undoubtedly some of these experiences shaped that not later on important factor at the Trudeau's views and having been an time do at came out I recall - but such do not recall I time. points think that I that one of the rather dramatic developments was the extent to which a number, some of the Certainly allies, reportedly attempted some of the ambassadors to get in NATO us to reconsider. it; the Belgians were particularly upset about this. reports we received, it was a very emotional scene of National Defence when his Belgian colleague, eyes, [HILL] pleaded with Canada not That was after [CAMERON] Pretty well, about this, I am sure. I to do There Ross was for the Minister with tears in his announced? Campbell could not any 235 According to this. the decision had been mean about very upset were tell you more suggestion that we would 000415 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information reconsider. was [HILL] We made we decision and that our were looking towards the day when the Alliance also longer be necessary. no [CAMERON] That question that a decision. our would It was other In words, idea the détente. of everybody was talking nothing particularly novel, was with consistent about the twin pillars of deterrence and détente, and détente assumed more normal which at a relationship between Western Europe and Eastern Europe, future time might involve some the gradual disappearance of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. [HILL] think that I it even in Europe. no Even already talking about Canadians", a issue, cuts Canadians", of I us and Trudeau about it the into relations Ottawa; and a was you had in national interest broader analytical terms. terms How or was that that was troop the "Foreign Policy for kind of academic exercise functionalism in the study of a on. so of his people coming in the world. the in and Initially, with some high tide were "Foreign Policy for mix of a whatever, would you see kinds all this and universities involved in producing this document, which was not In and they Conference bit about a process. impression, was Security on, My impression had the international imported kind of you had Mr. large; and tell pre-conceptions with their by European a about that process. different somewhat Europeans had moved the if you could But I wonder is worth mentioning. point that a longer the immediate aftermath of Czechoslovakia, 1971 was is of people look at the but some "Foreign was world sort Policy of for Canadians"? First of all [CAMERON] functionalism, whole approach world in a new I would agree that there way of to our regions and papers that regions were very much in the nature doing, not so an overdose of looking at things incorporated in the review of foreign policy. the was of much as to where we were 236 were an It looked at the produced account going. in of what There was various we were not very 000416 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information much in new the way policy of multi-coloured booklets that that no there States The was mildly, booklets described Asia, in Europe, and the recall, in Cabinet reason States United a affairs. So out are what reflected but our were we to the fact foreign policy. our nothing about the United States. way Third a in As I Because our relations with the indirectly our influence region, especially Latin America, they international an Sharp's choice It set about an increasing dependence by misinterpreted was away Option was the from treated was change towards ever intended the as an indication States in favour and even intended. was It States. I was the do not in any should we of result of the a press, that United the United arose as the in which on many United had a distorted notion as to what personally think it Option, Third the of lot of misunderstanding attitude signed by Mitchell article, relations with the United States in terms of Mr. think our for of External Affairs at the time. Minister turning I academics the notable were all-pervasive and so concern Europe. the and for it was that they could not get any agreement economically, States that was Options. Three papers doing in Latin America, were we they, ended by having approach our the critical aspect of our whole approach to represent who of rather key area of a relations with almost every Sharp, out came to how to proceed. as any booklet dealing with relations with the United to put it - in way more a reflection of the philosophy of people like Walter Gordon and the Liberal thinkers who were concerned about the degree of US control of Canadian industry and US concern that we should be investment; there multilateral more economic and trade increase our trade relations with Europe. Sharp was issues misunderstood. and that But to to my do in so our we This mind in was, it a sense, a approach to should try to article by Mr. was yet another indication of the extent to which security policy, foreign policy, and economic policy the security area, were we not treated as proceeded to being inter-related. justify a reduction of In our contribution to NATO, and in the foreign trade policy area we were talking about expanding our relations with Europe. [HILL]The article on Canada-US relations also 237 came just after 000417 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information the Connally affair? [CAMERON] I exercise, at case think least fitting of that the White foreign policy exercise, was very much a would I the with in with agree the you of trends functional look at our foreign policy. were not travelogue if you way of want to be sarcastic There follow. [CAMERON] on It was of more about it. There world a not was No. [CAMERON] Well, the papers. he was He was Department and Langevin Block and, There were no tracks laid down that you justified doing anything. The person you should have an interview with I remember. [HILL] the almost is Geoff Murray, that It really much in there to guide officials in not was the Department afterwards. had to a policy and in the way of policy. new having it that was new. very much in [HILL} in the of But in fact the papers that prepared did not contain very much certainly day, the Paper do you writing most of material by various sections of the man, he had the task of given the raw Geoff put of the remember, with piles of cups of coffee. Hе old I know him? was off in a corner had to grind out this stuff and turn it back to the various bureaus to see it would wash. if But he was on [HILL] could turn also to published in 1971. Canadians," and he it. went to work We given the raw material and in It a came "Defence in the 1970s," which out just way I think you after can was "Foreign Policy for find, shall we say, the philosophic justification for it in "Foreign Policy for Canadians." But in 1969 the head a way, also, the origins of troop cut decision. 70s" was i.e. first, now that NATO it In a way, they stood the having "Defence in the 70s" originally, what old happened in are "Defence order of priorities in the 1964 in the on White Paper, in its been slipped down to third. 238 000418 �Document disclosed underthe Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [CAMERON] And then former Prime Minister {HILL] something about that Could you tell us very angry. Pearson was process, you as it, of the preparation of the Defence White Paper, particularly saw with regards to Canada's role in NATO? [CAMERON] Well, think it I was It was NATO, to largely by written Gordon Smith, for of National Defence at the External to do who is man now who was largely had been had already Government to America, out carry taken, priority so It there was number actions the not was of course the a that great the deal of more about what would we one, the North defence of be the mobile forces they had talked about that kind of thing. As I recall, the United States were or statement, by determined debate about essential issues. doing Minister pretty good a pretty good consultation with External Affairs. policy the especially from He was brought in By and large there Ambassador our was their on looking at it from a bureaucratic viewpoint, consultative process, and a Donald Macdonald time. work. the decisions the and it stood the priorities that had been taken earlier; head. justification for a somewhat mystified too, as to what the in 1969 the Paper would mean White real terms, especially with respect to North American defence. were cutting back Europe in and said we doing were it in We partly because we wanted to devote more to the defence of Canada and North America. the At same time, I think the consultative process went reasonably well, than at the time prepared mainly version of of the in the the other hair out force Department paper of the proposals seemed to of the senior NATO it on, was certainly much reductions. of Defence, better study The whereas the was final originated principally in PCO and some develop out of thin air. I recall some people in National Defence were almost tearing their by their roots when they were faced with ideas that emanated from the PCO at the time [HILL] inter-departmental of some of the wild the 1969 Paper. The White Paper did maintain the NATO commitment although third in the order of the NATO Commitment priority. virtually 239 In practice, re-emerged as as time went number one 000419 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information priority, because that [CAMERON] I of 1969 to we come that Canada staying in NATO Europe. was but reasons we Ottawa, who had many ambassadors here in in and say what does all this mean. would various allies, our put. money was where the this, that in terms of explaining this decision say can was staying were out cutting back for We were Europe. in point We had to That was the the most important point. [HILL} In practice prominent one in terms of commitment NATO the remained as practical defence objectives. Would you that? agree with [CAMERON] There were quite a lot of new things they were buying for but not North American air defence, there But were expenses as a result of that decision. in North America that considerable. were My recollection is that there was nothing dramatically new, things that were acquired, defence. American to underline this new It was apparent, years, that the Government was not about capital expenditures Government the is think, and facing today. It takes during that period. [HILL] position presumably involved your going in the over between NATO to consultations they is that make up the neglect In North in the following ten and defence for on really serious about doing much down; establishment run defence I emphasis or new one and headquarters over there on of the whole problems the enormous an 1968 let you 1974 periodically behalf of to amount were and Canada. I wonder what sort of reaction you felt Canada got from these changes in policy and how did it affect Canada's role in NAТО? [CAMERON] There used to be a joke going around that necessarily reflect accurately the view, at the time as a was it - - it does not but rather the atmosphere that the Canadian decision was regarded by the Allies on (1969 carpet. No, little dog coming in from outside with a party going NATO's was not twentieth anniversary) and peeing popular. Cut-backs are never on the popular in this kind of 240 000420 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information organization, that it but more this, this is it them what recollection is boys. we the wanted to ambassador, Ross out to extent, some At the other objectives on negotiations, assist from them about man was some time Canada was Security and Cooperation talks and moving forward. 1970 up forward in quite a Canada's input, at remarkable that our capability able very Europe when way. into was the MBFR trying to in that whole phase these What and Canada Particularly time, impact. an in on. so 1973-74, to My on our voice extent by the spot, do. to attempting to promote the example, in much, we want very pursuing through NATO various for SALT political and impact an to have like, the The Government intended the on but it was bound same me I think that offset the negative fall Campbell. [HILL] Conference the of and do decision did have that the talent It was to seems Consultation pretty well amounted to in NATO and I think it was offset to and it it on to try and ameliorate the implications of this decision. economic telling lot a look back you badly by the Government. handled very was could have done to do think if I was things feeling about your Alliance moving were consultation on détente-oriented issues? [CAMERON] Well, think the effectiveness I of our contribution to Alliance discussions of these issues has been determined very much by the my quality of what we have to say. view, between the kind of reaction that bring something up at the ministerial difference, in might get when you when are There is you level. a But you dealing with the so-called "professionals" and discussing complex questions such as MBFR or SALT, what is important is not so much whether you recently cut back part of your Forces but whether you homework, whether you have thought new ideas, which might assist, for example, in East-West negotiations. If you have done take SALT your as an organization, available, I example, and the I size think, considering of the limited think we contributed quite a bit to If you compare us out the size amount NATO of of our talent discussions. with other countries involved, for example, with the MBFR talks in Vienna (and you probably know 241 more about this 000421 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information than most three or were one people do), recollection there that is were about four countries that would really do their of them. of the delegations would often go to The with meetings these my rest very We homework. instructions or is on some issues like CSCE, Canada was little the in of way considered advice. [HILL] quite do recall What I a strong force for pushing continually forward. and for getting the Americans involved. [CAMERON] ... [HILL] Well, because in that actually the Americans, period, fluctuated a great deal. Americans were not As a as did the British fact, the matter of in CSCE. very interested [CAMERON] That is right. governments think the at Whereas time, and Government I I was they changed and forth because think, if pro-CSCE, I am but not the mistaken, I Conservatives think Canada continually went down one direct think the constant reiteration of the Canadian position line. I had an impact. [CAMERON] that Labour not. were switched back The British [HILL] I affects the is think it people at a political impact in the the top at the that it but I do sense ministerial level, When you not think it has very much impact farther down the line. are dealing with this kind of issue, which is much more technical, longstanding, and the various delegations on officials value the basis of their grasp how many new ideas they may have. to explain these contribution the ideas. I think the of of the issues and Also important is that we the continued to ability have an impact on issues partly because of the quality of the work that was done by the people in Ottawa involved, particularly the [HILL] and in the missions that were NATO one. In your assessment, did membership in NATO enable Canada 242 000422 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information to pursue its goal international of provide good opportunities [CAMERON] changed, and yes, Oh think I much very say, as you that in for Canada to in the list of priorities. Yes, addition to the work is done through on SALT in NATO, that conferences such as MBFR and SALT, and discussions and fact in other ways, Alliance played a only with the not think I European Western European countries. because we much in talking to more You sometimes if us do expressed the impact elsewhere, or on the with the also in talking to interested not in relations, our but so, us be interested very They would like to know major East-West issues. there that - are think I remained we countries Swedes. on are think not that They would were we our views credibility and Nations They member of NATO. a about what [HILL] the important part in terms of very Eastern are had been it though even Did it this objective? pursue think, I so security? and peace any is NATO diminishes that Canada in sense the view moral Canada's might have in the - United the broader issues of international peace and security? [CAMERON] me would say I believe, to evidence. It that quite a good come we would say, that of view is not supported by Joe Clark made recently in Vancouver. speech, mostly meeting a experience would lead contrary. He I was was in Brussels the interested to read about the Arctic, but there a It was a going after the NDP for arguing should get out of NATO, and he from my the bit at the end about NATO. that I that point is quite speech last night was no. was with saying that he had just the ministers they where discussed with George Schultz and others what is going on in Geneva at the Soviet-US have influence, any known. impact disarmament negotiations. was an opportunity to make our views arguing in effect that if you want to have any world peace and stability, you have a better chance of He on here To the extent that we was having some impact if you are able to get your views across to people that are and make some directly involved, than you do if you the sit outside pious statement about the necessity of doing this or 243 000423 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information that. yourself divorce somehow do not think we should be to be think I by being in is better served interest make does not it such sense to I me. because the national is being out. than move a just because we member of the Alliance a Alliance. in the that and allies your from would be in the Canadian interest, like I think this idea that you guess I would share that view. I That is my view. responsibility, peacekeeping. that other countries willing or to dealt less were because Canada [CAMERON] Not at all, and I was involved to deal Poland, We think, I had when in the Sinai. Dextraze, General daily. almost 1971, with certainly did for do not feel scene a tense they put the not a bit in the negotiations had we I member of NATO. with an Eastern remember I used to have Chief of the Defence Staff, the fairly a to negotiate the agreement, NATO and UN the the broader on was led to the first joint arrangement European country, but example, they were not any less willing to Canada into account, that in for NATO, willing to look towards Canada, less Canadian views into account take only not with you also had the it from what you say that you in peacekeeping, for take being issues take I responsibilities, some or security for also position in Ottawa in that time, In your [HILL] period, Forces UN that in the in was Sinai. 1970 We had and the fact that we were way of us participating. stand in the a or member of I think it is wishful thinking from those who favour getting out of NATO to that say that the time in 1956, Nasser to leave is an it was Egyptian population would uniforms But I "Well, were and UN the if that kind think if you look back at the not partly because Nasser felt that the be able to distinguish between the Canadian uniforms because that kind of situation should be used to would be better out of NATO and we would we the Canadian identical to the Brits who had just invaded Egypt. do not think we I when the Canadian Forces were asked by President Egypt, British uniforms obstacle. were like Sweden or do say, better with Finland". The facts do not support of argument. 244 000424 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [HILL] in the same almost was will go We period. While you were in Ottawa from and took up his position at US behave towards presidency? the point in time when the This was getting disentangled from Vietnam. of [CAMERON] in NATO would How was first Nixon the US I on. so 1969. thinking was you assess the in NAТО? interest I elected at the there up until the Watergate period and were that he beginning of the wondering how did the amount 1968-1974, this and then he was election campaign, end of the year, of but still position just at the time You took up your running the Then you rather different field now, a exactly coterminous with the Nixon Presidency in the United States. was on to think that Kissinger's view of relations the between the United States and the Soviet Union had'a significant impact and very much affected the whole outlook of the United States and its allies at in the early days of the Nixon presidency were very positive ones in terms the of time. As I discussions recall, on the initiatives that had 1972. and negotiations not only on arms control, and alleviate American the it front had in period when there was a There in was was in discussions an Vietnam. effort to try On a time you same the change North in the gradual diminution a beginning of a slowdown in the worry about the bomber threat and the beginning of of but problem they concept of North American defence. or the At deliberate US effort to involve the Soviets a taken You had the first strategic weapons. SALT Agreement and the ABM Treaty in were US and concern North Consequently, in terms about the missile. American defence there good deal of uncertainty in the Canadian mind about where the United States was going of air in terms of the United States' to which it was defence. really tearing the other hand there be done it. a think that Canada was I conscious difficult position in Vietnam, and the extent On about was at the guts of were those Kissinger of a lot of Americans. who felt that something could course had a dramatic role in trying to bring about a final ending, which I guess really amounted to a US defeat, certainly was a although it very sad was never ending to 245 a portrayed in that way. It chapter in their history. 000425 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information They sort of managed to save face by the troop withdrawal [HILL] the process and [CAMERON] had fire of cease that Ambassador to Canada said, dinner he just particular period in personal terms. I remember that just been told Well, going to Yugoslavia. dinner for a we dessert, the in was make you NATO, in terms of terms of Nixon because giving the was of the period. Watergate the Presidency, Nixon first in terms of the So, 1969 to dealing with dealing with the Soviet Union and so on, dealing with Canada and North American defence and impression is that the assessment you would make is my on", the television set in terms of dealing with Vietnam, 1972 on, Yugoslav The and halfway through the me turn I resignation. that that assessment had to announcement of his [HILL] was I "Do you mind if got we as '73. and in so on, positive a one. [CAMERON] was That such could just add to that that Kissinger intellect that he tended to be somewhat is right. powerful a I arrogant in his personal relations. meeting, ministerial meeting, some of and which spent he are I of most pretty boring, attending a NATO the first part of the recall can as you know, reading the newspaper; then when it got around to his time to speak he did give a brilliant tour d'horizon of US interests, finished, he got up and left. anyone else had to say. in the sense of the So he He did not was not and then after he had even bother to hear what popular Secretary of a friendly, jovial American. preoccupied with Kissinger and his own He was very, State very, view of the world. presidency starting 1973, by then the US had largely disentangled If one goes then to the second Nixon [HILL] at the beginning of Vietnam. itself from better East-West interpretations with it relations. I starting was I think have heard of what is that what the US relations Now to there move are on promoting two different happened in early 1973. One doing was laying the ground work for better basis for good a and NATO as Europeans was the 246 000426 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information consultations which would then lead into better relations with the Soviets. Another interpretation is that Nixon and Kissinger were off in pursuit of quite prepared New go over to wondered if The Agreement example, was in seen Order, and World some heads the the the latter Nuclear There way. allies. other Prevention of the on of do this they were to for War, prior no was I consultation whatsoever on that, it was just announced to the other allies. [CAMERON] view. think I I do not consultation problem Kissinger always had that with the allies, Germans. the indications that the West I but Germans take account into a German interests. German Chancellor to make year. I twice or you will during that period three times a year. If see this The waves. concern it is were was more good a many the that a two agreement which would If you sort of German followed traditional for the Chancellor look you at usually develops when the has too good relations with the then the concern that there will the be history of NATO the Soviets will get out of Cuba, US of in superpower gets Soviet Union. sort a a probably went developing periodically concern too cozy, world"; in terms visit to Washington at least once a think probably some period to much so very nervous were post-war politics you would recall one world of sort think it I there think big boys would get together and work out not that know whether you can relate it from with all that? How would you assess but my impression is the problem was not the next, of is my understanding. That There is "divide up the will not help the Cubans anymore, and would not necessarily benefit the Europeans, but it will be to the the United States will do benefit of their overall world became à and may period major have than view. I something in Europe, do not know that issue but I think it was always in been perhaps more in the first. I in the think if the which this ever background, background in the there evidence was second of a deliberate US effort to improve relations with the West Europeans, it was, in a sense, an attempt to ameliorate or to lessen their nervousness, particularly in the case of the Germans as to what they might be doing with the Soviets. There was always the worry that the two big guys might have similar problems with their little 247 000427 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information if guys; try to look at you help the with problems Romanians. other the simplistic terms, in it big Greeks, that superpowers presidency little a together. get their was always talking bit opening playing about the time was that if one to Chinese, Japanese, [CAMERON] I the part think pinpoint I can [HILL] At that may there on China. during card. two Nixon the Kissinger think I the when place was The US assumption at suggest they would be confronted any of something of that about it? some one been have of members bit a NATO. of excessive But I do not event in particular. point Kissinger called for a New Atlantic Charter and also the Year of Europe, [CAMERON] That big balloon. [HILL] The US it my North Atlantic alliance. So you think there was nervousness have wanted to get the Soviets really worried, (HILL] think I but there is always the takes the China the most effective way would be to a well, initiative Another big fellow may problems with the your on, it of saying, have you and You do not know that goes suspicion by by fellow one was a talking in terms of was in early 1973. if you remember, a united Europe as though already existed--and if they could only get their act together then they would nicely fit into Kissinger's scheme of things. [CAMERON] I do not recall that too Year of Europe came of it, was just sounded good, [HILL] I a but I am a grand I this anything ever fiasco. I do not think publicity stunt more than anything. do not think anything ever I think this session think he put this idea forward, up with US it. Then, foreign policy. I think That that Watergate was started out 248 was on mean it so Kissinger at on the but then really embraced it in quite the terms he wanted, I developed. struck very much about your comment the NATO Council meeting. Europe. clearly, but I do recall Year nobody of else then he got fed very important for already in the summer of '73. 000428 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Was that of period felt in that Watergate very early [CAMERON] Yes, you sense the impact do you recall? on, that, extent to the Did in Ottawa? you know, the and here press television were forever reporting on what was going on south of the border, reporting on these hearings deal of about unease damaging; thought The it confirmed it had situation, the the Western Alliance. a really on Watergate. affected the leader of it as evidence that was coming suspicions, but of lot that gone far. good There was a And out I it was guess, pretty no one undermined the break US Administration's credibility, inevitably. [HILL] impression your it Was policy-making? absorbed with it? [CAMERON] At my level, There always this in White happening would the I cannot sort Did recall it had much of of background and House a it? concern what did if there were and who would take over. The they provide for what would happen, put it they get absorbed with Did increasingly was that the future it on get Nixon impact. an about what was mean, and how all impeachment, an disarray in the Administration was really not unlike the feeling around here a few months ago, things looked pretty bad in the White House when they fired all their people; But how much of unease. [HILL] of there an was something of impact it had I the same and kind do not recall. While you were in this position in Ottawa, there were the 1973 energy crisis and the Middle East War. Now, that was a pretty traumatic experience for NATO. What was your impression of allied relationships in that period? There seemed to be quite shipments of supplies to Israel, acrimony over US [CAMERON] The one has been the issue that took subject of whether the of some US air as so lot of on. place during that period which discussion recently, defence, and a well as SAC was forces, the question were put on alert in connection with their efforts to dramatize the seriousness of the situation, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. 249 My recollection is 000429 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information little a misunderstanding required it but vague, as to as what extent put their higher state of alert at East Middle obligation we were their part on Soviet time. the just informed. to move our a the well, there was an mix-up, jointly with Polish forces between as a major thing. We were peace-keeping arrangement for the military Canadian a in Chief of Defence staff, and not closely with We worked around there was also some But also involved in negotiation of devising on consult us about that decision whereas to informing the government; but that was not in under NORAD monkey remember I If informing our military branch, Middle East. forces by way of underlining the seriousness with they would view any which they think I Canada. Strategic Air Command and their air defence a some the Americans did and to what with consultation been had there recall I National the UN Defence and which would contribution work It was the force. first time an Eastern European country had sent peacekeeping forces and it reasonably well. Western up took of the an experiment. I for peace-keeping, country had engaged in such of lot a our time can recall about that of compare Canadian it like that, time joint operation. did we are by the two that So way a of our things that not as dramatic events. there dissension in Cuban missile crisis lot of trouble over that was much more - that period. If you Canada and the United issue. But 1973 was not dissension between the Europeans and Americans. [CAMERON] back to also, there, Yes, mind the heavy, And a American - the to States were in the though country Pact first the was But those period, Warsaw out My recollection of that is that there was not much in the [HILL} way a it worked it think in terms of what contribution to the settlement. I UN only unusual for a It was not provide troops to of bit a was part as or I was is the going to the other say, extent to which the extreme dependence of the as I later recall, I cannot that it brings energy crisis dramatized Europeans on the Middle East. remember whether during the hostage operation, get involved militarily. thing The British, I it took place their reluctance to think, were willing to do 250 000430 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information something. I to sending one think of at point one our gave thought some destroyers from the Atlantic squadrons to go our down into the Gulf if we asked to do were [HILL] I have another wonder how many Canadians really 1973 analyzing were in period. depth I what what his thinking was. was, Canadian ability to the assess so. point about this early Kissinger was doing, what his policy How would you officials perceive the what United States is doing? [CAMERON] that assume made I point at that I these groups looking at the Soviet Union, have all said that everything about the United States. know almost we meeting. recent a but we We think we I should spend more time assessing developments in the United States. I Washington and the thing that always impressed was four years in me they how was complex; there ever are to came decision. any system Their is so many pressure groups and points of view that so by the time they eventually get a decision, it is almost impossible to change it. going remember I consultation, which is people by saying how notes meeting a need we to have more who was I Our heart would recommend be is the in that we NATO once used to bore consultation place, right the you to admit first do. that but should You NATO. "I know a the way of consultation; we I in on then Secretary of State. aside he said to his NATO colleagues: lot of you feel that we should do more in and in Canadian preoccupation; a And at the meeting was Dean Rusk, Putting his to should consult tell you what more. would I instruct your Ambassador in Washington to keep his officers reading everything there is in the about papers soon of they as interest what is going the see something in the Washington to your until it about changing make their our I they country, gets farther 'inconcrete'." pitch. of should view. there into State the It is nothing we becomes, television, 251 as can do they say, understand how the Because we have all these on as Post for example is go do not think many Canadians have all the stuff And Because if you leave it too long ladder, up the point American system works. we in Washington. in Department and there, US, on reporters down we think we know all 000431 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information is to know about the there States. United analysis of what they do in Washington, Because we have so much less. not North Americans, as tend we think how they and more things, run we are placed to act we are well mediator between the US and with the Europeans. a need we information and because think that to I The Europeans be almost over-confident about how well we understand the Americans; nobody "Thanks, say And because we need do do affects us. [CAMERON] know am I Government is that we next door that not sure seems support us to own to the United States, we are really wise in doing what I in Washington it, and around turn It is of altruism. self interest, precisely because that is a and what say Americans they doing. is cannot The effort concerted to it is pretty do that If we do that influence pressure groups in Congress. hard for to our Ambassador to tend mislead ourselves very often. not in present this think to know that, live we because I think I Canadians thanks."" no them better. else knows [HILL] but here in Ottawa. [HILL] Just one How would you quick last question on the NATO, generally like the CSCE, and effective do you think How like that. that the NATO consultations assess on. so on period. things on they were? [CAMERON] On CSCE? [HILL] On things I guess Whatever going was on at that period. [CAMERON] would I say it depending on what stage you are at. tears listening to these things, people and ministers to focus "Take it away, on there are too many down to If it or comprehend clearly, comes and a varies it is I time to time, people get bored to Sometimes difficult to get senior things like MBFR. They just say, figures here, it's too complex". political issue, then from that would say, they can understand yes, there is probably 252 000432 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information good consultation often with those issues, people, senior the higher at is on try to to including level that. Under-Secretaries, intentioned they may be. You to deal with things, guess it has varied countries feel I so only the issues that are have many so however lot. a the on INF If the member important enough to have a real Part V - Five. think what I That was Bulgaria. I There was really good I would like to do now is to go when you were Ambassador to Yugoslavia, think that from was 1974 to in NATо consultation there. Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria, Ambassador to [HILL] I was the the special consultative group on negotiations. well- hours in the day impact, there probably will be fairly good consultation. Canadian representative problem the meaningful for the it make But 1974-77 Part Romania and except 1977, to on that in Romania it ended in 1976. [CAMERON] They got a [HILL] if wonder I new Embassy, you a new could tell Ambassador. us briefly about main your impressions of that period particularly in terms of the differences of viewpoint in those different countries? think the policies of the one is completely Western Also, how astute do you allies towards are those countries? [CAMERON] Well, its own each brand of Communism, involving They also consider themselves world. Tito was one a world different. a Yugoslavia has degree of self-management. leader, in the non-aligned founders of the Non-aligned Movement, of the They are very proud of their independence, they have good relations with virtually all, and they place tremendous importance on that. both the Western countries not all of in part them. to They have remind the and most a was very active foreign world Yugoslav Ambassador spoke to of the Eastern countries, of Yugoslavia's our CIIA group a policy, designed existence. The few months ago. Hе interesting but we could not stop him talking, 253 but to the point 000433 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information people had to leave because several where it late. getting was They are vocal, articulate, intelligent people of different ethnic backgrounds and considering their size they play a pretty important role on foreign policy the on the world scene. They mirrors. have allowed to sort of Romania appears but scene, agreement with the an dance the stage on are have different a outlook they speak country, Latin a Soviets Communist system to keep independent. a go Bulgaria is different language, Bulgarians are on statue of the uncle of George Ignatieff, the way to impression that they loyal ally, very pro-Russian; very, on they Romania does classic example of the their language is very similar, the statue Minister at the time the dependent on the through its territory a others. of So that reinforces the certainly under Zhivkov. the are Ceausescu's crowd in power. allow Soviet forces to exercises in Bulgaria. are that they from most have a different background but they are very much not and independently little bit a smoke more with the exception of East Germany. Eastern Europe, They is police state that exists in the in return for keeping the toughest Romanians think it I independent actor an as their main square is who the Foreign was They are they were liberated from the Turks. very conscious of the Russian role in liberating them from Turkish domination, which is still remembered a West apply, very relevant. Romania, in their history. point crucial would I look say the the on CSCE As as visit to of hour an would I the an useful from my the farewell our point of issue of call families who relatives we avenue on in Canada. through about to to is CSCE some which month have at This CSCE. to the extent they can going to call on the a once and include least was a a quarter particularly view, because we could legitimately raise family reunification. the Romanian President. were and When I was would always problems related on the sensitive go down there Bulgarians; attach Yugoslavia, parley with the Western countries. Romanians, we as policies of the the to how importance like Countries of the world in that part not allowed to leave In I gave him a list of Romania to join their He did not take offense at this, is intrusion in their national affairs. remember I fact, or say this Romanians accepted this 254 000434 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information part of their responsibility under the CSCE Final Act; as like it but they accepted it. not of relationship with our course main our interest was fair amount of trade and quite We had a was those countries. of source That they did one positive feature In Canada's of case Yugoslavia at that time. a few visitors from Canada. The Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Whelan, visited us in his official capacity and toured in Yugoslavia, farms Romania and Bulgaria. policies vary from state to state, but I think they have been intelligent in the sense that they have tried to maintain a Western dialogue with these countries which Bulgaria or Yugoslavia may of help to promote a in the even small of cases independence. degree of is different. course [HILL] After you finished serving in those countries, you to went U.B.C. for question on that period. in Eastern Europe and year. a just I between That was wanted one I particularly interested was role that played by was our their response to this effort to efforts of general in happen feeling [HILL] as extent to which measure of détente and embassies in those countries and bring result of a In of West and East together. martial some law in 1980 in of my time that some having a assess in and agreements I think on CSCE and the there almost We was until a the Poland. dealings with Eastern Europeans in the IPU, I have detected what increase over time in their Would you the SALT optimism, considerable Inter-parliamentary Union, some over a the the superpowers to get together. imposition of be your career pretty optimistic about what might happen on MBFR, and what would the phase of one second there was a genuine effort made to produce were you ask preparing yourself for the next period. [CAMERON] the to in 1977, phase. Were there any major in that period about that service, as you the reflections that you had were Romania I believe to leeway for independent action. East European countries have progressed little bit freedom of manoeuvre it varies from country to country. The East more vis-à-vis the Soviet Union? [CAMERON] Yes, but 255 000435 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Germans are one when was in I I used to go to Berlin about example. They Warsaw. are the stiff most Germans. the of They are the old Prussians and very regimented by nature, because they have this kind of régime. never let they really about anything. in interest It varies lot a from surprised at the But I was they had But of these questions of country to country. control and arms Such degree a the not was partly result a of change a dealing with its allies. have incorporate to they some Gorbachev's of going to have are in the Union's manner real in their ideas problems, especially own of going to they try if that sense with Any change I think that several allies are problem with Gorbachev real a the Soviet of of on. so case Bulgaria partly because of the way the Bulgarians are. was just not their hair down and told you what extent to which they thought month a once countries they go too if far. [HILL] gather that Pravda has been banned in the GDR. I It's too left wing. try to put yourself position, [CAMERON] You you cannot help sympathizing with the East Germans. In East Berlin they all have television know if you they call it the capital sets, of the DDR, they tried to stop them from getting television sets while by making it illegal but of course that did not watches the East German television, of through channels difficult diplomats they put out com it - was on among standards Berlin. I more they West right were German up in West and television. against Cadillacs, Berlin, it on So flesh the pot you name plus all this 256 it, flood they is the of Thursday going to be watching the latest do not know if you have been there Mercedes some difficult to get officials to go out Because shown jokes in East Berlin problem of trying to create a society with rigid, stores that, on sometimes And they watch, Berlin. West you get these - Why? night. are Nobody they need to do is switch the dial and get all the European and all and work. for a except maybe for the odd bit It is the most boring kind of crap news. sit and in their have US this socialist morals of Europe, recently, West but there luxury goods in the of information. The 000436 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Germans East country just trying are establish, to for them, it is almost an information flowing the Part VI state Communist in They have a real problem. about 200 miles wide. all the time cracking down are a this and that; on a They is difficult it impossible task they have in controlling from West Germany. Ambassador to Poland and the German Democratic Republic, - 1978-80 [HILL] interview, I the GDR. I think that I would once, had been I I is Part 6 of the in Poland and the a little bit with Ambassador as like to continue spent two weeks in in West fundamentally that was there was prior to that GDR nicely to what very us your period is which and GDR, leads This people and impression of the Berlin and my the conference a remain there German nationalists or Germans, and that nationalism is still an important there, feature to have sunk really that the GDR period when and relations right my impressions for what now, development during or they are worth, they are pretty superficial, because you do not there three from talking bit Now this may be but how would you assess the intra-German to me, the you were there? [CAMERON] Well, by being not seem, really deep roots in the population. just a surface impression, of régime did the Marxist to or four days people who once are a learn all month. there and again more But that much you learn a permanently. My impression is that they are all Germans, they are very proud of the fact that they are They Germans. are also proud of they had built up their own country without any help The country was stripped are or they are number now one number a lot from outside. in not number two one, the Warsaw most efficient, best producer of goods and services. the Soviets with fact that by the Soviets and it has now become, they proud of the fact that they are number three, the of highly Pact, as the They provide specialized items; they have the famous old German optical firms, highly technical things, they have industrialized the country which area before. Now it is the was most 257 essentially polluted, the an agricultural dirtiest place I 000437 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information pollution. have ever been in terms of air You hold kind of in East Berlin, not are smoke stacks to just terrible. it is your nose, industries German Ohio Valley the door to next living It would be like in East Germany. be That is down where the but farther south. There is the they Germans. On ambivalence in the nationalists and therefore they one hand Germany see are German a as а problem, but on the other hand there is a whole new generation that have been brought up who that they organized and they was, country. kinds of benefits Germans but are world. in the On own separated from the they themselves and West Germany. have Evidence of the of their youth programme is that their athletes success their have They also believe their youth has certain available in not they wave My impression Germany. that fact the separated, they It is degree of prosperity. one of part of Germany; they have done it other a proud more are is not I do that the younger people among the sense is reunification with West future Everything infants. from in the way It starts attention is given to their youth. much think there is any of the athletes, their treat East Germans. are the coin side of the other number are they have this repressive regime. But it is the one country in the East Bloc where system, the been made brought of which So I up to work. in the new own stake are the all you have in the also more but Germans, a young and lot, people for being system. of the links between East more a people huge bureaucracy all maintenance they have also relaxed East for addition to tradition, There do not know. travel In their have and West Germany; to Communist system, actually has this Marxist/Leninist, not with respect the from West. Commercial links between the two Germanies are very important. of the an reasons entry into has been a why East Germany has done the big factor because a to [HILL] might briefly touch East [CAMERON] This is great well is because it has Common Market through West Germany; closely tied We so a depth because German lot all the West it German certainly firms are counterparts. on your period which I of of One the period would like to have interesting, 258 in Poland. explored in fascinating things 000438 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information going there. on [HILL] 1980. did period in Poland and East Germany was from 1978 to Your Solidarity being felt already at this time in Poland or Was that time. other some come The Solidarity was the early '80s, was [CAMERON] Solidarity had not even heard left. about Walesa developing on the there years; attempted a more part realistic footing. effect of example, the of supply. how much and in they been meat, average 1976 In no there was a one even real mood 1976 when the a theology there have of had, is no such inflation. from The back, way a whole Pole could Canadian. go Meat lot of things, that, Poles up hate the Gdansk. When Speaker summer of we there I was equally cheap but in short I've all over the place their Parliament. are more going to try I 1980 forgotten by and they cracked than the was some cockeyed in terms of managing their economy. including to the Poles. and a lot Canadian of this were So money projects, pulp rest lending One lot of of the characters around on me: the "This economic reforms". that you had proportion of the budget going into subsidies. seventies, the banks a remember calling I introduce and because remember him telling Well the net effect of their policies the was They are really tough leaving in for was hate the Soviets Soviets. bus the bus for the equivalent of the reasons there was trouble in the north people a on they raised the price of meat they had strikes so down and they shot workers up in the shipyards in the north. the few Government they subsidized the cost of basic commodities, two cents one or and You have to go back In Communist has bread, milk, fares, But started They do not accept the idea this situation where been workers. of the of surge action to put the economy on what you might call thing as inflation. net we upward it not? strikes in Poland were to take when great an enormous The whole thing was On top of that during large amounts at low rates, they had an enormous build-up of debts going and to paper big for projects example, including some huge amounts of money. 259 000439 �Document disclosed underthe Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Rapid industrialization. [HILL] industrialization, [CAMERON] Rapid is again which the of one objectives of these regimes; to be industrialized, that is the wave used to export grain. here, over Speaker we could talking was Now have people coming we to really make this place and me, summer to institute some reforms, going raise to the prices would not have to spend said they were going of that going to do it [institute reforms] and we are because the fares went up the trams, they from the way they did it The Speaker said "We are Anyway, there was a not They tried big outcry a but the tram drivers also strike by the tram drivers in by itself was not very serious, but on top of that it Lublin which spread. that so only did they have Not strike. were region-by-region basis, on a it out first around Lublin. went on that they going to do it in the summer". on the When money paying for subsidies; and he differently it could we they intended that these things of "If go". what he meant was some so much to do saying in 1976, when the last riots took place. all at once, from the Wheat looking at this country and saying Board in Canada and take They Poland used to be the bread basket of Europe. of the future. Because I happen everywhere and government had a the Poles got word that the prices were guess minor crisis on this going its hands; to going was to So the go up. top of that, Poland on left about July, but the Vistula had just about overflowed its banks by then; there had was a miserable summer. It rained and rained; we flooding and dark clouds and windy weather. bit like the Scandinavians, because they have they to see a Poles are little bit of Consequently, winter. lousy a love The the a sun reforms started off badly and the government did not handle the strike very well, it spread up to the shipyards. and that. Essentially it deal with a unrest as common sense a huge a very was basic result of a of problem. their foreign grew out of sensible effort by the Government to So they had this combination of attempt into the management burden Solidarity of debt, to bring back their economy, plus an a degree of combined with overly ambitious industrialization programme which started shortly before I arrived, with projects which would be difficult to implement in Canada, let 260 000440 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information alone in Poland. I remember we were Poland. up in the northern part of paper in Poland. of Poland and North West Canada put firm. So up project. Well, opening, I think it a plans were invited to visit There made was to designed by build summer of 1980 when I along, lot of money and made it available for this Canadian engineering a come up and see the going to be at Christmas in 1978/79. of it and as expected to leave, sign no was ready. not was it came a visit During the visit we found that two behind schedule. The Canadians there told delay the for reasons were combination of a politicians, local Communist a lack of plant the this kind of situation, heads. They think Poles managers. they but Poles will very not are tell you their national trait. good The at carrying problem today is kilometre long and eats potatoes; take turns women day it them is to get women is going down a little hunk of meat. good are good at ideas it's out; One Polish work, to who very not the answer is as Now they the main sort of is that the people do not adequate balanced supply of food. And everybody works, us If you talked to and they themselves an line-up. than more they would just shake their have a was finally direction from Warsaw and badly organized are was the to interference by the the local government, and general mismanagement. Germans about The The next closer arranged. years in was plant manager phoned up to say sorry, it came large mill a it was spring desperate shortage a Ambassador I was invited to as paper mill a men work on It joke is what Polish meat a and often the Thursdays or whatever is really sad. What are talking about becoming a member of the International Monetary Fund. The Soviets have a strangle hold over is the answer? them in the sense energy: their oil [HILL] Those Government that them with a lot of their and gas. people that you knew, in that time, [CAMERON] The they provide Foreign most of those Minister is who were in charge of presumably have still around, he the gone now. was in East Germany then. [HILL] I mean that was the whole Gierek 261 period. 000441 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [CAMERON] Yes, Gierek society; when they previous one. nearly much as you would find in as Poland. there in reaction to lot what and West Their attitudes a and great regard for the Soviets them the in country. that sense Part VII [HILL] I part, Part VII, wonder you Affairs, of if issues a in that to the would you assess of they had sensitive in area to a of They not have liberate their 1980-83 go the to over for the law We turn Until State last 1983 I External for the Bureau of Well, this kind of the major one whole of business in Poland and on. so Soviet behaviour in that crisis and also the Soviets but to State, was martial [CAMERON] Well, uprising helped Arms Control. that situation? because They do responsibility Western responses to the А is much good. back to Ottawa. presumably Solidarity and introduction How living. to Canada. previous comment, because period that Not certain respect for a Under-Secretary of time with a ambivalence. came Security Policy and bit was Eastern. just quickly could we Assistant part of links mind which is really the end of the interview. were International my to come they have of one to the point in 1980 when you think about think the system Assistant Under-Secretary of - bring anything but being able of them than but is answer might fair standard of Soviets the Their attitude is say a lot a Western more are East Solidarity they do not like the system, do not not situation which had become unbearable. a people travel, of the corruption, improvement in relations with an considered to be they the do not know what the just in the question of being able to to have of blame place like Romania where you a condition; their people out lot a was I between and Union amelioration natural government one Undoubtedly is pretty well true of any that think that hopefully I Soviet the kick entrenched autocracy. had this in blamed, was deal very were with what strategic the world in very was in location. for them. 262 a difficult essence It is position, not a only very, an very They have large forces in 000442 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information East Germany, but the Polish lines of communication, the railways, Poland. go through but there serious, are There difficult really did situation, and wanted to invade Poland; I were in a very impression was that they think that they my do I not would doubt they ever intended to invade they could help it. Poland if The Soviets know quite what to do. not There would have been gained in taking over Poland because the people are to Soviets, it so There might could Poland, that many forces in in East Germany. lot a not all are created have also have been concern some even an advantage no not sympathetic situation. worse about the nervousness or loyalty of the Polish soldiers to the Polish Communist government. evidence to There is weapon that energy supplies. some they put Poland is such oil and time. gas, They such they would just have any not run threat freeze impress the upon imposition of as much going on in the martial law handled the list by the Poles Sunday. are Martial getting up minimum of without blood the wanted the to use an shed of early or the just power, the not enough to relationship. I as upon think that was designed allies, the country. their In retrospect the Government came as They did not rate part of instituted was mass and the a that way it was Soviet and Polish the when all and it on a Sunday morning, good Poles was carried Nazi-type police tactics. Armed Forces. I do not were asleeр out with It think a was done that they Armed Forces to be the ones, and probably the people in the forces themselves did not Solidarity activists. This short winter the economically Polish the on morning, about two o'clock in the or in religious people, they go to Church very law their off on the Soviets possible developments, of extremely skilful was authorities. every cut economically, death to surprise to most intelligence analysts. on ultimate the cheap coal but probably Poles, concern about what was highly to hydro electric their defence as a strangle-hold a They are dependent well as on was that anyway, that they could cut off their and does theory the mobilization and movement on the borders the Soviet to have case supply the country. much, Poles basket Poland so the a generating stations, for to support answer want was to be the ones to round up the done by the secret police. is that the Soviets were very much in 263 a dilemma So the as to 000443 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information they could do; they had to do something for security reasons. what The other big threat the Soviets was that to thing to get out of hand, and they already far, too Eastern countries a threat, as only not political system. difficulties for enormous well for the Soviet Union. as security threat, but a a of plurality, The idea work. you could get the two to work together. The two something like are you Another major you in about the the Ottawa of is question the two-track decision of Pershing it mistakes of its put future on did everything they could; mistakes a They thought there was was attitude was but that is a handled by was my judgment most vulnerable Soviets the the badly Government There were lot a of good consultation with the name of Fred Ruth. Looking do not think that Canada's I success. particularly noteworthy; I not very am proud of it, just a personal opinion. had you If to enumerate developments in that period, when you they in played by the Germans who had extremely able negotiator by the was missiles the introduction of missiles and they very active role back, I would say it 1979, in fact their efforts to get involved but, by and large, and allies, and counterproductive. were war line the in Germany. would not survive the vote propaganda on the by the governments. government particularly, which was the all, of December by and large handled well period while cruise and II but made, extremely was miscalculated opinion would the allies? The German [HILL] through NATO that an runs by the be get is The closest you do you think that whole affair would a There is no way well There were in in NATO installation [CAMERON] one democracy just does How Europe. NATO, issue that position this implementation of it was have in Yugoslavia. [HILL] were other to their whole just diametrically opposed. not the Because threat of this it had gone felt that trigger could this they allowed if be, international I mean peace in and respect security? three other major two or were in this position, what to the general What stand question out as of key 264 000444 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information developments achievements in that period? or [CAMERON] Well, there were the renewal of the SALT talks which were an important effort to reach an agreement at the same time Soviets of seeds did not agreement. an in move and that we did follow through. to by the Soviets in contained the formula always surprised me that It that, on trying ourselves in made Their "walk-in-the-woods" INF. on close to reaching agreement with the came very we strategic weapons, and on do not a always been little bit the political of political situation in Germany. involved in the Soviet negotiating position than there been We look at tend to what going is it side; Western the on There has do ahead, they also whether you call Well, [HILL] that period, see the and ever has in terms of terms. The they have Soviets it see as move a political implications of all their moves, or not. question, last a savvy big Western weakness. a players, chess it propaganda as more in terms of numbers, security in traditionally played as good been has controls arms to that more major mistake was But the of their analysis terms Soviets the leading today, to up based your reflections on do how other rate you on questions? [CAMERON] Polish significant other The crisis and the imposition of martial With relations. especially the it way event was was follow-up the handled. I reaction respect to the imposition of sanctions, of they political impact but they have been of doubtful mind was discord the meeting which was There with the was the no the was first held at La Alliance Canada West, and have had some in terms of played a threat of ministers by the United the key role in that north-east NATO of question Montreal. ever agenda and very few officials were present. a the the value the over Sapinière, private meeting of question of that Another event that stands out in my pipeline, and here Siberian gas It in the dramatic development in East-West law was a overall East-West relations. think to States to held. It dealt retaliate against their allies because of European support for this pipeline. 265 000445 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information It was the meeting at role publicity. without and Canada played very serious Alliance crisis, a potentially last [HILL] One Canadian foreign Americans the result was The serious allowed which a very key down back to agreement, which solved an a rift in the Alliance. question: policy? do you think it how you Do role in element in see NATO's is key a Canadian foreign policy, particularly in terms of the pursuit of international peace and security? of Do you remain strong advocate a continuing membership? [CAMERON] it believe to it remain I agree with because is it we I should belong everybody should join. I Clark had to say recently about Joe derived from being inside and not outside, lecturing the advantages Like any Alliance the others. and there are world live we think do not I club that a good deal of what a piously to interests. our serves simply strong advocate of continuing membership. a certain in relations with a there obligations are disadvantages, but in this inter-dependent nobody multitude really of countries. It closer without along get can seems to that the me important thing is that NATO should not become an alliance designed to forever the confront Soviet Union and should be an effort made to maintain détente. If anything, the East, on to my mind, it is reduce this [HILL} Do you trade work and see NATO [CAMERON] would not be as should think you exaggerate long exist, the build-up. arms negotiations and you are that too a fundamental on an East-West being rigid about that. you can envisage other broader types of not the and closer relations kind of discussions those do of that distrust that exists between East and West. conducting I the heart by hard only practical efforts through going to there balance between defence and a the divisions remove political divisions which are at To that the emphasis should be on negotiations with effort an its allies, should downgrade, either, what or the do CSCE for basi? It seems systems. I basis to me that For example, I not think that you has been able to 266 000446 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information accomplish. And think you have to I been fairly we have countries, extent the on pragmatic flexible. be fairly ourselves, more to which are for the we so than prepared I think some other to modify negotiating procedures. [HILL] you Basically, then, assess the utility of [CAMERON] Well, it will approach our with our clear, we have a continue to be a relations and Perhaps we should do European partners to our how would membership in NATO for Canada. to East-West allies. foreseeable future, big country here. important element in very in terms of our relations in the way of making more particularly, We have a the North extent to which American security problem, the dimensions of which are changing, and could well mean a greater emphasis on the past. It has Arctic and on the North than tended to fluctuate up and down. that the Europeans North American Canada first, are our sufficiently conscious security interests. Alliance after all; We have do not think of the extent a in of our question of being it is the question of there being security dimensions to North America which are (HILL] is not It I we changing. is the point will close at this point. that 267 And, I it is part of the NATO would emphasize. Thank you very much. 000447 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNA00005 Title A name given to the resource Robert Cameron: "In Alliance" Interview Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived “Research - In-House Research - Oral History of Canadian Policy in NATO - Hill Roger,” RG154, Volume number: 13, File number: 2100-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f94f674bf3590ccc64f8543cb0dd748c.pdf 4c38493ba5a6f1bd846b27415ac614e0 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information GEORGE GRANDE [HILL]* Grande, formerly in Vienna and with the RCAF Today we have with us Ambassador George afternoon. Good representative Canada's in RAF and time, war the Canadian Mission to the United Nations in of External with Affairs Ottawa, in National Defence College in These overseas. 1964-66, Ceylon Commissioner High 1979, and is now a Botswana, well Ambassador Grande, Lesotho ideas well on the in you know, NATO of Swaziland and what doing are we who 1976-79. affairs, has served Canada now active We want to in develop to as is trying We are so know how the years in the over and also interests here most been have to Canada. NATO direct national its of those broader this country, important to the future of international peace and security. We are trying to look at the long term goals, as as importance membership pursuit Force Balanced columnist and editorial writer known policy-making and NATO-related NATO's 1968-72, Iceland and to Department of External Affairs gather the views of Canadians to Commissioner oral history of Canadian policy in NATO. an the of Citizen. with the Ottawa part of and Mutual on Ambassador Grande retired from the in Staff and Ambassador to South Africa and 1973-76, to High Norway Conference Reductions in Vienna Directing following: to Ambassador the to Ambassador the Department Kingston, and in various senior posts the included the on in in Athens, York, New Division of Relations Defence the the subsequently served External Affairs in 1946, and Berlin, joined Ambassador Grande Department of in After serving South Africa. to Ambassador former the MBFR negotiations to main policy developments and issues years in and so how and Canada or Ambassador of the Alliance So the focus of periods of your flavour our fairly systematic fashion, and a developments. affairs in career NATO-related Vienna. in your *Interviewers: own personal were were issues, However, to over the learn we past 40 what happened, affected discussions will be our when you field such by on directly involved various those in NATо especially your period as would like to get the views also and reflections on Hill, Pawelek 000448 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document ent divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Canada's MBFR also touch So we will scene. policy, foreign and very extensive and interesting PART I - Early Years, [HILL] some on general evolving world of the other periods in your the on career. 1945 to you were born in Montreal, Ambassador Grande, I believe, and grew up there? [GRANDE] That's right. [HILL] You graduated from McGill University in 1940 in English and then briefly attended Osgoode Hall Law School, and Economics, in Toronto. [GRANDE] Yes. [HILL] In 1941, commissioned as you were to India in at that involved [GRANDE] so Yes. particular, and disqualified but was forces Flight Lieutenant. Could as a me it and how time, came that you went I still attending tried to enter the armed war hotted to tried up, enter for that rather as as you a I school in My poor in because forces recall, may recruit. quickly. law '41 in eyesight then tried for the Navy rejected on an interview and finally landed up with the Air Force who were at that Direction Finding), time pushing what they not have any of Montreal background whatsoever any as an sort, but this RDF mechanic, and went 269 was in signals, intrigued me, called RDF (Radio it radar and wanted and the Americans called people with fair educations to learn what it matter service with and were in the armed while first, I the time that saw were on. Osgoode Hall in Toronto, at later year a Afterwards you demobbed were and little bit about this period and what kind of tasks a and RCAF India and Ceylon, until 1945 when you you tell us the pilot officer. a in the UK, the RAF joined you all about. or and I did science for that I joined up in through preliminary basic 000449 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information signals training in Montreal at McGill, this time Clinton, AC buff rather than an as Ontario, RDF and radar, to a student. a taught everything there were we know in radar for those who did not have Then told were we transferred down to to my surprise be would we an sent to to was scientific background. a in Moncton along with I was in 1942, and others few a fact, In overseas. depot embarkation called out, was transferred I top secret RAF school in very hush-hush, and there university, but at my old had we - been interviewed for commissions before we left Clinton but did not think much of it were told we were pilot officers. then [HILL] That did not [GRANDE] a mean that you were flying, that meant that still in the radar field? you were on out and then called were we - Yes, in the radar field. together in Halifax, boat So we sailed went, all to over of 20 the UK, got us, and were transferred to various parts throughout England to radar stations, mostly ground radar stations, Mine station right CHL a was near commanding officer, and with altogether including RAF gunners flights over Still India I radar a arrived at officer, I was of the stations and from a tea beautiful this over air stations estate in [HILL] the Bay It was people there At that time, in the of from in India when I but time in the Madras Ceylon and so I there arrived, spend had to to some and and area, eventually I got I spent more or less the India, and between ground doing radar as a radar officer, ranging Ceylon, world pretty crummy accommodations fly us. as assisting signal's officers of various RAF between war spot 70 transferred transferred to a radar station in Ceylon. rest Fairlight, RAF or protect to before the radar equipment, time on basic signals, squadrons 60 suppose I May of the following year, in Hastings, Germany were frequent. from as they called them. CH and CHL stations Bengal, to which must spend part of near and do have the war, the most to some which we used to Calcutta from air rescue sea been mainly air/sea rescue presumably. and so on. There may have 270 000450 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information been operations in the Indian Ocean, naval some but much not at that time I guess. [GRANDE] Part II It all, was United Nations, - [HILL] think I go on to now York but also various phases in Ottawa, could tell [GRANDE] down to New York, 1947, of to mission of Canada, we to were the UN. We secretary, second delegation as then was as Council where Council, I secretary was I to was being established for to was well as as secretaries; all representative. he lot summer, our be the secretary under first of the MCNaughton, General McNaughton there was elected to the Security first Ambassador to the Security Canada be secretary, to be our first Permanent Representative to the UN. the delegation, of advising, of the late it was third General where largely administrative, and then when a in that period. the first permanent the secretary of secretary. were, it be I guess wondered if I called it the Permanent Delegation of Canada, it was our waiting, believe. I something about your main jobs us was sent I fall, early who Nations periop United the 1946-52, and that includes not only your time at the UN in New from you rescue. 1946-52 will we air/sea anyway, was ours if you will. work my there was We were all was more first at time, I did advisors in those days, advising the delegation on various subjects, wherever I was assigned. During the General Assembly, seemed the, on Committee. It when was it was established, that on the advising mostly it was the Ad mostly political and social. Carine Wilson during one session like I social on committee. Hoc I advised Senator prostitution and A dear Political lady. political work, but supplementary political work. a few things But mostly There was a lot of high priced help there with me; John Starnes, Harry Carter, John Holmes from time to time, Arnold Smith and George Ignatieff; all under General McNaughton. [HILL] You also represented 271 Canada on the Atomic Energy 000451 �Document disclosed under the Access to Injormation Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Commission. I the delegation did. mean Canada was represented at that time. [GRANDE] Yes, that is right. stopped meeting. when I think I headquarters Success, of that at the UN, [HILL] Which is out [GRANDE] It was the old the Sperry plant, and [HILL] even mistaken, the at Lake time, if I least to begin at am not with, was Long Island somewhere. on Sperry Gyroscope Company during the war, they took that over. During held. were committee meetings held much work involved right. That is were too not of the exact date it it? wasn't [GRABNDE] meetings was am not sure there. was [HILL] But there I were That is where the daily Assembly General held there too, sessions, and the plenary meetings at Flushing Meadow, the site of the World's Fair. So it was not until a the good bit later that the UN moved to its present site. [GRANDE] I of the present at there was Yes. [GRANDE] All the time [HILL] I was there we met at Lake Success without success. I gather the Canadian delegation Baltimore Hotel [GRANDE] laying of the cornerstone by Truman, building. [HILL] too much the For permanently over the Grand Central the General there Assemblies, scratched around 272 was housed in the old Station. yes. and Those of rented us who were accommodation al1 000452 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information over New York. A number of went us into a called Parkway place Village, which was a new development only for people connected with Ralph Bunche was at that time too, and that is where UN, the Sidney Starnes, Frigfeld, delegation, Arnold Smith. myself and people other John in They were all there at the same trying to get of our time in this development. [HILL] thing One that are we idea an in this series is the development of Canadian foreign policy with respect to affairs, in the organization of world affairs, international the effort to pursue international peace and security. one thing that interested are we in the is in So clearly thrust Canadian of policy with respect to the United Nations in the periods at the end of the war when the UN founded, was and in then immediate the post-war period when the UN was getting itself established. as you mentioned, while, because in perhaps was on Security Council for the of the elections Canada stood one in not was forward, if Australia to go it Canada I am not or '48, member on 1947 mistaken. became Canada Also, a aside to allow But then, a member of for years. I think the Security Council. [GRANDE] We But we set up become became majority vote was I 1948, think in those days you had in the West, to be elected. January 1, permanent mission because we knew we a member. a a going to and we knew we would have enough votes why General McNaughton a were pretty automatic a Most of my work was geared to that. general to head two sent was delegation to a there in the Security Council, I believe that first I place, a suppose, made sense. [HILL] Could you give us some towards the UN evolved over this stage had the but I this perhaps. more was idea that how Canada's attitude of period. I mean initially Canada was gradually wearing But my impression, complex than that. idea down now, towards is that I suppose at full about of enthusiasm '47, it is perhaps There seem to be more ups and 273 one or a 49 little downs. 000453 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [GRANDE] certainly was there in went I when There '47, tremendous a it seemed and to junior officer very a enthusiasm of amount that Canadian foreign policy revolved around the United Nations in those days. of most did, were UN decisions. required to make decisions, our Canada which we Everything was decision every we Most pronouncement had to do with subjects which were UN, the because most call to want them, international events, being were debated tremendous amount of enthusiasm. sort of enthusiasm to the extent that that there would be solution, lead was to an the enthusiasm for being sense work out on when we I and polemics. They went soon on for hours of course, great division do not think we on by some [HILL] I think with this. in that a UN was not was enthusiasm. It if you will, and and Cold in many cases, Indonesia and was so that first Assembly had set very full War were thought would we in with a of rancour and hours. in the war all It if instead of being rallied around. the Western side if as was you of the two had been on the same side. remember any things in those days. We will, I cannot but at the same time, American delegates, Buzz He said Nixon the that most then other as I day now. made an interesting of the officers that he served period were people who transferred the black and white view of the world from when they were fighting Nazi Germany. that a particularly liked the extreme attitudes that were expressed on а that this would of which Israel debates there rallied round the Americans point sort Western team, the it found remember well the Vyshinski and Dulles debates. I each other We, that there, was I of course, realized, certainly in The political vengeance. fighting So, in order to preserve peace and promote, also But '47 being debated at again, war that as a thought that this was the positions, such on make to or there. we a not the common independence of nations, on. in never world and all this, one being able to make items coupled with that enthusiasm for the UN, But man. the fact episodes, whatever you Pearson, Mr. in of decision a took, gone and now here was the new enemy. Now The black and white perception was simply to some degree transferred, which perhaps was 274 000454 �Document disclosed underthe Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information quite natural. wonder I if there probably [GRANDE] I think there people, not among those who affairs before that, the of got somebody like Dulles who But Department; he was extremely so on. There and I American side of that sort, and and the French people. delegation, and in the and others, all the people on the in those as well, outstanding Australians, it State knew he able very You Senator and the British delegation on think they viewed do not I many were yes, Hickerson versed well some or Department. State Jack of foreign in Mike Pearson single-minded, think yes. thinking among not such as from the was Warren Austin, but steeped and versed people among not bit of that kind of... a was, were knowledgeable people more nuances was sort of stark you were terms. [HILL] Yes, involved in but affairs, UN period that as proceeded, gradually time as while went perhaps, on particularly in the Canadian case after Mackenzie King retired, Canadian government and effect rethinking a crusade to other process, thinking of launched which turned something establish concerned about the way the UN process governments about then new, setting up into they because going. was what less how you would see things [GRANDE] Yes. do I which evolved at essential. One heard from Soviet attitudes which was diatribes the delegation, records Europe, all obviously profound influence a a they that of what the which Is that more viewed NATO as a day after day they said, orchestrated on going American, We down at It was 275 after the day not I am at of UN my in Eastern sure British the sort Bielo-Russian the others for months. Canadian, on. and and something elsewhere, and UN exposed to too much of that, and certainly was very were organization, new delegation policy makers in forming NATO. not know what a having evolved in that time? as think almost and that certainly is something, because of substitute for the UN, the not in was That led in to the whole eventually became the North Atlantic Treaty system. or the that and had other did not get level. kept fairly hush-hush, I did at a 000455 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information very senior level, in the days at the outset? before NATO. [HILL] You mean [GRANDE] The preliminary thinking about NATO. Canadian establishment people between and like [HILL] What apparent, I it was Niet" all that Eastern Europe people. [GRANDE] Very much the also there were that come to Lapointe time, and of remember that in there from the fact from most was contact on when the gentleman was That had window. individual mind. my that cases establishment that Mr. am of was Pearson, sure that other very active too, it did become, to establish or this St. new to the Was it that statesmen we of out impact there, system. What was UN in. case for Hugh speeches is leading a us all. In were able in the role impression the of other St. Western at one has, one time. countries Laurent and Pearson, a crusade in the lay behind that? point. mean here course they I Of end What lay behind this crusade? desire to preserve Western values, 276 and in those days. from case or Midzenty co-operated, become, virtually difficulties the UN a writing I yes. Laurent were very active in that you had people committed to the saw pushed very seriously by even least was Cardinal the in which but in the seem situation, profound played quite at Mr. like taken things however, NATO, a remember I but this Canada, [HILL] What about Czechoslovakia, too? Czechoslovakia co-operate, with the Soviets, were affairs world in can course off blocked The so. there were very few I Riddell of Soviet diplomats saying, full the Iron Curtain. was jumped out of Now I mean I were now was forget what the date fact, only but There was very little in the way of human contacts at that There time. the change this made public opinion. mean to Niet, "Niet, to that period the newspapers that forth, They did not reach down to George Grande. Reid. Escott imagine in the Mike Pearson, Gerry Robertson, Norman and back bounced memos I or what was it? 000456 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [GRANDE] a things would get fear that at things would get UN, the between worse to East the down it. West armed our not normal, after I the for the fathers of NATO that something was into their that, for [HILL] own some we thing in same a new I [GRANDE] I mean, was large element of largely kept secret, all and I highly secret. of or at other side the UN that group would know than at a on it. specifically Certainly it was included in way of in the included, the sort of the opening of the General Assembly in for reasons year it, were the anything specific actually. after NATO and of The United States was formed, there was course the response was the from a played the largest part but Canada involved, most other Western countries were involved, there were other So I reception did this the Western remember anything outbreak of the Korean War, was NATO was of course, cannot remember Less have about the others? 1950, command. of formed, what kind speeches UN a it eventually became apparent ministerial [HILL] they would if anyway. being not comment from the but I suspect the Americans I still was point that it same but what the the founding of He get in the UN? and as speech by Escott Reid given several years ago. treaty was do thought of was the about it, fact There formation wondering, when this without read made exactly the was recall, I it did not percolate down very far, say scaled had us rather interesting comment, just a minute ago, a which was that the shall again. Americans You made fear was done, because they probably would have gone was shell as doubt I The of farsightedness done. Iron Curtain sure. Most war, would have done something anyway but done it the way it quite am was things would get saying behind the or it remember referring do not and get back to what to try goodness and thank really Yes, to be getting seemed world, any security. have forces consulting anyone, I West, as they as worse in the impelled it That did worse, and West. East East and West as and outside that basically, you stated it correctly. I think countries; India for example, provided 277 and also a medical 000457 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information rightly. Did this, the involved in this response, restore some of the UN's lost prestige? if team remember I acquired a new purpose, Did people feel that the UN Soviet absence from the Security much a as [GRANDE] fluke, which I think the relief that there but label, Maybe it. was the repeated? be considered as a sigh of a great quite sure whether Canada, troops if there had not King MacKenzie with was way UN a feat for to cover would we UN a instance, for been the of out was seen very time that I think everyone breathed think it would have contributed or way of them doing this and giving it a I am not the UN as such. at Council going to latter. was not do I had not was that the UN fact have eventually, but certainly if he had still been around we would not have. [HILL] you When you ended up this phase of your went back Ottawa, to believe, I career the to UN '52, in late or Legal the Division. might mention [GRANDE] I in those days compiling in persons senior were think the year after and Basil was a put I Robinson did it, tremendous amount know if it still exists project. of or work for quite effort chapters to the United year, and fairly '50, each it. I had that honour, I put into this book. and there I do not not, but in those days this was a major important we United Nations, a spent "Canada and think the year before me, I It seemed to be very did at the was back from the United Nations to Ottawa, the Canadian government that we '49 and charge of in came great deal of time a book called a '48, 1947, Nations" each year, thing, one to the powers that be in record in great detail everything and all the divisions were hard at while preparing their various bits and pieces and this publication, which was an indication of the that time, the seriousness with which we took the UN in those days. [HILL] How did you perceive the UN yourself at time that you left this particular phase of your career? remember how you saw the UN going 278 on from Do you there? 000458 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [GRANDE] think I certainly were we pessimistic about how it would had higher hopes of having international an or think I economic and the were we long had we social certainly the military field. force The disappeared; since of truly international force under the UN Security Council, a for which provision is there, off got never continue to go. or its achievements in for fields than in the political idea go optimistic, not ground. the as you know, the heydays of the Children's Fund, by So regard to international already security and I were still was the beginnings of technical of focus the '52 But it those even when international aid, the beginnings of [HILL] certainly, and then the Point Four Program, in New York, assistance, work useful But in the Charter. into came being. policy with Canadian in fact shifted to peace had NATO. [GRANDE] Part Yes. III - [HILL] Well, we period in Athens Secretary 1952-54 Athens, in from the after Greece had will go 1952-54. Canadian the in part III, which was your time, you served as First Athens. This think it's hard to realize I and how many of and so Second World War and then the Civil Greece was not by any means. So I just At any rate, Mediterranean a it was resort certainly not a just wondered if you could tell us something of Greece while you were were the politics like? [GRANDE] Yes, the government was headed touch if you will when I was 279 at War that time, wealthy country. of the What sort of state there. also what military just poverty in which many people had lived as a result the So now people were involved in it, also the miseries of on. shortly was It was also not many years after the very bitter Greek Civil War. perhaps to In that Embassy joined NATO. how bitter that was, then on was condition in it and by Marshall Papagos, there. The the Foreign Minister 000459 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Stephanopolous, was Frederika king the his on was throne, Queen with directing affairs from behind him, and Greece was a very poor country. same time, my feeling was that they were greatly encouraged by the You could see Doctrine. Truman That had a poverty around Athens. even profound effect on At the the Greek people. They were getting substantial aid and had prospects of getting even if they used their aid wisely. more There was aid officials and so American and international bankers it seemed, coming in on, a but in the country, of and out continual flow of a particular huge American mission permanently established there there was whose sole job was to administer economic aid. On the military side, I remember Canada slowly. be Chargé d'Affaires the Greek played time, at the aircraft when we replaced them. They were. were the replaced them with [HILL] The [GRANDE] Yes. was The turned them over, preserve Pact came by of members a Even in those state visit, "Free World's" our old and then we and some to Greece days. This establishment. They in those even the Greek into being days, I the guess he was great people. for the Balkan Pact. in Athens. pretty good, and between while were Balkan I to cheered by the those They thought this the three of them, was greeted with remember Marshall Tito I was there. as one of Athens when it was, In was I This Pact. great enthusiasm by all three countries. paid to Yugoslavia and Turkey, Yugoslavia, original some the balance between Greece and Turkey Greece and bunch of a great. Balkan Relations the was to had been using in Europe, with great cheers received thought this to happened I type of aircraft they forget the I up jets probably. Sabre Turkey, trying donated we being built in that. role and were later model. a We we ones a forces Greeks the days, they had great plans was going to be the end of the animosity between these countries, certainly between Greece and Turkey. This was going to be the means of having a modus vivendi 280 000460 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information which would last between these two countries. [HILL] as Didn't they How wrong they were. it might draw in Bulgaria and Romania think well? [GRANDE] Yes. [HILL] But nothing ever [GRANDE] No. But that of came that. certainly being was discussed in those formative days. [HILL] there Were bases, I negotiations going to put them in there at that mean out presumably? And what the was role this at on time, of the time not Sixth over take to US them Fleet in the about that. area? [GRANDE] do I not specific anything remember Certainly there was a continual stream of naval visits. Admiral Mountbatten visited Greece when I Chargé d'Affaires. Commonwealth nation. for there, then was, He the guy He British. on me Canada and I guess, There they were always called were going there. [HILL] No? That is what [GRANDE] They must have agree But somebody, that remember there in was those envisaged that NATO down to Greece the there, when I the was senior I was senior Commonwealth in charge of the Mediterranean fleet number a of American visits too and great occasions for us. on them. because was Certainly no Soviet naval visits. were was I remember or I presume the negotiations The American bases had not been established. I wondered about. been discussing maybe it, negotiating it for it was you, mentioned this and not any specific role for Greece days, a forces military from role. the central anything of that-sort. 281 I mean think would that I it front would I I the was be can not moved role of 000461 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Greece just evolving, the military role. was [HILL] mentioned You people d'Affaires. Chargé were in the Canadian Embassy and what there were you How many own your were duties during most of that time? [GRANDE] addition to the Ambassador, In we had a First Secretary, Immigration Officer and Third Secretary, Commercial Secretary, team, Security Office, RCMP, and there were two Trade and Commerce officers. Immigration Office in those days The separate from was Embassy. the What [HILL] time? or an Were most there were [GRANDE] It the nature of Canadian-Greek relations was mostly developments, reporting reporting the on but There for through interested in having reports on it. our program. There was very in those days. that of sort watching a brief I quite was instance, think on bit of a the on economic not have any economic aid program in those days contributing were we well? as them. Pact, Balkan We did situation. keeping on that do with immigration and trade, to political issues many was issues the of at the UN, and they so Immigration was a were big part high immigration from Greece to of Canada Distressed Canadians abroad also, consular work, nationals going back and being snatched thing. Dual by the Greek government and put in military service, that of sort thing. of Enosis in Cyprus? already bubbling up and was this beginning to have [HILL] What about the problem Greek-Turkish relations or was this still dormant at [GRANDE] bubbled up I left. barricaded across or Greece's It was even It fairly before went in themselves the street from I this any effect on relations with the rest of NATO this time? there, it but had dormant when arrived, and bubbled up certainly after The waves. in Was but was British embassy. their ours I were Their prepared. embassy nothing much happened 282 is when I They just was 000462 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information there that front. on [HILL] One last point would I further is the thought that the north. explore little a from what it is on in have really integrated, multinational kind of complex. a forces the central front integrated and so are region, southern Whereas on. you what in Northern Europe you is support support largely of case facing Greece you would care [GRANDE] I to I there not United States. Also, of course, Turkey, their armies These are just comment is a are wonder if I battle plan NATO plans but I some are and in the degree some thoughts, and some bilateral them? on any in those days. Greece, to now of from another. through presume there in one i.e., do not know whether there right now. influence and other. each were from the flank in outside, from comes armed collection a countries which are geographically quite divided Their main The the southern on mainly have central the front On the bit the Southern flank NATO is quite a on really, animal, different kind of like to There certainly there still was quite am a sure communist some not was for Greece very good feeling between Athens and Moscow, although towards the end of my stay, this seemed to get a little better, so I think security. It it alone. I that wanted to think NATO call Greece. those am belong to days that they could quite sure about, I they could It for not even its own did not want to go in, obviously because it wanted belly play not or whatever you want a to such was in significant military role. have defended themselves under This was before there was any Soviet bomb to worry or think that having Greece as NATO of the Greek armed forces any nuclear blackmail will, club. the took Greece But the state direct attack. you Ambassador arrived and entered certainly Greece to protect its flanks or its under I an on. well as good for anything of that sort. in NATO then good Greece. was From that for us, evolved a Greece that became accustomed to cooperating with the Western world, 283 if the 000463 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document ent divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information of rest the because the there Port world. Western signs were mention I when even I was the there in Greece down at Western Piraeus saying boats to Europe leave of Tuesdays. Greece themselves quite quite European. not was Western. They world with They did considered Mondays on or not consider Middle themselves Eastern. The basic focus was on the economic side of things, not the on military side. [HILL] as You mean [GRANDE] as relations with NATO assistance, economic concerned, to they thought that and were concerned or Embassy and its operations? far as Greece was As War, Civil far Canadian far as the to have as get back top priority was their their on by going into feet NATO, the after and sort of looking as if they were doing their bit for Western defence, they aid. would get more [HILL] Did you [GRANDE] No. [Hill] Well, almost been I ever think it worked out that way too. the movie Elena? see it's about the Greek Civil War period, totally forgotten somehow. which has that whole But business about thousands of Greek children being taken into Yugoslavia, then packed to Hungary at off [GRANDE] There was still They still did were one point, was a dreadful you also. proud of having resisted the Italians too. They could still "OXI", meaning "No." "No, the Germans got in later. see feeling was kept subdued I think one chalked up will not on They pointed to some cliffs there: the Italians in." But They still feel that sort of thing. But we because the Balkan Pact was being [HILL] affair. latent anti-German feeling there, a it at the beginning of the war, you remember. signs which and let formed, any sort of anticommunist in the latter part of my stay. of the most interesting things you mentioned 284 000464 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information was that, that time, at quite good. It to be seems were the on whole really the Cyprus problem which has by animosities. large aroused old and relations with Turkey things now like the Aegean Sea, Of there course, but it seems to me that other are Cyprus was obviously crucial. [GRANDE] Oh yes, the crucial is. still factor. There were no signs of it being settled. Part IV - [HILL] Berlin, 1957-60 Well, think I which is part IV, Grande, You wonder on to the now the years in Berlin from 1957 served Secretary First as Military Canadian move '60. to Berlin, in Mission and just tell if something time, and in particular what did consular work what was you a speak, to had summer [GRANDE] '61. [HILL] '61. [GRANDE] That not gone mention that up that time. In of 1960. those titles are at All involve, and O'Hagen, not the Prime Minister's O'Hagen, who eventually I was successful towards the end of my stay to act and consular as in I fact, believe the it was not into one rolled did have some help, was getting a Dick there also with junior officer sort of administrative officer officer, but the military mission was military in name was set up because not lose we had the right to set it up. the chance, the victorious powers that supplied troops, and we giving Before locally employed former British military officer, a It I duties at your just is right. sort of thought about will I really, it's really just the one body there. only. I the work of the Canadian Military Mission? until the and mistaken. not am that me, the I could us of Counsellor you Berlin Wall Ambassador then if chance period next you were appointed Canadian Consul in West Berlin. in 1957, also will we should 285 right as so on. one We of the We were given 000465 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information the chance of having budget, German insofar wanted budget, Berlin whom locally, to be it an on the if there all the local German anyone was budget paid out of typewriters, you name it. We saw cheap. the Western called It was the a and get in were was under the sponsorship of the French, were instance, or the Americans. actually. fascinating, was dispatches which material there; which you could get unofficially. some of you Khrushchev It was When November, 1958, I take over West Berlin, that was came to doors, had business our we it was, There could get is. guess possible, as Ottawa. to a and to pass it was famous a wealth and of some in ultimatum in effect, indication. going to Then all the world everyone from largely crossroads of intrigue saying he was, the was officially, his issued It French and Americans, really to tap the British, much intelligence from them foreign still we of under the sponsorship and we were sort Others there It as because ours was work political. what it was, was military missions was in a particular sector, the Belgians for The setting Each of British. the lived well, and as chance of military mission a who military mission, whatever that meant. a in the British sector, -- both were supposed to be on, got free accommodation, German interesting listening-post mission, which up of British, or their salaries everything, the and all our local staffs, hired, we we funded It was budget, from the funded and that meant that living and office, staff be, for all I know. and it may still we as military mission that was funded out of the a under the sun. We had visits from all kinds of prominent Canadians who wanted to be on the Willy spot. George Drew dashed Brandt must have spent half over his from London for time instance. briefing visitors, I think. think? [HILL] He was mayor, [GRANDE] He Burgermeister and it was was his finest hour. I flow of damn good one too. in the raising of I think going on, the Berlin Wall, was The other phenomenon which was which eventually resulted the tremendous a refugees from East Berlin to West Berlin, 286 000466 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information and parts of East Germany to West Germany. other from some coming over in increasingly great numbers daily, these were think it came up to built. All of 1,000 where they briefings came or more people these tremendous a before the once, indeed which of amount intelligence in East Germany, and what the Soviets on. addition, direct having direct Germans. had we with contacts did We contacts. the was doing were not a with was and so point of the East in those régime German these what on We made but Soviets recognize the East not I in West From sector. going on In Wall by the Allies screened were and over, came day, a and by the Americans, by the French, depending Berlin, by the British, on But days, and we refused to accept the GDR visa but we acknowledged the Soviet occupation, to later Soviet forces within Officer who even though remember I called I on. if you will, was Berlin, East very on active and there out was of Soviet a West Berlin, contact, and we invited them socially, and they came. this sort opportunity of very much but how profile after the want us tap them directly. Protocol a great So there was They did not say could tell from the way they reacted and so They a you they felt. to not the Commander in Chief of the and in they did obviously trying were GDR was set up, to maintain to stay out of the way. military exchange missions, like had contact with the on low We also "BRIXMIS". The British, American and French exchange missions in East Germany were headquartered in West Berlin but also had their headquarters in East Germany in Potsdam. [HILL] What did [GRANDE] They they consist were just a were seldom heard missions. few years ago which of same to are right. The this. We do day. there remember I brought otherwise. throughout East Germany likewise of? and Soviet British, all up as an incident limelight. They had the right to travel that are not They banned, and in West Germany which have the French and Americans also have the right have Canadians attached to They dash in high powered cars all they pick was them into the areas forces there these. over East We did Germany, much intelligence as they can, mostly about 287 in my and troop 000467 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information dispositions there used to be then, now and certainly too much for British French considered [HILL] to less report back to Ottawa, in we so of of would not hear I functions. Berlin, was Mr. We had us They it. already paid, were our a did bilateral relationship but it was mostly flag stay there of course, and mission. very stupidly, now. In those days, our which was is not? was and then it was British military headquarters. Was there even Much later on. reopened. It's open any function in terms of representing Canada? common coordinating group West Germans offices were right in the Olympic Stadium, the any But salaries. Yes, or allied Nothing in which contact. There was in council Berlin West or any anything? [GRANDE] still Canada had a four-power they did meet occasionally and the Spandau prison of was I willing to pay everything, [GRANDE] There a to But it was closed eventually, there keeр There was Canada there and Berlin, West [HILL] Was conceived it. That is how I Berlin and get credit for closing [HILL] they retrenchement drive people thought we would shut down a what was not what to Canadian government could the The Germans in Bonn wanted had the really collecting intelligence was function too. city the waving. when is right. bilateral the attend must say Americans, access us I evolving situation in Berlin, and also in the GDR That waving flag gave the There was in Eastern Europe. and elsewhere with they but so, were as and their to should know. we informed on the a forthcoming, So the main function [GRANDE] access person to handle there, one very were bit a We had So there was almost too much information. reports too. the incident. an Every it back. and then pass and that sort of thing, we a seat command got reports course, but we maintained going, thing on their which had its and meetings. own régime.. 288 000468 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Air Safety Centre. Berlin There was the them, and then of course, opportunities there, pretty tricky. well, [HILL] If although There was separate a remember rightly, Khrushchev's ultimatum become a "Free City," or wanted to be "Free City." event, this a just going was I also put on [GRANDE] a There was did not taken over in 24 that is all they are. Berlin much, then this real a It hours. but If because I of West Berlin he In any Germany or or remember rightly he knew, although if that real a would Soviets the and the they could not that Allies have token troops The It could be there, but worry, not about been have were later was still could not be defended. So there was that, it and everyone it, about willing losing bad very to that, do bigger fight and bring into play, and this would be it. The balloon would could certainly spark off the NATO forces We were worried be up. worry any pretense make Berlin. symbolically, Berlin to independent an to definitely, deadline a was defend West so connected as six month deadline. withdrawn but it Allies was of Mr. case remember which. they would be allied control system. to the side West whole the was cannot not with immigration mission there it to mean separate entity and presumably perhaps clearance what happened in the perhaps touch immigration of decided he wanted he was, in kinds security Canadian mission. all were the our from I there kept We for a period, a much I think almost a The year. other thing.that we watched closely were the various incidents that took place the between the Allies and Soviets Autobahn. visas, We as officials, Canadian or the East Germans refusing to accept on GDR not use the Autobahn, but we kept closely in touch with the British, French and Americans about all the incidents that could occurred, and all of them got deliberately by heat, to put there were on cars forth all the planes. the Soviets the squeeze. going lot a of publicity. and the East Germans to They created these back and forth They were used turn 289 the incidents because and trains going back and time between West Germany and West Berlin; They did not touch the płanes. on We had to and also fly in and out. 000469 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [HILL] In the period you there, were the last few it was about years of the Eisenhower administration in the US, and this was also period of the aborted Paris Summit, the This pretty jittery period a was the U-2 in East-West incident and so on. relations many in you felt, sitting in West Berlin, about how NATO and how the Allies in general responded to that kind respects. of wondering how was I situation Did you feel that their policies were in those years? fairly well developed or that they were all over the map, felt they were right. to so speak? [GRANDE] On the whole, I think incident occurred just when gave lunch, farewell a me we I was and I certain people in Paris but leaving. I it was my remember Willy Brandt this being mentioned The U-2 a summit for personal summit being his own guest. This is before the Paris Summit which, place. Khrushchev circled Paris and then question. There Berlin, but it in the Demonstrations were and so it spirits was NATO Agreements in Western of being guys. purposely put on, and military parades, bands Berliners, but the West the partly to French and Americans, I keep up their also to think the general the just have feeling early '70s before you with a was that great deal the of Berlin interest. of I in Defence Relations in Ottawa. probably still Ambassador were suppose you must have negotiation the watched You interest, by There fear. and in time the solidarity, surrounded freedom was I all course there was not too much think it anyway, solidarity there. right track. You must were Back to your think, and to fly the flag and to show the world; and I on the [HILL] of tension took never bad of highly publicized. was did not go. feeling of a very often by British, on, boost the morale of own of excitement, of bastion last was excitement; was feeling of a feeling great a was was certainly There of course, in Norway at that watched them with given your previous experience. a time. good Do you think But deal that of they 290 000470 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information have made been a radical change in that situation? a Berlin crisis since [GRANDE] Yes. negotiations. those partly because of the agreements is political will there are many other there. be to have places where it is considered Soviet stooges, many to ways the more likely. They no Union country. They are flexing days, I do not think and think I We must also longer want to be though they are probably closer in even Soviet I do not think that crisis anymore. a the growing maturity of the GDR. note but mostly because I suppose, I can good place for either side a not do not think there will be another Berlin crisis, I do not think the mean there has I than other any Eastern their independence muscles European these lot a they would want to be associated with a crisis provoked from their territory. {HILL] That is while you were there? [GRANDE] We permit, and a interesting. could the Soviet visa only travel first year I travel to Did you travel around the GDR much as was much there as in we '57, Leipzig Fair. to the could on I able That year that they issued Soviet permits. After that you please could go. border and get do. We did urge I a you to but go recognize them, so we travelling in East Germany was concerned, Leipzig, which to British, the I They had Potsdam, one not too far Which not there We Americans to their French and mentioned. near very interesting. was did the last was go "Sure across go. So also the could not we was that were get to they said, just visa from the East Germans." not was Soviet a far one visit invited by exchange missions, of their headquarters in from the West Berlin border, as East as Germany and we could go there, had opportunity to rub shoulders with the Soviets because they were and we did whenever we had an opportunity to. always invited too on these social occasions. [HILL] I went government in 1968 to Berlin on a at the Otherwise, invitation visit which lasted a week, of the we no. German and I found it absolutely fascinating the way in which the various allied 291 Also powers 000471 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information their had still situation. a did not I afterwards, with several years to that time, At conference there where I the other side of the Wall, [GRANDE] often, but to go in should I East a into Berlin, and the spent two weeks GDR at all, but I went Berlin, in East on equally fascinating. I did go into East Berlin right to We considered we had the made it we of parliamentary delegation, qualify what I said. Germany. kind unique very a go which was to East not It's presence. own a point of going there quite frequently with the Canadian flag flying, sneaking or across at nighttime and attending the opera, which was much better there than in West Berlin in those days. [HILL] Very interesting. [GRANDE] Or going to the museums, Berlin. Otherwise there really just facade a conditions elsewhere. stayed and [HILL] It's still Part V not - number that bit stark as it like in the Ambassador very from 1968 to 1972, and Iceland. This Norway several three countries as issues of in your career with them commitment. I is I went but it's served also must there as have were a involving Canada, Norway and Iceland in related to the relations allies in NATO. Norway, you since Moreover, one great interest to people in Canada, still to this relations poor at that time. was interesting period of important time; to and you. downtown area, Grande, Ambassador East in East Berlin. 1968-72 Canada's a a week in in those days, see Ambassador to Norway and Iceland, [HILL] been stark as a good very buildings down since been back have for nearly last year perhaps I are not much to broken and shops of was which of course the among these thing that is of day, in terms of question of the CAST believe that had been set up just before you became Ambassador to Norway. 292 000472 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [GRANDE] Yes. [HILL] I that was I time, I to being and he would see him later, in upon Canada later arrived in Norway. that. on think I it you are into came understood from I not make were we it Germany. in the midst of not was That directly came military much was sort reducing our connected with that this good bit a forced of military the time I went to Norway in '68. good idea that out of this would come the Canadian Forces. already remember, just I And I think we had a pretty kind of retrenchment of some arrived in Norway in '68, I '69 We come. great departmental review, a the later. going to was at of I NATO. knew then We it. of people but it when The decision of exactly how it did that lot a knows He the truth you time a course in cuts much at Of give days to those contribution to were know about how you involved in that question. Campbell. Ross much, sense [GRANDE] establishment the on not was going [HILL] in not was think in '67, just the year before was taken I troop what us established and why? [GRANDE] At that wonder if you could tell towards the end '68, and only then really did I become conversant with what this commitment entailed, and how important it was politically, in terms of Canada's concentrated, and it Norway. with relations gave me an It entree was to the Norwegians in a way that nothing else would have. my work a lot. We were also at that time from time to time. over in the logistics commitment, and those side going and to start things, over to flesh thoughts It Collins out the for and still important to though they now them were I to am in bones of this logistics of where the Norway convinced, thought this was tremendously have aware me instance Canadian troops would be preparing for exercises and so on. then, the of helped I talking about prepositioning equipment, going through the and that sending military officers remember Admiral I that on how a Canadian commitment quickly 293 we could come there, to and even their rescue 000473 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information in times of need and other questions. thought, That was, I realizing this commitment was which well, was we stay, in those days lot. a me that my to Of course, Canada also had another commitment to Norway, [HILL] as and there intended to fill it, and it helped beginning happy very a through the Ace Mobile Force, was and guess that I in existence before the CAST commitment? used to visit every and [GRANDE] Yes. then when they exercised, and the units in various countries used to visit The Ace Mobile Force now us. thing which I found of interest The other Canadians on that NATO Northern Headquarters, of staff the was there were which is in Kolsaas just outside Oslo, and the commander there at that time was General Walker, but whoever He used to call am sure. us to his bunker. [HILL] whereas ACE The the CAST possibility in Southern Norway? [GRANDE] I commitment is to I can is North ACE the to of value. But there you travel there any deployed in Is might be be sent anywhere. You know it would be deployed in a crisis as distinct from a war situation. main and take whole of Norway, Norway. Mobile I they could be sent absolutely anywhere. suppose think they the that crisis a in occasionally and brief us, us Mobile one there would have done the same, was are certainly some That's its worthwhile targets in the south. [HILL] were Did there? [GRANDE] I Yes. of Norway while you suppose you did. made I there exercising. in those days. up through the whole a We had I point a of doing both when the troops were visit from Defense Minister MacDonald went with him. I also went with my military 294 000474 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information attaché other on colleagues. occasions, took I and coastal a on steamer my own up to with of some Svalbard my time. one Right up to pack ice. got up to Spitzbergen? [HILL] You [GRANDE] Yes. that, foot set to it. That's on it, the first ambassadors to do We were to parties to the Treaty, to the Svalbard Oh, Canada is too? I The Soviet Union, [HILL} rights because exert our we were all Treaty. Along with the Soviet Union see. and [GRANDE] Finnish ambassador and the and invited American the declined. I Soviet ambassador. All went up British the and [GRANDE] A memorable occasion to see what it and then we later see. to assert [HILL] and together. I also ambassador, He first said yes, [HILL] but The and the Swedish ambassador, went up there, ambassador Finland. and Sweden, Norway, our rights. Did you also visit probably be deployed like primarily, was the areas where Canadian troops would in north Norway? [GRANDE] Yes. [HILL] Could I ask what you think I been of that as a commitment these days? [GRANDE] commitment I am have there, told that we will almost the indeed been made, probably writing a favour voice of crying our maintaining in the decision has almost been made, that do like in so we if our wilderness. it has not will withdraw from that commitment but gradually. 295 You know, in accordance with 000475 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information procedures, established NATO get out of it entirely. it should take several years to really And Johan Holst, The Norwegian Defense Minister, weeks of ago position. we we everywhere. policy, with Arctic get more Central on into [HILL] Well, more money [GRANDE] on I maintaining Paper on both. I do we for the Canadian agree we to north the in one Forces are Norway if we quicker. there gather our that is Rogers General in in moves favour of our Norwegian commitment. and wait we'll what see comes out of the White that one. little bit to If I Iceland; am you were mistaken, not also Ambassador this problem. of these suppose one should not call them Icelandic fisheries Icelandic periodic fishery problem of fisheries between Iceland and in Icelandic waters, Law of Sea and also this negotiations, negotiations under have with Iceland maritime questions [GRANDE] our simply be a matter of spending somewhat That would Iceland at that time. Sea They would have to put period a to respects In many think in recent years there have been I Turning now a to do have it. Well, [HILL] cannot commitment our We must be able to get direction. we North. imagine what kept it. that difficult and than commitment that its hard to credibility more a Europe we the going to do there, they're so small. some in are think its incompatible with I emphasis our credit for Germany, because in commitment; Northern strong NATO a they but case, commitment our from the withdraw the just here a couple was it difficult to argue with Canada if we say They find making are want pleading it's to be regretted. think that I and the in this On the Law of the a a Well, I problems. Its people who fish very active period in the international, multilateral Law of the the UN. also was other also was What sort with Norway of relations did Canada over fisheries and other period? Sea question, 296 we had very, very close 000476 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information relations Beesley Alan expert on our theirs. on conferences particularly Norway, with all over side and Jens They used to the world, principals, between the two Evansen the Norwegian meet their at and when they legal international at home were they were constantly sending each others telexes which all went through me. It was refreshing. things, and they were both operators, I they mean of energy and full of knowledge, the three in international the helpful to the we would and able. very Norway relationship. these combat on most both high powered, both ful1 fraternity. legal criminals together if you will. how to eye eye saw They were two of lights in this Law of the Sea movement, four leading or both So On sealing, Norway and was very also both used to consult on we types, who when all that us are we terrible anti-sealing saying such nasty things about this that our sealers were were doing was to continue doing what they had been doing for years, not centuries, and how could they be in crime. anything we were days had a fishing dispute with Britain, and sympathetic to the Icelanders. interesting development then from NATO when I was there. very far partners So we were We worked together from that point of view. Iceland in those if mean. so if Left. parliament, members Foreign Minister we kept in to use In was As a not was influence to They heard us, and eventually, withdrew near Communist members members of Communist. keep damn election, they went an several of government, Cabinet. the got to know him well, I him, to Iceland in very close touch with his result of they had fact, Iceland that Also another in The and persuade him to continue on solid ground. in the next election, they swung the NATO, other way. ]HILL[ Of course they had had Communists in parliament right from prior to being in NATO, and then being in NATO some degree segments NATO, and a good in of the population. there so on controversial were Iceland, In fact, right of least at in fact public demonstrations against membership in NATO, deal at concern about the 297 was always among the to certain beginning of by the Communists and then afterwards there was impact of the US presence in 000477 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Keflavik, particularly [GRANDE] ...women. [HILL] Women! [GRANDE] But own there as is just troops, contribute bit a public opinion, talk about To belonging to the Alliance providing they do any in their Icelandic policy Basically, they opinion there, public stage, my if they went into Reykjavik, sparingly. by very few families. is controlled culture. to say language and not wear uniforms and they were allowed out insofar ... they kept the boys, certainly in They did camp. going was I Icelandic on are not have to contribute geography, of of favor in they and are probably more like the Swedes than they are like the Norwegians in viewing terms of know they American to close the of not British stooges. Nor do they want Canada They speak [HILL] It For one thing, in the dispute bit of a was with the too. also But if as than to the Icelandic community of in NATO for lesson a British, and there the was lesson in one for or was a lot of possibly among some that however a ways. two the Icelanders there know I country might be, it does have equality that, as They are closer even sympathy in Scandinavia for the Icelanders, and others be. to mentioned Canadian sympathy you themselves of Iceland. Western as country, other any to as think They world. Western do in Canada here part they in many respects. Denmark as but Western are or themselves very real small sense, a in it really wants to, it can always pull out of the Alliance if need be. think that I was something that was brought forcibly, in that period, inside NATO. [GRANDE] That is right. There was out very fear that NATO's secrets some would be filtered through the Communist International or something, but I on a do not think they had great need-to-know Government did information; as not access to military secrets. basis, this information, really have that distinct from much It's and the Iceland need for military political. 298 000478 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [HILL] Well, what happens to was But in up later again with the about that in the '70s about it way a you have Communist ministers in government, which if come speculation think that was the beginning of this question of I to seemed have Portuguese. France, handled been There and was Italy too. without too much difficulty. [GRANDE] Yes, [HILL] I It seemed think I the question the case mean to be so. upset seemed to be more of ways in the press about these things than there inside NATO headquarters sure if that is misreading the as I presented NATO, of was access the Cabinet this, the same left There like fisheries, [HILL] I have a I not I am a, never problems of the you know two pro- a of them, to any information as far the were as wing members of positions aware concerned. time they had it was at that time, these have at well always had He the members of opinion such as capitals. Minister, and between the Foreign they would control conscious of and Alliance. the if you will, if need be, rest to it. situation. knowledge, Communist to my a in allied or round that the Icelandic Prime Minister who has know on. so found was [GRANDE] information and to they that ever been access to So bow they to were public result of the election, a the in certain government think. couple of other questions on this period if have time for them today, or we might leave them till later. we From Soviet Union has mounted diplomatic campaigns aimed at the Scandinavian members of NATO, designed, I think, to time to time the raise thoughts that being in ought to in the period of the Bulganin move NATO is provocative and perhaps direction letters, of I Sweden. governments to see would how Norwegian the respond. I is that whole think, around 1954-1955 perhaps, which was quite a major issue at the time. carefully There they was 299 People watched fairly and wondering other Scandinavian whether there was 000479 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information anything [GRANDE] of kind while you of that '68-72. No, if there I been don't have anything specific. as far [GRANDE] No, I [HILL] No. [GRANDE] Norway, have kind of that was as concern when I there, was They rights. human about what concerned very [GRANDE] When the Norwegians were of Council the Colonels very followed very have heard of they were Norway was Europe prominent very the in that time were devoted position their NATO rights human on in Greece for power involved in Athens, And in in some fact, through prominent in this. world, developing the and of proceedings They were course, and you in Biafra in those days. was were that, to role. far As of joining the and a They sympathy. were But conscious Common They Market, lot of their resources government resources, to get the Alliance as responsibilities very seriously. thinking in terms trying and going to this. latter part of my stay, towards the great about closely the Biafra war and the atrocities that concerned they took their at are was in were opposed much against the Colonels. also concerned was problems. Intra-NATO Right. not may they are often holier than thou, but they [HILL] There know. I and instance. just wondering I was in that period. promoters, the Norwegians, were period in the don't think so. in developments really, that in mind something? Do you have [HILL] in Scandinavia? anything like recall don't I were developing their to that didn't detract from of how closely they had co-operated with Canada in the days of Halvard Lange and Lester Pearson, so-called two of the Three Wise Men. Ottawa-Oslo axis. We They wanted both paid lip 300 to continue the service to it, but 000480 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information to be frank I didn't I mean help to takes more than firm axis and to Ottawa, from it didn't get that much encouragement in those days, we we in us develop this anything meaningful. into cocktail parties and so on to develop a weren't given much meat from Ottawa in those days path. that personal relationships But very were good. [HILL] It is focused always seemed to central on just referring not Europe to NATO, very little attention to of, role at Still obviously felt that Well, [GRANDE] in general; Europe extent, I mean I am and there seems to be it is though we have the CAST force focused in that even not there wasn't much there large very a on Scandinavian affairs and certainly to the Norway in NATO, say, moment. the to but Canadian view that the me used be to direction. You interest. a lot visits of and social events, but not high profile projects. [HILL] Right. [GRANDE] So reading the on they tended other between be to day you know, Canada and forgotten. Even today, I was there are all kinds of visits going Norway and relationships, scientific co-operation, all kinds of co-operation in various fields, but they don't get much concerned, and publicity. the As far as big things, you are of Central Europe, terms Northern [HILL] or the two right, governments are Ottawa thinks in and of Britain occasionally, rather than Southern Europe. Right. What [GRANDE] about relations with Iceland? Are they very important? doubt it. There is probably one corner of one desk in External Affairs that deals with Iceland. I I think they are lovely people, 301 trusting people and very 000481 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document ent divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information high intelligent, very world. postman has written at Every [HILL] Written them Norway while Community. you membership on time, on the How much attention was part of the Canadian government? was thinking were in It turned out to be Common Market. So we were very and remember I before the vote on if they did please take this, terms interested concluding a to see whether making representations to the Norwegians Norwegian membership in the Common Market asking become members of the Common Market, would they this, this, and this into account in considering The the Common Market. All the a relationship with Norwegian government misjudged the mood of diplomats including yours truly misjudged the of the Norwegian people and we all unto mood it, to member of the Common a Canada's position and Canada's desire to have people. of us contractual agreement a going to be involved in becoming was Market, time agreement. contractual with the that at we by devoted was and also why positive? the result not attention of amount European the Why because the in it go through? fair say. there, involved in following it, A the What about the referendum in was [GRANDE] them, books, they ten of your time How much Norway that in read them. or were least highest the there, rate Obviously that was a big issue. paid to it at didn't literacy man a prophesied that Norway would join, the vote would in favour of membership, Norway would become a member of the Common Market; and we were all wrong, the Basically, There is still and of the Norwegians big powers. join NATO then. Well were prepared not And yet you of foremost go to the Germans, can ask of the into day. Europe. of the French, quickly why did they me they joined NATO in earlier days, they joined right after the beginning of NATO. NATO it would be but that including the government certain distrust a be close, And security concerns were in their minds in those days. They never regret that. I am quite sure that they will stay in NATO for as long as we will. But they weren't movement of in the think a United prepared United Europe, get completely they They might Europe. there is still to a weren't go sure back, enmeshed this they wanted to be join. I they might better than 50/50 chance that 302 in Norway will 000482 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information join the Common political Market its for economic own but reasons not reasons. [HILL] Were there certain economic interests which were opposed to membership? [GRANDE] The the did join, event Nordic community was divided Sweden did not. course. EFTA was still, with Finland, Sweden, those days of in and Norway, Denmark full in swing in Denmark and the UK. [HILL] Yes, that's right, Austria and Switzerland [GRANDE] If the Common had been Market would have joined overwhelmingly. is Nordic co-operation. [HILL] But I mean, that farmers [GRANDE] that Very than anyone Oh much. Norwegian farmers very much. ask Don't me why, the the farmers have benefitted more mean sure against are Norway particular segments like the some membership the in I me, thing, Nordic opposed to membership? were intricacies escape there well. Their first loyalty, their first priority, were a as of it the Common their and Market, fishermen, but the the rural people are definitely against it; and the business people, by and large, for are it, but they are outnumbered by the non-business people in the country. [HILL] Just part the of one Allies implications for [GRANDE] Not don't know. final question: rejecting that Norwegian concern, I don't [HILL] Well, think thank there any membership concern might on the had have membership in NATO? no. Certainly not concern. was Maybe among the European Allies. in Canada. Canada didn't have I that so. you very much. 303 000483 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loí sur l'accès à l'information Part VI [HILL] Ambassador with your work in stages those talks were, for number of a been have Firstly, reasons. first Canadian in Vienna at what of the one useful is to in our present excercise think I crucial most think it I negotiations devote some time to the MBFR the you were there and to believe, I negotiations. in those far so you in retrospect me interview will deal our Canada's representative at the MBFR negotiations as to Ambassador to Grande, this part of In fact, Vienna. seems 1973-76 MBFR Ambassador, - Reykjavik recent the Summit emphasized the importance of conventional force reductions or at is now the conventional least clear--the West Europeans Allies have made it clear--that they will nuclear not all be that unless forces question of happy with conventional balance. the very done much a for case direct more the think, is I linked directly to NATO, are linkage to than, NATO are in a way not, e.g., it example, for in address the to Second thing, that many of the other arms control negotiations is reductions large something is there the MBFR negotiations that because it balance in Europe, force is the CSCE. [GRANDE] Yes, [HILL] And thirdly, I think MBFR is an interesting case from the indeed. perspective of Canadian foreign policy, related and NATO mechanisms general good, that security, even and in many ways have less Allies, limited in that interest of the other Allies. of direct in; negotiations. it is of impact something course case, I mean the say, peace in terms of the of the Canadian force in Europe some but call, though the direct interests of this country are rather a might you the pursuit of international is to say relatively limited size to that of what for of Canada working through on Canada which Canada is And an MBFR than direct some of the other taking great participant Do you have any comment on those 304 compared agreement might Canada has been a as in the points? 000484 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [GRANDE] would I after started negotiations recall, in Europe. The what with agree had Canada In say. you forces, its cut fact the you if inclination of all of us professionals was to keep the Canadian forces at least at their existing strength or to increase them rather than reduce them. to contribute to what you say, NATO. I mean there is some [HILL] involved which is really are as compared with Geneva or something like that, negotiations, which started later in to day. this June. I wonder, at then, So, exploratory talks which began 28 is at the MBFR on Kissinger went June of 1972, other things, to to there two negotiations, for exploratory talks, full so deal here is linked to Nixon, think it in I was I Treaty, and so on the movement towards those Among on. then the full So, talks CSCE one CSCE, on negotiations, the crucial of those dates in order to make the MBFR and then the aspects the agreement in this stick, that the movement forward could take place in these two sets of negotiations. easy all But it seems, as that to smoothly and easily Geneva until switched to Vienna. took I recall that this was not it, an period in terms of this forward movement; it didn't take place with regard to the MBFR talks, go thinking of am a things which arose when Dr. were done describe could quite closely was preparatory MBFR negotiations. to respect was What I you lasted till which essentially amounted to the dates being set multilateral the a the and with the SALT was with 1973 with President Moscow deal These in 31 January if to the and have start the movement towards MBFR, the movement towards CSCE. '73 will beginning, the go on we little bit how the talks started. that MBFR, where linkage but not to the same degree. continued fact or being controlled by exploratory talks, and surrounding issues, and then to MBFR control arms The first part that I want to look at here actual really So that reinforces is the only negotiation where and it reduction arms reduction agreement. a My mandate of course was about and most of the last In fact the place on the 31st of January. in Vienna, in fact, but that is about all 305 if I am mistaken, not the NATO allies expected to minute, and then they were actually That was in the Hofberg Palace key thing was they did at that it that time. And I 000485 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information wonder you could tell if [GRANDE] Yes. wasn't I something about that directly involved in us period. preparations the leading up to the MBFR exploratory talks but I was there right from beginning the conscious keep the agree to MBFR before and we are January still hadn't had date 1973, were of to each of negotiations. At that time we and to we side, from the Soviet decided we try and do set The representatives Ad this on a in did assemble is known up what to preparatory some We the assemble to be done and to mark time. NATO. summoned were the as Hoc Group those who had been especially designated by their governments to represent them at earmarked for that. down sat But we agreement an of meeting in Brussels and Group these two. link to representatives the MBFR headquarters work if there was any to Hoc the Nevertheless place. and a effort one. definite agreement, a at NATO and had conscious CSCE to agree they have won in a sense by concluding proposed participants in Brussels a still waiting to conclude in Brussels they made they would insisted kind of friendly rivalry with them to make progress. a course Ad NATO countries Soviets Now of firm the I had we recall, as So a was MBFR, definitely linked fact, continuing. there the in and, though that to me seems by NATo and by the other member countries to effort made together; Also, It CSCE, which you mention, and the that them. of agenda, there, we they went so the I exploratory talks. I was the Canadian remember at the very first meeting when didn't have a chairman, Somebody, alphabetically. didn't we I we any have guess somebody in the secretariat, maybe you Roger, said let's start with Belgium, how about Belgium being the chairman but the Belgian hadn't turned up yet, me and so I they went became that at that we hadn't pack his CA, Canada, from so first Chairman of stage the American, heard bag the to the and go back the finger the Ad Jock Dean, Soviets--and he to Washington was was a meeting or Group. very all pointed at set I know impatient-I think to and I had to restrain him and tell him that it would be much better for have Hoc was two and then try and form us some to stay there and kind of a plan of action. 306 000486 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [HILL) said you You the Ad Hoc Group. [GRANDE] to at I wanted to to agree what we would at that stage, progress in peer into the future and We had to Brussels armed once we met thing. mostly it was and it shows how eager the Americans with the three Americans to came But were meeting the position four or administrative an decide them at the But days, those Chairman of decide what they and to say to the Warsaw Pact side preparatory talks. even sit down together about. talk first assorted representatives bunch of a the as entail? What did that trying to get was least designated were papers in for in their briefcases which they had worked out in Washington, after consultation with a [HILL} There already of was also course point, that at including Canada. few countries which a NATO negotiating mandate had been out recall I worked previous summer and which still stood in its broad terms. maybe there had been Well, [GRANDE] some the However, developments since. throughout the negotiation--starting at the very beginning--we realized that our mandate was really a tactical one, as distinct [HILL] was from The strategic one. a mandate worked Brussels in previous the summer strategic one. a [GRANDE] Sometimes that went to back 1973, but "Okay, was hurried a ourselves in NATO and agreed the to Geneva and we won't meet in we there line became blurred. Brussels and saying, Soviets So out date arouse going to descend our will we meet Geneva. you place. get on too, We had I to reply a the 31st of We suggest Council we upon them. And so didn't know what We we January meet in Vienna". capitals between and guess, cancel did pack our we and quickly everything in.... were bags and go to didn't know where we were going the format would be 307 we the from ambassadors in Vienna and tell them we Vienna for the opening meeting. to meet; finally did consultation again the and we But at any rate, or anything. We 000487 �Document disclosed underthe Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information just knew that going were we Warsaw Pact representatives somehow meet to city of Vienna. in the the with other or Do you want me to go on? [HILL] wonder if I [GRANDE] I make contacts. as We, an occasionally we Embassy, but during on all as know do I to the ended up went remaining the by run German the we had to tried we historic interest, of Embassy And later British the or Embassy. in the American talks Later Ad Hoc Group got its own our own conference room and Well, we secretariat representatives. the that met in Vienna as soon Ad Hoc Group, meeting place, The usually we which was on it. about accommodation and you remember so little bit about a American Embassy Conference Room to begin with. was the on remember arrived. had all we don't us always fascinating. The story is first meeting. some would tell you did make some preliminary contacts, through the Embassies, with the Soviets; meet now we in a huge meet, to room - and less right, we and nearest to go room and place, - marched into the we of row we suppose 15 horse-shoe. the grabbed or as were order or we up Bulgarian in the first 3 Canada, on one CA. or So And row, we were hole in the a one I found myself side and I think Hungary, These were all the potential participants; I in were didn't know what was a we horse shoe dashed next I to think to the attempt that last them. think, I no except they wanted the delegations handing chairs going up to the else, 4 had that. we so arrived anything and the Americans grabbed the last recall. still vacant and made suppose, the they Austrians the so rows of had for I would the Austrians were and because room Soviets sense as got there; and it So, chairs that alphabetical in we were a Anyway, didn't know them. shaped thing with I of glamorous we where one laissez passers which they the format would be before front Not the left, and centre--they didn't know us from and control, 2:30 say the entrance with there at Austrian hosts that in the Hofburg Palace. time a our appointed hour we all drove up the ground agreed with was much older a agreed Before out it and the row I I guess if that makes next to the forget, maybe Hungary. both what later became 308 000488 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information indirect and direct the everyone participants agreed to anyone being chairman, the left hand started side Bulgarian, his own third, delegation and make We this I was conference fulfilled, and said and said I I succeed and insist that know last think, the American, [HILL] who came That welcome us. But he didn't were welcomed translation [HILL] while, I so things being speak. to to or So said it looks like one Soviet, and we will he in different room, a going was to come an and in stay and he was quite right not to stay. his to not that city. Again there wasn't any what he said. sure meeting for quite think, and then you really went to work for sometime in I informal That's who Soviets. contacts and right. would I preparing for in other words try to made so make one contacts other with the Poles and decide was what would be programme contacts contacts; would make contacts with the our together and what we would discuss 309 the next meetings forth. informal The Americans should be there and the going the mandate prepared text any So then you adjourned after this first and making decided But this was alerted us am the Ad Hoc Group, [GRANDE] a Canadian it really. was that's true. Yes, We a have was in? ante-room. just the I What about the question of the Austrian Foreign Minister [GRANDE] He no that time. these we were I am the meet again some time. the think, in I with we on right around the table and the last I represent I at was it went, one We hadn't And he spoke out, happy to be here, and anything because we didn't was My memory recalls that this guy was this sort of baloney without all there anyone there. didn't have translation think, I after so the first person in the row on speak but I might be wrong. language. the about so to delegation of whatever it is. a And seemed to be seated there wasn't any chairman; microphone out there but there wasn't a there. were it took was place. obvious We the usually in contacts with Czechs so on. and somebody But what we else had to and how often we would meet and so on. Because the purpose 000489 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information preparatory meetings, exploratory meetings of these meetings, and decide to try negotiations, force agreement--it wasn't having meetings, guess, once members on meetings. were preliminary meetings think I formal got we difficulty--an agreement much too for Eventually negotiations. reduction with talks, formal our the now, as same to I week, and to having informal meetings of two or three a each side, These were took these out mandate for a on was place in hotels, to peoples' homes. in used us respective our or rooms it turned as time most of At that hotel our and East-West, to be rotated, we so place in between the preliminary take embassies. [HILL] With regards to the actual exploratory talks between East and West, as a mandate working take you mentioned, complete, full negotiations. for the eventual would take place, out how the meetings and place, But on. they were to the question of issue of this about What This meant where mentioned also you participants. indirect and direct so objectives was to work out of the one participation? Well, [GRANDE] NATO side, but only those reduction stationed troops still had it -- that whatever that came to be, direct participants, involved in matters territory participants. in because which the Other were would have troops and so domestic situation so, members reduction and affect Those both area agreed, in their the area, full time be fully troops or their with troops area would alliances and those be would direct also participants. course be You came didn't, they did not and went, depending on the country, during the talks, during 310 the to participate although they Iceland of Portugal - right to their called indirect not that fact agreed reduction every reduction of were and don't. the the on Hungary was to be included the area. that France decided invited to do or not they have proposed present at the meetings and will recall accept to the decided, was should be direct participants, territory in their reduction with it defined troops in with those in be to controversial point being whether in when prepared seemed everyone with area don't know exactly I the 000490 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information The Warsaw Pact side went through the negotiations. procedure. the At the plenary meetings, to speak right never had any voting, had who much and more it didn't come down to so often than there, but distinction was [HILL] think Portugal I the actual conference, participants. the direct as and who didn't. vote a as was It direct the it didn't sort of indirect participants had the The indirect participants spoke just Group. more just the same a the question of same in the Ad Hoc much and I suspect as participants. mean the So much. that actually didn't attend the plenaries, it did attend the Ad Hoc Group, but We if I am not mistaken. [GRANDE] they did attend Yes, had their problems at home. recall, the and then it was ambassador there other Ad Hoc Group except when they the times, they left, At those very ticklish matter with NATO. a understanding. very was allies didn't want the left He wing members of to ambassador informed and he didn't ask questions to access all of our the you may However, that knew secrets. government have as the Portuguese kept We the he shouldn't have asked. [HILL] I wonder if could just we look briefly little bit a further at the negotiating machinery, because I think this is quite interesting in terms of the linkage between MBFR and NATO. recall it, I think it was case a As I that you had the plenary sessions in Vienna which were attended by the participants, then you had the Ad Group Hoc instructions their as caucus. from mentioned that there were there sometimes [GRANDE] on Vienna on capitals As some fact plus Group got broad I think you kind of basic principles, already but was there weren't that many instructions sent it evolved, they had the Ad Hoc Group. ambassador, Hoc but it also got instructions tactics. the on Ad conflict between tactics and strategy? a Well, in tactics. Council, from the NATO directly The Jock a lot of high priced Particularly Dean, plus 311 the help in Americans had the Secretary of the Army an Stan 000491 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi i su sur l'accès à l'information Others had equally high priced delegations there. Reiser. decided in the end the our tactics. own blessing of governments' did instructions Policy but Council, from home. direct also instructions directly different we from would seek it. through government, from they needed that the NATO council or come felt If we So we Maybe some delegations got their own governments, as compared to those they received through the NATO Council. didn't often have any problems in [HILL] fact, In Pact on the But we regard. detailed tactics of dealing with the Warsaw day-to-day basis, a that NATO the presumably then worked out were in the Ad Hoc Group. [GRANDE] Group. We decided session, on behalf of NATO. there would who One well as for his own government. plenary meetings only the were Following were them, spokesman. he would say. speak, would maybe present would go our it case the and over In some cases, a if I knew of This they would side had a traditionally the was I importantly, the was go. I going was to have If suppose, had time we might we or we might not. in great detail used to again, Warsaw deciding exactly how drafts have And decided on the Ad Hoc Group informal negotiating sessions with the We to draft to the Ad Hoc Group and they it with a fine tooth comb. more tactics Pact. kept. was Each send it back to our governments for approval, also, They them. record formal a conferences. In as in the Ad Hoc Group we decided who would speak and what But I behalf of NATO on should have mentioned that these which in plenary next the in That was the purpose of press had we speak always spoke I public. meetings designated press Dutch. in the Ad Hoс they were worked out in great detail Yes, of what "talking points", and went through these with a we would far call fine tooth comb. Different delegations drafted them initially, but then they were before these informal negotiating to, and agreed on, worked sessions took place. Then we would also decide who would attend the negotiating sessions, the informal were the real Americans, they were. we the conference. In be present all case, the of them, and and Germans were present very often; the nitty gritty of recognized, had The British negotiating sessions, which to at our 312 000492 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loí sur l'accès à l'information Canadians, developed Dutch and Belgians it wasn't - did often. less often; formal a format, and so a sort of format. could change it and we The indirect participants never did we participate in the informal negotiations. [HILL] the There and military authorities. NATO civil Yes, that [GRANDE] was also, in the Ad Hoc Group, representatives of were worked with out neutrality. they Austrians knew they [HILL] They countries. I were their used not am quite government, came to protect formally, passports, own how it sure I as NATO guess. The diplomatic lists of the different What I recall is that in the early stages there really negotiations, or anything, they simply alliance-to-alliance, were which is their there, obviously. the on I don't think they were diplomatic protection These Austrian the Actually representatives; interesting. is presumably why the turned up or was no there. bloc-to-bloc, French did did keep not want to join them. [GRANDE] Yes, informed. us very so, although we If they didn't like what was going know somehow [COX] much as they quickly let Did the footnote countries it were? [GRANDE] Not that I [COX] I David. was French other. or Did you have any deviants? add footnotes on the recall, not in those thinking of other Not really, countries getting early days. individual restless and deciding to strike out on their own and perhaps taking their own initiative. [GRANDE] at one We had a time, think it was but deviant, in the person of the Belgian ambassador I don't think it just the man, was you know he 313 a government deviance. was in effect being I told 000493 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information what do to wasn't I sort of that was think the point there is that, Council. there were NATO the fellow but We had that it governmental thing. a [HILL] of time to time. from When the function people who had different ideas, they put their ideas into the hopper in the Council. NATO And that is where the basic negotiating mandates were hammered out. So there immense amount an was consultation that had gone of on prior to this, to the start of negotiations, over a period of about a And, year. since, both guess, I political and [GRANDE] As worked of course, that continued to go in the were the NATo Council unity and alliance cohesion. [COX] So, of Yes, it isn't easy, agreement may know what else may not or maintain- atmosphere of so--an procedurally sound way and the fact that there hasn't been was of did justify it in retrospect. course I month, I think, on every so visit more Brussels we divided that task between and so on. Council in person there, by us, and I think could see questions. who We had us; two we left briefed about happening, not a out what for was, Council and answer 314 a once a quite so we us used to go and were Brussels, and going to say and briefed the certainly by the Secretary General who and who Bill question and was little team there, three of or not. But the Council agreed and this was felt to be useful, by the Grande always sent We worked in the Ad Hoc Group before was There often. was happened. much had to the specific dates and us Council often if anything frequently if nothing represent I don't But whether it did or don't know later procedure developed where the we to tried they could have done, and it worked out very well in those early days. We Governments a you feel that this did We our approaching the negotiation? [GRANDE] an where was successful in doing very various the in ever NATO. things out before they reached us. -and I think we and has done and Council NATO military committees in you say, on was, and so on, and ask sessions after the briefing 000494 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information of the Council. {HILL] You must have at the Council meetings I was Secretariat, didn't report to I to the Secretary General, [GRANDE] been at some of those. that it. but of directly sent telegrammes We of communication. means our was being in the course And yet another aspect of these informal negotations was the bilaterals and these weren't very formally structured. wanted to Czech ambassador the see arrange to take him out for lunch I or would phone I him direct and and the something; If thing same happened several times with other delegations often on the same day and When we gathered on. so things did was to report we say, anything to report lunch with so and on bilaterals. our bilaterals, on your so and he said think he meant this the agenda or I something and so on. mentioned yet, on in the Ad Hoc Group This but so we would about this so he or I did, you The Chairman would so useful. was think I and of the first one tried say or we had that item to tell don't think I that the me have military representatives were there on each delegation too, and they had bi- opposite numbers. lateral contacts with their time ever, I think, that between the two alliances. meet had it been done is still the It This was the first on a basis regular only place where they regularly, which is quite remarkable. [HILL] So, on the whole, feel you that the machinery worked fairly well. [COX] I I don't want to get ahead of you, wondered if you could say East terms European approach. of, negotiating stance. [GRANDE] It was they objected, balanced Was it substance, you will meant is what mean. we did recall, by balance We wish. the Soviet and the how approach in you saw the But right from the very beginning force reductions", and they thought we but you completely wooden for example? pretty rigid. as about stop me if Could you categorize their necessarily not bit more a so meant to the phrase "mutual and: they didn't agree at all to what - and they were quite right, that by balanced reductions that they would reduce more than we would, because they would be starting off 315 000495 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument ent divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'íinformation from a higher, a much higher they reject that till of them, meet some call it MBFR. [HILL] Of this day. which is Negotiations It Europe, and Associated Measures, [GRANDE] Mutual imbalance, or still I they refuse the talks Force is to still not Reductions in something like that. No one [GRANDE] I didn't general desire detected this on the flexibility, any evidence of see in early days the and forces of arms in measures. Something like that. a of Reduction no? [HILL] was title Conventional on Europe and associated Central them, and remember it. ever can they never agreed to that, interesting in itself, MBFR. is So Whenever I meet official the course level. succeed. to Eastern side as well except as on there think I our own. I we guess this reflected the general East-West atmosphere at that time, which pretty good, hopeful in the early days. was way, the think, I time first were, flexible Hungarians anything, less I personal level, talks with them. position were always suppose I in Canadian Czechoslovakia We the on and had we at is in their mind they -- am not is in the days ago and big Czech ambassador, my contact up I leagues now saw as it very very centre.The wouldn't say but they were and this was career. the first to right now. back home. He He Central was here often the Czech. often compared to Canada, Deputy Head of the Foreign Department of the He -- why, sure throughout my diplomatic really friendly with the For on. loose, some the My opposite number, I so really didn't detect any more of didn't want them to diplomacy, and I have maintained allowed were forthcoming wall. and I have noticed this friendly and periphery than very Moscow inclined to stone happens Westerners, us on to be of them suppose many individually, interesting a on a They went out of their one is I think, I became anyway, now the Committee. just a few him. 316 000496 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [HILL] It's maybe because both countries begin with c. [GRANDE] At the United Nations in the old days we were with the Byelo-Russians for the [HILL] Well, extremely friendly with Comoros. than contacts with them, in between us, because the Cambodia [HILL] I is another glad am member and ask put you common by that working in one took position, that good Cap Verde was stuck quite, Not about differences question David, because out period and fairly large you felt reasonable, for there or policies the NATO example Turkey's compared as with look at one or two of their which is process. the main well-constructed, obviously, it Was as your you there So I differences, are mean I mentioned, a that bound wondered if at to we be could different countries starting with the impression But radically different strategic Canada's, particular policies, I group differences of perception. were of would like to go I the exploratory talks. of differences of perception and policy. and made positions with which they could deal with the East. then, nonetheless, if in this group the impression succeeded in. came few questions about varying perceptions a in the Western have had we sooner got case. attitudes of the Eastern groups, on no I remained. contact [GRANDE] But Union, that work went down the drain. all so new a reason. same Inter-Parliamentary the in once palsy walsy United key factor at the States, in this whole beginning of the exploratory talks, including the run up period to them in the last part of 1972, keen to move and then in the early part of 1973, that the US was quickly? definitely was. They showed evidence of this by coming very well prepared with position papers already worked out on a number of subjects. They drove us hard, as it were, in [GRANDE] Vienna. were Yes, it We had required, meetings at all hours of the night and day if they and although there were happy social occasions, even 317 000497 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgué en vertu de these for substantive used were they instructions, had delegation huge a They purposes. stage, one Americans, they had all the government agencies right there spot, so they could almost make their own control arms they had State the the on policy there; they had disarmament agency representatives right there, and they had all kinds of people from the the CIA right there, Department, both on the bilateral side, and even those on the economic side occasionally; They fly to used special back on and they so special occasions provided to them by plane the sparing were to effort. no Washington government, U.S. in a U.S. a military plane, fly back to Washington for special consultations when necessary. Later on in the exercise, a couple of years later Which is just bigger picture. At on, they weren't able to get their special plane. one example of in how much they counted the that stage they counted very much. Why [HILL] was there this don't know. of sense urgency their on part, in your view? Well, [GRANDE] I The exploratory talks just were before Watergate, weren't they? [HILL] Yes, before Watergate started. [GRANDE] And it was after up about this in the they just wanted détente. It was to the SALT American I, there in fact was a big plaque Embassy conference room. they wanted keep rolling, prevailing mood. I to I build guess up the don't think anyone in NATо disagreed. [HILL] There is [GRANDE] You know, world bilaterally which there was I a theory that, in fact there is theory they the with the Soviet some evidence, Union, I guess, . wanted to run the there is that theory of because it seems to me, if recall, the Americans did negotiate some treaty secretly with the Soviet Union on nuclear war prevention, without consulting NATо. 318 - Loi sur l'accès à l'information flooded with were at la 000498 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information That was essentially what I was driving at, because there [HILL] is a book by Chase, James who used to the be Affairs, who has the argument that the U.S. referred to "the as new establish close links with pentagonal world structure with That all went by the board subsequently because somebody's part or [GRANDE] in Well, the They spent personnel resources establish a Vienna. Very personalities so they on, more imagination on terms from that perspective out try and to the tell relationship with Whether from the negotiations he did Yes. allies who counted. the that because of other things, Jock Dean had this was So and energy I well They as did delegation in Soviet was and time as in thing this make their ones [GRANDE] [GRANDE] of amount You mentioned personalities. Right, Japan and China. was [HILL] [HILL] kind of Watergate, but to were convenient. or to of terrific and good all went a that very general very Americans opponents was not. succeed. their which form some united Europe, a it is always very hard to pin down if it Vienna, then Soviets and the following what he was policy", foreign American editor of Foreign because of the don't know. special relationship with the Soviets in Berlin. that with Khlestov? they knew each other. Khlestov was the Soviet ambassador. [HILL] And had Khlestov been in Berlin for the Berlin negotiations? [GRANDE] I [HILL] As an think he was involved in them. ambassador on from Ottawa of where US the spot, did you get any assessments policy was going 319 at that time? I am sure 000499 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information got you assessments wondered about President what on don't remember receiving any. I good government would afford it and occasionally, for major force did the policy the US was on about us but not often enough. to pick people's we We did go back when did [GRANDE] No, Sir. [HILL] But, I far as back home? come was concerned, was really one's own and conversations with US and other allied colleagues. [GRANDE] a formed Yes, there was lot friendships own your of that. and I line up We course. close last question One think, there had been It was on but the was Did you this 1971, I question certainly there was a great feeling of pressure from came up there any get and to The Mansfield Amendment was on any in the middle of feeling sense and right the MBFR process; beginning people were very conscious of that. But Prior Amendment, the Mansfield the Mansfield Amendment Amendment with the British same the Americans. of unilateral reductions in US forces. defeated, So the Germans to them. were [HILL] German Canadians listened to them and the Americans, chipped in whatever they thought. the you He wasn't at the preliminary talks, but he was there later, Ambassador Behrends. on judgement inevitably mean, might you ambassador who is here now in Ottawa. always have views opportunity the main mode of figuring out what was going mean, the US some brains. You didn't have special planes to as us our back to Ottawa come That gave [COX] of I this time? [GRANDE] on a but So, Nixon. people in the department do analyses at going, was Clearly Dr. Kissinger was was as policy Soviet where policy. US world affairs, in of Then '73, which of that during the that that was what was a new from the Mansfield again defeated. exploratory talks? was driving the US delegation? 320 000500 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [GRANDE] it, Yes, certainly it was they didn't try and hide it. and Herald Tribunes regularly and it equally, the Soviets were they knew Nor of the things that one York in the front pages. But except that and you that. of because in high gear in those early days were we our acquainted with that, of course, making any concessions at all weren't we, were read New We all was all driving was trying to get a quick agreement. don't know how important this I was. [HILL] What period, country, what about but explore every single don't want to I Germans, the in this and the say, did they want to sharp end there of or things down a bit? slow [GRANDE] There is country trying any the west Europeans they to get agreements, How keen were Dutch? no right evidence it down. to slow that at Sometimes the Italians, who indirect participants, argued at great length over what seemed were to in general. I mean European west the policies of about us to unimportant points, be d'être, raison instructions, to worry their so but I government canvassed they And had carefully. very us their whole was flanks. the about that mean I remember long long harangues from the Italians but we were all very patient and just heard them out. any specific instructions; hand. Belgian The sometimes. died; Bryan Quarles. agreement piece of weren't He It had lots were hard working and had its as good be a bit of good. He helped He in the our did quite The early days, nuisance a subsequently their First Ambassador. along with Jock Dean. He to team a helped get remarkable British, I think, but this is British place to play in these negotiations and they experience very as to pretty free a very interesting guy who was very too enthusiastic had think, got they were given the mandate of the talks. on of a He was work there reserve. think ambassador The Dutch had considerably. I The Belgians didn't seem to have to throw into the exercise. The Germans always, and viewed themselves very seriously, people there, and played their full part, I they should have, considering the considerable territory 321 000501 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information and troops that involved. were exploratory talks went the there? multilaterals but nonetheless five months. for on linkage to the negotiations going CSCE movement, There was this keenness to get [HILL] on Was What about the in Helsinki at that time, the it the the that case MBFR exploratory talks couldn't wind up before the Helsinki talks wound up? [GRANDE] of wasn't conscious I any recall don't History books might that. of I [COX] Were you very much in touch with the [GRANDE] No, sort waiting for deliberate but wrong, me prove them. NATO, but However, and we sometimes bumped worked in direct into each other in the halls of repeat our External used to going Affairs you In Group. Hoc telegrams to them that sense, we knew on. Did you feel [HILL] Ad the with contact they repeated their telegrammes to us. what was Did we we negotiators? CSCE achieve what the talks went along that you wanted do, to more fairly smoothly? less or within a reasonable time frame? [GRANDE] Well, in the exploratory talks, going to have to stay there for 6-8 a great 5 weeks, something like after that because we arrangements for accommodation and the main conference, once again no had so on one no We were all all -- no just Well, as pretty wel1 Regarding knew how long it would last. the beginning of [HILL] came families. to were were temporary by then, after the five-month exploratory talks, They we made But road. idea Certainly it perhaps. surprise that it lasted that long. exhausted had Everyone expected to stay months. that we the main conference were those who went prepared long for a the actual certainly right. now I would like to move on a bit to 322 000502 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information MBFR negotiations, is from the exploratory talks to the full- that negotiations which began scale Grande, you October 30 on associated with them until were both East and West made a Ambassador 1973. 1976, in that time and specific reduction proposals. number of There were initial Western and Eastern proposals in 1973, 1975-1976, for each side in the winter of from each side, one in '78 and towards acceptance of what is called 900,000 personnel each on 200,000 air personnel. stage agree as this, Negotiations The fact, In the on Mutual and Balanced in Central Europe. lists the proposals in tabular form. at here details but the not are relations and so on some What Force at one such issues I and 87 would like to get of the underlying issues of example, For on. Reductions: On pages 81 they were affected by general the negotations, how West sides did two This is all described in John Keliher's the Search for Arms Control he ceiling of manpower common they have remained apart but data and verification. book: the two sides moved side including 700,000 ground troops and up to on a again eventually two more, and Gradually, '79. one it seems trends in East- to that the me stagnation or the slow down in the negotiations from the middle of 1973 was not issues so much because of the negotiations themselves, themselves, but rather circumstances. There was of already broken out at the end of '73. because course in the middle of How would you period in terms of of surrounding or the political the Watergate affair, which had '73, then the Middle East assess the developments of War that the rate of negotiations? [GRANDE] Watergate certainly affected things. I guess it affected everything. It certainly affected the Americans, as I recall, and perhaps this was They seemed didn't evident. other I early in '74 than in the can of fall '73. they wanted on They had the impression that the people back home have things beginning, so to lack the type of instructions that the spot there. just more the authority to provide them. That was very just presume that this all stemmed from Watergate; were on which was their minds. obvious, longer there in Washington. to Priority given MBFR, Survival came was to at the dissipate, very was no uppermost in the mind of their President. 323 000503 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [COX] Then there [HILL] Right. [GRANDE] That's right. [HILL] President Ford [GRANDE] But Resor stayed all. If I nothing, events, and anyway. kept It and Jock Dean of to give a sort obvious, too obvious on the effect we decisions any weren't There throughout it there was generalization, of (Resor). Ambassador same course suppose that was because I really affect in administration didn't delegation. were no in. came change the American the the change in administration. was Vienna on there of was outside weren't getting very far be to taken even or concessions, obvious concessions to be made in Vienna at that time. It turned out to be a very tough, slow slogging match when you open the record. possibility, it soon turned out, There wasn't any of getting a quick agreement. [GRANDE] I didn't they had Again, dynamic, very Moscow. He notice the same people. bright guy was in difference any the Soviet They had Khlestov, who was apparently held and their legal advisor; he was a in high side. a very regard in very skilful guy; he remained pretty well consistent in his attitude throughout the four years I was there. the same length of time [HILL] there He left the same time I the Helsinki Final [GRANDE] by on so he was there course that such as the CBMs and an agreement contains so on. some Did the in Helsinki have MBFR? Well, Associated of and fact that they were able to arrive at impact did, in 1975, while you were in Vienna, Act elements of military security, any I was. Relating back to CSCE, was as we periodically raised CBMs, Measures in the title. that's what we meant The conference raised the 324 000504 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information issue and it reminded them of it. had an agreement I think Associated Measures if on could have probably we there on anything, among the particularly after the CSCE Helsinki agreement. be a agreement an lever to try and get was never was in Vienna didn't it from their point of view, you indications there Were if wonder I used that as In Vienna it seem enthusiastic very something which the It was something was i.e., they would have had than they wanted to. open up more [COX] Measures. pushing in their minds and therefore there wrong with to We and would mesh, who would supervise it and pursuing the Associated Measures. about West the Soviets very first agreements, Associated on clear how the two and on, so one supposed to was just pursue that a Soviets would not allow could the little bit. on-site verification? [GRANDE] Yes, there was certainly no authoritative statement made by from the time I considering inspections at all, operation by [HILL] was as there there was question, no the Soviets anything more than an espionage the West. And would on-site inspection have been indispensable from the point of view of the West? [GRANDE] were a It depends I what we are talking about you know; if it token agreement between the Americans and the Soviets, then probably not. yes. on But if it were a comprehensive East-West agreement, don't know when national technical They didn't talk [COX] don't I means about it that much in those think would have done the came into its own. days. that national technical means of '74-'75 job as far as troop reductions were concerned. You might have been able to, at that time, reduce tanks, but even then it would have been I think a very tricky operation. [GRANDE] Well, my feeling confirms felt in the Western side that we that I guess. We certainly absolutely had to have that 325 on- 000505 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information site inspection. We that stage. reached never agreement to worry about inspecting [HILL] working away little bit I impression The mean, burst on the forward the of aspects, technical forward movement of always was know, the format talks a that hope when we that you had, was recess in between each round. as broke up instructions, back and that each re-think and agreement. They we There would side I it back Moscow always that hope. round to It [COX] a out that mean, when political impetus from capitals, there must into deal low gear, in times of optimistic, a can with that? a of great movement and they back in would we round, for the way. How did you as there be a so is not much tendency to go perhaps to become less watchful than sense that capitals which we long slog. I diplomat so come for the next as a proposal of that way but there our it see a among ourselves hoped we it didn't work So you started to new urged the Soviets to didn't work out Likewise But with and hopefully advancing the negotiations follow. back come get more forward-looking instructions out of could use in hope break-up just before did. rounds of the to plan be made never You always usually tried to another recess. a three was mean we to consequence, take I instructions. better then was earlier. think it was three, and a fairly lengthy we a case? it, was out gone there been broke up for what maybe four, but could steam had that not the was or year or some in Vienna maybe you all felt that eventually there would be There go the which had movement an verifying. is that while you were get I or didn't have We on. one might be Can you stay you keep people alert and fully involved in those things? [GRANDE] I don't know. This this way, I think. I I No, is the first time this has think we remained as watchful think in the early days we felt that this exercise worthwhile whether or not we the ever first time representatives happened as ever. was in itself reached an agreement, to have for en masse of both alliances meeting 326 000506 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information daily and levels in daily contact with each other diplomatic the of rank structure ambassadors, including also the military. as has since a confidence building kind of a crisis often been suggested that this should control amazing an as well reached an agreement. never we reach of some agreement, an so if on [HILL] to now been we kept I know as major a prospects of are [GRANDE] is on and which the NATO on. is NATO even if we agreement an Still, what they are token agreement. Now we on that, It seems coming are do you to think still? seven as I understand it from years, the big emphasis Council has picked up and trying to negotiate on the mandate now the Soviet side in Vienna at the CSCE or in the expanded for these with corridors of CSCE. mandate is agreed for these talks, which would embrace all the a countries of East and West stationed there, then from these them to do other talks. or the will, Europe, not just those with troops who cannot see MBFR continuing separately I I do not think there thank God. The envisage is in effect MBFR continuing the new name. to warfare. outright these Atlantic-to-the-Urals talks which the Soviets have proposed, are back MBFR agreement unclassified position for the last now If block. think, peering into the future, I through emphasis went into trying initial, an Reflecting an There in Vienna over trying to have on is stumbling substance. questions of my far centre. What about this data and verification question? have there as basis for the in itself to have a token agreement than to begin with. working It The purpose of the conference was that In later years much more sort. ones to viewed this gathered not worthwhile was we up did something to prevent an we confrontation, that the exercise felt control the multilateral felt that we increase in tension and we as be information of amount So I think the years. East-West crisis centre, right all think it was. and I bilateral contacts So guess measure, such was and I levels, all at take place The Americans are more work format or adamant in is less for both that as I of could it is under wanting the new talks only between those countries that have troops which will be affected. Under no circumstances will 327 they accept neutral, 000507 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information having countries non-alliance U.S. [HILL] In other words [GRANDE] Yes, forces sort of two-tiered a two-tiered negotiation. a negotiations new determining what in say is to be in Europe. done with then a conventional on negotiation. and CSCE for everyone, control arms for the members of the two alliances. Soviets The [COX] informally, want. true. is that [GRANDE] If these they are are negotiations are and the Soviets, forced to have them under the larger umbrella, manageable [COX] Stockholm-type conference, a go to which I bilaterally on do not think that, but the comments that in the Roger put it, at least a are interesting about the way situation that in you that there might be facilitator. And I which a one of the limitations of still will is much more MBFR think the most a of could one bloc, third as party, charitable view of is that the neutrals a your negotiations bloc to role for, if not MBFR light suppose that described, credibility to the the the I play some facilitative role, rather than you attach any in comments the idea of putting it into the CCSBNDE, Would There MBFR situation developed structurally and procedurally. say between the Americans want. we then the real than the Stockholm one. These earlier going amount of certain a ... going to be really meaningful negotiations, in the larger context at be About halfway position. half way towards the neutral ... in fact least at is what the Americans do not That do not know what the Canadian view is. I [COX] if preference, some having the NNAs in the negotiations. for Yes, [GRANDE] expressed have might mischievous role. the notion that perhaps structure was the lack of a facilitator? 328 000508 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loii sur su l'accès à l'information [GRANDE] things I A going? think do I that the not prodder, a including the Americans, West, [COX] The [GRANDE] So Soviets say maybe. Sweden and Switzerland cannot see it, them say; a so negotiations. I Some observers as way could group, to just It really I devised to give be something or do put up with could in this umbrella heard that mentioned. never but I say, you toughest sense they could have their say them Stockholm context. negotiating American security. realistically. attaching Stockholm. found the neutral something to what its in in the get to well. as There's think that Congress not trying someone know who facilitated whom at non-allied countries very helpful and by being facilitator the or real occurred to this minute, but I think that might be acceptable, and certainly keeping them fully informed and so on. me [HILL] NATO What frequently so disparity problem? one. the more fundamental problem of MBFR, about mean, I mentions I mean, the fact in can is communiqués, that the central front than the Americans are, problem their on days when I In the was Do you think that we tried to make there, side, and then the Soviets poo-poohed it, NATO's standard line as to why this enough, in Euromissiles, the thing exists are there's some are same the is context in of really not That sort of reverse as kind of here a reverse in Europe now? connection there. a lot of and gave important. weapons nuclear it threatened by Euromissiles, the Americans Soviets [HILL] the to and then you have this basic by NATO. been addressed Interestingly troops closer are be handled? can [GRANDE] this, It's a difficult reinforcement rates and times being different. of obviously has issue Soviets geographic this that be got over? which and were. The not. so, are How many American 200,000? Ground troops? 329 000509 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information they are there. [GRANDE] I mean [HILL] I presume then, [GRANDE] I think there [HILL] What you want is They are not that there is the Atlantic. across limit to how much you can a ask. is. balance, betweeen of sort some the two sides. What about these data and verification problems that have made been [GRANDE] I data. you? Do times; at of much so do not think you'll Certainly [HILL] have think Jonathan Dean in suggested that, if there have to complete agreement a of hell lot a on more and when you reach the stage an agreement on data. providing mean, the if problems, but ones, and so three years the the ago so But was are article about two three years or political will there, then those willing to accept want fundamental he was the degree of some on. sides two more on. was Soviets site inspection and mean an and verification also could be resolved. things could be resolved, I a That may be. I on get ever that, then you do not need when you have I you they resolvable? and confidence and cooperation, trust ago are to, they problems sort can are the out these geographical suggesting that the basic problem attitude the of Soviet military, and particularly the Soviet need to keep control in Eastern Europe, and the general distaste of would disagree the Soviet military for any kind of reductions. [GRANDE] I forced the to judge that not negotiating table. with that, But I but maybe they do not know, we could were not from the record. 330 000510 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [HILL] No. [GRANDE] Well, you see the military did not participate in plenary They said whatever they wanted bilaterally to their opposite numbers, but they did not have a direct contribution meetings and on. so which is discernible. [COX] how Let's say that there were, to the count magnitude that actual had been disparities, roughly of the kind of discussed, but that there really were significant differences. Was there view that a [GRANDE] Well, Lets say from one suppose I it depends can disregard the disparities for thing, are question is, whether I you am I one now are those, of Did too ours type the important. East of agreement you field, Ottawa express persuade the others to get Never. [COX] No? [HILL] That leads or you agreement. We "We realize saying, and all My short this answer on the exploratory talks. on I that there who argue that and say, of sort to your but do not know. is at present and West in the conventional aren't there, [GRANDE] know, aren't," those who agrees in the conventional [COX] view. think we could live with the disparities, de facto parity between There and you convince the Pentagon could not not was yes, on any initial token length about that, in uniform, but that of Certainly you do not need any agreement, talking about. your cooks military point a could live with those disparities? are did talk at great just disagreements about not a field. things are balanced "Leave it alone". impatience, or want you to try and with it? to another question which I have concerning I asked your views 331 on the policies of the 000511 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information United States and on the policies of the Europeans. did assess about ask not perceptions Canadian the MBFR negotiations? negotiations to Canada? [GRANDE] I As this afternoon, on I playing same token, in NATO, that we had to would go all promote the operate closely were we team of this MBFR conference. occasion with Germans, the we for were came to a This co- and was by the sent us helped and as had let we few years before when Trudeau had his big sweep anxious play to our full role What would positions clear, and we that mean were an it. I were a 5% cut in Canadian terms? was not so roughly with or whatever We had our willing to do whatever we had to do. So it was in effect Alliance, taking in We had worked out military what we would do if there percent cut. the on. did we position papers, particularly [HILL] by the instance, think in general Alliance terms, who anxious to have our troops reduced. the was pieces of paper. the Alliance down up, so So occasionally reasoned I talking points and Ottawa new anxious to let all the Europeans know life in back Canada therefore sometimes with the British and others in preparing and preparing just with whatever knowledge and expertise we out success on security. security arrangements, role in Western a had think that we had lost reason to in the organization or in Western interest we including myself, know those in External Affairs here, anxious not to give NATO any were you and in that reduced our forces before these MBFR talks started, situation, would How is the importance of the MBFR What mentioned earlier far. so deliberately I partly to demonstrate an interest in interest in what the Alliance was doing in this field. [GRANDE] A [HILL] It political thing. was also a means for Canada to contribute to general international peace and security. 332 000512 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loii sur l'accès à l'information [GRANDE] Yes, but think that I was of all true the NATO allies. Certainly it was the Canadian position. These negotiations were to some degree promoted initially [HILL] by NATO, And as was a organization, with the allies behind it, of course. as an this done through NATO, then presumably being in NATO was contributing to this particular aspect very valuable way of of international affairs. [GRANDE] Yes, thought forces in chance. is it, and being in not have done we that right. were we NATO who would far MBFR was as we were NATO, in not thing, good a like to take concerned, knowing there sure how, could but a having these two the idea of something contribute were they had if out us alliances closer together could contribute something, quite could we very anxious to continue to show that was Ottawa As If we to were not promoting détente. [COX] position I know it's was, well, a difficult question. Did if not compromised, made you more feel that your awkward, by the reductions which had previously taken place in the Canadian Forces? And perhaps the other side of was leverage, potentially, that: if the would you have felt that there contribution had remained the same? [GRANDE] In practical terms, I think it would not have made any difference. But how can you measure these things, because we have a few thousand less Europe? What importance, ambassador other side, you less troops out of are asking a is very small number anyway in whether whatever, leverage, in Vienna at the conference, than if we as a this gave Canadian with my I think a lot personality you have got. I mean I could take paltry force in Europe and I did. 333 less diplomat, allies, with had retained the same strength. think it made any difference. me I the do not has to do with the a ribbing about our 000513 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [COX] So would you say that the [GRANDE] Maybe the NATO I do not know, in reflected more. Council [HILL] Campbell Ross actually made. were I his reaction to that you should ask John for of of think one was the was course the one So Halstead, well, cuts diplomatic efforts, the pros and cons of an increased this kind of linkage. therefore there is no agree with [GRANDE] cannot I that by the I was fact any more the number cannot one influence, of forces. not to reason in thinking you would just simply not of reasoning? would not agree with it, what see in increasing form of reasoning you would not agree with the I espoused? I correct form that point In other words, influence, therefore there is no Am them. decrease not any see We position would be that reduced contribution should or not be linked to diplomatic presence. cannot had the Who knows. effect. Would it be fair to say that your make there when the maybe in some ways iteven [COX] men was interesting things about to redouble Canada's the military cuts. reverse was saying is to say keep the delegation going around the clock to make that We you're what Halstead, Menzies, Arthur Menzies. not up ... trying that we had I What I say. to no. and that do not agree, was trying withdrawn whatever it was say was to - just how many did we withdraw from Europe? think. [HILL] About 2,500, I [GRANDE] Withdrawing 2,500 slightest of bit negotiations in difference Vienna. men to I I think it would be reduced tremendously. but I my That is all not have any forces in Europe, course, from Europe didn't lack make of power or said. Certainly, if our the it in we did political punch at NATO This has never been tested, of believe that very strongly. 334 000514 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [COX] this guess I argument I was great a just trying to get deal and try find to this: at evidence people use it but for perhaps it's the wrong way of thinking. [GRANDE] think it should be used either way. used as justification for justification is there on to be there. We have a terms is on having on the looking think its the wrong way of I having troops in Europe. role, but the way it works a even of Article II. It's a it is as hasten to I military alliance try to give it the economic dimension we It's still people there, and military, you have to have But though the us in practical quality delegation, add, otherwise you have no raison d'être. essentially, think the I its own if the allies in Europe want sizeable delegation and military side. do not I do not think it should be I dependent as much on the quality of a it. at essentially a military alliance. We're discussing essentially security issues. The political cooperation side of NATO, become of increasingly important to Canada, if to no one else, because the way political cooperation discussions Common Market. get observer status in them but now, an is going to I think, I which leaves us developing in the should somehow we we are other or try to excluded from them right out in left field with the Americans, and that way we want it. is not the [HILL] advocate that are I think that was the point that Gordon Smith was quoted as making recently about the comparison between being at NATO now as compared with when he was there in the '60s. Now, much more is decided among the Europeans before it's put into the NATO Council, and this makes it much more difficult for Canada, if I quote him correctly. [GRANDE] the Dutch, Well, it is. the Belgians I know and there so on, conscious of the Canadian position. are and so that presents the are of countries like Danes, who are very lot They do from the Common Market decisions but we from them, a in many problems and makes it 335 us excluded cases excluded not want all the more 000515 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information important political discussions in the that the meaningful. play in them, and that is the only We have a role to place we have that role to play, [HILL] MBFR of work unlike all the other countries. finish off this bit, to Just time? over You about crisis management and so would how touch on, or crisis on I think individuals, as as the assess if you like. control, like that? important in the longer term. think that is very I you already, talking this did What about the educational process and things [GRANDE] be Council NATO well as governments, based We, what on we reported to them, became much more knowledgeable about the thinking individual a That is almost psychological negotiations, if that has helped to us all make a I do not number a And I certainly in dealing with us think I lasting of was in combinations which by question, I on. Vienna, have one negotiations. of the If some friendships we effect creating more me, an as an had had concrete accomplishment; amazing thing that these two I think it's [HILL] One military, have has a some far of as the to and East-West so good effects agreements, point we to this still is, to mighty military alliances are is, but it for the and it last 13-14 years or marvelous safety valve. the impression that also this understanding and one meeting together daily, and have been more. this on intangibles, would not perhaps have had to stretch as sort of thing to permutations tremendous cumulative a lowering tension, think it's of these get you unique. by the number of people who think if you multiply that participated of members stretching across the so-called Iron Curtain, which last day. whole, participated in the those who any example, and I am individual the as sociological experience, a Certainly for enabled has and think I one. these countries. It countries member delegations. the thing the individual members, the Warsaw Pact, of learned a hell the of NATO system, the NATO the military the last 15 years. lot about balance themselves, through the MBFR process in [GRANDE] Yes. [HILL] And all the analyses that have gone 336 into the thing. I 000516 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information think always one Pact, Warsaw about their what forces, [GRANDE] Yes, not done before. [COX] but on I know at think, in There has been of work tell us lot a Could had you probably too, happening. is impression the has you several occasions given moment everything fact, they have to find out lot of [GRANDE] This is in my present capacity [COX] What kind [GRANDE] There an this is is of together some one them. And the discuss the concept. it in are Vienna. have centres. they have items met two [COX] they think between the they call the idea mainly United in Washington making of and Moscow. right where they one are ... talking States to between them is they there's where you are what discuss has promoted and I think there should be mean to continuing no I times three or are But As They appointed people to they somewhere, one idea. in the first Geneva forget the exact words I got eyeball to eyeball. confrontations becoming as in this whole I think the present agreement fine, but I that comment journalist. a mentioned establishing crisis control centres That is as genuine interest of they and crisis control your was responses have you had? Summit, the American and Soviet Summit. meet respect. international crisis control centre .:.? for know, about made proposals for MBFR the basis you work in that the conference began that little bit a military and NATO any a since the that about the and nuclear Soviet Union, strategic nuclear confrontations, whereas I get the sense that what you talking about is are local confrontations happen one week [GRANDE] Yes, a centre which would which were dangerous be able to consider in terms what might hence. exactly. 337 000517 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [COX] It's a conventional crisis control centre if you like. [GRANDE] Yes, I mean wanted to make there, it could be already a safety valve, in that have I area. or concrete as friendship and the but I not it could think worked is the out too. there play a details It greater but I Maybe you should follow it up. speak to him. that you again there once I the do not suppose role [COX] more a this is moment convening, one of suggest on it but the purposes of that is But it would not be the first time that it's now Hе intangibles. those for interested in working am but conference ... an ill wind nobody any good. that blows Maybe MBFR will be fed into a larger, broader conference; [HILL] but are I I is think somebody who has looked into it more than I have is Jock Dean. has written about it. you as is constantly But I think that the expertise it. in Vienna, right simple as say that does not been very a useful continued in some happen. I have the impression you feel it's exercise up until now, and probably should be form or other unless it's somehow submerged into something else. [GRANDE] this as the Canadian view. the idea, not think it should be, I and I think this is sound to have I have often, far, and the meetings, long time, - obvious basis for them is the Southern Africa, I would just [HILL} 10 one promoted stage but did of having periodic NATO-Warsaw Pact ministerial Some of our bigger brothers did not another a and I think our minister took it up at get very Part VII for like the MBFR Conference. idea. 1976-79 like to go on, if you have the time, say for minutes, to look at the South African period, and this would be Part VIII of this interview. You were Ambassador to South Africa and High Commissioner to Botswana and Lesotho for 1976-79. 338 000518 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de I think the element to always big thing in NATO, a crises that NATO has with the Middle ever East. '73. Those were is problem a at here look too, area, were Group while, [GRANDE] Yes, that comes but back to I not the Canadian rep in situ representative the countries who had not spot. diplomatic missions and so it Council I Contact beginning. I was the five countries who were the five Western the Security Council but who the Contact Group, in Pretoria who formed Germany and Canada, the non-permanent members on the was the at question. the Western on There on and to Namibia issue? the On only members had worst dimensions, same members of the Security Council at the time, were Crisis Also the Namibia you not? on the Southern Africa the the first, right at the was Suez for NATO. quite on think. I Canada's were probably think I very difficult things believe you a the out-of-area question, is been through have been usually had to do One though difficult enough for in la Loi sur l'accès à l'information time, plus Americans, the British the and the French. [HILL} Could you say issues -area as far as something about the NATO is concerned. management I mean of out-of- there been have periodic cries by various people that NATO extend its out-of-area of responsibility into the Southern Atlantic, anywhere. But what is more but that point perhaps is that here you to the have different NATO countries associated in dealing with or up to the whole question. How much of that whole area, African Southern a issue including problem do you think that and where do you gets never see it going, the is facing Namibia for and how NAТО, can NATO best deal with it? [GRANDE] NATO question. NATO. It do not I was think As far as this I is tackled know, it was as a never NATO problem even discussed in were not at NATO. Maybe it was occasionally, but the origins not conceived in Group with a conceived the by NATO or United Nations general desire to in a context NATO and context. set solve the Namibian last and to get it out of the way. 339 If we up as It a or a was Contact problem at long could not solve the South 000519 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'ínformation problem, African up there, which was a hangover from the last war, and do some good, and maybe that in turn could have the subsidiary problem least solve this at you could South African and I am quite situation. government it sure good effect a on That South Africa and was the reasoning, dreamed up in New York rather than was in Brussels. [HILL] But I mean it was [GRANDE] Oh, [HILL] It has an impact on NATO for that reason in that you have involved, NATO members [GRANDE] made it easier to do. It yes. Western group anyway? a least. at The French, for instance, were which they were not doing in Brussels. time, asking, among other things, threat South Africa, to Africa and South Africa, That's [HILL] I is did the as as we so-called a real another question and of these difficult, and That of times. the become suppose what I manage you are NATO members consider the Soviet to Southern come back to. threat which we might one to me there countries Western on are some the If situation African South gets more then these differences in the West may become greater, course may that Certainly the US has different views from others issues. various think what I thinking rather that it seemed was fully at one. different perspectives among different at cooperating these Namibian question greater a am source asking is what things is not of difficulties. do you among the Western resolved yet either. I mean, I think should be done to group? What should Canada try to do to help manage the responses to this problem in Southern Africa? [GRANDE] Well, I do not know whether my in the context of what one thing, am opposed views are very valuable the Canadian government is doing. to I, economic sanctions for many reasons. 340 for I 000520 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information do not they work, think trying to help, hurt they hurt the people and sometimes help the people there and and I think desperate take-overs, are you certainly not going to hurt rich South Africans, plan, I have not got any answers for South in cooperative full scale maximum a African South develop a blacks, but government, meaningful plan involve to simple as that. them get power. go that to There turn, black people We all kinds of are came in close to it, are whites. My indulge operation an possibilities of Its when as for helping decided it, to to the over sharing. power thought, I which is to turn power lack or to operation with the into them not to in our wisdom, We route. to the Africa, pressure force trying are operations you are we not sent to the Commonwealth Emminent Persons group to Pretoria and Capetown; but unfortunately, government for best known reasons deliberately either to them, thing. sort of the same time engage in Zimbabwe. on think there should be much I if we want But sabotaged otherwise or operations by carrying out military attacks this should be revived. the South African to do it, we do maximum punitive operation a I think of this more cannot these it and at against the country. ]HILL[ Where do you see the whole unless something is done fairly soon? South African unity, [GRANDE] maximum point of Western about a year before ago Congress, passed the President. But I still A not at disunity has passed given the the wishes on there up bath which will can be sudden being a five years. There is not There stil1 going to be a breakdown of government and law and order in South Africa. Their armed strong. the surely take place if there is political accommodation and solution is essential. in the next of of blood has already been shed, but not one, American least against package have lot position? Americans, measures bloodless change-over. avoiding the blood the Western the going, And what sort of threat does that pose to Western I think the scene forces They stockpiles. are are far too practically strong. Their infrastructure is independent economically, they have They manufacture or produce by artificial means their 341 000521 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information own petroleum are also masters at through kinds they do all kinds of amazing things, now and obtaining what they do not of channels which will always they and themselves, make exist in this world of ours. they are So They give up. going to break down. not going to all migrate. not are They English South The They wil1 might, but certainly not the Afrikaner whites. Africans going to not are stay right there. [HILL] through NATO, really Canada that much UN issue. [GRANDE) No. I [COX] But given the juxtaposition of your assignments, of more a conscious, would not mix the two. just not po can because its to deal with the South Africans, such, as nothing is there So of South Africa, but of the area, were which one as you affected NATO security? [GRANDE] way That is what I was African South the starting government putting it, claiming that they Cape is kind of route landmark. nuclear But no, Africa and happening. be Soviet a were Who government. I has been security. The years they have exaggerated. important to as naval a day of In this continents and maybe Congress cannot even NATO oceans, to the West I will happen. it remains that, see and Republic but Democratic knows, National African the importance some over That is I important anymore from a strategic point of view. it would suppose and years vital to Western are memorial think I for missiles winging their way do not think it's I a earlier. to say cannot radical and if they but the If if South see that radical becomes do the become the government of South Africa and they retain their links with Moscow and so become on, a which are very strong, democratic republic. worry something to protect? In this about. day of Then But nuclear Africa eventually would South what I suppose weapons, 342 they are I do NATO have trying to think that it still not would 000522 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loí sur l'accès à l'information is strategically [COX] at there you Were important. that the time of the Flash Double famous issue? When South Africa exploded [GRANDE] Certainly they have the know how, you did not hear much about it. they keep the thing fused or not. whether would use for? them India has at least cannot use [COX] I am What would Pakistan to threaten. they nuclear for? weapons South But scientific panel the know you sure use do not know what Africa, United the in eventually decided there was not a nuclear explosion but freak. a But since then people have gone back nuclear nuclear explosion. Given what you have is very There kind of thinking there was to just said, if it were and Africa announcements that Israel armaments and so now on. cooperation close South until a States a explosion, who is making the explosives? [GRANDE] Israel it of the Double Flash, vantage point there, your from they I Caprivi Strip. them up in the But Yes, but couple of nukes? a to is this about very to cut times between despite recent all at day off its supplying of relationship is a very close one, and up The considered worthwhile both ways to continue. I just do not know. think at this point [HILL] Well, I [COX] Do have [HILL] Okay. [COX] I years of we wanted just to one will we close off. minute? ask you, was it jarring detailed pursuit of conventional to go those from force reductions to the direct problem of racism? [GRANDE} Yes, I suppose jarring is a good way to put it. 343 I would 000523 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information not have gone to But South Africa if own any time. choice at having gone to South Africa, I do not regret having been sent there. I think I profited and sense, the Namibian operation, at stage, one mold, sort of threw me knew Did people better. which took up back which I had been in for the [COX] to had my I I over And, 50% of our in a time suppose into the negotiating previous four years in Vienna. they consult with you about MBFR when you had gone South Africa? [GRANDE] The South Africans? [COX] No, Ottawa. [GRANDE] No, typical [COX] Isn't this principal source [GRANDE] There were [HILL] Well, I think we Grande. I think. You are gone extraordinary, though, and forgotten. you must have been the of knowledge and then... others... will close off at this point, Ambassador Thank you very much indeed for coming and joining in this exercise. [GRANDE] It's been a pleasure. 344 000524 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNA00006 Title A name given to the resource George Grande: "In Alliance" Interview Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived “Research - In-House Research - Oral History of Canadian Policy in NATO - Hill Roger,” RG154, Volume number: 13, File number: 2100-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/cf2a9b49aed790e3f93826c375a02757.pdf c3f84d542c60607506bddec8d3e8fe59 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information ROBERT [HILL]* Good morning, Hilburn Falls. We FALLS guest this morning is Admiral our very grateful are participate in this project, Admiral Falls, [FALLS] I'm pleased to be here. [HILL] Admiral Falls, you as oral history of Canadian policy trace the development period, post-war and work to your also as a senior commander. as a to try to obtain Canadian of inside the organization. owing to and are delighted that know what we an is agreeing for join us this morning. could you you to Robert in NATO. interest examine to So we idea of in in here trying are since NATO the detailed work the your as a military planner, and approach this interview is background thinking, and touching on the various phases of your career in the Navy, look to very keen to have you with us, were The way we will some engaged We of some officer, naval are staff officer, by and then Chief of the Defence Staff and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, in more to go on detail. to We at your want to focus work on as the key questions these periods, and to ask how you have them assessed since. saw in the only in reflections on are but also in your specific issues and what they have meant to Canada, to and explanations, interested international peace and security in general. not to NATO, and First of all, think I should spell out the main details of your career. born in enlisted Welland, Ontario, in the R.C.A.F. and in educated 1942, of two them at the time and how you We information last and You I were in Southern Ontario. You pilot. You trained as a transferred to the Royal Navy and served overseas in the Fleet Air Arm. Then you returned to Canada in the Royal Canadian Navy, where you served in aircraft and various carriers, destroyers, staff positions. You rose to a number of air groups Command of BF 870, the RCN's first jet fighter squadron, and afterwards commanded H.M.C.s. *Interviewers: Hill, Cox, Pawelek Chaudière and the aircraft carrier Bonaventure. Your last seagoing 000526 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Your last seagoing Chaudière and the aircraft carrier Bonaventure. appointment, Commander of Atlantic Fleet, as held the rank of Commodore. At that time you Admiral and went to Headquarters in Ottawa Deputy Minister of Defence Staff. Vice-Chief of Policy. for In 1974 Military Committee you became Chairman of the NATO position the you held for the next in 1983, you've Navy President become and a before Just we Canadian and NATO history the past two basic questions, Canada's to relations, arms NATO's we and how did the general are forty years, posing are we did Canada in in this East/West inter-allied relations, by which I mean outside the country and how did it benefit this of how defence, collective disarmament, and pursuit Firstly, NATO. consultation about third areas, area, we utility efforts control discussion, kind of rule of thumb test of the involvement contribute peace and security? international question we are looking at is, how did Canada contribute The second benefit from, NATO's work in other areas of interest to this country. in a as over our examine the various events in As to and a member of the Board of the stressed the kind of things I looking for in this exercise. further Brussels, Canadian Centre the of get into the first phase of perhaps it would be useful if NATO in 1980 In Council of Canada. Atlantic and became and Since retiring from three years. for Arms Control and Disarmament, of appointed Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff and promoted to Admiral. the Chief Rear In 1977 you were selected to be Defence Staff. the promoted were made Vice-Admiral, were when you Associate Assistant as Next you were you in 1971, was One Foreign is referring here Policy for to Canadians the kinds and the of things mentioned recent report of the parliamentary Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations, including all the things that are important to Canada as a country, like the independence, economic aspects are not of the pursuit of national unity, sovereignty and prosperity, and so on. pursuit of international directly related to the work There peace of and NATO, are also those security which such as peace 347 000527 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loí sur l'accès à l'information keeping, the containment of regional conflicts, and resistance to terrorism, although sometimes NATO does get into those things to some degree. [FALLS] that Well, those main areas might have special opinions I all-encompassing, and imply are that evolve my career, and I think that is only partially so, might come out as of these subjects through the interview. go we involvement, my to for position, from my in the sense that application In the instance, Navy, in the it's not very large. [HILL] Well, issues, that these to let's put it this way, are the whole thing. to draw idea you "where things. are But approach them, in the way we as totality, a be to that so are we the approach our we are trying have some are approaching fairly well-disciplined but without coming from". trying We're think that these the criteria which lie behind people's experiences on I That's how we being overly rigid. Part I - Early Years, [HILL] Admiral educated, I to 1942 Falls, you believe, could tell they helped us little of a colour particularly and problems [FALLS] I'm not I schools. in Europe happened. had a your in Chatham, those early outlook on questions on world, years; partly such Ontario, Ontario. wonder if you life I and years how you believe and general in Canada's as and in Welland, involvement also in the of international peace and security? sure very born were that I gave them much thought in those early mundane education in Chatham public and high And of course during my high school years war broke out and I can only remember My best friend and that war was declared and he enough for us to get in it." I one were I curious walking to said "Gee, And rather Bob, I school thing that on the day hope this lasts long thought that was a remark that 348 000528 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information would not have made, I boy to be a raised my University to since my mother had always said pediatrician certainly soldier". became and London; in didn't in have doctor a went I it turned out, As mind to on and is join the military a in high school because cadets my parents. to me more guess I -- of my friends that were leaving to them and than continue with my schooling, my schooling people. later, And came go the on was out it University. I did not do truncated. That's about where I doing by so it seemed that -- guess I happened could leave it I you want of my on to went and somewhat guess to most for most for service early years unless there's anything else I could always pick up that, therefore my education was we and more Finally service. plan the back out of the even into the forces rather that and that turned it as They colleagues. because join I did not join the I itchy at that time got join would I I But such, as Nevertheless, during my high school years, that decided forces. career on eminent an discouraged from was I carried he now joining the cadets was a voluntary activity, and have not "I for the about know that. You mentioned that your [HILL] going into the Armed Forces. Was parents were not there any keen so particular on you reason for that? they didn't object to my joining the Armed [FALLS] No, the sense that it was to. I for not me part. mother's my decision and there there think My father ceased, so none I at all, flying was any I decided to glamorous, as war There was World go not in my close into War. military involvement that I'm aware of, think basically the First it history of was the when no he missed therefore therefore in the First World War, old enough to 1900 and all my not in pressure at on some was born he no disappointment was not was was Forces in in our family, family anyway. So join the Air Force because I thought did many other people, and indeed it is. And because there's that sort of feeling when there's a war going 349 000529 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information that school is perhaps not very relevant, and on interested in school and interested more in got less think I I idea of flying. the inevitable, in any event, that one either had to stay in school or join the forces, there was no in between, and I elected It was to go Part into the forces. II 1942-45 Wartime, - [HILL] As mentioned, you joined the R.C.A.F. and you beginning. flew fighter aircraft in the And then you transferred to the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm after that. could tell us just wonder if I a school marks and number were is, mechanically that I so got also I you. graduated fairly high in class, the those days instructor, to be an about as many off pilots In fact there was overseas as some of colleagues I've glut of a forgotten the names of the Air they needed as Europe. my because pilots, they them, but in into operations. been sent off as through a couple During that of time, an So was, courses a and I of students, Royal the suppose, I instructor, pilots, they could see the it Navy was operationally in had sat been sent I out the suppose of at least not campaign. the went effect they in were let alone to Borden and put graduated them as pilots. looking requirement for it. effects of war advantageous to have for experienced They could European war would be finished fairly soon, aware I you was in just waiting, and waiting, and didn't even do any flying, get think I Force had and were, ground good And the penalty for doing that, at that stage, 2. sent camps, and on happened to have been I guess I In a chronological sense, good pilot, you bit about that period, what kind of duties you had a and what kind of impressions wartime service left [FALLS] believe I but see they were the atomic bomb at that not that stage, officially, and therefore had to prepare for a Pacific And they needed to the Canadian Fleet Air Arm. Forces And this more pilots and so they put out for experienced pilots to transfer was an a call to the opportunity to do what we'd started 350 000530 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information in the first place, which was to do flying experience by then I had enough they wanted I a in Halifax from the transferred I the Air Force to the dark blue of the Navy and shillings and pence. seem took We being after looked lodging I should say. I was light blue of paid pounds, in terrible drop in pay, which didn't a with formed a clothing, and food your went off to Europe, and subsequently to Scotland, so in any event to matter in those days because money wasn't very useful. were a but -- and really qualify, didn't I -- thousand hours and I only had 700 accepted. got become operational, to and food initially England, to You thirty-two of us, ex-R.C.A.F., where fighter squadron in the R.N. Seafires, and we started on workup in Arbroath, Scotland. should say that about I European war Pacific. I packed up week after I arrived in England the a and have forgotten the actual dropped and Japanese sued when the that news broken all out acquisition a of an there called 825 Squadron, squadrons were reduced to of of Canadians. we were who wanted to the Canadian their Those of us who were not squadron moved to upgraded our We - - we in 803 as the was I anti-submarine And both of those in half from 32 cut go home did, on that is pursuing married and who had fighter squadron on and 825 our squadron aircraft - in Ireland Seafire operational training to the and the as to 15s extent of 3s training. continued - and deck no and became of the Canadian Fleet Air Arm or Naval Aviation. that in an responsibilities and were having fun, decided to stay the nucleus major own mentioned, I equivalent peace had course, and those who were rather keen say the married men, their education. have So as in a up was I scenes the to significantly, Essentially those down to 16. an was of time, like carrier. aircraft fighter squadron, squadron, would they the of my first holidays, one obviously behind for when the bomb was but peace, for At that fan. and over decided had Navy hit the of dates city in Scotland, having a week-end away, when training continued we so carried on ASW So we We with landing training. qualified in deck landing on HMCS Warrior which was a Canadian 351 000531 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Somewhere in that era, carrier. time we from the from 32 to 16, reduced started getting paid in in fact, in 1946. felt about into Canada of how I don't think I the thing, it to take seemed much so [HILL] his books this there was that that think everybody impact. of the power while before the implications ever a a new was in you no In world that that longer the pre-war could see, atomic weapons and in fact one [FALLS] Yes, that, it as in I'm was threat happening, [HILL] was a years. a That possibility, And in fact on Canadian all this already thinking were was consciousness into. "fire proof house", a as was going people 1946 no the as it longer had been the case, marriage between long-range bombers, and that nuclear missiles surprised that my first reaction wasn't the fact with some people, military folk kind of irrelevant, the there one the horizon. over were period. He mentioned described out I back dropping of the astounded at already thinking about the impact of Canada because on was security. late of So in terms I think that's a point that John Holmes mentioned that or came we must remember the as then in. sunk of enormity the was horrified was and good stuff. Navy Reserve when anybody who is old enough, must remember, again, of which was I'm not unique in that, But about the the major impact of that, think things, that nuclear weapon. I dollars, all I Canadians become in the Canadian I guess it was, actually made the transition we had to the R.C.N.R., R.N. we were, between, I'm I of war, with that now that surely be war can I don't bombs. atomic this makes us conducted, recall that just surprised that it didn't. think that was of more a sentiment, in the let's say, '40s, the feeling that conventional military power had gone of the window almost. hadn't. Nuclear power has out of some But then changed it became apparent the world but that it hasn't the need for military forces to maintain it ruled stability. 352 000532 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information pound difference at Hiroshima, Incredible. [FALLS] to grasp Part III [HILL] four thousand And that This were Mind you, all we reports. in the Royal Canadian Navy from career Canada, in the Navy and in served By the end of the '60s command of the ships that I in the R.C.N. and the Bonaventure. I wonder if by you had held 1971 also the first You'd commanded the Chaudière you could fill us in a little bit How did the establishment of that period and how it developed. serving or mentioned earlier and jet fighter squadron NATO affect news hard for us was command positions, and worked your way up the received ladder of command. on times larger. 1946-71 You returned to 1946 to 1971. course your covers that was the per the part that was subsequently, and Operational Career, - - enormity of that great big bang. the - had at the time, due three Four times ten to the power of [COX] officers in that period, towards the end of 1949? [FALLS] might This statements, questions of earlier, Roger, good time be a or ground rules if qualify what to to look you at these two that you spoke back like, officer it meant to be a naval concerned, being a naval officer in the post-war years. I think that, as far as I was was reasonably well prescribed in a One knew what, other words believed need to I in, have in general terms, think that there and a I think post-war was sense that and why you was a you had were a job to do. doing it. certain ideology that reasonably valid, that there Canadian Armed Force to ensure we In all was a that the repetition of the earlier two wars didn't take place somewhere in yet and as large a had weapons nuclear The future. the undetermined place in this, but we thought there was a future and 353 000533 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information need for Armed Forces in Canada. a But I'm not implications for Canada and the broader aspects Being here in these two sentences. suppose, Navy, you are going around on summary one-page world. the certainly in communications, that came my days over the garbled, supposedly world news. so really I missed that Anyway, I the material mean there was no great the at we wires thinking; and a matter of in course all my at all. avoiding it get one, been posted, because In fact felt interest, I career. I take it think to at sea about modernity had that just wasn't there part didn't, out sometimes junky, news a of sort a was of in Even do something about it, to I go daily ration. my unless which as sea tendency, interest, get You know I'm kind of part of as you Despite command when I should have been able to couldn't; in fact I or from home, incredible how little information It's what's bit isolated if you go away a outlined military officer, but more particularly in the kind of any about the you officer, naval a that thought I time, and in fact only very gradually thereafter, at that sea. if sure in very I never this end. from the other had someone much a natural strategic did have wasn't staff a question a of kept thinking I'd make an effort I was lack. a Somehow I I seemed to to have before I could sort of apply or think about it. I was posted to jobs that were just too interesting to try and avoid and I had, in fact, I'm not sure one how I hell of would an have into it without subtracting was having too much fun, interesting, enjoyable career. been staff from able to The fact is, that. enjoyment I can When I run came over what should say, to fly in a carrier. into operational but I those background did do. instructing again getting people instructional flying, doing So with that back to Canada, having been back into the business of I I course basically, satisfaction and things which I had to do during that time. maybe fit the And up to the an instructor, in Dartmouth, carrier stage, getting them from pilots That was a short flying as a member of period. a I squadron. to went I I got locally not basic being able back then think about 354 000534 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information three after years reluctantly I get to back, came in Navy. integrate the aviation component was never there tolerated. If Aviation". And should say, were Air "Fleet Canadian a was a all pilots so were term The term at all it to not was just was be "Naval expected to be, all air crew I officers be naval expected to Navy and the Royal possible, indeed there much as Arm". generic think, I deliberate policy decision to a as somewhat This was, the Canadian Canadian Navy had made The off went I watchkeeping certificate. a difference primarily between the fact, pilots and first second. in 1949 So sent was Haida. in H.M.C.S. months, I usually was somewhere between six and nine This guess, I needed was as in a on I kind didn't get back long time. I of to a sea after States to became I a tour in Seafuries, a from However, bit. a sailor, of squadron, a for pilot, a as I I was selected to go down to the United or came And Batsman. back as an L.S.0. so I and Landing Signals Officer. I it was in this period became conscious of That's useful. [FALLS] I don't highlight of think the Canadian of time that it and Navy. the chronological to the [HILL] a So from then fishead, member be to turned out career Landing Signals Officer a this might have for Canada's as As because, on immediately went back to sea of course, become guess that stayed This so-called a as off to Pensacola for six months and went and a I got my think I I enjoyable one. this dual fan of again very a in the carrier "Magnificent". also, but ship's officer. eye-opening experience and became months, six an a and think six months was the minimum I watchkeeping certificate I off to get my watchkeeping certificate of the NATO formed, was opportunities But I'm kind of that digressing now opinion. sticks in occurrence of history certainly or NATO of my my mind history. 355 000535 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Except that it 1949 I was when I was and I was conscious of it. far too It we in were NATO, also, too, was started we in fact from my contained feeling of pride in all of a what were of NATO of NATO, reasonably good Navy, better Navy because it and so I by then 1954 and that was quite and few mine sweepers a celebration. a of the navies had representation there was a all forth, and and I think it I took my was a you with it, but it 1953-54 was was bad fighters, out in weather we'd and a wanted to and in my eyes. know I from the point of view North Atlantic. forecasting or bad luck. back on board It was Fortunately the before, the flight and head they didn't know where but Fortunately they were also they had lots of fuel left, but they take his an that I should bore the all had we - of them Batsman was 1952 in events NATO exercise and it they flew around overtop for a couple of hours. Greenland, social middle the gotten so and airplanes were airborne, our long-range airplanes were too far away. long-range I - sure disaster, sudden fog rolling in, while all this was I'm not occurrence. a Norfolk at that become prominent to Wedding which was almost A lot of navies in ships of Signals Officer Training Northern dramatic rather large gathering NATO started remember too, exercise called guys basically which were destroyers and frigates, the corvettes, and we had most of We, but the carrier was basically my life. in and either much a in what Canada remember in fact being in Norfolk on the fifth anniversary I and a think I reduce in size after the war, down to major ships, our get rid of time, point of view it was had to for awhile, We were left with because ships. us again and aircraft carrier which the wartime Navy didn't. an of course, a learn the ropes Anyway, with other to work Haida; in outside the ship, on and in think, training busy losing sleep and trying to had done during the war. of I mentioned, there was a lack of communication. there to 1949 doing my watchkeeping, was to worry too much about what went as I in was came and know one of our straight west to get I they were going but at to least 356 000536 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information it was land, fuel. Then said he had and a attack aircraft do came by at got airplanes on, dusk very drunk in of again were competition of the objectively as Americans in terms compare can of ourselves And Bonaventure. We competition we bigger. Nevertheless we that we Class us that carried right on think, as fly the because able were was I to out the closest managed to thing we Carrier and larger faster fly in weather that was many aircraft airborne for as had we considerably a have had one, they were to playing were it gave the Essex Class was meant NATO course That is to say, would have loved as got He and of aviation, Essex the they did and keep in the big leagues. of and the pros, size. carrier, as that naval to to fuel wire fortunately. a an cut him and he I feeling think, can I got sort too, of life throughout and the was We was night. bar that with the American carriers, sense in high and fast and rate, a there back, and one American A.D., which is ours something to Canada. a these who was right down, he didn't have enough our that But got did and we of hell a toward this submarine and off We pass and he came one more American an was couple of hundred feet of ceiling. got all we all steamed we enough he sure there, and us it happened to -- the carrier and there as said, it happened to be and so for Greenland of out ran up on the air and came are, we already taken off direction same carrier with he clear patch where a this gang had be in the Greenland when they over United States submarine a hey we've got -- they would be so long as and bad they as could. [HILL] I think there is one point here impression from what I would like to pick up that when you on. I have the sea, and when you are the job at hand, and that's what you're mainly thinking about. got to. But I have the impression You've fifties, reference as naval a compared to for the Navy, an you officer, earlier because say, as era, the Navy you say, you also, at are get on with that kind of you had a was now in NATO. in the fixed And I 357 000537 ������������������������������������������������������������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNA00007 Title A name given to the resource Robert Falls: "In Alliance" Interview Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived “Research - In-House Research - Oral History of Canadian Policy in NATO - Hill Roger,” RG154, Volume number: 13, File number: 2100-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/8abb490c41f5f50df3223a030a79e2f8.pdf 04ade85f07023d5e4298bf119b7f5fda PDF Text Text ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. 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Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNA00008 Title A name given to the resource Charles Belzile: "In Alliance" Interview Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived “Research - In-House Research - Oral History of Canadian Policy in NATO - Hill Roger,” RG154, Volume number: 13, File number: 2100-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ffe965f797faa66398398fed3b319730.pdf c62f089f3a88aa4bb23ad12c53dfd21b PDF Text Text ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. 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Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNA00009 Title A name given to the resource Charles Nixon: "In Alliance" Interview Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived “Research - In-House Research - Oral History of Canadian Policy in NATO - Hill Roger,” RG154, Volume number: 13, File number: 2100-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/9150eb4a859af86f21dec2eab05fa8bf.pdf e0973f4594a7f1848c2301b372fcc71e PDF Text Text ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. 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Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNA00010 Title A name given to the resource Ross Campbell: "In Alliance" Interview Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived “Research - In-House Research - Oral History of Canadian Policy in NATO - Hill Roger,” RG154, Volume number: 13, File number: 2100-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/bd35f4a270ee713b845e43f085b18eeb.pdf bbf73885d7eb0b874ad83c032740e27c PDF Text Text �������������������������������������������������������������������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. 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Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNA00011 Title A name given to the resource Arthur Menzies: "In Alliance" Interview Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived “Research - In-House Research - Oral History of Canadian Policy in NATO - Hill Roger,” RG154, Volume number: 13, File number: 2100-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/53f2909a9831a5954f06fda68c742eeb.pdf 99831941bfa9393ab6f7b27b1b6446af PDF Text Text ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. 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Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNA00012 Title A name given to the resource John Halstead: "In Alliance" Interview Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived “Research - In-House Research - Oral History of Canadian Policy in NATO - Hill Roger,” RG154, Volume number: 13, File number: 2100-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/fecd19c6cd146cf8cf9d264e33240d96.pdf e24bdc5d80885206077baf493c1ff90c PDF Text Text ������������������������������������������������������������������������ Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. 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Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNA00013 Title A name given to the resource James Taylor: "In Alliance" Interview Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived “Research - In-House Research - Oral History of Canadian Policy in NATO - Hill Roger,” RG154, Volume number: 13, File number: 2100-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/9dd0ad31df5373298a28e34996223024.pdf 889911c5f90f1e0b11f33220a3924c52 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information PREFACE transcripts These idea The owe a recording of great deal to many people. experiences views the and senior of Canadian public servants, diplomats and military officers involved in NATO and NATO-related affairs was developed by Geoffrey Pearson, the first Executive International successor, Peace Bernard Director of Security. and Wood, the Canadian the Institute work continued The for under his Institute's present Chief Executive Officer. David Cox was Director Institute's participated in Professors a helpful of launching Research number Jack in of from the study. As the to 1987, he also 1984 the interviews. Granatstein of York Bothwell of Toronto University provided University and Robert helpful advice on interview techniques and transcript preparation. David Karsgaard of the Department of External Affairs assisted in providing access to the NATO files, background work. Section were John Hilliker and for some of the Dacre Cole of preparatory the Historical also very helpful. The interviews themselves were conducted under contract in the summer 1987. of Secretary, Foreign both of the Pawelek, actively heavy task of assisted the first drafts of the A.S.A.P. word processing contract, and and with transcribing preparing additional Editor, Fielding, Eleanor Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Trade, interviews. The Nancy service. the preparatory work and interview tapes and the transcripts was This Institute was is done carried out by under grateful a smal1 to Lynne i 000165 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information President, and Anderson, all her staff, for the great effort that went in to that phase of the work. Thereafter, took Institute Research Administrator, major responsibility of shepherding the transcripts on the through the corrections. Cioiu, Doina drafts, following Her hard work and in-putting and commitment to most of project the the are greatly appreciated. Mary Taylor, editing Institute and reviewing Other Institute work include Cecile one Editor, draft staff who Sicard, of contributed also greatly by the texts. helped with Secretary, and various John parts McLeod, of the Research Assistant. The Contributors also revision process, participated actively in the review and by examining all texts and recommending necessary changes. Thanks are also due to Charles Ritchie, former Deputy Under- Secretary of State for on his experiences The other process work However, on External NATO, for some helpful comments of NATO. was an arduous and complex one, substantive the material issues and itself contains insights, which hopefully well Affairs, appeal a interspersed by administrative wealth of matters. information and the interested public as to the dedicated student of Canadian foreign policy, and of international affairs in general. of will to as Roger Hill Senior Research Fellow ii 000166 �Document disclosed underthe Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information INTRODUCTION agenda. are critical a issue facing a rapidly changing world it. trying to They are to come Europe, watching grips with discussing arrangements, major military forces invasion and occupation of recently to greater Soviet the in Union, in the remainder Western reliance defence United the on stability. Many UN members sent the Persian Gulf Kuwait, and turn back Iraq's to participated in so major a uphold and strengthen the international system by firm effort to resistance do aggression. to This is now and security. time a to can to consider what Canada uphold world order and We stock need standing in the world, to take and to reflect before this country for a in developments modifications Nations for the promotion of global international and contemplating how best to upheaval the considering and today's on public figures and diplomats Once again Canadian and other manage of is order World promote of other and UN members international peace position and Canada's the possibilities that lie on influencing the march of events. Canada has long-standing interest in international peace and security and well-established connections through such bodies in the important international endeavours that doing so, NATO and the country will surely want to play its full part United Nations. This In as we should not forget now that lie ahead. Canada been has actively involved in the quest for world stability, peace and order for a good structures fifty began years. in the The thick work of on the current Second international World in War an exercise known as Post Hostilities Planning; and continued over the next few system. new years as Canada was global discussions a focussed founding member organization, and War period as the keystone of new a new and active looked to a on it in the United Nations supporter of immediate the Post- international security system. iii 000167 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information The more ambitious hopes for United the Nations were soon disappointed owing to the rapidly growing rift between the Soviet Union and the Western world. early 1950s The UN action in Korea in the decision-making. crisis of uphold the 1990-91 order new of endeavour, that - was exception to the an Henceforth until - Persian the United Nations military action in or contain device the Security Council. by Soviet withdrawal for a brief time from Security rule occasioned Council paralyzed This regional disputes peacekeeping. serving was majority great with the attempts to largely focussed played Canada has Gulf a full on role in of UN and similar peacekeeping missions. With dissipation the of original the hopes for United the Nations, Canada's attention turned to alternative arrangements. Together with States countries, 1940s, of the Canada United participated Organization (NATO). Set to Western reassure defence among the of about Atlantic states; and several West European establishment, in the late- and the North Atlantic Treaty 1949, in Europe North member the up in the Treaty the North Atlantic and this new system was designed security; its reaffirm area; democratic well-being promote guarantee and a the ideals sense of community. the South in June 1950, The North Korean invasion of fears that becoming the Soviet militantly Union international expansionist. collective military response the security of Collective defence about and other in This Korea; strengthened, and over the next in year it also Europe a Communism only including regions arrangements not Canadian prompted were triggered a raised concerns Western Europe. were accordingly infantry brigade and twelve squadrons of aircraft were sent to Europe to join other allied forces there. Since those the work of early days, Canada has actively participated in NATO, especially at the military and political levels. iv 000168 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Canada has naval, maintained land and air units North America. and also contributed other forces in Germany, to the defence of the North Atlantic and This country has also played active very a role in management of inter-allied relationships, and in the collective the expanding diplomatic work of pursuit in Treaty - the at which advocates scientific on in Article interest of 2 Canada - has issues, economic played addition, In Atlantic North the enhanced co-operation non-military level work NATO's its of contacts with the East. among the members its part environmental full concerns, in and exchanges. and technological This forty years of work in NATO constitutes a major Canadian contribution to international and security. peace stability and prosperity of Western Europe, the has promoted It and helped to bring about the political changes in Central and Eastern Europe which now promise an entirely new future of for At the same Canada. It Atlantic and time, has co-operation. East-West participating in NATO has been assured also directly Canada's for our own own defence territory beneficial across - and - the it has provided Canada with a pole of inter-relationships which help this country to reaffirm its own distinctness. In maintained linkages with the West countries which have helped counter-balance, to intense relationship So when we to with the European some degree, NATO, its Canada very close has and United States. look at the future of Atlantic affairs, relations, and world order, we need to recall East-West that there is already body of experience and knowledge built up over almost half a century. It is important to examine the record, in existence this whole as well as staring into the future. history of Canadian involvement in NATO and NATO-related issues is, above all, a human We also need to recall that this enterprise. Canadian people pursued Canadian policies - hacked out V 000169 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information positions collective with negotiated Headquarters, flew planes off other allied their Warsaw with aircraft carriers in the of Canada's contribution to NATO is government ministers NATO counterparts, Pact mid-Atlantic. The story record of great endeavour and many dedicated or by and hard-working public of this story is publicly known.Some public figures Little few former ambassadors write a in diplomats, military officers and service personnel. servants, and a diplomats their work, but the vast autobiographies leaving no comments on majority of public servants and military personnel do not. They do their work and successors, or formal then hand over record even after half a their to lifetime of activity. The present transcripts aim at capturing experience. than and about small major events in efforts Canada's such in The group are all former public servants, military officers. They there were plans do to at world one history, defence as order. diplomats or senior include former ministers, do not so NATO's fields related policy, East-West relations, and the pursuit of into part of this They set out the recollections and perceptions of more dozen Canadians about the a a although stage if the work had proceeded second round of interviews. A second round would also have a included, hopefully, Ambassador to the a North senior air force Atlantic Council, officer, and the current additional senior officials involved in Canadian defence planning. All who did participate had including periods of NATO key roles in consultations intermediate-range armed forces in nuclear Europe, or on immensely rich and varied careers, NATO-related work where they such issues as weapons, events in the Poland, the control or played modernization of of defence conventional spending in Canada. vi 000170 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information The interviews done were as biographies, of set a conducted in the summer of 1987. They all were following each person's career from one location and issue to another, and focussing most heavily on the periods of NATO or NATO-related carefully prepared in advance critical issues as much as a possible. However, or dry well as careful reflection, as affairs rather the aim than discussions that the so rigid one; activity. The questions were to was the approach encourage on not was spontaneous comment and to bring out point-by-point debate a focussed a true over this of sense that or particular document. transcripts are contained in the main body of this study, entitled: "The Record". They are divided into three parts, The according to main focus of each person's affairs. Thus John the NATO-related Ignatieff, Geoffrey grouped in Part I, related affairs in Paris, (NATO) was are with the establishment of the Treaty, the years East-West relations, or arms control negotiations. Group directly in Canada's defence effort; and Group the to North Atlantic Council in Brussels. However, literally. activity division into groups should this People's careers to another, as changed functions from Taylor James George because their main involvement in NATO and NATO- all Canadian ambassadors were Reid, Escott Robert Cameron and George Grande Pearson, II were all involved III Holmes, and in NATO career saw delegation member Moscow, as Brussels, Ottawa. and The as area from in Paris one taken too phase to a of work to another. range in the the of For perspectives early-1960s, North Under-Secretary of other from be of NATO they advanced through various stages and one NATO Ambassador overlapped not Atlantic as a had Council similar, - as a diplomat in State for External participants all example, (NATO) in Affairs in broad-ranging careers. On a personal note, the interviews were at all times a great vii 000171 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information pleasure to record The forthcoming, looking and the conduct. as they had participants as been devoted to were invariably outward- truthful a recounting of earlier to the effective performance of their duties. They represent Canadian public policy at its best committed, skillful and imaginative, without stridency or an - and absorbtion with panaceas. These practitioners were never simplistic or hawkish Two - they were, instead, dedicated and thoughtful. participants who stood out among passed away since the interviews their took place. generation have All regret profoundly the loss of John Holmes and George great Canadians who contributed country and to the pursuit of world. This study is one so much to the who knew Ignatieff, them two reputation of this stability, harmony and peace in the further way of remembering them. viii 000172 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information CONTENTS Preface Introduction The Contributors The Record Part I - World Order, Atlantic Affairs and East-West Relations John Holmes Escott Reid George Ignatieff Geoffrey Robert Pearson Cameron George Grande Part II - Canada's Defence Effort Robert Falls Charles Belzile Charles Nixon Part III - Ambassadors to Council Ross the North Atlantic in Brussels Campbell Arthur Menzies John Halstead James Taylor 000173 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information THE CONTRIBUTORs Group I John Holmes. Institute Canadian Department of External professorships at 1943-60. Affairs, (CIIA), 1940-43. Positions included Affairs International of Assistant Under-Secretary, held Secretary and other positions with the National 1953-60. Returned to CIIA in 1960. Also of University the and Toronto York University. Reid. Escott National Secretary of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in the 1930s. Department of External Affairs, 1939-62. Positions Under-Secretary, India, included Under-Secretary, Acting Ambassador to the Federal and Under-Secretary, Assistant Principal of Glendon College, York High Deputy Commissioner Republic of Germany. to First University. Department of External Affairs, from 1940 George Ignatieff. to the early 1970s. Positions included Assistant Under-Secretary; and Ambassador to Yugoslavia, the North Atlantic Council (in Paris), the Committee United (ENDC). Nations, and the Subsequently Eighteen Nation Disarmament Provost Trinity of College, University of Toronto. Geoffrey Pearson. Department of External Affairs, Served with the Canadian the NATO included Secretariat Advisor on in Arms Embassy in Paris during 1953-57 Paris during Control Ambassador to the Soviet Union, of 1952-1984. and 1958-61. Other Disarmament, 1980-83. First and with positions 1978-80; and Executive Director the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1984-89. Robert Cameron. War during World II. Department of External Affairs, 1947-83. Positions included Served with the Canadian army ix 000174 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Assistant Under-Secretary; Bulgaria; Ambassador to Poland; of Defence residence, and Arms Ambassador to and Director General Affairs. Control at the University of Yugoslavia, Romania and Two terms as of the Bureau diplomat-in- British Columbia and the University of Toronto. George Grande. Served with the armed forces in World Department of External Ambassador to Norway Ambassador to the Affairs, 1945-79. Iceland, and Negotiations II. Positions included first Canadian 1968-72; Mutual on War and Balanced Force Reductions, Vienna, 1973-76; and Ambassador to South Africa, 1976-79. Subsequent work columnist and editorial writer. as Group II served with the fighter of carrier. Commander Defence Staff, a of with Military Committee been squadron, the the of rank the a of Since Canadian Belzile. Rose to Chairman aircraft an Chief of for Arms the of the retiring from the Centre Canadian Armed Korea, Cyprus, Germany and Canada. the Second Battalion, Operations, and NATO service, Control and in Ottawa. Charles Mechanized Admiral. Afterwards II. Postings included destroyer, Atlantic Fleet. in Brussels. President Disarmament War Royal Canadian Navy until 1983. command has Navy pilot during World Falls. Robert 1953-86. Central in Germany; Army Served in Commands and positions included Royal Twenty Second Regiment; Brigade Group NATO Forces, Group, Fourth Canadian Assistant Chief Mannheim; of Staff, Canadian Forces Europe (CFE); Chief, Land Doctrine and Operations, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa; has and Mobile Command in Canada. General Belzile subsequently worked in private industry. Charles Nixon. After studying electrical engineering, entered service with the Royal Canadian Navy in 1949, served in Korea, and X 000175 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information then pursued military a Industry during Department of Office 82. during and 1963-64 Deputy Minister of 1965-75. Subsequent work Held senior positions with career. as consultant at Council Privy the the National Defence, 1975- in Ottawa. Group III Campbell. Ross service during World War II. Naval Affairs, 1944-75. Positions included of External Secretary; Ambassador to Yugoslavia and Algeria; North Atlantic 1972-75. Council, 1967-72; President susequently as Arthur of Assistant Under- Ambassador to the and Ambassador to Japan and Korea, Energy Atomic Department of Ltd. Canada Has worked consultant in Ottawa. a Department Menzies. of External Affairs, 1940-82. Service prior to 1972 included senior positions in Japan, Malaysia, Australia, and Ambassador to Head of the as the North Atlantic Council, II. York Halstead. Department of and Paris. Division 1972-76. in ottawa. Ambassador to 1976-80. Ambassador for Disarmament, China and Vietnam, John Defence Liaison Service with the armed forces Affairs, External Head of the 1946-82. during World War Served in Tokyo, Division, European 1980-82. 1966-71. New other Under-Secretary, Deputy UnderSecretary, and Acting Under-Secretary, all between 1971 and 1975; positions included: Ambassador to the Assistant Federal Republic of Ambassador to the North Atlantc Council, Germany, 1980-82. 1975-80; and Subsequent work in public affairs and teaching. James Served in Taylor. Department of External Affairs, Paris 1961-64 in Organization for Subsequently served Economic with 1953-present. with the delegations to NATO and Co-operation the Canadian and Development embassy in Under-Secretary and Deputy Under-Secretary, all (OECD). Moscow. served as Director General of European Affairs in Ottawa, between the Then Assistant 1976 and xi 000176 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'ínformation 1982. Ambassador Secretary of Japan, The to State 1982-85. the North Atlantic Council, for External Affairs, 1985-89. Under- Ambassador to 1989-present. interviewers Roger Hill. 1964-68. Department of National Defence, Political Advisor, NATO Secretariat, Taught international studies Ottawa, 1968-73. Brussels, Queen's University and the Royal at Military College, Kingston, 1973-75. Deputy Director, Parliamentary Centre Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, for Ottawa, 1976-87. Director of Research, Canadian for International Peace and Security, Senior Research Fellow, the Institute, 1990- 1987-90; Institute present. David Alberta, Lecturer Cox. in 1963-67. Calgary, Political Assistant Science, Professor University and of Associate Professor of Political Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, 1967- Specializes present. in teaching security and defence issues. and research Also Director Affairs and Watercan, Defence, Pawelek. Editor, Foreign Trade, Ottawa, Ottawa, 1987-90. Parliamentary Ottawa, Staff 1983-87. international Research, of Institute for International Peace and Security, Nancy on Canadian 1984-87. Centre for Foreign Executive Director, officer, Department of National 1990-present. xii 000177 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information THE RECORD 000178 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information THE Part I WORLD ORDER, RECORD ATLANTIC AFFAIRS AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS John Holmes Escott Reid George Ignatieff Geoffrey Pearson Robert Cameron George Grande Part II CANADA'S DEFENCE Robert EFFORT Falls Charles Belzile Charles Nixon Part III AMBASSADORS Ross TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN BRUSSELS Campbell Arthur Menzies John Halstead James Taylor 000179 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNA00014 Title A name given to the resource Preface to "In Alliance" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived “Research - In-House Research - Oral History of Canadian Policy in NATO - Hill Roger,” RG154, Volume number: 13, File number: 2100-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/06e0c7c3e1fbdccff470275834eb1d7c.pdf 61171083a54785289eed53f67a796e5b PDF Text Text 001477 R q CochbL It < A fWMi ► •nt* Sw> Rtw i ! ' tC m utm *# m f at mi I d|U | Government ■ ■ of Canada z% U<V 3103-1 {S3-01} ^oS s Gouvernement du Canada c h a a o i-OVT c am STiRANtMiMion md o ima �001482 X ; ■; } •'fc . 4“ ->C n.y Qy; ’"'/y �00li73 X . i- NAME COVE 1. Sam CARR "SAM"(ui 2. D r. H enry HARRIS "DOCTOR' 3. Em m a W O IKIN 4. D avid SHUO AR 6. M att S. NIO HTINQ ALE 6. F. W. POUND Av "NORA" "PHOMETI ' "LEADER ' 7. J. S . DENNING e« "FO > TER Erio 0. ADAMS TERNST" \ - ‘.V *\'\ *'-• 9. K. fflLLSHER * V M f) 10. Fre d ROSE "ELLI" "FR ED "( "GRAY" 11. H. S . OERSON 12. P rofe s s or R. COYER "PRO FE: ,)' , I 13. 0. LUNAN/ "BACK" 14. 1. HALPER1N . "BACO N 15. N . M AZEHALL ^ '<V ' ''<>***'-'' ' 16. D urnford SM ITH x "BAG LE "BADEA -» r 17. N. VKALL IS . Colone l 0. M. LETSON ' A !^" l. y r IV. 3 ’03-1 0. RABINOWITCH I U 0 "DICK" �00 1479 .£ <4virv asm • 't 0 0 tin If A It I ”ttM”(Mifti 1943) milXv VALTM •4\ >•.? ■DOCTOR* •ROM* *.u ' * (4 > !v» t! ,»«!• I*!- ^rt*v v . . .C \ *■* • Lo 1 l/o Toronto • Ottovi _,s Toronto • Ottawa ■FM0MSTHSU9* Toronto • Ottawa v •LEADS*" ••• Toronto • Ottawa Toronto * Ottawa ■rOBTM* Toronto • Ottawa •uw Toronto • Ottawa "ELLX" *7RS D"(untll 1941) 0S0010I 1/a Kontraal •CHAT" Mootrial •WlOKMOtt* Kontraal (Toronto - Ottawa) •BAGS" 1/a ftaaaaroh "BA00N" Boatsrob •BAOLET" Rtaaarob (Kontraal) •BADEAU* Riaaareb (Xn4ap«n4ant) w/.'- ■DICK" (Kontraal) r v 8vl«a r.,, "vy 4’ >? V ■d. $ 3103*1 0301} (Montrtil) Toronto • Ottawa ( ib) * �X 001180 ma fiJLIJULJLUU . 0 H 0 0 t ■' 1. Oon OARR 8. Or. Honry 8ARRX8 9 VOUXN 4. • 8. •8AM”(until 1149) nu», VALTER > *D00T0R* Dotrld 6HV0AR Ilott 8. KIOKTXXOAU «. Ft V. P0UW0 ?• j. 8. nxmiim tf r if > i 8. s rlo O. A0AM8 I* i ! 9. X. VXLLQHXR i.4- 10. Prod ROSE 11. 8. 8. OER308 Iw t i Profoooor R. DOVER 13. O. LUNAR ft ■»»*•*! 14. X. RALPSHZH ID . K. M AZSfULL 10. D urnford SM ITH 0 \ twl 17. Toronto • Ottovo Toronto • Ottovo pnorxsooa* IS . •DACE* •BACO H* •BAO LET* •BADEAD" u\C \ -C Oolonol 0. M. LXTOON IV. 0. HABINOflTCH *-*• 1 L« Toronto - Ottovo Toronto - Ottovo l/o Montrool ^>0 %■ % (Toronto - Otto** Montrool Montrool i/o Po March (Montrool) Roaooreh (Montrool) Rooooroh (Independe nt) Ovloo %■,. fyrs ■‘•N. Toronto - Ottovo M* YKALL 16. '«r, 3103-1 {33/01} Toronto - Ottovo HEADER* •FO STER* •IR H flT* •SLLX* •fR C D "(until 1048) 0X00X08 •O RAT* (Mont rot Toronto • Ottotro •KO RA* •PRO M ETHEUS* mm m I.M ’i I/# Toronto » Ottovo �001481 X INDEX 1« Sam CARR 2. Dr• H. HARRIS 3. Mrs . Emma WOIKIN 4. D. SHUGAR 5. M. NIGHTINGALE 6. F. W. POUND 7. J. S . BENNING 8. E. ADAMS 9. M iss K. W ILLSHER 10. Frod RO SE 11. H . Si G ERSO N 12. D r. R.-BO YER ^ ,4. 13. "0. LU NAN -v^v; 14. I. HALPERI N '-4-y yU- ‘ 15. N . M AZERALL V 16. D. SM ITH 17. N . VEALL 18. C olonel LETSO N 19. 0. RABINO W ITCH Ao. S.S. 6u*?M ^N . 3tc>im;o\) L �REt X GROUP Ban CARn--OOVer...name J»aAMnuntiia943) JRANE, VALTER •ft... 7m*vA -ft&*.___fiutUta/J-. STATCMCNt BIOGRAPHY Nam e - Baa CARR (C ohen— Kogan, changed by And poll, 1937)* Place of Birth - R ussia* D ata - July f, 1906# ♦ . *, Parents - Altaian Jew s* R acial O rlaln • Jew ish* M arital 8tatqa • M arried, Julia C ollins (form er Bom ber Y*C *L*) ona son R onny* O ccupation • Paid C om m unist functionary* Em ploym ent - R ational O rganizer, Labour Progressiva Party* R esidence • 14 M ontrose Avenue* Toronto* Status - N aturalized British subject* 1948* Police R ecord - 1931 - N ov. 13th - Toronto* O nt* - Seditious oonsplraoy - C years, cono* w ith sen tence of even data, as Sam uel CO HEN, P*D * #803/31* (quashed on appeal)* 1931 - N ov* 13th - Toronto, O nt* - M em ber of an unlaw ful association (£ ohgs*) - 8 years, each ehg* cono., (Appealed; appeal dis m issed, to com raenoe feb* 19/32), as Sam COHEN, Kings ton Pe n*y. /£528. 1934 - June 30th - Re leas ed on Tioke t-of-Le ave * Se nte noc due to e xpire S e pt* 18/38* OBNERAL . Specks, re ads and write s Englis h, Yiddis h and Rus s ian* CARR oame to Canada in 1924. In 1928 he aote d as organize r of the Young Communist Le ague */ In 1929 he proce eded to Moscow to atte nd the Lenin Ins titute and re turne d to Canada In 1931* S hortly afte r his re turn he was convicte d, with Tim BUCK and othe rs , unde r S e ction 98 of the Criminal Code of Canada* In 1937 he took an active part in the National Training Sobool of the Communist Party of Canada* v/x? In 1937 he vis ite d S pain* ~ *£■In 1938 he beoame Organis ational S e cre tary of the Communist Party of Canada* x V:J,-..'■'//' In 1939-41 he e ontrlbute d, while underground, numerous dis loyal anti-war artlole e for publication in the Communist Pre s s not only In Canada but In othe r countries * He was detaine d unde r Regulation £1 of the D«0*C*R* In Toronto, O ntario when he surrendered on Septem ber £8, 1948, being conditionally released on O otober 8, 194£* In August, 1943 he beoam e a m em ber of the N ational C om m ittee of the Labour Progressive Party (C om m unist Party of C anada) and at the sam e tim e was appointed N ational O rganiser, In August 1948 he was re-eleoted a m em ber of the R ational Executive* CARR visited M ontreal on April 19-£0th, 1943 and oooupled a room In the M ount R oyal H otel under the nam e of J.V* DAVIS, 148 Lorendale Street* Toronto* O n M ay 16-17, 1943 he again visited M ontreal and registered at the LaSalle M otel as J*V* DAVIS of 148 Lorendale Ave«, Toronto* 2103-1 (S3-’01) 004433 �R t, fi*a CARR— O O Ver...nam e.."BAM *.4 ua t i l . .1943) THANK, W ALTSR. Gr o u p ..-----------------------p2h/N6k*l,Z----- X 004484 STATCMSMT OBHSRAL (cont'd.) O n January 3, 1940 CARR w rote to Prim e M inister Xing w ith respeot to hlo naturalization and daolarad that. In order to blook tho laauanoa of bi tN aturalization C ertificate, tbo R .O .M .F. bad produoad as disqualifying evidence tbo foot that ha raglatarad In a M ontreal botal undar an assunad nans* Ba eontandad that ba did so to seek rast from tba os11s m ade upon a parson In tha Public Barrios. As a natter of faot O ARR visited U ontraal on both occasions to oonduot general G onm ualst activities, further ba is neither In tbo Public Service nor did be seek rest during bis visits* CO RBT'S 8TATKM INT . * In O otobar 1943, O ARR was contacted by Xoudrlavtsav (Leon— exhibit 01) and his co-operation w as enlisted by SO KO LO V, who was than organising an espionage netw ork* CARR was put at tba bead of tba Toronto-O ttaw a saotlon (ax* 51)« Ra recruited J.8. BINNING (ax. 01) and tri e ADAM S (ex. 01). He had under bis sore direct control PO LLAND and SURXJXL (ox.51) After tha ra-organlzatlon In M ay, 1943 San CARR seanad to hava been used as a recruiting agent and for other specialized Jobs (Xx. £8, 30-4, and 01). Thus, It Is CARR who was responsible for obtaining C anadian passports for Soviet agents and as reoently as August 14th (Xx. 38) ha was being pressed to obtain new papers for a nan m asquerading under the nam e of Zgnaoy W XTCHAK, who was then In Los Angeles w ith an expired C anadian passport. CARR claim ed that he could bribe one of the em ployees In the Passport D epartm ent but that this w ould cost #5,000.00. M osoow balked et this figure but w ere w illing to spend #3,000.00 to aooom pllsh their purpose (XX. 35-3). W ITCHAX's passport and four photographs of him self and bis w ife handed to Sam CARR on August 1 (Xx. 35-1) and the follow ing e was deolded upontA O riginal application form of the real W XTCHAK, together w ith his photograph w ould be rem oved from the fi l e In the Passport O ffloe and replaoed by another application fora, dated 1937 signed by the false W XTCHAK, duly aooom panled by his photograph and that of bis w ife. O nes this was aooom pllshed, Itw ould be safe to apply for a new pas s port In the regular m anner* C arr also suggested that It m ight be useful to burn half the passport, leaving only the num ber, but no decision on this was reaohed. & CARR Insisted that he w ould not be able to bribe the offi ci al In the Passport O ffloe for less than #3,000.00. CARR referred to him as "The Xxooutor" and olalned he was so placed that ha oould do everything him self personally w ithout depanding upon others. CARR hoped to settle the m atter by the fi rst half of Septem ber. ‘.'A- G RANT was Instructed on August 14 (ex. 37) to send to his head quarters a report on the "technical procedure of reoelvlng and delivering passports" and a seoond report containing al lthe particulars "for our own purposes" together w ith an Indication as to w hloh one "of frank's m en" w ould be In charge of this type of operation* An •'7 -'W 4 3*03-1 (33701) 'QV oA q9 ? t a : �001485 RCt..WALTKfl. .t / Gr o up . SVATCMCNV CORBY'S STATEMENT (oont'd.) CARR als o runs innti In the e arly s tage s , l«i. whan thaw art Bawl? re cruite d (ax* 16) and bafora they apa take n ewer by OfiAIT'a ova ataff. O* 6KU0AR la the Naval S amoa la a oaaa la point* Moaoow lnatruotad that e ontae t ahould be maintained through CARR until SHUGAR'a value vaa prove d* afte r whioh ha would ba dlrae tly approaohed (ax* to)* % i In June CARR waa aske d whathar ha oould de ve lop age nts in all thre e branobee of the S e rvloe unde r the De pt* of National Defanoa or la tha Oe ne ral S taffs * i Moaoow added "at the pre s ent time thaaa flalda e ra vary lntaraatmg i to ua and wa would Ilka to have you axtand your m axim um e fforts In that dire ction"# (ax* 98*4)* Again on August 10th M oaoow aakad about tha poaalbillty of aaourlng oontaota w ithin tha G eneral Staffs (ax* 95-6)• CARR waa oontaoted by Xoudrlavtzev and by M otinow until 1945, ' when he waa introduced to RO G O V (?)— refer exhibit 95-9 "The com m ander"— RO G O V knew Sam In Juna 1944 reoheok w ith CO RBI* The out out used to establish oontaot la D r* H enry HARRIS of Toronto (ex. 95-1, 95-9)* As previously stated CARR was oontaoted by KO UDRIAVTZKV in O otober, 1948 and hie eo-operatlon waa enlisted by SO KO LO V* SO KO LO V w orked m ainly through tw o agents, one of whom waa Sam CARR, but ZABO TIN m odified thla aet-up by aatabllahing dlreot relations. ZABO TIN was w arned not to com prom ise him self and he used various m em bers of his staff for this w ork including M ajor RO G O V w ho, using the oorer ham e BRENT, handled Sam CARR getting in touch w ith him through D r* HARRIS. .. - 4 '-% £ >. M O TINO V was also used but RO O O V took over tha oontaot on ,'5"45’ ' o>. In Ootober 1948 CARR was put in e harge of the Gttawa-Toronto Group which was appare ntly divide d into two parts because CARR re s ide d in Toronto. Under CARR1a more dlre ot oontrol end working In Toronto were HOLLAND—name not known of the Inte llige nce Branoh of the Air fore s * and SURKJKL Of Naval 8»mot (K. 61). ‘O CORBY oomments that the s e two men did not know the y we re working for the S ovie t Inte llige nce aa they be lie ve d the y ware aotlng only for tha Communist Party* In Deoember, 1944 CARR was given an as s ignment for SHUGAR (e x* 95-8) re s pe cting hydro aoous tlo de vloe s * In June, 1945 CARR was asked how matters s tood with SHUGAR (e x. 95-4) and re plie d that he was then working in tha Naval ataff but had bean under obs ervation and that s pe olal oautlon waa re quire d* CARR re cruite d J.8. BENNING (TCSTER) for SOKOLOV's organization in 1948-49 (ax. 'Mr*)* mm Y O. % ^-03-1 1330 5} CO RBY later identified "Thi of the Intelligence D epart! RO G O V being "The Com m ander definitely oleara up the m �« &£).». FRANK, WALTER. P a o b No ../......—.... 004436 ' X I i • when they are aken onr by ▼lot it a o«ai t alne d through lob bo would ! >p age nta la all of National r i i art Tory >u oxtood your ). )8olblllty of >X« 55-0). InoT until 1940| chib It 55-3 roobook with ; * COROT late r ide ntifie d ’The Commander* ae Colone l lflLIBTBIN alias MILSKT of the Inte llige nce De partme nt, Red Army, Uoaoow, tbuo my re fere nce s to ROOOV being The Commander" s hould be Ignored* This Ide ntification de finite ly oloars up the matte r. ! Senry HARRIS UDRIAYTZE7 In ed by S0K0L0T. of w hoa w as establishing and he used eluding liajor d San CARR OH contaot on .,o » Ottawa-Toronto arta because lre ot oontrol known of the IEJEL of Nawal ?w the y we re >e lle Te d the y were it for SHUOAR ?d with SHUOAR lng In the Natal t s pe cial caution OLOV'a organls a- : ' C: 'r, HO £ 2:c-a-i {9*t ’• �J) 001487/ RttSan CARR—oove r name "SAM" (until. 1943.)_FRANX, WALTSB* x Gr o u p '/t .fffhfhAjdQbm*. —[ — ffTAffMCMT CORBY*8 STATEMENT (oont'd*) In connection with the pas s port matte r, on Augus t 1s t CARR was banded WITCHAK'a pas s port snd four photographs of hims e lf and wife (e x. 35-1). It was arrangs d that tha original application form of ths re al WITCHAK, toge the r with his photograph, would ha removed from tha flla In tha Pas s port Offloa and re place d bp another applie s * tlon fora, dated 1937, s igned bp the fals a WITCHAR and be aring his photograph and that of his wife , CARR Motione d burning half tha pas s port but no de cis ion was re ached* / : Be ins is te d he would not be able to bribe the official la the Pasas ort Offloa for le s s than #3,000*00 and s aid he hoped to s e ttle the natte r bp the firs t half of S e ptcnbcr (e x* 96*1)* : Ban OARR re cruite d 8/L nightingale who knew him at "WALTER" (ex* 54)« ...... POLLARD of the Air Poroe Inte llige nce worked for Baa CARR from Januarp to April 1943* (Atri) SURSJEL als o worked for Baa CARR froa Januarp to April, 1943*^!>) CORBY be lieve s that Roman A* TRILL Bap be t# been in touoh with CARR, aWthe latte r was ins tructe d on June 10. 1945 to get in touoh with hla and find out what he wante d* (e x* 85-4) In April, 1944 two S oviet diplomatic courie rs arrive d in the United S tate s * One of the s e was named MILSKY, an Ins pe ctor Ge ne ral of the Inte llige nce De pt* of the Red Amp wboae.V.me was MILZSTEIN. MILSKY confe rre d with Sam CARR at some le ngth re s pe cting passports, lde ntitp docume nts, e tc* and means of obtaining them * Am ong a l i st of code nam es for tow ns and countries C0RBT reported that references to the "tow n ofBam " m eant Toronto* DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE. Exhibit No. 35 - GRANT'S Re gis tration Card of Sam CARR (FRANK) addre s s - 14 Montros e , Toronto, te lephone LI-747(Brook) knows Rus &n—finis he d the Lenin S ohool in Moscow* CO NFIRM ED - Toronto Telephom contains an Item reading: Exhibit No. 61 - SAM (FRANK) re Second Orouo Ottawa-Toronto. ------------S tudie d in 1924-25 in S ovie t S chool* Speaks R ussian* LEO N (KO UDRIAVTLEV) m et Prank in O otober, 1948* ' 7. */ ^; Toronto Telephone D irectory, follow ing item : "CARH S r 14 M o: CARR proposed FO STER, em ployed in the D ept* of M unitions and O upply for inform ation res pecting w ar m aterial, etc* and ERNST, a Jew who w orked in the U nited States for inform a tion respecting industries, etc* Two agents em ployed In January— H olland, connected w ith aviation who gave a plan of instructional schools and SUREJEL, who w orks in N aval Intelligence, supplying Inform ation respecting ships* Exhibit W o. 58 - O RANT's note respecting those w orking for SAM 's organization* Those oonoerned referred to as D AVIE, M ARTIN who w orked w ith ERNST and PO STER, seouring Inform ation respecting the Arm y and Tha Econom ist* Exhibit N o. 54 - G RANT'S note re S/L NIG HTING ALE, Sam was known to hla as W ALTER* D etails of m eeting on 19-12-44 supplied and arrangem ents Bade for further oontaots* 5503-1 {33 "1) "CARR S r 14 Loi �lHa^mNK, WALTER* PAOK NOJL.... 004488 .11 S NOUMV AMO MCMHT igus t lit CARR jraphs of hims e lf i fom cf the re al ba removed from by anotbar applies :TCHAK and baaring mtlone d burning 1* > offle lal la tbo laid ba hoped to ibe r (ax* 35-1). V % an as "WALTER* for San CARR : y to Aprili 1943.(<ltfi) boon In touob vltb . 1945 to gat In (ax. 85*4) s arrive d In tha Xi an Ins pe ctor Army whose^nnme RR at some le ngth o. and means of ntrlea CO RfiT * m eant Toronto. r-(. ~-v . ' or - •• • ^ , fSam CARR (FRANK) nto. telephone •finished the CO NFIRM ED - Toronto Telephone D irectory, April, 1944 to D eoem ber, 1944, oontalna an Item reading: "CARR S r 14 Koatro«a >; LI© ydbrook 7847". Ottawa-Toronto* t S ohool. Speaks ;V) ne t Frank In Toronto Telephone D irectory. D ecem ber^ 1944 to July, 1945 oontalna tha follow ing Item s ' - V / / XL oydbrook 7047". "CARR S r 14 Montros e A '' x oyed in the De pt. ? Information re s and ERNST, a Jew Cates for lnforma, e to. ; 'ik l aa ry—Holland, o gars a plan of 3UREJEL, who works plying Information ' ose w orking for concerned referred rked w ith ERNST and on respecting tha HO ALE, Sam w as know n 2-44 supplied and her oontaots. % **2<*tL-------- 5f *9 % 3103-1 (33/01) y'ys <y«, '» �X RtlBam CARR—OOVer n*ima ?aAU"(untU 1943|. TRANK, WALTER* Gr o u p * jUfatat*...---------------------- n 004439 STATBMtNT ' CO NFIRM ED - Toronto Telephone U lna on item reedingi Exhibit N o. 35-3 - 8AM *s iddriat show n ss 14 M ontrose. Lloyd* "CARH 8 r 14 M onti brook 7847 (tans addrsss as lx. 95)• Aiutrairf Toronto Talaptiona Dire ctory, Exhibit W o. 85*9 - 14*6-44 - Tht Com m ander (4M W ) m eeting SAM to arrange for futurt Matingi lowing item* with him and LION (Koudriavtaev). •CAKR Mr 14 aont Matting arrangad for 15*9*44 to dis ouaa pa s horts and money. f DO CUM ENTARY EVIDENCI (oont’ d.) •V Future Mat Inga arrangad through Dr. HARR18| Midway 9553. Exhibit Wo* 85*3 * 13*9*44 * ISON give n *360. for 8AM. Exhibit Ko. 35-3 • 15*9*44 * 80 arrange ments nde for Me ting to dlsoues passports and aoney. Exhibit No. 35-3 * 4*10*44 - Me e ting. 0AM re porte d handing M terlals to ERNST. Exhibit N o. 35-3 • 5-12-44 - 8AM asked for a aeetlna through -------------FO STER. Exhibit N o. 35-3 - 6-18-44 - Appears to eonoern a M eting w hioh was arranged for 11*18*44. Exhibit N o. 35-3 *11-12-44 - M eeting and 8AM handed |200. Re ported that pas sport bad been detained. Arrange me nts made for ne s ting on 14-12-44. Exhibit N o. 33-3 *16-12-44 - M eeting re passport when 8AM was give n new forms re pas s port. Agreement re aohe d re trans fe r of KHNST# Furtbop bg o tlos tmofod -v;. for *0-1-46. Y/;Exhibit H o. SB-8 « ia«lgna«nt H o. 1 headed *Su to S hugar" ras ps oting hydro.aoous tie s tations , ato. Exhibit N o. 35-3-80* 1-44 • C ontaot*1seed. Another m eeting sat for 15*5*45. Exhibit No. 35-1 * 7-5*4i • Me eting held at whioh the handing over of the D oetor froa LAM CUT to BRENT took pisoe. sr £ 3103-1 (33: Cl) Exhibit No. 35-1 -15-6*45 - Me eting in Ottawa, the Dootor re porte d no euooeas with the paas< port. FRANK paid |200», the DOCTOR |100. This Me tlng ar* range d through the DOCTOR. Rev Me ting aet for 17*7*45. Exhibit No. 35-4 -16-5*45 - •tas k No. 9 s upplie d at me e ting on 15-5-45 re VgALE, Lt. SHUOAR. Capt. OOTHKLL and pos s ibilitie s ol de veloping work In National Defenda, aviation, Navy or Military S taffs . This e xhibit me ntions Me ting arrange d for 17-7-45. Exhibit N o. 35-3 - 3-7-45 - M eeting respecting the passport. #200. paid. XI �! 43)- THAHIi >AiLTXR« Pa o c L ~o l 00P 90 -v' / No .. J" •TANDiMO fontrose , Lloyd* CO KTIRkSO - Toronto ToItphono D irectory, April1944 to D ecem ber 1944 eon* taina on ilea reading! •CARR 8 r 14 Kontroae LL oydbrook 7847", m*+) s ooting Toronto Tolophono D irectory, D ecem ber 1944 to July 1949 contain* tho foi* >r futuro s oot:lng)i loving ltost t (KOUdrlOTtS OT)* for IS*9-44 to » end soaoy. "CARR a r 14 M ontrose LL oydbrook 7047". ; > I i - irrongod through ty 9589* for 8AM . do for s ooting art* end s one y. porte d handing ST, s ooting through I rn a sooting od for 11*18*44, handed $200, aaport bad been gem enta Bade for *44. *>rt when SAM vat ro paaaport. id ro transfer of setting arranged i ' ;<s>. . headed "Sam to ing hydro.aoouttit Another sooting vhloh tho handing (or from LAMCUT loot, *&, the Dootor 3taa with tho paaa< Id |200.v tho hit s ooting ar* tho DOCTOR, Rev 17-7*48. piled at setting 8ALI, Lt. SHU O AR, nd poaalbllltlea or in R ational D efence, or M ilitary Staff*, ntlona sooting *7*49. Ing tho paaaport. 3ics-t ; : ' 4v �r Ki 8am CARR—oovtr. name "8AM". ..(until .19.431.TRANK, WAITER. GROUP */t ffK^C i-(ftC cM * 001491 ---- , ^=r^=: =: . rr: IW f DO CUM ENTARY EVIDENCE (oont'd.) Exhibit No. 3%1 • 17-7-45-Normal Batting htld. Tht DOCTOR wit pre s ent and butlnttt trans acted In tht tar. Fas *>ort and 4 photographs of a ptraon and wife handt4 over, liatttr to bt ooapltttd during firs t half of S e ptembe r, Method of making the change dlaouaaad and Btntlon Bado of ohanglng fonts . v Frank suggsstsd burning half tha pass* port hut m atter was l aftundecided. It was raportsd that tha 1stoutor agrttd to everything and waa reedy to w ork and that FRANK affirm ed onoa m ore that Itw ould not ooat low tr thai 3 (#3,000.)• FRANK glTtn a bottla of w hisktF and arrangem ents nada for Batting on 6-6-45. V Exhibit N o, 35-5 • l-O-45-Taak No. 3 handed ove r at this naatlni conce rning Ille gal e ntry, docume nts, oounte r-ttpionage , ato, Exhibit No. 35-3 - l-O-45-An e ntry on this e xhibit re ve al* that tha me eting on this data waa he ld in Montre al. Exhibit No. 35-1 - *. ; e -e-45-The me e ting s e t for this date waa normal, no de tails s upplie d. Exhibit Ko. 35-5 - 16-8-45-As slgnmant give n on this date conce rne d the aecurlng of general Information re s pe cting pas s ports . It wls o de alt with Information oonoe rnlnfl PROMETHEUS and the pos s ibilitie s of s couring pers ons among the Ge ne ral S taff, For Ins tructions re s pe cting ! this as s ignment re fe r to the Dire ctor's te le gram to GRANT (e x. No. £7). u. a*. *» M ISCELLANEO US DO CUM ENTARY EVIDENCE. Exhibit No. 37 - No date - GRANT'S mall Hat. See ite m No. 174— Sam «• trans lation from Englis h biographie s governme nt worke rs - no ds ts 46 pages * no marks . I Exhibit N o, 1 • G RANT'S, telegram . G RANT reporting to Tha D lraotor 12-7-45 that SAM waa not alactad. c Exhibit N o. 2 - G RANT reporting to Tha D lraotor 2-8-45 concern ing agreem ent w ith SAM reopeotlng tbs transfer of PRO M ETHEUS. SAM also prom ised Inform ation oonoerning several officer* of tha Arm ed Foroea. Exhibit N o. 27 - D IREC TO R '* telegram to G RANT, 14-0-45, advising no further delay possible ra passport and that naw questionnaire should be signed by FR AN K'* m an him self. Italso asked for a report on tha m ethod of receiving and delivering passport*, ato, (This duty assigned to FRANK 16-6-45, ax, 35-6). The DIRECTO R m entioned that 8AM long ago ohanged to TRANK, Exhibit N o. 28 - D IREC TO R '* telegram to G RANT 14-8-45 lnetruotlng that oontaot w ith PRO M ETHEUS be m aintained through FRANK, dlreot oontaot not to be com pleted until hla possibilities established. Interested In scouring prospeots, FRANK to reoom m end, (Assignedto FRANK 16-8-45 - Ex, 35-6). Qo % [33 [ ' ; �X Rii s u ciM»--«ow OROUP .(«amjw«5LfB*w. warn. 031492 '/ v^rw*v£ » ---SfATKMCNt DO CWS ^ART ICVIDKNCg RESPECTING Bill CARR* 8 CONNECT IOKS WITH THE (• i Y Y~Y%r ** • • * (w^sr*,*) •>: Krhlblt Wo. S ft-3 . I4.6.44 - Rl ■••ting Of GOMUNDM With BUI ' •rr«ng«a»nt» aid* to Mot l; t li pMOFor^o%Bd'«Moy?^^”v “? iihibit wo. 98-8 • 0.1I>44 « S ill hondod’lSOOi' and roportod ■■ ■ i i *'"wiS Mfor.. ooro bodljr flllod Id . u» ' •)1 ^ Exhibit KO o 55-5 - 15*12*44 »*8A* Supplied w ith new form s^ ' *, Exhibit N o. 95-1 - 15*5-45 -R egular Beating. The DO CTO R roportod bo suooess w ith the paaoport. FRANK paid #200. V '»>* Future ••tins arranged for 17.7*45. *. Exhibit No. 95*5 . Exhibit N o..55*1 - 9*7*40 • Voting out of town re s pe cting the pas s port. Eve rything normal, I200. paid. Urgant s ooting took plaoo rot* pooting tho pas s port at tbo DOCTOR'S apartme nt where FRINK was s ot. No dato quotod. Exhibit N o. 55-1 * 17*7*45 - N orm al m asting took plaoo. FRAN] glron $200. Hooting arranged for 1*6*45. Exhibit N o. 55*1 - 4* •0*45 * Re gular me e ting hold. Eve rythin* normal. Pass port photographs * handed oror. A bottle of whls koi s upplie d. FRANK s aid oos t would notbo lowe r than 9 (#3,000.). Exhibit N o. 87 * DIRECTOR'S te le gram to GRANT Of 44-9*49. Ho furthe r de lay ro ^Ers r^K? :^iS 'biSiSt!ttr* Information ro e e ourlng of pas sports jre quire d. Exhibit N o. 55-5 - 15-6*45 * Assignm ent given to FRA IK cover ing requirem ents of DIRECTO R, per exhibit 27. Exhibit N o. 20 : i . fs.rq?) * ZABO TIN telegram to DIRECTO R 29*6*45, reporting passport expeoted during course of the next few days. •V : �.( 001493 1 : f \ ■ £w H A ;i R R few I 3'03-1 :S3*ei) �ft REi X Dr* He nry HARRIS—cove r name "Doctor.!*.. GROUP ...... To ro.nto........ .Ottawa#............. ....... •TATCMCNT BIOGRAPHY Hawe • D r# H enry HARRIS Place of Birth • New York C ity, N #Y*, U#S*A# D ate - August 7, 1002# Pare nts Raolal Origin Marital S tatus « Jew Marrie d, Ray Waldo (Wladovuky) daug hter of Rabbi B* Waldo (Wladovs ky) MoCeul 6 ynagogue, Toronto# (Wife born In Rus s ia)# O c q jnation - O ptom etrist# H olds U#S# and C anadian O ptical graduation certificates# Re s idence - Home - 62 Bruns wick Ave nue , Toronto, up to about 10 ye ars ago* Pre s ent - Apt# £46, Cawthra Mansions , 210 Colle ge 8t#, Toronto, phone Ml# 6974# Busines s - £79 Colle ge S t#, Toronto, te le phone Midway 9503# S tatus - Naturalize d Britis h s ubje ct. Ce rtificate 61059A. £2-4*29, S .O.S . file 1084&-fc6. Police Re cord - None known# GENERAL c , RCMP e nquiry re s ubje ct's application for naturalization indicate s that Dr* HARRIS arrive d In Canada from New York via Niagara fallls in e ithe r November or December 1919 but S *0*S . file shows Port of Entry as Rouses Point, P.Q., pe r C*P.R*, Commis s ione r of Immigration advis e d S*0*S« no re cord oould be found of s ubje ct's e ntry Into Canada, Ha s pe aks Englis h end Yiddis h* /rv ; /'“ ... ■ r. ’ v / \ In D ecem ber 1930 It waa reported that D r* HARRIS was a financial supporter of the Party* In 1931 he was a subscriber to "The W orker". D uring his entire oonneotions w ith the C om m unist M ovem ent HARRIS has kept In the background* D uring the course ofa N ational C onference of the D om inion C om m unist Labour Total W ar C om m ittee held In Toronto betw een Jenuary 15-17, 1943 Sam CARR m ade several vi si ts to the offloe of D r# H ARR IS. D r* HARRIS w as a shareholder of the Everready Printing C o*, Toronto. C om m unist Publishing H ouse# O n one ocoaslon the shares originally held by Zelda Alper w ere transferred to him . $ O n Septem ber 1, 1939 D r* HARRIS transferred his share to D r# Arthur Llpm an# D r* HARRIS did m ost of the optical w ork for Party m em bers and allow ed them a out rate# The rank and fi l e of the C om m unist M ovem ent regarded Dr# HARRIS as a sooret Party m em ber# There Is every Indication that D r* HARRIS is one of the baokers of the Jew lsh-Anglo m agazine "To-day" w hich Is edited by R»S* G ordon, a form er w riter for the "C anadian Tribune"# It has been di ffi cul t to secure- inform ation respecting the C om m unist eonneoniona of Dr# H arris eyhe baa alw ays refrained from taking an open part In C om m unist activi ties* % xf % % 3103-1 '93'C t) Ot) 1194 �RE: Dr. He nry HARRIS --!** cove r name '$.OzX*Y .. Toron to-.O t lava....... ............. Gr o u p x •TATCMCMT u05495 GENERAL Betw een Septem ber 30, 1944 and August, 1943 va vara In com m unication w ith tha r.B.I. reapaotlng ona Arthur ADAM S, a Soviet agant w ho hod oom a to thalr attantlon In oonneotlon w ith m aking oartaln eontaots raspaotlng an azparlm antal projeot bains handled by U .S. Aray enginaara at O akrldga, Tann, ADAM S had at ona tlm s resided In C anada and wa w are asked to supply al lpossible Inform ation raspaotlng hla general beokground, a to, ' D uring tha eoursa of tha Investigations oonduoted by tha f,B,X« Itw as ascertained that on N ovem ber 30, 1937, H enry RARHZS, Financial Sooratory of tha C ourt of Ahavas Aohan, Independent O rder of foresters, a Jew ish C ourt of w hich ADAM S w as a m em ber In 1938, had w ritten a l atter of Introduction for ADAM S lntroduolng him as a m em ber of hla C ourt w ho visited New York occasionally. HARRIS addressed the l etter to ona H erm an H artlg of New York C ity, It Is significant that as far back as 1937 HARRIS should have supplied an Individual, who w as later Identified as a Soviet agent, w ith a l atter of Introduction, CO RBY STATEM ENT* M ajor RO O O V, under the oover nam e BRENT, handles Sam CARR w ith whom he gets In touoh through D r, HARRIS of Toronto, RO O O V took over this oontaot from M 0TIN 0V on 7-3-48 (ex. 33-1), Sergei L. KO UDRIAVTZBV, under the oover nam e LEO N, oontaoted Sam CARR betw een June and Septem ber 1944 through D r, HARRIS (ex. 35-3), In June, 1944 It was agre ed that CARR' would be contacted by KOUDRIAVTZKV through HARRIS (e x, 33-3), The ra Is re as on to be lie ve that M0TIN0V was handling HARRIS and CARR but he turne d the contaot over to ROOOV In May, 1945 (e x, 35-1). It Is de ar that Dr« HARRIS Is not an lnnooent oi^t-out, Mice he was pre s e nt at many of the me etings and took part In the trans actions concerning WITCZAK's pas s port (e x. 55-1, 35-3). ‘ ,‘ -. / V.v . Vys • : v O n June 13, 1945 RO O O V gave HARRIS |100, (ex. 35-1). DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, NOTEt -/ While there is no indication that Dr, HARRIS was pe rs onally pre s e nt^t ail or/the me e tings me ntioned he reunde r, de tails re s pe cting the date s , e tc* of me e tings with Sam CARR have been quote d be caus e It was through Dr, HARRIS that suoh me e tings we re arrange d. The me etings actually attende d by Dr, HARRIS are cle arly shown. Exhibit No. 35-3 14.8,44. Z1B0TIN notes re Clf,rt oonoe rns SAM me eting the COMMANDER WW and re aching an agre eme nt conce rning me e tings bs twee n he and LEON onos a month, A me e ting was arrange d for 13-9-44 In Montre al to dls ouse the matte r of pas s ports and to take money. CO NFIRM ED - Toro I t was arranged that future m eetings and -extra oalls w ould take plaoe by LEO N oalllng telephone oontaina the fol M idway 9553 of D r, H ARR IS, £79 C ollege Street, Toronto and giving the passw ord, follow ing w hioh LEO N w ould go to the plaoe arranged for the m eeting. X t le obvious from this exhibit that D r. HARRIS NO TE - I was approaohed prior to June 14, 1944 and that an agreem ent was reaohed w ith him respecting the pass w ord and notifying CARR of the tim es and placss arranged for the m eetings. ■S X.5 * %• % %/^Oz ^ 2103-1 {83/21} �t iNQumv and 09-1496 fiuem •TAMD1I *• we re in oom•tbur ADAMS i a i In oonnaotlon with .nontax projaot bains J wa wara as ke d to lla ge ne ral bookluoted by tha F.B.I. ?, He nry HARRIS, lohen, 2 ndapandent ADAMS was a non bar >n for ADAMS > via itad Maw York so ona Harmon Hartlg i far baok aa 1937 rho waa latar of Introduction. i v !' idle s Sam CARR with Toronto. ROOOV 5 (e x. 30-1). t LEON, oontaoted •ough Dr. HARRIS . be oontaoted by >re la re aaon to i CARR but he turne d 35-1). >nt oi^t-out, afro a ;ook part In tha ax. 35-1, 35-3). ! ; :• 35-1). . HARRIS waa -Inge me ntioned he re ato. of me e t Inga ia It waa through Dr* ;e d* The me atlnga Jle arly abown. t conoarna end e arning me etings i month. A me eting in Montre al to dis rts and to taka o ■-‘Ay H- h *. {■• W--, 1 ‘ pa m eatlnga and-extra CO NFIRM ED - Toronto Telephone D ireotory, April 1944 to Deoom ber 1944, LEO N oalllng telephone oontains the follow ing Item s , 879 C ollege Street, "HARRIS HENRY O pton 879 C ollage M I dway 9553". asw ord, follow ing a plaoe arranged for i tthat D r. HARRIS 14, 1944 and that an a respecting tha pass* e tim es and plaoaa 3!03-1 iSStt'i i ! ■ ' ; i �•r 001497 O r. H enry HARRIS— ne oover nam e. Toronto-O ttaw a* ..-.......... Gr o u p RE: s .t •TATEMSNT DO CUM ENTARY EVIPENCE (C O NT'D.) Exhibit H o. 35-3 • Sm all note concerning an urgent call of SAM through O r* H AR R IS, phone M idw ay 9563* In thle oaat i t la LAM O NT (M O TINO Y) w ho w ould phono the D r* end giro the poaew ord* CO NFIRM ED - Toronto Tel» tains the follow ing itei "H AR R IS HEN N O TEi- The only ohange thle arrangem ent m ade woe for the sail to D r* HARRIS to be m ade by M O TINO Y lnatead O f LEO N (KO UDRIAVTZEY)* Another ohange waa that the tim e of m eet* Inga waa one half nour later* £1*30 Instant of SI o'olook* Exhibit No* 35*3 - 4*10*44* H eating. 8AM reported haring handed orer m aterial to ERNST* Exhibit No* 33*3 « 6.18*44* SAM asked for a m eeting through FO STER* Exhibit N o. 33*3 - 8*18*44* Apparently this oonosrns a m eeting arranged for 11*18*44* „ Exhibit No* 35-3 - 11*18*44* M eeting re the passport* SAM handed |800* and reported the passport had been detained* FO RM S badly fi l l ed In* Exhibit No* 33-3 - 16*18*44* A m eeting w ith SAM who was giver new form s. An agreem ent reaohed respecting the transfer of ERNST* M at* N IG H TIN G ALE m ade acquainted w ith D r* HARRIS* Future m eeting arranged for 80*1*45 at the old plaoe near the hospital i fD r* HARRIS did not ohange i t* Exhibit N o, 35-3 - 80*1*43* C ontaot m issed, next m eeting 'arranged for 15-6-45 In O ttaw a* v.>:> Exhibit N o. 35-3/- 7*5-45* M eeting at w hich the D r* waa handed ~V over from LAM O NT (M O TINO Y) to BRENT (R 000Y). ** :■ '■ . * ^ *’ . ‘ 'y V -■ , A Item ecnoerna the arranging of urgent , oalla for FRANK through D r. H ARR IS. BRENT w ould telephone M l* 9593 (9553) and give the passw ord w hieh w ould m ean that the m eeting w ould take plaoe at 81 o'clock but I fthe D r* m ade a certain reply the m eeting w ould be held at the sam e tim e and plaoe but on the follow ing day* NO TE:- This third change In the passw ord sim ply m eant that Instead of KARRIS being oalled by LAM O NT (M O TINO Y) he w ould be ealled by BRENT (RO O O Y)* I t is quite evident from the three changes In the passw ord that D r* HARRIS was a highly trusted m em ber of the organization as by this tim e, nam ely M ay 7, 1945, he had bean personally ealled by LEO N (KO U D R IAVTZEV), then LAM O NT (M O TINO Y) and BRENT(RO O O V)* Exhibit No* 35-1 - 15-6-45* R egular m eeting In O ttaw a* The D r* reported no suooeea w ith the passport* R efsrsnos m ade to a telegram of 16-6-45* FRANK paid #800*, the D oetor |1Q 0* N ext m eeting arranged for 17*7*45 at 81*30* Subeequent Item s on this exhibit M iow that this w as a new tim e arranged for future m eetInga* 4 V- % 3103-1 {S3 21 ? CO NFIRM ED - Toronto ft an Item reading us fo. "HARRIS h �004493 Pa g e No . J l«BWr... -vC uvs-sv".-. « 3 an urgent oall of 8AM phone M idway 9563* Xn NT (M 0T1NQ Y) W ho w ould ve the passw ord. a arrangem ent aade wne HARRIS to be aade by LEO N (K0UDR1AVT2EY)• that the tine of Beat* our later, £1*30 instead CO NFIRM ED - Toronto Telephone D irectory, April 1944 to Deoeaber 1944, con tains the follow ing item "HARRIS HENRY O pten £79 C ollege M X dway 9353". i , ; > SAM reported haying 1 to IRNST. for a m eeting through y this oonoerna a r 11.1S.44. re the passport. SAM ported the passport had M S badly fil led In. ig w ith SAM who was giver em ent reaohed respecting 1ST. de acquainted w ith D r. nged for 20.1.45 at the hospital i fD r. HARRIS i Is s ad, ne xt ne s ting 5 in Ottawa. -.; % y.'.. c- c . whloh the Dr. was hande d IQTINOY) to BRENT (ROOOV). ■ arranging of urge nt ,ough Dr. HARRIS. BRENT 9593 (9553) and give would moan that the place at 21 o'olook but ce rtain re ply the me eting is same time and place ig day. .n the pass word s imply of KARRIS be ing calle d ) he would be oalle d by fc from the thre e ohanges it Dr. HARRIS was a d o t of the organization imtly May 7, 1945, illy oalle d by LEON en LAMONT (MOTINOY) and s e ating in Coes* with i te le gram the Doctor Ottawa. The the pas s port, of 16*6«45. |100. god for 17.7.45 at £1.30. n this e xhibit Miow that e arrange d for future 3103-1 |33-'01 s e> c. CO NFIRM ED - Toronto Telephone D irectory, Dooewber 1944 to July 1945 contains an lien reading as f ol l ow s: . MX dway 9553". "HARRIS HENRY O pton £79 C ollege V \ ^ �00 1499 x Op . He nry HARRIS—nwcovtr name. REi .. Toronto-Ottawa..... -.............. ........... GROUP •TATCMBKT DOCUMfeHTARY EVIDENCE (CONT*D.) Exhibit Mo. 88*3 - H#*tlng out of town about tht pas s port. It was e vide ntly bald at the Oootor'a plaoa. |800. paid out. Exhibit No. 86-1 • Exhibit No. 55-1 - No data. An urge nt ne s ting took plaoa ras paotlng the pas s port. It was hold in the apartme nt of Or. HARRIS and s tate s "1 made the aequalntanoe of FRANK". This was appare ntly when ROOOV firs t not CARR And Indicate s that the COMMANDER la not ROOOV. This point re quire s olarlfloation with CORBY. Although this Item bears no date It w as evidently held betw een July 3rd and 6th as I t refers to a telegram of 0-7-45. 1 j N ext m eeting arranged for 17-7-45. ! 17-7-45. N orm al m eeting. N ext m eeting arranged for 1-0-45. FRANK was given $800. Exhibit N o. 35-5 - 17-7-45. This oontains two Ite ms , one oonoe rnlng a me e ting arrange d at the apartme nt of the Doctor and the othe r oonoe rnlng the actual me e ting *h ioh was normal. t , Ne xt mee ting arrange d for 1-8-45 In Hontre al* , Exhibit No. 35-1 - 1.8.45.' Re gular mee ting attende d by the Doctor. All bus ines s trans acted in a e ar. ! Sam CARR and Dr. HARRIS .give *a bottle of ; .bun./, ‘■v u'pA; ;v./ ' RO G O V handed over the passport and four photographs. Final docum entation to be com pleted during the fi rst half of Septem ber. I talso deals w ith the plans reaohed oonoernlng the passport application sub stitution and CARK stating the cost w ould not be low er than thrss ($300f). Exhibit N o. 35-1 c Q i> % 3103-1 (33.0!} v R eference Is m ade to a telegram of 8.8.45 N ext m eeting arranged through the D ootor on 6.8.45 In O ttaw a. 8-8-45. N orm al m atting. Thla entry oontains tw o added w ords w hloh read "See D ootors" w hloh Indicate that a aaparata dossier. alm ilar to that w hloh CO RBY supplied covering Sam CARR, exists In connection w ith D r. H ARR IS. CORBY lator ide ntifie d "The of the Red Army Entailige ne t* ROOOV be ing "The Commander”, de finite ly cle ars up the ma �004500 X u- pa g e u- No....fr: KNQUIRY AND REPORT t i , v 30 l in I ; rhis 18 3ARR and ! CORBY late r ide ntifie d "The Commande r" as Colone l MILIS TKIfl alias MILS CY of the Re d Army Inte llige nce De partme nt, Mos cow, thus any re fe re nce s to ROGOV be ing "The Commande r" s hould be ignore d* This ide ntification de finite ly cle ars up the matte r* itioni fas 5th ing n % •5; %- ne r was / v I "Q "'S ' a the e of our be s ub^2/^0£: 3t03-V:S3;0i> 0/ �004501 RE: GROUP Dr. He nry HARRIS—rife cove r name ' &~6-cjCtr Toronto-Ottawa Group S TATEMENT f- DOCDMiiUTARY EVIDENCE (CONT'D.}v Exhibit N o. 35-4 15-6-45. Tas k No. 2 to Frank (Sam CARR) respecting A.N . VEALL, Lt. SHUG AR, C apt. G O THELL and developing of w ork in the N avy, Arm y and Air Force. A P.S. m entions a regular m eeting set for 17-7-45, em ergency 24-7-45 to be held "in your city" and ends by a statem ent w hich reads "The D octor know s". 6 WC 3!03-1 (33/01? ! ; t ' 1 �004502 X : s. vr 1 o , I K i . Ni C-... e-. <• i-v 310 3-!'<33'Cm �004503 -V> I // - Vi .A*!*?' la ra tion of the '‘Na med Doukhobors " of/Ca na da t ^PROCLAIMED AND ACCEPTED AT THE S ECOND CONVENTION OF THE AUTHORIZED J DELEGATES , HELD AT VERIGIN, S AS K ..CANADA. FROM THE 29TH DAY OF JULY TO THE 7XH DAY OF AUGUS T. 1934. A, D. I. We . the "N*ine d DoukhobofB." have be e n, nre and will be me mbe rs of Chris t's Church, confirme d by the Lord and S aviour Je s us Chris t Hims e lf add as s e mbled by His Apos tle s . and nothing but a "leave n of the Pharis e es .” The life of one Individual is of e qual value to the live s of many individuals . The Commandme nt s ays : “Thou ahalt nqt kill.” Chris t e xplains and 1 i- me nti indthe S Tb^. w7 £ lie ve in and prof«.. j..u. Chrl.t .h. S on ol ^ • God, who came in the fle s h and was crucifie d. He is our s ole Le ade r, S aviour and Hope . The re . is none and could not be any othe r name under the he ave ns through which man ought, ttf be s aved We have faith and hope through His name to attain the highe s t bles s ings , and there is no highe r ble ss ing than—“Ete rnal life in un* utte rable Joy.” This is the Hope and Re ward In Chris t Je s us and the principal aim of the “Name d Doukhobora." following In the foots te ps of our Divine Te ache r we, the “Named Doukhobors ," proclaim as did He : "We have come into this world not to trans gre s s the Law of God but to fulfill it,” and the re fore all idol* atry and de s e cration we s trongly re nounce and acknowle dge only the law and s upre me authority of God. "Name d Doukhobors ," having acknowle dge d and s ubmitte d the ms e lve s to the law and authority of God the re by be came libe r* ’ * ate d from the guardians hip and power e s tab* ilahe d by me n be caus e “One cannot s e rve two mas te rs ;" and the "Name d.Doukhobors " cannot 1 be s lave s of me n—having be en re de e me d by the pre cious blood of Je s us Chris t. The "Name d* Doukhobors " are not s lave s of corruption, but e s s e ntially are S ons of the Fre e S pirit of Je s us Chris t, and de clare "that wt ought to s ubmit . more to God than to .men.” We triumphantly de clare that we do not allow any force what, e ve r of man ove r man and e ve n more s p the killing of man or of me n by a man or me n under, any circums tances , caus es or arguments whats oe ve r. Eve ry individual, group of individuals , partie s or gove rnme nts of me n, and anyone whoeve r it may be proclaiming s truggle agains t war and its non-allowance but at the s ame time agre e ing and admitting the allowance for the * killing of e ve n one individual for the take of any inte re s ts whats oe ve r, la a lie and a hypocris y •1 mil *«« * ••*"'««< kll,in* of whlch *• 3. The mode rn world-r-ge ne ration of nurd. has s catte re d and divide d its e lf into countle s s numbers of groups —following the watchwords and programmes of the various politcal partie s , Eve ry political parly s trive s agains t anothe r not tor the be ne fit 4nd we lfare of the pe ople , bdt for dominance ove r the m—with all the cons e que nce s as a “diabolical incite me nt." The "Name d Doukhobora" ne ve r re cog* nlie d and do not re cogn&c any political party. ' They ne ver e nte re d or will they e ve r e nte r into the ranks of any political party. The y ns ve r gave nor will the y e ver give, the ir votes during e le ction, the re by they ate fre e from any re spon* s lbility be fdre ’Ood or me n for the act of any gove rnme nt e s tablis he d of me n. The "Name d Doukhobors " e s s e ntially are 7 above party politics . The y not only gave the ir , votes , but the ir bodies , blood and s ouls to the one and unre placable guardian of the he arts and touts of me n—the Lord and S aviour Je s us Chris t, the re by attaining pe rfe ct free dom: e gfe s aing from the s lavery of corruption into the glorious libe rty of the childre n of God We e mphatically de clare .to all: , . •: V KNO W YE TH E TRU TH AND THE TR U TH SH ALL SET YO U FREE, The "Name d Doukhobora" acce pte d and are fulfilling the command of Je s ua Chris t; "Rende r unto Cae s ar the things that are Caes ar's (me an- (\ ' ing the gove nune nta of me n), and unto God the things that att Ood'a." . Re s iding in whate ve r , s tate or country in this world we triumphantly de clare that, going unde r the banne r of “Toil , and Pe ace ful Life ," Eve rything de mande d of us which is not contradictory to the Law of God and to the Faith of Je s ua, we will accept, fulfill and e xe cute , not through fe ar but by cons cie ntious guidance . A&-MIWS ■vv>r ■ » ".i. �lD 094504 X Memorandum re Bnma WOIKIN Anna W O IKIN’ s parents are Nam ed D oukhoboura* W hen ftnm a W O IKIN oonpleted N ational R egistration on August 20, 1940, the follow ing details w ore entered by her to question No# 7, w hich reads, : j > .s* . "N ationality or C ountry of Allegianoe— British Subjeot (a) by birth? ". - No - Nam ed D oukhobour* ; r U- f ■ | ‘ * *»'« As she is a Nam ed D oukhobour she no doubt aooepts the D eclaration of the "Nam ed D oukhoboura" w hich was proclaim ed at Terigin, Seek* betw een July 29th and August 7th, 1934* This D eclaration was re affirm ed as reoently as 1944. ' v Prior to Dorns H O IKIN 's exam ination, i tis suggested that the D eclaration, a photostat copy of w hioh is attaohed, should fi rstbe studied* In this regard, i tw i l lbe observed that Nam ed D oukhoboura oleim to be "of the Law of O od and the Faith of Jesus" and i t continues about Faith and Hope end R eward, eto* This is follow ed by declaring that "W e have eom e into this w orld not to transgress the Law of O od but to f ul f i l li tand acknow ledge only the suprem e authority of O od** H aving m ade this acknow ledgem ent the Nam ed D oukhoboura oonslder them selves liberated from the guardianship and pow er established by m en* Another item deolares that as the Nam ed D oukhoboura have no connections w hatsoever w ith any political party, they are free from any responsibility before O od or m en for the aot of any governm ent established of m en* I t ends by declaring that "everything dem anded of us w hioh is not contradictory to the Law of O od and to the Faith of Jesus, we w i l l accept, f ul f i l land exeoute* not through fear but by oonsolentlous guidance". I t is not unlikely that Bm a W O IKIN w i l ldaclarc bar acoeptanoe of the D eclaration in question and m ay possibly adm it having "oonsolentlous eupplled inform ation, gu idanoe"# J . \ * 3103-1 mvij to WO be OX l : TJ r«! M d a V. N 1 t ¥ ( * �001505 Pa ioh on k. it be :>bours ved ess the ftnma WOTO The oolum n "Enquiry and H eport" oontaina various item a to be investigated. Itene, 4, 0, 6 and 7 oonoern Bom a W O IXIN 's parents, late husband, oharaoter and eduoatlonal background* Zinina HO IXIN applied for a position in the C ivil Service and on O otober £9, 1943 we w ere asked to oonduot an investigation respecting her oharaoter* This revealed M rs. W O IKIN was tho daughter of Alec KO NKIN, a retired farm er. He is a D oukhobour and bears a good reputation* M rs. W O IKIN attended O splnla Sohool in the Blaine Lake district and later took a com m ercial oourse in a convent at M aroelln, Saskatchew an* M rs* H O IKIN 'e husband died about 1941. p and aaed party, e aot not vi l l ious Ho derogatory inform ation was reoeived* O f the points m entioned in item s 4, 5, 6 and 7, the only Item now not cleared up is the cause of death of &sm a H O IKIN 's husband. ; e ~;T'vV <33.0'; �001506 Rti X»»* WOIXIK— oore r o im "Nora** * (ftt&rK O*ouw STATtMUrt BIOORAPHT Oft ipiolMS «of handwriting. •g / Nam e - lam a W O IXIN Xvldenoe re tOIX1H, htnd 11 ng of < a xbib 1to 28, J9, 40, and 41. Plcot of Birth - Blaine Lake, Saskatchew an pd< - He far*noe Exhibit 37 - and ea vour ae os rtaln if fOIKIN handlod or hr. D toam btr 30th, 1920 / Pirantl - Rus s ian fts cle 1 Origin - Ruaaian - Hamad Doukhibour flaoura data ffOIXlN tranaforrad f; Paaaport Offloa. Marital S tatus - Marrie d 19377, no* widow Aaoarta In nomas of pare nts , otvire to obtain tbls Information, bar ; Ocoupct ion - Aaoarta in s imilar de tails re gcrd; marriage , eauaa of de ath, any fa: farme r, houaawlfa, ale rt, atenographe r Employment - Laboratory Halpar, S t. Paul's Koapltal, S as katoon; Pas s port Offloa, De pt, of Exte rnal Affairs , S apt. 10. 1943 • Ts bruary 23, 1944, tranafarrad to Clphar Divis ion fabruary 13, 1914, raoantly re * turnad to Pas s port Offloa* Check up oberaoter and re putatlor Inve s tigate aduoatlonal bcckgrou: oours a at Uaros lin. 6ask, It 1. be taken In a s mall country town S"l"ry - I Asoartain present salary. H ealdenoa - Langham, S e s k.l 337 Chope l S tre e t, Ottawa; 63 frank S t., Ottawa; 360 O'Connor S t. (May 1944). Che ok C ivil Service reoorde for and references. OKNERAl Que s tion CORSTt Speaks and re ads Englis h and Rus s ian* How ho know SOI Canadian habeas then completing Notional Re gis tration on Augus t £0, 1940, ds dare d she owed e lle glanoe to no oountry, ILO In the U35R S oviet Union in the n applying for pos ition In Dapt, of Ixte rnal Affairs on S e pte mber 10, 1943 de clare d aba wee a Britis h s ubje ct, of Rus s ian origin* how we a she oon r, %-■ '*-v. v :a .X In completing anothe r de partme ntal form on March 20, 1944 alalms aba atte nded primary aohooi from .T9X7 to June , 1933 and qualifie d for Hle h S ohool antranaa,"vfollowing wtioh aha took a Comas rclal Coure e , bookkee ping^ typing mnd ahu: thand In K.ro.1 lnf a..k.t.b,..HCORBY 3TAT EVENT o/..,ltv .,: Who lrs truote d of lnformntlon? Was It as e re s pos ltlon ii What bas is for Can any avldocc CORBY Ide ntifie d Emma fOXXlH^ia^i?£lpfe WT ^3fk in the Dapt. of , External Affaire . Undor what arc comple ting National / Re e xplained that aha triad for aoaa time to aaoura a trans fe r | dare d Whan bar o Irous iatanoee did no to the Canadian Kmbaaay In Moaoov (thle la s ubs tantiate d to a | by changing bar pre s e nt oooupei os rte ln e xtant by the Ds partmental form of Mar. 20, 1944 whan aba was qualifie d* As oartain w aha e xpre s s ed he r millngne s e to s e rve In Ruws ial, Her e fforts .and applie d for a pos ition as i ware uneuooe aaful ao aha andae rourad to as oura * trans fe r to lds of Canada, nams ly Russ l the Commercial Attache 's offloa In Moacow but eame was re fus ed* iouts :tbls obange . fibs than e pproaohed the S ovie t Embassy In Ottawa for a pos ition and although aba was turnad down, it was Intimate d that aba oould he lp the S ovie t Union in othe r ways . She agre ed to provide information but for some time , fe aring pe ne tration, •ha was ke pt at arm's le ngth* Late r, howe ver, due to the Importance of the Mate rial aha had provide d, wbloh bad bean ce lle d to the atte ntion of Moscow and S talin hims e lf, aba was aooe pte d as an agent* It appe ars to bare be an bar jraotlce to raoons truot, in bar apartme nt, In summary fora, aablas whloh aba though might be of inte re s t* CQKBY s ubmitted 4 of tbaaa s ummarie s (s e a e xhibits 38, 39, 40, and 41). Emma WOIXIK als o su pplle d othe r mate rial, re fe r to e xhibit 37 ra £4 place s of mal I s e nt by ORANT to The DIRECTOR. Qc 7 'S? 3103-1 {S3:01) ; ! �V. X -001307 PAO« N*S . rs-sstsx-r* ' ■ ■VANOINS Otl ipitlMi of handwriting. e xhibits M m "S S 'lF 0f or htT4n* •••••* %0 originals or eoplas of Reference Exhibit 97 - endeavour to ide ntify tt»aa iid Uo m^ If ide ntifie d * as ce rtain if fOlKM band ltd or tad aoetaa to originals , •e e ure data fOIXI* tranafarrad from Olpbtr Division* External Affairs to hs iport OffiCS , : .4* ‘ Ai-;i •••-Vi4 not As certain Sanaa of pare nts , a hart o tar tod re putation, (Xt may/be pos s ible I to obtain tbla Information, tar pi roots taint Hamad Doukbobours )• mographer Aioortiin •tailor dottlXa re garding fOXXXN*o lato huaband, including data of Hos pital, fie s moon) marriage, aauaa of de ath, an/ family, e ta, •mil Affairs , fOXKXN bafora and aftar Barrings , 1044, tranafarrad to Che ok up obaraotar and rapotation of 1944, raoantl/ ra« Inve s tigate adueatlos al background and claim that aba oomplatad buainsaa oouraa at Maroalis . Saak, Xt la doubtful if a course of ibis nature could ba taken In a s mall country town In Saskatchewan, CO par month, As certain praaant s alary. cat, Ottawa; nnor S t, (Hay 1944), Check Civil S e rvice rae orda for de tails of e xamination, proof of e ducation j and rafare ncaa, | Question CORPit Row be knew VOXX1N endeavoured to aaeura a trans fer to tbs ! Canadian gmbasay In Moscow or Comnjarolal Attache'a Of floe ? uguat SO , 1940, deVbo in the USSR gmbasay Intimate d that aba oould help tbs S oviet Union In othe r wayat : arnal Affairs on Bow was aha contacte d to band over information? lab subjact, of Who Instructed bar to oontaot L, Malania and for what kind of Inform ion? U arob to, 1944 alilm a unt, 1933 and ; Vaa It as m re s ult of aucb ins tructions that aba secured a lng shioh aba took a i pos ition as Malania’s bouaakaapar? ahur thand in that bas is for s tate ment Mme, Sokolov oontaoted Miss IOIXIN? lark in tba Dept, of to aaeura a trans fe r i aubatantlatad to a ‘ Mar* tO, 1944 when tus ala). Her e fforts >oure a trans fe r to but same was re fus e d, Ottawa for a pos ition intlmntod that aba She agreed to iring penetration, s ve r, due to the »d, wbloh bad been Uo himse lf, aha was cons truct, in bar aba though might ba sum m aries (see refer to exhibit 37 DIRECTO R. Can any e vidence bs a a cured to corroborate? w h ; - o ,; ' V ^ Under what droums tance «, e to, did oonte ot take pleoe? Vben completing Rational Regis trationin Augus t. 1940 Emma V0XK1N dsclars d bar oireumatanoas did not pe rmit bar to aarva in tba national cris is by ebanglng bar praaant occupation {hous ewife) for s cat e ooupation for wbloh she wee qualifie d, Aaoe rtaln why aba late r ascured employment In Civil S e rvice1 and applie d for a pos ition as typis t-cle rk abroad, be ing willing to aarva outs ide of Canada, namely Rus s ia, Thar# may ta e s ignificant reason for this change, - * ’ �.( RCi GROUP Kama AOIKlN--e ove r noma "Mora" °04 j 08 f 0 rif'UJb * •TATKMBNt r CO HBY STATEMENT ICont'd. • CORBY de ole re d that JT01K2N was re oantly lns truotad to gat In oXoaa touoh with L. Malania, on employ## In the Polltloal Divis ion of the De pt. of Exte rnal Affair** fOXKIN is unde rs tood Malania Is not known to hare passed ove r any Information but he may be an unoons olous s ource , In any event be is not a dlre ot age nt. Malania9* fathe r Is a tie adlng offlolal of the fe de ration of Russian Canadians* Inapeetor Anthony reports It Is alleged that M m e* dokolor, wife of M ajor ookolov, now C om aerolal Attaohe, eontaoted Ella? fO IKIN . DO CUM ENTARY EVIDENCE. Exhibit 37 - O RANT m oll l i st to DIRECTO R. Item on page 175-N ora— eopieo-•telegram s oensus and photos— N ovem ber-D ecem ber— 10, oensus 3, photo 11— none* Exhibit 30 - H andw ritten oopy of despatob from Secretary of State for D om inion Affairs, London to External Affairs O ttaw a, dated August £4, 1940 re Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, H ungary end Houm anla* v.:- Exhibit 39 - Copy of despatob from Secretary of State for D om inion Affairs, London to External Affairs O ttaw a, dated August £4, 1945 re Belgrade,Yugoslavs, C etnlks. Exhibit 40 - Copy of de s patch from S e ore tary of S tate for Dominion Affairs . London, England to Exte rnal Affairs , Ottawa date d August £8, 1945 re s pecting S pain and a convers ation between Mr* Bavin and Gouseev. Exhibit 41 - Copy of deefra^h from S e cre tary of Dtate for Dominion Affairs , London, England to Exte rnal Affaire Ottawa, date d August 31, 1945 re Hungary and muntnipe l e le ctiona* M < "</ h'NO TE: Exhibits 36, 39, 40 «nd 41 balleved to be In Em m a W 0IKlN *u handw riting. F f �001509 X l J .; y *.r .. !■ t ; •' ' 5 \ D* :■ 8 H u! g; A Rj & ■'j • ‘ '■&/ : -''n- r ■ ' -'V •?r \ : . �Da vid SHUGAR-- ooTor name *PR011STBE«S"....(PR011ET2Y) I :: •• RE; Gr o up Ul 'i. J■***.*::. 004510 *TATtMCNT BIOGRAPHY m\% / Kam o - D avid SHUG AR \ Place of Birth - Apaeow , Poland D ate - Septem ber 10, 1915 (gave date as Sept. 6, 1915 at kcoin) • Parents - Polish H ebrew s Father - Joseph SHUG AR, Egg C andler R acial O rigin - H ebrew v\ M arital Status - M arried, G race Bishop W ales O coupatlon Gra dua te P hys icis t—Lie ute na nt, R.C.N. Employme nt - Re s ea rch Ente rpris e s Limite d, Toronto up to Fe brua ry, 1944. J oined R.C.N• Fe brua ry 14, 1944. Tra ns fe rre d H.U.C.S . Cornwa llis rob. 23, 1944 for bas lo tra ining. Tra ns fe rre d to N.S .H.Q. for duty on Ma rch 28, 1944 with Dire ctor of Ele ctrica l S upply. R esidence - 1933 - 76 D uluth Street, W est, M ontreal; 266 First .Avenue, O ttaw a ' Status - N aturalized Bri tish subject 1927. A? 0/lf Police R ecord - N one know n. \, G ENERAL. vv . ... , A v,,, SHUGa R s pea ka Englis h and ,*re nch a nd reads Scientific G erm an. v' co>; *0*,; SHUG AR sam e to Canada J in 1920,1? He. re gis te re d at M cG ill Unive rs ity, Montre a l on S e pte mber 29, 1933, conduct good, e xce lle nt re cord. ^ *4 q 2 '.. . Q c..v £*' ' O '-H is fi l e show ed that he previously attended Baron Byng H igh School. A/ - V »' ,V He gave as references - M r. H . H ackm ltz. 4882 Sherbrooke St.W . M r. I. H ackm itz, 4137 Esplanade Avenue, and M r. N . H aokm ltz, 4065 Esplanade Avenue, M ontreal. Follow ing graduation from M cG ill U niversity as a Physicist he secured em ploym ent w ith R esearch Enterprises Ltd. of Toronto. W hilst so em ployed he w as chairm an of the R .F.L. Branch of the Association of Technioal Em ployees. He w as dism issed by the R .E.L. for "show ing insuffici ent vigour In prosecuting his assignm ents". The A.T.E. charged that he w as dism issed because of his connections w ith that Association. SHUG AR w as sub sequently reinstated. -V.. i A. *s O n one ocoaslon SHUG AR represented the A.T.E. on a labour delegation of A.F. of L. unions, w hich approached the O ntario G overnm ent respecting collective bargaining legislation. D uring his service w ith R .E.L. the C anadian Tribune (replaced The C larion after I tw as banned) published three articles concerning SHUG AR1s dism issal. : r* ’ ' :% 0 X'~'£'0 % ' /•^ rO >j4 a V: O.i O n® published on M arch 6, 1943 deaoribed SHUG AR as C hairm an of tbe A*T.E. Local at R .E.L. and Secretary of tho U nion’ s N ational Executive. I t charged that SHUG AR*a discharge was the culm ination of num erous attem pts at intim idation by the com pany. I t also m entioned the appointm ent of a C om m issioner, by *he D® Pt# Labour, to Investigate SHUG AR * s discharge. 4 0 3-03-1 .330 n April, 1945 - 396 February, 1946 - Qc A new spaper iter, of L. U nions for out objections t collective barg-.: D ew ar Ferguson W orkers.L A repo R oad, Toronto, Septem ber 21st, M ontreal for ret B. Taylor, 3C 33 w ere Fred Rose D r. ohugar and election in sup; �*J PflOMETZY) Pa g e No ... /. 004511 5TAN0I INQUIRY AND REPORT 6, 1915 at R.C.N. ronto up to jbruary 14. 1944, fob. 25, 1944 to N.S.H.Q. for ctor of Ele ctrical ntre al; 266 Firs t .entl fi c G erm an, at M cG ill m duot good, iron Byng High S herbrooke S t.W, r. N. Haokmltz, s a Physicist he Ltd. of Toronto. .L. Branch of the lsm issed by the osecuting his . dism issed because UG AR w as sub- April,1945 -'<596 Avenue Road,-Apartment.212, Toronto, February, 1946 - Apartm ent 12, Kerstone Apartm ents, Elgin and C ooper Sts.* O ttaw a. A ne ws pape r ite m, date d fcarcb ,30th,r'1943, conce rned a de le gation of A.F. of I.. Unions formed to meet the Ontario Provincial authoritie s to point out obje ctions to ce rtain re comme ndations !by^Le gis lat ive Committe e on colle ctive bargaining. The Committo include d Pat S ullivan, Sam La pe de s , Dewar Fe rgus on and Dr. David S hugar of:*>he as s ociation of Te chnical Worke rs .C A re port of Way 29 th, H^dS ^ls tAd David cihugar, 396 .ve nue Hoad, Toronto, us a s ubs cribe r:^ 'the ^ Canadion Tribune . a Q > report of January1i i th, 1940 stated tnat D r. Shugar and his w ife, G race W ales w ere active in the Toronto kuniclpnl Election in support of Stew art i-m ith, L.P.F. candidate for controller. . on a labour iched the O ntario legislation. rribune (replaced ireo articles JAR as Chairman of tho Unlon*-i>>C;^ 3 dis charge 'was the si Q " <fit7X' ■ < V, °O^S ■’ ■ ■%? **$«?*&& 'Q <n -V - % 3tC3>1 (53.U I? �R E: X D avid aiU O AH --qp3rer. .na.ne....!!tBflllEXHJSUS."..(PBO M XTBY) G RO UP I (Uw/A.................................. 001312 . STATKM KN t 9KNERAL (C ont'd.) i n item published on M arch 13, 1943 dealt w ith the Toronto dl stri et Trades and Labour C ouncil supporting tbs A.T.B* In Its fi ght to w in O r* SHU G AR's reinstatem ent* An Item published on February 5, 1944 referred to SHUG AR** dism issal In February, 1943 "for union acti vi ty* and sub- ^ sequent reinstatem ent, adding that he had again been fired beoauee "hie qualifications w ere too high"* CO RBY STATEM ENT J '/r-- SHUO AR Is one of Sam C ARR 's recruits and he ran him during 7 the early stages before being taken over by O R ANT's ow n staff (ex* £0)* In D ecem ber, 1944 CARR w as given an assignm ent for SHUG AR (ex* 35-2) asking for inform ation on hydro-aeoustio stations, the location of plants, etc* CO RBY states that SHUG AR also gave valuable Inform ation on subm arines and periscopes (ex* £8 m entioned som e m aterial received from PHO M BTHBUS). In June, 1945 CARR w as asked how m atters stood w ith SHUG AR (ex* 35-2), CARR replied that be w as then w orking In the N aval Staff but had been under observation and that speolal caution w as required (ex* 35-4, Inform ation obtained from CARR at m eeting on 15-6-43 (ex* 35-1)* O n August 2 G RAN? Inform ed M oscow that SHUG AR w as In Florida (ex* 2) and that as soon as he returned to Toronto arrange m ents w ould be m ade to contact him directly Instead of through CARR (ex* 2). G RANT suggested that BRBNT (RO G O V) undertake the contact (ex* 2)* M oscow , how ever, had qualm s and pointed out on August 14th (ex. 28) that they had l i t t l e inform ation on SHUG AR. They added that I fhe should prove valuable, dlreot contact should be established, m entioning that i t w as not desirable to entrust this to BRBNT (RO G O V) but rather through CHESTER (G O RSHKO V) (ex. £8). , DO CUM ENTARY EVIDEN CE. ;;t>. Exhlblt No. 35-2 - As s ignme nt No* 1 for Sam CARR, date d 16-13-45 (obvious e rror and s hould re ad 16-12-44) which lis te d 7 tas ks re s pe cting Naval and Coas tal hydro-acous tic s tations and apparatus * It was he ade d "Sam to S hugar"• 7 .-?W' - .7... _ ■/.-v- ^ Exhibit No. 35-4 - Tas k No* 2 for FRANK (Sam CARR) of 15-6-45. Paragraph 2 as ked how the matte r s tood conce rning the fulfilme nt of a forme r as s ignme nt for Lt* SHUGAR* It be ars a marginal note which re ads :"At the present tim e he is w orking M aritim e Staff* He has consented to w ork for us but w ith special caution. He has been under observation." Exhibit No. 35-1 15-6-45 - This conce rns a me eting in Ottawa at whle h FRANC was p* Id #200* It was e vide ntly at this me eting that tas k No* 2 was hande d to Sam CARR, and the marginal note cle arly cove rs the information then s upplie d by CARR* Exhibit No. 2 - Te legram GRANT to The DIRECTOR, date d Aug. 2, 1945. Paragraph 1 conce rns an agre eme nt having been made with SAM �X Rtx GROUP 004513 D avid SHUG 1R— cover nam e ^PRO M ETHEUS* (PRQ M KTKI). i * ».?> (£ * (.Ua w .??.... .......... .............. ............ rrATCMKNT DO CUM ENTARY EVIDENCE (C ont'd.) Exhibit No. a (cont'd.) oonoerning the transfer of PRO UETST** connec tions to "us". PRO UETEY was then in Florida but i twas arranged to effect the transfer ?' 4 "in the tow n of SAM " (Toronto) on his return G RANT suggested giving BRENT the oonneetlon A with ia- .,! Exhibit Ko. 88 - Telegram DIRECTO R to O RANT, 10-0-48' This re fe rs to a te le gram of 19.7, advis ing j that until information re ce ive d from PROMETHEUS and until his pos s ibilitie s in the NAVY we re e s tablis he d, contact s hould be maintaine d through FRANK. If PROMETHEUS valuable , dlre ot contact could the n be e s tablis he d. Not de s irable to e ntrus t new oontaot to BRENT, be tte r to have CHESTER make it. ,> ■ft b' t- • , "C~- 1 r The Dire ctor as ked for the full name, pos ition, e tc. of PROMETHEUS in the Navy De pt • It als o re fe rre d to obtaining othe r pe rs cns from the s aid de partme ntal s e rvice s and as ke d that FRANK make a s urve y and s ubmit his re commendations . Exhibit No. 35-6 - As s ignme nt give n to Sam CARR (FRANK) on 16-6-45. It lis te d 5 tas ks . Ite m 3 conce rne d blographloal facts of PROMETHEUS. Item 4 as ke d for a s ugges te d place "Prone t" s hould work in e ve nt of -de mobilis ation, and ite m 4 conce rned the pos s ibilitie s of s e curing pe rs ons in the > /Ge ne ral S taff. Exhibit 35-G,*16-8-45 as s ignme nt give n " "f> "to FRANK ’On this Gate pe r the DIRECTOR'S / te le gram to CHANT—e x* £8 "' ;i fyb'sC '<} ’’ ; C'! !V 'G, i1 •v^b. , b- •bCv,<r;-> /•-; f �094514 X . 5* 'o1' M. v A NI : G H T I n; G. & A! l; ' Ei 7 AfQt 6n ' ir —%,c' %• .^kkt'O^r,. % :• k V: V X �RE: Gr M atthew S. N IG H T!N G ALE--co vor nam e "LEAD ER " 001515 Toronto-Otta wa o up •TATCMCN*r BIOGRAPHY Name - M atthew S. N IG H TING ALE (M att. Sim ona N IG H TIN C ALS) P la ce of Birth Da te M obile, Alabam a, U .S.A. V ■ f January 25, 1906. P a re nts - "n Both born in Q uebec, P.Q . Ra cia l Origin - Englis h. Ma rita l S ta tus O ccu patlon - Ma rrie d, s e pa ra te d, wife s uing for divorce . In cha rge of Toll Tra ns mis s ion Engine e ring De pt., Be ll Te le phone Co., Montre a l. Employme nt - Be ll Te le phone Co.--R.C,A.F.--a lnco de mobilize d a nd re turne d to forme r pos ition. R es ldence ^ i 209 Lakoshore R oad, Points C l ai re, P.Q . , 1942 Apt. 1, 155 O 'C onnor Street, O ttaw a, i^r 1671 Sherbrooke Street, M ontreal ? , 3425 U ni versi ty Street, M ontreal, telephone Lancaster 7905. (1941) 3616 O xenden Ave. .M ontreal . Ame rica n citize n ? Status P olice Re cord Ente re d Ca na da 1922. Nil GENERAL A report dated M ontreal 13-5-40 concerns the receipt, of an anonym ous com plaint respecting C om m unists in the Poir.te C laire di st ri ct . % The H at Included M at. S. N lG H TD N G iLB andC Vlfe, resi di ng at 209 Lakoshore R oad, em ployed by the Bel l Teaephone C o. N IG H TIN G ALE Joined the R .C .A.F., dm V o not know n and l ater becam e a Squadron Leader, Follow ing dem obilization he re turned to the Bel l Telephone C o. In his em ploym ent w ith the Bel l Telephone C o. N IG H TIN G ALE had ocoess to al l the l ateat technical inform ation on l i steni ng devloes and la aw are of future research plans of the Bell Telephone C om pany. f ;o c.. 1|S§88 l A /. 3103-1 Ci?3'Dl> 84 C edar Ave., Pole:- NOTE - Na tiona l Re gis try Lie : S ta te s . �•EADEH " Pa g e No .... / 00-43! 6 6TAN ENQUIKY AND ftCPORT I .GHTINGALE) j. / ,v ■ <! y gine e rlng a l. o dem obilized P .Q. a, 1942 - 04 Ce da r Ave • i P ointe Cla ir, P .Q. te le phone n Ave ..Montre a l. 1922. N O TE - N ational Kegi strati on August 15 - 40. states. C laim ed allegiance to onited ■ nce rns the mmunis ts in 6‘- re s iding a t one Co. y,/ IGHTINGALE had on 1 la te n ing f the Be ll 0* ^4^ 3103-1 (93-Cri �004517 Hatthe w S ,, NI0HTlNQAU-.-a9ttr nami.J'iJCADS R'' RCt X Toronto-Ottawa........ _ CROUP T.7-. '—_r •TATtMtKT CORBT S TATttlENT NIGHTINGALE van forme rly a me mbe r of the Communis t Party *10 ] aaa de taohe d for aaorat work lax. 04)• Ha no longe r doaa I Party work of any kind, hia aola oontaot with tha Party bain* < for oontrol purpoaaa only (ax. 64). *. A f Be fore tha war ha waa e mploye d by tha Ball Talaphona Company (a*. 04)4 : v;i-i . ; L NIOHTINOALE waa appare ntly re cruite d by Bam CARA 1 ifcoa ha knaw WALTER (ax. tt4#• ^ : >■ sv.- In D ecem ber, 1944 NIO HTINO ALE waa introduced to D r. H anry HARRIS (ax. 35-3). O n D ecem ber 19, 1944 ha waa aakad to aupply inform ation on tha netw ork of aerodrom ea on both ooaata, aa vailaa supplying coast m apa (ax. 54). O n January EG , 1945 ha told BRENT (HO O O V) that ha waa being dem obilized and w ould return to hia old job w ith the Ball Telephone Co. (ax. 54) CO RBY states that NIO HTINO ALE aupplied R000V w ith oom plata inform ation on telephone tapping darloea used in C anada and supplied K.C .A.P. coaatal m aps. d g :u ms n t a h v e v id e n c e . Exhibit No, 35-3 - 16-12-44. ZABOTIN * a yarioua lte ma oonce rning Sam CARR. A me e ting wao he ld on De cember 16, 1944 whe n CAHR was give n the new pas s port forma. It 0ontains the ^following re fe re nce to *1 Rave the oontaot with Hat. NIGHT!NOALS *1 m ade (him?) acquainte d with Dr. He nry Exhibit N o. 56 - Undated. UBOTItf'« note He aded *LK1DKH" whi ch 11 at a the follow ing ;«• *0. *^'rs y£ / ,f 1 ij /■u K 4v a M. "i . S. Poa a 1 b i 1 i t la a • 4c>, 'v 4^ " <T-v^ 3. Bags - l atter. 4. C all up. 5. H oney. Exhibit No. 54 - 1 Undate d This note oonoarns various matte rs connao tad with S /L NIGHTINGALE. Addre s s give n as 155 O'Connor Jt * 1 Apt. 1, te le phone £.45.34. "S am" is known to him «4 "Walte r'’. 19-1E-4&-. Firs t me e ting with NIGHTINGALE at his hous e. Pos s ibilitie s be ing s hown in:- AX Mb 11 No. 5,4 - 1. Ne twork of ae rodromes in the country (both ooaats ). 2. Hep of the ooast. U continue s that NIGHTINGALE had be e n de tached e nd re s e rve d for the future , that he did not work in the "oorpoxat ion", the contact be ing me re ly of * control nature , twioe e ye ar. h*°/r.' M/ a 6*' 3103-1 >03/01; % ' The firs t Ite m in thio oxt. 1944. Hie addre s s und te l1945 Otte wa-Hull Te le "rOST.Mt i)h A �nr name •UUDS H" pao k n o ../ 004518 X Comaunlat Part/ Ae I • no longe r doe a | ilth the Party bains 1 i 1 Te le phone company ! iv; '! am CARR, ihom ha kaav \ : ; /. i ii ' oad to D r. H anry ;r Ly Information on the tall aa aupplylns V that ha aaa balng )b w ith the Ball »0V w ith ooaplata lead In C anada and rlou8 ltam a concern>e ce mbe r 16, 1944 whan pas s port forma. It rafaranoa to 4 th Vat. NIOHTINGALS tad with Dr. Hanry C? v '% he ade d "LKADJCH" ng:- 4o■ yOn rs MO % irna vorloua matte r* INUALK. The fl rat ltaa In thla exhibit waa appare ntly writte n about Je oe mbe r 19th, 1944. The addraaa and telephone la th’it of JJr. A.L. PoJTaH. 1945 O ttaw a-Bull Telephone D lreotor oontulna follow ing item : "FO ST&R DR A L 105 0*C onnor £-4504". )nnor iit., Apt. 1, * la known to him with N10HTINQAU at i be ing ahown aa:romea in the mate ). Ga UC had be an de he future , that he oration", the oontaot % Oa *(■' °0^s l % 3103-1 x % �001319 A. .. . 4_ . RE; Ma tthe w S . NIGHTINGALE—cove r na me.. % . Toronto-Ott&wa Gr o u p ^ ^3^0/ STATEMENT DO CUM ENTARY EVID EN CE (C ont'd.) exhibit Ko, 54 (contTd.) N IG HTIN G ALE stated to be m arried to an Englishw om an j 4 Exhibit No. 54 25-1-45. Me e ting with BRENT (ROGOV) who he "tolS bwOf be ing de mobilize d a nd re turning to tHe ^e ‘% 1, Te le phone Compa ny, *oZ*h$1fcet <vfV -/Future .-&r.ra nge d for 24-2-45. Exhibit No. 54 “ .j 3////>. NIGHTINGALE ga ve the a d d rS h e rb ro o ke 57 (51) La +e rr. ‘ Te ie pticjne :§4„" urtti U%J? <0**43^ 9 Future me e tlngos e t^.f®'? '.24-5-45 whe n "he will give the coa s t (BBC)-/a pd-lis te ning in on Of:s the te le phone ". Ta s k lis te d H ecruiting (call-up) (2. M aterials of the com pany. (3. D ubox - G IN I (H IN 1) - how. (1. Q9 3103-1 (33/01) [ �004320 X ; 'I f i Ly L r t A -Am m A Qv a s s A % 3103-1 i33'05> �^SSSiS^tissmasp^jxjaBD Gr o u p .....Toronto. ....... •TATtMCKt W MM C- BIOGRAPHY Name - 001521 S/LF.W..JP.PUND......... RE: F. W, POLAND Place of Birth- G ranite C ity, l l l l nol a, U .S.A, Date - June 20, 1909. Pare nts - -- Fathe r, London, England -- Minis te r. Racial Origin - ! Englis h. Marital S tatus - Marrie d, wife ’s name Phyllis . Occupation - Ne ws paper e nd publicity. Em ploym ent - 1932-36 - Canadian Pre s s . 1^36-38 - Fre e -lance writing and publicity. Vd'66 - | j I Write r for Editorial S e rvice s Ltd., 80 Richmond S tre e t, We s t, Toronto. This conce rn als o known as "The Company for i Piibllo Re lations ". A Jame3 Cowan of ! Toronto was Vice -Pre s ide nt 1938-39 - Toronto Star. 1939-42 - M ontreal Star. Joine d R.C.A.F• May 15,i 1942. De tails of R.C.A.F. s e rvice ■%A,_ quote d he re unde r. Re s ide nce - 1936-,3V,> Afrfc. 4, 404 Jarvis S tre e t, Toronto. , $ >, - 2 Chioora Ave ., Toronto with Lon ^5^^«us .4,2ru,i I : . 4 POLAND*8%^^<%e ai^t. 7,^37 Elgin S tre e t GENERAL ‘**8? i POLAND atte nde d a 3-ye ar Arts Cours e in MoGill Unive rs ity, POLAND has a limite d knowle dge of Fre nch, R .C .A.F. Service D ate of Appointem ent - 15-3-42 Served from 15-5-42 to 10-11-44 w ith the D irector of Intel l i gence, AFHQ from the rank of Pilot O fficer to Squadron Leader. Seconded to W ar Tim e Inform ation Board 10-11-44 to 10-5-45. O n 12-5-45 he was m ade available to Secretary of State for External Affairs to act as Xxeoutlve Secretary to the Psyohologloal W arfare C om m ittee* R .C .A.F, R esponsibilities ! (a) Supervision of security education, including the prepare- ; tlon and distribution of a series of Seourlty Lectures. 1 (b) Advising D. of I, on m atters of Seourlty Policy. mm* i �S /L F. W. POLAND 00*1322 RE; Toronto...*..Q.t taws. Gr o u p •TATfMtNT GENERAL (Cont *d} (c) Member of S e ourity of S ub-Committe e of Canadian Joint Inte llige nce Committe e, aotlng it s e cre tary, > C,- , Id) ^)y Member of the Sub-Commi tte e of the Ps ychological Warfare .-4/; Coati ttee. (e ) tfe nbe r of the ATH4 Committe e on grading of clas alfle d documents . /, ' c ,0 *r *.. {f) Liais on offioe r with othe r S orvice ^on Inte llige nce Matte rs and e mploye d on Ce ns ors hip dutie s . j It is re porte d that POLAND was s e conde d to the W.I.B, following1 a propos al made by j 1 V.'hlle w ith the W .I.B. PO LAND used an office on the second floorI of 13SJ Sparks Street. | He was and st i l lm ight be Editor of a publication entitled "C anada D igest". After leaving the W .I.B. on M ay 12, 1945 Poland w orked w ith the D epartm ent of External Affairs in connection w ith m atters con cerning prisoners of w ar— office, Room 309 New Post O ffice Building, phone 6879. The Psychological W arfare C om m ittee, of w hich he is now Executive Secretary, is a Joint C om m ittee under the direction or the D epartm ent of External Affai re. CO RBY STATEM ENT . I t is not-certain 1 fthi s?ind' irtdual w as ever actually intro duced into ZABO TIN*a organize* " ■- K ‘ C- ~A>r: An individual known worke d for Sam CARR from January to April-*^ 2^43 le ^^iJi^He wras e mployed in the Inte llige nce Branch of the/Xix'*Fo^e e in Toronto but was late r trans fe rre d to Otta wa **0 . nv .v -- a.-, He provide d a plan or map of ?Ins tnUrt lonal S ohools , but appare ntly was not working at the 'time the re-organization, the latte r half of 1943 (e x. 51). “"r < > •C V^vV This individual has been tentatively identified as S/L F.W . PO LAND, who w as placed on a speolal assignm ent under the Cam p C om m andant, RCAF, O ttaw a. CO RBY l ater advised that PO LAND waa seconded from the RCAF to tho W artim e Inform ation Board and that he is now em ployed on the staff of "C anadian Affai rs". He lives in the sam e apartm ent as C . LUNAN (BACK) and w orks in the sam e offloe. DO CUM ENTARY EVIDENCE Exhibit No. 51 - This docume nt concerns the S e cond Group, Ottawa-Toronto, unde r SOKOLOV and shows that Sam CARR was in charge of the Ottawa-Toronto Group, It oontains the following ite mi- : ze ke n to work at the end of January, 3. fnOLLAND. Minis try of Aviation, Works in Toronto in the Inte llige nce Branoh. At the moment is be ing trans fe rre d to Ottawa. He gave a map (plan) of the ins tructional s ohools . Up to pre s e nt is not working." "Worke d up to April". 1 °<9 % 3103-1 (33/01) 's<-~ ‘A0*.: Cj '’'>&£S \ v> - 4/ �s a: i S' RE: S /L P. *. POUND GROUP ___ PACE NCX Toronto -JtUn u STATCMtMT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE g £ 'frcf 4? $ #.#X' -V *# § Exhibit Ho. 54 - ZABOTIN's re gis tration card of Lie ut. LUNAN which shows that he re s ide d In Apt. 7. 537 Elgin S tre e t, Ottawa, te lephone S ~7120. The address Is Poland's apartment and the telephone num ber Is Poland's residence , telephone, thus I tw as Lunan w ho lived ;ln Polsnd's a partaent• $ •£* j : This docume nt conce rns the "Res e arch Group* which see organ 1945* 1945 Ottawa-Hull Te le phone Dire ctory contain* the follo •POLAND PI 337 Elgin 5-7120" $ A-* O i ~’4‘" '*> c.; ■’3 ,o V''....... V» �094524 }: r- xx _ fi> %ou%J*.X'OVX x X°XX,_ 3103-1 (33/01) �004525 X \ 9 r J. S . BjgjNING . Sscur* N ational.R «gl»tr«tlon C ard.;.:i.1 1 ■ • S'; ‘ ' • ‘,;' t I ■ ; "£" D lTiaion'roport"that^EN N IN O l8 ajS ' |'i|/.'f r- -!; "# brother-in-law "of"H .S^O EM W .' ^oseW ^J;";U j •) ooTor 'nem o la,*<H U ff*^G roS(W *8iw ifeli:!:-;1f has relatives in C entral Europe— see ; *... " ' * exhibit 60. The relationship should be clari fied* C heck C i vi lService records for oom plete details of BENNING *s em ploym ent* There is som e question as to BEN N IN G 's true origin, in O ctober, 1942 he olalm ed that his parents w ere born in N ew foundland; on another occasion they w ere born at St* Pierre et M iquelon, P*q* question him on this^point. question BENNING as to the m ethod used in handing over m aterialto ZABO TIN* The large quantity handed-ovq£ by BENNING w ould indicate thatm eetings w ere frequently arranged. Exhibit 35-3 coneerne^4nV£$6*^^ 5, 1944 w hich show s that/C AR E asked m eeting through FO STER IBEN N IN G )^ circ instances of this shoi^id;/b^^i i B ^^^,''/.'> Ascertain i fBENNING w as conne^tefe^^% PF^, w ay w ith, or a m em ber of, a N orth Am erican M / C om m ittee of C o-ordination. A s - ; . -4 . 2 • y± v t&U., v^s * % 'C'x r. �004526 R£. James S cotland BENNINO-.rCO Yer... ne ma...."JOS TEfl " fr>vhiv • GROUP ...... X X rC: . • TATCMtKI CHOUIMY ANQ BIOGHAItiT Nom e - Jam es Scotland BENNING Place of Birth Da te - Montre al, P.Q, % June 15, 1913. Pa re nts Born S t. Pie rre e t Mique lon, P.Q. (In applying for a pos ition with the Civil S e rvioe In Ootobe r, 1942 BENNING de clare d his pare nts we re bom inlNe wfoundland). Raclol Origin Marital S tatus - Occupat ion e mployme nt - ■X V Joltic. Anglo-S axon (Englis h). Marrie d, one child, NOTE:- "C" 01 vl e l on re port BENNING la a brothe r-in-law of H.S . GERSON, cove r name •’GRAY". Cle ric. 1932-33, Canadian National S te ams hip Line s — D eck H and. 1933-34, C anadian Steel Strapping C o., Ltd., M ontreal P.Q . 1931-35, M aohlne O perator, storekeeper, C anadian Laatox Ltd., M ontreal. 1935-41, C oats C krk, D om inion R ubber C o. M ontreal. 1941-42, Barrett C om pany, M ontreal. July 1 - 21, 1942, Allied (far Supply C orporation, M ontreal. July 21, 1942 - July, 1945, Llalaan O fficer, Am m unition D ivision, Am m unition Production Branch, D .M *S. and Joint Seoretary of C anadian M unition Assignm ent C om m ittee. July, 1945 Transferred to D epreciation C om m ittee. D. M. and S , Pre s e nt - Economics s tatis tical Branch, D.M. k S , He s lde nce - July 14, 1942 re s ide d wlth H.S .' GEfiS Cfi, ±p t. 1, 5000 Hutchis on S t., Montre al, phone CO 0024. '• /, Ottawa - o/o T. Bryne , 193 S unny s ide Ave . , VX S tatus Britis h s ubje ct. / - -y. a ' 4/,-^ Police Re cord None known. X " Cl v V '*?) '' % CS NS BAL -H 'v • He was e ducate d in the Montre al Publlo S ohoole and atte nde d McGill Unive rs ity in 1936-37, s ubje ct Accounting. *he n he mode application for the Civil S e rvice ha was e pons ore d by Ur, U.B. Fis he r, Comptrolle r, Hltz Carlton Hote l, Montre al! Mr. T.S .C. S aunde rs , Comptrolle r, Jue boo Liquor Commie a ion, and Mr. C. Le Blanc, Ins urance Age nt, Montre al. In his q)plloation BENNING applie d for a pos ition as Munitions and s upply Offioe r. Invs s tlgatlona oonduotod in 1942 re s pe cting his characte r re ve al that BENNIKQ re ce ive d many me rit marks wfailat e mploye d by the Dominion Rubbe r Co. and re ce ive d thre e promotions , Junior Coe t Cle rk und Cos t Es timator to S tandard Cos t Cle rk* BENNINC’s re oord at the Canadian S te e l S trapping Co, waa favourable . His rooord at the Barre tt Co. wee favourable , e xoe pt for one occas ion whe n he was che okod up by the manage me nt for re marking, A-X to ce rtain e mploye e s , that the y we re working for too s mall a %^Q*ala ry. NOfre cord of Communis t activitie s . . I]Q > • X- 'JA XX4,X X* % 3103-1 03'01) : ► ; Augus t iy40 - 1192 Bis hop S t........ontronl. it �RE: Jam es Sootland B5N NIN G --cover nam e J!F.0STKR" GROUP 001527 ■^CTM55^. 4*w A (fo* .< eTATCMCHT CORBY STATEMENT. CO RBY stated that BENNING was reorulted by Sam CARR for SO KO LO V*s organization in 1942-43 (ex* 51)• He then o^m e under ZHKVKNIO V of Tass (ex. 51, ex. 52). BENNING has been em ployed by the D epartm ent of M unitions and Supply since the latter part of 1942 (ex. 51). CO RBY reports that BENNING supplies large am ounts of inform ation, including m onthly review s, production figures and copies of correspondence w ith com pares. A single bag, sent to M oscow on January 5, 1945, contained over 360 pages of inform ation supplied by him (ex. 37). DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE. Exhibit No. 51 - Octobe r, 1942. This document conce rns the Ottawa-Toronto Group unde r Sam CARR and re ve als that In Octobe r, 1942 CARR propos e d that FOSTER, an As s is tant to the S upe rinte nde nt of the De partme nt of Dis tribution of War Production, Munitions and S upply "gave mate rial about war mate rial, guns and othe r kinds of s upplie s *. It was als o me ntione d that he oould gain othe r information with promotion and give be tte r mate rials . FOSTER was tie d up or contacte d with Martin (ZHEVENIOV). Exhibit No. 52 - Undated*. This conce rns thre e individuals who did not "work for us dire ctly but for SAM’s organ izatlon". One of the individuals , -C/ i» MARTIN who e vide ntly worke d with ERNST (Eric ADAMS) and FOSTER (BENNING). The ir main tas k was to s upply information conce rning the Army and look for new pe ople . mu * r Wfc; Thre e re ports ,we re ;-- ~ s ubmitte d conce rning aviation, the Fle e t and the Army. ‘ Q* f, ' -y ■ Cj o Exhibit No. 35-3-5-12-44. ZABQ Tlif notes concerning various m eetings w ith Sam CARR. O ne item reads as follow s:' “ "5-12-44 Asked for m eeting through FO STER". Exhibit No. 37 5-1-45. G RANT’ S M ail List. This contains 70 item s al l of w hich FO STER is shown as being the source. The total num ber of pages of m aterial supplied by FO STER am ounts to 361. The num ber of the item s on the l i st are quoted hereunder:111, 116, 121, 126, 131, 136, 141, 146, 151, 156, 161. 166, 171, 179, 3103-1 iS j .SO 112, 117, 122, 127, 132, 137, 142, 147, 152, 157, 162, 167, 172, 191, 113, 118 123, 128, 133, 138, 143, 148, 153, 158, 163, 168, 173, 192, 114, 119, 124, 129, 134, 139, 144, 149, 154, 159, 164, 169, 177, 193, 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 170 178 194 j. �RE: .. Janas S cotland BEWHIMQ—oov»xr nama "FOSTER• •Me n tweed- fVwK^* • GROUP •t a t k me n t ! > ■ DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE (CONT'D.) Exhibit No. 37 (cont'd.) - The 70 Ite ms cove r nume rous s ubje cts . The following will give some ide a of the many s ubje cts de alt with:* Manus cripts on Canadian-Britis h re lations , production of ae roplane s , production of s hips , te le grams , corre s ponde nce with companie s , corre ctions of contracts , note s to contractors , s upple me nts to contracts , ‘e xplos ive s , note s on ce rtain programs , -re ports .on Ce ns ors hip Branch, s pe cifica">7%^^ "tions , ./Corre s ponde nce re s pe cting Ins pe e tion Bfanoh,^the compos ition of a packing commis don,. note s on production, te le grams , monthly re vie ws ^' production of arms during Nove mbe r, 1944, analys is of orde rs on Nove mbe r 30, 1944, re ports on a NorthAme rican Committe e of Co-ordination and note s conce rning the same Committe e . l a % -'v> •£ 310? * m ZM �004529 X i : Cc : 8, R I 4 C A1 D A U xS i * L ’&yt O/f A- °^> s*. w;"j -> ^:-/V q9 \%v 3t03-l«iS3^SR.- i : S �RE:...Eric ..Georga..ADAMS--cover....name.JJZRNSXJL— Gr .. Trws &.-..(fthta-------------------------------- o up WTATCMCNT BIOGRAPHY Nam e - Erio G eorge ADAM S Place of Birth - H ull, P,Q . D ate - April 3, 1907. Parents - C .A. ADAM S, form er Principal G ranby H igh School-retired, now residing at,Ste. Anne de Bellevue; Racial Origin - Britis h M arital Status - M arried prior to 1934, Josephs M cKinnon, born Sherbrooke, P.Q . M arch 13, 1908. O ccupation - C onsulting Engineer. Em ploym ent - 1925-29, M cG ill U niversity, Engineer B. Sc. 1930, H arvard U niversity, M .B,A, (M aster Business Adm lnis tratl on. 1931-34, Em ployed C oppfleld Brow n C o., M ontreal, 1934-35, Secretary, C anadian N ew sprint Association 1935- 36, Econom ics, O ffice of the President, C .P.R . 1936-39, C overdale and C olpltts, New York, as C onsulting Engineer. 1940, O perated ow n business as C onsulting Engineer in Toronto. 1940, W artim e R egistration Board, D ept. M . & S.— Foreign Exchange C ontrol Board, M ontreal, Later em ployed as Industrial Engineer and Appraiser, Industrial D evelopm ent Bank, F.E.C .B., M ontreal. C R estdence - ................ ... :.y ... A,y ; r v 1935 - 4870 Cote 4e s m ges Road, Montre al. 1940 - 3280 Ridgwood Road* Hamps te ad, P.Q., Atlantia 2807. 1940 - 83 Ingle wood Drive * Toronto. . Vf„4. Status - British subject, '“V * ^ c:£ ... / '* •#* Ss<* "* . Police R ecord - N one know n. G ENERAL Prior to attending M cG ill and H arvard Adam s attended Prim ary and H igh Schools at G ranby, P,Q . After graduating from H arvard he w as em ployed as previously stated. O n July 11, 1934 Passport N o, 84048 w as issued to ADAM S and his w ife, sam e being returned during during June, 1940 bearing the follow ing endorsem ent:New York 1934, G erm any Septem ber 1934, R ussia, during August or Septem ber 1934, Follow ing his return to C anada ADAM S w rote five articles under the oaption "R ussia To-day" w hich w ere published in the "Evening Post" of M ontreal, Perusal of these arti cles reveal ttet ADAM S w as m uoh Im pressed by conditions in R ussia, O n M ay 22, 1935 C olonel Sir Vernon Kell, London, England advised that M rs, ADAM S had been in touch w ith the C om m unist O pposition G roup in New York C ity and advised that she w as Interested in C om m unism but knew l i t t l e about I t , She w as referred to the M ontreal Branch, 3;03-1 (33/C l) 001530 �RE: Gr Brio George ADj^^-c^or n o u p. Toronto - Ottawa ... 004331 ____________ STATEMENT -7;.;. CENERAL{cont *d.) u v.>! o ’li- O n Septem ber 4t 1936 the U .S, Im m igration D ept. granted ADAM S I perm isdon to reside perm anently- in tho U .S.A. Thla perm ission I was apparently obtained so that he could w ork In N ewYork C ity 1 J l /l ^ -Vg .... r/y/: * The July ^-..19'^5. YaaueAof ^W pfe^rker" contained an Item show ing that Eric A dA l ec ,a^BO tR /'O f the C anadian oom m lttee I of the Fr i endl on>,' ://. 1 ' w;. 4 CC*'**- CORBY STATEMENT CORBY re porte d that prior to the re -organization ZHXYENIOV of Taaa aote d as a contact be twe on S okolov and Erio ADAMS (e x. 52) •i CORBY s tate d that Adams was originally re oruite d by Sam Carr for S okolov's 1942-43 s e t-up (e x. 51 and 52). He then worke d unde r the dire ct control of ZHEYENIOY (e x. 52) Unde r ZABOTIN Adams continue d to work unde r CARR (e x. 35-3) until De cembe r, 1944 when the contact was trans fe rre d, pre s umably to one of Grant's own men. ' CORBY ide ntifie d Adams as an e mploye e of the fore ign Exohange Control Board in Ottawa and that he s upplie d de taile d informaticn on indus try and futuro plans . Ho als o s upplie d re ports of moetings of Boards of S cie ntis ts , Indus trialis ts , e to. and the de s patoh of munitions to England. A s ingle ma ll bag, forwarde d to Moaoow on January 5. 1945, (e x.37) containe d £63 page s of information s uppliod by ADAMS. CORBY adde d that Kay WTLLSHSR pas s od he r ^formation to Erio ADAMS. mmh �REt X • Brio Oaqrg».JJ>A^ ..'Tgggfe fe .r-^ftS gk.— GROUP. •TATCMtWT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE. Exhibit No. 51 ■ • y>. Zabotln note s of forme r organization tfloh contained the follow ing Item reepeeting ERNST who w as proposed by Sam G AlR s* * — - ,vz v; • • "ER N STJew #' He w orks Hn the U nited t(som e ofthe paper torn toff) ??? of the w ar governm ent?\U SA and ^C anada) lco-ordinator) * He gives detailed Inform ation about al l kinds of Industries, plans for the future. Supplies detailed accounts of sessions • (m eaning m eetings of Boards, scientists, industrialists, etc.) G ave m aterials dally. G ood w orker." Exhibit N o. 52 - Zabotln note concerning three individuals who w ork for SAM 's organization. ERNST and FO STER w orked w ith M ARTIN and their m ain task was to supply inform ation concerning the Arm y and look for new people. y• Thre e re ports we re s ubmitte d conce rning aviation, the Fle e t and the Army. 'J'S Exhibit N o, 55-3 - 4-10-44. ZABO TIN 's various notes re Sam C AH R .^;/W An item of this date contains an entry show ing that Sam reported having handed over som e m aterials to ERNST "that he w i l lnot obtain them ,-he asked to advise." Exhibit N o. 57 - 5-1-45. ZABO TIN 's m ail l i st . This contains 27 entries show ing ERNST as the source of the m aterial w hich totalled som e 263 pages. The Item s are as follow s ISO , 185, 190, 202, 207, 212, 181, 186, 195, 203, 208, 213. 182, 187, 199, 204, 209, 183, 188, 200, 205, 210, 184 189 201 206 211 The m aterial concerned num erous m ntters;D espatoh of m unitions to England, invention of w aterproofing, notes on a conference, unloading of m unitions, reports, inspection branch, correspondence w ith com panies, enquiries, m aterial concerning a C *N . Branch eto. % ' X-.Avy-' yyb <4} S'- ' :m ms -w •■4 c % 3.05-1 : ! j . j S f; ty ! : ' �001333 X : ; i i': * I : % %. ,1 ¥ i;: 1 ! ttfslll* V ! 1 £ s• v ......... U * % I'tir 1 ‘ ! HI-a ' : I ' W I L L 8 H E a .j •? K0>" ‘ 4.- '*0 Co .*-. ;--x?' i-j. ®Or* O. *? . .,;V % -r ■ ■ >■ ’ 3503*1 i3*CU>. �£ s? § S p - her for details*^Apparently i tw connected w ith her w ork as she ca there after offioejhours,'i*e* 6.1 ..."“Jb ar ...Tlw [CaPadag aptjis S re porte dlthatpJiaipnXLS HZRl ■hand ed #ore r$he &mate rialfto ?Xrio | ■ADAMS ^in^carbonicopy ^Que s tion te a ■to iclro urns tance s hinde r indwritte nl Lscertainlif] lontactiwith] On*De o emb e rTEl^l94 5 xMi s s 'llfills he r hande d?a Jfruit ‘bas ke t and fa rolle d e nTe lope |to ‘ Ende avour to as ce rtain Bate rial hande d tby^Mis s zffills he r&to -sf a' On p40 m inutes In the offioe of the C *I»8« rBate "A" D ivision check to learn i f fv«h* TCl.lB On December D7th Mis s Ifills he r s pe nt 40 minute s in the C.X«S* ,officque s tion &&]}. ;.r: JW& �1 : I SSS^BSsSnxii ;ntx Gr o u p. '»/• mm R « rrATtMi BIOGRAPHY * *r\ v Nano - Kathla^i^WIIXS HEHS [tfbrr«bvNaaJjS THathioon Karr “ ‘ ‘ WILLSHER* . ;.4>v Place of Birth «TEnfiland . ,,, „„„„„................. JBffon*~ 40 - 5y a s r1^0f^g a?5s Vtroh’ES thM.905*•*: . Pa re__ nte -' r « f l * foatborn H4. Data - j ^n*oa«awMRrittp*l^^ _ , Marital S tatui^^S wS lngUK O ccupation • V m,-. • Em ploym ent • 1930 •1933 -Grads 1-2 S horthand Cle rk, Roglatry ‘•■.•v£Wgc£^' Office Of Britis h High Commis s ioner for C anada, O ttaw a* . In England for a abort period* 1933 - Present - G rade 4 stenographer sam e office. Re s idence - Apt. 15, C ourtland Arm s, 225 Kent Street, O ttaw a, R esides w ith C harlotte Islay Johnaton, D ept, of Agriculture, S tatu a - Britis h s ubje ct m v.v*:. Police R ecord - None known. GENERAL kis s WILLSHER is be lie ve d to have graduate d from a London Unive rs ity, which might pos s ibly be the London S chool of Economics, * The Rt. Honourable ^Malcolm for Canada, de s cribe d Mis s not ge t much e njoyme nt out e fficie nt and Is not known w hatsoever In or about bar MacDonald, Britis h High Conn 1 s al one r WILLSHER aa a ne rvous type who doe s of -life * S he la not re garde d as to have s hown any Communis t te nde ncie s place of e mployment The Rt. Honourable Malcolm MacDonald Jbea as ke d that, In the e ve nt of Mis s WILLSHER be ing appre he nde d, he firat.be allowe d to have a private Inte rvie w with he r, during the courao of which he will e xplain that he r aotlona have oome .tothe atte ntion of the Police that aha has violate d he r Oath of Offloe and the Official S ocrats Act and he is prepare d to give he r an opportunity to make any e xplanation aha may de s ire * .Mr, UaoDonald,cons ide rs that Mis s WILLSHER will like ly make a comple te admls e don-to him* ‘ If this turns out to be the cas e ,, Ur/Mao Donaldwill re pe at, In the pre s e nce , of Mis s WILLS HER, to a me mbe r of.this Foroe , what e he re ve als , following whloh s he may be take n*,into cus tody for furthe r Inte rrogation.^^ ; Some time prior to 193(f the Britis h High Commis s ione r In Ottawa wrote England conce rning the e ngage ment of a=Grade fi s te nographe r for s e ore t work* His .propos al was approve d and Kay WILLSHER was e ngaged in England for a te rm of thre e ye ars # ‘ • v 'iVe .!' V * • At the expiration of this period she w as a O rada 1 stenographer and lndloated a desire to rem ain In C anada but her services w ars not entirely satisfactory,~a G rade 2 stenographer being con sidered m ore effici ent, It.w aa desired to prom ote the latter and I twaa suggested to M iss W ILLSHER that as she had oom pletod her period of engagem ent ehe should return to England and that I f ehe w ished so to do, she oould later return to C anada at her own expense when she w ould be given an opportunity to again w ork In the offloe as a local appointee. 2103-1 {33-Til)* N ational R egistration, Auf B.So, (Econom ics - London} Speaks, reads and w rites �:|SSg Sts:;. 004336 W- M ■•$5!S &S dG$£if- Pi: ip fils''' i i/i.VM&S $ '$4(0 MMi<S ■ -SPSi ■ ■'■■iMihif1 lS9 e rk, Re gis try Commis s i one r pe riod* '*. wm r same office * re e t, Ottawa, n, De pt* of s p ® mt HP" Ip . §> a^fWWwp. Speaks, reads and w rites English,;Trench.andvO em ani^ C onm isatoner rpe who does ;arded as l i st tendencies iiilBSP , In the e ve nt owe d to have which he will of the Police » flclal S e cre ts o make any a that Mis s la* A? - 1 re pe at. In Fore s , what cus tody for s r In Ottawa 3 s te nographe r WILLSHJ5R was s te nographe r s e rvice s we re ilng conbe latte r A comple te d id and that nada at he r o again work :--Jr r r-. t: /■ Of • <&c. ' ' '-’vr ■, jt ' 4i •S’ 3 ICS 1 ■Hf/ ------.' -I-----40««.8ubJeot.eltlm ed aba bald D agraa cf N ationalR egistration,August B.So* (Soonom ios -*; London )0l of STAWOtWa ■. ^r- « iB We e tbom Ad*, ?;■ (SJB / ';vje ■$m s e n fce ry HILLS RKR. I </...-• i k 1 �004337 l v- aneTucayr Hi Ml' iSf^&Tr [Qr o um m OgWBRAt *( CONT*D»‘) '■iff. £Toovt m!V KBS .W&mmts ®?!l^aB8&fin«d.br .tl»» Or«d«.a 6uncgr«ph«r< ■:. Illli^eCanada.and TOM1 ^ a coopted a f HI —— ------- *“* *&*/< pos ition ai Orade.8 Cle rk.««S he.was Jfg§ appointe d a Grade 4 Cle rk at: a s alary of• |r,580i\P«r|§S £ ' mwsz&mm % :■ T-i. ^|fci8Bii8l8«^P(BateM Mpg- ; !®H^4iaplaytd an inte re s tvin Communist activitie s and^atte nde d^M fI m '; . to note that aa far baok as June ,-1937lit was alle ge d that ^*7* *" '*• '* ^ kis s WILLS HER furnis he d,; to the Cornual at Moveme nt, names and • i'asswBK %'fi0 -I the reeords of the League of N ations Society, of w hich a U r# Inoh la a leading offi ci al ,&This m ay hare been voluntary .. ' in' ^M>WIL^«UHUia BVi^ ■cove r name ERNST••Vj;She appare ntly be lie ve d this information. &' ’ ;-K ?ent to . the C om m unist Party but w as not.aw are that sam e found W:- l^^s a MMIMMM &*»* WILORESS^the >Canadian Ambas s ador, to Uos cow, dated. .*4. ■ ;& deapatoh de alt.with the financial'»r>dlt»..for..tli>,«wHtt>s «>.jof trade betwee n the 08SB and Ore at r f.j m ■m; & m m& ;F' IPI m 00py - of, ay.not• 1 wrl1te n. by.Lord,Ke yne s which de e l t with ^^^^^finane ial^arrange me nts lbe twte nJS re at^Britain;and CanadaTS p^P |^||M|^^ora F*S «8? e Mn? !«S ^lln5rwa ^®P ? S Te ^M‘%l s hould be ty\ fe ^^^^ffiooo^tadronlyiTor.what^it?may. be^. worthy She was give n **oodd r nan»lwhloh] lnd tcate a^afmore ; clos e ; oonne 01 ion j &\ m^^^™»thanjCORBrvBay..:>be faware rofi»Kn^thia;re gard ^the ^r-'3> »a torIc l X^avaHablo^rewaals $'?h a 0 d • ? notme a we re notllf '^i^■ ^ ®®u®ualJrf*lYen^nl0#,?*th^ lndlTlduayis ?cern®d^ft*j^^ ^•^■p^^aotual ly^employedxaa] an>agenjfe m :Enquiri5^7*t^S e %ffloe jorj^ne ®gh?Comtf^OM^ail£ s pe oifloally;me ntlons {bothaite ms ;and^s hows ’ELLI as sthef j ^ fjf ** .stfwhicht m h A: a | --H;; -wU-aj cr ' Qo yv- 3tO> 1 (93/0'0 . �•4 . :=; 7 i<fc: ■ -9 (fa y) WIXa a xB-e ore ra .B. «gU3' • ’ •/>’,£ "' %$?$(?7 ‘ ■- vr -j - j,.-~:^;^.- -■ >97; 1V/, v' 9 # ;' ■ -. •? ^DOCTMZBTAHT yriDS HCr(COIg*P.> .a&jfli .9 V",#/9vo It ,: ‘-' O *v .;:••• O .a V ->, f>9 c>; „o J? 7< fits jr*se£Zf&£Z?y ^.Cy-V-- iaBs^yiiggig^aaaBaaig ■rmraiirial MU '“ ;e Ie graa>oTo«Iitthat ^te a 3k>*gl09( conce rn in* e tte rjms re s s jto Kins c once rne d|j*hs :£■ tte rIriTlnane lal^r«dlt«iror>»»urln«>ra(laib«^-J 9 HES s S e ^, 9 l loins he uncove re d ;tb« s ource Yroa'e hich 9tho jfon^toa^rnn^e flydd^-----* ‘““A"—■ -•J Jin ^te le ^aa^Hno^S rS * IH*ins tractions : re s pe ct Ing the 'fcttppljlns of s inforae tion rtoS I the S ovie t Ambassador e nd* that Jms matln aJ L oases dcs crlbctho JPI&3CT0Bj l b . the ^s ource j ■sa •i siSSi iP WM •V 9 •' «* frs&Hr^. 3 Biiw JP ifc S^illiiSSa rr-T.-vv-ir'T?^:"?';* �004539 X ! i*.' ! % *f ■ X a ■■a. ■ ■ :,?iiaa; i - •" 'I- . h 7%: ■ } . :v •V *>■ 10. ■ R ' 0 V s E /■*<*>: o > <$> / /:■ A C^,, a- XX > x •,, °x°X.. x - ' ‘ <* '^ c,: ‘X - . - :• ;03~ -_.iX *':? • >. • �r>- ptt „fr#4 Rosi-*o o y « p..aan«...rxBOiai ^-Uiaoczijaj Onouw. _ //' nnIP W*zt:-r'- 'I 3**^:- ■ •' fTATWMCWT EIOORApmC Raw* - Pred R0S2 (R osenberg) Place of Birth • Lublin, Poland Pete - Deoem ber 7, 1907 Paranja • Polish Jew * 7 \ R aoltl O rigin - Polish Jaw M arital Statu* - H arried 1931, Penny C herneee (U krainian)-* M osber Y.C .L. O ne ohildOccurs tlon - Kle otrtole n by tr«de --pe l4 Coaaunlat functlone rp for many ye ar*. U.P. (L.P.P.) Rq»ldone e - 1942 -- 709 Be ll lre nue , Montre e lj 461 Rhe rbrooke S tre e t, *e at, Montre alj 30 Be e ohwood, Apartme nt 1, te atrie w, Ontario* S tatue - naturalis e d Britis h s ubje ot on fathe r’* ce rtificate (Jacob Ros enbe rg) 1926* Police Pe oord 1929 - Oct. 22nd - Toronto, Ont, • Dis orde rly conduct - $25. and coats and 30 days or 30 add. daya as Pred ROSK, P.D. /651/29. 1931 - June 6th - M ontreal, Q ua, - Sedltiou* uttering* • 12 m onth* oaae appe aled* 1932 - Oot, 24th - Montre al, Qua. Appe al die s is aed - To s e rve 12 month* from Octobe r 24, 1932, le a* 32 day* s e rved from Pe b* 29, 1932 to April le t, A932 «• Pred ROSS, QPP /10293. 0SNr.RAL ROSS he * a knowledge of inglle b, Tre nch, Polis h, Ocnaan and Tlddls b* RO SS oaae to Canada per the 0.8* *C or*loan" in 1920. He Joined the Young Com m unist League in 1923. He Joined the Com m unlet Party of Canada in 1929, later beooaing Provincial O rganizer In the Provino* of Q uebec* In 1929 be becam e R ational 0aoratary of the Toung C om m unist League* Proa M ay to R oveaber 1930 he waa in M oeoow «• an executive aem ber of the Y.C .L* International. D uring hie m em bership in the Young C om m unist League he'acted . .*.I t.rof -TO . Iou„, iorlc.r*. . , . ,• ; In 1937 he beeam e Secretary of the C entre! C ontrol Com ala*ion ef,tt*c,r-of - . .• , A aouYenir program of the 0th contention ofthe T.C .L., held .. in 1930, lauded H08X for hie long connections w ith the Com m unist M orsm ent and daeoribed him ea haring "led m any .V^lo, •trike*". I talso claim ed he "w as jailed for organizing the5## unem ployed" (actually tbs charge vac for asking seditious jV/S K utt.r»no.«),■. : After the outbreak of w ar in 1939 RO SY wee oontiw aoualy satire underground, w riting disloyal pam phlets end leaflets opposing ?’,03-1 133-01) mam*' •£ iv'tr'T , . *«oy*«v *»to *««m PAOl NO. �Gr s o u p. ■' <f> I; S 0)?:k:\ .of J? c4 D«LMT AMO M0*0*rr Q CS NS RAL (CONT'D. ) I He we * de taine d unde r Re gulitIon'Q, of tlQr I&bjxjfc~ R. whan ha s urre nde re d in Toronto on £«pt*cb£r ,.-fc3, < |t94«>;nd was coudltionolly re le as e d on Octobilf .O 4 On Octobe r 2nd, 1939 Bre d ROS S re turne d to Toronto afte r having vis ite d Northe rn Ontario to colle ct monie s from various organizations s od individuals who financially s upporte d the Party. The re po rt me ntione d that • one of the mos t promine nt e xe cutive s of the C.P. of C. in Northe rn OntaIn Augus t 1M3 he be e as s ^S lie tt&br.4f the ' National Comml tte a rio was a Je wis h mining e ngine e r * of the Labour Progre s s ive ;Pai^f. 6:At£;ih¥/*4s e tlm >, ha be came Upon ln. vws tigatlon, Kirkland Lake De tachmont le arne d that the Je wis h »inLng • ■•*k*r °r u* e ngine e r was known as Harve y Cars on, Manage r of the Kirkland Cold Band In Octobe r, 1944 he wa rV pp« l^tbd ohainia'n of the L.P.P. Ulna, Kirkland Lake . The alne was not the n in ope ration; whe n it was Xnglls h S e ction In th*PrO»In«4 Of Que be a. ope rate d twit of its e mploye e s we re Communis ts . The y re ce ive d pre fe re nce lO Cf ^ O from Cars on. "Harve y* Ce rs on is obvious ly Harold Cars on who was Manage r R03 was e le cte d K.P.V Cartie r ^onitltue necy, as a labou of tba nine re fe rre d to from 1936 to De ce mbe r 1941. BOSK had, accordingly. Prog re s alve candidate In the hf-e le ction ha Id on Augus t 9, 1943L known Cars on for many ye ars , was re -e le cte d in the l» i5 Ce oe ral.XIlotloa ii la J~P.P* candidate for.the S ome cons titue ncy, dtoa | BOS S waa*conne cte d^wlth*Armand Labla^TELDlUt on OGPU age nt wi^g who bad the ape clal*taak of ae ourlng pas s ports and Ide ntifie s -*: tion pape rs for S ovie t age nts .*rlt mi yZLOlUf who arrange d,«£S ( hrough rre d BOS K,*for*tbS 'i>a*s port of Will BRANDZ3 the S ovie t* • ge nt who organize d and. dire cte d .the pe ne tration of Woolwich fit Ars e nal a bo u t »1937.^TKLDiUJ< wns jde taine d*ttnd s x^Be gula tion'21J 1Df«thatI?.0>C.B^durl^;the A»aT»iflBWatfti>MliattrtWft<<>BJPSirsi<INin3 ^RHT^S TlTOfS rr rBOS X'ap^oaehad?kajdrZ£OCOLOTf( lUTTpl?Bhix^June a9^H ax*?# • )# ^Ko LOTTc ^c ke d^B OS Z^t hroogh*lcha 11 o vKNo 1 is rr« 1 [Cons ul of JlawjToxk^ahoiwaajthan.as s is tingXCIOLOTil Kax. A9)e 1 MS B _waa|than^patj & wV" Let' .Ottawa. HS" hargaVo fjthe *Jto ntx^lTcxiroiffi a x£%4 9 j* [HIs 9ag«nt^we raTCZRS 0K^(aiZIH^e x?^9)?*nd*profe e e ar?BCTKBjBl |(e x.vil J.lKEis :*contact'with S CKOLOT.was ^amlntaine d iHuoughJi fTwartnhotod^o^l^tTB^rwapplle d^lCBJLliTTtha^datalla^ofS s e cre tjae e s lon^fYtbe -Dominion'Parliame nt ;(e x.$37,Tlt«m. Ko*4 “ ..........................—* >• ;Cne of^tha;or1 glnal*age n t s *ofS CK0L0Y*a'194f’s tt-trpfunde r ^pre d BOS S /was Profe s s or.B01ZR who.was 'In touch with IHED1 Wfm' Attache d to BOSX*s Kontre ol^Croup wma^on s ux111 lory group^oS w which coas ls tad of a*Js w known only ai "GINI" who owne d a drag s tore and a pbotographle laboratory. "He lping him with this work was a y oung a rtis t known as "COLLI" or "BOLLK" (ax* 50). '. Contact was s mlntalnad with BOS K through 7BKDA, who was than workl ng In tha Inte rnational Labour OTfloa and CJLLTl «ho occu uple d a ne ighbouring apartme nt to S 0K0L07 and who was t;Vj\ ©on ue t be twe e n him and BOSZ. ^ ». . # , ' ' ^ On one occas ion Kos cow propos e d that BOSZ s hould act as tha?.-' contact with Primros e but ZlfiOTLN oppos e d this as be ing too dange rous and s ugge s te d ons . of his s in. S e ve ral months ago rRKDA gave the Dane of Arthur S TKDTHERO (B SBC S R) to 2LLBOT15, probably through Bre d BOSK and ZABOTIB arrange d that on Uay 12, 1945 BOSK hims e lf or one of R0S K*a me n s hould s s e S TSINBJLRG in fae hlngton and s ound him out . (e x. 61). S TS INBKRO was to be as ke d to work for the Cocxs unls t Party or for S ovie t Inte llige nce , according to hla re action. rv ldcotly S TIINEZRC was ls te r turne d ove r by 2AB0TIK to his oppos ite numbe r In the Unite d S tate s . §pigp" #ai# c::. O' I �.t Kft Gr o u p «PP$R©!342 >,r ^sss *...MnStSSSlRS......... --. ijUOIUi^JMESO. -* >lua mmmm SHOMltY AMO MPOffT HpgifKfcO CORBT STATntKHT (O00t*d) ' ■■ / • fa*? fc!’ *■ '■■■ About Map. 1944 a pars on knowus s BllRlUH won to and n» give n lnatruotlona bp Prod, ROSA oonos rnlng a oontaot to bo mad* In London (ox. 40 and ddUMThe ae e xhibits re ve al that BERMAN tai to bo handodfa'lotts *] bp ROSE*a man In London mi lob would boor the vs igns turi ■PRANK", BERMAN ovldontlp bolag pre vious lp advis e d of thin arrange me nt, If tho oontaot wan mis s e d ,1*1 not a] range me nt would bo mado through ROfllJox^dO DOCUMENTARY ETIDENCE ‘ Exhibit No, 49 - v g r a n t *a notoo botoro ri^organliaiionf® Roforonoo to *PRXt>»Dlrootor of tho Corporation*,. Mentioned ao having worke d^ with "NEIGHBOURS" (NKYD) up to 19X4*«la:M Mop-Juno, 194t mot BAVI.(S okolov)and ^^ propoood ho loin, t. DAYY ohookod up on PRXB through MOLIER (Cons ul Mlohallor),* The***/ "NEIGHBOURS" propoood to uso PR ED. In Soptorebor of 194X PRXD, on lnatruotlona fro* UOLIIR, e ontaotod flokoloff, >* r w PRKD'o work was in ohargo of tho Montre al Group, Thofoames of two of his group aro -V:. give n as ORAT and ORXKN, Tbs firs t s uppllod Information ros pootlng war matorials , tho sooond ros pootlng tanka* .4 : Exhibit 40 3S m aw:• Wy?-' a;?'. i.4 G RANT tologram to Tho DIRECTO R, undated, sum m arizing Inform ation suppllod bp D obolso in oonnootlon w ith o conversation ho had w ith M inis tor ofPlshorlos Bortrand and Joan Louia G agnon, U nsigned tologram to Tho D irector on N , I toonoorn 0 arrangem ents m ado for tho m ooting w lth BERM AN in London, England and handing him tho lottor s igne d "PRANK", If mooting mis ted, BERMAN to send his addre ss to his wife , who will giro It to DEBOUZ who will de live r it to *uo* so that arrange * manta might bs made -to < comple te tho . oontaot In BERMAN1s living quarte rs . Upon > roe olYlng approTs l of Tho Dlrootor, DXBOUZ will bo adriood and hs will writs to. *L-V Be r ma n *s wifo in oonns otlon with tbs now <<j>. ' 4 *,,,rort* Exhibit 61 4;; -%r:/* ^ % y Those lnotruotlona w ore apparontlp handed to DEBO UZ on M ap IS, 1940 at 2S00 hours (10 p.m ,) at Bt, Patrick and C um berland Strsats in O ttaw a, Exhibit N o, >4 - D raft unsigned m osotgo to Tho DIRECTO R on "N N# I trofora to rooelvlng from D XBO ISI a photograph of BERM AN and a l atter for him , DKBO ISX’ s m en, who w i l lbond l ottor to BERM AN, known as "PR AN K", M ention m ade of piaos and elroum stanoos.of tho m ootlog in London, CO RBY reports thin m essage was not asnt. K % 3 ’-03-1 133/0 tf : G RANT’ S note to DKBO UZ respecting STEINBERG / ' ' C /. (BERG XR)• I t lnstruots that DEBO UZ should ‘ oontaot BERG XR and dapending on tho olr*. <•4 0/ ' ^,4 4 oum stanoos propose that hs w ork "for us /r; ' '£y/JSr . 'if or tho corporation". M ethod of eontoot V *?/. ‘ v* in W ashington to bs arranged, $600. to bo given. I fDEBO UZ unable to vi si t U ,S»A«, than m attsr to bo handled bp m oans of s l atter from DXBO UZ to BKRQ KR, r r �("FH iD " 1542) RE; Fred RO SS— -cover nam e D EBG ISE, DEBO UZ 3 £ t Gr o up PAGE NO. Hyjciji ■ CirvM,-S !£m) •TATCMCHT i DO CUM ENTARY EVIDENCE (C oat’ d.) Exhibit N o.37 - G RANT'S m ailing l i st . R afer item "108— DEBO UZ— N otes— C onTarsation w ith Profess. D eo. Seer. Session of Parliam ent— No date— O ne page— N one. ' Exhibit N o. 35-4 - This exhibit Is task N o. 2 of15-6-45 eontalned In G RANT'S dossier on Sam CARR (FR AN K). I teoneerns securing of Inform ation respect ing A.5. TEALS but no Interest should be show n In any Inform ation he night supply. I t also m entioned Lt. SHUG AR, C apt. CO THSLL and developing w ork In M i l i tary. N aval or Air rglnalnote w hich Staffs. I tbears a show s that arrangem ents w ere m ade for sem e details to be explained to FRANK" through a ; m an nam ed "C hob" and D ebouz" both along the . lines of trade onions.(this exhibit establishes that RO SS and CARR som etim es w orked together j In espionage nati vi ti es. Exhibit N o. 1 - GRANT te legram to The DIRECTOR* date d 12-7-45 re porting that DEBOUZ Obtained some data from conve rs ations with office rs who had taken part In the We s tern Front campaign. It als o re ports that DKB0tt£ the re -e le cte d a member of the Fe deral Parliame nt and that "thus from the carpofators .the re is one member of the Fe de ral.Parlia0nt*.C> f ^ jj .^ty v I ! Exhibit N o. 55 - Handwritte n note TroMGRANT's s afe cove ring an as s ignment to ALBC-^ Point 8 re ads "to think about de yilojptoent"3nd unde rne ath this appe ars the name."Fre d itiS S " which wee late r s truck out. rS jSc S ' x' Exhibit N o. 26 - Te legram DXRBCTDB.tofGRANT.8-8-45 (14-8-45). It re fe rs td .re ce iving some mate rial from GRAY and as king for additional Information re s pe cting frroe ds s us e d In producing various mate rials . It Is s ugge s ted that the task s hould he handed to: BACON If he was s till working In the Artllle ry Committe e . Exhibit N o. 11 - Telegram CR1NT to the DIRECTO R, dated Aug. 14, 1945 reporting that the tasks w ould bs detailed to G RAY, BACO N end The Professor through DEBO UZ. I talso m entions m eeting DEBO UZ at the end of the m onth. Exhibit N o. 18 - Telegram G RANT to The DIRECTO R, dated Aug. 28, 1945 reporting that steps bars been taken to f ul f i l lthe tasks and that som e 11 of Aug. 24th concerned the tter, as w ell as corr respondence on a shell. % NOTE: ,v a o .d Exhibits 26, 11, and 18 re ve al that DEBOUZ acted, at le as t on the me tte r me ntioned, as GRANT'S contact with CRAY, The Profe s s or and BACON. This Is the firs t Indication that ROSE was conne cte d with BACON In any way, cons equently CORBY s hould be que s tione d for any lnforcation he may have re s pe cting this angle . u � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIG00179 Title A name given to the resource Corby Case Volume 1 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived A-2017-641 (Access Informal request) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canadian Security Intelligence Service Subject The topic of the resource Corby Case Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b745f12004550e56a8051aa867292837.pdf 90323dd7ed92e8001c1e48e89443d225 PDF Text Text 1 c. 000483 Oo "'O- wwo xQy 0&* % 3103-1 (33'0t) �p-Tr: ft-i& 4 Sfe: u: * «' .'‘A >-■■}* •A1?'" .?• tf*TiWif/ • *?->• '■|;.K« * ; '*’ *L tfffl V w»^ **■ &0M0* m ■a#.:,-, * iw* tlvfi s$fc* mi w ■®m $ 4 •4.* 1* Ll«ot. 0* loata. '- 4-> '-'''£■, .. ■V ("Btok") ^; ;, • -4;-' ' . V 1 .4 -,„•/■■■• W*J ■ ■<’. ■RES •■•*V3» ,?*& '&3J[ Js« y*\ :; v-s gwfa u v "'' ‘'**“* a£k msmme ?:rw--■• Vv ' I- Pr c* • - ,•;•/- \ »‘' V • ^ • •# ■ ■ .< -.'VT:* -nm ^■ ; v. • -V 3103-1 (33'0f) 4 «# '4 ’ /* - * •»*.'. ' ■ ;■. , r �I 000435 r KAPTCHKA 7VEVX. i A\ 1/ ftaiMjaig/ toig* oT^ecTBO £• HOOBAOHKU mwvw&m* n . t it ma w ^<;;VQi;w-;&ry ■ ;* t-'iCv.4 '^y ‘ #<T, ■: , C liapTa 1945 rofla. 3* C KaKoro 4* A^pe c: '/q S ’* & '* / '• a) CJlvaegHHft SPARKS S T. "CANADIAN AFFAIRS? TCL97621 g) floteuiiHHft 337 ELGIN. APT>7.TELEFH0NE-5-71-20. yf; 5, He c t o pagoTH H EH A^?ASPCtt> PagQTaoT a o j ix h o c t l b HHor^a Hyx/iae Tca b f- KanacTBe Koppe cnoflOHTa. 6* Ua?epsisun,HHe ycjioBKH }•••• Pe ranum* Boe HHoro s ypnajia "KAlfc IIoJiyMaeT OKoao C00AOJt.n. b ne cflu. MaTepnajiBHOfl noMonm. ■ S xorpa^one oKKa flaHKua: A. k Pofliwon •y d 191S rofly b ECTJAIW"’,r.onaT. no oCpasoDaHmo ayp- HajlHCTt B 1938roay npn6ii.il 8 XAIIA/7. B HacTpns;e e Bpe ua paOoTae r ' " C. 8 *yP»»Me "KAHASJtEH A»A3PC. ... HJien • PAE0aE-;iP0rPe X;CI!Bn0« nAPTMH". EoittnoJl KHTepeo npoaiw.'c ''!^%;/M07 K ROAMTme oxoft BK3HK KAIIA/W. Xopomo HacTpooit K HaM. ' Cjiy*e 6HO« 4 fSfr • : ...f< . r • v« . . 3103-1 {9301} • ^ ne ycT0flWB00» MOxeT 0« t b Ae uog^KoouaH. B apuiw ocTaIIooAe b o Ah u Hauepe udeTca nocTyn;iTb paboTaT* b '^^^He cTae .xypiraAHCTa b Kanofl AHgo H3 AypnajioD K3Aa»imixca u itOKTPEA^«^%» B TOPOHTO. t �WW11IS: . imm m r. .....T'"5a?^h? nr~ ! ; 000486 \ -- i t i "■»8SSI®V ■/. ~ 4 f>'Cr ^rv q- s i i i! i 'i*; ' I ?3 mv c'0 ^ - - ^0$. */ ■ 'V„: Vfr 1 : - , V-J ."•■v-* ••• %a A Qo & '<*$ :« f 4 4 > 3'03-l (93.-01) I �Mm m ff mS ^a S s KIT m i REG ISTRATIO N CAM ) i 1* Last nam e, given nam e and patronym io !• 000487 Lieutenant G . Lunan : : * 2. Pseudonym - "Back” 3. Length of tim e in net/-:from M arch, 1943 : 4* Addr ess ______ , ,. . (a) Business - Sparks Street;-/"C anadian Affairs" Telephone i (b) Home - 337 Elgln*/;Apartmeht-7-^/^Telephone - 5-71-20 ! i i i &• 3105-1 {93-01; . 07621 -4'/ 5. Plaoe of eerrioe and duties.-/.Editorial staff of M ilitary ^./Journal, C anadian Affairs. 'v^w orks in capacity of a cor• '^respondent. ? ^C xv- ^ 6. M aterial agreem ent (financial) - R eceives around $200 a m onth and needs m aterial help occasionally. D etailed biographical inform ation - Bom in Scotland in 1912. Is m arried. By education he is a Journalist. Cam e to Canada in 1938. At present tim e is w orking for Journal, C anadian Affairs. He is a m em ber of the "Labor Progres sive Party". He shows a great Interest to the poli ticall i fe in Canada. He is very favorably inclined to w ard us. H is Job is not stable. He can be dem obil ized. He does not w ant to rem ain in the arm y. After the w ar, he plans to w ork as a Journalist for som e m ag azine published in M ontreal or Toronto. �f mm r 000488 m iy: SCHEME OF THE i ®*3• "W rnl&m ! ! \ ST "RESEARCH" 'GROUP * • .s-vs- '•■•'V • \ :■ •S' r <• . SC; c: rs " b l* r“4v; j. V.. - S : r So. ^ <ss ‘ ... :5 V:oi^-vV.V ! . *,n k ? % 3103-1 (33-Dt) �m- •> |r ';'Am ■:$m 1* ,The schem e of your 000489 <r*rIS;: p: P-:V- ______ h as ft is shown below . , TSgBaHR1 ^Q;LunanWy' Isidor ': M azerall ■SS:&@S - ' * You only w i l lknow m e (as.Jaty.4bub nobody else# • 2. W hat we w ould like you to a.To characterize the scales and w orks carrying out at N ational R esearch and also the schem e of this D epartm ent,A ‘"O .. b.To conduct the w ork of "Bacon",BBadeau",and "Bagley".. ‘I tis advisable to put the follow ing tasks to them separately: Barley- to give the m odels of developed radio-sets, i ts photographs,technical-,• (data;facts and for w hat purpose i tis intended. O nce in three m onth tr w rite the reports in w hich to characterize the w ork of R adio D epartm ent, to inform about the forthcom ing tasks and w hat.new kinds of the m odels are going .p to be developed. ‘ ,• ‘,'v? Bacon- to give the organization and characters of Valcartier Explosives i Establishm ent's D irection. To w rite the report on subject:"W hat kind of the i w ork is this organization engaged in?" I fpossible to pass o.n the prescription: (form ulas) of explosives and i ts sam ples. Badeau- to w rite the report: W hat kind of the w ork is his D epartm ent engaged in and w hat D epartm ents i tis.in contact w ith (by w ork). All the m aterials and docum ents to be passed by Bagley, Bacon, and Badeau hare to be signed by their nicknam es as stated above. I fyour group have the docum ents w hich you w i l lnot be able to give us irrevocably, we shall photograph them and return back to you. beg you to instruct every m an separately about conspiracy in our w ork. ’ In'order not to keep their m aterials (docum ents) at your place, i tis ; : advisablethat you receive al ltheir m aterials (docum ents) the sam e day you 7'- *' have'-the m eeting w ith m e. -v/' vTo answ er al l the above questions we shall have the m eeting on liarch 28 I• -5s "" c-_: :v>. J. * P.s;'After^tudying burn i t . °'V (1) 2:03-1 <3301) �i m $8 i 000490 mif.-■ K ^OJ^BCTPgttT •£■ 8 ^ ;*v1 P- K9-K»- n«n. nptmeqaHMe ^^yjrS rr^K c j >p ~c +<a *a a ! t *** “J|S|p^ -<C*>s c- .? b^<y ^ ^ fpC& : ■»•*+• j^e ^cA G 2/*&0 /**! x^uc*+++z z * /’*«*'• ■■ ■ gfifc i ! A ' 2. *<* £ctw«*X4f *y *t«f Jfo€<f •io 2/.^0./9cc. /L4^u**t*»+4 £<*c >j. ■ -. 0~ *~f s **ws o-ttyuritA* - /i. v. vc / t-2/.^o ^vfk a a ^j , — 2 /•*».* rj .^e >r • V t#w/ Ws uri&e etf JohOs &t" »0„% KS; *b 9i C4' t£V£S . —«£&, -/V/-> */. Cv, ; ^ cu<* ; ,>*^)t~ too frtu**' J 0 - JO /» • 3 r I "C^ • ^ ^ f ( 6 2/.J 0 i — ^1G*J <t«V i $t&w*s c*G ~ 4. % 0fl*<S t+<>+4 &4+>i'jU*c4/ &&.4. f-<4fi%4ttUci.C0tnU^*A~« PXtjxOtfT**) - ^*. < , V b“ y*U<*iA^*A ~ & *6 us~, O 3t03-i {33-01) ** yuU /<MJ 2 2/. /«? jO* **r*i>«* C&t~£i-'ny 0L**d ff(b£^ fD, �CO URSE O F M EETING C ontenta of M eeting N oa. 000491 N otea U rgent eall by telephone a. D ial 9-7621 and the queation ia Lieutenant Lunan. 1. 3. b. After this, Brent aalcs "C an you tel lm e when your next m agazine w i l lbe publiahed?" This w i l lm ean that the m eeting w illtake ‘ plaoe on the follow ing day at 21:00 at the regular m eeting > A m eeting to get acquainted took plaoe on the corner of Edward Avenue and D aly at 21:00*7 Everything waa norm al. . ' -‘V R egular(m eeting) - 28-3-45 Tim e - 21:00 Plaoe - C orner drivew ay and Lew ie Paid out:$190 28-3-45 R egular(m eeting). Everything norm al* Item ized: Baek: 100 R egular(m eeting) - 18-4-45 Bacon: 30 Em ergency - 21-4-45 Badeau: 30 Tim e - 21:00 Bagley: 30 Plaoe - C orner W averley and M aoDonald 18-4-45 R egular(m eeting) - Everything norm al. R egular(m eeting) - 5-5-45 Bnergency - 8-5-45 Tim e • 21450 Plaoe - C orner C hapel and Stew art aaetlnS* Everything norm al. .* .R egular (m eeting) - 6-6-45 ^>7Em ergency - 8-6-45 4 , lna'-7 :«1:30 %b %:‘s %4'Plaoe ’- Corner Carling and Harmer }Af 3103-1 133/01; G ave out: 100 present for the w ife) �c 000492 SC55T mi 3: J%»C* C0A«T«M4Ut» gOTpSSfe ,. «. ^ .! • ! ;! ! /Jy : <? z K**r»*** * ^ ?VJV /*«**“** $>■?' vr Af&M/, - 2/-30. u^t^c - yw FC c *<a . /5tg* £ ’ /t* 4jy<++>+A*^ C Vbot rfe ;i •i %•. s> tf* • £ZJ££- /<j«g. -y^ C £ClA&4**&**£}U+‘ • C<W* /fae JZ ^«uuij »*<4<./ <XV*. I** 0ZtfiA9**+$m 6<$-t(? L f * 2.2.'** 30Lu*U*<*t* «A<^*-t» » 7- GrCtCQCtC-S &+**f Pd- (P'S '^S '- fPpts t+c^A mf4**--**i., JfM+U-C’ <>tf*«*»W ~CmC-4K^<W M4> /t>[£&T S 9n &$.$&+, Kpn*yCe+*** f&C*-t++*4. t* fyn*+**4 7>t'MS ‘ H*> \ - f»W ■%A; /b^tpL+ts C 42ZO'0 <? ;&***, ^f^***^*/ **s CC-+C+<y*.0 puA ''%74^*'-%; v'U <2- • .>4ic4’^ fincn " Atsrt+4, ' 'V°/^4%/ kt%iu,*~*o G\ 5. . 3. 0. ttrj^'2**0 % (1) 3103-1 (33101) ^rzr^s. y *+t-y* O X /b**9» *uj**- O UU4A-Q - W-<* t*4tc<« tu*. CftftptC ***( Jo%£ �SHF ■ »‘ i'Xi&KK Conte nts of Me e ting Noa. 5. 000493 Note s Me e ting for an emergenc’y*a?5^lfe |)pointe d gjk--. place . Eve rything Normal. 8-6-45 R egular(m eeting) - 5-7-45 v5’ Em ergency - 8-7-45 Tim e - 81:30 ^ ’ PIace -C orner of Flora and Bay He la to bring Badeau to the m eeting. 6. V; .' 5-7-45 VC „ C - R egular(m eeting)..- Everything norm al. He w as w ith Badeau. The l atter brought valuable m aterial. Ife agreed upon further w ork. Baok him self brought m aterial on the federal Parliam ent elections. R egular (m eeting)'- 6-8-45 : " Bnergenoy - 9-8-45 Tim e - £8:00 ; , • Plaoe - O uigues and Parent Street 7. '% 70y^ • "vo. 6-8-45 R egular m eeting.'^'Everything norm al. He brought valuable m aterial on the radio from Bagley.- W e.took pictures and returned them 7-8-45.^’ O n 18-8-45, 22:00 in H ull, a personal m eeting w ith Badeau, w ho was designated to reoeive literature.for photo graphing. R egarding Baoon and Badeau, he com m unicated that he had not seen them . Both are in the servioo and he also oom m unioated that he end Baoon had a baby born to them . ass^ssa.; ’"7 ■ Time - ZZ100 Plaoa - Ne ar the aohool on Chapel and York o D T C3- r <S3.*0{) 0/ G ave Baok $50 �'3 •?m ■*> M y $ m s m r.WK m m mm : • 0TWArrr7j^TTcwAT. igrm!l7 ^^^^gAffWcn0TTP mow c 6 m... “M? 3103-1 {33-0 M 000494 ba c k �-J- 000495 // •; LI i- • ----------------- -------------------------------------;. e.: on \.n ,* *,*. l io 'J fri’Otta wa * I fN'.S ! *1 f »" '? ,,v*^ V r, . < r • ■ o jt< « ii* • *.* ui*J v j i*m I if*M^^rch. *^8 t ■ o;r ■ n • i ;t 'r Viii »t vL’/of* ju L‘*f.nt» te ar fathe r and fathe r; r;lau C • J . t uru6:»-*ioit :clnr>- ., *v: #: •.>!':•. ; .Vc --a n. • r »“I n nr • ?j :. In * J t : , n • J ->*11#*-. . •-■ i ^ *1 Ge ne ral approach .£0 worjcj0 1V- Your. writte n Ins tructions are 1 .r . mi •:*.•.i '■*» v s rVj W ItO • fcX’1-.T * unde rs tood and' aopie pre liminary, wopX has., be e n accomplis hed on the s pe cifi,e ^.ake ^s e t*.., cv flfc" .s hould b,e unde rs tood that ne ithe r Bacon, Bagle jr nor Bad.au ire we ll known to mo e ithe r lrogre s 3 has boo *i % pe rs onally;or politioallj,:: por I to the m. ; J>;be ld up. somewhat, owing., to pne,- or..Otfchan of them be ing out .< ??r iOwn; *hd.by. ,the ,.caution, dis playe d- by-Badoau (a good . thing probably.),.in.ohoe jcjngi.intd pw^,cre de ntials . With 9ftcojPi*£$a£ is onunis ias tic fwd, politically T )* J ; ■je xpe rie nce d,., it wopld, d j b , junwis e tq.appr.oach them point blank-withj all,. thlo /ctf9Hi‘ip.s s igpiJ'd.l..t)ll.They alre ady fe e l the 1 u- ne e d ro,r maintainlps , A,ye ryt high dagre.e .of s e curity and .. taking, abnormal, pre cautions .at ,the ip.normal me e tings (about once 'ln two we e ks ;)'s ino’e the y, ape, de finite ly not labe lle d ! with any political affiliation. 6ne or two have even oppose d the Introduction-of pe r mombora,.fto our group on the "..grounds , that.ItVwould e ndange r ti^e ir.dwn-s e curity. I 1 * the hofore .’b'e lifVe ' it .wis e ,^to,wi.se ‘to. approach them care fully; and not.' to advance j tQfygrtip^ip as s ignme nt to them at one • time ... Als o, for.jtjie Mme be ing, not to characte rize the . work .for.what it Is , bh^me roly." $9l$t, it bo unde rs tood it is ..work of..a, s pe cial .opnapiratorlal nature , without • * : 'that > me ntioning, s y,.conne ction';with-you,-j lfvl re ad your ins tr- • uotipha oori’ootlyi you "assumed... that f.wfljild dls ous s the j ^.s ituation frankly;,with.e ach,s e parate ly.,.; This 1 have not v / 7... done .vr* But' Ilwouldfllki to <Us quoji1$bJ.o(.aope ot with you. ; 'V /Abotbflr alight. re s is tance $6.bo bveroomo. is the s trong ,^4..s e ns e Of s e curity abbiit the ir,.work'tbpV thos e men have .: 'deve lope d as wap s ot*htis ts . .p H\.• , .*., ^-^i'e ^Jjave :4*pirie noe d‘ a little '(iiffioulty (which we s ))ai^hofe ve f,#0te r.ooae ', J'.bfrtie vo) (In making our initial . . arrAdge me nts ^td ae oti Thera .e re ,,s e ve ral re as ons for this . . B&>fley live a..aulte fttr. put o$„tOwp in,the oountry and Is de pe ndent on train, aone dule s • BadoflP- live s at the furthe s t' end of Hull and"tockg during.the day out|Of town and out of '< . re ach at Jlunoh tlne ^.and othor.timAs bontonie nt to me. v.y bouse is ; out., of the que s tion for.me e ting,(and typing) purpos e s ,aa J havo two othe rs .living with me. v.e s hall , probably so lve , tf^s e difficultie s e ».we ,gain praotioe in the work. ' * J 1. * I 1 *•4 ( . » f\ 31C3-1 (53/00: :< , • ♦ r* • f 1 u» * f ! (t* ove r (l) �o■*v 000496 •> - 2- \H »a v r» rn '■’The following note * de s orlbo In de tail progre s s mad# with e aoh Individual on «aoh taak ae t. Badeaut _______ Warmed up s lowly to my re que s ts and re maine d non-oommlttal until'"ha1 had bhobke d Inde pe nde ntly on my bona ride s , Onoa s atis fie d, he promlae d to ooope rato. He la pre paring the re port on hie de pt, aa re que s te d, one a fro !aieb-’f full1’re poHf»*bft 'objfe hltttibn1 and’pe raonne l, Inte rlocks 3opT«, e to. of HOC plus any othe r Information he thinks . t.-u l i . • vec /•« ,uae ful'l'“’ TKbe V re port a 'ire pkbmls 'e d to mt for Apl 9. I J. IJ hooJi.v>fh i/ cat 'tmable to ge t’ the fcfautfriobnb*,* e dit a wit oJ .iiviA n - • n* I•S i. nwt •• vd tad c^te*i;.on « •1 ■ In ge ne ral, Badoap iuo lwi nvd- lnformb'iri*0 that fcoat ■Mrbtf’Wurk' at'pri'ae nt la on nuole ar boo>./l >»'»be phyiroe ^'lbotabart&e hf'bf' fWl4-V4tlve V apbatanoe a to produoe iwl.v .?lalJme ne rgy1)'! *•*ThlaHV»W'e ,r\uah»Wueh‘than radar and la be ing xlIWlve rbltV’OT e lbarriW'on bt Vnh&tkktMffMtf td Montre al and at HoMaate r inioq AeriJ rte <Mlve re ity°bk'fAmi'ltbtt{y* J Badebtr thinks ^ that gove rnme nt arid X«*el xbre tle purbhaae l-ofvre fflui^bt'odWilng-plahV'le 'oonne ote d with this Nta Ire te aroh. i,f* Wgbne ralv’he 'dl«lm«’to, Vnow of no new de vol^ e ^oip't^rf ttlnop Improve me nts in It# I»wv»- vVml'o,» -l Mt ; ,tr t X 1'jla lullll', < •• '1 */W no ,i/vn toe *»Baoontnw‘- I'?,e 6^iye «t,'iW>'43cp^ile ni re port on Baoon, and X .xJtn/r-e *~754lW4i hlM mor# frankly. the n/ the othe rs . He aeema ClXi/leve o aedJ dovobiurtOul t6,be06f'he lpjr ’v Hlb'bVtltudi'ia that moat of the •no J* Mf»(i o3 Jiioi*4allbd baofe t.VoMrl'a'Ir ‘Joke ; ’ afri‘‘while it la officially edJ e altwjo»n«oe w, tM ae dre i lis t, thofi,forking oanvbn It ean aee no bonfa'ft'U' fiakbn f6r te e rfOT»rt *He unde rtook to‘provide the Information doorfJl- .v-of.n U ri'due iie d’oh Vai'oartie r. Iftf'augge ite d 1 obtain It dlre ot •ndanl nuox from hls 'Bhlbf-ln'my'offrplaPoe paOlty. but 1 advis e d him edJ e aue tfb f-lthaf, thlrwia not“wlJ4 as * 1: d6?hot', blah to show any ofl'lolal ion »v*.i ( fin inte f'e at'‘in''thl'r fl'fid'uhtll*'and unle aa'we de oldc to do an • uox dll* i,,c I’^artlolV'iJfi'it.''7 Rt'ole &i' the re "la HO,'particular ae ore oy ’"iJ * * about-* tbb aat'^up, bbt';!" pfrauade d him to. e ive me the whole avail ne w •,"l",r#pbrt M'thVBatMr*.* J„d'id liot’montlon formulae and a ample a at thliTme e tlAg', la I"don't think Baoon la alfflole nt X ■j>r, i. Jylmpre ae e fl with thaoonapiratorial nature of the work as , *w He »iiwt vj[o• J1 BtitJ.he .1 a‘ de finite ly ke e n and will be he lpful. 1 Xe tJt(il 'i'H. ’-nJjia;htiil«aatM^0h akaln!oh''ApIvS ',t'o''he tr;about hie re port end ,*l tJ nol '••'0«',',',,t5*tata‘ud'Your‘fe que at wttn'hla'‘farthe ri* He trave ls a good .nrn.«fefiis6’ •?«»»*» lo Juo l.ne n*',,/1<'|ikle W,.Tl1ha'Te',bbe hAtiftibH! tifMe ’fllk'|a ye t. He haa not x* 01 iii*»ln,'tJgn"a Ve fyl'ragti'lar'of'e otbvilaitlb au^borttar for s e ve ral lf.nl it* ,'<M,*oS tbi,|ltMugn‘MAl» hp5 <novlrigttio,bo e ntfwalaam. He llvoa xiane e . .+* iX'thb^'rtiWM Md.hl* »lN laS n^aBonlatlo to hi# polit »l e iiJ nl *oli* e <ii "'•‘pabtlblpktion.1’7 'Watflke a^M ^a'balM^aomawhat naive politically, and J s hall take things 'alow with him for a s tart. 1 plan to de ve lop hit aoqualntanoo aa muoh 'i^VO and gain hla oonfl anoe by collaborating on aome an artlole s . Mil re port on him ne xt time . (1) ttnWUbl 3105-1 {£3.'01} �•• ik smt&m :;■ m kmm 000497 $v: H; •1 mwm p ■ o ■■■;:■■. xm m with re gard to photographaifandlS iS grS plffS ai1' note s on Bagle y and the : othe r8j%Ba<^2andfBade ati|%ili provide them with the lrJre porta'?|3AlOjlll3fBt(^pl'wBagle y»a late r. Bacon la a mathe maticafprofe a? orjrrbmflftue e n * a Unive rs ity at Kings ton, now|a^na|or|lritthe ianQr^^Bade au Is an e le ctrical e ngine e r^.whoJfhaa^worice d|inxtne; e ngine ering de partme nt of Montre al. Pulle r de taila aate rJi ----- — * m ■ Back it (sf- W: m mm M ■.mm --m i ;. ' %,.v •f ■y m mm ,y r htJi (f gp;; HPT 0 . iSV/ % "uv MCo;4 0 (1) 3103*‘* iS3-Df) �m ♦ sw 9 ■ifc _ 000498 wK m QUnz m m J. t .t t it o ts ow Tin^CT^ia ^ww'* EMU B1CK °*Tm M:: ■ ■• - . \ i \ -, r 'lQ . t r r : i I li K1 i I*I *o ■' -64... 4 s % ^Cn7$ % *. ; 3103-1 (S3-a!) �u. Mm mm. ' (*• ■i* 000499 :r //.v.»*r . * • a. -t .* - *. There la relatively little,progressvto report slnoe..last tim e because of a aeries of unfavourable ciroum stanees w hich huv» «ade continuous liaison w ith^-m y.people;iinposalblea - •• ' Aa you w i l lhave realized,"! waa outnof^tow n<foriseveral days last week and waa uable to keep m y appointm ent. Bacon waa away from w ork for-several’days*w lthva cold, tlflwaa Inadvisable to see him at his hom e'to*dlsouss m atter w ith him *'although I did vldlt him there ,onoe to<receive aireport.from him * .Badeau also* m ade a',trip,to Toronto “durlng'the dne week :when I.vaa .In tow n and relatively free to see him ; and^for the.follow ing week he was detained late at the office '(laboratory) w orking on a special •rush experim ent. The proapeot^for’m yaalf'tover the next feww weeks ian11 any-brighter, unfortunately* The:announcem ent of>the elections,'earlier than expeotadiby us^has-lnvolved'-m eln a great deal of rush'w ork w hich w illkeep m e^’l n’ Kontreai all.next w eek. This'w ork, of course,''has tobe given ’priorityj but<it'deans that the tim e available for seeing m y people i tvery'seVerelfoout into — eapeolallyfw hen they m ight be busy on thosetim es’ when -1-am free. * \ •i o • *:■ «n iKt'i'ts r*' ' j ft £ This la not a very brlght^plcture for the prdgresa.of our w ork. •*’ But i tla the ciroum stanees in w hich we find ourselves,.and i tla . only to<he hoped that w ork w illease up soon. • Incidentally, 1 suggest that Jan’ s call' to m y offloe w aa•not Strlotly-'neoessary, slnoe we already had the arrangem ent that the m eeting w ould take plaoe three days later Iffor any reason either party failed to turn up. H ow ever, I thad this advantage, that It tested out the system of oalllng on the telephone, w hioh was quite suooessful. neportlng In general on the w ork done slnoe last m eeting: Bacon has given considerable thought to m y original requests and has given m e the m aterial for the attaohed report, Ho offers to ' c f i l lIn any details that m ay he asked for i fhe oan. Z have not ‘had the opportunity to ask him about paym ent. p, Badeau was very disturbed when I brought up the subjeot of ' paym jnt.'? ! think he fel t that i tbrought the subject of his w ork Into a different (and m ore conspiratorial) foous. Re waa to ^thlnkclt ovey and l etm e know , but we have had no opportunity to m eet since Iw as/in:M ontreal in the Interim * He is very alow in giving m e any inform ation, largely beoause he aotually has not tim e to si t down and hiaki^^report. He offered m e the prlntod report of the R esearch O ounoilV'vbut Z assum e that all this Inform ation Is known or oan be readily,obtained from a G overnm ent library. The latest report he oould get was also considerably out of date. He reported to m e in w ords tne goneral details of his own w ork. He Is In the radio engineering end of things, specialising In radar, O urrent w ork, on w hioh there was an em ergency rush last w eek, is in oonneotlon w ith a battleship radar devloe for use in the Faolflo. (1) 3*03-1 (93-C 1) �000501 : -f- i ll.V.trf. ^Bacon's,, re port.1, y.,-.- £Xl- n *!i«s 2n«aio wiJ xn> :jJx<v . : ; r *. f*v * i lbtB’C’i'4 CUM ns ) os ;; < °• J i! * 'to Baoon has, be e n pe rs onally re s pons ible Jt6 a 'large e xte nt for the o r :,ufl pre lle \lnjiry. workrin conne ction .wri-th orgahiai'ng C.A.H.D.B. v , «o t*t ^(Canadian Army; Re s e aroh‘. Divls idrijiiExplos ive s ')ii':‘'This is an organis ation wbiohiis .in-tpr.dce s a/'iof ibe ing,crtfate d<S ."'lt Will have both oivilian and military'pe rs onne l', ;birt'|will be adminis te re d by the army. It is inte nde d to b^ inte grtae d with the various ars e nals in Canada — at le as t two ofs whioh will probably be maintaine d pe rmane ntly afte r the war. A I. • r..: nr vjotf. ■ 1 * 0 M li>* ‘%s?0 «<f S iCHAIVlO ‘/txi-- '-IC CAfcDS w ill contain the follow ing: ''li' i .'i -*i j 11 • o . * * •• -r. . ; -1 , f.tn/wino noJclOTfe r&i&p j h *< V' If ,A.i.Pilot!explosive's- plantgr«<Thta ia!-bblng built by, and controlled ,byr>H ational Re search1.iC ounall, butw ltttarm y funds. The chem ical branch of NRC w ill>’have«.'Very 'iittlSe1 or^hothing to do w ith i t . Itw illhave a 1 arge capaoity and will be capable of experim ental wobk w ith new explosives; both HE and propellants. i It la not yet being operated; w illbe taken over by CAKDE when ■ com pleted. Probable dlreotor w illbe Englishm an, H arold J. Poole, who is now acting director. He is a perm anent oivij. servant in the xploslves field. Said to be slow aa an organiser and executive, but a com petent teohnlolan. Baoon believes that this plant oan be of trem endous im portance and oan im prove production m ethods to m eet ohanglng needs. C anadian raw m aterial situation very good. j! (Baoon gave som e inform ation on present explosives plants and their capaoity. This is probably w ell know n. Can produoe Inform ation i fdeslrod.) B. Ballistics Laboratory.' U nder direction of D r. Laidler. „. "v^This is Ihe only part of the over-all projeot w hioh is at prosent - in operation. This seotion is w orking w ith the D epartm ent of V^:r.0h*»i stry st Toronto U niversity in experim enting w ith a variety t,; '^A. of new propl llante• They aro using a new explosive "D INA" m ixed H' 4 h w ith RDX as a com ponent in propellants. DINA is Intended as an "vV/ alternative to nitro-glyoerin. Am ericans are said to be very .i nterested in one of these new peopellants oalled "Albanite". This i s a propellant containing DINA and plorite as an alternative to the standard British propellant containing N itro-O lyoerln and plorite. 0. D esigns Brtnoh This w illbe m ostly for designing sm all ordnanoe and -w ill*include a pilot plant. This w i l ldo the w ork w hioh is now ' D. Ple ld Trials Wing. being done a truffl e id and Valoartler by the Inspection Board of U nited Kingdon and C anada. They have a good solentlflo and do a good job of analysing raults and difficulties of m anufacture. I (1) 3’. 03-1 i'83 0 i} ■ �^sgmrnm: , i t# , ■ *• \ ' ' *'00502 Eve ntually the organlration wlll conaldtrqDfjnft/.'ByjqL^ > D. Dr. Don Chaae (an NRC phyaiciat) haa alre ady be e n appointe d aupe rinte oi CARDS* oHe :drills <be Tfe bponalble titoJ the * Dire ctor of Colon© lr.Ww£*lYan ifltbe mbe rg) xwhot'tr arbiol*gis t and who a^^tl bittitum ib>vce affonai^La itdivtbe rkaate rtfGone r>al* -of ‘Crdnanoe , Army Il3?onfrually/rthe re ^*111 'probably cpm la e doainltte e ioddmpriairfg ie Int.T^tpre a^xrtatVre ^ ,ofihtbe . thpe e r.f«diiVi3 e r^ nalllvlo ris no cvuri Ri/olnts v un.t rfdiw Le adcpednf ©d oi bobcte dai al dl . •vm'Xi5 f-^ ed ^IdiftaAopiOTPhae iae afto o**d d-.e ol da - abanuO ni fcj.r**en.< • e rfd^s dla xA^ne naine ; he-*;! vinl r The importance of CARDS in controlling factory production j*nlwoIIo*l odd rx!<iinoo iCtv /* /-' The laying down of a alee le ton armame nt a re ae arch ce ntre which i '\h .%:« ^-.auld:be r'take n war by.:bM^Brltj!3h in:„: the \future if it became v'prne oe .ajiary.rJ ♦ JltrOould^tak^oh'Vaali^e ntav land notr hha aome I n>:»'<o,pl\d*hichrrtO frorkrf.viH iu * :J Ion ,i:: ol If • * ;'fia <:dfc«j jco \.ym I - Cjc, • r•. 4i : ;i/< • »* ‘.foci fc»vl3oi! ;t * ••v'i vJt^A'1 ai'C n^.'K / t 7 z? uvr* "• Sa.t orf i I ?•*• ; le d * \. '■ r. * "L td X i f *# 'xo/o^tfr ^r'K^ri . O i • I rlj.t'i , .tL.a ic. /1\rt " J ni V'iir. I!'/ r. iii*;u w#i i t m’J • m %> i • • * • :*• *• V l it* n4t.\ iiiir‘*iO 'iii fut -^Ch ::.'J o; i.;i: ♦• !l.x‘ , W lJ JO • rnlofridouJ da >. * • » JrfiiJ »• .»•/•• tii'j a- r,t . u«. ^o.'ie d'io iml a i‘< rf«* r*'*i.< ■ ■■; .»•■ r j l wof#:u u^*' • ! .’G 4 1 : i i i w » I ; fj/S > *■ n'jJlO'i' tit »/ Bt'Vl-OX -*V' M.*C* r • . »f,l * f? f ■ ..!• 1G • in.* *: \ - X T ^dO*f .'T' • .* lo ‘ fti .'t* ti« •• ■ J» > *« • 1 4 oi .*vf i-.rii’J lrt («*i ( I r>' II * .. : t .»• i« ’ f# 1 i *i * * ' « i f\ ■ am ; ^ u»r. I 1 ‘ ■*l«? ’» .I « ‘ ‘ : 4 10 f 4 : » I 1 t.» g j, •n «.,rj • ; • • 'tr l» I I ..|L flO .1 * • ( . t °’< ‘W' BcfdWvfw . f’i f»dd “i n r. 1 * #% •> •7 t *J . • I ... ■ It •H *1 ! ! •*!■» r / • »1 * .-I f H c{? % »%1 Vffclr .v <0^ . I ;. i |i^i # f‘l ’" 1 "v>- 0^ s ^, t *1 f .-.4 .,/mm , »Ui« v 1 -HA . f ^ it.i f7 m h * ,n*»‘ it v.i • vfrvf•• • o' n/.' •L r. VlUCf tVhui.M>o *'.l n Mie nu "t/» r»* I .. .• n ^ ,• *fO -Vt 31 u '10 t; aot'r 'fG? tw Jd j Lo 'X*! li.t-T \ -••' j n TTTc :/ -• •: *MJ 11 ^ ' rt t/Hfi" *. * ^ !dc,,*i '■ h nt 'IB r«!Br4#t I'# * «; i '•>4- 17 I *■■• . ■: •« t •* ! 1 •1 G v- . v.*r • •- I At i i : (•? * . I 11 ivtrM t7-t“ * ■J ; ♦ > t At ‘ »4 .—7 1 ,• I ’ll •t i t * *■ (i) 31C3- ? (33'31} �ii 00500 -JfThis is an extrem ely sensitive-detecting device w hich h$s been lauooesafully tried out'.on: the ; Eaat^C oast. Present w ork . Lis the .designing and construction of:a:pi l ot‘ m odel* . Badeau has been largely responsible fo^thls^voz/nPoasibly there are speoific questions w hich oould be asked about this, as Badeap is a very * di ffi cul tperson to pin dovn toidetai l.n i / [ r* ... •r • * •' V. i . • . • i: * * ^ o ?. Idm .su*' bnn :!*• • J i ; . I thas st i l lbeen im possible ^to see Bagley and introduce him to his assignm ent*. 4cAs:I pointed put-bofore, since I know very l i t t l e of this -person,t i ti s !m y plan ‘to.-.becom e ;better acquainted w ith him and get som e idea of his readiness form w ork of this kind. The - tim e, how ever, has been, quite beyond m e as yet. * v: ;v."’ T i?*Io*J ■> t.} v&T 1*10 end * * • :* ' tiJ * j i W ith regard‘ to.biographieei~ .both Badeap.and*Baoon.have prom ised to provide ibiographical'notes*n I.w as .to haver reoeived theee.on M onday, but.icould. not keop^m y appointm ents;.-being out of tow n.Li W ill obtaintthem for next tim e* ?rrBadeau ie m arried w ith,2*ohildren — about 6 and'6 m onths.old* He .iscabout.33 years if old'and be fore Joining the Re ee aroh Council**worke d in.the . fUs e aroh De partme nt of the Be ll'Tole phone Oojl m y at*/kontre al. He is a graduate e le otrloal e ngine e r. Bacon is a man of about Zb, marrie d and with jihratinalitftiimtmx-^vchlldge n land-.* third on the ..way..v He la a .profe s aor-of inathe matioa:atrQue e n'a Uriiwe ralty, , i Kingaton and.inte nda to go.baolo.to-that-workc-afte r thalwar. He la i ■ f -at.pre ae nt a major ln'tho Artille ry. i. t r. ! * .■ ■ • l ■ i r. ; .if ■> .* ■rr / v • . "cl V. . . . . .: i:• ? .« . * • ■ ‘e T.-f.i \ •# V ' L’* L 'V ; r B .i ’ ‘ . i % • * i n ' i» r i t ; / • •- s’ j i. ♦ . ' O • ’ <-U 'V Lfc /0,V ^ '***$ x . >i 4 i ■ il . HO * j n **, 1 i v « i r o t 'i 1 .1 a 1 . 1 f ii. I t ' J t l i i •j (1) 3103-1 (53-01 j �CPjQ Jh*32 ***** __________ 99 +** *’ I had a ve ry s uooe s s ful me e ting with Be gle y and ho agre e d to participate to the furthe s t of hie ability. 1 als o re oe ire d an e xplanation of what I took to be hia e arly re luctanoe to me et me. Bis wife te aohea musio, and on the fre que nt oooas ions when she has to be away from the hous e , he has to s tay home with the ohildre n. He is unable to plan hla fre e time ve ry much in advanoe, henoe the duffioulty in s e e ing him. He Is Inte re s te d In the work and Baglayt imme diate ly pporM«e d tn he flf.*a ihta nflnT 1 gave rum a full quota of tas ks , and he promis e d re ports on his work and on various othe r qs pe ota of the .ge ne ral work athiA pltcQ» dine s firs t s e e ing him, I have be e n in K-ontre al, and on the two oooas ions 2 trie d to ge t In touoh with him for • progre s s re port, he 'was not available . He had promis e d to de live r his work in full in time for this me e ting. He now Ipfnnma «#f hftre e e p, he has noypftmple fr.itrl. tih* .ndwiii-i\A*h te n de yqr v He pie ado a e xtre me bus ine s s as the re as on. 2 know that the y are ve ry bus y, and it is mos t diffioult to pe rs uade the s e fe llows to give up the time . In faot. the are working to tlrht s ohe dule s •prt lt4s e MifnmttnLfor the m to work oontlnuajly at a tas k. urypil ft f iniahad. 2 s hall ke e p afte r him, and try to got the mate rial within th» te n days me ntonod. Ptoom I s,ent a w hole evening w ith Baoon, w ith m ost disappointing results. 2 put the tasks to him , and on both of them he assur'd m e he had nothing to offor. He claims that the eleotro-bom b is com m on know ledge to the O erm ans a*^ assum es i tm ust be so to you. He is unw illing to take any risk in ovm lnlrv: i ‘*to«lU -hich h- is convinced is already obtainable. 7 tried to persuade him to m oot the dem and any w ay, but he was unw illing to do so. *lth re gard to the ge ne ral que s tion on e xplos ive de ve lopme nt, he as s ur’d ms that he has nothing to add to his fomor re port. He Is hims e lf ourlous about the Chalk Hlve r riant and the manufacture of Uranium. He claims that thoro e ^re s t de al of talk and s pe culation on the aubje ot. but I t ^hafc nothing la known outs ide of the s mall and oarofulljr >y guarde d «'roup comple te ly in the Know. He^e irohaalfe d that hlnfle lf-lJL. a s .re mote from this tyre of_information 5, ^; mys e lf. His work is at a virtual atandatlllj and In any oas t.; his -work has be en mos tly In the fie ld (fie ld laorove w^nts l an nQt in the re alm of 4/ WfflOiUvs poae aroh^ He maintains that the re Is a dlitlnot %nviMon oe twee n re s taroti and jie vflbrme ni. lie e xpe ois hTs worTTTo ce as e fairly s oon, end wants to go baok to te aching. This fe llow 4s a mathe matician, and not a che mis t or phys lols t. whle h may account for his re mote ne s s fros t ths de tails of e xplos ive re s e arch. 2 s hall continue to see him but he gave me de finite ly no e ncourage me nt las t time . Be cki The m is a de lay in time be fore the arrival of uaby. X-rays re ve al that e v*nt won't take place unt il clo/ie to end of July. Jtoinforme tion as vot n to. future dl «Egs[ tlon in tho *rS Vi ' HIV* JU llpe on prompte d on HQMiULt^f- prs s caLrorKi. tjrbe -e t-mJh* Ton at it »s r?nr anothe r monTTParyV probably "longe r]:------------3103-1 (9301) Beck (1) 000503 �000504 CRQAKTZAWOWAL Vl imu ? l ABOUT THE WCSKARCH'ORCUP FROM BACK DATED 8-7-45 ■ ■ Sl» fi ■ %,Pmr. "If «• ■ • !~'C > 0;-V. * 310.3 • 1S3-01; £ ’£ �000x05 'I 2 ! ** I ; 0*m^$mrn i i i^egasisgj^gas^ ?;>■ •v^ «. S3 ' _ s£g gisi* ■■: 4^- / II I'MM^, • ■?.* : AZn - ^ ___K_B_^f. , 1 ! •; ts ^<•^7 _5—•""*— lg, V &*-<-<* <^V«* ~ , i .*. : I £ ;^OT|Pk' I ^ i v/'-^mmw~;~ f -r r.^S J C-<-^u . I .. < I - t i : 2, » I A^4*--£-44~e _\ • ’ • • *l’-’v- :' - V ! <£-*■ /^ssi^^c^e /<<j3 C&tS ' ts -^^e . /w ■ ?2^ : ! ! ! I. l» t 7Q/^ j ■Jfr>.<,<#-*' . r— f—' ^ ! *'“'C/cf '** ‘i.. • t tl« i N> (i) 3'03- i (S?'G >} �000506 ; ASSIG NM ENT NG M BER 1 G iven to Back1a G roup (R esearch) G iven 8-6-45 BACK: C om pleted 5-7-45 BACO N: 1* W rite m ateriel "on the election in the /r'Xadarei-^arlldnLent and the resulting confliot*f showing the fiel d and the m eaning/O f each party in this* G ive the characteristics ofn&ach party 9 i ts political'^latform e^d-.w ho finances i t and w hose circles i trepresents. <a, About the pointsl* G ive instructions (specifications} or any other kind of m aterial on the electroprojector (the V-Bom b). ) 1* Ee prom ised to obtain i t for the next 2* W rite out w hat new research w ork is being tim e* carried on and w hat is the latest right now and the question of explosive m aterials and arti l l ery arm am ents* 2* Has no facts w hatsoever* BAG LEY: W as com pleted 5-7-45 ■CKC 3103-1 (33/Cl) Establish a firm er contact and receive at least oral inform ation* �*'-*.*. ^. * * 000307 '■XT ■!**:.■ '■ ^.r V c ^ ' ' h •: •« ■' ^4 •^^n***********>*■*£**+**-*?> Js ls ut9 y y S ^^c T 7~Ut^t^t5>l_^ #*' '^- *«/&* -/c " ) I( V _J(/ / ^ '%/%,, \v >2^ At vV 2. ^pU^b ■"■v &sti ^tsO**t*y<*G *«• Ux. t-«V<2s5 ^c<r ♦ - J . ^-{rL<^ZZ& ?tcj<<y t/Pyy^p^ /z ^y<^cc^y " /m tyt \ /i* <5 fr'W ’&A — &ts - ft'€s tCy — 0^ui4>&<s z — /^UytA t 'Xs is C^o V-^C JUf—V £**■ ^v &-<**< ^ty-<^c4^c_ ''t;t4<'-t't:.-t ' Ju„uu~*. <*>**-' ■% cu^r y^- l&bfyA*s&*t A/ / /' I'ji^pyiyis tt — /2-cy^, tikuiZt, "6L4 l *c <4 s <p s y*cc£~cs sc. <£~. p'./j (1) 35C3-1 {S3 01} • • �000508 i* BADEAU: According to points 1# 1. Comple te d 5-7-45 - -. navigation pe ris cope . 2. Partially comple te d 2. O btain any kind of m aterial on the Am erican airplane radio locator type (radar) ?AN/APS - 10", radio (radar) Girt more de tails on organization of ^Re s e aroh.t^undil". Manipulate s o as to ge t to the ir le ade rs and find out what the y <do. c*^' ■X 3. Not comple te d 3. Ge t the te lephone dire ctory of the "Re s e aroh Council"# 4. Comple ted 5-7-45 4. Find out about the work of Urs s . S nithDurnford, D.A. Ke ys and I. S /Tfos te r. Give a ge ne ral de s cription of the kind of imple me nts the s e are and whe re the y are us e d and fundame ntal facts about the m. See mate rial No. 1 through BACK. A Note : •Cu i % 3103-1 fa? or* All as s ignme nts mus t be comple te d by 5-7-45. �000509 -i- iv^rAuiT,Antoine:j yKASAHm .Jin rg^fll^J j£S ^T3!! • ; lJ*&* r.\> :’• ;>• <? 4S 4^ ^CtlauuO fift4*&f+Qtuie 6 Mi $ /U?%LUUy<LU<tM.) Q Hq 'SjUUxt+4. U__ /^rw ms u / & K a*tW «u f e fTy******e Zlid * **^m?j*^ ****?* 5TS& ) :\m mi» ra RtSf*' ' “*4 ■ u i V ___ UUf fre +fMtruco. Xttco fro 5?^ 3S03-1 {33/01} ■fiq/toa^betc 4kai uue p, ^ $4*^4**- y-t U) : ! �% 000510 ; O RG ANIZATIO NAL ASSIG NM ENTS FO R "RESEARCH" G RO UP 1* Any m eeting w ith 3acon, Badeau and Bagley m ust take place not in any building but on the street and at that w ith each one separately and once a m onth* /V>» 2* M aterial m ust be obtained from them on the sam e day when you are to m eet m e in the evening* The m aterial m ust not be kept by you at hom e a single night. 3. Their w ives m ust not know that you w ork w ith and m eet their husbands. c, 4. In connection w ith the Tact^that Bagley and Badeau live far from the city, we w i l lgive them m oney for a taxi when this wi l lbe necessary. W arn them that/they m ust not ride in the taxi clear to the place w here they are going to m eet you. % 3103-1 {93-01} - �000511 0^^ t^tcuAje*. /3 o u c /£ s GUU-- ^O x HU-&u ) »■'&/ yf2^ ^ £ ^TT /z^y7 ’fr~0lj&-f& &4f*fr*UA£+f. *$>&uu Qutc4it&&t favAuct fcaJZuuMZr A^fy-t-rA-o O 1 £ Ct^uce L, dcu#&£«%o*ZaUAo uuwe f- PZafi &v^Cd2^a^o /va*^T: *) /Ue p u u ^ i> <? Lfru p j [** ^4^ y/U^fCU^L ^<OXCHH/ ^ S aduLU, fto&it euyufiffy^ $CL&o ~k , •<' Ai$$%%£* ^ra* ** eau^ *• *"-9 K'L ^ aW- **** JfatftuS Z #aut 9+^~C c U4*£ l 4 £>s Cc 4/ ZJy^^< 0103-1 ,J33-!C t> &&€**, Bajt&e u. ■A^6 A'/r ¥-£>*&£ ) (1) �A 000512 5# Figure out w hat N .D #C . stands for# Ask Badeau w hether he can obtain U ranium and 235# Tell him to'be very careful. Ti^he can, t el lhim to w rite in detail about this radium producing plant. 6# The schem e of your w ork can be approxim ately as follow s: .: ' :v.r a# G ive them the assignm ent (Bagley 4-19, Badeau 4-23, and Bacon 4-24)* b# Warn them to be 'oa re ful* v ,'A £■;. ^* X.- V'\ c. Agree upon m eeting;j(w here, W hen and w hom ) # *4^:. * i s*-- "'^fr\ . V / . d# 7# R eceipt of m aterials {from Bagley during lunchtim e, from Badeau after w ork, and from Bacon tw o hours before you m eet m e). For the next m eeting, i tla necessary to find out: a# W hether Bagley, Bacon and Badeau can l et you have the docum ents for four or five hours (w e m ust photograph them ); ' o: Ko£%y-^£' ■ % 31 C> 1 (SS'CI) �( .< 000513 -3' . ! 2 : "W -V* *r- IS ^ i e ^£f»fuo ? «ftSV <fie u^ic< — ! I A? maj&bLC. ! /Sww /3a*k. - M0- I ! Sv ! J/'rS tb?y■ ■ % ; / .'».’ *.2 ■'v* • ..•■>& ■■ '.* r. /O 6 4| 6i % X % % ^5 (X) 2103-1 .53 01;, �000514 . outline s and formula s without re turning them4, if this is not da nge rous . 8* Money: ! Back Ba gle y 5 V‘ Ba de a u,^ 30/o/y!Bacon "v;. Bp'' i % { ; '-v i r i l 1 i i V i % t l ; y °* 3103-1 .33::!} �U0.-C5) I-COIG ft) ! %c>^>^72lC^> i S &J &V* *-is 'W * ^tnrzte'TniPiytf ymi —>T?J -r^ .^J. -1^2, "# '-Ze -p+ry^ f ______ * r^^rr *1 - *v-7»y ' »wrr><4y s *r>+i***4, *^s f . nry&wht -rvut +vr7%*Jyif <rm »Vp '$ s yryl !' *7^/ >2 ^ W -?^JV £? ^ /» 'fojm r. 4^'7>S 7,J /1( s^TT'&^rtr'*s^ ^ -^ -***i& %ty «^ ' 'JX t • 7^I-P?I fy,~.'■'<//} ^ ^ ^ ' /Q ' / ~~*****n >^3 $ » % t*^,*^ -■*** i ^**^**\:*?~? :f L rr-rr^rvol &*& / ; Jf U&WQ/ n ; i VTS* -;$•'•. y i~ p 4**{£+ , *r'*y*+7>cf *2*1 V '»£ "£s S ^js S 5£32g£r a ->v* *> ^r'*;-*--;:**H*S--. >*■: "2 -**/ *rr>?-y ■ . I . f{ 7V*2&Wft/* 'i 7 ,‘ Dt'W ?/ sxsooo r ). g» 9 g>•»>-r>~K<>‘^1>'»™,1^* '""**** ^*l �000516 i- \ ASSIGNMENT NUMBER 2 BACK: 1. Can Bacon afte r going to the Que e n’s Unive rs itymaintain his conne ctions with the •artille ry committe e s whe re he (ille gible due to be ing's cratche d out) time works ? 2* V/hat pos s ibilitie s will Bacon have for our work in .Klnge ton?^^7^ :: ’' q , Z. ! G ive the hom e ;and office telephone of Badeau and his hom e address. 4* TellBagley that he should m ake up a l i st of the literature w ith w hich he has con tact about w ork, ti tl es and their files and also should give us a short sum m ary of the topic* T h . •». 5* G ive a l i st of the arm y divisions w hich have returned from overseas to Canada and also the nam es or the num bers of the div isions that have been divided, w hich w ere reshaped or are undergoing reshaping, i 6. Num ber of troops in the C anadian Arm y in the postw ar period and/approxim ate system of organization* P.S* Upon reading, burn. Oa % I 3:03-1 (93/01) /the �000517- \ .. ...\ '! r), *. i V Wm .'I f/- 1 ■•■• ‘ 3;y_ V o- SI***. '*0. r '■. :e ‘■V1 s« .* Sam Ca rr vy " ;>oO , ("Frank?) r, Q:. 4 ■ ■ y- ?■• - ■; * fi, ' ;"0 ‘ : l*‘.‘ . . r.: f" : i - •, A4- '••••;', V £ 4 % . °/} ■ ♦ . -U, ?«?***£>, ■ •f ■ \ U ^Cp/s . % • ] l ■-.i i j 2*03-1 (33/T1) �UG;££) LvDiC (3) •* %' V-ifiJTDOn a /ITOMIU ttWOKiarar iruhHOwo'xncif ^miOO/Td *®««c OHo^dHodu •rvj7jjv';;oy a •<u ,t j j o kio j i i 1 • ioa-y) :tj*n«V •* ! o h ‘H^h^iioego OH^rewdoIWiT b i/j o h m ofiKiroxgoe H incsoroX waronm&tx»K *9 us e v • xwirou-« h :jam • djodn-s oioivd. *x o o h x t o ¥ v luogvd oxo»jf *q •(^oojq)ifr84^ri7T®«I.*0XN0H0i,®s oj^r\ow *T IPanwnctf (9 "” : ! piHptx^ro {9 to*<£kt 't ’«•# * XH«n*dff ojom 0 *8 •>h y- Kwm ~r~Vo KXHOV«»On *3 ecxotixo 4vnx <vxnore$ • 1 1"2' .S\,^/Oy ♦ TXShX YHHOidTO ■ 8JS000 vO - ! i/O ^ % a Hoxeewxf Hitf^dJOKg ou lre iate iTM tfnHgodtfou iwuntf •JOCOtlxZnKLxoxg ; ■ ■- 1 �000519 REG ISTRATIO N CARD 1« last nam ei given nam e and patronym ic - Sea C arr Z» Pseudonym - "Prank" '"‘I- ' ;% c; &■ 3* Le ngth of time in ne t -' - ^ ' ; £ ., A’i f-.. ' o <?>• t lcc 6; 4* Addre ss BusinessHom o - 14 U ontroae, Toronto* Telephone - LI 7848 (brook) I: 0. Flaoe of s e rvioe and dutie s .-Labor Progre ss ive Party, political .aotlTitiea , 6. M aterial agreem ent (financial) - financially independent,but taken m oney# I tia necessary to aaaiat at tim es# D etailed biographical inforzaation - the C om intern, knows H usaian perfectly, finished the Lenin School in M oscow# ; i 'So, c: %• % 3103-1 33V01' �: c, 000520 i i ftOfl POTPTO* Sab /. Co;w C/99 thetas. *) 3 z~~ f) £p€A*>Z*_ ! fox? »**/+*') .* /v»^ >n4»<ay i# x - //• • l/xVW*/tT*f. UoLyffisn- ate+Ez, *~=** u+t* 3 y>Z& ^r<g v&te x* «*+** gj/Ht - ' /** &<* * <?/.<?o a*e-£ fce s&&* / wDo <4^*»V J* »■».;; . ^ &rn getL+f tLg&sCt,t * - <t**++4 g+*4k^c*++£r, U4* ^ ^ €44+*&tjffaauym*** «v '€/lCcA*Ap > x^g> jgyy ^£+*c4f % 2. % ./Cl %M ^4 7SAS CAu^4v4^tC/ /5*> rn!’’%'f.%, '4 ; 3103-1 {33-01) 4. c# - C*~+f*ir**,*~o a /It ** ^ <»*Z°V~**^+*<* ?*++**<,~r /£.6.«S *J . %*fiiSj& 12^ % I o£> Jt*L' ^* g-tf. <t» K? ^U4<te^ "'^P’finSsc Ov *< hXpAf+*AetA' ^ /Ma JUJU^o ^#W444Aa # 3fC04 ^ /♦ <* t*~4~ - Tc Su Lk a * ' <7J ** *130 6*a+3ifu*€*m *+o /% t <ny ^ fiSCS:*?.® *■"« - *<-<* >^V^x - ^ T (2; �: Kir. 000521 COURSK Or CTSTTNOS Ke e ping of Me e tings Nos . 1# Urge nt call for FRANK (through the DOCTOR): a* Call te le phone Midway 95-93# b# BRENT s aya: "Hallo Dr# He nry# How are you? How is your wife ?" o# The DOCTOR re plie e : "Ve ry we ll, I s hall seo you late r**,# This rmoens that the me e ting will take pic oe at the corne r of Lowthe r and Admiral Rd# at 21.00 <cf olockTI but if ^re plie oi^lS l am glad to se e you a ga Iri” -/ this no one / the t th e me e ting will be he ld at the above de s ignate d plaoe end at the same /time # but on the following day. 7.5.45 3# 15.5.45 The handing over of the DO CTO R from LAM O NT to BRENT took plaoe. The m eeting took plaoe near the hospital, evorything norm al. The regular m eeting took plaoe at the oorner of Som erset and tha square (park). Everything w as norm al. The DO CTO R repor ted no suooeaa w ith the passport beanuso of the absenoe of authentio data (see telegram of 16.5.45)• N ext (m eeting) - 17.7.45 - 21.30 • 24.7.45. Re a.rre - at the hospital Plao. 4. An urgent m eeting took plaoe about the passport# H ere at the appnrtm ent of the DO CTO R Im ode the aoquaintcnoe of FRANK# Everything w as norm al (see telegram of 5.7#45). */: yc?^h''°Z ^ °N % 3103-1 (33-'01) Note s Paidouti To TH23J?-$£00 To D0CT0R-$100 The me e ting took plaoe through the DOCTOR. �900522 IM3- Coj&yxts xe BCTPgB gg5t s. /J, 7 4 T •>Ca^+**oJU**LA4 x. npKii»g*gj[» /?*<,/* &€lt*c+ymj /Zjr - J<*+ 0- /-J-4S I £ s 2/. jo "* 2-&M sJ Uf&t*-* - s ^MM*e JJ)X^+++ H*, jtj. 93****- “ S p*n. :'v-2d*f"fiii«x);£**-+» /»**r/'e a£ #<<*■ 6. /•A-^ • * '. . O/, / •<' ' Cs&+*+>*\>^Cu- <*->c.<„^i>$ . ^f,’ ^ %-*' *a,€iA'<<+***<? '^^c j *, c*. . /£ c ia S jr^v -» &+*%** <£-fr •.*■; 4. t? W^^t^ce^. *//'£pA**f*A*S iK.. /nt>n^rv»t rUZs C> jc+p iXZ+^x^, 2+At+***C£*<*> c &/&Us c<H - r H^Co^ tu>u+*e cju*e * 'CLAtfAJyA . v: C'LfX'f- Q^a*C^m \ f7c* ,t^4 s j C4- C^V****^£4lp**+~***+-+V c yuf <<4. ^T fS j?i, 1 ”/^Uk /u ; y<HK<x XK ,^;^3fs>e. 0\%+p yZ, / I ■» : -d. . 5/ fffy **' <*p*o+a>*c<Uc4< /C C*a *^*4*>+Z6*+*^ V? ! *rrf3n t C4**4C*+d+ 4k'- “.i-'''4,-<: ■^/i°/'Qy •# 3103-1 (33 01} a A«« a-<-C- j**A >»y>^»^tit..t< -r / kt ,. ^ W*t*x£cc^<2 d<**+xZ+ 7-p~*4^e a i f***4*sO c. Tre t***, <pe ^. , M^0 s~y-m pjt+*+CA**s r, &*}U+W/*+~0 C*Ka M A»-» * /£ //t**1* j* ^-fvO (2) �000523 Page 2. Nos . Keonlnp, of M eetings. 5. 17.7*45. The usual nesting took place. Every thing w as nom al (see telegram of 18.7.43) . N ext 1m eeting) - 1.0.45) El.30 ^e s e rye ^Ql;0^> " Place a -v; - Kontre e l at the oome r of ' '- jr ’/fi- ,S harbrook e nd Guy, ne ar Arts Bid. Give n t Tr a W. ije oo. 6. 1.8.45. The re£ular"m eoting took plaoe. Everything,w as*norm al.r The DO CTO R w as at the M eeting. ^11 the buaineae w as transacted in tho ear. G ave a bottle of w hiskey. Ihanded over the passport (of) V ... and four photographs w ith tho w ife. The fi naldocum entation m ay be com pleted in the f i rsthalf of Septem ber*. Idea for the changet The old picture ot V (not of our m an) w i l lbe taken out. in i ts plaoe w i l lbe placed the photograph w ith the w ife of our (nan)9 but everything w i l lbe dated as of 1957. This i s neoessary for surety. After this the change to the new passport w i l l take place9 for this i ti s neoessary to f i l lout tw o form s w hioh w i l l then be pinned to the old (one). X;v % 'S'e* . % 3103-1 (93-01) Note s Therefore i tis neoessary for V to have signatures on 4 form s9 of w hioh tw o are for his docum entation of 1937 nnd tw o for the ohan^e of 1945. In case of tho change i tw i l lbe neoessary to find a reason for thl s9 ho (FRANK) suggests to burn half of the paeeport9 to leave only the num ber, but this hes not yet been decided, i t is possible that i t wi l lnot be neoessary to do this es the executor (the person w ho does the Job) �W; <;•. O/y w4, M. 000524 155^ Co^^gwoMi utvi+n* Uj l Sj l f£+<*L~~4 C<u*/ */ S'O* u i¥'*vZ+<> “•/, 1&S€<- y&i C'-, iS f>ps +***c *++*2+++ J>yvC~* . O^r. (V*t*p<#++GIt* c^**~**<S *+4 -4 /*L4Kst+U+V . 0 '&S.ri^<p,**<*+.4 —• ^i- ~&3a J-P - /i/XC^Ui - ^ • ^5** *tp&+**~t*& fr*f - S or*4~c.S *-& *• 21-30. -*x> %,:o D '^K fy.t^Ce- 4S -% 'vv-c 0^h.-0^ V 4s/Cb. ^ °V, 5V <* - % ,4>S' % (2) % 3103*1 .; 33-01} �V l 000525 ; cV; ,sy /, ( % The Sxeoutor agrees to everything and la ready tor the w ork. I( * R egarding the cost Trank affirm s onoe m ore th^t i tw ould not be low er than three* ) t D etailed faota about the M ating, see telegram dated r -8-45* R egular m eeting through the D octor in our city* R egular - 8-8-45 Plaoo - corner Sum m erset and U etoalf (O ttaw a) Tim e - 21-50 M argin The Batting w ent offnorm ally. See "D ootora." o/ 'Wmt 4 °'V % ^ *03- 5 {33'01) o.'S5 �000526 A,. AS8iaNtfm A of "16-18-44 (?)" % j I' I , ' 'SjCy 4k- ' % %^ % 3103-1 {33.3:11 �•"VV 000527 'm*r‘'' • r*m- * l <-V^ A ‘*r m s j u a h iie *U ;;:•“* *• • * 'IT Tactical and te chnical facta df^ftial^cfai^md coas tal hydro-j*e irics tations working in ultra-aound diapas on* Conmon2review^pnvrthe rCaproni,,a s tability rsass^: _. s“i.v«,». ^^aaa»&« «-w and other principle , so-called hydro ‘foftnttfta finaing «ata^^^;^v;4« Situation of hydrophonio beta in the ships of different classes. 5. Plants, w orkshops, Scientific R esearch,Institutes and laboratories in England and in the U .S.A# w hich.are m aking and planning the hydrophonio apparatus. TO * . -. i ' 6. Passing of the planning and the teat of.exam ples of new types of the hydrophonio apparatus. ■ ? r -'••*. 7. Know ledge of the battle utilization of the”hydrophonio m eans* •’* •' >' '«• v •’ S' 1 I ‘j \ [ j *■ f J > 6 « l... ..c4 ’ "; .? X04^/0/ % ! O i 1 3103-1 <S3.'01) (2) �000528 »>« ■ I E*2l £L £-&, ^U9t£T K /¥TTUht&ote*; 952 /ZcutOMtvf* 0 &$a*^DW(LX Z&CC&p ’&'£/£? t O C^'-te cut # Q tUfu/ (Zltk^-Qsca 7icL44UxrtC*ftO ft# /47ft f'fS'T. yfautetsAUL*** \$ua$&p OcCT&Lf/%*&4L4£55^^ / ^^ucjce Jk^^ J. (A^t JzZtZi 2*f+&u£, OWs tJU+f&j fy : *a &+*Z&ZUl >; /#, £ Jo %*uJfct* /& ^cr%;%::^.;:/ < uUt €*Ccu~ i &tZ7&pq\M JftA /a&A*u**c** y s ~£if *y$te x& tUj&IuJt ^Cic^cu, /$ct4U^e ^^£u£Ut v&tr it .*&• Mr j Zfa>tyb. — r„ * if ^ ^ °^r y, A« jfc/n^ryrx*/^ , -- dci4**S ^£+tct4w tvo 7H+fa> /fatyCC&j ff 'A'liuJlZ HzT A&P a a P -• | 'd*og fST3&+*2 ~ /7l+f-4*t£l*A $ s /&-££*<*/ ~£ f/ \2?*+*> z <> ^ fytps s «y-£e uc+^p % ,^9 ***t?3 0**y**’/r «&</ . A,***^s 3xv h>s *or4r& ‘^ C^u/-— fe &cUc&z y frO t£V MQUuUtfaut U tsCu&t/g / s LjO<t/j/'.C0ur <U-rtUfvJ, -u~* i#axinif-co*f ? u a j S><.j «=£©**. >. 4*y&w /f £(* l 3103^1 <33 31) Ufj cp^nuap. n+v+*4> f ft& do_~cta<\ fa —h i (2) �000529 Various . 3AM Sam , 14 M ontrose, Lloydbrook, 7847* 14-6-44. Com m ander net 3AM and oam e:to agreem ent about m eetings w ith bin and LEO N onoe a m onth. N ext m eeting set for lb.9.44 at £1 ofolook| D om inion Boulovard {opposite the W indsor H otel) in M ontreal. 10.7774 to dlaauaarc^x0 1. m *o prepares the passporta, that.is w hat kind of people. Are they possibly 614 ahoem akes who disappeared (l i teral l y ^^nt^ninder) several years ago • 1 ^r ; •* s £• To take m oney to the m eeting. In the future m eetings and extra calls w i l l takafelaoe in Toronto at £1 o*clook in the apartm ent. passw ord lMN calla the telephoneM idw ayWoS of doctor HARRI3, £79 C ollege St., Toronto. "Iw ant to say hallow to m AN K". After this LEO N goes to the m ooting in Baton*s store (oorner of C ollege and Young) ERIC calls (Invites) through SKELTO N. 13.9.44 To LEO N 330 dollars for SAM R eceipt for £00 dollars obtained, LEO N has 130 dollars in oaah. 4.10.44 SAM said that he had handed over the m aterials °iyZ^orto ERNST, that he w i l lnot obtain them , he asked to 4vy ^ *aTl ae* naked for naeting through FO O TEn. : B.12.44 .-departed. — W at 11.12.44. Set for 16.12. In r tow n O t 21.00 SAUK. BET ^4. ', Of, w\- v Isr* ‘^A/ " * <*Ca 'c % % 3103*1 (33-0n �000530 r" \r fyp’turt'f <24 u *q . /tf+upC+Hyt-s P+** &4S VU4 Ap4*H*f**^e +4y fM*f+4<MC9% ^Uc^UlS ‘ ' ^*V*7L-A> *W«-£< H$ ^ ^T-« &*-£&»*£ ■£ ° '*?*- • <2-4^ UtS «f<,U4%{Ute yiciau, y * ’*?$**'■+- y^S pli* sk fruj % •V- :V/^- SLJ1 !-Jl M t* - | '/ fl*Sf*JuMZ4 - 0 r..._ |L_ %,L... ... :.. f ‘^L foiALjJttJ-UMs a£c*$€f€*c£ A fJ^.<***4m rttyOccyUfCUcVf fr044*CkJt£4tcJ fa £__ ~.4o‘txr Y0*1 jf V<*^°**^ ML^ ^ ^~ <9 - ^/>„ ^ 2 0 >7 4 U£J XfycftLi+t ^ i; ti •• ' . * “*****“ 2/<~^ / ,+J^J7 ■ ?■ Vf £ &• : '9rXM44<AA» ?%/f. Wy !**• . u £*m fCr-uv) i*o^> f C^-0-»-fc^ i-Kt- /**^< We d('c+-e - d^-t: 4-t*/. 21.30\ t- /. (2) 3’C3*1 <33/01; �000531 Ihanded over £00 dollars. The passport— (that is the fi rstline at the top of the page. The second to the ninth lines are oovered by a notes w hich says:-) U rgent csll-of Sam , is being accom plished through the optioal doctor H Akftls , who lives at 279 C ollege St., Toronto. LAM 0NT rings the doctor en telephone - M idway 90*53. Pass-w ord - *1* w &t to say hallow to TR AN K"• This m eans, that the m eeting (contaot) "w ill>ta3ce place in the region (vicinity) of the hospital behind EATO Nfo store, w hich is on the oorner of Tonga - C ollege St. at £1.30 ' Q ,r Sketoh as opposite. To take up the question of receiving evidence of naturalization and m arriage. £0.1.45. M issed, set for 7.3.45. N ext (m eeting) 15.6.45. £1.30 Som erset and oorner of the park, In reserve £1.6.45. C all now * at the hospital. 3.7.45# - took plaoe out of tow n about the passport. Everything norm al. Plaoe - at the dootors. given out - £00 dollars. Aocount system of 5.7.43. 17.7.45. - next (m eeting) at the apartm ent of the dootor tim e £1.00 V/. of 17,7.48, Took place norm ally. 1.8.45. In M ontreal at the corner of Sherbrook • - -> - a j '»•••. ‘ * and G uy near the M edioal Art Pldg. % -c; Tim e £1.30. ^l In Te s e rva V-£.8.45. at the same pla oe a nd the same time . ‘‘Wo, 3103-1 (93/01) �•'O 000532 > (Translation of text ooTered by the note*) fy. Handed orer 200 dollars* Tbs passport has haen detained. The form s w aro badly fi l l ed In. O n th# 16*12 ho w i l lgiro new © nea.'16*12 at 21.00 Inot (him ) norm ally*' Ha gar* the;hew form s* Vo agrood on the transfer of IR N 8T/ 1 gave the oontaot w ith HAT KAN TZlTO AlJt«^(prohahly naans HIO HTIHO ALB) Im ade (him ?) acquainted w ith doctor HARRIS HENRY* Isat the next (m oating) for 20*1*45 at 21*00 at the old plaoo near the hospital I fdoctor HARRIS does not change It* i % 3 503-1 <33/01/ �UQ/CS) l-CO i £ ?g*Wv. . .. . I ^J5 S C^i. (yyv* ptjf £rr*? 77 «• +»■*■*■>>■?****-& i^yy ?• ft +*?*« »y%*J'a2*+&*t i ^'V>*+*9+t )i£ rrt+tg &vtf >**02 ’//’>C^ VQ V *»»****£/ * -?^*Jo&rr3 <j *2>> ^ rfat^nry & (b+rrTrrrtf^it) ; >9 W^ ot*a ^T* ^ 1 ^4 ^/ ■« •»>•? »g ■yr>’^y /• yptrr^ r ; : ’ _-» zf t^n ’+*> -•vo-v >vty 6»»» »><y *as -pm7» »,<lX- *+*?** *> TTy^T-irjy**^-vyy~j >■■> ■ - C-'/c 'V. 'e / • ♦ ^/H- -i 4v/»W ^^7' *> >rv ■Tpwyz , >r~+£<?-/ +~*~& ~ tfO-s r' **s ' $}?1 » on-a^^c ry^a ^ •*£-£rx/£^r'fjf l6M/*4 j£r'' 02 W‘^ ’u"a J ix » j » ^ • ' '*^’‘~y 4 *Oy~r ^.1/ '<£*' ji ~* s cW 8SS000 ■'O' +++ -^yy^o rrTWrt ^(^r?**7-t79^7y**t**Tf ) T»y>7\.--y>-^-T»>yi »v looming 'JTVTHf' •ShZSi* 40 c'S iaifHVWs i ^.o/ O' ‘&T0*+>~7&*/:'1*L-rt+44^ *7- �■■S"' 000534 tfaak fZ of "15,6.45" FRANK* 2 cop. Flaoed (set) io,6,4¥ o• C c to •H 0 uo '■ h ; ; I • i ! I 7- 5*€ •i-i e pq'SS mu At the present tim e >we w ould w ish to know w ith m or we i, u, kBM fiiiAM )| and i t is therefore det ailregarding V2ALE desirable that you enlighten us in w ritten form for the noxt m eeting 115, f , 49) on the follow ing ques tionsf ' 'Q a , * 'Gs >y «’ S'a © e » «H 1, O n the basis of previously ooram unicatod data regarding A.N , VEALE (fin Englishm an), we know that up to 1342 he w orked in the m cteo-service of the R oyal M ilitary Ai r Foroes in C am bridge, Aftor this he w ent to C anada on a scientific m ission. Before his departure YKALH , allegedly (apparently), re ceived instructions from his director (in the sense that he handled YEALE. Trans, note) to m ake contact w ith your corporation. 4» • b. I fthese data are confirm ed then try to draw YEALE out in frank conversation and put the straight question to him ; W hat does he w ant from you. u 4* 0*0 o <jS: 5f ^4^ 4 3103-1 {33/01) v' / k"o a. D oes YKALS actually w ork in the m eteo-service of the R oyal M il itary Ai r Foroe in C am bridge and * has his m ission (sojourn) in C anada direct (obviously a w ord is m issing and is probably connection* Trans, note) to his acrvlce in England, �Uo/ce) i-coio (3) 9) * % 4; mi ;i ^ ^>y3T»-yyT^y-^ >7 '*h&3/WrZ> >7 /7’»)/T>'<^»^»»^ <*vy 'pj*j 'S w <zs7*Jh>/f > o **rr*y>'i • *^r>- i 0^1 ~r>1 C7> *- '^5^2 _rc° -p ■ <oZ°k£ '*?y '* * ■£***£■ rn?6 *'*£'6^^ ^ /<;v " 4/ - —* / -“'&7*~zrp~arr*~rx> — &p~r>zstr7/7 ! : <p ***-4-j ! — £^3/ -S> **^>r >7 d .# - • !»«,. S*ZP S rrr^nJTT~& 9 dr&~9^2 £rrz 2?~ry4> ' ^ <P- '"’V sssooo • ? — <s �1* 4$ 4- o o o r? 3 •) Vf o* If, however* i tdevelops Is the oourae of conversation that VBALB refers to his oorporatlon relationship and to the order of his director in England that he was supposed to tie-up w ith the C anadian oorporation* then l ethim give the nano of that poraon who gave-him those orders. ^ 0£ /' w>:r d« D on’ ttake any m aterial from VBALB and don*t show any interestIn any infor m ation he Blight give you. ctW .' ! | !! I At the present tim e he is w ork- 8. C om m unicate how the m atter stands w ith the fulfilm ent of the form er assignm ent for lng M aritim e >8taff. He has Lieutenant Shugar. 'consented to w ork for us hut w ith special caution. Be has keen under observation. ; ; From the college 3. W hat about m atter w ith C aptain G otholl he is being trans- (Kingston)* w here he Is right now and Is ferred to a train- there any possibility that we could use lng detail In him in our w ork. British C olum bia on political ideas(?} Be is in prooess of . %?V*r*A•e>. -' W .M / % 3 * G 3"1 (33-01) % �A 000537 -3- > ~(q V Hs i^j. ***C>>'C*4*^*jC**{0*>40>*£l^ I U: I ?'■1 ■ ! i ► —- - £> Ctc+'ts ifi &1 i-4-A-vt*.<^ • .., ; 4 /ye -e \ \ ^ VJL ___ \C^]U^^ ^t6^-<4i4>L «-<i ^cV2Av"^ - ''A-^ • .* ^L? •t %! *•'■■-. ,^-o * »-£<urj ~ y, ^*-r || - '- AA: -A AAv AA- ( ill i• ^ pv U ^/,r ^^v ^/^£>/^.--'^ ‘v^. '*■' c s c ^0/ <^c„ /C^LS ^ji 4. ^c^u>r ^ &~C s&i&f I i ^ '^%s . ' i ' %%; _r™ ■ ^ p*c^s. ? 29* ?*h ^ <? 4.$v+i T°-" *** ( £? )<*£ **L42 *S~£ti(t «. f. v«Ac C Aa ^ * /iyfls &'Xr j(^&'^£. is tJ * % f (2) 3 *03-1 <93.'D!) �000538 v. . ' v~) i , j | Everything w i l l be olarlfied in July and August sines at the present tine a change is being m ade in the staff of the offioers of the line. 4* Kara wo the possibilities of developing our w ort in the M inistry of N ationalD efence, in the M inistry of Aviation, in the M inistry of Kaval Fleet or even In their m ilitary staffs* At the present tim e these fields are very interesting to us and we w ould like to have you expend your m axim um efforts in this direction.„ P.S. 1. R egular m eeting 17.7.43* em ergency 84.7*45 at 9t30 In the evening in your city in the sam e piece.(next to the hospital). The D ootor knowa« ^ y 2. After reading burn. o f 3*03-1 <33C i} �is" . jfliUtg: *v ■ u * i/ou+KJ+Att'., &Uu a U4 «**■ &y*f**<***<%+fffijr*?****4#*/1 tfc ***e“cC/ ***«***- Uiz s u /k Lc * it <gati#4Z4r*e 6*je l j /rous y<A*+44C- ^ 7. O rT' cSS. Jiy ^ s AJ^a u^q ^u/^0 ^90 i^c ^ yya+Ttf^^r C^^rw'/mC. \ /f^**^^u/ ;; 6 '' A-iJk^W- e ?Z*ym ****£/ G*tru/AU*±±UJe ~ ■ J'^• ttU£*4*a/jU&'~AJCLfCr* - *4£*S o /<&>7+ S t*<y*S i f Gfrt>%y/r'S44x«jLm tea::-.. !r*- "- .■ p\ JlfrfL+JUut tjc*/ ** GA C^e ^s o • ■„ ••' °^; c*5?^%v ;_. .'; <9. J&t-n^CtL£*'Acs qyu^ h : ■ 000539 *7V fir?w^yA> Qrao^yn*, /dt&Mno ■■ /Mu 4«C/ *. v. " ‘ V* - r*’ - '. •• £f? < *■;' /t T ■C*4*~*f<4€At*~ • W £4s 4<iAt+u±C. . - 6^~r~~*Zr- \ S '’" , ; £ iM /^c^cc^i a ■ **• ^ . *U&t*e opt*S *- ■ - ytAfcCUA/Gutf fgU(L*4)UK/*±±uf 0%^t*uc ^e ******,**^, OryS *^, ■ j^AU*0MA. . /ro<*rU/Js u-tmc. C. V C &ny=>t+ « (*A^ tIL*fo MtS *SCL~ **^**^2? fr-e u*faujD V A€*Jt44*tjL v 6itjtjou*LC- *S ottou*f /5c Cptus m+n fuuUmc *> CUt/fs . kj e JtyjuA+is -s i }$**&*. *f*t+ G ^ccy<jRc<4ttp CyUAXt^ c ^tu/ r \f, t *.' • ! ^ * tyvyiAuf c l ^u u J Q c/oJvw fdU*+vy) 9AMU<^0 <ptA^^ CLuX K—- & ffo/ ^tT, (2) 31C3-' {33-0!) �000540 ) TASK #3 Of "1-8-4S " 1* The requirem ents (qualifloetions) w hich an illegal m ust satisfy-Jnationalltyi citizenship, profession! education, know ledge of languagest fam ily and financial standing* eto*) 2• M eans oflegalization {organization of trade eBtabllshm entaictO enter'ther firm as partnerf enter som e offloe os an em ployee* to join the arm y as a roluntee^l/^ ) 3* D ocum entation w hiohotfce Jtllegalm ust have• (passportt Tarious kinds O f certificates, inform ation (w ritten), letters of recom m endation etc) % 4* The m ost adm issible m ethods of illegal entry* 0* Aosuranoe of living quartors and finances for the period of acquainting the Illegalw ith oonditlons on the spot* 6* O utw ard m anifestation of channels of English governm ent influence on C anadian forlegn policy* 7* The conditions of entry into the oountry and m oving about in the oountry* 8* The oonditlons of aocllm ation and living in the country* 9* M ethods of w ork of oounter-eopionage* The organization of organs of oounter-espionagef federal and provincial* 3*03-1 i'33'Cn �000541 i /6.^.vr ! i I /* i M^tP CJ^uyj /-«-*■ e. *< fT>' /*£***<? ^C^O ty7/>*e *-4ic*Aj : fas tts frctfoA-**^^ *:i- (2-<£> €->-«? •*> - j?—?tt<*f'~cf p*e**A0> %: ■'■.-.>;C/'>;:< /2 % /£>tt't4^L*£+- jpCP~*C gf <* />7#U> - I I ■e* nc-s^o^ ' * " -1* -%' .' ,* •<**' ■■„ ^ ^9 .V'^; i ^yw^c^Zt^f / <2 -6 ’-T y «*42 ~2<p &&&<*&*&*■ *■<*-<-*?- *--ii ',, ■ g >^fr t/ ^ AZcU^re ^cO ! - ■e ** ,.? /C%; % • ,--------- > 1___ ■ /*<**• o' 'O' - '°X>f^pPf>4 g <* % ► . ■, **Z*-<> ... _ . -^Ct^o . ^=r. (2) 3103* f {93/01) �000542 > ASSIG HM ZHT G IVEN 16-6-45 1* W rite the report on docum entation of passports and other docum ents pointing out by you (Frank) who eoncretely does such things-# ^/. £• W hat docum ents ban he prepared and received .tern** you. 'to . 3# G ive the oom plete oharaoteriotic of Prom etheus show ing the duties of the departm ent In w hich he w orks in the W ar N aval Fleet and also w rite down biographioal facts ascertained about his hom e and offioa w ork, his address and his telephone num ber. • ) 4. Suggesting plaoe of w ork Pronet w ould w ork in case of dem obilisation# 8# Tour possibilities on the rem oval of people in the G eneral Staffs of the Arm ed Foroes# S ?Q ' « r.M V 3103-1 (33.0*) CSy? % �000543 *Vs V\.V .1 O •' ' ' • . ■ * \ * - t- > ■*. ■W ‘ ^ -: i rvc- v' ,VV»I 11 v^ . >w..v'. : ■&■ . • . O'.-. ■' -Mm’. I I* ■ ■Vi; ;• -: •_ ■' 1 few.' ' ■■;:■■■;-■■ •: . ' ,V* ■; »;* • ■: f ■;■ i ; ’ \ v* ! \ : U 3:03-1 (23/01; $ �000544 KAPTCTCKA nETA. N>- O' :? ■ 1 • SaHKJiMH, KUg^ Qttie crBO^ > * (> o, w 8. IIC0BAOHM14 1)AHIT?0HTH SMITH. ^A/, 0^ ^C V■ ; *'f£ / O'. ; -, H-ttlS BADEAU » 3. C K&xtoro Bp 0140 HH B C0TH 4. Aflpoc: а) CjiyzoCHUft __________________________________________ б) ^OUamHHft (Om * 5. U0CTO pafiOTH K AOJJXHOCTB i J- 3A . 14~ .W A//^ r 4. // ./.y < Ha^HO-Hcc^Bjoi;aTO.ii>cK;;ii CoBBT.PajiHQ OTite jte ns io. Pa6oTa0T Hav^Him c o t p v j ih h k o « t « h ,?.o h o p . 6* UaTepKSUiBHK0 ycJiOBKH I Cjiagoo.nojryHae T o k o j io d • MOCKU. HyB^aaTCH B napHOAHMOCKOri* ZlOMOmU BKorpa gmooioie ^aHHue t B03pacT 33ro;;a f I o h iio b . av c* *A.;u^ v ^ ' Os , h mo o t no oSpaaoBaHHK pa ,;ito A*yx a ®t o :1( kh bbkbp* ■ TEAEJOJI Em CO. * B IXirTTiSAJW. OAHOMy 6.ij t , AP'/rony 6 m©- PaooTzui a HayuHou coaeTe i J ita cTonnoe Dpewn paooTaoT S Cx?^/^0-» -UajrwKO- MCC.TOAOBaTOJIbCKOU COE.0T0 B 0TTAE2. Is ^O a , a xjioit,» ;pAE0^Il2:-nP0rPiiCC;i3II0rA nAPTK;: ", b paOoTo Q9/' <a ^7>>; 0/ ; 0* ko t o po npwHjf- aKTff&Koe y^a cTito. Ivopono Ha crpoe H u Ha u. C bojia mm xejtaHweM ,, ! % %*O*i0Typa6oTaT b Ha na c. 1 m % v„_ i : (3) 3103-1 j33:'CM) �-n, 000545 REGIS TRATION CARD 1. Last nam e, given nam e and patronym ic - D aruforth Sm ith 2. Pseudonym - "Badeau" 3. Length of tim e in net 4. Addre aa IS • Bus ine s s -ute ' - O/c Hom o - (O ttbw b )3-5870, 145 Ste. M ario (H ull) ‘ . 3. Place of service and duties •.Scientific resenroh, R esearch r; -C ouncil, R adio D ivision, ^cl'vv^^-^atif^iD C ta^alstant engineer. 6. M aterial agreem ent - (financial) -W eek. R eoeivos around $300 a m onth. N eeds per iodic help. De ta ile d biogra phica l informa tion ^Cn^S % •____________■ 3503-1 {93-01) Is 33 years old. H as tw o children, one six years, other six m onths. By profes sion, radio engineer. N orked in the Scientific C ouncil of the Bell Telephone C om pany in M ontreal. At present tim e w orks in the Scientific R e'search C ounoll in O ttaw a. He is m em ber of the "Labor Pro gressive Party". Ho takes an active part in i ts w ork. Very sym pathetic to us. H as a great desire to w ork for us. �’~'V 000546 XOR BCTPEZh. Na-lP- npHue ^aroie Coaepaarote BCTpera n,n. /. S , 4r - KC4 »u. f /tt4*C***~+*> *~VV €**~z 044«t-^ Au* L* <^6 JfU4**«*C * A-U+-* t>p^« .-■■■ ^ «< Ca 44 , 4f /yicflL^C c /^r^5^, *£*//*-?- 7~>Ck X ^»iU itf '9^> f*-t**f #<**+# w •4'frt''0** < fey toe* /9 £Xo**£is ,^ **p^^ty^e o**6*+^*-**t *&$^s /^tA< h*p*t%A*7C44*AA.x2j 2. \>i »•) [%•£• tfS* <f*&++Co . T*o++c& -c>^-r> ^ ^ ^ C*^C~C£* . yb % O-^tM x. cxC«-</ f* tf-*<j£jCr/ ;p* «> «* /bU^»cc (3) 3103-1 <33/01) �000547 P corns?, o? C ontents of M eeting Ko » 1. mc t t ih o 8*7*40 N otes A m eeting to get aoqualnted w as arranged by Back# H e givea a good Im pression. He oonduoted him self/rery cautiouely, a l i t tl e oow ardly. He brought m aterial on radio locators (radar);to be photographed. He w ants to w ork for us and prom ised to do everything that he y*oan. " ' ; He lives in H ull in a separete l i t t l e vi l lage. Asked about independent photograph ing and eonneetion viith Parloy* For datai l a see telegram dated 6*7-43. G ave a hundred dollars. T!e took the m oney readily. In tim e to oom e9 he m ight be a group leader* ) R egular (m eeting) not agreed upon. He w i l l m aintain eonneotlons w ith Back. G iven spoo ls 1 assignm ent (see enolosed). 2. 18-6-45 U rgent m ooting on photographing. He Just returnod from the U nited States. D idn’ t bring anything; for the next m eeting, he wi l lbring his account of tho tri p to the U nited States and other m aterial w hieh we designate. He oould not take any photo graphs. He hss only a photo, apparatus and nothing m ore. Re gular (s e ating) - 26-6-45 Ple oe - Hull > 3103-1 {33-C5: �o. 000548 WHP- n»n» npMuexiaHMe Cojgeps aHMe BCTpe*n> J. LtpS UA+i" f“e He t<* f<r?ft^C , M 4 uyf >y **4*u i K*>^<4.<*Cc***tl^ ptis f Us C 6 ++*^/'**3 yC<s C~+&* «'"* *♦ ** *^ *" **+'**> ^ „ ■ > ’ &B-U* i f+Mtoxvi ***** * • tn*yu> h . „S T) ^Zut-ogutt - tuu -Ccfc Jc+ '^■■■< / *****+<*ys +*c* . . <c» ^ fH* ~ P jp */ &***• ^ ~;'%____ 'tCwLp/L-Ks t*’ " : ! 2 c. jg'Mr *<+ j *+*? (?% T--ffl “ 2(£". 3.^ ^ i 4 2ZJ&& £**&+ ^ < * I frUgs +J-oO /OOffS j} , I (Pz fyttfU+t ! 1 >^'Z^^vt/-C<Xe 6 j 0 Ofye~'C4^i*<P~* pj£j-Q+++ £‘6#+'C4*+~*a I^.r r ( t*A*+t - . I i.Qv.C-ic. . ^9 <* /^JHL-C^c ^ j'f^j-^ .... . %! ^ 'floats }fp***1s ^ i.,9 I hcoxj 3~3> 2 ^0 / /**>1t^U. I , /lt&/^ty *)£rt'£: s ir < O tlr-9 £d'X*i~l", ! <-•* - r l* C- C / is t^s V /& &T *Z~ a~*\4 JRJ57. ||fj^ •• . a^k.,f£@ fQ $3*~ V*‘ ■■': * S td$$t0*U<Z !*c *Os t*~> Cwe p+U*,. •• \» 3103-1 {33'01} t^VV>VWt^ ^ d^/ '- 1 /Qs O N___ ■ (3) �000549 > 3. £3-0-43 R egular (m oating), everything norm al* H anded over a large quantity of radio literature and varioua reports, al ltold about ten books. There w as on aw ful rain# He cam e, how ever, gave notice that in future he w ould not com e during such kind of w eather — not naturally. He gave notice that he w as going on a tw o-w eeks' vacation. -/ r Q /A W as given the assignm ent'on rod io m aterial and other things. {Sea as- The m eeting to return the rcnterial wi l lbe on 26-3-45 on the com er of O sgood And C um berland (t) at 22:00. 4. 26-0-43 M eeting to return the l i terature. Everything norm al. Give n $100 R egular (m eeting) through Back Agreed upon a passw ord for urgent m eeting! v > Brent w i l lcallby telephone (w hom ) 3-5870, and after talking a l i t t l e w hile, he w i l lsay at the end wM ary sent her love for your childran". . This w i l lm ean that the m eeting w i l l take place at 2l!00 on the corner of Borr and r*t*' U orie. i t Bad w i l lw alk dow n from Barr on ste. KarTe on the l eft side. ! >- nip. ' O k , *’ A0> 'V % ! l : 3103-1 (93*01) �000550 £LL ! /i>y, /2> u^ot^a. /?**??> : I q. pAvi>& J bcs W^'<2f a. I t^a^e - #>*- /Ije ^cas z &^t (^o4s ^JC^~C<^c> C opilc^ $>£&'{/iOM o^, //0~^i'filjL*C*>&s c,<2-^? C^-c^ Cs 'g ;'-O u*^**-J~**^t^ Pce -fruiT <ip ery*Z<? fo u^TU. f'p^l-o fco jf-dst,r^A V> i>ti K \Yu <$(_ dz +ts *s j ^*4^ X^7 r^« ^o , As p j^rx^K^r j > Ni •V <*« \ 1 c ^J a . e a^f-^C fopP^a^-LS U4**<*t^t4c*Pie S Xq u *&a U H* tfc^<^<s *eAe-<>--«^-**' '&*&- •t's * $*tf'/Uiru# • - ^ *tyu e ^cp^U^ **-*«*'&*% %ro <feSt% U 5? ^ 6'« < vr —^ ^ ^P } i I •°* ^4S^ %' ^ ’ HJO lZ*cue-~ t* US * &>&«,^C4<jt ^tt&HAXLr JjZ^Pc^f - C4 l >&&S '-C* &*?'$). Jwtb \fAxLu, / 3103*1 {33.-01; U2-pX-^-*^ 2 'C '4&U* {3; �‘~r. j J: ' Iflf* ■ • m 000551 * r. iHil: P5 ! ASSIG NM ENT ( BADSATTi G iren 5-7-45 1* In tho m onth of,Xttna»*1948, tho m ilitary air power' of.Canada in,connection w ith Photographio Besearoh C om m ittee'as w ell as w ith tho O ptloe'Q eotlon of,tho N ational R eseeroh C ounoil oarrlaa pn'taatB W lth a now photo flash bom b bursting * w hich had a 750 m illion oandle power and speolal lenses for night aero photography* W e w ould like the anaw or to the follow ing questionst. .. , t:. fiw .•> •" a* O f w hat la the com position w ith w hioh,the bom b is fi l l ed oom posod and i fpossible w rite i ts form ula* J ; ; ! b* W hat area of surfaoe Is l i tby the flare of this.bom b end the dura-> tion of.buraing of the bom b* • • - _ : ■ i e* - The m axim um height from w hioh oan be taken praotioal photographs w ith the aid of this bom b* i d* W hat do the new photographic lenses represent and give teohnloal foots (focus* light* and so forth)? ■‘%Qi % % r'' 3103-1 (33 01) �000552 /^Co^ (2<P >r? ^U<ruo P^/T s O t?0 'tCAs ^As ^^-^ ’&£>-&£*-' ^JA & (P (T T^C^e ^r J-r- P^L-jp/D '<A:,.^r; * (^V«-***V«*^-*W g \,' ^ Is s O’t^? 0- '■* / <-. ^ <? **$/}*4+ • ~Z*£s<si. &, v a' ft .^r *■**’■- • a A* tcX^&P - ",\ jft&tC&iS - ;/v 4 i' N.:; 7~Vos -f e*t4tk£S ‘ ^-M. j ,.s' Hs aS -C(csis>+-f* ~s US tS S s O1** (i C 'S l a S S S C-l s Csss-*•SSsK~&-& • <^M^53P S ^&S s S LrftUS -/—tTtlus * fs t*friiS ts 5^s c. C-£4S --cj£*--t ‘ <2- 7lAys(s iSssJs,*) is /■ Cs<sliJra-s!^<ssi u ---- -; :**&<&&& a ?a >a z/A ■*<&»£<<* 'i (3) 3103-1 (33-01) �'"O , 000553 £• N het now w ork is being carried on by the Photographic R esearch C om m ittee in the field of height aerialphotography9 eolor aerial photography and photography through cloudsf w ith tho old of infra-red rays# /-> ”7% -C4^ '•r M ake notation of. the new est types of aero photo# apparotus used l>y:the H*iC#A•P. and R.A#P# and faot*^l)Q ut\th' oaw :h. a. * ■; 'o,: % o--vifc.^vr-v ? Typo of e ppowtu#^(tradamarJc) b • M axim um height pf'effeotivenea a '¥ w>y /. o# Num ber of orow and dim ensions of picture d# (al lthis crossed out) R xpedienco for itinerary end plane takes e# Types of lenses and their light and focus characteristics > 2103-1 {S3 D1) �000554 /“ , _ i 7• S : * A> dc^-e -e ^u /• /it *dlt> i? t- /•** >*/ ^3 “ jVa V 712^ 7~s> ^yiic; c ~c l ^<-c -C. ‘•^. /te u *-c-x C ax , "'^t4 /y ~ i>lU ^ / ^‘cyojc- , ■~-X* '? 3 . **vz> /it' c* (^<S l4<4^-</>^»^ O ^^ ^ | ^(X/, < ^/ • ~£'W L~ C^.~fr U bo* " JT* <L*~^iX-C^C Arxfl ^> 3 n T-fL W*- <*xO/ r^viv /? C/ wA-^i Cc4-^ . _A - J> w J^/ t-a. . <b. ‘’*5/» h '/^V. Z> t^ ,,/b cJ y*< v <V ^ >\*://^ ^ ‘ C^c^iX *-oy ^< 4 %>~h v /v *< ffi-i^c^niuC-n-c-n.t-t- ^ &* "/ /5 }K . i t^vnr ut.<p *- "Cu-tf?_t_^. /w-p'r'*1'*'^e ^c. /U-TS c-tx,* X-< .-A?r< *.-<_ ~ 10 *f (3) 3103-1 {33-01) �000555 > ASSICMM3KT NUMBER 8 O lTen 4-7-4S D irectly BADEAUl s> / 1. G ive the characteristic facts on (Il l egi bl e due.to.brofla out m arts! (send-) ing and .receiving radio bulbs for L-3 and L-larid thei r technological m anufacture• ^4:-: Z. The sam e about bulb "4 J-33". el d of radio looatora 3. New Tort in the fi (radio) for anti -ai roraft arti l l ery and planes w ith L-3 and L-l . i 4. W hat does the T-R sw itoh represent on L-3 and L-lw ave? . 5. Types of radio antenna for L-3 and L-l s being done on the seoond fl oor 6. W hat i of the"Boyd Station"? There is supposition that they are testing i nfra red rays and are w orking out radio installations. G ive a m ore detailed teohnioal descrip tion of "Ap/AR S-10". 3103-1 {33-'01) �KJ*-. * '■.Xs 000556 i1 SS--E*”. js vf.\ «,• *: *r~. * j * L -., « JpES^*. ;c.,j. , .. <:>-5.-:v- • ' <*■«■« ■'■*■' fl^?r 'fiP m i ¥* -2- vUi «* *a HR4&fe <:■■:; ’, .A ■* . U^'jts O--£s ~~ ■‘■ ' ^» r & 3 . AcA*** -tie JpilL fat*<*««*+ Ac£ +4<**•+*«■»/7^^< -t: c^r^J #; iwyj^r ^, jFc? SSS. -■ •as®-.-- .4 ■ ■i-. ^ fistic-. J M&S S . . I I Qo i • . ^ v. (30 i 3103-1 (93/Cl) �000557 Q. In tho latest literature on theso point out their trade nark* , >. N otes! 1* W herever possible, get sam ples of radio bulbs# i 2# \ i: D ocum entary m aterial is im portant to us for photographing# 3. I fyou do not have the possibility to answ er several of these questions on speolal aotlvenoss, donft oom e# ( * 4# After having read this, burn# f 1 i ?- ;% i '•k tx ’<>"; • /J UV.* ->v'; i 1 i jO >? 'Xt *s MS 3;03-1 (33/01) ^ �(ic.se) i-sois % ...... 'V •~cv '■<0 r;/ CO • .* H Q: ■V' •i ,1*. ! ; ! •" % i .1 : i /r V' ~?w? hy ,*« •<* ^ J -V > ‘-v ,; ;r.\ /C< '<2 -9>^r?joo •j'd ) dyy~vyj? ~>t& 0-*ra^ Z^+TyryiA^/ <yvf cy^y t -?-T>^r>rryi'£ 7 z .e y>vh/ •mz r*9*rr >i**r^ri(r+-tr>y j-'-t-**y>■*■&■ if .• ^y>^*~r^rvy?>lg+ y* _ _ msO-i* - •* _ r c^5» • ' S '? &;&/!?/ *7*00 /? O^W s mammmm 8SS000 1 & .* e/ 'oh o hi J '5'tf .;: €> •*'. n‘ ! y( �000559 i AflS IOHMTOT FOR BABBAtJ. fTDUBKR 3 C lran through Haok 6-6— 4b, O btain the follow ing literature for photo graphing! O L 14003, Son. 1403B, A.fl.V. 14040, B and NS 13960. i H otel i 1 I f the specified liaterial is bulky or i fi t is not convenient to take suoh a num ber of books, then the given num ber oan be reduced at your discretion, but everything m ust be very oereful# ! f f > \ V S. After rending bum * 1 Cte M .U, % % 5103-1 i33:-D1) V. �<100 560 ■*, ■■•■.#■ V*tfV -v ■-. ;«S . - ••. C^<^n^4^uo jJgS e r w >>? £fjp4A4* /**#%+*> ^rt. t ikj ; yTCV-yt*-*^k 4*<*£~ ~4 £~+-e> a „ J. /C I • • • ••■,/ Jc+4*r%+4 ’. P(ft&ty a Bio .-y : ''\m$^m ,«s ■ ^igum® m • •>-•<• • ;.: <vi»w&5 ki'Sfr>. ~£o- c iii ifig ^ ^ >V FjZiK***** *& gsSgg^ • 'V> > i# >‘%?1 X? •* ... •". . v.\$5? *V; ■ "H ;o %/So^ ^'■%,,. UP>^ ^ft /y#>, — %- • « $ &&&*, % *Qo Mv 3*03-1 (33-31) 'Xs *. �000561 ,n » S'- ;► s a s s iq n ms h t ■A £ y Olm pe rs ona lly to Ba da a u S 3-8-45 <»: ■:*> •v 1. Anew or the last l etter regarding new redlo bulbs, radio equipm ent, both (for L-l , £ and 5), and the other questions In that letter* £• Sf £• Try to find out som ething about "oleotron shells". 3* Bring the follow ing books to our next m oot ing! &• & & LG 13053| G L 14017, and P (R AD) 13920. si® & ^a r &' P .8. Afte r re a ding, burn. ‘ F: % «.A .A® -/A tr.t i i? I' Xf *r -/O A I f o >/A ’ Ns ? 3; 03-1 <;3,VDt; ''9 �000562 Vf- &r | ------- ’Mf> Gfifi+Tv / ftAB/O Sj pl r>jv- ! : NRC. 9£lfy A &K/6A0tt* rcMAUACE- /te c/** ■ fe Jtao ajL . /?4 3+*~+4 S n/impJbrrrtjf Jjm'*b— :i i ! ' '> i Mr, Jtf G(/hf S c/atbfit 0fftc*K S tcfi** /j cfiwdcj at Jbr+s *nt~ j ' /nto de b*** • J/4r*y Bre e z e . - (S tC.h¥* r lou Mi)Ur~ * ($£&. MjbU/mln<Z++tS ‘ k ' <?> \ iAb +^c JL Ce c.m. r£L */*/(• baffax -is Eric Eoknto* C<c,D' S iEme t ttau/te Js . V Uttry'U. Raff // /J/r Farctj Qma A aJL ) ! i : ; 3103-1 (33/01} �000563 *■ r' P«£-V.*- u> ms ■ ■-■tmm m “r ’e : ' sa'a'ag.1:1 Me **+H 6. F}c.k~j //*r*/y ^*t /'j / i ^ <?. N putUr f/*d /4#z r*0M. BtrwrvA/ *-(c. cF. £| £Vf. Af. Sc#\ l*/***i»~0 U/*rH *** A* Sca.hVy>> 4 [ . £*// /t'or**b«\ri> ^ atf** «s s ts Ai o A/*vf S fcrroAS * /Zos s S *frm~ S tz rmv * /V&AD» / /#■*<<, ^i^r-F **% <SKi erf Cpx £c*M, + 'li*>-H Pre fix '£x/?*ctth**iS h+fz ,*^. Jhe U/j r ^*A//t /A/ £~£/f s - ^ //MS F FJhnort. Ps rks . H/fiAlS f TrfM/JfC rvrs 4 jtS is fctHt* * >\u Kp ;: •«1-Ss $*8 i In i'sj ■' (3) I r %04/^*>/ % s^Sk0' 3103-1 (33/01) �000564 i ! ! w i ii t ii. ; / 3. j I D*V*UOfM£MJ- S £Cr/Of\/. i 4 t O £VUr; \ -c I ~>f.u /,. a */. fttuu - fee Trov Ns a o 1 Mouucs r-C Ju ^ t/*rtt s A/< « /tfovtu. j V* £kf inte rs l • £jj+trZj. tt% Com*n***4m af S*of<%** JoMh '2^4 v/S Ci/ilS onJ •/ Modulators to 7 Cufifib /WjU/ <to Hui i__ (q ifaAcn<y/»*Y\~k» An*G t% DwPS OtJ - fjuc^/tus oTt amphfi+rj *•. & t Cfftoft Al/?C tmZ+rm*/<V-Q I I '* .. 1 I K (3) ! o f ‘ ■ ) >' o- '■%, • -_5?/v V % •or >$' Mr ‘ /x 3103-1 (3301) �i 000565 ' ! i i !! !l t j; ;! li : S e c r< on* I i ;; !; ! I i ! i i o f i T)r. \A/.dt Ncn^c Y*S O\^ /V« ) - / Dr. fJartM £ h). *_s u*MtA* GrK+t *>*-*.*! CSJ. Mitra* '~S citV*r- CD . y C++* 4 /*c+i*i/ - tvtmL X+f 7^<* l <$7 ! ! <4 --' . c '^CC% tfyjtnr* j J^n tuuU. j <°UrtTCest T*+k* t. ^ 'mpuirjv* <* #- 4, t t ! r r .. °^?%., 4- r'4Xci9 ■ • 'G«9 %'<?K ^/'S ^0 . j 1 **• Olfc+o - fis ojn >4 7C*+ruu^ - V.. (3) 3103-1 (33:01) I i \ S /u 4 K &££*&& ri-r *~.*0 C>(onL*r* ft*fe Utc. i. k/> C. C/l rk. . ! ; 4 X c>/0^v ^ •; � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIG00180 Title A name given to the resource Corby Case Volume 2 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived A-2017-641 (Access Informal request) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canadian Security Intelligence Service Subject The topic of the resource Corby Case Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/269c2fc58d0f3a7f40ea01d87dcdbfd7.pdf eca9e2f728bdf808b2897378d751b265 PDF Text Text A,f -4 ' TOP SECRET 000453 % ^ . w%.0; - 1 ~n- ~ 'A': •v % aSB COHBT CASS (Vol. ZIZ) CopyNo,? s * part* I - orant’a Mall Lis t Part*'!! . • Sana ffolkln D igasts Part>ZZX • O araon Sztraots ■j Part"17 - D urnford Sm ith Notea • >.$ .i T 'SsS%,,, '-illlSi 3103-1 ;33'01) % �*\ i •/ ''On/ ^6 k i TOP SECRET '£ -«.c '•..,.. 000454 /*<£•> ■J/-, X i- $ C0R5T C1SB (Tol. 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