2 20 34845 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5da753118e6950745d6a88490f772956.pdf 57184f59716d9e1aba1e918b7d494280 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act_ ' Document divulgue ~n vertu de la Loi sur l'acces ii /'information ... ....CHIEFS·OF STAFF COMMITTEE Extract k6j from the Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee .;:;;3;...,;o;..._L.;n~1..:::c.::3::¥f. held on ___ ~~L-·. ,., ~~··. -1•~.- ·'--•--•-.-·•-~-·•--~---==.:::.---:--F• ,w·:t I! .._,, r--- - -~ __ -_· II i · ---'---'' ______ !";"~ . • = __:__.:_________:____:...~------ I I 'j;,~b-.,.-· - •____ · ~-- .. -n --------, \ CONCEPTOF MILITARYOPERATIONS FOLLOWING THE INITIAL PHASEOF HOSTILITIF§ ( TOP SF.CRET) j " ·t s-o-The-Committee-had~for-consideration-a-dratt..-paper-prepare,d~____J by the Joint Planning Committee in accordance with the direction of the Chairman» Chiefs of Staff.o (Cs<;s5oll Tl>s.1dated 28 May 57) 7o General Foulkes introduced this paper and explained that it had been written by the JPC as a sequel to their previous paper entitled "Conditions Under Which Mobilization Might Take Place"o He considered that the Chiefs of Staff should reach agreement as to their views on what might take place in the subsequent phase of hostilities before mobilization plans could be adequately reviewedo . · · 80 The Chief of the Air Staff considered that the paper was generally well written although some parts could be improved by re=writingo Lieutenan~General Graham agreed that the paper was a good draft and in line with the present.Chiefs of Staff thinking on this mattero However~ it was dangerous to base all our plans \ ~n a concept of hostilities that inciuded widespread nuclear ---•:,,.----------4W· ll!lage--4-n-Gana-da-ei-nce-it-wa-a-very-poeei:bl-e...-tbat-oerta4.-n-mill~ } <-• operatiom might have to 'ee carried out under conditions where nuclear destruction was either non-existent or on a very small scale. 9., !. ••' 'Ir _ , r 000351 jJ, �' Documeni:-,fiscio~derthe Acces.. to Information Act - 10 The Chairman 9 Chiefs of Staff' pointe<io@ltM)t <th"erlbk,e,ctgen,>,sur racces a!'information eral concept in the paper conformed in large measure to that laid down in NATOdocuments and previously agreed to by the Chiefs of Staffo He considered that "the rolesof the Services" required further consideration and developmento He suggested that the Chiefs of Sta:ff give general concurrence with the paper as a first drafto 0 , .. llo The Chief of the Air Staff' stated that we must be prepared to some extent for the unforeseeable and that 9 despite our specialization to meet a nuclear war of global size 9 the Canadian forces should retain sufficient flexibility to be able to operate efficiently in a less widespread struggleo • l2o 'Viee Admiral DeWolf pointed out that the flexibility of the Canadian forces was weakened by the real support Canada was -giving to the NATOconcept of collective balanceo l3o The Chairman 8 Chiefs of Staff replied that our contribution to meeting our full NATOcommitment did not mitigate against meeting other lesser commitments such as local hostilities or police actions in support of the United Nationso I; 140 Mro Leger pointed out that any UN commitments Canada might undertake would be in conjunction with our UN allies and in all probability using only conventional weapons o The numbers of men involved might vary as might the location of any such police action 9 but he doubted very much whether under any circumstances there would be a requirement for a Canadian force of more than brigade strengtho l5o General Foulkes considered that the difficulties involved in reinforcing the Brigade in Europe and in providing the bal= ance of the Division by M plus shipping time 9 brought up a number of major problems o He noted that the balance of the Division was now regarded by SACEURas a strategic reserve 9 and considered that studies should be progressed as rapidly as pos= sible towards making more of the Army air portableo Such a con= c.ept would not only be of great assistance to SACEUR but would certainly be vital in the role of the Army in Canada in a sur= vival phaseo 160 The Chief of the General Staff pointed out that such studies were well advanced but that the reorganization of the Anrry could not take place overnighto At the present time he could organize an air portable battalion within a week but such a force would have no heavy equipment or armouro 170 Discussing the role of the forces 9 the Chief of the Naval Staff considered that parao 14 should be re~written as it gave a wrong impression of the intensity of Soviet submarine attackso He appreciated what was in the Planners' minds and agreed that the intensity of such attacks would build up during the first three weeks of hostilities it gave insufficient 9 but he considered emphasis to the vital importance of operations against submarines carrying guided missiles at the outbreak of hostilitieso /4 000352 �_,.. ., ,I Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en Jertu de la Loi sur /'acres ii /'information ,, .. =4= 180 Referring to parao 14 (c) and (d) 9 the Chairman suggested that studies should be undertaken with regard to the provision of logistic support in such locations as Icelandv Greenland and the Azoresv as well as to the pro= vision of seagoing mobile logistic supporte l9o Referring to parao 16 9 the Chairman 8 Chiefs of Staff questioned whether any provision should be made in mobiliza= tion plans for the employment of RCNand RCAFpersonnel in support of civil defenceo The Committee noted that in para o 22 the word "survival" should be inserted between "all" and "commitments• in line 4o 200 2lo General Foulkes suggested 9 in referring to parao 24 9 that the role of the M:>bile Striking Force and its air support still needed ~larificationo He referred to minutes of pre= vious meetings~cir the Chiefs of Staff and pointed out that this matter had been under consideration for a year and it was essen= tial that it now be finalizedo 220 In general discussion concerning the role of ground forces 9 the Under=Secretacy of State for Ex:ternal Affairs pointed out that any change in the allocation of the balance of the Division to NATOmight result in the unfortunate conclusion amongst European countries that Canada was reducing her NATOcommitmentso This would be difficult to answer since the reasons for any Canadian reappraisal of this matter would be different from those put forward from the United Kingdom in support of their reduction of forceso 230 The Chairman 9 Chiefs of Staff' pointed out that there was no question of reducing Canadian ground forces 9 it was simply a matter of devising a realistic plan for making fomations of the Canadian Army available to SACEURat a time when they would be most urgently needado 240 Referring to the "Air Section" 9 the Chairman referred to the statement concerning the RCAFtactical component of the Mobile Striking Force in parao 27(b)o He considered that the requirement for logistic support to continue beyond the present 30=day period as concluded in parao 28 9 should be reviewedo Mro Zimmerman suggested that there might be some mention in the paper as to the wartime employment of scientists and technicians of the Defence Research Boardo 250 260 The Chairman 9 Chiefs of Staff stated that any proposals put forward by the Chairman~ Defence Research Board 9 on this matter 9 should be considered by the Planners and incorporated in the papero 270 The general concept was agreed and it was understood that the Chiefs of Staff would review the service portion, of' the paper withtheir Directors of Plans and that following this review 9 the JPC would then review the paper and make any alterations considered necessary for further consideration by the Comridtteeo 280 General Foulkes stated that it was necessary that this be dona at the earliest possible opportunity in order tha - ·------- should �II .;..· -- ·-~ --~ Document disclosed under the Access-to Information Act - - ' CONCEPI' OF MILITARY OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THJi:unYUa:JiAten vertu de la Loisur /'acces ii /'information PHASEOF HOSTILITIES (TOP SECRET) 5o General Foulkes recalled that at the Committee the Chiefs of Staff had regarding the concept but had decided the Service_s• -with their Directors of the 609th meeting of reached general agreement to review the "roles of Planso 6. As a result of this review, Vice Admiral DeWolf tabled a paper (NSTS 11650-35) suggesting certain amendments to the draft paper. 7. Commenting on the draft paper, Lieutenant-General Graham also suggested certain minor changes in the role of ground forces and Air Marshal Slemon had some comments to make concerning the role of air forces. 8. Referring to paraso 24 and 27(b), the Committee again dis= cussed the role of the 1'bbile Striking Force and its tactical air support. 9. The Chairman pointed out that ground defence planning in the Canada-United States region was the responsibility of Canada and the United States in their own countrieso He suggested that the Chiefs of Staff should again consider whether there were in fact any targets in northern Canada which might be attractive to the enemy, and whether counter action against enemy landings on such targets, if they existed, could not be more satisfactorily carried out with airportable troops rather than para.troops. 10. Referring to parao 24, the Chairman suggested that the Chief of th-e General Staff review the responsibility for_internment and prisoners of war with the RCMP. ' 11. After further paper as follows: discussion, the Committee agreed to amend the a) para. 10 - first "undoubtedly". sentence: substitute "probably" for b) Parao 10 - last sentence: for "it will not be possible to carcy out additional militacy activities", reads "it will not be possible to undertake any military activities in addition to those already being carried out in the first phase"• c) Parao 12: delete and substitute: "To destroy submarines in transit to their operational areas. The transit routes passing as they do through the Denmark Strait and Norwegian Sea, will allow us to obtain defence in depth by means of an A/S barrier in these areas. Ho~ever 9 since some submarines will undoubtedly have penetrated this barrier either before the war starts or during the initial phase, and since submarines can enter the North Atlantic from the South Atlantic /3 EXTRACT FROM610th meeting of Chiefs of Staff Cttee 6 Jun 57 1 000324 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information .:· without passing this barrier~ the role of maritime forces must also be to control waters adjacent to North America by destroying submarines within firing range of North American targets. Canada-u.s. maritime forces in close cooperation will be required to deny this area to the enemy". d) Para l48 delete first sentence and substitute3 ttin the transit area operations may be expected to start from the outset against submarines already at sea when the. initial blow is struck. The intensity 0£ operations will increase rapidly as the remaining submarines are sailed from USSR ports to their operational areas. In waters adjacent to North America, the USSRwill also be capable of deploying a number of guided missile submarines without giving away surprise prior to D-day. These even though small in numbers could · provide a significant contribution to the initial nuclear attack on this continent. The number or submarines reaching this area will rise sharply three to six weeks after the initial attack when the full intensity of the war at sea is expected to be felt. This period of intense operations is expected to last approximately seven to eight weeks, subsequently decreasing in intensity". e) .Para. 163 delete the second sentence and inserts "It is unlikely that the bulk of the reserves could be employed in the RONand RCAFroles envisaged by this concept of operations until the task of survival has been achievedn. 3", f) Para. 19: line 4 - for npara. g) Para. 23: second sentence: for "it will be essential to move troops", reads "it may be essential to move troops"• h) Para. 25(d): for "its ability to conduct conventional operations", reads "its ability to conduct military operations". reads"para.14•. 12. The Committee also agreed that the amendments would be in= serted by the Secretary, and the paper circulated for further 000325 discussion. �T\ -7 -~losed Docume~ue l... -· under the Access to Information Act en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information IN REPLY No. 11\tpartmtntof Jflational11\tftnct CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE CHIEFS Rltl'LY TO. SECRIETARY OP' 9TAP'P' CONNITTIEIE, OTTAWA. 10 June 1957 Chairman, Chiefs of Staff CAS cos CNS CDRB Concept of Military Operations Following the Initial Phase of Hostilities 1. Attached for your consideration is a revised draft of the above mentioned paper, amended in accordance with decisions of the 609th and 610th meetings of the Chiefs of Starr Committee. r.w :r:L~c.~ (F.w.T. Lucas) Captain, RON Secretary FWTL/6-6756/mck c.c. Deputy Minister Secretacy to the Cabinet Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Coordinator Joint Start QUOTE CSG•5ell. ..'.J:'P;l.... CANADA ADDllltH PLEASE TOPSECRET �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information •--~---- - TOPSEI:RET csc:5.11 27 May 57 REPORT A To The CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE By The JOINT PLANNING COMMIT:I'E& I 1. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in a par/er entitled Under Which Mobilization the preparation Might Take Place,, of service mobilization tary commitments during the initial forces guidance for /1ans to meet present mili- / phase of a major war. to plan for the subsequent operationslaf j necessary for the Chiefs of Staff 7 provided "Conditions In order a major war it is now decide on the part the Canadian should play during this peh.od and consequently .I the form the forces should take to meet this/requirement. . 2. It h~een conditions a general life !' agreed in the Chiefs of Staff \ whibh might exist in Canada during the initial war ~)\e s~ized and war effort\fojat and for a much longe The causes of this the Chiefs of Staff lization 3, pl.annin/ The Chail, I • period as a serious least ~is~ption I to be related follow of national of attack or contlllllinated, conclusions drawn up by Commi\tee to provide part of the basis for mobi- are attac\ed at Appendix •A•, Chiefs of\Staff . f~llowing the initial is to be clrried destroyed and additional \ . disruption the phase of the period of the threat in areas Planning Colllll\'ttee to prepare~ operations Committee that I has therefore directed the Joint study on the concept of military phase of a major war. This study out within pre~ent National Defence policy and is to our agreed equip\~nt /111 not interfere policy so that the plans which with our \\tablished priorities for the initial!. phase. I 4o The aim of this study is to recommend to the Chiefs of Staff Committee what the C~adian concept of military operations shoulp be /2 "--- - �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - TOPSECRET during the period following the initial with the role to be played by each of the the mid-l96Os, together services ization phase of a major war up to during this period and the general pattern of the forces required of any reorgan- to carry out this role. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 5. It is considered major war in pursuit a major portion that the enemy's primary objectives of his war aims would be to neutralize of NATO'smain retaliatory clude large scale attacks against the initiative that we will get little North Americao The enemy can attack more than tactical It is very difficult and as the Soviets warning, probably a from the DEWline. to judge when the initial phase would end and the subsequent phase begin, however, it is considered initial or at the beginning of the war it is concluded warning of 2-3 hours received 6. all, powero This would in- hope to achieve his aim only by a surprise will-have in a phase would end when the enemy is incapable large scale nuclear attacks. The initial that the of delivering phase could last for days or weeks, and there will not be any abrupt change from the initial phase to the subsequent phase. 7. In the subsequent phase of operations capacity phase. to fight we will be limited to the weapons remaining at the end of the initial Furthermore we cannot assume that any productive will be available in our for some considerable capacity time. ASSUMPTIONS 8. It is assumed that: a) the initial phase has not brought an end to hostilities and the will to 'Iring the war to a successful We will still conclusion still meet resistance exists in NATOo in varying de- grees from the forces of the USSR. /3 000328 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu d'(ila Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - TOP SECRET b) At the close of the intense nuclear exchange the NATOpowers will have superiority ability to deliver in the nuclear attacks. CONCEPT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS FULLOWING THEINITIALPHASE 9. Despite the heavy attrition of forces and the intense nuclear weapons during the initial pha~e the Soviets will still nuclear weapons and will only be limited numbers and types of delivery and will also have a substantial have in the use of them by the systems still will have a small number of long-range but reduced operations. use of available. aircraft The Soviets for sporadic raids number of submarines for sustained There will therefore be a continuing quirement for air defence and anti-submarine re- forces for the defence of Canada and the United States. 10. Because of the intense initial phase, directed Soviet use of nuclear weapons during the against targets in North America, the pri- mary problem in Canada will probably be one of survival. it is considered available that the maximummilitary will be required to assist and rehabilitation of the country. the first task and, until pri6rity activities out in the first llo ably be similar survival of survival will be has been accomplished to those already being carried following the initial to that existing phase in Europe will prob- in North America. to an intense However, Europe nuclear attack but have been overrun to some extent by Soviet ground The greatest and rehabilitation ations The battle in addition will not only have been subjected forces. in measures for the survival phase. The situation it will likely forces that can be made commenced·, it will' no·t be possible" to undertake and rehabilitation. any military Consequently effort will have to be devoted to the survival of the NATOcountries, will have to be limited remaining Soviet forces. and therefore military oper- to the containment and liquidation The NATOpowers by the threat or use of or /4 000329 �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information TOP S:&:hET -4- e their superior nuclear power will endeavour to prevent Soviet ad= vances and to force the capitulation quently it may be necessary to establish zed. control of the enemy forces to take over certain and to·ensure Subse .. o areas of the USSR that resistance is not reorgani- It is not envisaged that large forces would be required these operations or that it would be necessary to occupy large areas of the USSRto carry out this objective. called upon to assist against in the rehabilitation for Canada might be of Europe and operations remaining Soviet forces. ·MARITIME OPERATIONS IN THE SUBSEQUENT PHASE OF A GENERALWARCOMMENCING UP TO THEMID-1960'°s Role of the Maritime Force 12. To destroy submarines in transit The transit routes; to their operational areas. passing as they do through the• Denmark Strait and Norwegian Sea, will allow us to obtain a degree of defence in depth by means of an A/S barrier in these areas. marines will undoubtedly have penetrated war starts or during the initial tbe North Atlantic However, since some subthis barrier either before the phase, and since submarines can enter from the South Atlantic without passing thi's barrier$ the role of maritime forces must also be to control waters adjacent North America by destroying American targets. will be required submarines within firing Canada-U.S. maritime forces to range of North in close cooperation to deny this area to the enemy. Concept 130 A large proportion of Soviet naval bases and mobile support facili- ties will be rendered inoperative following marines can be expected to be destroyed A/S operations. will be limited allied in port, The remaining submarine force, to the capability attacks. in transit and in although substantial, of the USSRto provide support. However, because there will be nuclear weapons available, force will continue initial Some sub- phase operations the submarine in the subsequent phase, /5 000330 �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - TOP SECRET but at a reduced and gradually diminishing in the subsequent phase, allied intensity. Consequently, maritime forces will have to con- tinue to combat the Soviet submarine threat. Operations 14. In the transit the outset is struck. against area operations be expected to start from submarines already at sea when the initial The intensity of operations remaining submarines are sailed areas. may In the waters adjacent will increase blow rapidly from USSRports to their as the operational to North America the USSRwill also be capable of deploying a number of guided mi-ssile submarines without giving away surprise prior to D-day. bers could provide a significant attack on this area will rise when the full continent. to the initial contribution intensity operations is expected to last decreasing maritime forces providing the initial this attack of the war at sea is expected to be felt. seven to eight weeks, subsequently meet these threats, nuclear The number of submarines reaching sharply three to six weeks after This period of intense a) These even though small in num- forces=in-being, approximately in intensity. To should be capable of: combat ready, deployed so as to be able to deal with the submarine threat from the onset. b) Maintaining of three intense operatiom months to defeat operations for a minimum period initial phase submarine and to be able to meet operational com- mitments in the subsequent phase. c) Dispersed logistics and maritime airfields with a minimum POLstock of 90 days. d) Provision of seagoing mobile logistics chances of survival to increase greatest by dispersal and, more important, the period that the fleet operational to increase can maintain its intensity. /6 000331 �I Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information e TOP SECRET Providing a seagoing mobile repair e) organi- zation to operate from a safe haven or minor port. f) Controlling operations through the establish- ment of maritime headquarters communications, located interrupted operation and adequate so as to ensure unduring both phases· of the war. Pattern 15. of Forces No change in the pattern considered likely tinuation of forces for the subsequent phase is as the subsequent phase is expected to be a con= of the initial expected to be available case of logistics, phase. after repairs Normal base facilities the initial exchange, so, as in the will have to be made at dispersed making use of seagoing mobile repair ational are not units sites, to maintain maximumoper- intensity. Reserves 16. A small number of naval and air reserves and earmarked for a particular specifically duty and located in areas where they would be employed in war, should be able to report the initial phaseo It is unlikely Shipping in-the 17. until the task of survival would require envisaged by this has been achieved. The direct as a secondary target protection Canadian·maritime of shipping, if it is necessary, adding emphasis to the need for mobile support to ensure our forces retain and mobility priority forces to operate at great distances from North American sources of support, bility concept Subsequent Phase Shipping at sea will be attacked in both phases. at the onset of that the bulk of the reserves could be employed in the RONand ROAFroles of operations trained such operations the endurance, flexi- demando /7 000332 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information I TOPSECRET -7CONCLUSIONS 18. The concept of maritime operations and the role of the RCN and RCAFin the subsequent phase will be a continuation phase operations at a reduced intensity perienced on both sides in the initial 19. due to serious phase. Therefore, ex- for employ- for the subsequent of requirements 14 above will apply to both the initial prosecution suitable phase will also be suitable the provision losses phase. The types of RONand RCAFmaritime forces ment in the initial of initial listed in paragraph and subsequent phases in the of a general war at sea. Role of the Ground Forces 20. The role of the ground forces in the subsequent phase will be to: a) continue to conduct operations b) assist c) continue to conduct acy required civil authorities under SACEURin Europe; in survival operations; direct· defence of Canada operations •. 21. Because of the many imponderables in the initial difficult to determine when fi:ny portion phase, it is of the balance of the division c,:,uld be sent to SACEUR. Apart from some additional support to the force now in Europe to bring it up to WEand provide first the balance of the division 22. Initially assistance progresses, from the Militia. it will gradually ments in Canada with the exception SACEUR'sstrategic until conditions release. reserve by SACEUR. most of the Army commitments will be met by the Regular Force with limited the Militia has been placed in strategic reinforcements, As mobilization take over all of defence against reserve may not be available survival of commit- enemy lodgments. for despatch to Europe in Canada are such that the Government will agree to its Its ,role will vary between employment in rounding up enemy detachments to assistance in the rehabilitation of Western European economy. /8 000333 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information TOPSECRET -8- 23. Anrry assistance evacuated centres to civil authorities and maintenance of vital portation facilities, facilities, etc. food distribution sections tation will be disrupted, facilities troops from one section services services, Since the assistance ably in different assistance will include policing required such as transcommunication will vary consider- .•· of the country and since normal transporit may be essential to move of the country to another by air. This may extend well into the subsequent phase as the Arrrr:ywill be required to assist population in controlling the return to more normal conditions. of the economy and However, as indicated this role can be taken over progressively by the Militia above, as it is mobilized. 24. It is difficult to predict subsequent phases the requirement may disappear. at what period in the initial for defence against Canada operations The requirement such as protection for other direct of vital points, RCNin Coast and Seaward Defence, and internment will continue in the subsequent phase. authorities enemy lodgments The Army must be prepared to continue to meet this conmitment if required. pone certain or defence of assistance to and POWoperations It may be necessary to post- of these tasks in order to meet the demands of civil for assistance in survival operations. CONCLUSIONS 25. It is concluded that: a) Ground forces for employment both within Canada and as SACEUR'sstrategic portable b) should be air- .. The force in Europe in peacetime must be maintained up to establishment have with it its c) reserve The militia initial strength reinforcements. should be reorganized :-a st~ong healthy force related war. Mobilization and should to proVide to its role in plans must include the mobili- zati9n o:f the militia although such mobilization may be delayed in whole or in part. /9 000334 �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information .._ e -9d) The Army must maintain its ability military operations to conduct both at home and abroad and at the same time prepare to assist authorities in survival civil operations. AIR The. Role of tbe RC.AF 26. The role of the RCAF,in the light of the stated concept of military operations in the subsequent phase, will be: ~) · To continue to maintain the air defence system on full alert until the threat of enemy air operations against North America no longer exists. b) To continue to maintain the RCAFcomponent of our maritime force at maximumoperational capabilit7 until the enemy maritime threat no longer ~ists. c) To continu~ air operations control of 4 ATAF. operational d) in Europe under the To maintain in imm1:3diatereadiness, . air transport the military airlift capability the maximum to meet the demands of services and the civil power for from Canada to Europe, and within Canada, in $Upport or mj.litary operations and national survival. e) With the resources and personnel not directly gaged in, or in logistic to assist in tasks related en- support of the above tasks, to national survival for as long as required. /10 000335 �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Dqcument divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information •.. .. e -lO- TOP S~RET General Pattern ot Re-Organization or the RCAF 27. As the role of the OOAFin the subsequent phase will not d!ffer appreciably organization.of from that of the initial forces is required. peacetime pattern phase, no major re- The following changes in the of the RCAFwould take place in the initial phase, and would continue into the subsequent phase: a) The role of thE! RCAFtraining change at the.General organization would Alert from that of training to that of providing trained personnel to augment the RCAFoperational and to assisting priority. commandsas first in national survival as second Training might be resumed in the sub- sequent phase dependent on conditions and the requirement for. additional b) priority, At some stage in the initial the RCAFtactical in Canada trained personnel. or subsequent phase, component which supports the MSF will either have compl-eted its task or the requirement for MSFoperations will have disappeared. this time, the role of the RCAFtactical will change to reinforcement commandsand assistance At component of RCAFoperational to the national survival effort. CONCLUSIONS 28. It is concluded that; a) as ROAFair defence, maritime and transport are expected to continue indefinitely phase, every effort sure that logistic operations in the subsequent should be mape in peacetime to ensupport (especially could continue beyond the presently POLand armament) planned 30-day period despite the breakdown in transportation supply which might be expected from en~ and sources of action. /11 000336 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information j e TOPSECREI' -11- 28. b) To ensure the maximumutilization or the ROAF forces and resources assigned to national survival, the concept of operations, task assignments of the national organization should be clearly and the survival defined as soon as possible. TOPSIDRET 000337 �, Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information .. ---~. - DRAFT TOP SEI:RET CSC:5.11 27 May 57 A REPORT To The CHIEFSOF STAFFCOMMITTEE By The JOINT.PLANNING COMMITTEE 1. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in a paper entitled Under Which Mobilization the preparation Might Take Place", of service mobilization tary commitments during the initial provided guidance for plans to meet present mili- phase of a major war. to plan for the subsequent operations necessary- for the Chiefs of Staff to decide on the part the Canadian should play during this period and consequently forces should take to meet this the form the requirement. It has been agreed in the Chiefs of Staff Committee that the conditions which might exist in Canada during the initial a general war may be summarized as a serious life In order of a major war it is now forces 2. •conditions and war effort for at least disruption phase of of national the period of the threat of attack and for a much longer period in areas destroyed or contaminated. The causes of this disruption and additional conclusions drawn up by the Chiefs of Staff Committee to provide part of the basis for mobilization J. planning are attached at Appendix •A•. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff has therefore directed the Joint Planning Committee to prepare a study on the concept of military operations following the initial is to be carried to be related out within present 4• This study National Defence policy and is to our agreed equipment policy follow will not interfere initial phase of a major war. so that the plans which with our established priorities for the phase. The aim of this study is to recommend to the Chiefs of Staff Committee what the Canadian concept of military operations should be /2 000338 ' �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - TOPSECRET during the period following the initial with the role to be played by each of the the mid-1960s, together services ization phase of a major war up to during this period and the general pattern of the forces required of any reorgan- to carry out this role. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 5o It is considered that the enemy's primary objectives major war in pursuit a major portion of his war aims would be to neutralize of NATO'smain retaliatory clude large scale attacks against powere will have the initiative that we will get little all, This would in- attack and as the Soviets at the beginning of the war it is concluded more than tactical warning of 2-3 hours received It is very difficult warning, probably a from the DEWline. to judge when the initial phase would end and the subsequent phase begin, however, it is considered initial phase would end when the enemy is incapable large scale nuclear attacks. or weeks, and.there or North Americao The enemy can hope to achieve his aim only by a surprise 6. in a The initial that the of delivering phase could last for days will not be any abrupt change from the initial phase to the subsequent phase. 7. In the subsequent phase of operations capacity phase. to fight we will be limited to the weapons remaining at the end of the initial Furthermore we cannot assume that any productive will be available in our for some considerable capacity time. ASSUMPTIONS 8. It is assumed that: ' a) the initial. phase has not brought an end to hostilities and the will to bring the war to a successful We will still conclusion still meet resistance exists in NATOo in varying de- grees from the forces of the USSR. /3 000339 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de,,.laLoi sur /'acces ii /'information 0 TOP SF.CRET e b) At the close of the intense nuclear exchange the NATOpowers will have superiority ability to deliver in the nuclear attacks. CONCEPT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THEINITIALPHASE 9. Despite the heavy attrition of forces nuclear weapons during the initial and will also have a substantial have in the use of them by the systems still will have a small number of long-range but reduced operations. use of phase the Soviets will still nuclear weapons and will only be limited numbers and types of delivery and the intense available. aircraft The Soviets for sporadic raids number of submarines for sustained There will therefore be a continuing quirement for air defence and anti-submarine re- forces for the defence of Canada and the United States. 10. Because of the intense initial phase, directed Soviet use of nuclear weapons during the against targets in North America, the pri- mary problem in Canada will probably be one of survival. it is considered available that the maximummilitary will be required to assist and rehabilitation of the country. the first task and, until priority and rehabilitation. arry military out in the first 11. ably be similar to that existing to undertake to those already being carried phase in Europe will prob- in North America. to an intense However, Europe nuclear attack but have been overrun to some extent by Soviet ground The greatest and rehabilitation ations will be has been accomplished not be possible following the initial will not only have been subjected forces. survival of survival phase. The situation it will likely The battle in addition that can be made in measures for the survival commenced, it will activities forces Consequently effort will have to be devoted to the survival of the NATOcountries, will have to be limited remaining Soviet forces. and therefore military to the containment and liquidation The NATOpowers by the threat operof or use of /4 000340 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information . their superior nuclear power will endeavour to prevent Soviet ad= vances and to force the capitulation quently it may be necessary to establish control of the enemy forceso to take over certain Subse- areas of the USSR and to ensure that resistance is not reorgani- zedo It is not envisaged that large forces would be required these operations or that it would be necessary to occupy large areas of the USSRto carry out this objective. called upon to assist against in the rehabilitation for Canada might be of Europe and operations remaining Soviet forces. MARITIME OPERATIONS IN THESUBSEQUENT PHASE OF A GENERALWARCOMMENCING UP TO THE MID-1960 1·s Role of the Maritime Force 120 To destroy submarines in transit The transit routes; to their operational areas. passing as they do through the Denmark Strait and Norwegian Sea, will allow us to obtain a degree of defence in depth by means or an A/S barrier in these areas. marines will undoubtedly have penetrated war starts or during the initial the North Atlantic However, since some subthis barrier without passing this barrier~ the role of maritime forces must also be to control American targets. will be required submarines within firing Canada-u.s. before the phase, and since submarines can enter from the South Atlantic North America by destroying either maritime forces waters adjacent to range of North in close cooperation to deny this area to the enem;y. Concept l.3o A large proportion of' Soviet naval bases and mobile support ··racili- ties will be rendered inoperative following marines can be expected to be destroyed A/S operations. will be limited allied in port, The remaining submarine force, to the capability attacks. in transit and in although substantial, of the USSRto provide support. However, because there will be nuclear weapons available, force will continue initial Some sub- phase operations the submarine in the subsequent phase 9 /5 000341 I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act-\ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information \ TOP SECRET but at a reduced and gradually diminishing in the subsequent phase, allied intensity. Consequently 9 maritime forces will have to con- tinue to combat the Soviet submarine threat. Operations 14. In the transit the outset is struck. against area operations be expected to start The intensity In the-waters of operations adjacent will increase giving away surprise prior area will rise when the full continent. to D-day. This period of intense contribution a) to the initial nuclear the initial attack of the war at sea is expected to be felt. operations is expected to last decreasing maritime forces providing submarines without The number of submarines reaching this seven to eight weeks, subsequently meet these threats, operational These even though small in num- sharply three to six weeks after intensity as the to North llmerica the USSRwill also bers could provide a significant on this blow rapidly from USSRports to their be capable of deploying a number of guided mi~sile attack from submarines already at sea when the initial remaining submarines are sailed areas. may forces~in-being, approximately in intensity. To should be capable of: combat ready, deployed so as to be able to deal with the submarine threat from the onset. b) Maintaining of three intense operatiora months to defeat operations for a minimum period initial phase submarine and to be able to meet operational com- mitments in the subsequent phase. c) Dispersed logistics and maritime airfields with a minimum POLstock of 90 days. d) Provision of seagoing mobile logistics chances of survival to increase greatest by dispersal and, more important, the period that the fleet operational to increase can maintain its intensity. /6 000342 �I Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information TOPSECRET e) 14.. Providing a seagoing mobile repair organi- zation to operate from a safe haven or minor port. f) Controlling operations through the establish- ment of maritime headquarters communications, located interrupted operation and adequate so as to ensure unduring both phases· of the war. Pattern 15. of Forces No change in the pattern considered likely tinuation of forces for the subsequent phase is as the subsequent phase is expected to be a con~ of the initial expected to be available case of logistics, phase. after repairs Normal base facilities the initial exchange, so, as in the will have to be made at dispersed making use of seagoing mobile repair ational are not units sites, to maintain maximumoper- intensity. Reserves 16. A small number of naval and air reserves and earmarked for a particular specifically duty and located in areas where they would be employed in war, should be able to report the initial phase. It is unlikely until at the onset of that the bulk of the reserves could be employed in the RCNand RCAFroles of operations trained the task of survival envisaged by this concept has been achieved. Shipping in the Subsequent Phase 17. Shipping at sea will be attacked in both phases. would require The direct as a secondary target protection of shipping, if it is necessary, Canadian maritime forces to operate at great distances from North American sources of support, adding emphasis to the need for mobile support to ensure our forces retain bility priority and mobility such operations the endurance, flexi= demand. /7 000343 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information -7- TOP SECRET CONCLUSIONS 18. The concept or maritime operations and the role of the RCN and ReAFin the subsequent phase will be a continuation phase operations at a reduced intensity perienced on both sides in the initial 19. of initial due to serious losses ex- phase. The types of RCNand RCAFmaritime forces suitable ment in the initial phase. Therefore, phase will also be suitable the provision for the subsequent of requirements listed 14 above will apply to both the initial prosecution for employ- in paragraph and subsequent phases in the of a general war at sea. Role of the Ground Forces 20. The role of the ground forces in the subsequent phase will be to: a) continue to conduct operations b) assist c) continue to conduct any required direct civil authorities under SACEUR in Europe; in survival operations; defence of Canada operations •. 21. Because of the many imponderables in the initial difficult phase , it is to determine when any portion of the balance of the division could be sent to SACEUR. Apart from some additional support to the force now in Europe to bring it up to WEand provide first the balance of the division 22. Initially assistance progresses, from the Militia. As mobilization it will gradually talce over all survival ments in Canada with the exception of defence against 1 s strategic SACEUR until conditions release. reserve by SACEUR. most of the Army commitments will be met by the Regular force with limited the Militia has been placed in strategic reinforcements, reserve may not be available en~ of commit- lodgments. for despatch to Europe in Canada are such that the Government will agree to its Its ,role will vary between employment in rounding up enemy detachments to assistance in the rehabilitation of Western European econOiey'o /8 000344 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information TOPSOORET -8- 23. Army assistance evacuated centres to civil authorities will include policing and maintenance of vital portation facilities, facilities, etc. food distribution services, sections tation will be disrupted, facilities such as transcommunication required will vary consider- Since the assistance ably in different services of the country and since normal transporit may be essential to move troops from one section of the country to another by air. assistance This may extend well into the subsequent phase as the Army will be required to assist population in controlling the return of the economy and to more normal conditions. However, as indicated this role can be taken over progressively by the Militia above, as it is mobilized. 24. It is difficult to predict at what period in the initial subsequent phases the requirement for defence against may disappear. The Army Canada operations enemy lodgments must be prepared to continue to meet this The requirement for other direct commitment if required. or ·such as protection of vital points, defence of assistance to RCNin Coast and Seaward Defence; and internment and POWoperations will continue in the subsequent phase. pone certain authorities It may be necessary to post- of these tasks in order to meet the demands for assistance in survival of civil operations. CONCLUSIONS 25. It is concluded that: a) Ground forces for employment both within Canada and as SACEUR's strategic portable b) reserve should be air .. • The force in Europe in peacetime must be maintained up to establishment have with it its initial The militia c) --ll strength reinforcements. should be reorganized st~~ng healthy force related war. Mobilization and should to provide to its role in plans must include the mobili- zatiq,n of the militia although such mobilization may be delayed in whole or in parto /9 000345 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • -9d) TOP SECRET The Army must maintain its ability mill tary operations to conduct both at home and abroad and at the same time prepare to assist authorities in survival civil operations. A IR The Ro¼eof j;Jle RCAF 26. The role or the ROAF,in the light of the stated military operations a) concept of in the subsequent phase, will be: To continue to maintain the air defence system on full alert until the threat of enemy air operatio~s against North America no longer exists. b) TQ contin~e to maiptain the RCAFcomponent of our maritime force at I!l8Xinrumoperational capab111t1 until the enemymaritime threat no ·· longer .exists. c) 1o continue air operations operational d) in Europe under the control of 4 ATAF. · To maintain µi immediate readiness, . air transport the military airlift capability services the maximum to meet the demands of and the civil power for from Canada to Europe, and within Canada, · in support of military operations and national survival. e) With the resources and personnel not directly gaged in, or ip logistic to assist in tasks related support or the to national en- above tasks, survival for as long as required. /10 000346 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ( • -10- TOP smRET General Pattern ot Re-Organization or the RCAF 27. As the role of the RCAFin the subsequent phase will not differ appreciably organization from that of the initial of forces is required. peacetime pattern phase, no major re- The following changes in the of the ROAFwould take place in the initial phase, and would continue into the subsequent phase: a) The role of the ROAFtraining organization would change at the General Alert from that of training to that of providing trained the ROAFoperational and to assisting priority. personnel to augment coJJllQands as first in national survival as second Training might be resumed in the sub- sequent phase dependent on conditions and the requirement for additional b) priority, At some stage in the initial the ROAFtactical in Canada trained personnel. or subsequent phase, component which supports the MSF will either have compl-eted its task or the requireJnent for MSFoperations will have disappeared. this time, the role of the ROAFtactical will change to reinforcement commandsand assistance At component of ROAFoperational to the national survival effort. CONCLUSIONS 28. It is concluded that: a) as RCAFair defence, maritime and transport are expected to continue indefinitely phase, every effort sure that logistic operations in the subsequent should be made in peacetime to ensupport (especially could continue beyond the presently FOLand armament) planned .30-dq period despite the breakdown in transportation and sources of supply which might be expected from enemy action. /11 000347 �( "' Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii l'informatio ... } TOP SECREr -11- 28. b) To ensure the maximumutilization of the ROAF forces and resources assigned to national survival, the concept of operations, task assignments of the national organization should be clearly and the survival defined as soon as possible. TOPSIDRET 000348 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information rrro• TI) J "Ti(Rt'T il 1f L Ailt TOP SECRET NSTS 11650-35 Vol.2 (STAFF} COPY NO: /t:> CONCEPTOF MILITARY OPERATIONS FOLLOv~ lNG THE INITIAL PHASEOF HOSTlLITIES Noted below are proposed- amendments to the draft CSC 5-11 dated 27 May_,1957 shown by paragraph nwnb~r:2. JPS paper, - (a)- - Para 10 (b) (i) First sentence - substitute for 'undoubtedly'. 'probably' (ii) Last sentence - substitute after "possible" - to undertake uny military activities in addition to those already being carried out in the initial phase. - Para 12 (a) Delete and substitute:To destroy submarines in transit to their operational areas. The transit routes, passing au they do through the Denmark Strait and Norwegian Sea, will allow o obtain defence in depth by means of an A/S barrier these areas. v. However, since some submarines will undoubtedly have penetrated this barrier either before the war starts or during the initial phase, and since submarines can enter the North Atlantic from the South Atlantic without passing this barrier, the role of maritime forces must also be:(c) Para 14 Delete first sentence and substitute:- In the transit area operations may b~ expected to start from the outset against sub1narines already at sea when the initial blow is struck. The intensity of operations will increase rapidly as the remaining submarines pre sailed from USSR ports to their operational.areas • I . ~--- In the waters adjacent to North .Amertca the USSR will also be capable of deploying a nwnber of guided missile submarines without giving away surprise prior to D-Day~ These even though small in nwnbers could provide a significant contribution to the initial nuclear attack on this continent. The nwnber of submarines reaching this area will rise sharply three to six weeks after the initial attack when the full intensity of the war at sea is expected to be felt. This period of intense operations is expected to last approximately seven to eight weeks, subsequently decreasipg in intensity. 000349 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 2 - 2. (Cont'd) It is unlikely that the bulk of the reserves could be employed in the RCNand RC.AFroles - -- .. envisaged by this concept of operations until the task of survival has been achieved. (~) Para 18 Delete and substitute:It is concluded that in maritime operations the initial phase may well be of longer duratio_n than thE;t of air or land operations and that there will be no clear cut dividing line between the phaseso The concept of maritime operations und the role of the RCN and the RC.AF maritime forces in the subsequent phase will therefore be similar to those of the. initial phase, decreasing in intensity as losses are experienced by both sides. l C(• 0 TT AW A, 5 June, 1957. TOP SE:;RET 000350 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Concept of Operations / MAY-JUNE 1957 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1957-05 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00110 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Draft report to the Chiefs of Staff Committee by the Joint Planning Committee, 27 May 1957, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/07c5efdfb13ff67ff1598151425fbb50.pdf c2764c7c6503b2326dbe8ceacd193588 PDF Text Text r----------,----------------- - oocument disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - ~~---~-- MEMORANDUM ANSWER J/t .. ----· To:J.,_ To: /, ~/4,,d,~~ :Ot!/3~,.-,,,w.,#u-' JUN 17 19'5l ~ i. ~~A ✓"'7e~~ ~~~h ~;II ~~~~~A- ~~/~A~ ,fa_ AA~Jh/AI~,# CAFA 20-r - '?'"V-~~ 33M Pods 100-10-55 HQ 4554-A-207 ~ /' ~~Af'd~ '~. v/ _JJ.../ l'-o/fa4l",..,/'d~ (M-8536-353) 000317 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • SECRET •,' • IN REPLY DEFENCE ____ , DEPARTMENT RESEARCH '..... . \(;" '--'I' )' ,.) "' OF NATIONAL 8 5AAM»57 DEFENCE ~. CANADA - ;:~ FILC - ..... BOARD /} r9ttawa., PLEASE QUOTE DRBS l7U-OO/D36 {S/Coo rd ) Ontario, jt!-:,r"(!l-3June, 1957 ? .7..::1 { "7 6-// .,:),, Brigadier R. P. Rothschild., Joint Staff Coordinator.,. Room 4007., 11A11 Building. / Herewith twenty copies of the Dei'ence Research Board contribution of paper on the concept of the roles of the Armed Forces in the subsequent phase of a nuclear war. . As per our telephone caiversation., would you have this cleared for inclusion · in the paper approved by Chief's at the Meeting. S/Coord. ,c..·/ ,>000318 lO0M-8-55(56-519) I,., �r Document disclosed under the Access to InformationAct Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acces ii /'information •. •· :-1C' ,.,, / t - ;,_,·~·;_, I SECRET d ;) General Under the present concepts of conditions which may exist in Canada in the event of a thermo-nuclear attack, it seems probable that a number of the research activities of the Defence Research Board will cease or at best be seriously disrupted. Under the above conditions the scientific and technical resources of manpower might easily be dispersed and hence become lost to the defence effort. In order to prevent such an occurrence suitable which might be undertaken must be determined and detailed carried out in cooperation wit'.1 the Armed Services• Scientific and Technical tasks planning Potential In addition to its Headquarters, the Board operates nine laboratories across Canada. Some 600 scientists and an equivalent number of technicians are employed. Major fields in both the Physical and Biological Sciences are represented to a more or less degree in all the DRBestablishments and its Headquarters. The details are contained in Appendix 11A11• Probable Tasks staff arise are:- The training and experience of the scientific and technical of the Board make them capable of a variety of tasks which may as the result of an atomic attack. Broad examples of such tasks 1. Technical advice on militar? 2. Contribution to the solutj_on of problems of survival, rehabilitation, and control of population. 3. Direct aid to the Services problens posed by enemy action. in certain technical fields such as telecommunications. 4. Interpretation 5. Advising on reoccupation of contaminated areas and the rehabilitation of the civilian population and economy. of fall-out data, 6. Assessment of bomb damage and collection of weapons effect data. 7. Calibration and maintenance 8. Detection and identification 9. Coordination of radiac of first instruments. use of B.H. or of plans for the rehabilitation c.w. of the scientific community. Suggested Procedure It is assumed that the Chairman, Defence Research Board, will move with the Chiefs of Staff. In order that the Defence Research Board can provide assistance to the Armed Services, it is suggested that: (a) The RCNand RCA,~having operational roles in Canada make knm·m their requirements for scientific and technical assistance whic:1 they anticipate may arise from the&e roles,. Plans will then be developed for the provision of this assistance. •••/2 100031 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • SECRET ' - 2 - (b) The Canadian Army, since it has the responsibility of assisting in survival and rehabilitation, be the Service responsible for making known to the Defence Research Board requirements for assistance in these areas. (c) The detailed planning to meet the above requirements be delegated to the Heads of Establishments in cooperation with the military commanders in their area and subject to over-all control and coordination by DRBHQ. (d) The Defence Research Board scientists now attached to various military formations and Headquarters to remain at their posts on the outbreak of war. 000320 �Document disclosed under the Access to InformationAct Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acces ii /'information ., • .. SECRET APPENDIX11A11 Scientific and Technical Potential at DRBEstablisbments (Note - numbers are ap:Jroximate only, since they vary from month to month) Ottawa Area DR.TE- Shirley Bay and Montreal Road, Ottawa of 96 scier"1.tists in the following fields: A total Mathematicians Engineers Physicists Various Technicians in support 4 51 37 4 119 DRCL/KL(Ottawa and Kingston) of 62 scientists total A in the following Chemists Physicists Mathematicians Psychologists Biologists Biochemists Bacteriologists Physiologists Engineers Various Technicians in support fields: 26 12 1 1 1 3 10 1 5 2 73 Halifax i:rea fHE (Dartmouth) total A of 59 scientists Chemists Physicists Engineers Various Technicians Valcartier 2 in the following fields: 8 23 23 in support 4 88 Quebec GARDE A total of 117 scientists Engineers Chemists Physicists Mathematicians Various Technicians in support in the following fields: 70 18 22 5 2 185 •••/2 000321 �r I Document disclosed under the Access to InformationAct Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acces ii /'information .,• SECRE1' APPENDIX11A11 - 2 - Toronto, Ontario DRML A total of 44 scientists consistmg of~ 6 Chemists Physicists Psychologists Biochemists Biologists Physiologists Engineers Various Technicians in support Fort Churchill, 5 13 2 4 3 4 3 38 l"Ianitoba DR.NL A total of 3 scientists Chemist Engineers Technicians Ralston, in the followmg .fields: 1 2 in support 9 Alberta SES A total of 44 scientists in the following Chemists Physicists Physicians Biochemists Biologists Bacterfologists Physiologists En6ineers Various Teclmicians in support fie:J_ds: 9 17 2 2 2 3 2 3 4 104 Esquirnalt.! B.C. PNL A total of 25 scientists Chemists Physicists Engineers Various Technicians in the following fields: 4 11 8 2- in support 26 ••• /3 000322 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information, , ... I> SECRET •• 11A11 APPENDIX ,l,. 3 ... DRB HQ and ORG These two unH,s are located in Ottawa arid have a strength of i78 scientists• However, some 60 are on detached duty in the U.K., Europe, u.s.A. and with Service }Qs and Commands• 000323 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Concept of Operations / 13 JUNE 1957 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1957-06-13 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00111 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "The Defence Research Board," LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/fd9030485f89649d15dee7e7053d6ba0.pdf 415a88572d6c7a6ba997aeabf016f69f PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information (THIS DOCUMENT IS THE OF HER MAJEOTY'S PROPERTY CANADIAN GOVERNMENT) IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE No ... 119tpartmtnt of J!attonal lltftnce ATTACHMENT: TOP SECRET CANADA JOINT 9.~9.... 5.'.'.'.+.+. ...{~9.L ....... . STAFF JOINTPLANNING COMMITTEE ADDRESS REPLY TO CHAIRMAN CHIEFS Of STAFF, OTTAWA- 2 October 1957 Secretary 9 .Chiefs of Staff Concapt-of _Operation Following the Initial Phase of a Major War lo The JPG has studied a DRBcontribution~ inclusion 2. submitted for in the paper on the above subjeet. The JPC now recommends that the DRBsubmission be included in _the Paper ''Concept of Operations Following the Initial Phase of a Major War. paragrapbs29 3. to 34 inclusive The JPC further This ·submission is o.ontained in · in the enclosed Paper. recommends that this Paper be kept under one cover with the CSOPaper "Conditions Under Which Mobilization Might Take Place". .9- rt•krfJ(W_/.,. J.C. Newlands) Majorg Secretary 9 Joint Planning Com.'n.ittee. Copies 2 to 15 inclusive. 000298 ~ �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ) - TOP.SECRET csc 5-11 COPYNO ___ 2 October 1957. !:-REPORT to the CHIEFS OF·sriFF·coMMITTEE .. , ... - - .b_y_.the - - .•.. - ' - .•· . - . JOINT PLANIUNG ·COMMITTEE The Chiefs of Staff Coilllittee in a paper entitled 1. Under Which Mobilization the preparation of service- Might Take Place", mobilization - tary coimitments during the initial -•--••- provided guidance for plans to meet present phase of a major war. to plan for the subsequent operations necessary for the Chiefs of Staff "Conditions ndli- In order of a major war it is now to decide- on the part the Canadian forces should play during this period and consequently the form the forces should take to meet this requirement. 2. It has been agreed in the Chief's of Staff' Committee that the eondi tions which might exist in_ Canada during the initial a general war may be sununarized as a serious life and war effort for at least disruption phase of of national the period of the threat of attack and for a much longer period in areas destroyed or contaminated. The causes of this disruption and additional conclusions drawn up by the Chiefs of Staff Committee to provide part of the basis for mobilization 3. planning are attached at Appendix "A,~. The Chairman, Chiefs of Sta.f£ has therefore directed the Joint Planning Commmitte to prepare a study on the concept of military operations following the initial is to be carried be related follow.will initial 4. phase of a major war. out within present This study National Defence policy and is to to our agreed equipment policy so that the plans which not interfere with our established priorities for the phase. The aim or this study is to reeonunend to the Chiefs Committee what th' Canadian concept of military operations •••••• 1---------------------------------------000299 or Staff should be ·2 1.....__ �I Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - TOPSF..CRET -2- cluring th~ period toll.owing tb.e initial phase of a major war up to the mid.•l<J60a,together with the role to be played by each ot the 1ervice1 duringthie period and the general pattern of &trf reorgan~ ilation ot tile forces required to carry out this.role. GERERAL CONSIDERATIONS ,. 8 s primary obJective1 in a It ie conaidered that the ene101 maJorwar in pursuit ot his war aims would be to neutralize all, or a major portion of NATO'a main retaliat017 powero This would in• f elude large scale attacks against North Amerioao The enem, can hope to acbine his aim onl.1'bt a surprise attack and as the Soviets will,have the initiati•e at the beginning of the wax-it is concluded tut ve wW.get littl• 110rethan tactical warnings,p:robal:t]1" a was,itrcot 2•3 houre received from the DEWlineo 60 It is verr difficult to judge when the initial phase would end. ad the subsequentphase begia, however, it is considered that the ild.tia1 Phase woulden4 when the enemyis incapable of delivering large eoai. nuclear attackeo The initial or wttlct, ..,_, ~ere will not be ait,y phase could last tor dqa abrupt change f'J"omthe initie.l pbase ~ tbe subeeque•t phase. 7• %niht!! i'\1'1,e~qu~~t pbase ot opera.tions we will be 11mite41a our oapaotty to tigb.t to the 94eELpone remaining at the end et the ild.tial ' phase. F\lrthermore\le cannot e.ss1JJ11.e that any productive aapaoit, will be available tor eomeconsiderable time. 8. Xt is aeswed thate a) tlie initial phe.ee has mt broupt an en4 to hostilities and the will to l:ring ~e warte - a eucoesstul conclusion still exists in MA.TO, Wewi1l still meet resistance in varying de• greea trom the forces ot the USSRo i-----------------------------------000300 1, 7 j �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information At the close or the intense nuclear exchange b) the NATO powers will ha\'e euperiority in the abillt1 to deliver nuclear attacks. ·concm OF)JILITARYOPERATJORJOLLOWIBG TD 9. Pl4SE of forces and tile intense uee of Despite the heavy attrition nuclear weapons during the initial phase the Soviets will still limited in the use ot th• nuclear weapons and will only be numbers and types of deliver, systems still available. 11111have a small number ot long-range aircraft and will also have a substantial but reduced operations. INITIAL have 'bt the The Soviets for sporadic raids number ot submarines tor sustained There will therefore be a continuing re- quirement tor air defence and anti-submarine forces for the defence ot Canada and the United States. 10. Because of the intense Soviet use ot nuclear weapons during the initial p~ase, directed against targets in North America, the pri- mar., probl811111'1Canada will probabl.7 be one or survival. -Consequenti, it is considered that the maximum military f"orcee that cd be made available will be required to assist in measures ~or the survival and rehabilitat1on ot the eount17', The battle ot survival will be the first task and, until survival priority commenced,it will not be possible to undertake and rehabilitation any- militar;r has bee11e.ccompliehed activities 1n addition to tho•• alread7 being carried out 1n the ti~st phase. 11. The situati~n ab]J' be similar "ill following the initial to that existing phase in Europe will prob- in North America. However, Europe not onl1'have been subjected to an intense nuclear attack but it vUl like]¥ have been overrun to some extent by Soviet groun4 forces. The greatest effort will have to be devoted to the s'Ul"Vival and rehabilitation of the NATOcotmtriee, and therefore military- oper- ot ations will have to be limited to the containment and liquidation remaining Soviet forces• · The IATOpowers b7 the threat or ttae ot /4 i-----------------------------------000301 j �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • TOPSECRET - 4 - their nuclear power will endeavour to prevent Soviet superior advances and to force the capitulation Subsequently it !la.Ybe necessary the USSR to establish not re-organized. required control of the enemy forces. to take over certain areas of and to ensure that resistance is It is not envisaged that large forces would be for these operations or that it would be necessary to occupy large areas of the USSR to carry out this objective. Canada might be called upon to assist Europe and operations against in the rehabilitation of remaining Soviet forces. MARITIMEOPERATIONS Role of the Maritime Force 12. areaso Strait To destroy sublla.I'ines in transit The transit routes, to their operational passing as they do through the Dell!lark and Norwegian Sea, will allow us to obtain a degree of defence in depth by means of an A/Sbarrier in these areas. How- ever, since some submarines will undoubtedly have penetrated barrier either before the war starts or during the initial and since submarines can enter the North Atlantic Atlantic without passing t..his barrier, must also be to control this phase, from the South the role of maritime forces -waters adjace·nt to North Allerica by destroy- ing submarines -within firing range of North .Allerican targets. U.S. maritime forces in close cooperation will be required Canada• to deny this area to the enemyo Concept 13. A large proportion support facilities attacks. Some of Soviet naval bases and mobile will be rendered inoperative allied submarines can be expected to be destroyed in transl t and in A/S operations. although substantial, to provide support. weaspons available, initial following in port, The remaining submarine force, will be limited to the capability of the WSR However, because there will be nuclear the submarine force will continue phase operations in the subsequent pha~e, but at a reduced ea•··,} ;i-,-· ·~ ~ ,·• ~ . ..... /5 1-----------------.--...--------------------------000302 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - • TOP SECRET - 5- and gradually dillinishing the,subsequent Consequently, . in intensity., phase, allied, Jlari tiiie forces will have to continue to combat the Soviet submarj_ne threat. Operations 14. In the transit outset against intensity sailed area operations may be expected to start submarines already at sea when the initial of operations will increase from USSRports to their rapidly operational from the blow is strucko The as the remaining submarines are areaso In the waters adjacent to North America the USSRwill also be capable of deploying a number of guided missile l!IUbmarineswithout giving away surprise prior though small in numbers could provide a significant nuclear attack on this continento contribution the initial of the war at sea is expected to be felto operations is expected to last to the initial The number of submarines reaching this area will rise sharply three to six weeks after intensity to D-dayo These even approximately - attack when the full This period of intense seven to eight weeks, subsequently . decreasing a) in intensityo consist To meet these threats, of forces-in-being, maritime forcel!I should: combat ready and deployed so as to be able to deal with the submarine threat b) be able to maintain intense operations for a minimum period of three months to defeat'initi~l operations from the onset. phase submarine and to be able to meet operational commitments in the subsequent phase. c) be sunnorted by dispersed airfields outfitted and logistics d) bases and alternate maritime with a minimumstock of 90 days POL o be provided with seagoing mobile logistic support forces to increase and, more important, chances of survival to increase maintain ~ts greatest by dispersal the period that the fleet operational can intensityo oeooeooooo/6 Q 1----------------------------------------000303 _·_1 -.1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • - 6 - 14. e) TOPSECRET Provide a seagoing mobile repair organi- zation to operate from a safe haven or minor port. t) Control operations through the establish- ment of maritime headquarters - and adequate - eommunicatio1lS, located interrupted operation so as to ensure un-during both phases of the war. Pattern 15. or Forces No change in the pattern considered tinuation likely of .forces for the subsequent phase is as the subsequent phase is expected to be a con- of the initial expected to be-available case of logistics, phase. after repairs Normal base facilities the initial exchange, so, as in the will have to be made at dispersed making use of seagoing mobile repair tional are not sites, to maintain maximumopera- units intensity. Reserves 16. A small number of naval and air reserves and earmarked for a particular duty and located specifically in areas where they would be employed in war, should be able to report the initial phase. It is unlikely until at the onset of that the bulk of the reserves could be employed in the RCNand RCAFroles of operations trained the task of survival envisaged by this concept has been achieved. Shipping in the Subsequent Phase 17. Shipping at sea will be attacked in both phases. would require The direct protection Canadian maritime forces from North American sources of support, as a secondary target of shipping, and mo~ility such operations is necessary, to operate at great distances adding emphasis to the need for mobile support to ensure our forces retain bility if' it priority the endurance, flexi- demand. •••.• /? 1---------------- ....... -- .......... ----------------~---000304 �, Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • TOPSECRET - 7 CONCLUSIONS ~8. The concept or maritime operations and the role or the RCNand RCAFin ~f i~tial the subsequent phase will be a continuati~n v due to reduced intensi phase operations at a serious loeses experienced on both sides in the intial phase. 19. The types of RCNand RCAFmaritime forces suitable the initial phase will also be suitable provision of requirements listed initial and for employment in for the subsequen~ phaseo Therefore, the in paragraph 14 above will apply to both the subsequent phases in the prosecution of a general war a.t seao Role of the Ground Force; 200 The role of the ground forces in the subsequent phase will be to: a) continue to conduct operations under SACEUR in Europe; b) assist c) continue to conduct any required direct defence of civil author~ties in_survival operations; Canada operations. 21. Because of' the many imponderables in.the initial phase, it is diffi- cult to determine when any portion of the balance of' the division sent to SACEUR.Apart from eome additional support to the force now in Europe to bring it up to WEand provide first the division has been placed in strategic 22. Initially progresses, reinforcements, reserve by SACEUR. from the Militia. As mobilization of the it will gradually take over all survival commit.mentein Canada with the exception of defence against enemy lodgments. strategic the balance of' most of the Army commitments will be met by the Regular Force with limited assistance Militia could be reserve may not be available SACEl.JR's for despatch to Europe until conditions in Canada are such that the Government will agree to its releaseo Its role will vary between employment in rounding up enemy detachments to ae.eis tance in the rehabilitation of' We~tern European economyo o. o oo ooo/8 i---------------------------------------000305 _j �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu_ de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • - 23, Arllf¥ assistance to civil authorities will include po1icing evacuated centres and maintenance ot vital services such as trana• portation tac111tiea, tacilitia1, etc• tood distribution services, commmication Since the asaiatance required will -ra:qconaider• ablJ'-in ditterent sections o:t the counts-y and since nol"Jll&l. traupor- tatioa tacilitiea will be disrupted, troops hem one aeotioi,. ot tbe it 001:mt17 JDa1'be essential to to another bf air. JllOTe ibie a1 • i1tance ..,- extend well into the euoaequent phase as the bar ¥111 be required to assi1t in controlling the return ot the econoiqr8114 · populatioit to more no%'m&l conditions. However, as inclicatecl abo-re, thie l'Ole cu be taken oTer progreseivell' 'by the Militia as it 11 mobilized • 24• It ie ditticult to pi-edict at what period in the initial subaequant phases the requir••nt mardi,appear • or tor detenoe against en.., lodgment• !he A'l'tJtj m\lat be prepared to continue to meet thi• cona1taent if' :required. !he t-eqttirement to'l' othet- direct defeno• ot Canada opetationa such as protection ot vital points, assistance to I.OBin Ooa1t8Jl4 Seaward Defence, and internment, and JIOW operatiou will continue in ihe subsequent phase. It ID!A1 be ~eoaasar, to ,01t• pone cfftaia ot the1e ta1k1 i• orde:r to 21eet the dnan4e ot ciT11 tor assistance 1~ 1\U'"ViTal operation,. authorities QOlliLVIJQIII· 25• It it concludedtlaate a) Gro'31ldtorces tor emplo,aent both wi;hia C&nada 11 1trategics reserve should be airu4 aa SACED portable , la) The toroe_1n Europein peacetillle auat be main- tained up to establishment stre~gth and should bave with it itJJ initial reinf'orcement1. o) 'lh• militia should be reorganized to pro'V'ide • strong healthJ- tore• related to it1 role in war. Mobiliaation pl&M must include the mobUizatiqn of ,.the militia althoup 1-------------~IIUIV!!!W-~be~~A\t.84 1- _________________________________ such mobUizat1oa h---lih.o.l•~A~r~. ~1~n...p~.a~rt~•------+-/t•--Q00306 ._. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ., •9- - 1------------....._ d) The Az,q must maintain its abilit7 to conduct militar,- operations both at home and abroa4 and at the ·s•e time prepare to aaa1e1; civil authoritiea.in eurvival operation•• AIR n,.e Role of tl)e Rpg 26. The role ot the ROAF,in the light or the stated concept ot milita17 operations in the subsequent phase, will be: a) To continue to maintain the air defence qstem · on full alert until the threat ot enem, air operations aga~nst North Amerioano longer exists. b) To continue to maintain the ROAFcomponentot our maritime force at maximumoperational capabilit7 until the eneJD1maritime threat no longer exists. c) .To continue air operations in Europe under tbe operational control d) or 4 ATAF. To maintain in immediate i-eadiness, the maximum air transport capabilit7 to meet the demands ot the militarr airlift servicee and the civil power for from Canada to Europe, and within Canada, in support ot milite.1"1 operations and national survival. e) With the resources and personnel not direct]1' engaged in, or in logistic to assist support ot the above tasks, in ~ska r~lated to national sUl'\'ival tor as long as reqw,.red. /10 __________________________ .000307 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ·• - TOPSll:RET -10- General Pattern of Re-Organization or the RCR 27.• As the role ot the RCAFin the subsequent phase will not differ appreciabl.1 from that ot the initial organization ot forces is required. peacetime pattern phase, no major re- The tolloVing changes in the ot the RC.AFwould take place 1n the initial phase, and would continue into the subsequent phase: a) The role ot the RO.Al training organization would change at the.General Alert from that or training to that of providing trained personnel to augment the RC.AF operational commandsas first and to assisting priori tr• priorit)", in national survival as second Training might be resumed in the sub- sequent phase dependent on conditions in Canada and the requirement tor additional trained personnel. b) At some stage in the initial the RCAP'tactical or subsequent phase, component which supports the MSF will either have compl~ted its task or the require• ment tor MS1operations Will have disappeared. thi1 time, the role ot the ROAFtactical At component will change to reinforcement ot ROAFoperational eomandeand assistance to the national survival ettort. CONQLUSIOU 28. It is concluded that8 a) as ROAFair defence, maritime and transport operatione are expected to continue indefinitely in the subsequent phase, every effort should be made in peacetime to en• sure that logistic support (especially fOL and armament) could continue beyond the presently planned 30-dq period despite the breakdown in transportation and sources ot supply which might be expected from en9D11 action. /11 1- ______________________ _.______________ 000308 - J �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • • TOP SECRET ':" 11 b) To ensure the maximumutilizatio.n resources assigned to national of operations, survival of the ROAF.forces and survival, the concept .and the task assignments of the national organization should be clearly defined as soon as possibleo .. - ... -- Role of the Defence Research Board 290 To assist the Armed Forces in their conduct of military against the enemy and in aid of the civil operat.ioW!I power.. Concept 300 In addition to its Headquarters, acrol!IS Canada. Some 640 scientists employed.. Major fields represented 31.. the Board operates ten laboratories and an equivalen'i number of technicians in the Physical, are Chemical and Biological Sciences are to a more or less degree in pita establishments amd its Headquarters .. Under the present concept of condi ti.one which may exist in Canada in the event of a thermo-nuclear attack, research activities seriously it seems probable that a number of the of the Defence Research Board will ceaBe or at best be disrupted .. ~nder these conditions the scientific sources of manpower might easily be dispersed .and technical re- and lost to the defence effort. Probable Tasks 32. In order to prevent such an occurrence probable tasks which might be undertaken should be determined and detailed planning carried out in cooperation with the ArmedServices .. 33. The training and experience of the scientific Board make them capable of a variety and technical staff of the of tasks.which may arise as the result of an atomic attack .. Broad examples of such tasks are:a) scientific advice on military problems posed by enemy action ..; b) contribution rehabilitation, to the solution of problems of $Ul'vival, and control of population; ooooeooe/12 000309 - �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Docume'llt divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • • 33. - 12 - C) direct aid to the Services in certain TOPSECRET technical fields such as telecommunications; d) calibration e) detection and maintenance of radiac ill8trumen"M. and identification of first use of BoWoor c.w.; f) or plans for the rehabilitation coordination scientific of the community. CONCLt5IO~, .34. In view of the possibility noted in the concept., planning should start now·to:a) 1 Provide for '-orderly evaoua.tion of''each es tabiishnent and the Headqua.rterso b) Determine the requirements of the ArmedServices -for scientific and technical anticipated initial c) role in military Allocate responsibility Enlist to each establishment to organize and and technicians by the Military visualized to meet Commanders in areao the support ot other scientific "tor the .rehabilitation. 1-----------------"' of their operatioll8 following the groups of scientists the requirements their in light phase of a major war. train selected d) assistance of the .""' ,_ ~ ,'· ~ "scientific :agencies and provide c6mni ty • . ~ --·..-...·---------------------------' . i------------~---""'!"""-----------------------000310 j � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Concept of Operations / 2 OCTOBER 1957 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1957-10-02 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00112 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Concept of Operations Following the Initial Phase of a Major War," 2 Oct. 1957, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4af0cdba8f5baa6c2fc4de3d697cc222.pdf 3dc6ef871342a247f096aca668e08fed PDF Text Text ,--------------------------------------------,r 1 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ,,.;· ..-- CSC: 5-11 (PA/CDRB TOP SECRET CANADA OFF.ICE OF THE CHAIRMAN OTTAWA 9 October, 1957 Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee Concept of Operations following draft the Initial Phase of a Major War Reference your CSC5-11 TD:l dated 3 October, 1957 and copy of the JPC paper as marginally noted. Having in mind the time period the following comments are made: (a) Re Para 11up to the mid-196o I s11, 5 In this period, the chances of an attacker being able to achieve surprise, if he is employing manned aircraft in large numbers, are decreasing. Once ballistic mi~siles become operational surprise may be achieved, or at worst, from the attackers' point of view, the warning time will be short. On the other hand, the ICBMmay not be sufficiently accurate for attack on a SACbase which is also employing the ICBM. With these points in mind, it seems more likely that a mixed attack would take place; ballistic missiles from Russia and from submarines being directed against cities, and manned aircraft against SACbases. The purpose in attacking SACwould be to damage its facilities,hence reducing its capability to mount successive strikes. It is felt that any plan concerned with the period of the mid-196o•s should include an assessment of the ballistic missile threat and consider that the defence may have to deal with an attack on cities. (p) Re Para 9 Here again, there is no mention of the ballistic possible effect on the conduct of defence operations. (c) missile and its Re Para 11 The statement that the NATOpowers will have superioritv in nuclear weapons may be somewhat misleading. If one is referring to the weapons at the disposal of the ground forces then both sides will likely have larger numbers than could be used in a nuclear exchange. It may well be a matter of one side having twice as many weapons as required and the other side perhaps 1.5 times the number required. In these circumstances the statement that one side will have superiori-cy- is not too meaningful. ( d) Re Para 12 If one considers the submarine as a missile carrier, then some mention mj_ght be made of the HudsonI s Bay and Pacific areas. ( e) Re Para 14 It IDC\Ybe unwise to assume that only a few submarines could take part in a missile attack. The present pattern of submarine sitings is confusing and a shift in numbers to the western Atlantic might not likely be detected. I ----- 2. I 000295 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information '!OP SECRET CSC:5.ll (PA/CDRB) - 2 - Recent developments in the USSRwould indicate that the ICBM threat may be closer to reali-cy- than when this paper. was originally drafted and hence consideration should be given to the effect this would have on the general considerations, the concept of milita:cy operations and the roles of the military forces and the Defence Research Board. Subject to the considerations as a planning document. noted above, the paper is acceptable The proposed distribution is also acceptable, and in this connection, the Defence Research Board will require three copies. Chairman 000296 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE csc:5.11 TD:l No.•••••••••• •..... • ..... . :l\tpartmtntof Jlational1!\tftntt CANADA CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE 17 October 1957 Chairman, Chiefs of Staff (thru CJS) Concept of Operations Following the Initial Phase of a Major War 1. Attached herewith are the comments of the CGS, CNS, GAS and CDRBon Chiefs of Staff paper "Concept of Operations Following the Initial Phase of a Major Warti. 2. As you will recall, this paper was submitted by the~JPC to the Chiefs of Staff who considered it at their 610th meeting on 6 June 1957. At this time certain amendments were agreed upon by the Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary was directed to circulate the paper for further discussion. Subsequent to this a section was contributed by Defence Research Board for inclusion. This section was considered by the JPC and, after a re-write, was included. The JPC re-submitted the paper to the Chiefs of Staff on 2 October 1957 and recommended that it be kept under one cover with a previous CSC paper "Conditions Under Which Mobilization Might Take Place 11• 3. The revised paper,as approved by the JPC, was circulated secretarially to the Chiefs of Staff on 3 October 57 for approval or comment, and for approval of a distribution list. 4. Replies from the Chiefs of Staff have been received and it is noted that the Chairman, Defence Research Board has made certain comments of substance which, if included, would require the revision of certain sections of the paper. However, CDRBstates that "subject to the considerations noted, the paper is acceptable as a planning document". 5. With regard to the distribution there is also a difference of opinion between the Chiefs: CGS recommending that the paper be used only at Defence Headquarters as a basis for planning and not distributed to other authorities, while CNS, GAS and CDRBagree with the distribution proposed by the Secretary. 6. Direction a) whether the paper should now be distributed Staff paper in its present form; b) whether it should be combined with the previous paper, nconditions under which Mobilization Might Take Place» c) whether the distribution should be as proposed by the Secretary, or in accordance with the views of the CGS. is requested please, as to: as a Chiefs of ·-Pi .. w.c- .lu~ (F.W.T. Lucas) FWTL/6-6756/mck 20M-8.50 (3589) B.Q. 224-15 ..9 Captain, RCN Secretary 000291 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Concept of Operations / OCTOBER 1957 (FURTHER DRB COMMENTS) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1957-10 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00113 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Memorandum from the Chairman of the Defence Research Board, "Concept of Operations following the Initial Phase of a Major War," 9 Oct. 1957, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3; "Concept of Operations following the Initial Phase of a Major War," 17 Oct. 1957, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ddc8043d6f87ddb1ebe456374c49c70a.pdf 4e726b2866d713d1deb0b1f4dc63bcd2 PDF Text Text Docume THISDOCUMENT IS THEPROPERTY OF THEGOVERNMENT CANADA CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE .TOP s:mm csci;.11.9 csc: 5.11 ... 28 November 1957. COPYN0_. __ 2_"""_ '- CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS Including. (A) (B) CONDITIONS UNDERWHICH MOBILIZATION MIGHT TAKEPLACE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THEINITIALPHASEOF A MAJOR WAR APPROVED BY THECHIEFSOF STAFFCOMMITTEE ,- .....-:-w' -::,, I • LJc_~ (FoWoTeLucas) Captain, RCN Secretary ..__ �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - TOP SECRET csc 5-11-9 25 November 1957 COPYNO. 2 REPOR't Tb THE CHIEFSOF .STA.FF,· COMMITTEE BY THE ., .. JOINrPLANNING·coMMfi'TEE / CONDITIONS UNDER .WHICH MOBILIZATION MIGHT. TAKFf PLACE lo The Chiefs of Staff Committee will shortly review Service mobilization plans. Before such a·review can be carried out the Chiefs of Staff require an agreed set of · conditions ..for the first stages of a war taking place in the early 1960's under the.MC 48 concepto 2o At its 596th meeting the Chiefs of Staff Committee agreed that the Coordinator, Joint Staff prepare a directive to the Joint Planning Committee to prepare the necessary studyo 3. The terms of the study as presentetl to the Joint Planning Committee by the Coordinator, Joint Starr are q~oted verbatim under the headings AIMand ASSUMPI'IONSo AIM --,- 4. The aim of this study is to set forth the conditions which might obtain in Canada at the outbreak of a general war between the eastern and western blocs, in the early 1960Pa, and under which mobilization of Canada Vs armed forces would have to take J)laceo ASSUMPI'IONS 5. The war will be global in scopeo Nuclear weapons of all sizes, including submarine-launched guided missiles, will be used by both side:s'from the outseto .£. 0 . . The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)will not be in use operationally by either sideo J -1 Plans will exist for decentralizing the administration of the •country temporarily to each province but the Government will TOPSECREr ,V 1r 000144 b �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ·: - TOP SECREr --csc5-11-9 - 2 - dated 25 November 1957. not have made any firm arrangements for alternative sites from which ~o conduct the nation 11s business should Ot_tawabe evacuated or bombedo ~o The war will-start with little or no warning and air attacks againf$t targets in N01'1.'H .. AMERICA will take plaqe. from the outseto i:O The Government will not have declared an ALERT_ prior to.the first warning of, actual attacko go In addition to ariy direct attacks on Canadian cities» there will be random explosions of nuclear bombs from damaged or crashed eneiey aircrafto i MC48 Concept 60 In the ~ 48 concept global war will consist of two intense nuclear exchange which victory; and secondly 9 a period lesser intensityo NATOnations are agreed that a f'uture phases'_ firstly» a relatively short and probably would determine the uitimate of operations of indeterminate length of Soviet Course of Action 7o It Bhould be assumed that· Soviet strategy would be based upan preserving -the·ir owncountry from destruction while at the s~e time enforcing their will upon the Westo Thus they would first attempt to destroy all nuclear offensive power which is ranged against themo The SACbase complex and weapons storage system in North ~rica will be the major consideration in any ~eneral air assaulto An equally vital and closer threat for Russia, however 9 is presented by the naval atomic strike forces and the SACand RAF bomber commandbases around the periphery cf the USSRo These would_be attacked simultaneously with any attack on _North Americao Centres of industryj government and population in North America are targets which would be attacked as second priority targets in the initial phaseo So The nature and scale of attacks America are summarized at Appen~ix "A"o that are probably against ,.. ( _ North c-, Attacks Againe;t Canada 9. The most direct approach route to ·sAC and AECinstallations in 1 the United States is over Canada and thus it is possible that the USSR would route a considerable number of bombers--_ over Ca~ada o The likelihood of air attack on Canadian cities is not entirely dependent on their importance or on the priorities which my have been assigned to them by the Soviets 9 or ourselveso.other factorsj such as the strength of the defence, the attrition of enaiey aircraft 9 the rortitude and experience of eneiey aircrews~ weather conditiens 9 etc.» have to be taken into account, and therefore it should be assumed that Canadian cities and areas may be bombed deliberately or at random even though they may not be high on the list of North American target priorities. Similar considerations should be taken into account when assessing the probablity of submarine launched guided missile and other for:m:sof attack against Canadao ./ TOP SECRET 000145 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information •• - - 3 - TOP SECREr csc 5-11-9 dated 25 November 19570 lOo At the time of -the fir~,:t.wa~ning the country will be much as it is today, the population carrying on its day__by day business and pleasure, and the services maintaining their present sta:te ef readiness~ The following few paragraphs attempt to foresee the reaction in Canada to the first warning of attack and the effects of this warning and actual thermonuclear attack in the initial phase. Overriding Considerat~ons 11 o The degree to ·which the effecte will be. experienced in Canada must be assessed against the prevailing climatic conditions at the time. As a matter of principle it should_be assume4 that.all effects will be more greatly felt in winter when trarisportation,,accommoda,tion, food distribution naturally present more pro~lemso Initial Reaction l2o Presuming that warning would. come from the DEWLine, Canada would have about 2-3 hours before an attack would rea.ch the heavily populated areas. The Yarning would be rece.ived first by tl;le Air Defence Command which, in addition to alertin.g the air defences, ~ould relay the information to the Chiefs of Staff a.nd to Civil.Defence authorities. 13. It is almost inevitable that there will.be delays between the receipt of the actual warning and the initiation of positive defensive action unless streamlined procedures are developed. Delays would be caU8ed by possible inability to contact immediately the authorities concerned, time taken to evaluate the warning information and to arrange consultation' at the higher governmental levelso Consequently, it is possible and even probable that the enemy would have been engaged before the Government had declared an Alerte Formal implementation of War Book measures prior to attack would not be possible in,these circumstances, 140 HoYeverj the Civil Defence authorities may be expected to react quickly. They would relay the warning to the general public and, if such is the policy, would initiate evacuation measures in the selected cities Yithin minutes after the warning is received. 15. It is anticipated that warning of attack would trigger violent reaction in Canada, particularly in the heavily populated areas. Safety of self. and family would be the primary concern of the populace and this Yould result in a rush to clear out or areas which, in the minds of the people, would be liable to nuclear attack. Workers would leave their jobs, families would endeavour to unite and to leave the cities as soon as possible, and in the process it is inevitable that surface transportation facilities and telephone communicatiorui would ~ecome ?verloade~. Evacuation 16. On the basis of their rehearsed plans the Civil Defence authorities would try to effect an orderly evacuation to arbitrary perimeters about the cities and areas shown at Appendix "B"and to prepare for attack. According to Civil Defence sources it is doubtful that plans would exist for Montreal and Quebec where political considerations have delayed their development. Where plans existed-and control could be maintained the Civil Defence authorities expect that about 60%of the population could be moved to relative safety in about 3 hours from the first Civil Defence Yarning. Where there were no plans or where control of the people was lost, Civil Defence-authorities presume that less than 60%of the population could be evacuated in a three hour period. TOP SECRET 000146 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - - 4 - TOP SECRET 'csc 5-11-9 dated 25 November 1957. 17., Under an emergency evacuation 9 planned or unplanned 11 _there would certainly- be conf'usiori 9 perhaps panic and looting, uncertainties, conflicting instructions» and lack of information .. Surface transportation facilities would be over-taxed a,nd pe_rhaps jammtl3doOverloaded· and perhaps abandoned communications facilities 11 1:»th. trunk and'local1> would make control difficult and could increas.e the. confusion •.. other essential ser..: vices such as powers, wa.teri, and food.distribution would be curtailed if in fact they were not completely disrupted. M.micipal 9 . provimcial and federal authority would be weakened and i:il..·some c.ases .non-existent in the hurried exodus from Ottawa and the six provincial capitals. J',!'hichare the list of cities to be evacuated by Civil Defence authorities .. ! .. on 18.. rt will be against this background the armed forcee will have to maintain organization and discipline 1 to give aid to the civil power and Civil Defence authoritiee 1 to continue their.efforts to repulse the enemy, andcto prepare themselvee for the war effort during the period between the initial warning and the time of a first attack .. 19. Civil Defence authorities consider that without interruption from an attack it should take about 6 - 8 hours before the_largest of the target cities would be evacuated and the Civil Defence organiz~tion more or lees organized and prepared to deal wi_th the resulte o! !3,n.attacko The extent of dispersal of the population from target areas.would likely increase and may be expected to prevent a reorganization of the population at large for the war effort for some periodo Civil Defence officials euggest that this period would be from 4 t9 7 days and prolonged if there had been an attack in the areao · 200 Essential services would be of doubtful reliability in the evacuated areas because the Civil Defence authorities plan that evacuation would last until the initial phase is over .. Telephone exchanges, power stations, landline communications systeme, terminals 9 and relays 9 and rail transport to and through the evacuated.cities may or may not be working · reliably 9 if working at all 9 because of the absence of key operating amd maintenance personnelo As it becomes apparent, if indeed it does, that some of the target cities might not be attacked during the first few days of the initial phase it would seem reaeonable to expect that after their families have been safely and confortably established, some key personnel swept away in thEf evacuation might return to offer their services o Therefore 9 before the firet phase is Qver tnere might be a partial restoration of essential services in evacuated and unattacked a.reaso · Attack 2lo A nuclear attack against a city or area before evacuation was completed, or where there was little no evacuation 9 would add to the disruption and denial of essential servicee » and would magnify the terror of the people leading to panic 9 looting 9 rioting» apathy 9 ·and even anarchyo Loss of life would be heavy and damage to essential services, f0od and material warehouses, accommodation 9 ana communications and transportation would be great .. Restoration of these services and facilitiee would be impossible at least throughout the first phase 1 and more likely for a month or more 9 because of the residual radiation hazard and the lack of tools and material for reconstruction and repair o Examples of the effects of attacks against M,:ntreal and Halifax are conta 1ned at Appendix "C"o or TOP SECRET 000147 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information •,, ;' - = 5- TOP SECREI' csc 5-11-9 dated 25 November 1957. 220 An attack after evacuation has been.completed should result in a lower loss of life but the implications of.damage to facilities would :still apply, except in the case···of mobile transportation equipment where lower lo:sses might be expected becaus~ a: large amount of the equipment would have been moved clear in the process:iof evacuation .•_ Stocks of Equipment and foods in storage, and upon which .the services and public normally rely, will probably not have been removed from the target areas, certainly not in the.first few da.ys of Phase I 9 and will be destroyed and damagedo 230 The broader effects of an attack on Montreal might include a break in the major rail route to the M:i.ritimeso · fhi~ might be overcome by udng the :single rail ltne through Northern Ontario to Quebec, but if Quebec b attacked or evacuated it would not be possible to complete the rail and ferry connections 'With 't,he mai_n.line on. :the. south :,bore of the St. La:wrenceo Simila.rly 9 an attack on Winnipeg would.cut rail and other com'munications between east andwesto. An attack on Halifax would deny the UBe of the port to shipping and would nece::isitate diversion to minor port area:, where only limited transportation)) comniU.ni.cati.ons and acco:mmc,dation 51•. storage are availableo Random Nuclear Explosiorus 24. It should be expected that there would be loss of life, damage to equipment 9 destruction of aceommodation·9 .etco 9 in· cities and areas not assessed a:s likely targets but which may be subject~o random nuclear explosions following,the destruction or damage to enemy bombers as they overfly Canadao Some of th~se areas might have been :used for the accommodation and supP()rt of peopl~ evacuat~d :from target cities or might be relied upon for the sustenance of the population and.defence forceso The effects of random explosions would be of.limited significance in norther parts of Canada but would cause more widespread public apprehension and disorder, loss of life~ and disrupted services in and near industrial and populated areaso Fa:1.1 ...0o.t Hazard 25o Whether from bombs aimed at Canadian cities, or from bombs jettisoned :from or exploding 'Within crippled bombersll there is likely to be a comsiderable hazard from fall-out through0ut Canada 1:ut particularly in 'southern Ontario a12d:southern Quebeco Exten:sive fall-out will add to the pr,riblems of evacuation and r~organizatipn and.may 1Jring about disorder ;and p~ha-ps panic in areas otherwise· considered ·to be safeo Fall-out may ' be·, expected to -contribute to the, loss of life and the disruption of essential services in affected areas.. ' -Clandestine Operations and Sabotage 260 If clandestine operations and sabotage were attempted at vital points fl a's is possible~ they may be expected to add to the disruption of essential services and to produce further obstacles to evacuation and reorganization of manpowero For example~ saboteurs may cut landline commmtlcations and rail services at isolated points on the major cross country routes with the aim of breaking air defence communications and preventing the movement of personnel and equipmento TOP SECREr 000148 L �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - = TOP SECREI' csc 5-11-9 dated 25 November 19570 6 = 27. It must be .expected tha.tll with the disorganization 9 reaction and movement of people 9 and denial or facilities w:hi_chwould prevail during evacuation and which would be more seriou~ in.the event of attaqkll there would be many demands upon the resources and manpower of the regular and reserve forces for assistance to the Civil Powers arrl to the Civil Defence organizationo cbNbttrsroNs 280 It is concluded that the conditions in Canada on the outbreak c,f a general war in the early 1960~is-maybe summarized as a serious disruption of national life and war effort for at least the period of the threat of attack and for a much longer period in areas destroyed or contaminatedo This would be caused by evacuation 9 damagej _loss of lifell and fall-out in the areas in which the majority of Canada vs population and armed forces are located» and will includei · Delays and difficulties in obtaining government direction 9 approval and policy for war measures. Overloading and breakdown of COlDIIIUnicationefacilitiee in and through evacuated and/or attacked cities and areas affecting air defence, the comm.andof the armed forcesll control of the populace, and the coordination of the country 0s war effort. Overloading and breakdown of transportation facilitiee in and through evacuated and/or .attacked cities and areas thus reducing local transportation, transcontinental rail capacity through Edmonton9 ·winnipeg and Montreal, and making uncertain the use of terminal facilities in ports such as Vancouver~ Montreal 9 St. John 9 NoBolland Halifaxo Fearll confusion populationo ~o 9 'panic apathy .. 9 · 9 and even anarchy in the Casualities 9 coupled with h 9 £~and~ abovel) resulting in loss Qf centralized control by civil and military authoritieso Competetive demands between civil defence authoritiee, municipal 9 provincial and federal governments and the armed forces~ for manpower9 transportation 9 equipment, food and accommodatione Breakdown of normal distribution channels for the supply of fuel 9 ~ood and materielo Unpredictable circumstances _formulated planso requiring departures The probable abandomnent of large areas contaminated, for long periods of time. 1 :from that have been TOP SECRET 000149 ---_________ �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ·,/ - TOP SECREl' ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS DRAWNUP BY THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE TO PROVIDEPART OF THE BASIS FOR - -. ·11oi3tt.tz11'toN· PLANNING .. !,o Conditione likely to pertain.in the first few days of a war in the early 196O°s~ and perhaps f0r the first phase, will require the Services to devote the maximumresources that can be made available to assist in survivalo .Qo The battle of -survival will .be the first priority task andi, until slll7Viva1 pas been accomplished and rehabilitation commencedj it-will not_ be possible to carry out additional military_ activitiesi, .such as the raising and training of additional forces and the provision ~f additiona; stores and equipmento .£0 The conditions visualized in this paper may preclude the earmarked reinforcing of ourM--dayforces to allow for 100% and round=the~clock manningo Therefore the forces required for urgerit defence activities on M=dayi,and for the first phasel) must be raiseds, trainedll equipped and be immediately·available on an alert being declared or hostilities connnencedo TOP SECRET 000150 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - TOP SECREI' APPENDil "A" to CSC 5-11-9 dated 25 Nov 57. NATURE. ANDSCALE .OF.SOVIET-ATTACKS (Based on ACAI39) Ur Attack To enable nticlea.r·attacks to'be carried out against North America it is estimated that the Sov-iets could .employ a minimumof 600 heavy bombers, of which approximately 480.could arrive in target areas anywhere in North America on ...two way missions. .A maximum of 1,100 medium and heavy bom9ers, of which 850 might reach target ~reas might be used, with the medium.bombers oper.ating on a o•e'way basis. This latter course is considered unlikely. ' 1. 9 Submarine Attack 2. The Soviets are given the capability of operating a maximum of 319 and 17 submarines· on a continuing basis, in Atlantic and Pacific coastal waters respectivelyf and may_be.expected.to use a limited number of these submarines for launching guided missile attacks against targets up te 250 miles inland. Airborne Attack 3o The USSRwould be capable of carrying out airborne assaults against the continent of North America. However, .it is considered that such assaults on Canada would be limited to small scale attacks on isolated points in the North. Amphibious Operations 4. Amphibious operations against North America will be limited to commandotype raids probably launched fr.om submarines but will not be a. significant threat. 5. Submarines might also be used to transport Clandestine a.gents and saboteurs. Operations 6. Clandestine operations by the Soviets using nuclear weapons is considered risky and unlikely to be carried out but they remain as alternatives to other major attack methodso In addition clandestine employment of psychochemical agents is a possibility in support of the primary aim of the Soviet. Sabotage 7. It is probable that Soviet organized sabotage groups will attempt to attack pre-determined targets either in conjunction with~ or as soon as possiblef after the outbreak of war to add to the disruption of Canadian and United States transition to war. TOP SECRET 000151 �------;-----r ., Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - TOP SECRET APPENDIX11B" to CSC 5-11-9 dated 25 November 1957 ctvrL'bmNt:E'LIST CITIEs-·FoR· WHICH EVACUATION IS PLANNED Halifax Quebec City 'Montreal Ottawa & Hull Toronto ' Hamilton 'Windsor Niagara Falls Winnipeg Edmonton Vancouver Victoria 000152 �Document disclosed under the Access tp Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information { - SECRET APP1!:NDIX "C" to CSC 5-11-9 dated 25 Nov 57 lo The informa:tion-contained·in the enclosures· to this appendix has been extracted from the appendices to JIC 158/1(56) dated 13 January 1956. 2o The enclosures are included to indi.cate the estimated extent of damage to Halifax and Montreal after attack. by nuclear weapons of 50 kiloton and 1 .megaton yields ... (Enclosure l - Effects of a 50 Kiloton Airburst on Halifax 2 - Effects of a 1 megaton Surface Burst in Halifax 3 - Effects of a 50 Kiloton Underwater Burst on Halifax 4 - - Effects of a 50 Kiloton Airburst on Montreal 5 - Effects.cf al Megaton Surface Burst on Montreal 6 - Effects of a 50 Kiloton Underwater Burst on Montreal 000153 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information l .' - SECRET APPENDIX"C" Enclosure 1 EFFECTS OF-·A· 50 krt.bToN·AIRl3URsr ON.THE POR'fot HALIF.AX 1. It is essential that this medium-yield weapon be employed in such a way as to make full use of its blast and thermal effects. 2. Ground zero was selected s~ as to. give the greatest possible effect on pert reception and clearance capacity. For a 50 KT weapon this was determined to be the area: of_ Union Station_~- ..The :maximumeffective height of burst for such a WElaponwould be a.bot1.t3000 feet. 3. The comments presented-tmder effects of a 20 Icr air burst are also applicable, in- general., to the effects of a 50 Icr air burst. The largest single problem of recovery would. be the raising of vessels sunk alongside the piers. · 4. The damage that might be expected, from this be su.nnnarized as follows: type of burst can (a ) Complete destruction by-bla~t and primary and secondary fires of all structures and piers in the commercial wharf area between the Deep Water Termiu.ls and the Oceu Ter~nals. (b) Virtually complete destruction of all transit sheds and contents in the Ocean TermiMl:5 and moderate to severe damage to transit sheds and conte-nts in the_ Deep Water Terminals. ( c) Severe damage to· ships at Pier B and complete blockage of Sea Wall •nd Pier .Aby vessels sunk alongside. (d) Severe damage to 90%.of loco:rnotives in marshalling yards and complete destruction of remainder of rolling stock. (e) All frame structures, about 85% of the total, in the general area east of Dalhousie University and south of Cogswell street destroyed by blast and fire. (f) All buildings east of SummerStreet Citadel area severely damaged. (g) 100% casualities yard made up of 85% killed (h) Probable slight storage depot. and south of the in the Ocean Terminals and marshalling and 15% seriously injured. damage to Imperial Oil refinery and ./ (i) All streets within 1.5 miles of ground zero blocked with rubble to varying depths. 5. Residual~adiation in the target area would be negligible and re-entry into the area would not be impeded by the radiat~on hazard. Fire would be the greatest immediate restriction on re-entry and debris would prohibit the movement vehtcles. of 000154 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ; - SECRET APPENDIXttCtt Enclosure 2 EFFEtTS OF A ONEMEGATON SURFACE BURST ON THEPORTOF HALIFAX 1. The dimensions or the fireball of this size of weapon is such that in most cases it will touch the ground and must be con·sidered therefore as a ground burst • . 2. Although the surface burst does not give maximumblast effects, the radius of blast effects is still extremely large. In addition the secondary radiation is or such intensity and so widespread that the use of large areas is prohibited for a considerable period. This is a particular advantage of the large size weapon since it would increase considerably the time required to reestablish the p~rt capacity. 3. The effects of blast and thermal radiation of this size weapon, which would probably be a thermonuclear weapon, wo'Uld be similar to the smaller atomic weapons but proportionately larger. Insofar as these effects are concerned, the best location of ground zero would be in the vicinity of Barrington and Sackville Streets. The physical damage that would probably be incurred is summarized as follows: a) A crater in excess of 3000 feet in diameter and some 500 feet in depth could be formed at ground zero. b) All structureswithin would be demolished. c) All structures in Halifax, Dartmouth and Woodside would be seriously damaged. d) All vessels e) All rail facilities and rolling stock in the Ocean Terminals, Deep Water Terminals and H.M.C. Dockyard, would be seriously damaged• .f) 90 percent of the population of Halifax and Dartmouth would be casualties of which 90 percent would be killed. This does not include secondary radiation casualties. g) Complete destruction 1½ mile radius of ground zero in the inner harbour would be sunk. of the refineries at Imperoyal. 4. The area affected by secondary radiation is dependent upon meteorological conditions, particularly on wind velocities at various levels, the nature of the soil or rock at ground zero and the height of the centre of the fireball. The number of variables does not permit an accurate, detailed description of the fall-out pattern; however, an indication of the order of magnitude can be given. A downwind belt about 40 miles in length and up to 15 miles in width would be so contaminated as to seriously threaten the lives of nearly all persons in the area who did not take protective measures. 5. plosion It is probable that the radiation level one hour ~fter in the Ocean Terminal area would be about 1000 roentgens exper /2 000155 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ; • SECRET -2- hour. Assuming a normal decay rate it would be 1.3 days before the dose rate would be down to 1 roentgen per hour. Assuming a maximum allowable whole body radiation dose of 25 roentgens for a 24 hour period, 24 hours after burst a working party would only be able to stay in the area for 1 hour and 10 minutes. This allowable dose is particularly high and could only be applied to the immediate relief phase. If the allowable dose or 0.l roentgens per day, which was established by the U.S. Committee on X-rays and Radium Protection, and which is still high compared with the present peacetime dose of 0 •.3 roentgens per week, were applied it would be eighteen months· before a working party could enter the area and remain for an eight hour period. 6. Although the extremes have been presented to illustrate the problem, it must be assumed that it would be a matter of months before the real work of rehabilitation could be commenced. Just how long it would take depends largely upon the availability of manpower. If manpower were scarce the allowable dosage would have to be reduced in order to get the maximumoverall return from that manpower available. It is probable that some decontamination measures taken in critical areas would improve the situation. 000156 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ·I .. SECRET APPENDIX "C" Enclosure 3 EFFF.CTS OF A 50 KILOTON UNDERWATER BURST ONTHEPORTOF HALIFAX 1. The comments presented under effects of a 20 KT underwater burst on the port of Halifax are also applicable, in general, to the effects of a 50 KT underwater burst. 2. On the basis of estimated very tentatively of a harbour 50 feet deep 250 feet deep, with a lip bottom would reduce these very inadequate information, it can be that a 50 KT bomb detonated on the bottom would form a crater 2000 feet in diameter, height of 140 feet. Deeper water and rock dimensions somewhat. 3. The damage.that might be expected from a 50 kiloton at a depth of 50 feet and at a distance of 500 feet off-shore Pier A can be summarized as follows: burst from on Pier A and severe a) total destruction of structures damage to those on Pier B. b) Destruction c) Severe damage to at least in t~e marshalling yard. d) Severe to moderate damage to all structures south of Morris Street and east of South Park Street. e) Severe to moderate damage to the Uniop Station, the Cold Storage plant and the Nova Scotia Light and Power Co. f) Moderate damage to about 60% of the commercial docks between Ocean Terminals and Deep Water Terminals. g) Streets in terminal areas and as far west as South Park Street blocked with rubble to varying depths. of Pier A and 80% of Sea Wall. 50% of the rolling 4. Re-entry into the target area would be dary radiation hazard. One hour after explosion, Ocean Terminals area would probably still exceed It would take almost two weeks for the dose rate gen per hour. stock impeded by the seconthe dose rate in the 800 roentgens per hour. to decrease to 1 roent- 5. Within 3/4 mile of ground zero at least 25% of the population would be casualties, of which 35%would be killed. · 000157 �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ; SECRET APPENDIX"Ctt Enclosure 4 EFFECTSOF A 50 KILOTON AIRBURST ON THEPORTOF MONTREAL 1. Details or the effects of a 50 kiloton weapon are given here; however, as in the case of the 20 KT weapon, it is relieved that certain factors would preclude the possibility of a low or medium yield weapon being used in an attack on Montreal. 2. The best location for ground zero for an airburst 50 XT weapon would probably be at the end of Alexandra Pier, with a probable burst height of 2800 feet. The probable results of such an attack can be summarized as follows: a) All vessels sunk at Alexandra, King Edward and Jacques Cartier Piers, severe damage to ships at Victoria Pier, and moderate to severe damage to ships in Market Basin. b) Moderate to severe damage to ships at Bickerdike Pier and in Windmill Point Basin. c) Light to moderate damage to rolling St. Charles yards. d) Moderate to severe damage to rolling stock in Windsor and Central Stations and in the Bonaventure freight yards. e) Severe damage to Locks 1 and 2 of Lachine Canal. f) Moderate damage to Cold Storage Warehouse. g) Severe damage to all structures inland within a distance of about 3/4 mile from ground zero. h) Moderate damage to all at least 1.5 miles. i) Considerable damage to other port facilities such as cranage and harbour craft depending upon their location at the time of the explosion. structures stock in Point at a distance of 3. Within 3/ 4 mile of ground zero 100% of the population be casualties, with at least 80% killedo would 4. Residual radiation in the target area would be negligible and re-entry into the area would not be impeded by the radiation hazard. Fire and debris would be the greatest immediate restrictions on re-entry and vehicle movement. Severe damage would extend over an area of almost one sque.re mile outside the harbour area and moderate damage over an additional area of about 4 square miles. This would greatly reduce the number of recovery facilities available and would seriously restrict access to the harbour area from landwards. 000158 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information I J SECRET APPENDIX - "C". Enclosure 5 EFFECTifOF A ON.ifMEGATON' SURFACE BURSI' rom·OF--MON!REAL ON THE L Although one megaton and larger weapons are of the order of size which might be used e>nMontreal because of,its·importance as an industrial target, these weapons weuld not completely-· destr<>Ythe port facilities. Im the case of a one mega.tori weapon about 3 miles of.harbour frontage would be damaged, which is less than half.of the 10 mileso..r so of actual frontage. The burst would be sG positioned to destroy-the most vital portions of the harbour but it is -probable that it would be placed to cause the greatest destruction to the industrial ·capacity· of. Montre.al, and to place the majority of the effects over the more built.up areas of the city.rather than over water. 2. A surface burst of this size weapoJahas, in addition to the blast, thermal and instantaneous effects,.cratering and secondary radiation effects which greatly increase the problems of recoveryo ·The diameter of the crater formed would prooably be in excess of .3000 feet in diameter a:nd 500 feet deepo The dependence of the distrib~tion of fall out and secondary radiation upon meteorological conditions.makes the prediction of the possible contaminated area impossibleo The figures indicating the order of magnitude of the problem for Halifax in Appendix "C" would apply equally to Montrealo · .3o Assuming ground z~ro to be t};te CNRCentral Station the following damage would result to the harbour facilities: (a) Severe dama~e to: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (b) The following vessels (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) ( c) Sheds Noo 2 to 20 Elevators No; 1 and 2 Elevat~r B Cold S~orage Warehouse All Rolling stock in Point St. Charles Yards, CPR Freight Yards, CNRCentral Station, CNRBonaventure Freight Terminal Locks 1 and 2 of Lachine Canal Transit sheds along La.chine Canal as far south as Atwater Avenue All at Alexandr~ Pier, King Edward Pier, Ja~ques Cartier Pier and Victoria Pier All at Bickerdike .Pier and in Windmill Point Basin All in Wellington Basin and Basins, 1, 2, .3 and 4 of La.chine Canal All in vicinity ,t3f Montreal Dry Docks Limited. The following vessels (1) (ii) would be :sunk: would be immobilized:; All in'Ma.rket Basin Vessels tied up at Harbour Sections 23 and 24. In addition to _this damage to the port and transport facilities, abwt 10 square miles of the city would be severely damaged or completely destroyed, and another .30 square miles would be moderately to lightly damagedo Also other harbour fa~ilities such as cranes and tugs would be damaged depending upon their locationo\ 5o Within 2 miles of ground zero there would be 100 per cent casualties of which ~0 per cent would be killedo 000159 �i •. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ' I SECRET APPENDIX"C" Enclosure 6 EFFECTSOFA 50id::toi'oi{UNDERWATER BURsr ON THE.PbR•tOF-MONTREAL 1. The comments presented under effects of a 20 KTunderwater burst are a.pplicable,-in·geiieral, to the effects of a 50 KT underwater burst. On the basis of very: inadequate inf.ormatio.n, it ...can be estimated very tentatively that a 50 KT bomb.detonated oh.the bottom of a.harbour 50 feet deep would form a crater 2000 feet _in. diame.ters, .250 feet in depth, with a lip height ef 140 feet. 2. In the harbour area itself the river is wide enough to prevent its being completely blocked; however the shipping channel would be blocked and entrance to the harbcmr.. upstream. fr,o:rn.the burst would be prohibited. 3. Assuming a 50 KT burst with grounq. zero 200 feet off the end of the ~ing Edward Pier, the.following effectswollld be expected: (a) Probaple total destruction ~/ 4 of .Aiexandra and Jacques Cartier Pier. Pier, of King Edward Pier, Piers i and 1/3 of Victoria (b) Moderate da~ge to Market Basin Sections, and Windmill Paint Ba.sin area. (c) Total destruction Bitkerdike of Sheds Nos. 2 to 19 and ElevatortJ Nos. 1 and 2o (d) Moderate damage to Elevator_Bs, CPR freight and associated rolling stocko terminals, (e) Complete blocking of entrance to La.chine Canal, Windmill Point Basinl' and Bickerdike ,,Pier. (f) Severe damage to all structures'inland of about Oo4 mile from gro_tmd-zeroo (g) Moderate damage to all structures up to one mile o 4. Within 3/4 mile of grotmd zero at least would be casualties, with 30% killedo to a distance at a dietance of 60%of the population 5o In addition to the above effects an area of secondary contamination would be presento This would create an additional hazard and reduce the recovery capability as wello One hour after explosion~ the dose rate in the vicinity of the crater would still exceed 600 roentgens per hour. It would take about 10 days for the dose rate to decrease to 1 roentgen per houro 000160 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information I' ,. / ;✓ TOPsEbRET csc:5.11 2 October 1957 COPY·NO ? ,.... , A REPORT to the CHIEFS.OF STAFFCOMMITTEE by the JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THEINITIAL PHASEOF A MAJORWAR INTRODUCTION 1. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in a paper entitled "Conditions Under Which Mobilization Might Take Place", provided guidance for the preparation of service mobilization plans to meet present military commitments during the initial phase of a major war. In order to plan for the subsequent operations of a major war it is now necessary for the Chiefs of Staff to decide on the part the Canadian forces should play during this period and consequently the form the forces should take to meet this requirement! 2. It has been agreed in the Chiefs of Staff Committee that the conditions which might exist in Canada during the initial phase of a general war may be summarized as a serious-disruption of national life and war effort for at least the period of the threat of attack and for a much longer period in areas destroyed or contaminated. The causes of this disruption and additional conclusions drawn up by the Chiefs of Staff Committee to provide part of the basis for mobilization planning are attached at Appendix "A". 3. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff has therefore directed the Joint Planning Committee to· prepare a study on the concept of military operations following the initial phase of a major war. This study is to be carried out within present National Defence policy and is to be related to our agreed equipment policy so that the plans which follow will not interfere with our established priorities for the initial phase. 4. The aim of this study is to recommend to the Chiefs of Staff Committee what the Canadian concept of military operations should be during the period following the initial phase of a major war up to the mid-1960s, together with the role to be played by each of the services during this period and the general pattern of any reorganization of the forces required to carry out this role. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 5. It is considered that the enemy's primary objectives in a major war in pursuit of his war aims would be to neutralize all, or a major portion of NATO's main retaliatory power. This would include large scale attacks against North America. The enemy can hope to achieve his aim only by a surprise attack and as the Soviets will have the initiative at the beginning of the war it is concluded that we will get little more than tactical warning, probably a warning of 2-3 hours received from the DEWline. /2 000161 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information TOP SECRET -2- 6. It is very difficult to judge when the initial phase would end and the subsequent phase begin~ however, it is considered that the initial phase would end when the enemy is incapable of delivering large scale nuclear attackso The initial phase could last for days or weeks, and there will not be any abrupt change from the initial phase to the subsequent phaseo 7. In the subsequent phase of operations we will be limited in our capacity to fight to the weapons remaining at the end of the initial phase. Furthermore we cannot assume that any productive capacity will be available for some considerable timeo ASSUMPTIONS It is assumed that; 8. a) the initial phase has not brought an end to hostilities and the will to bring the war to a successful conclusion still exists in NATOo We will still meet resistance in varying degrees from the forces of the USSR. b) At the close of the intense powers will have superiority nuclear attackso nuclear exchange the NATO in the ability to deliver CONCEPT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THEINITIALPHASE 9. Despite the heavy attrition of forces and the intense use of nuclear weapons during the initial phase theSoviets will still have nuclear weapons and will only be limited in the use of them by.._ the numbers and types of delivery systems still available. The Soviets will have a small number of long-range aircraft for sporadic raids and will also have a substantial number of submarines for sustained but reduced operations. There will therefore be a continuing requirement for air def.ence and anti-submarine forces for the defence of Canada and the United States. 10. Because of the intense Soviet use of nuclear. weapons during the initial phase, directed against targets in North Anlerica, the primary problem in Canada will probably be one of survival. Consequently it is considered that the maximummilitary forces that can be made available will be required to assist in measures for the survival and rehabilitation of the countryo The battle of survival will be the first priority task and, until survival has been accomplished and rehabilitation commenced, it will not be possible to undertake any military activities in addition to those already being carried out in the first phase. llo The situation following the initial phase in Europe will probably be similar to that existing in North America. However, Europe will not only have been subjected to an intense nuclear attack but it will likely have been overrun to some extent by Soviet ground forces. The greatest effort will have to be devoted to the survival and rehabilitation of the NATOcountries, and therefore military operations will have to be limited to the containment and liquidation of remaining Soviet forceso The NATOpowers by the threat or use of their superior nuclear power will endeavour to prevent Soviet advances and to force the capitulation of the enemy forces. /3 000162 �Document disclo~ed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information TOP SECRET Subsequently it may be necessary to take over certain areas of the USSRto establish control and to ensure that resistance is not reorganizedo It is not envisaged that large forces would be required for these operations or that it would be necessary to occupy large areas of the USSRto carry out this objective. ,Canada might be called upon to assist in the rehabilitation of Europe and operations against remaining Soviet forces. MARITIME OPERATIONS Role of the Maritime Force 12. To destroy submarines in transit to their operational areas. The transit routes , passing as they do through the Denmark Strait and Norwegian Sea, will allow us to obtain a degree of defence in depth by means of an A/S barrier in these areas. However, since some submarines will undoubtedly have penetrated this barrier either before the war starts or during the initial phase , and since submarines can enter the North Atlantic from the South Atlantic without passing this barrier, the role of maritime forces must also be to control waters adjacent to North America by destroying submarines within firing range of North American targets. Canada~UoSo maritime forces in close cooperation will be required to deny this area to the enemy. Concept 130 A large proportion of Soviet naval bases and mobile support facilities will be rendered inoperative following allied attacks. Some s~bmarines can be expected to be destroyed in port, in transit and in A/S operations. The remaining submarine force, although substantial, will be limited to the capabibility of the USSRto provide support. However, because there will be nuclear weapons available, the submarine force will continue initial phase operations in the subsequent phase, but at a reduced and gradually diminishing interisityo Consequently, in the subsequent phase 9 allied maritime forces will have to continue to combat the Soviet submarine threat. Operations 14. In the transit area operations may be expected to start from the outset against submarines already at sea when the initial blow is struck. The intensity of operations will increase rapidly as the remaining submarines are sailed from USSRports to their operational areas. In the waters adjacent to North .America the USSRwill also be capable of deploying a n;umber of guided missile submarines without giving away surprise prior to D-day. These even though small in numbers could provide a significant contribution to the initial nuclear attack on this continent. The number of submarines reaching this area will rise sharply three to six weeks after the initial attack when the full intensity of the war at sea is expected to be felt. This period of intense operations is expected to last approximately seven to eight weeks 9 subsequently decreasing in intensityo To meet these threats, maritime forces should:! a) consist of forces~in=being 9 combat ready and deployed so as to be able to deal with the submarine threat from the onset o b) Be able to maintain intense operations for a minimum period of three months to defeat initial phase submarine operations and to be able to meet operational commitments in the subsequent phase. /4 000163 �r Docum~nt disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information 0 TOP SECRET -4c) Be supported by dispersed bases and alternate maritime airfields outfitted with a minimum stock of 90 days POLand logistics. d) Be provided with seagoing mobile logistic support forces to increase chances of survival by dispersal and, more important, to increase the period that the fleet can maintain its greatest operational intensityo e) Provide a seagoing mobile repair organisation to operate from a safe haven or minor porto f) Control operations through the establishment of maritime headquarters and adequate conununications, located so as to ensure uninterrupted operation during both phases of the waro Pattern of Forces 15. No change in the pattern of forces for the subsequent phase is considered likely as the subsequent phase is expected to be a continuation of the initial phaseo Normal base facilities are not expected to be available after the initial exchange, so, as in the case of logistics, repairs will have to be made at dispersted sites, making use of seagoing mobile repair units to maintain maximum operational intensityo Reserves 16. A small number of naval and air reserves specifically trained and earmarked for a particular duty and located in areas where they would be employed in war, should be able to report at the onset of the initial phaseo It is unlikely that the bulk of the reserves could be employed in the RONand RCAFroles envisaged by this concept of operations until the task of survival has been achievedo Shipping in the Subsequent Phase 170 Shipping at sea will be attacked as a secondary target priority in both_phaseso 'I'he direct protection of shipping, if it is necessary, would require Canadian maritime forces to operate at great distances from North American sources of support, adding emphasis to the need for mobile support to ensure our forces retain the endurance, flexibility and mobility such operations demand. CONCLUSIONS 18. The concept of maritime operations and the role of the RON and ROAFin the subsequent phase will be a continuation of initial phas 7 operations at a reduced intensity due to serious losses experienced on both sides in the initial phaseo 19. The types of RONand RCAFmaritime forces suitable for employment in the initial phase will also be suitable for the subsequent phase. Therefore, the provision of requirements listed in paragraph 14 above will apply to both the initial and subsequent phases in the prosecution of a general war at sea. /5 000164 I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information . ;, -.,..... TOPSIDRET GROUNDFORCES Role of the Ground Forces 20. The role of the ground forces will be to: in the subsequent phase a) continue to conduct operations in Europe; b) assist c) continue to conduct any required of Canada operations. civil authorities under SACEUR in survival operations; direct defence 2lo Because or the many imponderables in the initial phase, it is difficult to determine when any portion of the balance or the division could be sent to SACEURoApart from some additional support to the force now in Europe to bring it up to WEand provide first reinforcements, the balance of the division has been placed in strategic reserve by SACEUR. 22. Initially most of the Army commitments will be met by the Regular Force with limited assistance from the Militia. As mobilization of the Militia progresses, it will gradually take over all survival commitments in Canada with the exception of defence against enemy lodgments. SACEUR's strategic reserve may not be available for despatch to Europe until conditions in Canada are such that the G9vermnent will agree to its releaseo Its role will vary between employment in rounding up enemy detachments to assistance in the rehabilitation of Western European economy. 23. Army assistance to civil authorities will include policingevacuated centres and maintenance of vital services such as trans· portation facilities, food distribution services, communication facilities, etc. Since the assistance required will vary considerably in different sections of the country and since normal transportation facilities will be disrupted, it may be essential to move troops from one section of the country to another by air. This assistance may extend well into the subsequent phase as the Army.will be required to assist in controlling the return or the economy and population to more normal conditions. However, as indicated above, this role can be taken over progressively by the Militia as it is mobilized. 24. It is difficult to predict at what period in the initial or subsequent phases the requirement for defence against enemy lodgments may disappear. The Army must be prepared to continue to meet this commitment if requiredo The requirement for other direct defence or Canada operations such as protection of vital points, assistance to RCNin Coast and Seaward Defence, and internment and POWoperations will continue in the subsequent phase. It may be necessacy to postpone certain of these tasks in order to meet the demands of civil authorities for assistance in survival operations. /6 000165 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information TOPS:mRET -6CONCLUSIONS It is concluded thatz a) Ground forces for employment both within Canada and as SICEUR's strategic reserve should be airportableo b) The force in Europe in peacetime must be maintained up to establishment strength and should have with it its initial reinforcements. c) The militia should be reorganized to provide a strong healthy force related to its role in war. Mobilization plans must include the mobilization of the militia although such mobilization may be delayed in whole or in part. d) The Army must maintain its ability to conduct military operations both at home and abroad and at the same time prepare to assist civil authorities in survival operationso The Role of the RCAF 26. The role of the RCAF, in the light of the stated of military operations in the subsequent phase, will bes a) b) concept to continue to maintain the air defence system on full alert until the threat of enemy air operations against North America no longer exists. . To continue to maintain the RCAFcomponent of our maritime force at maximumoperational capability until the enemy maritime threat no longer exists. c) To continue air operations in Europe under the operational control of 4 ATAF. d) To maintain in immediate readiness, the maximum air transport capability to meet the demands of the military services and the civil power for airlift from Canada to Europe, and within Canada, in support of military operations and national survivalo e) With the resources and personnel not directly engaged in, or in logistic support of the above tasks, to assist in tasks related to national survival for as long as required. General Pattern of Reorganization of the ROAF 27. As the role of the RCAFin the subsequent phase will not differ appreciably from that of the initial phase, no major reorganization of forces is required. The following changes in the peacetime /7 000166 �,.. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information .• TOP SECRET --7pattern of the RCAFwould take place in the initial continue into the subsequent phase: a) phase, and would the role of the RCAFtraining organization would change at the General Alert from that of training to that of providing trained personnel to augment the RCAFoperational commandsas first priority, and to assisting in national survival as second priority. Training might be resumed in the subsequent phase dependent on conditions in Canada. and the requirement for additional trained personnel. b) At some stage in the initial or subsequent phase, the RCAFtactical component which supports the MSFwill either have completed its task or the requirement for MSFoperations will have disappeared. 'At this time, the role of the RCAFtactical component will change to reinforcement of RCAFoperational commands and assistance to the national survival effort. CONCLUSIONS It is concluded that: 28. a) As RCAFair defence, maritime and transport operations are expected to continue indefinitely in the subsequent phase, every effort should be made in peacetime to ensure that logistic support (especially POLand armament) could continue beyond the presently planned .30-day period despite the breakdown in transportation and sources of supply which might be expected from enemy action. b) To ensure the maxinrumutilization of the RCAFforces and resources assigned to national survival, the concept of operations, and the task assignments of the national survival organization should be clearly defined as soon as possible. RESEARCH ANDDEVELOPMENT. Role of the Defence Research Board 29. ations To assist the Armed Forces in their conduct of military against the enemy and in aid of the civil power. oper- _Concept 30. In addition to its Headquarters, the Board operates ten laboratories across Canada. Some 640 scientists and an equivalent number of technicians are employed. Major fields in the Physical, Chemical and Biological Sciences are represented to a more or less degree in DRB establishments and its Headquarters. 31. Under the present concept of conditions which may exist in Canada in the event of a thermonuclear attack, it seems probable that a number of the research activities of the Defence Research Board will cease or at best be seriously disrupted. Under these conditions the /8 000167 j �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information , • I I ) 0 TOP SEJRET scientific dispersed and technical resources of manpower might easily and lost to the defence effort. be Probable Tasks 32. In order to prevent such an occurrence probable tasks which might be undertaken should be determined and detailed plan• ning carried out in cooperation with the Armed Services. 33. The training and experience of the scientific and tech• nical staff of the Board make them capable of a variety of tasks which may arise as the result of an atomic attack. Broad examples of such tasks are: a) scientific advice on military enemy action; problems posed by b) contribution to the solution of problems of sur• vival, rehabilitation and control of population; c) direct fields d) calibration e) detection and identification or C.w.; f) coordination of plans for the rehabilitation scientific community. aid to the Services in certain such as telecommunications; technical and maintenance of radiac instruments; of first use of B.W. or the CONCLUSIONS 34. In view of the possibility should start now to: noted in the concept, planning a) Provide for orderly evacuation of each establishment and the Headquarters. b) Determine the requirements of the Armed Services for scientific and technical assistance in light of their anticipated role in military operations following the initial phase of a major war. c) Allocate responsibility to each establishment to organize and train selected groups of scientists and technicians to meet the requirements visualized by the Military Commanders in their area. d) Enlist the support of other scientific agencies and provide for the rehabilitation of the scientific community. 000168 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information I TOP SEX::EET APPENDIX --nA" to CSC:5.ll dated 2 Oct 57. THECONDITIONS IN CANADA DURINGTHEFIRST PHASE 1. 'I'be following is an extract of the Conclusion contained in JPC paper CSC:5.11.9 dated 14 November 1956 which deals with the conditions under which mobilization of Canada's armed forces would have to take place at the outbreak of a general war between the eastern and western blocs in the early 19601 s. This paper was approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee at their 600th meeting held on 7/8 November 1956. CONCLUSIONS 2. It is concluded that the conditions in Canada on the outbreak of a general war in the early 19601 s may be summarized as a serious disruption of national life and war effort for at least the period of the threat of attack and for a much longer period in areas destroyed or contaminated. This would be caused by evacuation, damage, loss of life, and fall-out in the areas in which the majority o,f Canada's population and armed forces are located, and will include: a) delays and difficulties in obtaining government direction, approval and policy for war measures. b) · Overloading and breakdown of communication facilities in and through evacuated ana/or attacked cities and areas affecting air defence, the command of the armed forces, control of the populace and the coordination of the country's war effort. c) Overloading and breakdown of transportation facilities in and through evacuated ana/or attacked cities and areas thus reducing local transportation, transcontinental rail capacity through Edmonton, Winnipeg and Montreal, and making uncertain the use of terminal facilities in ports such as Vancouver, Montreal, St. John, N.B., and Halifax. d) Fear, confusion, the population. e) Casualties, coupled with (b), (c) and (d) above, resulting in loss of centralized control by civil military authorities • panic, apathy, and even anarchy in and f) Competitive demands between civil defence authorities, municipal, provincial and federal governments and the armed forces, for manpower, transportation, equipment, food and accommodationo g) Breakdown of normal distribution channels for the ~upply of fuel, food and materiel. /2 J I 000169 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information APPENDIX"A" to CSC:5.11 dated 2 Oct 57 -2- TOPsroRET h) Unpredictable circumstances from formulated plans. requiring departures j) The probable abandonment of large areas, have been contaminated, for long periods that or time. ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS DRAWN UP BYTHE CHIEFSOF STAFF.COMMITTEE TO PROVIDEPARTOF .THEBASIS FORMOBILIZATION PLANNING a) Conditions likely to pertain in the first few days of a war in the early 1960's and perhaps for the first phase, will require the Services to devote the maximumresources that can be made a~~ilable to assist in survival. _, ? ,irt, .fl/ ~/1- b) ,The ~ba·ttil:e::t.G>:f: survival will be the first pri~ ·ority task and, until survival has been accomplished and rehabilitation commenced, it will not be possible to carry out additional military activities, such as the raising and training of additional forces and the provision of additional stores and equipment. c) · The conditions visualized in this paper may preclude the earmarked reinforcing of our M-Day forces to allow for 100% and round-the-clock manning. Therefore the forces required for urgent defence activities on M-Day, and for the first phase, must be raised, trained, equipped and be immediately available on an alert being declared or hostilities commenced. TOP SECRET f � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Concept of Operations / 28 NOVEMBER 1957 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1957-11-28 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00114 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CSC paper no. 1 (57), "Concept of Operations following the Initial Phase of a Major War," 28 Nov. 1957, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/72a52db5ab043fcc1b69209677f76a30.pdf add9e2a4a1e95d08365423cdfc7f1eb8 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to tnf~r/;,°tion Ac Document divulgue en.v~rtu de la . j/S JOINTINTELLIGENCE CCNMITp Extract from the minutes of the held on ------ ,· ---- /f ,fl/ -3-f' SE 6' LZ'.::cce/ ii l'informat ,, a. meeting , (TOP SIDREr) XI. CONCEPl' .OF FtJrURE WARFARE -~---· ---- -·-;;: ;h~- ~·~~;~;·hac1.-;~~-~~~~;_de;~~;_~~-JIC251/2(58) dated -·- ----- --f 11 5 Feb 58., "The Nature of General 'War.,1965-70 • (CSC 2156-1 and CSC 7-17 (JIC) of 6 Feb 58} ~ / 23 •. w/c Gordon doubted if we were in a position as yet to write this paper. In view of the joint study. on the threat to North America., it would be possible to prepare a pa.per on the nature of general warfare between __ _ the Soviet Union and North American nations. However., in order to make · statements covering the nature of general warfare in Europe., a paper on the threat to Europe would be required.. 24. Brig. Rothschild stated that first of all it should be determined if there was a real requirement for this pa.per. If the pa.per was·written it should be prepared in conjunction with the Planners as a paper on which future planning could be based.· · 25. Colo-Tate stated that the Army has already prepared a study outlining the concept for the employment of the Army in the event of nuclear or limited war. 26. Cdr. ,Stowell stated that the Naval Warfare Study Group has also prepared a study covering the employment of the RONin Phase I of a nuclear war up to 1960. This group was now engaged in enlarging the scope of the original study to cover the employment of the RONin both nuclear and limited war up to 1967. Since at least two services are already engaged in unilateral studies of this nature, there would seem to be a definite requirement for an agreed paper to set the stage for more detailed individual service studies if' conflicting and possibly overlapping concepts were to be avoid'ed. [', 27. Dr. Arnell noted that the individual service directors had indicated that they had prepared such a paper for their own service. He considered that there must be a requirement for a paper embodying the views of all services. \ 28. Col. Tate felt that the important thing from the point of view of the Planners was courses of action. 29. The Chairman suggested that possibly a much larger study than the Threat to North America paper was now required covering the threat to the NATOarea., outside of North America., and perhaps this should precede the writing of a paper on the concept of future warfare. ',i ' JO. Brig. RothschiJd stated th~t the Army had pr~sented a btiefing to a group of senior·officials from the Deputy Minister's office, Department of .Finance and DDP, the CNSand the CAS about two weeks ago on the Army concept of war in the future. Such a briefing could be useful to the JIC. ,-~ - --ting that Committee to cons:i.ut;;.1: uuv ·-'"1-reques . g a combined services concept of future warfare pa per coverin t · b ti· on to make and indicating that intelligence has a con ri u to such a paper; th JPC u1d indicate that the develop(b) that the memorandumto ·re uire the preparation of ment of this concep~ po~~~b~vret thre~t to the NATO area, less a joint study covering · . North America; and . . t B . g Rothschild to make enquiries and to arrange., i)L (c) to reques ri • b i fin 0 f the JIC if ssible for a combined services re g 000276 cov:ing individual service concepts of future warfare. \ 1 �Document disclosed under the Accessto tnf?r~a~'.on Act -. Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces a I ,nformat10 • ., JOiltT INTELLIGENCE CGOO.TTEE . t:: · Extract from the minutes of . 5 ¼ held on a.,..,/ :.; JI t"' ---:'J 7 ,~e -..::-•---- meeting • ....... \ .., '').' ,,.,1 (ToP·smRET) X-i-i'I.--GONCm-OF-RurURE-WARFARE Secretary 290 ·The··committee· had for consideration of the JFC on this subjecto a draft memorandumto the· lJ (CSC 2156-1 (JIO) of 20 .Feb 58) \ 300 ·In the considerable diseu.ssion·which :followed, the.Committee noted that the preparation of this joint study would entail the preliminarypreparation of joint papers on the threat to the NATO area outside North Americao The requirement., if anyg for these papers was consideredo It wasnoted that the information necessary to write the threat estimates would have 1 s support would be necessary to to be obtained from SHAPEand that the CCOS obtain the release of this :information. ·The majority of the members felt that the COOSshould approve the preparation of the threat estimates to the NATO.area outside North America prior to steps being taken to prepare these estimateso -· 3lo Capto Caldwell stated that the RCNhad a requirement £or a joint estimate to assess the Soviet threat to western sea lines of communication in the Atlantic and Pacific and to shipping in North American coastal waters during the period. 1958a67o . 320 ·It was agreed thatg \ {a) parao 1 and sub,,,parae 3{c) would be deleted fro~ the draft memorandumto the Secretary Jl'C; (b) DAI would advise at a £uture meeting as to whether ·the OAShad a requirement for a joint paper to assess the Soviet threat to the:Europea.n NATOarea during the period 1958-67; ( c) DAI would also advise if the OASwould forward this requirement to the Chiefs of Staff £or approval or whether it should be submitted to the Chiefs of Staff by the JIC; and (d) no further consideration would be given to the preparation of a joint study on the concept of future warfare miless invited to do so by the JPC or higher authorityo I -.~--·--- r (n 000271 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ~bJ ~· cse l{:tlc") ~1~i- ,,-""'-- TOP SECRET DRAFT Future Warfare 1. a possible requirement future i'Eii-Wlll.general on the knowledge already been agreed that which for warfare. that an important contributioP 2. It was the development prepare area outside to the North it papers on the and missiles same general would be necessary America which to were not The JIC therefore 3. that JIC/JPC the covered requests study to NATO of the threat and would have In addition, threats JPC views of future warfare and of threat estimates it to North ~D& joint for (a) to the would be complementary America, minor in had a study. to the and structure. study of intelligence threat papers to North approach fram~ would be necessary These joint had The JIC as a preliminary a concept, America. lines be d!;JH<:;Q!fUprepared, could to make to such recently-approved from aircraft the studies the of was based serv5-ces. and considered JIC/JPC concept general within JIC 1 s view that, of such joint concept, service required, on these by individual a combined was probably service The discussion studies undertaken individual· a combined threat on the paper?' requirement up to~ with (say)~ the following To assess the Soviet threat area during the period 1958 to the European NATO to 1967; 0JJe~~;c;p.J I\ (b) ~o assess the Soviet threat to~sea lines of ~.~'?F!ffiEFJJC2:.t.tsw-2:UhJL.~ ~9~~E3..!~if i c_!"i """N,.~G'..1o,,vd4V during the period 1958 to 1967; •-· ( C) llv~ 4. If will for To assess the from \_irborne and slJlrersion 1958 to 1967. these be glad these proposals to prepare papers, Soviet threat to North America and amphibious attack~,e:::stJ171:'Y!t::I Zl!:i::8 and sabotage during the period are for acceptable joj_nt to the cUscussion JPC, detailed the JIC 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Doc ent ivulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE 1!\epartment of j}ational JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE 20 Feb 58 MEIDRANDUM FOR THE JIC Conge;gt of Future Warfare 1. I refer.to the decisions meeting on this subjecto or the Committee at the 586th 2o Attached is a copy of a draft memorandumto th~ Secretary, Joint Planning Co•tteeo 3. This draft memorandumwill be considered at the meeting of the Committee on 26 Feb 58e Enc. GPH/2-5459/meb cc. CJS CB NRG JIS (5} A Cl 000273 V �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information CSC2156a-l(JIC) TOPSECRET 20 Februa.ry 9 1958 Secreta.ry 9 Joint Planning Committee. Conqept 1. of Future Warfare The JIC has considered a possible requirement for a combined service concept of future general warfareo was bas.ed on the knowledge that studies already been 1.Urlertaken by individual The discussion on these general lines had serviceso The JIC -agreed that a combined concep~9 within the framework of' which 'individual studies could be prepared that intelligence 9 service was probably required» am considered had an-important contribution to make to such a studyo It was the JIC 9 s view that 2a 9 as a preliminary to the development of' such a concept 9 it would be necessary to prepare joint JIO/JPC papers on the threat to the NATOarea outsid~ North •,. . .America. These papers would be complementary to the recently= approved j-oint JIC/JPC study of' the- threat from airm-a.f't and missiles to North .America9 and would have the same general approach and structureo threats In addition 9 it would be necessary to study the minor to North America which were not covered in the joint threat paper. The JIC therefore 3. requests JPC views on the requirement for a combined concept of' future warfare up to (say) 19f:r/9 and on the preliminary preparation of threat estimates with the following objectsz (a) To assess the Soviet threat to the European NATO area during the period 1958 to 19&7, 11r.,, (b) To assess the Soviet threat to 1Uestern sea lines of communication in the Atlantic and Pacific and to shipping in North American coastal waters during ~he period 1958 to 19&7i "4 000274 I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information TOPSECRET ( c) To assess the Soviet threat to North America from I I airborne and amphibious attacks and subversion I. and sabotage during the period 1958 to 4. 1967. If these proposals are acceptable to the JPC9 the JIC will be glad to prepare for joint discussion detailed formats for these paperso (GoPo Hartling) · Major Secreiaryo GPH/2=5459/j\Cl 000275 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Concept of Operations /FEBRUARY 1958 (JIC AMENDMENTS) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1958-02 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00115 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Joint Intelligence Committee minutes, "Extract from the minutes of the 586th meeting held on 19 Feb. 1958," LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3; Memorandum from the JIC, "Concept of Future Warfare," 20 Feb. 1958, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/847ed40cce1815fc0ae90e40ef349b60.pdf 99ca5c9f56cecd7c9c3d602076debaa0 PDF Text Text ;;~;~;ulg;~nc~o; Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - ~iur /'acces a /'information IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE DEFENCE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL CANADA DEFENCE ~-~:;, I _is :u~. BOARDb! / J(D'Yottawa, June DRBS l70-BO/J35 Ontario, 5, 1958. 0 1201 PH,,/- C Fil~ Secretary, Joint Planning Paper on The Nature r:Hr.·r:1'1 . :~-~;zz_S't -/ ..Jk,/ca-d Committee. of Future·War 1. I enclose nine copies of a paper on The Nature of Future War given recently as a lecture by Dr. Arnell, Director of Plans, DRB. 2. I suggest that this material may be of interest members of the JPC and would ask that you distribute the material to the members. to (W. Petrie), DRB Representative, Joint Planning Committee. Encl. 9 ttt-f 000257 l00M--4-56 (56-2088) , I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ·• I I ,.,,...:' l i S ...,J .:·.'' ,, SECR.El' • D Plans MemoNo.3/58 8 April 1958 THE NATUREOF FUTUREWAR by Dr. J.C. Arnell, Director of Plans, Defence Research Board, Canada. The following is a paper prepared from the text of a lecture presented to the Eleventh Course of the National Defence College, Kingston, Ontario on Monday, 17th March, 1958. This paper is an attempt to examine the impact of weapons systems now under development on a general war in the future. While it is difficult to decide just how far ahead one should go for such a study, the end of the next decade should see the next generation of weapons in general use. This view is supported in the Threat to North America paper, recently approved by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, which places the arrival of the missile age at about 12§5. From this date on it is anticipated that the guided missile will be the major offensive weapon with manned aircraft playing an auxiliary role as reconnaisance vehicles. During the months that the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Joint Planning Committee met separately and jointly to develop this 11threat 11 paper, there was the gradual acceptance of the fact that the advent of the guided missile is near. However it was possible to detect in the minds of many of the officers taking part in the discussions a feeling that the missile would replace the manned aircraft mainly because it was the next offensive weapon on the list. At times it was extremely difficult to make the point that a weapon system does not become obsolescent of itself. History has shown that weapon systems are retained by fighting forces until they are either defeated by enemy countermeasures in the field of battle or because the possessor of such weapons feeJ:§._that the enemy will defeat his weapons if they are put to the test. This poirrtis important because it has a major bearing on an assessment of the shape of a future war. Consider the situation as it pertains to manned bombers in the future. There is a strong possibility that the Western Countries during the past thirteen years have placed all too great an emphasis on the manned bomber in relation to the long range guided missile. There is an equally strong possibility that the Soviet Union has placed the emphasis in the other direction. As Kissinger in his recent book "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" has aptly pointed out "nothing stultifies military thought so nruch as a victorious war, for innovation then must run the gamut of inertia legitimized by success •••• (World War II) had not only been won, but its course had run true to the (American) notion of what a war should be 11• Allied air power had been triumphant and during the latter stages of the - 1 - i)Y 000260 �•I. • Document disclosed under the Access to InformationAct - l Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acces ii /'information SECRt,---r war had been able to range almost at will over all sections of enemy territory. Even without atomic weapons the massive bombing attacks against her cities was sufficient to bring Germany to her knees. On the other hand the German Luftwaffe, which had entered the war with superior strength, met its first serious defeat early in the conflict during the Battle of Britain and manned bombers were never again to be an effective component of German offense. With their main long range strike capability gone, the Germans turned to missiles as a replacement and although their success in developing this form of attack by air was impressive, they had lost the war before they could bring the full impact of guided missiles to bear on the Allies. In a like manner the Russians were equally unsuccessful in the air battle, although their failure was due more to a lack of adequate aircraft, at least until the latter phases of the war when Lend-Lease equipment was reaching them from Great Britain and North America. Thus at the end of World War II we find the situation where the Allies, having triumphed through the use of strategic bombing, felt that the manned bomber would continue to form the major, if not the sole, component of air offence. In support of this view the development of increasingly higher performance aircraft has continued unabated, particularly in the United States, in the ensuing years. In contrast to this it appears that the Soviet Union recognized the guided missile as the next generation of pir offence. There is evidence that the Russians set up parallel programmes to develop high performance aircraft and ballistic missiles after the War, but within the last couple of years have reduced the priority on aircraft and are now concentrating on missiles. At no stage do they appear to have been as enthusiastic about long range bombers as the West. In 1945 when the Western Allies and the Russians overran Germany, the German missile development facilities were shared between the two groups. On the Allied side the largest part of the German scientists and facilities went to the United States where they were integrated into service programmes, while the Russians segregated them and having picked their brains, returned them to their homeland and continued with a native missile programme. Available evidence suggests that both the United States and the Soviet Union exploited these captured missile experts in very much the same way. This was to be ex~ected as in both cases there was virtually no native knowledge of missiles and the German scientists were put to work on the lines of development which were underway prior to the defeat of Germany. This has resulted in a very similar pattern of missile development in the two countries and a corresponding time scale of development. If at the present time the Soviet Union is slightly ahead in its development of long range ballistic missiles, this is because of a lower priority assigned to missile development in the West due to a vacillating policy and the vested interest in maintaining the manned bomber as the major strike weapon. Looking forward from the present it appears that the increasing capability of air defence is making the use of manned bombers an unreliable method of delivering nuclear weapons on an enemy's heartland. It would appear that there are techniques of air defence in the form of manned interceptors, surface-to-air missiles and the supporting radars and ground environment to cope with any of the high performance aircraft available in quantity in the strategic air forces of the present. It is this defence capability coupled with the· complete lack of any defences against the ballistic missile which is hastening the retirement of the manned bomber. It - 2 - 000261 I �Document disclosed under the Access to InformationAct Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acces ii /'information • • SECRET may be argued that present air defences are inadequate to cope with the existing manned bomber threat with the result that offensive aircraft will be retained. If true, this could affect the time scale of the changeover slightly but has little effect on the argument to follow. Thus in considering a future war it is assumed that the main attack will be in the form of long range ballistic missiles, for which there will be little warning. lacking defence, targets are virtually certain of destruction, and as missile launching sites in themselves will be difficult to attack, the prospect in a future war at first sight appears to be mutual annihilation. At this point it is desirable to consider present western strategy. This is so dominated by Washington that an examination of the United States' policy will be adequate for this discussion. Immediately following World War II the United States was the only country with atomic weapons and it was considered that these weapons coupled with a strategic air force could be used as the deterrent -- the "big stick 11 -- against any country with aggressive intentions. The possibility of fighting a limited war against Russian or Chinese aggression was largely discounted and instead reliance was placed on the threat of massive retaliation at places of American choice to prevent such aggression taking place. The Communists were expected to calculate that any aggression might entail an all-out nuclear attack on their own territory and that this risk was not worth taking. Until five or six years ago this was a valid philosophy and probably served a very useful purpose, However when the Soviet Union in her turn developed atomic weapons, the first cracks appeared in the doctrine and if it is projected forward into the missile age, it becomes rather frightening in its implications. Nevertheless the United States' strategic thinking has concentrated on all-out war and the major part of American military resources have been devoted to the strategic air force and other methods of launching giant nuclear devices. The result is that the United States is militarily and psychologically prepared for this type of war, but for no other. As indicated by the British White Paper of last Spring, the doctrine of massive retaliation has also taken a complete hold of United Kingdom strategic thinking. Because of the obvious shortcomings of this philosophy a strategy of limited hostilities has been proposed by several people, of whom Kissinger is probably the best known, This has received considerablP official support, particularly in the United States, The basic arguments for this strategy are: (a) The weapon is too big for its purpose, since the more destructive weapons become, the less their possessor is willing to use them. The development of atomic weapons has produced a growing feeling that the use of force is unthinkable unless national survival is directly threatened. (b) For historical and geographical reasons the United States has never felt her security seriously threatened until she has been directly and vitally attacked. Under these circumstances the American reaction always took an all-out form, This attitude persists and it is still envisaged that a future war will begin with a massive surprise attack against North America, or at least against one of the NATOpartners and will only end with the unconditional surrender of the enemy. Such a situation is most - 3 000262 I �Document disclosed under the Access to InformationAct Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acces ii /'information • SECRET • unlikely in the future as the Soviet Union is not pursuing a policy likely to lead to the United States recognizing a threat to her very existence. Rather, she will be faced with a threat from internal subversion and limited war, against which she will be very vulnerable. (c) Finally since the Russians have developed the means to launch or drop megaton weapons on the United States, the unrestricted use of such weapons by the United States would be as suicidal in a hot war as it is unthinkable in the cold one. An all-out attack on the United States would ·have to be answered in kind, but it would not be in her interest to initiate a thermonuclear exchange in any circumstances. For there can be no victory in such a war. The fact that the United States might inflict appreciably greater damage on the Russians than she herself would suffer has no significance, because her own damage would be enough to cripple her. Thus the United States has arrived at the point where the threat of massive retaliation is her only deterrent, but she herself is deterred from any resistance to communist aggression because of the exi3tence of the same threat in-R~ssian hands. Kissinger stresses that the present doctrine of massive retaliation as put forward by the US is undermining the various alliances which that country has in different parts of the world. This doctrine implies that the United States reaction to local aggression will not be in the form of either the defence of the local area or of limited off0nsive operations within the area. As a result of this the potential allies can develop little enthusiasm for an active role in resistance, for while all-out war may conceivably bring ultimate victory to the allied cause, the threatened country ¼Qll not be spared the horrors of occupation. Even if this feeling of ineptitude does not induce a tendency to neutralism, it does remove/all incentives towards making any military contributions and effort in the commoncause. This doctrine of massive retaliation converts the alliance system from an active defensive chain to a restriction to the United States' freedom to act. If aggression in one small area of the world automatically means an all-out war threatening the remainder of the allies with nuclear destruction, every ally not directly affected by the aggression will press the United States to seek some other, and probably ineffective, solution. The proponents of this concept assume that war "\\Qll be as essential in the future as it was in the past for settling international disputes after all other methods have failed. In the place of the major war, limited hostilities away from the heartlands of the great powers are envisaged. These will provide the foci of international disputes and the grounds for settlement without the ma.jor powers having to commit themselves to massive attacks on each other. It is anticipated that such hostilities will be limited in several ways limited geographically, limited in participants, limited in the size of atomic weapons used and limited in .- 4 - 000263 �Document disclosed under the Access to InformationAct Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acces·a /'information • • SECRET the scale of attack. Any such concept appears doomed on the basis that if a major power saw its future security threatened as the result of the loss of a local conflict it would aJmost certainly increase the scale and scope of the conflict until a major war had developed. It would appear that of a future war it can be said that irrespective of the manner in which it may start it ·will aJmost certainly end with the major antagonists attacld.ng each others heartlands, providing that each had a significant interest in the outcome. This situation, coupled with the increasing dependence on long range missiles with nuclear warheads as the main offensive strength, is again fostering the idea of disengagement in Europe .• Th~ has been given consicierab)-e prominence recently by George Keenan in his six Reith lectures which were delivered over the BBC system last fall and retransmitted by CBC early this year, and is also a component part of the Rapacki plan for an atomic free zone in Central Europe. - -=- j 1 f There is much to be said for this disengagement in Europe as it is difficult to see how any hostilities involving the United States and the Soviet Union in this region could be concluded satisfactori]y without the area of conflict being expanded to include North America and the Soviet homeland. That there would be almost total annihilation of the towns and cities of Europe in the event of a nuclear war there can be little doubt. Such devastation will not contribute to any decision and may be considered as wanton destruction of life and property for no good end. With ·the· appearance of intermediate range ballistic missiles it is possible to envisage an atom-free zone across the central part of Europe over which the iron birds would fly. On both sides logistics would require that the missile bases be established as far from the Iron Curtain as range would permit. Thus it is logical to argue that Germany, Austria, and possibly Italy in the west, and Germany, West Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the east, could form the necessary atom-free area. This could be extended to include Greece, Rumania and Bulgaria without affecting the basic argument. The above tends to point up one of the main considerations of a potential conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. Anybody who has followed the diplomatic moves of the two countries over the years cannot help but be impressed by Russia' obvious concern over the threat to European Russia posed by the NATOforces in Europe. Many pious words have been spoken by Western statesmen asking the Russians the rhetorical question of why they are so concerned over the allied military strength in Europe. It seems probable that at the present time tactical bombers operating out of the several hundred military airfields in Europe are seen from Moscow as a more significant threat to Byelorussia and the Ukraine than is the U.S. Strategic Air Commandoperating - 5- 000264 �r I Document disclosed under the Access to InformationAct Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acces ii /'information ·• • SECRET out of continental North America. Llke~Qse in the missile age a short to intermediate range missile based in the European area must be viewed as a more significant threat than the so-called intercontinental ballistic missile. The shorter range offence is always to be preferred because it offers a more reliable attack, which is more difficult to detect in advance because of the considerably reduced time of flight. This leads to another theory of the shape of future war which is based on the premise that a future war ¼Qll be a conflict involving the United States and the Soviet Union and that a decision vdll only be reached by one country defeating the other. At the present time Western strategists tend to look at the whole of the Soviet Union as the target system which must be brought under attack in an all-out war and at the same time consider that in return the Soviet Union must attack the entire North .America complex. This philosophy stems from a predisposition to assume that the top priority target on both sides must be the other's retaliatory capability, which is only a realistic strategy for the nation which begins a war with a surprise attack. No defensive strategy can be based on this concept. While this is probably quite valid as long as the offensive forces consist of manned bombers, it is doubtful that it ~Qll still hold in the days of long range missiles. This ~Qll be due to the fact that the attack vdll come in the form of either short to intermediate range missiles launched from submarines or long range ballistic missiles fired 11 from so-called hard sites 11, which will be very difficult to destroy, or from mobile sites, which vdll be very difficult to locate. In any case it seems likely that such targets will be very difficult, if not impcssible, to attack and will only be targets for the side which fires its missiles first. There is a second reason to doubt the validity of this assumption. There is a reasonable argument that offence is the best means of defence and as long as there is a reasonable chance of wiping out the enemy's retaliatory capability this might be the plan of attack. Howev~r success in such an attack appears dubious for either side even at the present time and it is quite obvious that partial success in this direction would not win a war. The form of attack which would be most likely to defeat an enemy in a missile war appears to be a massive assault on the real heartland of the country. By this is meant that area 'Which contains the seat of government and a large part of the population and industry. If this concept is accepted it is interesting to examine the North ilmerican continent and the Soviet Union with this in mind. The most striking fact in both cases is the relatively small area of the whole which comprises the heartland of the two continents. European Russia and the north eastern triangle of the United States including that part of Canada which borders Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River includes the part of each country which must be attacked in order to disrupt the life of each effectively. In order to appreciate this point consider the following facts. - 6- 000265 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information / ••• • SECRET Over fifty percent of the population of the United States live in the northeastern part of the country, b©unded by the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes on the northwest, the state of Illinois on the west, and a line joining St. Louis Ho., and l'Jorfolk, Va., on the routhwest. This area, which consists of less than 450,000 square miles is only fifteen percent of the total area of the United States or less than eight percent of the mainland area of Canada and the United States combined, but contains well over half the vital industries of the country. By extending this area about fifty miles to the northwestJ·a large percentage of the Canadian population is included. Similarly the western part of European Russia and the Ukraine contains about forty-five percent of the Soviet population and probably sixty to seventy percent of defence industry and research and development facilities. This area, consisting of the territory lying to the west of a line drawn from Leningrad around Moscow to Rostov-on-Don at the eastern tip of the Sea of Azov, is approximately 625,000 square miles in extent or about seven percent of the ~rea of the Soviet Union. From the above figures it is easy to aee that both the United States and the Soviet Union would be crippled if, thes!3 areas were effectively attacked and it is most unlikely that either could continue to fight a war successfully under these circumstances. One might conclude therefore that tne future defensive posture will be one of t'wo very heavily defended areas representing the heartlands of the two major powers, as other areas of the world cannot be considered vital to either. Both will recognize that attacking any other part of the enemy's territory will be indecisive and be little more than wanton killing and unnecessary destruction. In fact ;:is long as the attack is mado with atomic weapons having radioactive by-products, attacks on these other areas will tend to harm the attacker's population to at least the same extent as the defenders. 'i:his can be readily seen from the fact that an attack on the Soviet maritime provinces in Eastern Siberia will produce clouds of radioaotive debris which will be carried by t:1e prevailing winds either through Alaska and the Yukon into Alberta and Saskatchewan or northwest through the states of Washington and Oregon into riontana, and in either case will continue eastward across rbrth A,~erica depositing the radioactivity along the w&y. Similarly, clouds of radioactive debris resulting from a large scale nuclear attack on any part of the United States to the west of the Great Lakes will tend to miss the American heartland anJ be carried aero ss the North Atlantic to deposit on European Russia and its satellites. It must also be borne in mind that as long as atomic weapons produce clouds of radioactive debris, there is a limiting amount of explosive energy which can be released before these resulting radioactive fission products will pose a threat to future generations. This lim..i.. t cannot be set accurately but it is the considered oninion of the Defence Research Board that it is of the order of ten millio~ kilotons. This means that the explosion of 500,000 - 600,000 nominal atomic weapons would produce enough radioactivity to pose a long-term threat to life, if it were uniformly distributed around tho world. Huch has been said about "clean" nuclear weapons where the explosive energy will be derived from the fusion of hydrogen without radioactive products, rather than from fission. At the present time large yield weapons in the megaton range derive their energy from a combination of the two processes. Although the percentages of the two processes which occur in such weapons is not known, it is sufficient for this argument to assume equal contributions from each. This w:iuld permit doubling the amount of nuclear explosive energy which could be released and this would represent a total of about 1500-2000 10 MI' woapons. When it is considered that this figure must include all nuclear testing which has been carried out to date or may be carried out in the future, as well as all weapons used by all the combatants, it can be seen that care will have to be taken to ensure that large yield weapons are only used against truly vital targets. - 7000266 �r I ' i. • Document disclosed under the Access to InformationAct -i_: Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acces ii /'information SECRET Studies have shov-m that warheads with 1 l'-ITyields will probably be necessary in missiles used to defend targets against long range ballistic missiles. In order to ensure a kill it may be necessary to commit several such missiles against the offensive warhead and its attendant decoys. All this points to the necessity of a limitation of targets by both sides in a major war, if life is to be preserved on this planet after the war is over. The present emphasis in nuclear weapon development is to produce fusion ' weapons and thus eliminate this raclioactive hazard. The day will undoubtedly come when such weapons are available and the combatants will no longer have to keep track of not only the number of weapons they use themselves, but also the number used against them. Until that time target limitation will be essential. The possibility of a major war being initiated by a series of miscalculations under circumstances where the major powers recognize the danger of mutual annihilation cannot be entirely discounted. However tLe most likely situation appears to be one where the major powers will prevent the international climate reaching the point where a major conflict was likely unless one of the powers saw a possibility of winning such a war. As already indicated, once the long range missile has become the main offensive weapon, any strategy based on the reduction of an enemy's retaliatory capability by surprise, or in other words 1rd.nning the war before the opponent gets off the ground, is doomed to failure. 'Ihere does, however, appear to be some hope in a strategy based on a missile offence backed up by an adequate defence against missiles surrounding the heartland. It has already been suggested that nuclear attacks on the northeastern United States could be decisive, while similar attacks elsewhere on the continent would be unlikely to produce a decision. Studies of the problem have indicated that it would not be feasible to attempt to defenc an area as 12.rge as continental United s·0ates against a long range missile attack. Although it will be extremely difficult politically to provide an adequate defence for a small part of North America at the expense of the rest, this nevertheless ·will probably be the pattern for the future as ~he defence of a relatively small area appears to be possible. vJhile the vital triangle of North America is probably too large to treat as a large point to be defended, it should be practical to develop a unified pattern of defences which will be adequate for this area. Although the heartland of the Soviet Unio~ is almost half again as large as its North American counterpart, it nevertheless lends itself to the same ty-pe of defence. In faot there is some evidence ~o suggest that the Russian defence tactics against the manned bomber are patterned on this concept of local area defences instead of depending on a long range _offensive directed against the Allied bomber bases before these could be used to mount an attack. Some idea of the seriousness of the Russians in this direction can be seen from the magnitude of the present air defences of the greater Moscow area. Close to the city are hundreds of antiaircraft guns. Surrounding these a.re two rings of surface-air guided missile sites and extending outwards from these are many early warning and ground controlled intercept radars supporting dozens of squadrons of day and all-weather fighters. Moscow has been unique in having this level of defence. However it appears that the Soviet Union is currently extending it to include such centers as Leningrad. Although at first sight these two areas appear to require separate defences, it is conceivable that they can be fused into a single system w~th the further inclusion of such areas as the Ukraine. Having discussed the target systems in a fu+,ure war, sideration should be given to the long range missile which will sible for the changes in the nature of a future conflict. The liquid fuelled intercontinental ballistic missile has received some conbe responvery large, so much - 8 - 000267 �Document disclosed under the Access to InformationAct Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acces ii /'information ·• SECRET .1 ;...,, • publicity that little needs to be added here. This monster requires liquid oxygen or .fluorine as one of its fuel components and this in turn requires an elaborate base complex of liquefaction equipment and apparatus for the detailed checking of the myriad components prior to launch. As a result it must be operated from a large fixed base, which will provide an easy target once it has been located, unless expensive hardening techniques are followed in the base construction. Two current developments are leading to a modification of this ~Jicture - lightweight nuclear warheads, from which result marked reductions in the size of the missiles and solid fuel propulsion systems, which coupled with the smaller size permit operations from mobile launching sites and eliminate the timeconsuming countdovms. These missiles will be capable of operating over ranges of 4000 - 6000 n.m. and at the top of their trajectories will be about 600 n.m. above the earth's surface. This latter fact suggests a theoretical detection range of tho order of 1000 n.m., which offers a period of warning of about fifteen to twenty minutes providing that the early warning detection facilities are placed as far as possible away from potential targets. It is hoped that this period of warning will be adequate to permit the calculations necessary for the interception of the incoming offensive warhead by a defensive missile, A second and possibly more dangerous offensive weapon is the ballistic missile launched from·a submarine. This missile will have a much shorter range (1000 - 1500 n.m.), and will be much more difficult to counter as the reduced time of flight and lower trajectory will almost eliminate the period of warning. Added to this is the mobility of the submarine which permits the direction of the attack to be varied within the limits allowed by the oceans, It may be argued that much of North America cannot be brought under attaclc with this system anc:1in answer to this it should be noted that the nIDst remte point of the America heartland, as defined above is only about 650 n.m. from the nearest ralt water. It is only within the last couple of years that the submarine has been considered in this offensive role. Prior to this time rrost military thinkers viewed the submarine in its classical role of attacking convoys and generally disrupting maritime Enes of communication. This role has a long term strategic effect resulting from the disruption of food supplies, etc., but having no immediate effect has been considered as being ·of decreasing importance in a future war, when taken in the context of an all-out nuclear attack whi.ch should produce e. decision in a matter of days or weeks. It was ·not until the development of solid fuel motors for ballistic missiles thnt the way was opened up for the use of such weapons from submarines, as the problems associated with the use of liquid fuels made such use im:_oractical. With solid fuel engines the fitting of ballistic missiles to submarines has become largely a matter of ship design and standard engineering. If anybody has any doubt about this use for conventional submarines, this should be dispelled by the advent of nuclear propulsion. As American experience with atomic powered submarines has shown, these ships are capable of high underwater speeds, indefinite submersion and unlimited range. Thus they may approach any ocean area at speeds comparable to surface ships without any need for surfacing during their journey. Then as it is possible to launch ballistic missiles from underwater there is still no requirement• for a submarine to show itself unless this becomes necessary to establish its location. --------------One of the more significant aspects of nuclear powered submarines is their ability to operate under an ice cover. This was largely theoreti~ cal until the USS Nautilus made a trip of nearly 1000 miles under the ice of the Arctic Ocean last Fall. In making this trip the Nautilus steamed north through the Greenland Sea between Greenland and Iceland and travelled - 9 - 000268 �Document disclosed under the Access to InformationAct Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acces ii /'information SECRET I • ,.•, north under the ice to a latitude of 87°N. This trip had no particular objective but was ra-;:,her a probing expedition to get the feel of underice operations. The early part of tho trip went so smoothly that it was decided to continue north until the commander decided to return to open water following a minor mechanical failure. Such operations pose a serious threat to North America against which no defence is at present conceived. An axamination of a north polar map will show that :Jt would be possible for Soviet submarines to cross the Arctic Ocean and make their way into the Davis Strait oithor through the Robeson Channel between Greenland and Northern Ellesmere Island, or through the Viscount Melville and Ltmcaster Sounds, -which separate the northern and southern parts of the · Canadian Archipelago. From Davis Strait it would be possible for a submarine to penetrate Hudson Bay and possibly James Bay through the Hudson Strait, or in winter to get into the Gulf of St. Lawrence without leaving ice cover. Such under-ice operations :·muld be almost impossible to detect as present detection methods are based on some form of acoustics. The movement which is almost continuous in ice fields produce considerable noise which would tend to mask any submarine noise, even assuming that adequate detection equipment was available. Unfortunately the missile carrying submarine is a more useful weapon system to the Russians than to the Western Allies because of geography. While the North American heartland has some five hundred miles of sea coast, the corresponding Soviet territory is at least five or six hundred miles from open ocean. Notwithstanding, an intermediate range ballistic missile launched from a submarine could pose quite a problem to · the Russians, as an attack could come from the Mediterranean Sea, the North Sea or the Barents Sea in the north. The picture of the nature of a future war, between the United States and the Soviet Union, which has boon presented above, can be summarized briefly. (1) Radioactive debris from nuclear weapons will produce a long term health hazard unless their use is restricted to a limited number of vital targets. The development of pure fusion wea~ons will eliminate this hazard. (2) Limited hostilities are unlikely to produce a sottlement of any conflict of vital interest to the major powers. (3) In order to win a clear cut victory a successful attack must be made on the enemy's heartland, while maintaining an adequate defence against a counterattack. (4) The heartlands of tho two countries consist seven percent of the t·otal area and contain half of the population. (5) The offensive weapons will be the intercontinental ballistic missile 2.nd the missile-carrying submarine. vlliile a defence can be foreseen against the former, a system of countering the latter is still being rought. of about about - 10 - 000269 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Concept of Operations / APRIL 1958 (“NATURE OF FUTURE WAR”) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1958-04 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00116 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived J.C. Arnell, "The Nature of Future War," 8 Apr. 1958, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4a81bb1d8f88477ef58fa91c7db5fa5a.pdf 5882cfa00d55a3ef74a2ec27b125d20b PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE NO ...................................................... TOP SECRET . NSTS 1650-35 V3 (STAFF) CANADA ®ttatua, JPC AGENDA 14 November, 1958. COPY NO.I CONDITIONS UNDERWHICH MOBILIZATION MIGHTTAKEPLA.CE,CSC 1/57 DRAl!T REVISION Enclosure "A"- Draft Revision 1 CSC 1/57. Five copies of .Enclosure distribution to the members and the required. Revision of CSC 1/57 is Planning Committee Minutes 11/58-2, "A'' are forwarded for Joint Planning Staff as provided for in Joint 17 June, 1958. 2. The threat of missile attack in the form of ICBM or submarine launched missiles has been taken into account in the draft revision. The primary task of the military has been clearly established in Paragraph 21 as to provide and support the combat forces and their supporting facilities. Aid to civil power has been reeognized as a secondary task in Paragraph 22. The nature of civil defence operations has been removed from the main body of the paper to Appendix "B". 3. Appendix "A", "The Nature and Scale of Soviet has not bee~ revised pending clarification of what intelligence it is intended. to use. Attacks" 4. Therefore CSC 1/57 be placed it is requested that revision on a JPC agenda to determine: of (a) Direction to JPS who will co-ordinate and produce the revised CSC 1/57 for further . JPC consideration. ( b) The intelligence to be used for·the revision, particularly in Appendix "A"· (A.G. Boulton), Commodore, RCN, Naval Member, JOINT PLANNINGCCM4ITTEE. SH:CRETARY, JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE. TOP SECREr HQ. 1010A 150M-11•54 (NS. 449) N.S. 7570-HQ. 1010A 000131 ___l___,___,__..1 --~ ~ .:.. - .- J �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information .. • TOP.SECRET ENCLOSURE "A" to: NSTS 1650-35 Vol 3 (STAFF) Dated: 14 November, 1958. CONDITIONS.UNDERWH.ICHMOBILIZATIONMIGHT TAKE PLACEr CSC 1/57, DRA.Fl' REVISION 4. The aim of this study is to set forth which might prevail in Canada at the 9utbreak between the eastern and western blocs 1969 a~d under which, states of Oanada 9 s armed forces the conditio~s of a general war from the ea~ly 1960 9 s up to of readiness, alerts and mobilization would take place. ASSUMPTIONS 5. a. The war will be global b. .... The war will warning. targets start in scope. with little Missile or no and air attacks in NORTHAMERICA will against take place from the outset. c. Nuclear weapons of all by both sides d. sizes will from the outset. The intercontinental ballistic and the submarine launched missile by both sides. The Government may not have declared ALERTprior to the first ( ICBM) guided missile will be in use operationally e. be used an warning of actual attack. !· Plans will exist for decentralizing the administration of Canada temporarily to each province but the Government will not have made any firm arrangements until the Middle 1960 9 s for alternative sites from which to conduct the nation business should Ottawa be evacuated 9 s or bombed. g. In addition cities, to direct there will attacks on Canadian be random nuclear explosions. 000 TOP SECRET 2 000132 --~- - ~_J �' Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • TOP SECRET = 2 - ~ NATURE. Of THE W~ MC 48 Col).cept In the MC48 concept NATOnations 6. a future global war will relatively short would determine operations soviet consist are agreed that of ~wo phases - firstlyj and intense nuclear e~change which probably the ultimate victory; and sec_ondly, a period of indeterminate length of lesser be based upon preserving their at the same time enforcing would first attempt is ranged against intensity. strategy general assault presented their will all upon the West. nuclear Thus they offensive An equal threat by the naval atomic offensive forces power which These would be attacked simultaneously North America. of industry, Centres The nature to ~ussia ICBM, submarine by in the initial aµd scale phase. of attacks that are probable North America are sullllJlarized at Appendix "A". Attacks Agail).st Cl;l.llada The Soviet's SAC and AEC i~stallations Therefore most direct be routed that over Canada. Because the vast of oceanography difficult, SSG's could reach suitable 3 coasts North America. will bombers sea areas and off Canada. make submarine location to launch missiles The likelihood not necessarily is over Canada. ICBMand aircraft the nature Canada.~s air approach route to in the United States it can be expected on government and population against 9. is of the USSR. with any attack in North A,m.erica would also be attacked and aircraft in any and the SAC and RAFbomber commandbases around the periphery a. while The SAC base complex and weapons storage through the air. launched missiles would own country from destruction to destroy them. Soviet sy~tem in North America will be a major consideration cities of CO\lrse of Actipn It should be assumed that will a firing against of nuclear be on their positions off most targets attack relative in on Canadian importance Ooo TOP SECRET 3 000133 �1 --------------,--;-,-------------------D-o-cu-m-en-t-di-sc-los_e_d u-n-de-,-th-e-Ac-ce-ss-to_/_nf,-o,-ma-t,-·on Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acces ii /'information • TOP SECRET which may have been assigned other factors» to them by the soviets, such as the strength of our defence missiles and size of warhead available on their aircraft and submarines, to be taken into account. Canadian cities or ourselves. the nwnber of 9 to the sovieti weather Therefore attrition conditionsi etc. it should be assumed that and areas may be attacked deliberately or at random e~en though they may not be high on the Soviet -North American target have list of priorities. 'lHE.EFFECTSOF 'IBE INITIAL HI.ASE IN CANADA ,7 At the time qf the first 10. be much as it is today, state of readiness day business t.t,J.eservices maintaining and the population and pleasure. v'\..;..,,it,,,, r,.,-..JI-..{ ~t...o- warning!\ the country will carrying The following on its present day by few paragraphs to fores.ea the reaction in Canada to the first and the effects warning and actual of this their V attempt warning of attack, thermonuclear (/;t4 attack 9 in the initial overriding '"'':J.&tt 1 ,✓, (Z•. J~j.f/;.11ft. ,.,." , /~ 1 ' phase. - .-~ Considerations Joce,..J-,.;uKt!} 11. f- dec,t/4-., "'- ~ The degree to which thef(effects '" _. in Canada must be assessed conditions at the time. against will the prevailing It must be accepted that /i.1.;kp-,/- be experi8nced climatic all effects V will be more greatly accommodation, felt in winter food distribution wµen transportation, will present appreciably more problemf3. In~ti~l Warning and Reaction (°\ 12. MaxipJUmwarning of ICBMattack minutes. During this possible to alert retaliatory short defence against and defensive forces. submarine launched missiles form of attack public period it will would be about 20 probably only be the ICBMand to alert The warning of attack would be even shorter. the by Under this there would probably be no time to warn the 'biefore the first missiles fell. 000 4 TOP SECRET 000134 j �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • TOP SECRET = 4 - Presuming that warning would come from BMEWS,the 13. DEWLine and its seawings, underwater surveillance minutes before heavily populated the ASWdetection system, an attack areas. The.warning would be received and Civil between the receipt positive defensive developed. that unless streamlined immed'iately the authorities evaluate the warning information governmental and even probable that will be delays are inability to and to arrange levels. of procedures concerned, Consequently, time taken to consultation at it is possible the enemy would have been engaged before the Government had declared an Alert. all War Book measures prior to attack Formal implementation would not be possible of in circumstances. 15. The Civil to react public to warning and the initiation contact these there Delays would be caused by possible the higher information Defence authorities. of the actual action first Commander, who in addition would relay It is almost inevitable 14. to through the air would reach the the Air and ASWdefences, the Chiefs of Staff or the Canada would have from by Air Defence Commandor the•Maritime to alerting barriers, quickly. Defence authorities They would relay if such is the policy, and, measures in the selected cities may also be expected the mrning would initiate within to the general evacuation minutes after the warning is received. (L ') 16. trigger populated It is anticipated violent reaction areas. of the populace Personal and this that warning of attack in Canada, particularly safety attack. in the heavily would be the primary concern would result in a rush to clear of areas which, in the minds of the people, nuclear would Workers would leave their endeavour to unite and to leave the cities and in the process it is inevitable that out would be liable jobs, families to would as soon as possible, surface transportation 000 TOP SECRET 5 000135 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • TOP SECRET - 5 - facilities and telephone The nature 17. Priority )\ ot----c1vi.l"defence operat1~ \,____.-.-~- It must be expected reaction and movement of people, would prevail ---~~ is surnma-ri"zad ~ resources that, , with the disorganization, and denial·of during e~cuation, in the event of attack, to the Civil Howevert.he and sustain Clandestine Powers and to the Civil is to be sec~ndary essential points, they will services, reorganization major cross operations certainly of manpower. country communications Defence organiz= /to provid} to th6ir ' c.~ prime tas'i obstacles services of at isolated and may cut land= points with the aim of breaking and preventing are attempted to evacuation For example, saboteurs and rail routes and sabotage add to the disruption and produce further communications for and Sabotage If clandestine at vital forces ~heir suppi MY ot'.;rope/!n rorces Operations 19. and reserve primary task of the Armed' Forces ~at which there would be many demands upon the ?eArmed Fore?/ involving facilities and which would be more serious and manpower of the regular assistance ation. would become overloaded. of Task and Demands on Armed Forces ·18., line communications on the air defence the movement of personnel and equipment. CCNCLUSIONS 20. It is concluded that break of a general in only partial conditions war from the early mobilization of the mass disruption in support to the otherwise in Canada on the out- 1960 9 s to 1969 would result of combat forces, orderly because way of life. I These conditions of disruption from the time of the threat a. would commence to be generated of attack and would include:= Delays and difficulties government direction, policy in obtaining a~proval and for war measures. • 0 • 6 TOP SECRET 000136 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • TOl?SECRET = 6 Para. ~ (cont 9 d) 20 b. Overloading facilities in and through and/or affecting air cities defence, the command of the armed forces, ation and areas evacuated attacked control c. and breakdown of communications of the populace, of the country Overloading facilities attacked 0 0 and the co=ordin- s war effort. and breakdown of transportation in and through cities evacuated and areas transportation, and/or thus reducing transcontinental rail local capacity through Edmonton, Winnipeg and Montreal, making uncertain in ports such as Vancouver, John, N .B., d. Fear, the use of terminal and facilities Montreal, Saint and Halifax. confusion, panic, apathy, and even anarchy in the population. e. Casualties, resulting civil f. coupled with in loss authorities, ~'and~ of centralized and mil~tary Competitive ~P control municipal, provincial governments and the armed forces, equipment, the supply of fuel, h. Unpredictable. i. The probable /The ,, the provision agai~ I for manpower, channels requiring abandonment of large departures areas, for long periods ---------.. primary task of the Armed-Forces continues /\ of, comba.~arrd for plans. have been contaminated, 21. and federal food and materiel. circumstances from formulated defence food and accommodation. Breakdown of normal distribution g. by authorities. demands ~etween civil , transportation, above, /" their ~ support in~rrs that of time. . to be ~ the enemy. •• TOP SECRET 0 7 000137 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • TOP SECRET - ? = 22. conditio~ to prevail war i.n the . perior 1960 9 s will require I assist in Canada 9 s National l Defence o / Military 230 including the raising provision of additional until operations and training stores some rehabilitation the earmarked reinforcing and round=the-clock support required the initial the earlt the initial of additional forces s phase, and the and equipment may not be possible visualized in this Therefore p~per may preclude to provide the forces for immediate defence activities must be 1 raised, t;l\ to be immediately following of our M=day forces manning. phase, the has been accomplished. The conditions 240 CanaQ \1960' the Services, as a secondary task, to -I \ survival, chiefly by aiding Civil' ~/ ini J;ial phase 0neral to late in trained, for 100%, and their on M=day, and equipped and functioning .t, available\ on an alert having commenced, or when directed being declared, hostilities by the Government of Canadao L TOP SECRET 000138 �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • TOP SECRET APPENDIX"B'' to: NSTS 1650=35 Vol 3 (STAFF) Dated: 14 November 9 1958. Evacuation On the basis authorities of their would try to effect perimeters about the cities to prepare for attacko maintained the Civil of the population evacuated and areas and control expect Civil Defence warningo of the people was lost in a three less Defence to arbitrary shown at Appendix "B'1 and could be moved to re~ative presume that plans the Civil evacuation Where plans exist or where control authorities an orderly Defence authorities hours from the first plans rehearsed that could be about 6~ safety in about 3 Where there 9 Civil were no Defence than 60% of the population could be hour period. Under an emergencr evacuE1tion, · planned or unplanned~ there would certainly uncertainties, surface o be confus~on, CQllflicting transportation jammed. service.s would be curtailed disrupted. and lack of information. Municiipal, difficult if in fact provincial exodus from Ottawa and the six provincial of cities to be evacuated It will 3. while carrying out their also have a secondary stability, authorities be against capitals to give aid to the civil they were not authority in the hurried which are on background that to create the armed forces to defend Canada will otganization and power and Civil Defence during the period between the initial time of a first and Defence authorities. primary responsibility responsibility, and could increase and federal by Civil this facilities~ such as power, water, would be weakened and :in some cases non-existent the list and perhaps abandoned communications would make control Qither essential food distribution 9 would be over=taxed Overloaded and perhaps the confusion. completely instructions facilities both trunk and local, perhaps panic and looting, warning and the attack. 000 2 TOP SECRET 000139 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • 'l'O~v§!CRET = 2 = 4. Civil interruption Defence authorities from an attack the largest of the target Defence organization with the results population expected that Telephone exchanges, terminals, at all, cities and may be Civil at large Defence officials days and prolonged would be of doubtful until and rail reliability Defence authorities the initial power stations, arid relays, evacuated increase in the area. services would l~st to deal of the of the popula~ion areas because tp.e Civil evacuation and the Ciyil of dispersal period would be from 4 to? Essential without and prepared The extent areas would likely if t:P,ere had biee~ an attac,k that organized for some periodo this in the evacuat'!d would be evacuated a reorganization for the war effort suggest cities of an attacko to prevent that it should take about 6 = 8 hours before more or less from target consider phase is overo landline trap.sport plan communications systems, to and t~rough the may qr ~Y not be working reliably, because of the absence of key operating if WQrking and maintenance personnelo At:tack An ICBM or other before evacuation evacuation, rioting, would be hearr warehouses, Restoration at least of t4ese food and material and transportation services throughout and facilities the first and material to Loss of life phase, for a month or more, because of the residual hazard ·an:d the lack of tools or no of tl:).e people leading services, or area of essential and even anarchyo, and dame,ge to essential impo~sible more likely apathy, and denial accommodation, and communications would be great. a city was completed~ or where there was little and would magnify the. terror panic,.looting, be a,ttack agt\inst would add to the disruption services, would nuclear and radiation for reconstruction and ,, repair. Halifax ;Examples of the effects are contained of attack$ ?l~ainst Montreal and at Appendix "C"o .. TOP SECRET 0 0 3 000140 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • TOP SECRET - 3 = An attack 7. result in a lower loss facilities would still transportation of life has been completed should but the implications apply~ except in the case of mobile of evacuation. might be expected Stocks and upon which the services probably of damage to amount of the equipment would have been moved in the process in storage, will evacuation equipment where lower losses because a large clear after of equipment and foods and public normally not have been removed from the target not in the first few days of Phase I, and will rely & areas& certainly be destroyed and. damaged. The broader 8. include effects a break in the major rail of an attack route might be overcome by using the single Ontario to the Maritimes. rail line to Q.uebec, but if Q,uebec is attacked not be possible the main line an attack to complete the rail east and west. shipping. Because an attack on Halifax to plan to use alternate This would necessitate though limited transportation, would be limited facilities connections on the south shore of the St. Lawrence. and other in these diversion it would with Similarly, communications between should be expected and anchorages it for to minor port areas communications, places. should be carried ports This through Northern or evacuated and ferry on Winnipeg would cut rail is necessary on Montreal might Therefore storage and accommodation dispersal out on a permanent basis even of vital in peacetime. R~n~om Nuclear Explosio~s It should be expected 9. damage to equipment, and areas not assessed to random nuclear destruction that cities population as likely ~xplosions. targets etc., of life, in cities but which may be subject Some of these or might be relied and defence forces. would be loss of accommodation, used for the accommodation and support target there areas might have been of people evacuated upon for the sustenance The effects from of the of random explosions ••• 4 TOP SECRJ!n' 000141 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces ii /'information TOP SECEET =,' would be of limited si~ificance would cause more widespread of life, and disrupted 4•·-- in northern public services parts apprehension of Can_ada but and disorder, in and near industrial loss anq populated areas. Fall-Out Hazard There is likely 10. out throughout Southern ~uebec. evacuation perhaps Canada, particularly Extensive fall-out and re-organization panic in areas may be expected of essential to be a considerable services will considered to the loss in affected Ontario and add to the problems of and may bring otherwise to contribute in Southern hazard from fall= about disorder to be safe. of life and Fall=out and the disruption areas. TOP SECRET 000142 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Concept of Operations / 14 NOVEMBER 1958 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1958-11-14 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00117 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Conditions Under Which Mobilization Might Take Place, CSC 1/57, Draft Revision," 14 Nov. 1958, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/72642b968b9fa8d9adf783ebdeeb2333.pdf 1e8b2625b32baf0b7ae55ed115b34c86 PDF Text Text Document disclos1ad under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information BXTrulc.1Fr..Ct U[Gu"? .. CJ? ~c )/59 lfC k.>::in:ti h.ll.D '.--------: ~---'=- ••. =~a~•~1t~s~~~9==;;;----------:-:-, ,~r.:J·; =--......,._......,._ """C-~-_,:--,-_ --~. ,::--: •. -:,-_.~- -::1:'_ • ..-- __ -....,..~------------ -. _ ____, ___ ::-,-_ ,..._ -__ ...,.,,,--,.;-:-,:_.~ Requirement for Clarification of the Meaning of "SurvivaLOperations" J:)'"-A.csc 2156-1 . 3/59-6 __ :--::__ ______, ______ .,..,. __ -,--. --e--. ::--:--,1 -:,:. ' . ··'1i - Y (TOP SECRET) 1\ ~\-.. . r ,:~.;_ - . 10. The Committee had for consideration a paper on the above ·-·---...:..---sub~e-ct-(,NSTS-li>50-¼47/2-(-st-affh-26~ov-5-8},mbmit'tlrd~by--t;heRCN'------,._ Member. ACNS (P) outlined the RCN's reasons for submitting this \ . papero He-·cbnsidered that~th~=;~!ci~Ity-of-tas;-<~::-..::::. ~':.:::::;~--. j "> provided in CSC1(57), should be clearly established in order that ,,,,,,__----~--Service-operations --iii-supporfof ___ Clvirfief'ence survival would not be at· the expense of providing and sustaining peak combat forces in purely military operations. .. - ,, 11. ·ooPO expla;!,ned the reasons for the Army'suse of the term -~· "survival operations" a,nd··stated t~t the Armyagreed with ·the RON--· in the need for a definition of this termo Heproposed, _however, an alternate set of definitions as follows: •,/\ f -- ·(a) National Survival - The whole process whereby, following an-attack on Canada or its allies, Canada survives and thereafter continues t6:prosecute the w~re (b) Survival Operations - All military and no~-milita.ry operations undertaken by the Canadian Armed Forces which directly contribute to national survival.· (c) Civil Defence - Those aspects of national survival which ·are prilllarily concerned with the saving of human lives in the immediate period of attack. - . :J j I ·l2o C Plans I stated that within·_services' plans each has an operational role to aid the civil powers and such a role was written into their emergency plans. This·role is a primary one to the Army but seconcfa.ry to- the RONand RCAF. He felt,· however, that there was a need to retain flexibility, as certain ROAFunits (e.go, training units) not immediately involved in the air defence battle might be r_equired to provide 1oo,gaid to .civil defenceo 130 ACNS(P) referred to the Canadian Arµry Defence ,Plan and the _Canadian Army Mobilizaticn Plan and pointed out that it was stated in the latter "the assistance or the Army in the interests of national survival has first priority"o 1Je noted that this pr~ority was related only to civil def~nce operations and that no mention of priority had been made in th~ other sections of'the plan dealing with military operationso Hesuggested that military qJterations should be the first priority. · --.... ' l4o -~ stated that in Canada and as long as the "30 day" concept of war is accepted, the Army's first priority was in fact the provision of assistance to the civil authoritieso ACNS(P) stated that~ there was still a requirement for a definition of survival operationse \ C Plans I suggested that such a definition might be .included in CSC1(57); ioeo, the term "Battle of Surviyal• might·be defined to mean "Aid to the Civil Power9 o 150 \ . K 16. r-Art~r:~ther-di"'S"CU'S"S'imrtlieCommI=t_t_e_e_agr_· -e-ed-::--:t-0---=-de-f::.-e-r-a----~~-~ ..1 1------~~;1Q.r:,e~c~1=.si~n~wit1'.lthe next meetingo ' l • '"'::,;?'b~ r..;.: __-~' lU1~.L-----~~---------i------------------------=-=--------------;i--000200 ., /~ · ·; :-I! �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information -._; ..._ , ' . llf&C! fRCHMmurF.SOF ~IE 3/59 lFC' IEEfDll BSLD -..2:,3@.59 (SECRET) 3/59-5 Conditions Under Which Mobilization -~~Might-Take--Place---CSC ,,_l(i!l) 5011 1\ · ____ ·~C :: Comittee had for consideration a memorandumf'rom the I" l;creta.ry, JIC in answer to a request for JIC comments on the ppendices to CSC1(57) (Item 6 of the Minutes of the 26/58 J,PC :' refers). . - \ 9-.. The Committee concurred in the JIC suggestion that a JIC review of Appendix "_A_" to CSC1(57) be postponed until the completion of the new Canadian Estimate of the Threat to North America and that the review of CSC1(57) as a whole should await the i:e~~ipt_of _____ J,-IG-comment"S-on-.A:p~tx1A•. tr ---.1 (Action:: Sec. JPC) J ,, !I -( ••' �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information f (THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF. HER tv1AJESTY'S CANADIAN GOVERNMENT) ·~ IN REPLY ·PLEASE QUOTE NO .. Dtpartmtnt of ~attonalDefence CANADA JOINT STAFF ,,Q$.Q,,,g;J,5.9.:::l .... {/..f..C.1. .. ATTACHMENT:TOP SECRET JOINT PLANNINGCOMMITTEE ADDRESS REPLY TO CHAIRMAN CHIEFS Of' STAFF 1 OTTAWA, 23 Dec 58 Joint Planning CoDmlittee / Requirement for Clarification of the Meaning of "Survival Operations" The attached paper on the above subject was received from the RCNMember, 12 Dec 58, and is distributed to the Members f9r study. · 1. 2. Although related wishes to·have this item JPC deliberations on the awaiting JIG comments 0n to CSC faper i (57), the RCNMember discussed in JPC prior to further revision of CSG1(57), which is now the Appendic•es to Part "A"o 3-. - It would be appreciated if' the Members (other tban the RCNMember)would advise the:Secretary when they are ready to discuss this item. (jt-~ JCN/2-4972/mr O. Newlands) Maj•r, Secretary, Joint ..Planning Committee• .DISTRIBUTION OOPO ACNS(P) 0 Plans I .DNPO DMO& P DJCP DNPOSO(S) DMO& P. (M0-1) . External Affairs Repo (Mr. Tremblay) DRBRep. (Dro Petrie) CJS JPS (XA) . JPS/N, JPS/M, JPS/A Sec. JPC ' --------------------------------------000205 ''i �... J'" -- ll[ Il 1<\'f)) lf\i(•;• Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Qocument divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information J,,· :, r:. i' 1:-4ti - 1h-, I! • TO:r:-SECRET 1_.\l.,t~ 11 I ; ' '~.·. .\;.\ .• IN REPLY ~tC\ 1 \\ ",i /t/t.JJ..oYJU...CAN.A.DIAN NAVY ,,:on<=,~10.• •· rt,). 1 ol.'-e•• C\•e,l'l''') Re. -~---· ,.\i..c •• ---····· .• --·· ..-1-1r.•O ,<:\ __••. - .-•·· .. QUOTE NO, ..................................................... . NSTS 1650-147/2 Cs)M:wy.\tnt of j}ational1itf tnct CANADA PLEASE (STAFF) COPYNO. I ~ttabla, 26 November, 1958 • REQUIREMENT FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE MEANINGOF ''SURVIVAL OPERATIONS" References: (a) CSC i/5?, Conditions Under Which Mobilization Might Take Place. (b) H~S 2090-1 Vol. 8 {DMO& P 2A) dated 2? November 1 195?, Emergency Powers survival Operations. (c) Civil Defence Planning Assumptions, CSC 5-11-1 (JPS/N), dated 2? August, 1958. (d) Civil (e) The Canadian Army Defence Plan, dated 2 June, 1958. (f) The Canadian Army Mobilization Plan, dated 11 July, 1958. Defence Paper No. 5. The basic policy promulgated by the Chiefs of Staff in CSC 1/57, Conditions Under Which Mobilization Might Take Place, Reference (a), places first priority in a general war on the battle of survival. In CSC 1/5? the battle of survival is interpreted to include requirements for provision and sustenance of operational (combat) forces and their support as well as civil defence organization and protection for the population centre, industry and governments. / 2. The remaining references have plans for survival operations based on CSC 1/5? but principally applied to civil!, defence survival. It is noted that there is a tendency to allocate first pFiority to civil defence survival operations in Canada, which implies that the provision and maintenance of combat forces i~ secondary. 3. For example, in the revised Canadian Army Defence Plan, Reference (e), Chapter III, Part II, the phrase "Survival Operations" is used heading a section dealing with Civil Defence planning. The Canadian Army Mobilization Plan, Reference (f), in support of the Defence Plan, in Chapter III, Section 2 states: "The assistance of the Army in the interests national survival has first priority", of and then continues to describe civil defence. No mention of priority is made in the other sections of the plan dealing with military operations. SECRETARY, JOINT PLANNINGCOMMITTEE. 0 0 0 2 I HQ. IOIOA 150M-11-54 {NS. 449) N.S. 7570-HQ. !O!OA 000210 ~-- ~~ 1 �r •-• R .. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information TOP SECRET - 2 - I 4. It is considered that if the emphasis being placed by the services and other Government Departments on civil defence survival is continued, _it mµst b~ at the expense of provid~ng and sustaining peak combat forces and their support, as the two objectives will be competing for similar commodities and services in peace and war. Therefpre, it is considered necessary for the priority of task for the armed forc~s, provided in CSC 1/,57, to be clearly established. 5. It is suggested that the first step to establish the above requirement is to issue a definition of the term ·"battle of survival" from which the ter.lns "Survival" and "survival operations" are derived. The following definition is proposed: The term "Battle of su;rvival" includes in peace and war (~) As first ( i) '. priority: The provision a.Q.dsustenance of combat forces and their supporting facilities, and - {ii) (b) As a secondary (i) ---- The maintenance, and, if necessary, the reconstitution of the Federal Government. priority: Organization and implementation defence operations, of civil and= (ii) T4e increase, our industrial survival and revival capacity, of and= (iii) Operations priority. ot4er than those of first 60 Therefore the terms "survival" and "survival operations" usually applie.d to Civil defence will have the connotation that implementation of civil defence ,measures although important to the battle of survival 1 a:renot to have precedence over tbe tasks of first priority. Military authorities should be dire~ted to revise their plans to conform with the· definition. The JPC revision to csc_ l/57 would be a g9od place 'to start. Government Departments should be notified of this military definition aswell. ' ,' Establishment of priorities for (a) military use, and (b) interdepartment use, with cognizance being paid to the proposed definition is also req_uired to insure that plans and arrangements are made in peace for immediate implementation when directed by the Government, based on combat forces and their support being authorized the highest priority. 7. 8. rt is requested that this subject be placed on a JPC agenda for discussion and approval of the proposed definition, following the distribution of copi~.s of · s paper to the JPC Members. ~'(~ ( •• Boulton), / commodore, RCN, Naval Member, JOINT PLANNINGCOMMITTEE. TOP SECRET 000211 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Concept of Operations / NOVEMBER 1958, CSC 2156-1 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1958-11 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00118 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Extract from minutes of the 3/59 JPC meeting held 27 Jan 59," LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3; "Requirement for Clarification of the Meaning of "Survival Operations"," 23 Dec. 1958, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3; "Requirement for Clarification of the Meaning of "Survival Operations"," 26 Nov. 1958, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/19e0a6a48b5af7f795605bc2413fd3f0.pdf 232f2de6b68c57815df7d1cf2c00cd58 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • TOP SECRET csc 2156..1. (JIC) 20 May59 DRAFT Sec JPC CSCJ/57 - croncept of Operations 1. I.refer to your memorandumCSC5-11-9{.JPC) of 5 Dec 58 requesting JIC comments upon the above paper. You will recall that on 30 Dec 58 I replied on behalf of the JlC' suggesting tbat comments should be postponed until the new Canadian-United States Agreed Estimate of the Threat to North America had been completed. 2. This estimate {CANUS-59) has now been finally reconsidered CSCJ/57. upon certain approved, and the JIC has; The JIC considers that it is only competent to comment of the assumptions, paras 6-9 of the paper itself and Appendix "A" • .Commentson these points are attached. Secretary JIC· 000192 __j �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information .• - TOP SECRET R A F T JIC COMMENTS ONCERTAIN SECTl'ONS OF CSCJ/57 A. Para 5c If the period under consideration remains the "early 1960's" (say 1960 to 1964)11 the assumption that ICBMswill not be in use operationally by either side requires revisiono We estimate that a few ICBMsmay be available for operational use by the Soviet planners as early as 196011 or possibly 1959, and that this number will grow fairly years. We suggest that this assumption be deleted of the intelligence 11 rapidly in the following now that ICBMsform part background. B. Paras 7-8 We suggest that these paragraphs be deleted and that the following paragraphs (from CANUS-59)., which provide a more balanced statement» be inserted.a 117. An attack against North America involving Soviet military forces can be expected only in a general war, or~ an attempted surprise attack that would initiate general war. The Soviet leaders might decide to initiate general war during the progress of a limited war, during a period of intense intenmational crisis or in a period of comparative international calm, although the last possibility is considered the least likely., The Soviet leaders do not, in our view9 intend deliberately to initiate general war; they wish 9 on the contrary 9 to avoid serious risk of such ware Despite the acquisition of long-range missiles capable of striking the United States 11 the Soviets probably believe that the scale of damage they would suffer in a general nuclear war would be too risky to accepto (This judgment presumes, among other things, the continued maintenance and improvement of Allied armed strength and the absence of an unforeseen Soviet technological breakthrough of major military significance)o The Soviet leaders would almost certainly not decide to precipitate general war unless they concluded that conceding a position to the West would sooner ar later threaten the survival of their re·gimee They would undoubtedly initiate a general war, however, if they were convinced that the United states was irrevocably committed to the early launching of an all-out nuclear attack against the USSR.. · ooo/2 000193 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 2 ·- TOPSECRET "8. In planning for general war, the Soviet leaders must relate t;Jtrategically desirable objectives to what is tactically feasible with forces at their disposal. They probably wu1d adopt as far as possible the following general course of action for the Blocs .&• .is the highest priority, initially to employ its strengths to attempt the destruction or neutralization of Allied forces capable of causing immediate and significant damage to Bloc warmaking strengths • .b• To employ its strengths, as appropriate, to destroy, neutralize, or reduce the effectiveness of other Allied forces-in-being by ground, air and naval action. S• To employ its strengths, as appropriate, to destroy, neutralize or capture Allied war-supportillg strengths. ,g. To employ the st,rengths considered necessary to ensure the continued security of the USSR. of the Bloc and especially "SA~ In planning for an attack against the North American continent, the Soviets undoubtedly wou1d seek to maximize their chance of securing surprise, consistent with the necessary weight of attack. The Soviet planners would probably select as objectives for attack the following (not necessarily listed in order of selection for attack)& .. Nuclear retaliatory forces and facilities • . .b• _tlontrol centers from which direction is provided for governmental actions, continental defense and retaliatory offensive operations. S• .Population, transportation centers. "1 and communication C:. .Ai.ppendix"A". We suggest that these paragraphs be deleted and that the following be inserted. This text is extracted from the conclusions of CANUS-59and certfd.n paragraphs (7 and/ or 8, for example) can be omitted if the period covered by the revised CSCl/57 is restricted. "Aircraft, .Missile and Submarine Threats 1959-196Q 1. The USSRwould place chief reliance for attacks against North America upon aircraft carrying nuclear weapons supplemented by such ballistic missiles and guided missile submatines as are available. Guided missile submarines would probably be employed to launch missiles with nuclear warheads against targets along the coast, with the Atlantic seaboard receiving the bulk of the attack. Ballistic missiles would probably be directed against area targets in North America• •••/3 000194 �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information I - - .'.3- TOPSJOORET 2.·· .It is believed that the whole of the available he~vy bomber force plus a substantial portion of the medium bomber force of Long-RangeAviation would be employed against North American targetse As an example for pl.anni.Ilgpurposes, it is estimated that· (disregarding combat attrition), the USSRin mid-1959 could put a combination of about 500 heavy and mediumbombers over continental North America in an attack designed to 6mh1eve surprisee A majority of the strike airorad't launched would necessarily be on one-vtay missions • .'.3. Soviet employment of a small surprise bomber force {sneak attack) to be followed by the ma.in body of the assau1t 1s regarded as a possible but relatively unlikely course of etion., .Should a sneak attack be detected enroute or fail to any significant degree• Horth American defenses would be at a :max1mmnalert for combatting additional Sovi~t forces and attacks on the USSRby retaliatory forces would be set in motion. 4. ·While some heavy bomber operations could be mounted from home bases, the USSRwould have to use forward bases in 1£ola, the Central Arctic, Chukotski and Kamchatkafor mounting most initial mediumand heavy bomber attacks against North America., Additional bases elsewhere in the Bloc oould be used after the initial considerations of surprise no longer existed. ;. The USSRwould probably plan to the maximum extent possible to penetrate all Allied radar screens simultaneously, and to take the greatest advantage of the hours of darkness for their missions against North America. Someportion of the aircraft would probably be employed as specialified ECMaircraft for diversion and decoy pm-poses. 60 The USSRhas developed an operational pattern with their submarine force which would allow them to have stationed off the East and West coast ot North America• a small number of submarines for use in the initial stages of general war. It is estimated that this force would be composed primarily of such guided missile submarines as are available, used in conjunction with aircraft in the initial attack. There would also be at sea. in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans a significant number of torpedo attack submarines capable of attacking naval forces and shipping soon after the initial attack is accomplished. 1963-19667. By mid~l963, Soviet guided missile capabilities will probably allow extensive reliance on ICBM' s for the delivery of nuclear weapons against North American targets. Mannedbombers wou1d be available in sizeable numbers, however, and would probably be employed to supplement missile attacks. Submarine-launched missiles will probably contribute significantly to the Soviet assault. In spite eu/4 000195 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • - 4 - TOP SECm of reliability and accuracy factors, the inherent speed of delivery and relative invulnerability of the ICBMrender this weapon a most like4' choice for initiating the assault on North Americao· The timing of the diversified operations like4' to make up the Soviet attack would pose extreme4' complex problems to Soviet planners. To the extent practicable, however, they probab~ would plan to place ICBM1s on target at the time Soviet bombers were penetrating AJ.J.ied radar screens. By such tactics, the USSRwould hope to pin down Allied defenses and retaliatory forces until the bomber attack arrived over its targets. Soviet bombers would probably utilize air-to-surface missiles against the more heavi4' defended targets. S'oviet guided missile submarines would probab4' be employed in both the Atlantic and Pacific against North American land targets within missile range. Limited numbers or submarine-launched missiles could also be directed against the Gulf' coast. The effectiveness of USSR submarine attacks, including those on shipping and naval forces in North American waters, will be increased by- the advances made in nuclear propulsion and advanced weapons. 1964-1971 _Duringthis period, the Soviet long-range weapons system inventory will probab~ come to include ample numbers of improved lDBM1s and other advanced missiles including submarine,.,la,mched types, manned bombers, and large numbers of nuclear weapons tor all purposes and with a wide variety of yieldso It could also include advanced-performance manned winged vehicles capable of hypersonic speeds with ranges of from 61 000 n.m. to global and possib4' capable of weapons delivery 9 and/or other radical4' new weapon systems., The Soviets will have markedly improved capabilities in communications, and in electronic warfare including many types of decoys and jamming techniques. The likely form and scale of a Soviet attack on North kmerica during the latter part of this period may be generally described as involving the launching of large numbers or imrpoved l'CBM'sas the pr.i.marymeans of attack, supplemented by advanced guided missile submarines and advanced bomber and a;ir-launched missile attacks. Nuclear submarines with advanced weapons will probably be on stations in North A'merican waters from the outset. 8. other-Threats 9. It is estimated that the initial attack on North America would entail little threat of amphibious operations beyond commando-typeraids against selected targets in the Aleutians, the coast of Alaska north or Bristol Bay, and even possibly against parts of Canada and continental United States. These raids would most probably be launched' from submarines • ... /5 000196 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information .. - 5·- TOPSF.cm 10. It is considered unlikely that the Soviet :Union airborne operations against . North America at least in the early stages or a nuclear w_m-,although airborne operations on a small scale against isolated points in Alaska and the .meutians would be a probable course of a ctiono Airborne operations against Northern Canada, Greenland and Iceland are considered improbable. would attempt sizeable 11. Sabotage and subversion both by lmown and anonymous local m:immunists and sympathizers and by trained saboteurs outbreak or war. The ile ans or sabotage could include Bl and CWagents, and limit·ed numbers of nuclear weapons •. Espionage would be carried out by trained and integrated "illegal residents". The scale of all these operations would, hOlilever, be limited by countermeasures, fear of prejudicing surprise, and by the effects or the nuclear exchange itself. 000197 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Att Document divulgue,en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE NoC.SC ..·.2156~1..(JIC.) ...... . 11\tpartmtnt of J}ational1lltftntt · TOP SECRET CANADA JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE \ 11 Jun 59. ·Secretary, ·Joint Plarmii:ng Committee,, Conditions Under Which Mobilization · .Mt$t_.Take Pl.ac6 1. I.refer to your memorandumCSC 5-11--9 (JPC) of 5 Dec 58·requesting JIC comments upon the above paper. You will recall that o~ 30 Dec 58 I replied on behalf of t~e JIC suggesting that comments should be postponed until the new_Canadian~United States agreed estimate of the threat to North America had been completedo This estimate. (CANUS=59)has now bean approved by the Chief's of and the JIC has·reconsidered CSC1/570 The comments of the JIC on Appendix "A" and on certain other parts of the paper are attached. After studying CSC1/57, the JIC has been led to suggest that it might be . useful if certain aspects of such studi_es were considered by the JPC and the JIC togethero For axamplep the JIC ·believes that it might be useful to consider jointly some of the assumptions of CSC1/57 (para. 5), the adequacy of the MC.48 concept as a basis for this paper {parao 6), and some of the details in parao 9 9 which deals with-Soviet air attacks against Canada. 2. Starr, Att. GfH/2-5459/cp 000125 lo � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Concept of Operations / MAY-JUNE 1959 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959-05 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00119 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Draft report, "CSC 1/57 - Concept of Operations," 20 May 1959, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3; Draft, "JIC Comments on Certain Sections of CSC 1/57," LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3; "Conditions Under Which Mobilization Might Take Place," 11 Jun. 1959, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a4b811cc106f44d570f5e809c2287699.pdf b33b96df05283f97d0434cda932f00c3 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information IN REP.LY -· QUOTE CSC:,5.11 TD:l .............................. No ................ 11\epartment of jl}ational11\tfenct CHIEFS CANADA ADDIIIEH PLEASE . TOP.SF£RET OF STAFF COMMITTEE RIIPLY TO. SECRETARY CHIIEl'S 01' STAFF COMMITTEE, OTTAWA. 28 May 1957 Chairman, Chiefs of Staff CAS CGS CNS CDRB Concept of Military Operations Following the Initial Phase of Hostilities Attached for your consideration is a paper on '.the above mentioned subject, prepared by the Joint Planning Committee in accordance with the direction of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff. 1. 2. any This paper is in draft recommendations. form and does not include 3. This paper will be considered as Item I.I of the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to be held at 0930 on Thursday - 30 May 1957. (F.,W.T. Lucas) Captain, RON Secretary FWTL/6"'6756/mck c.c. Deputy Minister Secretary to the Cabinet Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Coordinator Joint Staff. .. 000354 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - DRAFT TOPSECRET CSC5=ll Z7 May 57 A .REPORT TOTHE CHIEFSOF STAFFCOMMITTEE BI THE JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE INTRODUGTION lo ·The Chiefs of Staff Committee· in a paper entitled Under Which Mobilization preparation "Conditions Might Take Pla:ce" provided guidance for the of service mobilization plans to meet present military commi.tmentsduring the initial phase of a major waro In order to plan for the subsequent operations of' a major war it is now necessary for the Chiefs of Staff to decide on the part the Canadian forces should plq during this period and consequently' the form the forces should take to meet this requiremento 2o It has been agreed in the Chiefs of Staff Committee that the conditions which might exist j,n Canada during the initial general war may and war. effort be summarized as a serious disruption for at least the period of the threat phase of a ot national life of attack and for a much longer period in areas destroyed or contaminatedo · The ca.uses of this disruption and additional conclusions drawn up by the Chiefs of Staff Committee to provide part of the basis for mobilization planning are attached at Appendix "AIVo .3o The Chairman,, Chiefs of Staff' bas therefore directed the Joint Planning Committee to prepare a study on the concept of military / ··"""'.···. .operations following the initial to be carried related phase of a major waro This study is out within present National Defence policy and is to be to our agreed equipnent policy so that the plans which follow will not interfere with our established priorities for the,·initial pha.seo ~, 4·0 The aim of this study is to recommend to the Chiefs of ~taff Committee what the Canadian concept of military during the period following 1j,heinitial operations should be .• phase of a major war up to the 000355 �i Document disclosed under the Access to tnfofination Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information I TOPSECRET = 2 = mid-1960sj) together with the role to be played by each of the services during this period and the general pattern of any reorganization of the forces required to carry out this roleo .GEIOAL CONSIDERATIONS 5o It is considered that the enemy0 s primar,- objectives war in pursuit of his war aims would be to neutralize portion of NATOsmain retaliatory scale attacks all, in a major or a major powero This would include large against North Americao The enemy can hope to achieve his aim only by a surprise attack and as the Soviets will have the initiative at the beginning of the war it is concluded that we will get little more than tactical warningj probably a warning of 2$3 hours received from the DEWlineo 60 It is very difficult to judge whe.nthe initial phase would end1 and.:'the subsequent phase begin$) howeveri, it is considered that the I I ini/tial I , phase would end when the enemy is incapable of delivering scale nuclear attackso The initial large .phase could last for days or weeks, and there will not be arr, abrupt change from the initial phase to the subsequent phase. 7. In tbe subsequent phase of operatioDE! we will be limited in our capacity to fight to the weapons remaining at the end of the initial phase. .Furthermore we cannot assume t.hat any productive capacity will be available for some considerable time~ ASSUMPTIONS So It is assumed thats §• The initial phase has not brought an end to hostilities and the will to bring the war to a successful still exists in NATO. We will still conclusion meet resistance in varying degrees from the forces of the USSRG .B• At the close of the intense nuclear exchange the NATO powers will have superiority in the ability to deliver nuclear attacks. 000356 �r----------------------------------------- Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act:_-] Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur racces ii /'information I .. CONCEPT OFMILITARY OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THEINITIALPHASE 9o Despite the heavy attrition of forces and the intense nuclear weapons during the initial phase the Soviets will still systems still availableo will have a small number of long-range aircraft will also have a substantial reduced operationso have The Soviets for sporadic raids and number·of submarines for sustained There will therefore for air defence and anti=submarine or in the use of them b.r the nuclear weapons and will only be limited numbers and types of delivery use but be a continuing requirement forces for the defence or Canada and the United Stateso Because of the intense Soviet use of nuclear weapons during 10. the initial phase 1 directed against targets in North Americap the i prima.ry' problem in Canada wil~ be Consequently it is considered that the maximummilitary can be made available survival and rehabilitation will be the first and rehabili~tion task and.p until ?~,,{,;--7) ~fJvC(·~ The situation probably be similar that survival ,, of survival has been accomplished ~.-J..:Ar:/4,,, ~-0~7' to 1.,v{;,I,!i:;::..,,l7 -r.,,J..-{ a.~ d. /, following the initial to that existing will not only have been subjected will likely -The battle ,,t;.;du-u --1µ1/ _ .,., ~,... ~___,,u d.-i forces in measures for the commenc~d,'-it w~ll not be possibl~ ~~M~-a.-e~v-i,ties,,,; 11. to assist of the country-. priority -,,,J~A &-~ will be required . I one or stttviv~o phase in Europe will in North America. However $\trope \ nuclear attack but it to an intense have been overrun to some extent by Soviet ground forces. The greatest effort rehabilitation will have to be devoted to the survival of the NATOcountries will have to be limited Soviet forcaso 9 and therefore military to the containment and liquidation The NATOpowers by the threat and operations of remaining or use of their superior nuclear power will endeavour to prevent Soviet advances and to force the capit~ation of the enem;r forceso take over certain that resistance Subsequently it may be necessary to areas of the ~SSR to establish is not reorganizedo forces would be required oontrol and to ensure l~ is not envisaged that large for these op.e;r_~tionsor that it would be necessary to occupy large areas of the USSRto ca:rry out this obj~ctiveo Canada might be called upon to assist and operations against in the rehabilitation remaining Soviet forceso of Europe 000357 �I Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information -4- TOP SF.CR.ET MARITIMEOPERATIONSIN THE SUBSEQ,UENT PHASE OF A GENERALVJARCOMMENCING IN--4"1flEMID~196o~s ~Mi3:l ROLE OF THE MARITIMEFORCE 12. (a) To destroy submarines in transit to their operational areas. Transit routes to North American waters are channelled through the Denmark Strait and Norwegian Sea making, an A/S barrier type deience in depth an effective forward defence against the ingress of soviet .submarines into the North At'lantic. (b) To control waters adjacent to North America by destroying submarines within firing range of North American targets. Canada-us maritime forces in blose co-operation will be required to deny this area to the enemy. CONCEPT lJ. A large proportion of soviet naval bases and mobile support facilities will be rendered inoperative following allied attacks. some submarines can be expected to be destroyed in port, in transit and in A/S op,erations. The remaining submarine force, although substantial, will be limited to the capability of the USSR to provide support. However, because there will be nuclear weapons available, the submarine force will continue initial phase operations in the subsequent phase, but at a reduced and gradually diminishing intensity. con.sequently, in the subsequent phase, allied maritime forces will have to continue to combat the Soviet submarine threat. OPERATIONS 14. The period of intense operations to be conducted by the Soviet submarine force in the initial phase is expected to commence about three weeks after the onset and to be approximately seven to eight weeks duration, continuing at a reduced operational intensity in the subsequent phase. To mee.t these threats, maritime fore es should be capable of:(a} Providing forces-in-being, combat ready, deployed so as to be able to deal with the submarine threat from the onset. (b) Maintaining intense operations for a minimum period of three months to defeat initial phase submarine operations and to be able to meet operational commitments in the subsequent phase. (c} Dispersed logistics and maritime minimum POL stock of 90 days. airfields with a (d) Provision of seagoing mobile logistics to increase chances of survival by dispersali and, more important, to increase the period that the fleet can maintain its greatest operational intensity. TOP SECRET os1>oeo 2 000358 �r Document disclilsed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information TO::PSECRET 14~ (e) Providing a seagoing mobile repair organization to operate from a safe haven or miner 1,ort. (f) Controlling operations thrcugh the establishment of maritime headquarters and adequate co.mmunications, located so as to ensure uninterrupted operation during both phases of the war. PATI'EHNOf FORCES 15. No change in the pattern of forces for the subsequent, phase is considered li,kely as the subsequent phase is expected to be a continuatioµ of the initial phase. Normal base facilities are not expected to be available after the initial exchange, so, as in 'the case of logi~tics, rerairs will have to be made at dispersed sites 9 making use of seagoing mobile repair units to maintain maximum operational intensity. RESERVES 16. A small number of naval and air reserves specifically trained and earmarked for a particular duty and located in areas where they would be employed in war, sould be able to report at the onset of the initial phase. It is unlikely that other Reserves could be employed in th_e RCN and RC.AF roles envisaged by this concept of operations in either phase, except in support of a civil defence and survival role. SHIPPING IN TEE SUBSEQ,UENT PHASE 17~ Shipping at sea will.be attacked as a secondary target priority in both phases. The direct protection of shipping, if it is necessary, would require Canadian maritime forces to operate at great distances from North American sources of support, adding emphasis to the need for mobile support to ensure our forces retain the enduranceD flexibility and mobility such operations demand. CONCLUSIONS 18. The concept of maritime operations and the role of' the RCN and RCA!!'in the subsequent phase will be a continuation of initial phas~ operations at a reduced intensity due to serious losses experienced on both sides in the initial phase. 19.- The types of RCN and RCAFmaritime forces ruitable for employment in the initial phase will also be suitable for the subsequent phase. Therefore 9 the provision of requiremerrts listed in paragraphd)above will apply to both the initial and subsequent phases in the pro\ution of a general war at sea, \ '4 TOP SECRET 000359 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • -6- TOP SECRET I Role of the Ground Forces 20•... , ....The roi.e of ~11~gro.und forces will ·'· . ' in the ~ubsequent phase be to: \ (a). Co,ntinue to conduct operations under SACEUR in Europe. (b) Assist civil authorities in ~µrvival operati9ns. (c) Continue to conduct any required direct defen-ee of Canada operations. 21. it Because of th~ many imponderables is difficult to determine of the division apart of reserve a.s su.ggested the division Initially the Regular progresses it will 1ri qanada with enemy lodgements. evacuated is acc9mplished i for employment in Europe where its warfare role to assista.qce 9f the Western European economy. to civil centres vary considerably ~ of is under way in Canad~, SACEUR's strategic authorities and maintenance facilities, facilities, etc. will include of vital food distribution Since the assistance in different normal transportation it w-ill"'i>e essential gradually the 8xcepti0n When this . such as transportation and since be met by ot: the Mill tia Army assistance communication a strategic from the Militia. can be released policing the by SACEUR. in the rehabilitation will reinforcements, vary between employment in conventional 23. now in Europe assistance and rehabilitation will first force Force with limited against reserve to the should be ~onsidered ovei- alf~entS defence of the balance most of the Army commitments will As mpbilization take support up to WE and provide balance 22. when any portio.q phase, could be sent to SACEUR. It may well be that, from some additional to bring it in_ the initial sections facilities to move troops Services services, required of the country will be disrupted, from one section of the ..../~ 000360 �,--------------------------------------~ Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en v~rtu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information -· 7 oou~try into to another by airo the subseque~t i~ controlling This assistance t~e return is difficult lodgements direct points, internment role at what period in the initial for defence against en~my to continue The requirement for other such ·as pr~tection of vital to RCN in Coast and Seaward Defen9e, will can is mobilizedo of Canada operations and POWoperations coptinue to postppne to meet the de·mands of civil in survival this T~e Army must be prepared It may be necessary in order to more as it commitment if required. assistance p~aseo to predict may disappearo defence above, by the Militia ppases the-r~quiremen~ to meet this to assist of' the econ<;>myapd populati9n be take~ over pro~ressiv~ly ~r subsequent be reqµired However, as indicated ! It may extend well phase as the Army will normal conditionso 24. TOP SECRET = and in the sµbsequent certain of these .tasks authorities for assistance operations. Conclusions It .. is concluded _.,. . (~) that: Ground forces for employment both within Canada and as SACEUR 's strategic ' . reserve must be airportableo (b) The force in Europe in peacetime maintained up to establishmept should have with (c} The militia stro~g should healthy Mobilization (d} • its initial related although in ~hole i to its to provide role a in War. the mobilization such mobilization may be or in parto oper~tions its in survival ability to conduct both. at home and abroad and at the same time prepare authorities and reinforcementso Plans must include The Army must maintain -~~al strength be reorganized force of the militia delayed it mµst be to assist civil. operations. 000361 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -. Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acces ii l'informat10n i I V -8- TOP SECRE'.t .A IR ,:pe Role of the RCAF of the stated The role of the RCA]', in t~e light 26. of military operations (a) in the subsequent phase, will To continue to maintain tull alert against {b) until be: the air defence system on the threat North .~.erica of enemy air operations no longer exists. To continue to :maintain the ROAFcomponent of our maritime force at !118Ximum operational until (c) concept the enemy maritime threat To continue air operations operational control no longer exists. in Europe under the ' of 4A~Af• (d) To maintain in immediate readiness, transport military capability the maximumair to meet the demands of the capability service.a and the civil power for airlift from Canada to Europe, and within Canada, in support of military {e) operations and national survival. With the resources and i:ersonnel not directly 'in,' or in logistic support of, the above tasks -to assist in tasks related to national engaged survival for as long as required •. General :Pattern of Re-Organization 27. differ A_sthe role appreciably organi~ation of the ROAF in the subsequent phase will from that of the initial of forces is required. peacetime pattern of the RCAF phase, no ~jor The following not re- changes in the of the RC.µ'would take place in the initial phase, and would continue into the subsequent phase: (a) The role of the RCA,ftraining change at the General ~ert to that of prqviding trained organization from that personnel the ROAFopera tiona.l commands as first would .. of training to augment priority, and 000362 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information -9- to assisting priority. in national tm-vival as second Tl:\aining might be i'esum.e~in the subse- quent phase:dependent on con~tions the requirement for additional (b) At some stage in the initial • the RC~ tactical in Canada and trained persopnel. or subsequent phase, • • I component which supports the MSF will either have completed its task or the requirement for MSFoperations will have disappeared. At this time, the l"Ole of the RCAF tactical ' component will : change to reinforcement of RCAFoperational and assistance to the national commands s1ll'Viva1 effort. Conclusions 28. It is concluded that: (a) As RCAFair defence, maritime and transport operations are expe~ted to continue indei'in:f:.tely in the subsequent phase, every effort should be made in peacetime to ensure that logistic support (especially ment) could continue beyond the presen~ POLand armaplanned 30 day period despite the breakdown in transportation and sources of supply which might be expected from en~ (b) action. To ensure the maximumutilization and resources assigned to national concept of' operations, the national of the ROAF forces survival., the and the task assignments 0£ survival organization should be clearly defined as soon as possibleo 000363 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act .Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information e 11 APPENDIX•A. to csc 5.;.u dated_.'ZJ May"·57 THECONDITio:NS IN CANADA DURING THEFIRST PHASE The following is an extract 1. of the conclusion contained in JPC paper CSC 5-11-9 dated 14 Nov 56 which deals with the conditions under which m'obi1batiOn of''.Canada!s armed fOl"ceswouldhave to take place at the outbreak of a general war between the eastern and western blocs·in· the early 1960's. -· This paper was approved by Chiefs of Staff Committee at their 600th Meeting held on 7/8 Nov 56. CONCLUSIONS It is concluded that the conditions in Canada on the outbreak 2. of a general war in the early 19601 s may be summarized as a serious aisruption of national threat life and war effort for at least the period of the or:a~taek arur for a much..longer.-period:·1n: areas destroyed or contaminated. and fall•out This would be caused by evacuation, damage, loss of life, in the areas in which the majority of Canada's population armed forces are located, and and will include: J!:o Delays and difficulties in obtaining government d.irection, approval, and policy for war measures. !?• Overloading and breakdown of communication facilities in and through evacuated and/or attacked cities areas affecting forces, and air defence, the commandof the armed control of the populace, and the coordination of the country's var efforto So Overloading and b~akdovn of transportation \ \ and through evacuatea and/or attacked cities thus reducing local transportation, TOPSECRET facilities in and areas transcontinental rail ··••0002 · 000364 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Info Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acces ii l'infor ' ... - TOPSECRET - 2 - capacity th~ough Edmonton, Winnipeg and Montreal, and ma.king uncertain the use of teminal facilities in ports such as Vancouver, Montl'8al, StoJ ohn, NoBo, and Halifaxo ,g. Fear, confusion, panic, apathy, and ev~n anarchy in the populationo ~• Casualties, coupled with ,!2, .!h and ,2 above, resulting loss of centralized control by civil l,o Competitive rlemands between civil municipal, provincial armed forces, and federal and military in authorities. defence authorities, governments and the for manpower, transportation, equipment, food and acconnnodationo g. Breakdown of nonnal distribution of fuel, channels for the supply food and materielo !!• Unpredictable circumstances requiring departures from formulated plans • .1• The probable abandonment of large areas, that have been contaminated, for long periods of time. ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS DRAWN UP BYTHECHIEFSOF STAFFCOMMITTEE TOPROVIDE PARTOF THEBASISFOR MOBILIZATIONPLANNING .§• Conditions likely to pertain in the first few days of a _, war in the early 1960ffs, and perhaps for the first ·--t phase, will require the Services to devote the maximumresources that· can be made available to assist !!• The battle of survival will and, until be the first additional and priority task survival has been accomplished and rehabilitation commenced, it will not be possible military in survival. activities, to carry out additional such as the raisii;1g and training forces and the provision of adnitional equipmento TOPSECRET of stores i r/ �i ---------------~---- ..... ..------,---~ ... 3 ... ~o The conditions visualized earmarked reinforcing :J . in this paper may precluae the of our M=dayforces to allow for 100%and round=the-clock manningo Therefore the forces re= quired for urgent defence activities first phase, must be raised, immediately available trained on an alert ties connnencedo TOPSEqRET on M-day~ and for the 9 equipped. and be being declared or hostili= � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Concept of Operations / 28 MAY 1957 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1957-05-28 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00109 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Draft report to the Chiefs of Staff Committee by the Joint Planning Committee, 28 May 1957, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/78c4a52f3e342af3a44cb61713c1cea2.pdf 7b1ff6fc8c3274bc2ed5b8da0f079fe5 PDF Text Text ��� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Origins of the Cold War Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Vodka honeymoons / fluctuating estimation / 24 JUNE 1943, NO. 74 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1943-06-24 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00001 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/092a2790a5478b5c7c73c90cc54a675c.pdf 65897135c33e0920b3545484b1f53e84 PDF Text Text �������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Origins of the Cold War Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Vodka honeymoons / fluctuating estimation / 3 JULY 1943, NO. 80 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1943-07-03 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00002 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Kuibyshev to Ottawa, 3 July 1943, no. 80. Record Group 25, series 2-AE(S), vol. 1. Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ec73844a02bb4274e6ca10792a594d99.pdf a765116fb978ebe7da114ca186922e81 PDF Text Text ����� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Origins of the Cold War Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Vodka honeymoons / fluctuating estimation/ 6 JULY 1943, NO. 82 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1943-07-06 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00003 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Kuibyshev to Ottawa, 6 July 1943, no. 74. Record Group 25, series 2-AE(S), vol. 1. Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/009c98ba6167dc3fbc769fd5b10ab98f.pdf 6c7472a6085a69c44a113f5db704ca04 PDF Text Text � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Origins of the Cold War Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Vodka honeymoons / fluctuating estimation/ 23 AUGUST 1943, NO. 107 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1943-08-23 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00004 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Moscow to Ottawa, 23 August 1943, No. 107. Record Group 25, series 2-AE(S), vol. 1. Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/86bdddc7b026b67ac1fe8484cf2599b3.pdf b4f9c9b8dbe59dccbb24d2010db9218a PDF Text Text ���� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Origins of the Cold War Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Vodka honeymoons / fluctuating estimation/ 24 AUGUST 1943, NO. 108 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1943-08-24 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00005 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Moscow to Ottawa, 24 August 1943, no. 108. Record Group 25, series 2-AE(S), vol. 1. Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4fc66fe385f2e2a3b1405205a74f4fd6.pdf 36779a17b174449d9f3dd49c9c5e35af PDF Text Text ����� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Origins of the Cold War Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Vodka honeymoons / fluctuating estimation / 31 AUGUST 1943, NO. 112 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1943-08-31 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00006 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Moscow to Ottawa, 31 August 1943, no. 112. Record Group 25, series 2-AE(S), vol. 1. Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a4a42bf0cdbd494abad905b5e66044ac.pdf dadce01c1d422b037c6e3785c6b7ea3a PDF Text Text �������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Origins of the Cold War Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Vodka honeymoons / fluctuating estimation / 18 NOVEMBER 1943, NO. 200 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1943-11-18 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00007 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Moscow to Ottawa, 18 November 1943, no. 200. Record Group 25, series 2-AE(S), vol. 1. Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c52b37d38625fa651aadc19dc7d1343d.pdf 85048fb6f145121646b270c82c896964 PDF Text Text ���� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Origins of the Cold War Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Vodka honeymoons / fluctuating estimation / 17 JUNE 1944, NO. 195 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944-06-17 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00008 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Moscow to Ottawa, 17 June 1944, no. 195. Record Group 25, series 2-AE(S), vol. 1. Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa. https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/885c4a5b6917dbcf76b2ffb1251fdec7.pdf c2469c3ab19ebb4bd2607b043fd09e31 PDF Text Text ������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Origins of the Cold War Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Vodka honeymoons / critical assessment / 25 SETPEMBER 1945, NO. 368 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1945-09-25 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00009 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Moscow to Ottawa, 25 September 1945, no. 368. Record Group 25, series 2-AE(S), vol. 1. Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa.