2 20 34845 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ccaa359457ae9760d0efd860d48d4f64.pdf 27b4a1b96d4279ad121bcf46922b98a0 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a {'information 1 HOUSE p' , .JF COMMONS DEBATES Friday, February 1, 1966 Sb3<??-4-^ •It:- IclJ.SC By Charles Lynch Southam News ; Services Prime Minister Diefen- ! baker is understood to have in his possession a document that is the rootcause of much of his bitterness toward the United States, and a number of his supporters think he proposes to make it public in the closing days of the election campaign. Important bearing Whether he does or not, the reported document has an important bearing on this campaign and the stormy , events that preceded it here in Ottawa because more than any other single factor it has shaped the attitudes of Mr, Diefenbaker and External Affairs Minister Howard Green toward the Kennedy government in Washington. (Last night at Kelowna, B.C., Mr. Diefenbaker branded the report that he had the document in his possession as 'completely false' "I don't know where that story came from . . . I have to repudiate it,' he told newsmen.) Mr. Diefenbaker: is reported to have had the document for almost two years and has already gone through one full election campaign w i t h o u t using it. Canada-U.S. relations were not an issue in last June's vote. This time, however, Canadian-U.S. relations are an issue. One of the things that precipitated the fall of the government last month was the famous State Department press release taking issue with Mr. Diefenbaker's policy speech on defence in the. House of Commons. That press release touched just about the most sensitive nerve in Mr. Diefenbaker's makeup and caused him to retrieve the document and threaten to make it public. His desire to do this heightened the crisis within his own cabinet, a majority of whose members took the view that to make the document public would put an intolerable strain on relations between the two countries. Cabinet pressures Mr. Diefenbaker accepted the pressures brought upon" him within the cabinet to keep the document secret—although two cabinet ministers, George Hees and Pierre Sevigny, subsequently resigned, saying they were dissatisfied with, the Prime Minister's assurances that he would not go anti-American. ' At least one cabinet minister — Senator Wallace Mc-' Cutcheon, now minister of trade and commerce—stayed in the cabinet on the express understanding that the suspicious document would not be used by the Prime Minister in the election campaign. Early this month, the matter c a m e before cabinet again, with Mr. Diefenbaker wanting to use it to bolster his campaign. Once again,' a majority of the cabinet, led by Senator McCutcheon, talk-, ed him out of it. '-. (See PM, Page 5, Col. 3) 4 manifester un interet marque a toutes les questions ayant trait a cette exposition uni, verselle. ! L'hon. M. Chevrier: Monsieur le president, ipuis-je poser une question complementaire pour faire suite a la longue reponse que le ministre vient de donner a une courte question? Puis-je suggerer au ministre d'etudier bien (serieusement la rumeur qui circule actuellement a I'effet que les nominations seront exclusivement de caractere politique, et j'espere que' le "ministre verra a ce que ces nominations soient denuees de tout caractere politique. - . M.fJ'Orateur: A l'ordre! Je suis d'avis qu'il est contraire au Reglement de formuler des observations semblables. • .11:. -..•••*:•.:.* .FISHERIES r REFERENCE TO COMMITTEE OF REPORT OF NORTH Urtnco JW PACIFIC COMMISSION On-the orders of the day: Mr. Colin Cameron (Nanaimo-CowichanThe-jlslands): Mr. Speaker, I shouldillike to ask,,the,rMinister of Fisheries if any progress hasrJ>eenrmade. in the matter of referring the /recommendations, of >.the 'north Pacific comI' missionyto the committee on marine and I ('fisheries? -^ >, ••& •.. I I Hon.'J. A. MacLean (Minister of Fisheries): I I have nothing to add to the answer which I 000445 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information •«. V' •>• nppiea cnnaren in ~ine un your help. Please take a Easter Seal return envelope ROTARY CLU Chateau A Choose from000446 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW06987 Title A name given to the resource "Claims report 'false'," by Charles Lynch Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Canada-US Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence - Establishment and activities," RG25-A-3-b, vol 6049, file 50309-A-40, part 4-2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Government of Canada Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1-Feb-63 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/e93033f573aad2fddc1a5047a9f9a41f.pdf a4e15a41c007b987e194cfa71a10874b PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de lo Loi sur /'occes /'information a • ' - - -r G O TT-F I -- -T -I -· • AL ·, •.-, Mar 53 2 Air Officer Commanding, 1 RCAFAir Division, CAPO5052, • c/o Postmaster, Montreal, P.Q .. CommandInstructions Gener~l ,..,_ In order that 1 Air Division, ·U-10::3eforces your status RCAF, may be clearly of the North Atlantic as Air Officer defined Treaty Commanding, in relation Organization to assigned t:, ,Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe, the following cc,rnmand instructions :tssued further are Orgr.:mization Order 71/52, to and in support of ll~ Oct 52. Command You will 2 ~•rith those assigned forces command 1 Air Division, of the North Atlantic to Supreme Headquarters As Air Officer ministrative Allied Commanding you will control over all 1 Air Division, Allied RCAF under and carry Tac,,~_c;aJ Air Force., will be exercised operational and ad- to your command. command of 4th to the provisions you will out such tasks fror~ :5.Jr:e i.:,o time by the exercise Commander in Europe has placed Subject Command Instructions, such plans Powers in Europe. th,e operational Tact:i.cal Air Force. :tr thuse Treaty .Organization Fo:.:ces assigned The Supreme Alli~d RCAF, now integrated the:refore Administrative execute as may be assigned CorrrrnandingGeneral? control outlined to you l,.th Allied of your Division by the Chief of the Air Staff. Com2Q§.i.~i9.!l 4 ultimately The composition consist between four Royal of twelve CanR.dian of 1 Air Division, F86 Interceptor ;\.i:r RCAF, will Squadrons allocated Force V:1.ngBases in Western 000182 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de lo Loi sur /'occes /'information a C O }I F I D E j'J T I A L •• ,,;hich reay be included in the Your prime Ai:c Di~ns:tor. :-1y'l 6 it elements to discharge as a component re::;ponsibilities as AOC1 Air Division sta::.1dard of operational of all to enable from time to time$ responsibility to ei1sure a proper n:Lti:=.,t::c2.tive efficiency Air Division Your specific and ad- compt·i sing fully of the its the RCAF commitments Air NATOAllied as AOC 1 Air Division functions EC.AF are~ (a) (b) To exercise operational control over all Division RCAF .. forces aerodromes stallations and other of changes national to the of ROAF RCAFin- .. To keep RCAF Headquarters vised to 1 Air assigned adequate ground defence To ensure occupied (c) and administrative constantly to requirements responsibilities RCAF of plans of NATOAllied which concern and the affecting ad- implications the employment Air Forces .. Status 7 The Force any occupation duties Civil Pwer insurrection under your command will in Germany or any tasks in France or Germany. you will take action in aid In the event to ensure not undertake the of the of riot security or of your own Force. 8 It will working arrangement between Officers Organization for be necessary the exercise of your Force Forces for you to establish of mutual and other North powers Atlanti·c a of command Treaty ll1 ~urope~ 000183 �7 ~---------------------------D-oc-um-e-nt-d~~c-/o-se-d-un-d-er-th-e-Ac-ce-ss-to_l_~_or_m_ot-ion_A_c_t_ Document divulgue en vertu de lo Loisur /'occes a /'information The legal France is Regarding F., :,:·:i.20 set forth the Construction 7 o:f this by you, PX(-Teised in the the disposal French ::·:c)garding the your signed i, Force virJecl for in London on June is governed by Article of Forces lC 10 of the Agreement of the Germany is Charter of the Germany for the defence High Commissioner right Allied of· r:rrtions of the of June 19 9 1951 Europe, zone of occupation status of pro- Agreement of be issued 'When the forceo to be stationed I, occupying of Western and the Force in Article than Atlantic comes into 11 as Agreement an'.:t'1gements in 3 (a} paragraph High Commission other North the legal 9 will of your to be force of the to the above=mentioned to be found th-c,t Forces such areas Governments instructions be continue coming into by the administrative The legal ·Testern the 19 9 1951 with have been placed of Parties Supplementary Status installations Canadian :tn command will command will Pending of Forces signed in accordance operational where and the Status that~ ']C.te while RCAFo Canada and France Use of Air.fields, Territorial territory ·:_J(:;t:,.:eenthe French '.'reaty and the You wll1 of the your For(;,?, to ·oe sc..s.tiorl1d in .~t Agreer.1ent between Agreement, exercised i.'.t in the May 14 9 i952o or'. Article stctr": which provides powers employed in may be stationed as are by the agreed Commander-in-Chief in of the zone con- cerned o From a legal 11 ..l. ttoccupation force" in Germany but Allied High Commission public law in the enjoy this formations Force shall pri'1ciple at all Force is NOT an of Law 69 of the of and has the force of Germany~ t.he Force rights 9 privileges of 9 its and force". The principle Canadian part the your by virtue Republic of an "occupation 12 that 'Which is Federal members and dependents immunities standpoint of the separate times :i.s brought entity be maintained. to the in ·which you may be serving, attention so that of the You will ensure of contnanders your of tasks 000184 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de lo Loi sur /'occes /'information a r CON I D E ITT I A L <-=Cl...,_..,_,-,._,__._ and undertakings regard may be so allo~;t:Jd to operational Canadian Force, ~i..pline necessity that its or. arr2.nged, and to the Canadian entity size will . with __ coa.:, due of the be preserved 0 apd Administration 13 You will Officer 1,d th the Forces in Europe.. ci1)line be the North Atlantic and administration prn\1ers with and other Central North '1:-rhichwill from time pcrsonnele Separate dealing Channels with RCAF Forces special call instructions powers for assigned Tactical Organization the v1ill to 1 in- Powers in Europe, and 4th Allied for dis= and men who are Allied Treaty to time Operational have disciplinary RCAF officers Atlantic Air Force Organization you will Europe Canadian be responsible Supreme Headquarters Air Forces f:J.1ied of all to those Royal Treaty In addition, regard with tr.:;g;rated Senior As such you will ir Divis ion RCAFo }i'o::·ce ___ Air formations integration of RCAF be communicated to you ·with respect to discipline .. of Commtg!,~~q_tion You are authorized 14 Air Officers to communicate Commanding Commands and Groups Member Canadian correspondence Joint relating Staff directly in Canada and Air London as you requireo to policy will with be passed Copies of to AMCJS Londono 15 of comrm1nication No limitation on any matter is placed with on your direct the Chief channel of the Air Staff. lem n) Air Mars al of the Air Staff (C R Chief 000185 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de lo Loi sur /'occes /'information a DIST: AOC1 Air Div Min ND D0r)1.,1_ty l.-1:i.nister ND C(_,airman COS ''.,A1.Jo:::- DAI- DOE JAG ~:::--,1.irman CJS London ;\ .·.: J'S London Cncc:~rman CJS Washing ton f\~1:CJ S Washington 3ec 1 y of State of External Affairs Copy Noo 1 Copy Noo 2 Copy Noo 3 Copy Noo 4 Copy Noo 5 Copy Noo 6 Copy Noo 7 Copy No., 8 Copy Noo 9 Copy Noo 10 Copy No., 11 Copy Noo 12 Copy Noo 13,, 14, 15, 16 Copy Noo 17 Copy Noo 18 Copy Noo 19 Copy Noo 20, 21, 22 000186 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDEX01121 Title A name given to the resource "Command Instructions" for Air Officer Commanding 1 RCAF Air Division Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 02-Mar-53 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Soviet air attacks in Germany - Possible employment of RCAF, RG25-A-3-b, Volume number: 6030, File number: 50290-40, File part: 1. Library and Archives Canada. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2023-05125 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en IIIF Item Metadata UUID 3d32ba06-5c86-4c4b-b662-3082fe968e16 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/04421e040b887e96ede92045aa9800b1.pdf 48d9980250df953391e3af6959291a63 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de lo Loi sur /'occes a /'information o , oto r 3, 1 l _j i �Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces a /'information r • �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de lo Loi sur /'occes a /'information 000191 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDEX01119 Title A name given to the resource "Consultation with Parliment on Disposition of Canadian Forces" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 23-Oct-51 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Soviet air attacks in Germany - Possible employment of RCAF, RG25-A-3-b, Volume number: 6030, File number: 50290-40, File part: 1. Library and Archives Canada. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2023-05125 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en IIIF Item Metadata UUID 9e6c9a97-3f79-4d45-9011-45e9828d1a0d https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f0d0c0d5870a47cf0baab81276ba1296.pdf 61622dfac29818f6a224821f88934ab9 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information CROSS REFERENCE SHEET Name or Subject File No. DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - A c q u i s i t i o n of N u c l e a r Weapons f o r Use by Canadian Forces Regarding Memo re Defence questions requiring immediate attention (1) Nuclear weapons policy for Canadian forces (2) NATO Ministerial Meeting (3) Cabinet Defence Cttee (U) Questions for the near future & also context of defence policy - D-l-5(f) Date Apr. 16/63 SEE Name or Subject R.B.Bryce from F . A . M i l l i g a n File No. G~l~10(a)~5 Req. 77 4M-12-58 000773 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01807 Title A name given to the resource "Cross Reference Sheet: Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 16-Apr-63 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b76a1d6c1c237ead963b8ec46a24274c.pdf bbbe8b45b7b477929f250611d9f324bf PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information CROSS REFERENCE SHEET Name or Subject File No. DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition D-l-5(£) of Nuclear WeaponB for Use by Canadian Forces Regarding Date Black Binder Draft Agreements & Commentary Nuclear Weapons Policy Copy No. 5 - (?) May 9, 1963 SEE Name or Subject File No. D-1-5U) /Filed Separately/ Req. 77 5M-4-60 000695 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01848 Title A name given to the resource "Cross Reference Sheet: Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 9-May-63 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5bca8623196bf79583f7f8f51d0ba956.pdf e03e6e86fa7ae4e2c39e3b69039b5b91 PDF Text Text % NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL Copy ORIGINALS ENGLISH No* I8/7 NATO SECRET DOCUMENT 'C-M(56')138(Final! DIRECTIVE TO THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES FROM THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Approved by the Council at its meeting on 13th December, 1956)(l) Part I Analysis of Soviet Intentions Part II The Directive Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIe» (1) C-R(56)74 NATO SECRET 000613 �NATO SECRET C-M(56)138 (Final) % - '3 - PART I. ANALYSIS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS General trends of Soviet policy The Soviet leaders see international affairs in terms of a struggle for world domination between two rival ideologies. This concept also coincides with many aspects of traditional" Russian power policy. They continue their unremitting efforts to weaken and ultimately to destroy the " capitalist world", which they look upon as their opponent in this struggle for power. This assessment has been confirmed by the events which have taken place in Hungary and the Middle East. 2. Whatever repercussions these events may have within the USSR, there is no reason to doubt that the regime will remain sufficiently stable to go on developing its economic and military strength. In spite of reductions in manpower, the military strength of the USSR will not be diminished. On the contrary, it is steadily increasing in terms of modern weapons for air, land and sea forces. Overall nuclear capability continues steadily to grow, including a capability for the delivery of nuclear weapons both within Europe and directly against North America. In addition to expanding their nuclear capability, the Soviets appear to be keeping forces able to undertake non-nuclear warfare on either a large or a small scale. The effects of the upheaval in the satellites on the military strength of the Soviet Bloc are not wholly clear, but some of the European satellite forces might not be reliable, depending on the Circumstances in which aggression occurred. Changes in the direction of decentralisation and limited "democratisation" in the Soviet Union have taken place; these changes have not been so extensive or of such a character as to constitute a basic change in the Soviet regime. These developments have also affected Soviet-satellite relations. The recognition of "different roads to socialism" and the shock of destalini.sation have imposed very great strains on the structure 6f the Bloc, and have confronted the USSR with serious policy dilemmas. It is not clear at present whether the USSR, having apparently miscalculated the scope and strength of nationalism and anti-Communism in Eastern Europe, will continue its earlier policy of modifying Stalinist types of economic, political and military controls in the satellites. It is clear, however, that there are limits beyond which the Soviet Government will not permit the satellites to go and they are prepared to take not only economic and political, but also the most ruthless military measures tp retain their control over the Bloc. 3. The rapid growth of the Soviet Union's economic strength gives added hope to the Soviet leaders that their aims can be achieved without resorting to a war in the foreseeable future. To accomplish an expansion of its influence the USSR has attempted to portray itself as a force for peace, has tried to lessen the suspicion of Soviet intentions in nonCommunist areas, and has made increasing use of traditional diplomacy, economic ties, and cultural relations. While the Soviets are likely to continue these policies they may now find increasing difficulties in doing so, at any rate in the West. The USSR's continuing and maih 'objective in the NATO area is to undermine support for Western defence arrangements and thus lead the way to the dissolution of NATO. At the same time, the Soviet Government are actively exploiting new possibilities for trouble-making which have arisen in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. By capitalising on the forces of nationalism NATO SECRET 000614 �V NATO SECRET C-M(56)138~(Final) - « - and neutralism, the Soviet Government seek to increase their position of power vis-a-vis the West and to undermine and outflank the world-wide positions of the Western Powers. In this process two important weapons are the Soviet Union's growing ability to make attractive economic offers on a highly selective basis and its readiness to supply conventional arms from its large disposable stocks. They will be able to do both with increasing facility as they continue to maintain a rate of industrial growth designed to outstrip the West in economic as well as military power. Possibilities of Soviet launching of general nuclear war 4. There is no doubt that the Soviet leaders understand and fear the consequences of general nuclear war. It can be assumed therefore that they will not deliberately launch a general war so long as they know that the West is prepared to retaliate with nuclear weapons in sufficient strength to devastate the USSR. Circumstances may develop, however, in which the Soviet leaders may harden their attitude and be prepared to take greater risks than heretofore. They have indulged in the use of threats, including the threat of war and even of nuclear attack^ as blackmail to attain their ends. There is, furthermore, a danger of general war arising from miscalculation on their part. This danger could arise, for example, through an underestimation of the Western reaction to an aggressive action by the Soviets or through a misconstruction of Western intentions which might lead them to conclude that the Soviet Union was about to be attacked with nuclear weapons. Possibilities of Soviet action through use of conventional arms entailinq risk of general nuclear war 5. The Soviet leaders are fully aware that any attack they might launch against NATO, even with conventional arms, would entail an immediate military response by the NATO Alliance and thus risk a general war. They would almost certainly regard open attacks with conventional arms across recognised state frontiers outside the NATO area by Soviet, Communist Chinese or satellite forces as involving, under present conditions, a serious risk of general war and therefore as something to be avoided. The Soviets are thus not likely to launch such attacks, provided that the West maintains its defence commitments, such as the stationing of overseas troops in Western Europe, its firm -purpose to defend itself, appropriate nuclear -retaliatory strength and adequate conventional forces to ensure that local armed intervention by Soviet or satellite forces does not offer a prospect of easy success. 6. However, the following possibilities of action by the Soviet leaders through the use of conventional arms, but which would, in varying dedjree, entail the risk of deteriorating into a major war, must be included among those requiring consideration: j (a) General .attacks against NATO. The USSR might launch general attacks with conventional weapons against NATO if the Soviet leaders estimated that the Alliance would be deterred from employing nuclear weapons against the USSR except in retaliation to a Soviet buclear attack. The Soviet leaders might believe that NATO would be thus deterred, for example: - because of assumed Western reluctance to be the first to use nuclear weapons; NATO SECRET 000615 V V 1 �NATO SECRET C-M(56)l38~(Final) - 5 - because of assumed fear on the part of the West that it was more vulnerable than the Soviet Union to nuclear attack; - because of assumed Western division or demoralisation. (b) Local attacks against NATO. If the Soviet believe that NATO "would be deterred from employing nuclear weapons (except in retaliation to a Soviet nuclear attack) and were not able to defend itself against all types of limited aggression, including local attack (e.g. by a satellite), the Soviets might initiate, instigate, support or condone such aggression. (c) Attacks against peripheral non^NATO countries. If the West is deemed to be deterred from employing nuclear weapons and if for this or other reasons the Soviet leaders thought that a non-NATO country on the periphery of the Soviet bloc would not or could not receive effective support of the Western powers, the Soviets might be tempted to use their preponderance in conventional forces either for armed intervention in the country in question or to exert pressure on it in order to influence it towards alignment with the Soviet camp. (d) Insurrection and guerrilla. Armed insurrection or guerrilla activity under direct or indirect Communist sponsorship ' supported by irregulars or "volunteers-" from the bloc might occur if the Communists are presented with opportunities (e.g. serious internal} disorders in a non-Communist country, disunity in the free world or collapse of its defence arrangements, etc.) (e) Indirect intervention outside of NATO area. Situations in which the relations between countries outside the Soviet bloc deteriorate will be exploited by the USSR to further her political, economic and military influence. If the deterioration of such relations reaches the point of armed conflict, the USSR may go to the length of sending various forms of military assistance, including "volunteers", from the bloc. (f) Soviet intervention in satellites. Extensive military measures by the USSR to cope with serious deterioration of its control over the satellites can produce an explosive situation. NATO'SECRET 000616 �> 6 - NATO SECRET C^Mt56U38~( Final) PART II - THE DIRECTIVE The North Atlantic Treaty states that the basic aim of the Alliance is to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilisation of the peoples of the NATO countries8 Tdlihis end, a ^collective defence system has been built up for the purpose of averting war,, This purpose cannot be fulfilled unless the potential aggressor is confronted by NATO with forces which are so organizedj disposed, trained and equipped that he will conclude that the chances of a favourable decision are too small to be acceptable and that fat£l risks would be involved if he launched or supported an armed attack, even with superior numbers and the advantage of surprise,, 2„ In the light of the conclusions contained in Part I of this paper', a review of NATO defence planning is required in order to determine how, within the resources likely to be available, the defence effort of the Alliance and of each individual member can best achieve the most effective pattern of forces0 3« For NATO defence and as a major deterrent to Soviet aggression a fully effective nuclear retaliatory force provided with all the necessary facilities must be maintained and protected„ h. Taking into account the role of the nuclear retaliatory force, the land, sea and air forces available to NATO must be designed to enable them to defend NATO territory and In particular to enable them to meet all the following requirements; (a) to keep confidence in the military effectiveness of the NATO defence organization, and thereby to contribute to the deterrent to aggression, and to prevent external intimidationj. (b) to deal with incidents such as infiltrations, incursions or hostile local actions by the Soviets, or by Satellites with or without overt or covert Soviet supports. (c) to identify Soviet or Satellite aggression (on land, sea or air) | (d) to deal with armed aggression, other than that referred to in (b) above, in accordance with the concept of "forward strategy", counting on the use of nuclear weapons at the outset, and to sustain operations, without any intention to make a major withdrawal, until the strategic counter-offensive has achieved its objective; Ce) to protect and maintain sea communications as required in support of the above missions <> For the purposes of this directive it should be assumed that British, Canadian and US forces will continue to be stationed in Allied Command Europec 5o The .shield forces must include the capability to respond quickly, should the situation so require, with nuclear weapons to any type of aggression,, They must, of course, also have the capability to deal with the situations envisaged in k(b) above without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons., NATO SECRET �7 • NATO SECRET C-M(l?6)138rFinal) '60 The responsibility of governments to make decisions for putting NATO military plans into action in the event of hostilities is not affected by this directive. 7. Although NATO, defence planning is limited to the defence of the Treaty area, it is necessary to take account of dangers which may arise for NATO because of developments outside that area(l)o In planning for the most efficient organization and equipment of NATO forces, account must be taken of the possible need for certain NATO countries to use some of their.NATO forces to meet defence commitments elsewhere, such as may arise because of the various and changing forms of the Soviet inspired Communist threat on a world front0 This need, however, should, in conformity with their NATO commitments, be harmonised with the primary Importance of protecting the NATO area,, 80 It is possible that an attack on NATO would be preceded by a period of acute political tension and heralded by advance indications involving the application of the ""alert11* system. In any case the consequences of an attack on NATO without warning are such that those NATO forces and facilities directly relating to early warning and the nuclear retaliatory action must be kept in constant readiness at all timesj all other forces must be maintained at the appropriate NATO standard of readiness. 9c In deciding on the allocation of total resources, governments will take account, inter alia0 of the rising cost of new weapons and of the need for economic resources to deal with the Soviet threat in all its aspects, without endangering their economic stability, which in itself is an essential element of their security . The question of allocation of resources will be kept under constant review, but meanwhile it should be assumed for planning purposes that in present circumstances, few, if any, NATO countries can be expected to make a substantial increase in the proportion of their resources devoted to defence* The continuing need, however, for men, money and materiel for NATO defence remains realo (1) NATO military authorities have no responsibility or authority except with respect to incidents which are covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW02661 Title A name given to the resource "Directive to the NATO Military Authorities From the North Atlantic Council" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO - Nuclear weapons - Policy," RG25-A-3-b, vol 5958, file 50219-AL-2-40, part 2-1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 13-Dec-56 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f9feed0f654cfddb908448467a30d91d.pdf 3d79d0aca99795186005139483ca9df2 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ANNEX TOP SECRET DRAFT AIDE-MEMOIRE TO THE U.S.A. GOVERNMENT On January 11, the Embassy left with the Department an Aide-Memoire setting out the replies of the United States Government to a number of questions which had been posed at the last meeting of officials on December h, 1962. Clarification of certain points made in the U.S. Aide-Memoire of January 11 was requested by the Canadian side. This was supplied in the further Aide-Memoire of January ±5, 1963. The following Canadian comments are offered in connection with both documents. (1) Reference has been made to the meetings between Canadian and United States Ministers in Paris on December lhs 1962, in terms which suggest that there may have been a Canadian misunderstanding as to the main U.S. preoccupation. The Canadian understanding of these talks was that the United States was prepared to work out with the Canadian Government a stand-!;" arrangement for the arming of the Bomarcs and CF-lOls in case of need. There was no suggestion at the time that the "missing part" proposal was incapable of meeting the requirements of effective defence. (2) The Aide-Memoire of January 11 noted that if the "missing part" concept were to be applied, there was no practicable alternative to the umbilical cable for the Boin.TC or the ejector rack cartridge for the CF-101. The Canadian side agrees with the judgment in respect of the Bomarc and is prepared to explore further the best means of reducing to a minimum the time required to make the CF-101 operational with the MB-1 missile. (3) The Aide-Memoire of January 15 asserted that the movement of missing parts to Canadian bases at a DEFCON level as low as four, while representing a considerable improvement in the operation of the "missing part" concept, would still be insufficient to meet an urgent and effective defence requirement. The latter was defined as "the ability to respond within likely time of any warning without running the risks of possible lastminute difficulties in moving missing parts to Canada In time of emergency". The Canadian side has the following comments to offer in this connection. (a) A review of NORAD alerts shows that three times in the last six years NORAD has been placed on DEFCON-four alert in periods of sharply rising international tension (July 15 to August 2, 1958 - Lebanese crisis; May ljSO - U2 incident; October 1962 - Cuba crisis). On any of these occasions, which were not followed by immediate transition to higher states of alerts, the airlift of missing parts could in fact have been accomplished without encountering "last-minute difficulties in time of emergency". 000798 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET - 2 (b) Both of the Canadian delivery systems are effective only against bomber attack and the object of the negotiations to date has been to find the most effective arrangement for arming the Canadian delivery systems in under three hours, the likely warning time for impending bomber attack. The proposals under consideration as of the December *+, 1962 meeting of the negotiating teams demonstrated that it is possible to be well within this warning time. (k) The U.S.A., in its Aide-Memoire of January 15* has made a counter-proposal that essential missing parts be stored in Canada separately from the warhead, under either U.S.A. or Canadian custody. This counter-proposal fails to meet the Canadian objective of negotiating a stand-by arrangement which would not involve the storage on Canadian soil in peace-time of operational warheads. It is noted from the Aide-Memoire of January 15* that the United States Government had not thought of discontinuing the talks or of changing the channel of the talks. On its side, the Canadian Government is ready to continue the negotiations. 000799 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01797 Title A name given to the resource "Draft Aide-Memoire to the U.S.A. Government" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource [undated] https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/d6fa56702a8e7bf43c5b22d03b1c3164.pdf 65345d198ee3f48f5ec0e430eb80dd99 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en verttnde la Loi sur I'acces alpformation _D - I - £> (P) SECRET J u l y 1 1 , 1963 DRAFT CANADIAN NOTE CONCERNING NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES I have the honour to refer to Articles 20 and 21 of the communique Issued by the North Atlantic Council on December 19, 1957, and to discussions which have taken place between the appropriate authorities of the Canadian and United States Governments regarding the general principles under which nuclear warheads will be made available for the Canadian Forces. It is the understanding of my Government that in the course of these discussions agreement was reached regarding these general principles. In order to implement this agreement my Government suggests the following arrangements : (1) The United States shall provide and maintain stockpiles of nuclear warheads for the use of the Canadian Forces in respect of the weapons and weapons systems shown In the attached Annex, which may be amended from time to time by agreement between the two governments. In this agreement the expression "nuclear warhead" Includes the associated weapon where the two cannot practically be considered as physically separate components. (2) Stockpiles of nuclear weapons, to meet the needs of approved defence plans, will be established at locations to be determined by the Allied Commanders concerned in accordance with their approved plans and in agreement with Canadian and U.S. military authorities, or as determined by the U.S. and Canadian military authorities when appropriate. . .0/2 001081 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 - S E C R E T (3) Except as otherwise agreed, the costs of construction, administration and maintenance of the storage sites and associated facilities, including those required for the support of the United States custodial and support personnel, shall be borne by Canada. Provision, without cost to the United States, of land required will be the responsibility of Canada. To the extent that the North Atlantic Council approves the establishment of nuclear stockpile sites under NATO common infrastructure, the apportionment of costs will be subject to NATO infrastructure procedures. Installations and facilities for nuclear warhead storage and maintenance will be built and maintained to satisfy NATO or U.S. standards and criteria as applicable. Installations and facilities for normal logistic support (housing, messing, offices, etc.) which may not be specified under NATO criteria, will be provided and maintained as mutually agreed. (4) It is recognized that the custody of any stocks of nuclear warheads provided by the United States will be the responsibility of the United States and that United States personnel will be provided for this purpose. The status of such personnel in Canada will be governed by the provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which . may be agreed upon. (5) The release of nuclear warheads to meet operational requirements will be the subject, where practical, of prior inter-governmental .../3 001082 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 3 - S E C R E T consultation. They will be used, when authorized by both Governments, only In accordance with procedures established by the appropriate Allied Commander or by the Canadian and United States military authorities as applicable. (6) The United States will be responsible for the maintenance, modification and assembly of nuclear warheads, including the provision of personnel and technical equipment for the performance of these functions. (7) External security for all nuclear warheads in storage or during movement is the responsibility of Canada within Canada and, except as otherwise agreed between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments, elsewhere where there are nuclear warheads for the support of the Canadian Forces. The details of external security arrangements will be determined by the United States and Canadian military authorities and in accordance with the directives of the Allied Commander, where appropriate. (8) The United States will be responsible for the movement, in accordance with agreed procedures and in conformity with applicable Canadian laws and regulations, of the nuclear warheads between the United States and points of entry in Canada. Subject to the provisions of Article (4) above, Canada will be responsible for the transportation of nuclear warheads between points in Canada, and elsewhere as may be agreed. In respect of Europe, the United States will be responsible for the movement of nuclear warheads into and from the countries within the ,../4 001083 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 4 - S E C R E T ACE area. Subject to the provisions of Article (4) above, the Canadian Forces, except as otherwise agreed between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments, will be responsible for the movement of the weapons within countries in the ACE area. (9) Except as otherwise agreed by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments, a reliable system of signal communications will be provided by the Government of Canada where necessary to meet the purposes of this agreement. (10) Canada will be responsible for providing reasonable administrative and logistic support for the United States personnel described in Articles (3) and (4), and their dependents. (11) Where Canada Is a joint user, with other members of NATO, of storage facilities in Europe, the division of responsibilities for the support and external security of such facilities will be as agreed between the governments concerned and the appropriate Allied Commander, (12) The safety procedures for storage, maintenance, transport, loading, delivery and salvage of nuclear warheads will be at least equivalent to U.S, standards and will be the subject of arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the United States and Canada taking into consideration classified (atomic) information which may be transferred under agreements between the two governments and the interests of other allied governments, as applicable. (13) Supplementary arrangements required to implement this agreement will be negotiated between .../5 001084 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 5 - S E C R E T the appropriate military authorities of the United States and Canada. (14) Canada and the United States will consult with regard to any notification or other form of diplomatic communication addressed to a third government concerning the proposed establishment of any stockpiles of nuclear warheads on Its territory for possible Canadian use. Agreement on the location of stockpile sites will be obtained from the appropriate authorities of any third country in which stocks are to be located. (15) Publicity concerning this agreement and its implementation shall be governed by the Exchange of Notes of February 19 and 24, 1951 concerning publicity relating to Joint Canadian-United States defence plans and operations, I propose that if the foregoing is acceptable to your Government, this note and your reply indicating such acceptance will constitute an agreement between the two Governments on this subject, the agreement to enter into force on the date of your note in reply. 001085 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ANNEX WEAPONS AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS 1) The IM99B (Bomarc) 2) A i r - t o - A I r m i s s i l e s f o r t h e CF-101 3) A l r - t o - S u r f a c e weapons f o r t h e CF-104 4) The 762 mm Rocket (Honest John) 001086 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01870 Title A name given to the resource "Draft Canadian Note Concerning Nuclear Warheads for the Canadian Forces" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 11-Jul-63 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/2d6f43d47ef00ea1215b5970840ce3bf.pdf e7332f2f7bc64b74452b48ebdd078e68 PDF Text Text ^ Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E£ RET July 11, 1963 DRAFT CANADIAN NOTE CONCERNING NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES I have the honour to refer to Articles 20 and 21 of the communique issued by the North Atlantic Council on December 19, 1957, and to discussions which have taken place between the appropriate authorities of the Canadian and United States Governments regarding the general principles under which nuclear warheads will be made available for the Canadian Forces. It Is the understanding of my Government that in the course of these discussions agreement was reached regarding these general principles. In order to implement this agreement my Government suggests the following arrangements : (1) The United States shall provide and maintain stockpiles of nuclear warheads for the use of the Canadian Forces in respect of the weapons and weapons systems shown in the attached Annex, which may be amended from time to time by agreement between the two governments. In this agreement the expression "nuclear warhead" Includes the associated weapon where the two cannot practically be considered as physically separate components. (2) Stockpiles of nuclear weapons, to meet the needs of approved defence plans, will be established at locations to be determined by the Allied Commanders concerned in accordance with their approved plans and In agreement with Canadian and U.S. military authorities, or as determined by the U.S. and Canadian military authorities when appropriate. .. o/2 001007 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 " S E C R E T (3) Except as otherwise agreed, the costs of construction, administration and maintenance of the storage sites and associated facilities, Including those required for the support of the United States custodial and support personnel, shall be borne by Canada, Provision, without cost to tbe United States, of land required will be the responsibility of Canada, To the extent that the North Atlantic Council approves the establishment of nuclear stockpile sites under NATO common infrastructure, the apportionment of costs will be subject to NATO infrastructure procedures. Installations and facilities for nuclear warhead storage and maintenance will be built and maintained to satisfy NATO or U.S, standards and criteria as applicable. Installations and facilities for normal logistic support (housing, messing, offices, etc.) which may not be specified under NATO criteria, will be provided and maintained as mutually agreed. (4) It is recognized that the custody of any stocks of nuclear warheads provided by the United States will be the responsibility of the United States and that United States personnel will be provided for this purpose. The status of such personnel in Canada will be governed by the provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon. (5) The release of nuclear warheads to meet operational requirements will be the subject, where practical, of prior inter-governmental ..•/3 001008 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 3 - S E C R E T consultation. They will be used, when authorized by both Governments, only In accordance with procedures established by the appropriate Allied Commander or by the Canadian and United States military authorities as applicable. (6) The United States will be responsible for the maintenance, modification and assembly of nuclear warheads, including the provision of personnel and technical equipment for the performance of these functions. (7) External security for all nuclear warheads in storage or during movement is the responsibility of Canada within Canada and, except as otherwise agreed between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments, elsewhere where there are nuclear warheads for the support of the Canadian Forces, The details of external security arrangements will be determined by the United States and Canadian military authorities and in accordance with the directives of the Allied Commander, where appropriate, (8) The United States will be responsible for the movement, in accordance with agreed procedures and in conformity with applicable Canadian laws and regulations, of the nuclear warheads between the United States and points of entry in Canada. Subject to the provisions of Article (4) above, Canada will be responsible for the transportation of nuclear warheads between points In Canada, and elsewhere as may be agreed. In respect of Europe, the United States will be responsible for the movement of nuclear warheads into and from the countries within the .../4 001009 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 4 - S E C R E T ACE area. Subject to the provisions of Article (4) above, the Canadian Forces, except as otherwise agreed between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments, will be responsible for the movement of the weapons within countries in the ACE area. (9) Except as otherwise agreed by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments, a reliable system of signal communications will be provided by the Government of Canada where necessary to meet the purposes of this agreement. (10) Canada will be responsible for providing reasonable administrative and logistic support for the United States personnel described in Articles (3) and (4), and their dependents. (11) Where Canada is a joint user, with other members of NATO, of storage facilities in Europe, the division of responsibilities for the support and external security of such facilities will be as agreed between the governments concerned and the appropriate Allied Commander. (12) The safety procedures for storage, maintenance, transport, loading, delivery and salvage of nuclear warheads will be at least equivalent to U.S. standards and will be the subject of arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the United States and Canada taking into consideration classified (atomic) Information which may be transferred under agreements between the two governments and the interests of other allied governments, as applicable. (13) Supplementary arrangements required to implement this agreement will be negotiated between .../5 001010 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 5 - S E C R E T the appropriate military authorities of the United States and Canada. (14) Canada and the United States will consult with regard to any notification or other form of diplomatic communication addressed to a third government concerning the proposed establishment of any stockpiles of nuclear warheads on its territory for possible Canadian use. Agreement on the location of stockpile sites will be obtained from the appropriate authorities of any third country in which stocks are to be located. (15) Publicity concerning this agreement and its implementation shall be governed by the Exchange of Notes of February 19 and 24, 1951 concerning publicity relating to joint Canadian-United States defence plans and operations. I propose that if the foregoing is acceptable to your Government, this note and your reply indicating such acceptance will constitute an agreement between the two Governments on this subject, the agreement to enter Into force on the date of your note in reply. 001011 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ANNEX WEAPONS AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS 1) The IM99B (Bomarc) 2) A i r - t o - A i r m i s s i l e s f o r t h e CF-101 3) A i r - t o - S u r f a c e weapons f o r t h e CF-104 4) The 762 mm Rocket (Honest John) 001012 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01880 Title A name given to the resource "Draft Canadian Note Concerning Nuclear Warheads for the Canadian Forces" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 11-Jul-63 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/d3b47f30697a1e4d814c5c0f2a89190e.pdf 82ec6ef11228db879c3541238b8e22ff PDF Text Text ~ ~ ~ ~~ Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - V > Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET J u l y 1 1 , 1963 DRAFT CANADIAN NOTE CONCERNING NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES I have the honour to refer to Articles 20 and 21 of the communique issued by the North Atlantic Council on December 19, 1957, and to discussions.which have taken place between the appropriate authorities of the Canadian and united States Governments regarding the peneral principles under which nuclear warheads will be made available for the Canadian Forces. It is the understanding of my Government that in the course of these discussions agreement was reached regarding these general principles. In order to implement this agreement my Government suggests the following arrangements^ (1) The United States shall provide and maintain stockpiles of nuclear warheads for the use of the Canadian Forces in respect of the weapons and weapons systems shown in the attached Annex, which may be amended from time to time by agreement between the two governments. In this agreement the expression "nuclear warhead" includes the associated weapon where the two cannot practically be considered as physically separate components. NOTE: Except where indicated the text is that of the original Canadian draft approved by the Cabinet on ..^fT.?4.1?§3i.. A square bracket indicates a deletion, and underlining an addition to or rewording of the original Canadian draft. Relevant paragraphs of the «bfesxxjftx$3fiei06*srtoC' are incorporated immediately below the paragraph of the general agreement to which they relate. Letter of Understanding 000971 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET OricLnal Canadian Draft Agreed Redraft (2) Stockpiles of nuclear warheads w i l l Comment (2) Stockpiles of nuclear weapons, to meet (2) The deletion of a reference t o "quantities" the needs of approved defence plans, w i l l i s i n l i n e with the U.S. desire to. have the locations to be determined by the Allied be established a t locations to be d e t e r - t e x t of the general agreement conform as nearly Commanders concerned in accordance viith mined by the'Allied Commanders concerned as possible to the usual NATO stockpile agree- t h e i r approved plans or by the Canadian with t h e i r approved plans and in agreement ments wherein no commitment i s given regarding and United States m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s with Canadian and U.S. m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s , quantities. as appropriate. or as determined by the U.S. and Canadian t o the explanatory note contained i n the m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s when appropriate. L e t t e r of Understanding as supplemented by the Letter of Understanding further communication attached as Annex "B". be established /Tn quantities and7 a t ' I t s deletion was agreed subject I t i s intended by the provision "to meet the needs of approved defence plans" t h a t the quantities of nuclear warheads to be made available to the Canadian Forces i n the defence of North America shall be j o i n t l y agreed and shall not be altered without f u l l prior consultation. 000972 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET (3) Except as otherwise agreed, the costs of construction, administration and maintenance of the storage sites and associated facilities, including those required for the support of the United States custodial and support personnel, shall be borne by Canada. Provision, without cost to the United States, of land required will be the responsibility of Canada. To the extent that the North Atlantic Council approves the establishment cf nuclear stockpile sites under NATO common infrastructure, the apportionment of costs will be subject to NATO infrastructure procedures. Installations and facilities for nuclear warhead storage and maintenance will be built and maintained to satisfy NATO or U.S. standards and criteria as applicable. Installations and facilities for normal logistic support (housing, messing, offices, etc.) which may not be specified under NATO criteria, will be provided and maintained as mutually agreed. (ii) It is recognized that the custody of any stocks of nuclear warheads provided by the United States will be the responsibility cf the United States and that United States personnel will be provided for this purpose. The status of such personnel in Canada will be governed by the provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon. 000973 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET Original Canadian Draft Agreed Redraft Comment (5) The release of warheads to meet opera- (5) The release of nuclear warheads to (5>) There are two elements in t h i s provision: tional requirements will be the subject, meet'operational requirements will be the release by the U.S. President to the operational where practical, of prior intergovern- subject, where practical, of prior inter- commander concerned and authorization of use by mental consultation. /Tney governmental consultation. They will be both Governments, as nay be authorized by the Canadian used, when authorized by both Governments, draft i s considered t o come closer to the 3overnment and in accordance with pro- only in accordance with procedures estab- Canadian requirement, that operational use requires cedures7 established by the appropriate lished by the appropriate Allied Commander the specific authorization of the Canadian Govern- -Hilled Commander*or by the Canadian and or by the Canadian and United States ment. United States military authorities as military authorities as applicable. Governments should be required for use, the U.S. applicable. Letter of Understanding was making provision for a situation i n which" It is understood that in respect of North release and authority to use would be simultaneous, American defence, consultation in accor- The relevant provision i n the Letter of Under- dance with the procedures set out in the standing establishes the need, wherever possible, secret Exchange cf Letters dated for consultation p r i o r t o release and r e l a t e s i t September 30 and October 2, 1959, between to existing agreements and arrangements providing the Canadian Ambassador in Washington for consultation on increasing NORAD*s s t a t e s of and the Secretary of State and supple- readiness i n periods of international tension. mentary correspondence dated January 11 The provision for review of the procedures and will be used Regarding the l a t t e r , the U.S. In proposing t h a t the authority of both and January lli, I960* relative to 000974 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET Original Canadian Draft Agreed Redraft Comment increasing NORAD's states of readiness means whereby the two Governments would authorize will, in all situations except that of use is intended to clarify how and when autho- surprise attack, precede the release of rization is to be sought and communicated in nuclear warheads to meet operational re- various situations of attack. quirements. The procedures and means whereby the two Governments will authorize use cf these weapons operationally will be reviewed at an early date by appropriate officials of the two Governments. Provision shall be made for any further communications and other facilities necessary to permit authorization procedures to be carried out effectively and rapidly. (6) The United States will be responsible for the maintenance, modification and assembly of nuclear warheads, including the pro- vision of personnel and technical equipment for the performance of these functions. 000975 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S EC R E T Original Canadian Draft Agreed Redraft Comment (7) External security for all nuclear war- (7) External security for all nuclear war- (7) In substance the l a t e s t version does not heads in storage or during movement is the heads in storage or during movement is the d i f f e r from the o r i g i n a l Canadian d r a f t . responsibility of Canada within Canada responsibility of Canada within Canada w i l l be responsible for external security ( i . e . , ^Tnd elsewhere as may be agreed.7 The de- and, except as otherwise agreed between Canada tails cf external security arrangements the appropriate authorities of the two securing the storage s i t e s against any kind of within h o s t i l e element yxxxxx Canada and, except as may will be determined by the United States Governments, elsewhere where there are be otherwise agreed, a t Canadian bases i n Europe and Canadian military authorities and in nuclear warheads far the support of the and also aboard ship i n the event t h a t ASW accordance with the directives of the Canadian Forces. The details of external weapons should l a t e r be provided. Allied Commander, where appropriate. security arrangements will be determined by the United States and Canadian military authorities and in accordance with the directives of the Allied Commander, where appropriate. (8) The United States will be responsible (8) The United States will be responsible (8) The modification i s directed t o for the movement, in accordance with for the movement, in accordance with r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r movement of warheads within agreed procedures and In conformity with agreed procedures and in conformity with NATO c o u n t r i e s . clarifying 000976 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET Original Canadian Draft Agreed Redraft Comment applicable Canadian laws and regulations, applicable Canadian laws and regulations, The interpretation of "points of entry" i s of the nuclear warheads between the of the nuclear warheads between the specified i n the Letter of Understanding, United States and /storage sites7 in United States and points of entry in Canada. Subject to the provisions of Canada. Subject to the provisions of Article (h) above, Canada will be respon- Article (1-.) above, Canada will be respon- sible for the transportation of nuclear sible for the transportation of nuclear warheads between points in Canada and warheads between points in Canada and elsewhere as may be agreed. In respect elsewhere as may be agreed. In respect of of Europe, the United States will be res- Europe, the United States will be respon- ponsible for the movement of nuclear war- sible for the movement of nuclear warheads heads into and from the /ACE area. Res- into and from the countries within the ponsibilities for movement within the ACE area. Subject to the provisions of ACE area will be as agreed between the Article (It) above, the Canadian Forces, appropriate U.S. and Canadian military authoritie s.7 I except as otherwise agreed between the <•••»• MS SSSM •IS»«»S«»M«t«»»»«M»^SS^I»l«»SS»«»^St»«StS»t«»-»^»ISMW,.«.iSMMS«tS«»» appropriate a u t h o r i t i e s of the two Governments, w i l l be responsible f o r the movement of the weapons within countries i n the ACE area. 000977 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information Original Canadian Draft SECRET Agreed Redraft Comment Letter of Understanding It is understood that the expression "points of entry" means, in respect of airlift of nuclear warheads, the airport of landing in Canadian territory from which warheads are to be transported by other means than by air. (9) tfhere necessary t o meet the purposes of t h i s agreement, /a r e l i a b l e system of signal communications w i l l be established, operated and maintained i n a manner to be agreed upon by the appropriate a u t h o r i t i e s of the two governments.7 (9) Except as otherwise agreed by the (9) The explanatory note in the L e t t er of Under* appropriate authorities of the two standing i s intended to provide t h a t any pro- Governments, a reliable system of signal visions for cost sharing en communications in communications will be provided by the existing or future agreeirsnts involving the two Government of Canada where necessary to countries w i l l be deemed to apply t o comnunica- meet the purposes of this agreement. tions required by this agreement. Letter of Understanding It is understood that the phrase "except as otherwise agreed by the appropriate authorities of the two Gcrvernments-1 is intended to take account of existing I 000978 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET Original Canadian Draft Agreed Redraft Comment and future NATO and Canada-U.S. agreements where they may be applicable to the financing of communications required by the present agreement. (10) Camda w i l l be responsible for p r o viding reasonable administrative and l o g i s t i c support for the United States personnel described in A r t i c l e s (3) and ( I ) . (10) Canada will be responsible for providing reasonable administrative and logistic support for the United States personnel described in Articles (3) and (h) and their dependents. (10) Tbe interpretive note regarding the level of support to be provided by Canada means that U.S, personnel and their dependents will be accorded the same standards as comparable Canadian personnel and dependents in Canada and in Europe. Letter of Understanding It is understood that "reasonable administrative and logistic support" means support provided on the same basis as, and of a standard not less than that provided for comparable Canadian personnel and dependents. 000979 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET (11) Where Canada i s a j o i n t user, with other members of NATO, of storage f a c i l i t i e s i n Europe, the division of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s for the support and external security of such f a c i l i t i e s w i l l be as agreed between the governments concerned and the appropriate Allied Commander. Original Canadian Draft Agreed Redraft Comment (12) The safety procedures for maintenance, (12) The safety procedures for storage, (12) The addition of."storage" is intended to com- transport, loading, delivery and salvage maintenance, transport, loading, delivery plete the list of activities in respect of which of nuclear warhead3 will be at least and salvage of nuclear warheads will be safety procedures must apply, equivalent to U.S, standards and will be at least equivalent to U.S. standards the subject of arrangements between the and will be the subject of arrangements law and regulations was not pressed by the Canadian appropriate authorities of the United between the appropriate authorities of the side on the explicit understanding, recorded in the States and Canada, taking into considera- United States and Canada taking into con- agreed sttrnmary record, that the phrase, "will be tion classified (atomic) Information sideration classified (atomic) informa- the subject of arrangements between the appropriate transferred under existing agreements tion which may be transferred under exist- authorities of the U.S, and Canada", would mean between the two governments and the ing agreements between the two governments that in the supplementary arrangements yet to be interests of other allied governments, and the interests of other allied govern- negotiated, agreed safety procedures would be in as applicable. ments, as applicable. conformity with Canadian laws and regulations and the would require the prior approval ojf Atomic Energy A reference to the applicability of Canadian Control Board of Canada, The Insertion of "which may be" is intended to indicate that the U,S, is only under an obligation to transfer such information as is relevant to the 000980 weapons systems under consideration. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information (13) S ^ e n t a ^ a ^ ^ e n t s r e o ^ a to i ^ l e a e n t t h i s . g r e e ^ n t « ! r i t i e s of the United States and Canada. Original Canadian Draft (1L) Canada and the United States w i l l consult with regard t o any notification or other form of diplomatic communicaticn addressed t o a t h i r d government concerning the proposed establishment cf any stockpiles of nuclear warheads on i t s t e r r i t o r y for possible Canadian use. oe n e g o t i a t e , oet»een tne ^ Agreed Redraft H M l i t e r y antho- Comment (Hi) Canada and the United States w i l l (Iii) The additional sentence i s intended to pro- consult with regard t o any notificatio n vide for consultation with t h i r d governments in or other form of diplomatic communication Europe as required^ addressed to a t h i r d government concerning the proposed establishment of any stockpiles of nuclear warheads on i t s t e r r i t o r y for possible Canadian use. Agreement on the location of stockpile s i t e s w i l l also be obtained from the appropriate a u t h o r i t i e s of any t h i r d country i n which stocks are to be located. (15) Publicity concerning t h i s agreement and i t s implementation shall be governed by the Exchange of Notes of February 19 and 2h, 1951 concerning p u b l i c i t y r e l a t i n g t o j o i n t Canadian-United States defence plans and operations. 000981 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET Original Canadian Draft (16) /The terms of this agreement may be Agreed Redraft (16) Letter of Understanding Comment (16) The U.S. desired t o delete t h i s a r t i c l e and reviewed by the two governments at; the re- The review and termination clause normally include i t s substance i n the L e t t e r of"Under- quest-of either government and after such inserted in any international agreement standing in order not t o create a precedent not review may be terminated by either has been omitted from the Exchange of Notes found i n other NATO stockpile arrangements. government upon six months' notice.7 solely in the interests of conforming to U.S. asked t h a t t h i s provision which they NATO stockpile agreements. It is under- accepted i n a North American context, be incor5* stood however that the Exchange of Notes porated i n the Letter of Understanding. of The may be reviewed by the two Governments at the request cf either Government and after such review may be terminated upon six months1 notice. 000982 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET I propose that i f the foregoing i s acceptable to your Government, t h i s note and your reply indicating such acceptance w i l l constitute an agreement between the two Governments on t h i s subject, the agreement to enter into force on the date of your note i n reply. 000983 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T ANNEX WEAPONS AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS 1) The IM99B (Bomarc) 2) A i r - t o - a i r missiles for the CF-101 3) Air-to-surface weapons for the CF-10U k) The 762 mm Rocket (Honest John) 000984 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01886 Title A name given to the resource "Draft Canadian Note Concerning Nuclear Warheads for the Canadian Forces" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 11-Jul-63 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5523e08c852d2f47d1c7e7004c91d129.pdf 36ed2e25e520469342d886e8c2e20300 PDF Text Text Document disposed under the Access to Information Act - SECRET J u l y 1 1 , 1963 DRAFT CANADIAN NOTE CONCERNING NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES I have the honour to refer to Articles 20 and 21 of the communique issued by the North Atlantic Council on December 19, 1957, and to discussions which have taken place between the appropriate authorities of the Canadian and United States Governments regarding the general principles under which nuclear warheads will be made available for the Canadian Forces. It is the understanding of my Government that in the course of these discussions agreement was reached regarding these general principles. In order to implement this agreement my Government suggests the following arrangements : (1) The United States shall provide and maintain stockpiles of nuclear warheads for the use of the Canadian Forces in respect of the weapons and weapons systems shown in the attached Annex, which may be amended from time to time by agreement between the two governments. In this agreement the expression "nuclear warhead" Includes the associated weapon where the two cannot practically be considered as physically separate components. (2) Stockpiles of nuclear weapons, to meet the needs of approved defence plans, will be established at locations to be determined by the Allied Commanders concerned in accordance with their approved plans and In agreement with Canadian and U.S. military authorities, or as determined by the U.S. and Canadian military authorities when appropriate. • o o / C* 001047 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information " 2 " S E C R E T (3) Except as otherwise agreed, the costs of construction, administration and maintenance of the storage sites and associated facilities, including those required for the support of the United States custodial and support personnel, shall be borne by Canada. Provision, without cost to the United States, of land required will be the responsibility of Canada. To the extent that the North Atlantic Council approves the establishment of nuclear stockpile sites under NATO common infrastructure, the apportionment of costs will be subject to NATO infrastructure procedures. Installations and facilities for nuclear warhead storage and maintenance will be built and maintained to satisfy NATO or U.S. standards and criteria as applicable. Installations and facilities for normal logistic support (housing, messing, offices, etc.) which may not be specified under NATO criteria, will be provided and maintained as mutually agreed. (4) It Is recognized that the custody of any stocks of nuclear warheads provided by the United States will be the responsibility of the United States and that United States personnel will be provided for this purpose. The status of such personnel in Canada will be governed by the provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon. (5) The release of nuclear warheads to meet operational requirements will be the subject, where practical, of prior inter-governmental .../3 001048 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 3 - S E C R E T consultation. They will be used, when authorized by both Governments, only in accordance with prooedures established by the appropriate Allied Commander or by the Canadian and United States military authorities as applicable. (6) The United States will be responsible for the maintenance, modification and assembly of nuclear warheads, including the provision of personnel and technical equipment for the performance of these functions. (7) External security for all nuclear warheads in storage or during movement is the responsibility of Canada within Canada and, except as otherwise agreed between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments, elsewhere where there are nuclear warheads for the support of the Canadian Forces. The details of external security arrangements will be determined by the United States and Canadian military authorities and in accordance with the directives of the Allied Commander, where appropriate. (8) The United States will be responsible for the movement, in accordance with agreed procedures and in conformity with applicable Canadian laws and regulations, of the nuclear warheads between the United States and points of entry in Canada. Subject to the provisions of Article (4) above, Canada will be responsible for the transportation of nuclear warheads between points in Canada, and elsewhere as may be agreed. In respect of Europe, the United States will be responsible for the movement of nuclear warheads into and from the countries within the .../4 001049 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 4 - S E C R E T ACE area. Subject to the provisions of Article (4) above, the Canadian Forces, except as otherwise agreed between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments, will be responsible for the movement of the weapons within countries in the ACE area. (9) Except as otherwise agreed by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments, a reliable system of signal communications will be provided by the Government of Canada where necessary to meet the purposes of this agreement. (10) Canada will be responsible for providing reasonable administrative and logistic support for the United States personnel described In Articles (3) and (4), and their dependents. (11) Where Canada Is a joint user, with other members of NATO, of storage facilities in Europe, the division of responsibilities for the support and external security of such facilities will be as agreed between the governments concerned and the appropriate Allied Commander. (12) The safety procedures for storage, maintenance, transport, loading, delivery and salvage of nuclear warheads will be at least equivalent to U.S. standards and will be the subject of arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the United States and Canada taking Into consideration classified (atomic) information which may be transferred under agreements between the two governments and the interests of other allied governments, as applicable. (13) Supplementary arrangements required to implement this agreement will be negotiated between .../5 001050 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 5 - S E C R E T the appropriate military authorities of the United States and Canada. (14) Canada and the United States will consult with regard to any notification or other form of diplomatic communication addressed to a third government concerning the proposed establishment of any stockpiles of nuclear warheads on Its territory for possible Canadian use. Agreement on the location of stockpile sites will be obtained from the appropriate authorities of any third country in which stocks are to be located. (15) Publicity concerning this agreement and its implementation shall be governed by the Exchange of Notes of February 19 and 24, 1951 concerning publicity relating to Joint Canadian-United States defence plans and operations. I propose that if the foregoing is acceptable to your Government, this note and your reply indicating such acceptance will constitute an agreement between the two Governments on this subject, the agreement to enter into force on the date of your note in reply. / 001051 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ANNEX WEAPONS AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS 1) The IM99B (Bomarc) 2) A i r - t o - A i r m i s s i l e s f o r t h e CF-101 3) A i r - t o - S u r f a c e weapons f o r t h e CF-104 4) The 762 ram Rocket (Honest John) 001052 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET J u l y 1 1 , 1963 DRAFT UNITED STATES NOTE Excellency, I have the honor to refer to your Note .... of and the Annex attached there- to proposing on behalf of the Government of Canada certain arrangements under which nuclear warheads will be made available for the Canadian Forces. I am pleased to inform you that the arrangements set forth in your Note and Annex are acceptable to my Government. My Government further agrees that your Note and this reply shall constitute an agreement between the two Governments, effective to-day. Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Ambassador. His Excellenoy Paul Martin, The Secretary of State for External Affairs, OTTAWA, Canada. 001053 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET J u l y 1 1 , I963 DRAFT CANADIAN LETTER Dear Mr. Ambassador, The Governments of the United States and Canada have just concluded an Exchange of Notes constituting agreement concerning the provision of nuclear warheads for the Canadian Forces. Because It has been necessary to embody In one agreement arrangements applicable to the Canadian Forces assigned to NATO and North American Commands and because the requirements in respect of the latter do not In some respects readily lend themselves to the standard NATO stockpile agreement, the Canadian Government considers it desirable to set out in this supplementary letter its understanding of certain provisions. Paragraph 2 It is intended by the provision "to meet the needs of approved defence plans" that the quantities of nuclear warheads to be made available to the Canadian Forces in the defence of North America shall be jointly agreed and shall not be altered without full prior consultation. Paragraph 5 It is understood that in respect of North American defence, consultation In accordance with the procedures set out in the secret Exchange of Letters dated September 30 and October 2, 1959 between the Canadian Ambassador in Washington and the Secretary of State and supplementary correspondence dated January 11 and January 14, i960, relative to Increasing NORAD1s states of readiness will, in all situations except that .../2 001054 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 - S E C R E T of surprise attack, precede the release of nuclear warheads to meet operational requirements. The procedures and means whereby the two Governments will authorize use of these weapons operationally will be reviewed at an early date by appropriate officials of the two Governments. Provision shall be made for any further communications and other facilities necessary to permit authorization prooedures to be carried out effectively and rapidly. Paragraph 8 It is understood that the expression "points of entry" means, in respect of airlift of nuclear warheads, the airport of landing in Canadian territory from which warheads are to be transported by other means than by air. Paragraph 9 It is understood that the phrase "except as otherwise agreed by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments" is intended to take account of existing and future NATO and Canada-U.S. agreements where they may be applicable to the financing of communications required by the present agreement. Paragraph 10 It Is understood that "reasonable administrative and logistic support" means support provided on the same basis as, and of a standard not less than,that provided for comparable Canadian personnel and dependents. Review The review and termination clause normally Inserted In any international agreement has been omitted from the Exchange of Notes solely in the interests of .. ./3 001055 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -3- S E C R E T conforming to NATO stockpile agreements. It is understood however that the Exchange of Notes of may be reviewed by the two Governments at the request of either Government and after such review may be terminated upon six months' notice. It is with these understandings in mind that the Canadian Government has entered into the Exchange of Notes of with your Government. I would be grateful If you would confirm that this supplementary letter represents your Government's understanding of the several provisions to which reference is made. Yours sincerely, Paul Martin 001056 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET J u l y 1 1 , 1963 DRAFT UNITED STATES LETTER Dear Mr. Martin, I refer to your letter of which set forth your Government's understanding of certain provisions in the agreement effected by your Note .... of and my Note .... of the same date relating to the provision of nuclear warheads for the Canadian Forces. I wish to confirm that these understandings are identical with those of my Government. Yours sincerely, Ambassador. 001057 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01873 Title A name given to the resource "Draft Canadian Note Concerning Nuclear Warheads for the Canadian Forces" (and other draft notes) Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 11-Jul-63 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c7af85bff5e034a62b327e89cb292eeb.pdf 99f2b1ce85baf694040da7ec8dc8b417 PDF Text Text Document disclosed undej^the Access to InformationtAct Document divulgue en v e r t u / f t la Loifyr I'd&es qJSmormation C^^a^LAtA^A #o£3//f£, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF DEFENCE PANEL Document Ho. ED S..-.6.&.... S E C R E T DRAFT GUIDANCE ON ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR CANADIAN DELEGATION TO 1962 TRIENNIAL REVIEW The possible acquisition of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces continues to be given serious consideration by the Canadian Government at the highest level. At the same time, as the information supplied in connection with this examination makes clear, the necessary preparations are continuing to enable the Canadian forces to have the necessary vehicles, carriers and ground installations for both training and operations should it be decided to acquire nuclear weapons. 000381 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01705 Title A name given to the resource "Draft Guidance on Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Canadian Delegation to 1962 Triennial Review" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 31-Oct-62 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c6da90eaafb289891a4bda2a4ce9e2f9.pdf 7546507c93ff85ca3608cc39f9029535 PDF Text Text /Zujtz-- e dlz^ eay eeeaiteafci* last teat© beta aaMbaktB. oafeefe*!?«£ Canada* 6QsniltBiG&£& -tev© twsti aad& 3f«ap: Caaada in oon&iftQnt&l nad collective dofenco ifttdti est! ©filar &3 «»s*bi ©at by Oupdlas tmmm If waleer MSttiQsds -*t» ustid* -' Hiepefisif©, i t i s ©ar duty aad' cor tofceatise' ' to «ieg,*te I M A M * cssw&loiiftor.'tfeesftsieapsiia *fce» to oar e«M«s«iw t*t*ieii tsm tosCAMttao siltesat stub ©ssssusiiiisa. T T l M t i l l 'iift'JI I1M1 —• — • - • - - = • i M ' I'MI " B l - —"• •'- t t mk iii jit # — "•' • Jhi H I ittt ^ i.iM • - . ' • a i m — . ^ i ; . i L % . „ »,- .•• —•• - -••• - - Jfc * - - . . _ . . . fc. ...„ aaaarfttttos © SMrtaf <o? tl& enti** defta* effort of Oasial& to capdar to dstenatot* far tho flttNro'idwt'tfafr aoet.«£XtoeUv» eestriteatiott ta «BD 'illSftao* ©ar sanatisr s©a mm* V$i& mUm $m posaS&IU4a> osr wotrol' s«y bs ateogad ty- ng!?sKES8afc *it!t oat saHtos# lb* Oaaadfcta (tovMaaftBt sajjperfcs .too •**•*' ti&t ft'' stfiiiftihamtas: of ito- g&aBta&LGHEHkl' foists of £&$& -BUS. usd&es th& VftUflBM :6S ttttltt?; tM*i/Q& ^«Bp«9 £<*r dtofottto M^Bftt flftfeflfe*. 'Ba also -KBpovfe m&_wm &&&& ptmIMB teat g&mUm doltooUvo •"©Mfe?©! af «|1 • S^S ^satieadL nac^Usisdr' woaoojis. . ; TO flaf«MQ of tlai Vfc*& aov vnrito'-liafeijr ©a ^ ^ © s r rataiS^I©^ fKsaer bafe for -nfjr ^d3M rm&m taa fetosdJaa Cksftermeisfe. fes a® I ^ ^ ^ I of ^ftten",!^ tits $&$&&&& olsfe: Igf ^^iisi!fefcQ-ii of • . J 9 * . Placed on Fib ^ Histoncal Division ;T 4f'i>A.LM."3 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW03590 Title A name given to the resource "Draft Notes for Possible Statement to the Press by the Minister of National Defence" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO - Nuclear weapons - Policy - NATO long term planning," RG25-A-3-b, vol 5960, file 50219-AL-2-40, part 8-2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2-May-63 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4e472e9a65a976e1d5bbeab5cd73cece.pdf 0f3b73129f3ee4078e173fc04a31e490 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information D R A F T SECRET Ottawa, DRAFT OF PROPOSED AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNING THE PROVISION OF STOCKPILES OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR CANADIAN FORCES Sir, I have the honour to refer to discussions which have taken place in the Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence and ift the Permanent Joint Board on Defence regarding the terms and conditions under which nuclear warheads might be 'j- provided to and accepted by Canada, My Government»s understanding of these conditions Is set out in the Annex and Schedules attached to this Note. If your Government concurs, I propose that this Note, together with its Annex and Schedules, and your reply thereto should constitute an agreement between our two Governments, I further propose that this agreement will be brought into effect when both Governments have confirmed, by a further Exchange of Notes, their intention to do so. Accept, Sir, etc... 000479 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information D n i\ v T SKCJUCT A_N__NJKJC ' . A. 1. Definitions In this Annex and attached schedules, unless the oontext otherwise requires: "Canada" means the Government of Canada, and "United States" means the Government of the United States of America; the term "warhead" includes "weapons" where the two cannot practically be considered as physically separate components; "NATO" means the North Atlantio Treaty Organization; "Allied Government" means any Government allied to Canada and the United States through membership In NATO; "Allied Commander" means the Commander of a NATO Allied command; "SACLANT" means the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic of NATO; "COMCANLANT" means the Commander of the Canadian Atlantio sub-area; "SACEUR" means the Supreme Allied Commander Europe NATO; "NORAD" means North America Air Defence Command, established.by Canada and the United States by an Exchange of Notes of May 12, 1958; "CINOIIORAD" moans the Columnnder in Chief of NORAD; 000480 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information "Storage Slto" means the site or sites at which the,warheads are to be stored together with their appurtenant facilities such as magazines, fences and buildings deemed essential for preserving the security of the warheads together with the land on which these are to be constructed, B» General 2, Ownership of any stocks of nuclear warheads covered by this Annex and its attached schedules will remain with the United States, 3* Arrangements for the security of the storage sites for the warheads will be the Joint responsibility of Canada and the United States, to be exercised as followst(a) United States personnel* to be provided \ln the minimum numbers required, will be responsible for the inner security of the storage sites; (b) Canada will be responsible for the external security of the storage sites, 4, The procedures under which the nuolear warheads will be released from the Btorage sites to meet logistic or operational requirements will be based on the principle of Joint responsibility exercised by means of intergovernmental consultation, 5. Authorization of the use by Canadian Forces of the nuclear warheads subsequent to their release, from storage in accordance with paragraph 4 will be the responsibility of Canada, They will be used only in a period of grave emergency and in accordance with the plans and procedures governing the operations of the Command concerned. 000481 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 6. The detailed procedure3 under which the principles outlined in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 will be carried out are set out in the schedules to this Annex. 7. The United States will be physically and financially responsible for the provision, maintenance, modification and assembly of the nuclear warheads, including the provision of technical equipment, and of personnel in the minimum numbers required, for these functions. The warheads will be provided in numbers sufficient to enable the weapons systems for which they are intended to be maintained at all times at the level of operational effectiveness required by the plans of the Commander concerned, g. Safeguards in the design of the nuclear warheads will be the responsibility of the United States. The procedure for handling the nuclear warheads to afford the maximum protection of lives and property will be subject to the agreement of Canada. Safety procedures for maintenance, transport, loading, storage and salvage will be at least equivalent to United States standards, 9. No test firings of the warheads will take place in Canada, 10. A reliable system of rapid communication will, where necessary to meet the purposes of this agreement, be established, operated and maintained in a manner to be agreed upon by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments. C. 11. Provision of Stockpiles of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian ""Forces in CanacTa The location of the stockpiles to be held in Canada will be determined by Canada in consultation with CINCNORAD or SACLANT a3 appropriate. 12. The United States will be responsible for the movement., in accordance with agreed procedures and in conformity with applicable Canadian laws and regulations, of tine nuclear warheads to and from Canada. 000482 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information A. 13. [ ' -i-Baoept ao may •othGiawlrae bo agroed,- Canada will be responsible for and bear tho coot of:(a) provision of tho land required for the storage sites and associated facilities; (b) construction of the storage sites and associated facilities which, except for those specified In paragraph 13 (c) below, will conform with standards and criteria prevailing In NATO, and also their operation and maintenance; (0) construction, In accordance with normal Canadian standards, of the increments to Canadian administrative installations and facilities (housing, messing, offices, etc.) necessary to accommodate United States custodial and support personnel, as well as the operation and maintenance of these facilities; (d) movement of the nuclear warheads within Canada, subject always to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 above; (e) security for all nuclear warheads during movement within Canada, the "detailed arrangements to be made by the appropriate military authorities of the two Governments; 14, Canada will be responsible for arranging for reasonable administrative and logistic support, including that for United States personnel required to implement this agreement, ^ Details of the support for United States personnel/*, v,*^ ALK will bo a matter to be mutually agreed, between the' appropriate agencies of the two Governments. Each Government shall bear '' the cost of the pay, allowances and messing of its own personnel. 000483 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 15. The status of United States personnel in Canada in accordance with the terms of thi3 agreement will be governed by the provisions of tho NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon. D. Provision of Stockpiles of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian Forces in Europe 16. The location of the stockpiles to be held in Europe will be determined by the appropriate Allied Commander in consultation with Canada, the United States and the Allied Government or Governments concerned, 17. Canada and the United States will consult with regard to any notification or other form of diplomatic communication addressed to the host government concerning the proposed establishment of any stockpiles of warheads on its territory for possible Canadian use, 18. Subject always to the provisions of paragraph 4* United States forces will be responsible for the movement of the nuclear warheads into and from the Allied Command Europe Area, Responsibility for movement within this area will be as agreed between the appropriate Canadian, United States and Allied authorities, 19. Storage sites and associated facilities included in NATO infrastructure programmes and allocated for the use of Canadian forces will be subject to NATO infrastructure funding and procedures. Canada will be responsible, in accordance with the terms of Part C of this Annex, for arranging for the provision of facilities in Europe which it is mutually agreed are required for Canadian forces and United States personnel and which are not provided under common infrastructure. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 20. 'Where Canada is the sole user of storage facilities in Europe, the responsibility for operation and maintenance of the facilities and administrative and logistic support for United States personnel will be in accordance with the provisions of part C of this Annex, subject to agreement with Allied host governments where appropriate. 21. Where Canada is a joint user, with other members of NATO, of storage facilities in Europe, constructed as part of an infrastructure programme, the final determination of the division of responsibilities for the support and external security of the site or sites will be as agreed between the Governments and the Allied Command concerned as may be appropriate. E. 22. Review and Termination The terms of this Agreement or any of its Schedules may be reviewed by the two Governments at the request of either Government and after such review may be terminated by either Government upon six months' notice. 000485 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information S E C R E T . ' I l i U B I i . l H I O l * i»Mi.mH,».i<.>P.I»f| l |i» SCHEDULE A DRAFT SCHEDULE GOVERNING THE STOCK-PILING IN CANADA OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR BOMARCS This sohedule deals with the availability of nuclear warheads for the BOMARC B (1M99) Squadrons to be located at North Bay, Ontario, and La Macaza, P.Q., under the operational control of CINCNORAD, 1, The United States shall provide the required type of nuclear warheads in sufficient numbers and at the time necessary to enable the RCAF BOMARC B Squadrons to carry out the tasks allotted them under CINCNORAD»s plans for the air defence of North America, and shall maintain the stocks at all times at the required level of operational effectiveness* 2. Ownership of all stocks of the nuclear warheads made available by the United States to Canada In fulfillment of the purposes of this schedule will remain with the United States, 3. The United States will be responsible for main- taining and assembling the nuclear warheads and will provide the personnel and technical equipment required to perform these functions and other functions as specified in this schedule. In the exercise of this responsibility, the United States will provide a detachment of no more than officers and men to be stationed at each site, 4. The nuclear warheads will be stored on the missiles. The missile launching sites will therefore be deemed to be special ammunition storage sites and storage, maintenance and associated facilities will be provided. The whole will form an inner compound and will be surrounded by a 000486 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 - fence equipped with an alarm system. An outer compound will be formed by an additional perimeter fence to be erected at an appropriate distance and will also be equipped with an alarm system, 5. The control of access to the sites established in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 will be exercised as follows:(a) Canada and the United States will be jointly responsible for controlling the access to the inner compound. This joint responsibility will be carried out in such a way as to permit qualified and authorized RCAF personnel to perform appropriate functions relative to the maintenance of the weapon system and its associated facilities within the inner compound, and the loading and unloading of the nuclear warheads in the manner to be agreed between the authorities concerned. However, all maintenance functions for the nuclear warheads will be performed only by U.S. personnel in the appropriate area of the inner compound,, (b) Canada will exercise responsibility for the security of the outer compound. 6. The particular responsibilities of the U.S. detachment referred to in paragraph 3 above will include the following functions:(a) to maintain custody of all material such as test equipment, technical orders and documents designated as Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data; (b) to establish, operate and maintain control of U.S. cryptographic material; oo•J 000487 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information .3. (c) to maintain survellance of tho loading (mating) and unloading of all nuclear warheads; (d) to comply with approved safety procedures for the delivery system for which the warheads provided under this schedule pertain; (e) ' to support the training of RCAF personnel as may be required; (f) to assist in the movement of the warheads within Canada as may be required, 7. The U.S. detachment commander or his authorized representative will act as nuclear safety officer and will advise the appropriate RCAF commander on matters pertaining to nuclear safety. 8. Each site will be under the command of an RCAF officer regardless of the presence of U.S. personnel. Subject to and without derogation from the arrangements provided for in this agreement regarding the provision, storage and release of nuclear weapons, the U.S. detachment commander will be responsible for the exercise of command over the administration, training and tactical actions of U.S. personnel, and over the detachment*a equipment. The U.S. detachment commander will ensure compliance with all applicable RCAF directives and orders. 9. The United States will be responsible for the movement of the nuclear warheads to and from Canada, Canada will be responsible for the movement of the nuclear warheads within Canada, Authority to Import the nuclear warhoad3 into Canada and for their removal from Canada will be sought through the diplomatic ... 4 000488 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information channel. All movements of the warheads into and out of Canada will be in confontiity with applicable Canadian laws and regulations, 10. Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Annex, approval for the release of nuclear warheads from storage and for their use will be exercised as follows:(a) If, pursuant to the Exchange of Letters of September 30/0ctober 2, 1959» between the Canadian Ambassador in Washington and the Secretary of State, the two Governments authorize CINCNORAD to increase the state of readiness of his Command to a state of Maximum Readiness (Air Defence Readiness) they may determine at that time whether such authorization shall be deemed to constitute authorization for CINCNORAD to employ these warheads in the event of an attack of a character which in his judgment necessitates such action, (b) If as a result of such consultation it is agreed that CINCNORAD should be given this authority, each Government will so advise CINCNORAD and its respective national release officer at the appropriate Combat Operations Centre and its senior officer at each site through appropriate channels. (c) The authorization by both Governments to launch surface to air type nuclear warheads will be accomplished through positive control provided by double lock switches, one key for which will be held by the commander of the appropriate Combat Operations Centre (a Royal Canadian Air Force Officer), who shall be deemed to be the Canadian release officer, or his authorized RCAF representative* The other key will be held by the senior United States Air Force Officer at the Combat Operations Centre, v/ho shall be deemed to be the U„3* release officer, or his authorized USAF representative* c �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ,3. (d) If advance authorization as indicated above has not been given and the situation is such that in the opinion of CINCNORAD It is necessary for him to have authority to use the warheads, he shall seek approval from the two Governments, Normally such approval will be sought through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff but he may simultaneously establish direct contact with the respective Heads of Government, (e ) Confirmation of approval to use the warheads, if given, will be sent directly by each Government to CINCNORAD and to its respective national release officer at the appropriate Combat Operations Centre and its senior officer at each site. (f) CINCNORAD will only issue operational orders to use the warheads after the Heads of Government have authorized their release for use as above mentioned. (g) The weapons will be employed' only In accordance with NORAD plans and directives, 11, The cost of salaries of U,S, personnel, rations and suoh equipment and training as the United States agrees to furnish, will be borne by the United States, 12, The costs of the construction, development and maintenance of the storage sites and associated facilities, ... 6 000490 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - I) - including those required for the support of U.S. personnel and their dependents, shall be borne by Canada. The storage sites and associated facilities will be in accordance with NORAD standards and criteria. If such criteria are not specified or are increments to Canadian installations they will be of a normal Canadian standard. Exceptions may be made on the basi3 of mutual agreement. 13o The costs to be borne by Canada in accordance with paragraph 12 above will include the costs of the following: (a) All standard ground support equipment required for the handling of the nuclear warheads. (b) Adequate transportation as shall be mutually agreed to include drivers, POL and maintenance, to meet the requirements of U.S. personnel. (c) Dependent (married) quarters of mutually agreed standards and in agreed numbers for authorized . dependents of U.S. personnel. U„S. personnel occupying such quarters will pay rent in amounts comparable to that paid by Canadian personnel of equal military grade occupying 3imilar quarters and will pay the costs of gas, electricity and heating at the prevailing local rates. (d) Medical and dental treatment as shall be mutually agreed. 14. The RCAF will make available to U.S. personnel the privileges of membership in all appropriate military clubs and messes for officers, non-commissioned officers, and other ranks. U.S. personnel and their dependents will be authorized to utilize such morale, welfare, recreational, or individual logistical support facilities as are provided for members of the R0AFo • o•f 000491 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 15, Fire prevention measures aad insure Lions 'within arc-as exclusively occupied by U.S. p^rsoni^l will La a U.S. responsibility. The KCAi*' commanders will provide fire-fighting equipment and personnel authorized to assist in fire prevention and fire-fighting in or near such areas. The U.S. authorities will give these personnel such information and instructions as may be necessary to the performance of their duties, 16, A combined Canada-United States communications plan will be developed based upon NORAD criteria and plans and according to the' following requirementss(a) Atomic release/recall communications from the designated NORAD commander and to the U.S. detachment arid/or Combat Operations Centre, as appropriate, (b) Atomic logistics control and reporting communications, (c) U.S. unit administrative communications, including internal and external security communications, (d) Convoy communications for the security of movement of warhead sections, 17, The above plan will also provide for such'other communications as are required to ensure that the necessary authorization to employ the warheads may be obtained In time to meet operational requirements. To this end, each Government will establish direct-line communication facilities, maintained on an instant-use basis, between the representative of each Government authorized to approve the use of the warheads, the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, CIIICIIORAD and the U.S. and Canadian release officers at the appropriate Combat Operations Centre and the senior Canadian and U.S. officer at each alto. The manner In which this •. • 3 000492 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information system will be established, operated and maintained as well as the cost-sharing aspects will be the subject of consultation and agreement between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments. Use will be made of existing facilities where appropriate, 18. All the necessary communication electronics equipment and power equipment to be provided will be in accordance with NORAD criteria unless otherwise mutually agreed. 19. Personnel to support the above mentioned com- munications and the maintenance of these communications will be provided as may be mutually agreed. 20. Training of Royal Canadian Air Force munitions and weapons loading crews to standards equivalent to those specified for U.S. personnel will be accomplished, as required, through USAF sponsored joint U.S.-Canadian crew courses conducted in the United State3 or on site in Canada. 21. The United States will be responsible for pro- viding the necessary and authorized information, equipr ment and technical publications, etc. to the RCAF for training purposes. Reciprocally, the RCAF, if requested, will make available to U.S. detachments Canadian-owned training devices for the training of U.S. personnel. 22. U.S. detachments will support the training re- quirements of these RCAF units. The U.S. detachments will maintain the maximum condition of readiness tc render full operational support to these forces and U„S. training schedules will be compatible with those of tho RCAF units, where applicable,, ...9 000493 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information 23o Routine, periodic training inspections of the U.S. detachments and RCAF units may be carried out as mutually agreed. 24. The commander of the U.S. detachment and the commander of the RCAF security force will maintain close contact in order to be fully informed of all matters affecting the security of the sites and of.all U.S. and Canadian property and personnel connected therewith, 25. The commander of the RCAF security force will prepare plans, in conjunction with the U.S. detachment commander, for the evacuation of all nuclear warheads with minimum delay in event of subversive activity, disaster, civil riot, and any other condition of emergency. 26. ' The United States will be responsible for the radiological safety of all areas which are the specific responsibility of the U.S. detachment and for providing RCAF personnel at each site with adequate warning and advice on any radiological hazards caused by fissionable material stored at the sites0 27. The RCAF will be responsible for radiological safety except for those aspects which are the specific responsibility of the U.S. personnel and for the isolation and security of all areas, which, for radiological safety reasons, mu3t be sealed off to prevent entry of unauthorized personnel. 28. U.S. and Canadian personnel will not be subject to radiological hazards, external or internal, which are in excess of those permitted by the lesser of their national standards. ...10 000494 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information - 10 29. In the event of an accident during transportation, U.S. personnel will be responsible for taking the necessary action to reduce to a minimum radiological hazards* 30. The RCAF will be provided with the necessary safety and handling rules for nuclear weapons and U.S. safety rules for operations with U.S* nuclear warheads will be complied with. 31. The RCAF will advise the appropriate U.S. authorities of all modifications and changes to be performed on the nuclear warhead delivery system to ensure that nuclear safety is not adversely affected. 32. Combined procedures will be established for the determination of radiation levels in the decontamination of operational and storage area3. The RCAF will be responsible for decontaminating all areas except those which are the specific responsibility of U.S. personnel. The RCAF will provide such assistance as may be required to support U.S, decontamination efforts, 33. The RCAF will be responsible for the explosive ordnance disposal of atomic weapons. U.S* personnel ; will assist in this task as may be required. * 34. The recovery of parts or portions of nuclear warheads which have been accidentally or otherwise incompletely destroyed will be the responsibility of the United States, 35. Movements of all personnel and equipment in response to explosive ordnance disposal missions will conform, to the maximum practical extent, to the policies and procedures for the movement of the nuclear warheads. 000495 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information -• .1.1 36. - Mo public release of information regarding this schedule or its implementation will be made except by mutual agreement between the two Governments. 37. All claims arising from the implementation of this schedule will be dealt with in accordance with tho provisions of Article VIII of the Agreement Regarding the Status of Forces of Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, 000496 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E G U E T SCHEDULE B DRAFT SCHEDULE GOVERNING THE STOCK-PILING IN CANADA OF NUCLEAR ANTI-SUBMARINE WEAPONS FOR THE R.C.N. AND R.C.A.F. MARITIME COMMAND ___ This schedule deals with the availability of nuclear warheads for anti-submarine weapons for the units of the Royal Canadian Navy and the Maritime Command of the Royal Canadian Air Force assigned to SACLANT. 1. The United States shall provide the required type of nuclear weapons In sufficient numbers and at the time necessary to enable the units of the RCN and of the RCAF Maritime Command to carry out the tasks allotted them under SACLANT'a plans for the defence of the area of his responsibility, and shall maintain the stocks at all times at the required level of operational effectiveness. 2. Ownership of all stocks of nuclear weapons made available by the United States to Canada in fulfillment of the purposes of this schedule will remain with the United States. 3. The United States will be responsible for maintaining and assembling the nuclear weapons and will provide the personnel and technical equipment required to perform these functions and other functions as specified in this schedule. In the exercise of this responsibility, the United States will provide a detachment of no more than officers and men to be stationed at each storage site. • • • d» 000497 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information .2, 4. Special Ammunition Storage sites will be established in the numbers required and will each consist of an inner and outer compound. The inner compound will consist of the magazine, buildings for the assembly and maintenance of the weapons and appropriate security devices and will be surrounded by a fence equipped with an alarm system. The outer, oompound will be formed by an additional perimeter fence to be erected at an appropriate distance and will also be equipped with an alarm system. 5. The control of access to the Special Ammunition Storage sites established in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 will be exercised as followst(a) The United States will be responsible for controlling the access to the inner compound* (b) Canada will exercise responsibility for the security of the outer compound. 6. The particular responsibilities of the U.S. detachment referred to In paragraph 3 above will include the following functionst(a) to maintain custody of all material such as test equipment, technical orders and documents designated as Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data; (b) to establish, operate and maintain control of U.S, cryptographic material; (c) to maintain surveillanoe of the loading (mating) and unloading of all nuclear warheads; .,. i 000498 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ,3 (d) to comply with approved safety procedures for the nuclear weapons system or systems for which the weapons provided under this schedule pertain; (e) to support training of RCN and RCAF personnel as.may be required; (f) to assist in the movement of the weapons within Canada as may be required. 7. Each U.S. detachment commander or his authorised representative will act as nuclear safety officer and will advise the appropriate Canadian commander on matters . pertaining to nuclear safety. The U.S, detachment commander will also act as U.S. release officer. 8. • Each site will be under the command of an RCN or RCAF officer a3 appropriate, regardless of the presence Of U.S. personnel. Such officer will also act as the Canadian release officer. Subject to, and without derogation from the arrangements provided for in.this agreement regarding the provision, storage and release of nuclear weapons, the U.S. detachment commander will be responsible for the exercise of command over the administration, training and tactical actions of U.S. personnel, and over the detachment's.equipment. He will ensure compliance with all applicable RCN and/or . RCAF directives and orders. 9. The United States will be responsible for the movement o.f the nuclear weapons to and from Canada. Canada will bo responsible for the movement of the nuclear weapons within Canada. Authority to import the nuclear weapons into Canada and for their removal from Canada will 4 •e• ' 000499 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur fajcces a /'information be'Sought••through the diplomatic channel. -All movements of; the weapons into and out of Canada will be in conformity with applicable 10, - Canadian laws and regulations. Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Annex, approval for the release of nuclear weapons from storage and for their use will be exercised as followst, (a) In the event SACLANT should deem that the situation requires him to . declare a Simple or higher state of alert, the two Governments shall consult as to whether he should be authorized to employ the nuclear weapons, (b) If as a result of such consultation it is agreed.that SACLANT should be given this authority, each Government 'will so advise SACLANT and its respective national release officer at each storage site through appropriate channels. (c) If advance authorization as indicated above has not been given and the situation is such that In the opinion of SACLANT it is necessary for him to have authority to use the weapons, he shall seek approval from the two Governments, Normally such approval will be sought through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff but he may simultaneously establish direct contact with th© respective Heads of Government. 000500 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information .5(d) Confirmation of approval to release the weapons from storage for operational employment, If given, will be sent directly by each Government to SACLANT and to its respective national release officer at each site. (e) SACLANT will only be able to issue operational orders for aircraft or ships armed with nuclear weapons to proceed on operational missions after the respective Heads of Government have authorized their release for use,as above mentioned, (f) RCN and RCAF units will employ the nuclear weapons only in accordance with NATO plana and SACLANT directives, 11. The coat of salaries of U.S, personnel, rations and such equipment and training as the United States agrees to furnish, will be borne by the United States. 12. The costs of the construction, development and maintenance of the storage sites and associated facilities, Including those required for the support Of U,S* personnel and their dependents, shall be borne by Canada* ©si© storage sites and associated facilities will be In accordance with SACLANT standards and criteria. If such criteria are not specified or are increments to Canadian installations they will be of a normal Canadian standard. Exceptions may be made on the basis of mutual agreement. ... 6 000501 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information .6. 13, The costs to be borne by Canada in .accordance with paragraph 12 above will Include the cost3 of the followings(a) All standard ground support equipment required for the handling of the nuclear weapons, (b) Adequate transportation as shall be mutually agreed to Include drivers, POL and maintenance, to meet the requirements of U,S, personnel, (0) Dependent (married) quarters of mutually agreed standards and in.agreed numbers for authorized dependents of U.S, personnel, U.S, personnel occupying such quarters will pay rent in amounts comparable to that paid by Canadian personnel of equal military grade occupying similar quarters and will pay the costs of gas, electricity and heating at the prevailing local rates, (d) Medical and dental treatement as shall be mutually agreed, 14. The RCN and RCAF will make available to U.S, personnel the privileges of membership in all appropriate military clubs and messes for officers, non-commissioned officers, and other ranks. U.S, ' personnel and their dependents will be authorized to utilize such morale, welfare, recreational, or individual logistical support facilities as are provided for members of the RCN and RCAF, 15, Flro prevention measures and inspections ... 7 000502 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information .7. within areas exclusively occupied by U.S. personnel will be a U.S. responsibility. The RCN and RCAF commanders will provide fire-fighting equipment and personnel authorized to assist In fire prevention and fire-fighting in or near such areas. The U.S. authorities will give these personnel such Information and instructions as may be necessary to the performance of their duties, 16. A combined Canada-United States communications plan will be developed based upon SACLANT criteria and plans and according to the following requirementsi(a) Atomic release/recall communications from the designated U.S, commander and to the U.S, detachment, (b) Atomic logistics control and reporting communications, (c) U.S, unit administrative communications, including Internal and external security communications, (d) Convoy communications for the security of movement of the weapons, • 17, The above plan will also provide for such other communications as are required to ensure that the necessary authorization to employ the weaponB may be obtained in time to meet operational requirements. To this end, each Government will establish direct-line communication facilities, maintained on an instant-use basis, between the representative of each Government authorized to approve the use of the weapons, tho Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, SACLANT and the U.S. and Canadian release officers at each storage site. ... 8 The 000503 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information .8. manner in which this system will be established, operated and. maintained as well as the cost-sharing aspects will be the subject of consultation and agreement between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments, Use will be made of existing facilities where appropriate, 18, All the necessary communication electronics equipment and power equipment to be provided will be In accordance with SACLANT criteria unless otherwise mutually agreed, 19, Personnel to support the above mentioned communications and the maintenance of these communications will be provided as may be mutually agreed, 20, Training of RCAF and. RCN munitions and weapons loading crews to standards equivalent to those specified for U.S. personnel will be accomplished as required, through U.S.-sponsored joint U.S.-Canadian crew courses conducted, in the U.S. or on site in Canada. 21. The United States will be responsible for providing the necessary and authorized information, equipment and technical publications, etc, to the RCN and the RCAF for training purposes. Reciprocally, the RCN and RCAF units, if requested, will make available to U.S. detachments Canadian owned training devices for the training of U,S, personnel. 22. U.S. detachments will support the training requirements of the ROW and RCAF units. The. .- U.S. detachments will maintain the maximum condition of Q 000504 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information •9readiness to render full operational support to these forces and U.S. training schedules will be compatible with those.of the RCN and RCAF units, where applicable. 23. Routine, periodic training inspections of the U.S, units and RCN and RCAF units may be carried out aB mutually agreed, 24, The Commander of the U.S, detachment and the Commander of the RCN or RCAF security force will maintain close contact in order to be fully informed of all matters affecting the security of the sites and of all U.S. and Canadian property and personnel connected therewith. 25; The Commander of the RCN or RCAF security force will prepare plans, in conjunction with the U.S. detachment commander, for the evacuation of all nuclear weapons with minimum delay in event of subversive activity, disaster, civil riot, and any other condition of emergency. 26,. The United States will be responsible for the radiological safety of all areas which are the specific responsibility of the U.S. detachment and for providing RCN or RCAF personnel at each site with adequate warning and advico on any radiological hazards caused by fissionable material stored at the sites. 27. The RCN or RCAF as appropriate will be responsible for radiological safety except for those , ,, 10 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information aspects which are the specific responsibility of tho U.S. detachment and for the isolation and security of all areas, which, for radiological safety reasons, must be sealed off to prevent entry of unauthorized personnel. 28. • U.S. and Canadian personnel will not be subject to radiological hazards, external or internal, which are in excess of those permitted by the lesser Of their national standards, 29, In the event of an accident during trans- portation, the U.S. detachment will be responsible for taking the necessary action to reduce to a minimum the radiological hazards. 30. The RCN and RCAF will be provided with the necessary, safety and handling rules for nuclear weapons and U.S, safety rules for operations with U.S. nuclear weapons will be complied with, 31. The RCN and RCAF will advise the appropriate U.S, authorities of all modifications and changes to.be performed on the nuclear weapon delivery systems to ensure that nuclear safety is not adversely affected, 32. Combined procedures will be established for the determination of radiation levels in the decontamination of operational and storage areas. The RCN and the RCAF will be responsible for decontaminating all areas except those which are tho specific responsibility of U.S, personnel. The RCN and the RCAF will provide such assistance as may be required to support U.S. decontamination efforts. • • • JLJ. 000506 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information «*•* o 33, The RCN or the RCAF as appropriate will be responsible for the explosive ordinance disposal of atomic weapons. U.S. personnel will assist in this task as may be required, 34. The recovery of parts or portions of nuclear Weapons which have been accidentally or otherwise incompletely destroyed will be the responsibility of the United States. 35* Movements of all personnel and equipment in response to explosive ordinance disposal missions will conform* to the maximum practical extent, to the policies and procedures for the movement of nuclear weapons, 36. No public release of information regarding this schedule or its implementation will be made except by mutual agreement between the two Governments. 37, All claims arising from the Implementation of this schedule will be dealt with in accordance with the provision of Article VIII of the Agreement Regarding the Status of Forces of Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, 000507 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information O..JAjiWf SCHEDULE C DRAFT SCHEDULE GOVERNING THE STOCK-PILING OF NUCLEAR "WARHEADS FOR THE 762 MM R O O M (HONEST JOHN) FOR THE CANADIAN ARMY IN EUROPE This schedule deals with the availability of nuclear warheads for the 762 mm Rocket (Honest John) for the Canadian Army in Europe. 1. The United States shall provide the required type of nuclear warheads in sufficient numbers and at the time necessary to enable the Canadian Army delivery units to carry out the task3 allotted them under SACEUR"s plans for the defence of the area of his responsibility, and shall maintain the stocks at all times at the required level of operational effectiveness. 2, -Ownership of all stocks of nuclear weapons made available by the United States to Canada in fulfillment of the purposes of this schedule will remain with the United States. 3. The United States will be responsible for maintaining and assembling the nuclear weapons and will provide the personnel and technical equipment required to perform these functions and other functions specified in this schedule. In the exercise of this responsibility, the United States will provide a detachment of no more than _________ officers and men to be stationed at each storage site. • • o <C 000508 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information .2. 4. Special Ammunition Storage sites will be established In the numbers required and will each consist of an inner and outer compound. The inner compound will consist of the magazine, buildings for the assembly and maintenance of the weapons and appropriate security devices and will be surrounded by a fence equipped with an alarm system. The outer compound will be formed by an additional perimeter fence to be erected at an appropriate distance and will also be equipped with an alarm system, 5. The control of access to the Special Ammuni- tion Storage sites established in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 will be exercised as followst* (a) The United States will be responsible for controlling the .access to the inner compound, (b) Canada will exercise responsibility for the security of the outer compound, 6. The particular responsibilities of the U.S. detachment referred to in paragraph 3 above will include the following functionst(a) to maintain custody of all materiel such as teat equipment, technical orders and documents designated as Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data; (b) to establish, operate and maintain control of U.S. cryptographic material; ... j 000509 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information • J i (c) to maintain surveillance of the loading (mating) and unloading of all nuclear warheads; (d) to comply with approved safety procedures for the nuclear weapons system or systems for which the weapons provided under this - schedule pertain; (e) to support training of Canadian Army personnel as may be required; (f) to assist in the movement of theweapons within the Canadian area of responsibility as may be required, 7, U.S. Each/detachment commander or his authorized representative will act as nuclear safety officer and will advise the Canadian Army commander on matters pertaining to nuclear safety. The U.S. detachment commander will also act as U.S. release officer. 8. Each site will be under the command of a Canadian Army officer, regardless of the presence of U.S, personnel. Such officer will also act as the Canadian release officer. Subject to, and without derogation from the arrangements provided for in this Agreement regarding the provision, storage and release of nuclear weapons, the U,S, detachment commander will be responsible for the exercise of command over the administration, training and tactical aotions of V,S, personnel, and over the detachment's equipment. He will ensure compliance with all applicable Canadian Army directives and orders. ... 4 000510 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la l o i sur I'acces a I'information 9. , The United Skates will be responsible for the movement of tho nuclear weapons outside the Canadian area of responsibility, Canada will be responsible for the movement of the nuclear weapons within the Canadian area Of responsibility. Points of entry into and exit from the Canadian area of responsibility will be mutually agreed, 10, Pursuant to paragraphs.4 and 5 of the Annex, approval for the release of nuclear weapons from storage and for their use will be exercised as followst(&) In the event SACEUR should deem that the situation requires him to declare a Simple or higher state of alert, the two Governments shall consult as to whether he should be authorized to employ the nuclear weapons. (b) If as a result of such consultation it is agreed that SACEUR should be given this authority, each Government will so advise SACEUR and their respective national release officers at each site through appropriate channels, (c) If advance authorization as indicated above has not been given and the situation is such that In the opinion of SACEUR It Is necessary for him to have authority to ;U3e the weapons, he shall seek approval from tho two Governments. Normally such ... A �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information .5. approval will be sought through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff but he may simultaneously establish direct contact with the respective Heads of Government, (d) Confirmation of approval to release the weapons from storage for operational employment, if given, will be sent directly by each Government to SACEUR and to its respective national release officer at each site. (e) SACEUR will only be able to issue operational orders for the employment of the nuclear weapons after the respective Heads of Government have authorized their release for use as above mentioned. (f) Canadian Army units will employ the nuclear weapons only in accordance with NATO plans and SACEUR directives. 11. The cost of salaries of U,S, personnel, rations and such equipment and training as the United States agrees to furnish, will be borne by the United States, 12. The costs of the construction, development and maintenance of the storage sites and associated facilities, Including those required for the support of U.S. personnel and their dependents, shall be borne by Canada to the extent that they are not provided under NATO common infrastructure funding and procedures. Installations and facilities to be provided by Canada will be in accordance with SHAPE standards and criteria. ... 6 000512 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information .6. If such criteria are not specified they will be of a standard to be mutually agreed. Exceptions may be made on the-basis of mutual agreement, 13, The cost3 to be borne by Canada in accordance with paragraph 12 above will Include the costs of the followings(a) All standard ground support equipment required for the handling of the nuclear weapons. (b) Adequate transportation as shall be mutually agreed to include drivers, POL and maintenance, to meet the requirements of U.S, personnel, (c) Dependent (married) quarters of mutually agreed standards and in agreed numbers for authorized dependents of U.S, personnel. U.S. personnel occupying such quarters will pay rent in amounts comparable to that paid by Canadian personnel of equal military grade occupying similar quarters and will pay the costs of gas, electricity and heating at the prevailing local rates. (d) Medical and dental treatment as shall be mutually agreed. 14, The Canadian Army will make available to U.S, personnel the privileges of membership in all appropriate military clubs and mosses for officers, non-commissioned officers, and other ranks, U.S, per- sonnel and their dependents will be authorized to utilize such morale, welfare, recreational, or individual logistical support facilities as are provided for members ... 7 000513 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information .7. of the Canadian Army. 15. Fire prevention measures and inspections within areas exclusively occupied by U.S. personnel will be a U.S. responsibility. The Canadian Army commander will provide fire-fighting equipment and personnel authorized to assist in fire prevention and fire-fighting in or near such areas. The U.S. authorities will give these personnel such Information and instructions as may bo necessary to tho performance of their duties, 1.6. A combined Canada-United States communications plan will be developed based upon SHAPE criteria and plans and according to the following requirements, the costs of which will be met in accordance with current NATO infrastructure funding or, where such funding is not applicable, by mutual agreement between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments, (a) Atomic release/recall communications from the designated U.S. commander and to the U.S, detachment, (b) Atomic logistics control and reporting communications,. (c) U.S. unit- administrative communications, Including internal and external security communications. (d) Convoy communications-for the security" of movement of weapons. 17. The above plan will also provide for such other communications as are required to ensure that tho necessary authorization to employ the weapons may be ... 8 000514 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ,o„ obtained in time to meet operational requirements. To this end, each Government will establish direct-line communication facilities, maintained on an instanfc-use basisi between the representative of each Government authorized to approve the use of the weapons* the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, SACEUR and the U.S, and Canadian release officers at each storage site. The manner in which this system will be established* operated and maintained as well as the cost-sharing aspects will be the subject of consultation and agreement between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments* Use will be made of existing faellitiet; -where appropriate, 18. All the necessary communication electronics equipment and power equipment to be provided will be in accordance with SHAPE criteria unless otherwise mutually agreed. 19. Personnel to support the above-mentioned communications and the maintenance of these communications will be provided as may be mutually agreed. 20. Training of Canadian Army munitions and weapons loading cx'ews to standards equivalent to those specified for U.S. personnel will be accomplished, as required, through U.S.-sponsored joint U.S.-Canadian crew courses conducted in the U.S, or on site. 21. The United States will be responsible for providing the necessary and authorized information, equipment and technical publications, etc, to the Canadian Army for training purposes. Reciprocally, Canadian Army units, if requested, will make available to U.S. detachments Canadian owned training devices for tho training of U.S. personnel. ... Q 000515 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information .9. 22. ' U.S. detachments will support the training requirements o£ fche Canadian A m y 'units. Tha U.S, detachments will maintain th** iaaxlaura condition of roadli.oss to reader full operational support to those "forces aod U.S. training .schedules will be compatible •with those of th© Canadian Army units, where applicable,, ' 23." ",••' • Routine, periodic training inspections of--. '•'•'•••'.•'•' the U.S. units and Canadian Army units way be carried out aa mutually agreed, 24* The Commander of the U.S. detachment and the Commander of the Canadian Army security force will maintain close contact in order to be fully informed of all clatters affecting the security of the altos and of all U«S# and Canadian property and personnel eonneotsov therewith, 2,5* Tho Commander of the Canadian Ariay seowrlty forco will prepare plans/in conjUr)otion with the UVS t . detachment coriander, for the evacuation of all nuclear weapons with minimum delay in event of subversive activity# disaster, civil riot, and any other condition of, emergency.' 26, The United States will be responsible for the radiological safety of all areas which are the specific reopsto»lbility of the U.S. detachments and for providing Canadian Army personnel at each site with adequate warning and advice or? any radiological hazards' caused by fissionable material sotred- at the sites. 27. ' Tho Canadian. Attny will ho responsible for radiological 0afofcy in tho uvea of its responsibility cxeopt; for tho&a nspoct'o which aro tho specificreopon- . fjlbilifcy of tiki U.S. do'cac;^ it nt;d for the isolation ... 13 000516 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 10 - and socurlty of all areas, which, for radiological safety reasons, must'be sealed off to prevent entry of unauthorised personnel. 28. U.S. and Canadian personnel operating within the Canadian area of responsibility will not be subject to radiological hazards, external or internal, which are in excess of those permitted by the lesser of their national standards. 29. In the event of an accident during trans- portation, United States personnel will be responsible for taking the necessary action to reduce to a minimum the radiological hazards. 30. The Canadian Array will be provided with the necessary safety and handling rules for nuclear weapons and U.S. safety rules for operations with U.S. nuclear weapons will be complied with. 31. The Canadian Army will advise the appropriate U.S. authorities of all modifications and changes to be performed on the delivery system to ensure that nuclear safety Is hot adversely affected. 32. Combined procedures will be established for the determination of radiation levels in the decontamination of operational and storage areas in the Canadian area of responsibility. The Canadian Army will be responsible for decontaminating all areas within its area of responsibility, except those which are the • » • JL JL 000517 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information • • ; ' • • - 1 1• " . . .-" specific responsibility of U.S. personnel. The Canadian Army will provide such assistance as may be required to support U.S. decontamination efforts. 33. The United States will be responsible for the explosive ordinance disposal of atomic weapons. Canadian. Army personnel will assist in this task as may be required. 34. The recovery of parts or portions of nuclear weapons which have been accidentally or otherwise incompletely destroyed will be the responsibility of the United States. 35. Movements of all personnel and equipment In response to explosive ordinance disposal missions will conform, to the maximum practical extent, to the policies and procedures for the movement of nuclear weapons. 36. No public release of information regarding this schedule or its implementation will be made except by mutual agreement between the two Governments. 37. All claims arising from the implementation of this schedule will be dealt with in accordance with the provision of Article VIII of the Agreement Regarding the Status of Forces of Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. 000518 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information J E 0 u E '[' SCHEDULE D DRAFT SCHEDULE GOVERNING THE STOCK-PILING OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR AIR-TO-GROUND WEAPONS FOR THE FIRST AIR DIVISION R.C.A.F. This schedule deals with the availability of nuclear warheads for air-to-ground weapons for aircraft of the First Air Division o f the Royal Canadian Air Force. . 1. The United States shall provide the required type of nuclear warheads in sufficient numbers and at the time necessary to enable the CF-104 squadrons o f the First Air Division, RCAF to carry out the tasks allotted them under SACEUR's plans for the defence of the area of his responsibility, and shall maintain the stocks at all times at the required level of operational effectiveness. 2. Ownership of all stocks of nuclear weapons made available by the United States to Canada in fulfillment of the purposes of this schedule will remain with the United States. 3. The United States will be responsible for main- taining and assembling the nuclear weapons and will provid e the personnel and technical equipment required to perform these functions and other functions specified in this Schedule. In the exercise of this responsibility, the United States will provide a detachment of no more than officers and men to be stationed at each storage site, 4. The arrangements for the storage of the nuclear weapons will, be as follows :(a) Special Ammunition storage sites will be. established in the numbers required and will each consist of an inner and outer compound. The inner 000519 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information compound will consist of the magazine,'buildings ., for the assembly and maintenance of the weapons *• . and appropriate security devices and will be surrounded by a fence equipped with an alarm system. The outer compound will be formed by an . ,. ' additional.perimeter fence to be erected at an appropriate distance and will also be equipped with an alarm system,, y ' (b) Additionally, quick reaction alert areas will be > provided for aircraft armed with nuclear weapons* Such areas shall be deemed to be storage sites for the purposes of this schedule and shall be surrounded by appropriate security devices. 5<» The control of access to the Special Ammunition storage sites established in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 will be exercised as follows:(a) The United States will be responsible for controling the access to the inner compound. (b) Canada will exercise responsibility for the security of the outer compoundo 6« The particular responsibilities of the U 0 S. detachment referred to in paragraph 3 above will Include the following functions:(a) to maintain custody of all material such as test equipment, technical orders and documents designated as Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data; (b) to establish, operate cind maintain control of U.S. cryptographic material; (c) to maintain surveillance of the loading (mating) and unloading of all nuclear warheads; ...3 000520 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la l o i sur I'acces a I'information - J - (d) to comply .with approved safety procedures for the nuclear weapons system or systems for which the weapons provided under this schedule pertain; (e) to support training of RCAF personnel as may be required; (f) to assist in the movement of the weapons within the Canadian area of responsibility as may be required* 7o Each U.S. detachment commander or his authorized representative will act as nuclear safety officer and will advise the Canadian commander on matters pertaining to nuclear safety. The U.S. detachment commander will also act as U.S, release officer, 8, Each site will be under the command of an RCAF officer, regardless of the presence of U.S. personnel* Such officer will also act as the Canadian release officer* Subject to, and without derogation from the arrangements provided for in this Agreement regarding the provision, storage and release of nuclear weapons, the U.S. detachment commander will be responsible for the exercise of command over the administration, training and tactical actions of U.S, personnel, and over the detachment's equipment. He villi ensure compliance with all applicable RCAF directives and orders* 9. The United States will be responsible for the movement of the nuclear weapons during their movement outside the Canadian area of responsibility. Canada will be responsible for the movement of the nuclear weapons within the Canadian area of responsibility. Points of entry into and exit from the Canadian area of responsibility will be mutually agreed,, 000521 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information 10. . Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Annex, apprpval for the release of nuclear weapons from storage and for their use will be exercised as follows:(a) In the event SACEUR should deem that the situation requires him to declare a. Simple or higher state of alert, the two Governments shall consult as to whether he should be authorized to employ the nuclear weapons, (b) If as a result of such consultation It is agreed that SACEUR should be given this authority, each Government will so advise SACEUR and it's respective national release officer at each site through appropriate channels. (c) If advance authorization as indicated above ha3 not been given and the situation is such that in the opinion of SACEUR it is necessary for him to have authority to use the weapons, he shall seek approval from the two Governments. Normally such approval will be sought through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff but he may simultaneously establish direct contact with the respective heads of Government. (d) Confirmation of approval to release the weapons from storage for operational employment, if given, will be sent directly by each Government to SACEUR and to its respective national release officer at each site. (e) SACEUR will only be able to issue operational orders for the aircraft armed with nuclear weapons to take off on operational missions after the respective heads of Government have authorized their release for use as above-mentioned* . OO J 000522 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 5- (f) RCAF units will employ the nuclear weapons only in accordance with NATO plans and SACEUR directives. II*, The cost of salaries of U.S. personnel, rations and 3uch equipment and training as the United States agrees to furnish, will be borne by the United States. 12« The costs of the construction, development and maintenance of the storage sites and associated facilities, including those required for the support of.U.S. personnel and their dependents, shall be borne by Canada to the extent that they are not provided under NATO common infrastructure funding and procedures. Installations and facilities to be provided by Canada will be in accordance with SHAPE standards and criteria. If such criteria are not specified they will be of a standard to be mutually agreed upon. Exceptions may be made on the basis of mutual agreement* 13• 'he costs to be borne by Canada in accordance with paragraph 12 above will include the costs of the following i (a) All standard ground support equipment required for the handling of the nuclear weapons© (b) Adequate transportation as shall be mutually agreed to include drivers, POL and maintenance, to meet the requirements of U.S. personnelo (c) Dependent (married) quarters of mutually agreed standards and in agreed numbers for authorized dependents of U,3. personnel. U.S. personnel occupying such quarters will pay rent in amounts comparable to that paid by Canadian personnel of equal military grade occupying similar quarters and will pay the costs of gas, electricity and heating at the prevailing local rates. 000523 Oo o �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la l o i sur I'acces a I'information \ . 6- (d) k''(b".cal and dental treatment as shall be mutually agreed, 14o The RCAF will make available to U.S. personnel the privileges of membership in all appropriate military clubs and messes for officers, non-commissioned officers, and other ranks, U.S. personnel and their dependents will be authorized to utilize such morale, welfare, recreational, or individual logistical support facilities as are provided for members of the RCAF. 15. Fire prevention measures and inspections within areas exclusively occupied by United States personnel will be a U.S. responsibility* The RCAF commander will provide fire-fighting equipment and personnel authorized to assist in fire prevention and fire-fighting in or near such areas. The U.S. authorities will give these personnel such information and instructions as may be necessary to the performance of their duties* 16. A combined Canada-United States communications plan will be developed based upon SHAPE criteria and plans and according to the following requirements, the costs of which will be met in accordance with current NATO infrastructure funding or, where such funding is not applicable, by mutual agreement betveen the appropriate authorities of the two Governments. (a) Atomic release/recall communications from the designated U.S. commander and to the U.S. detachment. (b) Atomic logistics control and reporting communications,, (c) U.S. detachment unit administrative communications, including internal and external security communication So (d) Convoy communications for the security of movement of the vi cap on Sp ,907 000524 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information _ 7 - 17. -1'he above pi on will also provide for such other communications as are required to ensure that the necessary authorisation to employ the weapons may be obtained in time to meet operational requirements. To this end, each Government will establish direct-line communication facilities, maintained on an instant-use basis, between the respresentative of each Government authorized to approve the use of the weapon's, the Chairmen of the -. national Chiefs of Staff, SACEUR and the U.S. and Canadian release officers at each storage site. The manner in which this system will be established, operated and maintained as well as the cost-sharing aspects will be the subject of consultation and agreement between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments. Use will be made of existing facilities where appropriate, 18o All the necessary communication electronics equipment and power equipment to be provided will be in accordance with SHAPE criteria unless otherwise mutually agreed. 19o Personnel to support the above mentioned com- munications and the maintenance of these communications will be provided as may be mutually agreed. 20, The training of RCAF munitions and weapons loading crews to standards equivalent to those specified for U.S. personnel will be accomplished, as required, through U.S,-sponsored joint U.S.-Canadian crew courses conducted in the U.S. or on site. 21„ The United States will be responsible for pro- viding the necessary and authorized information, equipment and technical publications, etc. to the RCAF for training purposes. Reciprocally, RCAF units, if requested o oa 000525 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information -, 85 — will make available to U.S. detachments Canadian owned training devices for the training of U.S. personnel. 22. U.S. detachments will support the training re- quirements of the RCAF units. The U.S. detachments will maintain the maximum condition of readiness to render full operational support to these forces and U.S, training schedules will be compatible with those of the RCAF units, where applicable, 23. Routine, periodic training inspections of the U.S. units and RCAF units may be carried out as mutually agreed. 24* The Commander of the U.S, detachment and the Commander of the RCAF security force will maintain close contact in order to be fully informed of all matters affecting the security of the sites and of ' all U,S. and Canadian property and personnel connected therewith. 25* The Commander of the RCAF security force villi prepare plans, in conjunction with the U,S. detachment Commander, for the evacuation of all nuclear weapons with minimum delay in event of subversive activity, disaster,.civil riot, and any other condition of emergency. 260 The United States will be responsible for the radiological safety of all areas which are the specific responsibility of the U.S. detachment and for providing RCAF personnel at each site with adequate warning and advice on any radiological hazards caused by fissionable material stored at the sites. 27. The RCAF will be responsible for radiological safety in the area of its responsibility except for those «»* y 000526 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information aspects which are the specific responsibility of the U.S. detachment and for the isolation and security of all areas, which, for radiological safety reasons, must be sealed off to prevent entry of unauthorized personnel. 28, U.S. and Canadian personnel operating.within the Canadian area of responsibility will not be subject to radiological hazards, external or internal, which are in excess of those permitted by the lesser of their national standards. 29, In the event of an accident during transportation, U.S. personnel will be responsible for taking the necessary .action to reduce to a minimum the radiological hazards. 30, The RCAF will be provided with the necessary safety and handling rules for nuclear weapons and U.S. safety rules for operations with U ,S. nuclear weapons will be complied with. 31* The RCAF will advise the USAF of all modifica- tions and changes to be performed on the nuclear weapon.; delivery system to ensure that nuclear safety is not adversely affected. 32. Combined procedures villi be established, for the determination of radiation levels in the decontamination of operational and storage areas in the Canadian area of responsibility. The RCAF will be responsible for de- contaminating all areas within its area of-responsibility*' except those which are the specific responsibility of United States personnel. The RCAFiwi11 provide such assistance as may be required to support United States decontamination efforts. ,10 000527 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - ^ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 10 33. The United States will be responsible for the explosive ordinance disposal of atomic weapons. RCAF personnel will assist in this task as may be required. 34. The recovery of parts or portions of nuclear weapons which have been accidentally or otherwise Incompletely destroyed will be the responsibility of the United States, 35. Movements of all personnel and equipment in response to explosive ordinance disposal missions will conform,, to the maximum practical extent, to the policies and procedures for the movement of nuclear weapons. 36. No public release of information regarding this schedule or its implementation will be made except by mutual agreement between the two Governments, 37. All claims arising from the implementation of thi3 schedule will be dealt with in accordance with the provision of Article VIII of the Agreement Regarding the Status of Forces of Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty* 000528 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01665 Title A name given to the resource "Draft of Proposed Agreement With the United States Governing the Provision of Stockpiles of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian Forces" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource [undated] https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4c79e9afeb73f8074cac29ceef4660a0.pdf 6087d09f6bc0f8d06b4181ccf0fb26c6 PDF Text Text / (/ s* D R A F T SECRET &£A^ rst*)^ <V*i Ottawa, March 23, 1961 DRAFT OF PROPOSED AGREEMENT?. WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNING THE PROVISION OF STOCKPILES OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR CANADIAN FORCES Sir, I have the honour to refer to discussions which have taken place in the Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence and in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence regarding the terms and conditions under which nuclear warheads might be provided to and accepted by Canada. My Government's understanding of these conditions Is set out in the Annex and Schedules attached to this Note. If your Government concurs, I propose that this Note, together with its Annex and Schedules, and your reply thereto should constitute an agreement between our two Governments. I further propose that this agreement will be brought into effect when both Governments have confirmed, by a further Exchange of Notes, their Intention to do so, Accept, Sir, etc... �D R A F T SECRET ANNE X A. 1. Definitions In this Annex and attached schedules, unless the context otherwise requires: "Canada" means the Government of Canada, and "United States" means the Government of the United States of America; the term "warhead" includes "weapons" where the two cannot practically be considered as physically separate components; "NATO" means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; "Allied Government" means any Government allied to Canada and the United States through membership in NATO; "Allied Commander" means the Commander of a NATO Allied Command; "SACLANT" means the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic of NATO; "OOMCANLANT" means the Commander of the Canadian Atlantic sub-area; "SACEUR" means the Supreme Allied Commander Europe NATO; "NORAD" means North America Air Defence Command, established by Canada and the United States by an Exchange of Notes of May 12, 1958; "CINCNORAD" means the Commander in Chief of NORAD; 000056 �"Storage Site" means the site or sites at which the warhead3 are to be stored together with their appurtenant facilities such as magazines, fences and buildings deemed essential for preserving the security of the warheads together with the land on which these are to be constructed. B. 2. General Ownership of any stocks of nuclear warheads covered by this Annex and its attached schedules will remain with the United States. 3. Except in cases when the sharing of storage facilities with other Allied Governments requires otherwise, arrangements for the security of the storage sites for the warheads will be the joint responsibility of Canada and the United States, to be exercised as follows: (a) United States personnel, to be provided in the minimum numbers required, will be responsible for the safeguarding and maintenance of the warheads; (b) Canada will be responsible for the external security of the storage sites. 4. The procedures under which the nuclear warheads will be released from the storage sites to meet logistic or operational requirements will be based on the principle of joint responsibility exercised by means of intergovernmental consultation. 5. Authorization of the use by Canadian Forces of the nuclear warheads subsequent to their release from storage in accordance with paragraph 4 will be the responsibility of Canada. They will be used only in a period of grave emergency and in accordance with the plans and procedures governing the operations of the Command concerned. �6. The detailed procedures under which the principles outlined in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 will be carried out are set out in the schedules to this Annex. 7* The United States will be physically and financially responsible for the provision, maintenance, modification and assembly of the nuclear warheads, including the provision of technical equipment, and of personnel in the minimum numbers required, for these functions. The warheads will be provided in numbers sufficient to enable the weapons systems for which they are intended to be maintained at all times at the level of operational effectiveness required by the plans of the Commander concerned. 3. Safeguards in the design of the nuclear warheads will be the responsibility of the United States. The procedure for handling the nuclear warheads to afford the maximum protection of lives and property will be subject to the agreement of Canada. Safety procedures for maintenance, transport, loading, storage and salvage will be at least equivalent to United States standards. 9* No test firings of the warheads will take place in Canada• C. 10. Provision of Stockpiles of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian Forces in Canada ~~" The location of the stockpiles to be held in Canada will be determined by Canada in consultation with CINCNORAD or SACLANT as appropriate. 11. The United States will be responsible for the movement, in accordance with agreed procedures and in conformity with applicable Canadian laws and regulations, of the nuclear warheads to and from Canada. 12. Subject to paragraph 7| the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 11 will be applied in such a manner as to permit the return of the warheads to the United States at any time at the request of the United States. 13. Except as may otherwise be agreed, Canada will be responsible for and bear the cost of: �(a) provision of the land required for the storage sites and associated facilities; (b) construction of the storage site3 and associated facilities which, except for those specified in paragraph 13 (c) below, will conform with standards and criteria prevailing in NATO, and also their operation and maintenance; (c) construction, in accordance with normal Canadian standards, of the increments to Canadian administrative installations and facilities (housing, messing, offices, etc.) necessary to accommodate United States custodial and support personnel, as well as the operation and maintenance of these facilities; (d) movement of the nuclear warheads within Canada, subject always to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 above; (e) external security for all nuclear warheads during movement within Canada, and elsewhere as may be agreed, the detailed arrangements to be made by the appropriate military authorities of the Governments; (f) a reliable means of rapid communication, where necessary, to meet the purposes of this agreement as shall be agreed by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments. 14. Canada will be responsible for arranging for reasonable administrative and logistic support, including that for United "States personnel required to implement this agreement. Details of the support for United States personnel 000059 �will be a matter to be mutually agreed between the appropriate agencies of the two Governments. Each Government shall bear the cost of the pay and allowances of its own personnel. 15. The status of United States personnel in Canada in accordance with the terras of this agreement will be governed by the provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon0 D. 16* Provision of Stockpiles of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian forces in Europe. The location of the stockpiles to be held in Europe will be determined by the appropriate Allied Commander in consultation with Canada, the United States and the Allied Government or Governments concerned. 17* Canada and the United States will consult with regard to any notification or other form of diplomatic communication addressed to the host government concerning the proposed establishment of any stockpiles of warheads on its territory for possible Canadian use. 18. Subject always to the provisions of paragraph 4, United States forces will be responsible for the movement of the nuclear warheads into and from the Allied Command Europe Area. Responsibility for movement within this area will be as agreed between the appropriate Canadian, United States and Allied authorities. 19. Storage sites and associated facilities included in NATO infrastructure programmes and allocated for the use of Canadian forces will be subject to NATO infrastructure funding and procedures. Canada will be responsible, in accordance with the terms of Part C of this Annex, for arranging for the provision of facilities in Europe which it is mutually agreed are required for Canadian forces and United States personnel and which are not provided under common infrastructure. 000060 �20. Where Canada is the sole user of storage facilities in Europe, the responsibility for operation and maintenance of the facilities and administrative and logistic support for United States personnel will be in accordance with the provisions of part C of this Annex, subject to agreement with Allied host governments where appropriate. 21 j, Where Canada is a joint user, with other members of NATO, of storage facilities in Europe, constructed as part of an infrastructure programme, the final determination of the division of responsibilities for the support and external security of the site or sites will be as agreed between the Governments or the Allied Command concerned as may be appropriate. 22. Canada will be responsible for and bear the cost of a reliable means of rapid communication, where necessary, to meet the purposes of this Agreement as shall be agreed by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments. E. 23. Supplementary Arrangements Supplementary arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the United States and Canada and between these authorities and Allied Commanders shall be negotiated as required for the purpose of implementing this agreement. F. 24. Review and Termination The terms of this Agreement or any of its Schedules may be reviewed by the two Governments at the request of either Government and after such review may be terminated by either Government upon six months' notice. 000061 �D R A F T SECRET SCHEDULE "A" Nuclear Warheads for BOMARC Installations in Canada 1. This schedule covers the detailed procedures under which the provisions of the Annex to the Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of , 1961 will be carried out with respect to the availability of nuclear warheads for the Bomarc B (Bl 99) Squadrons to be located at North Bay, Ontario and La Macaza, P.Q. under the operational control of CINCNORAD. 2. This schedule is also supplementary to the Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of , 196l governing the financing and installation and operation of facilities in Canada required to strengthen and extend the Continental air defence system .(CADHJ). 3. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 7 of the Annex, the United States shall provide nuclear warheads in a number sufficient to keep the 28 Bomarc missiles for each of the two Canadian squadrons at all times at the level of operational effectiveness required by CINCNORAD1's plans for the air defence of North America. 4. The nuclear warheads will be stored on the missiles and for this purpose the launching sites will be designated by Canada as storage sites. 5. Pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3(a) and 7 of the Annex, the United States will provide a detachment of not more than 20 officers and men at each launching site to be responsible for safeguarding and maintaining the warheads. 6. An inner compound will be established at each launching site consisting of the launching site for the missiles, buildings for the maintenance of the warheads and �necessary security devices, and will be surrounded by a fence of appropriate standards equipped with an alarm system. Canada and the United States will be jointly responsible for controlling the access to this inner compound. 7. Pursuant to paragraph 3(b) of the Annex, Canada will exercise responsibility for the external security of the site as follows: (a) An outer compound will be formed by the erection of a fence of appropriate standards around the perimeter of the fence establishing the limits of the inner compound and at an appropriate distance from it. (b) Canada will control access to this outer compound by the establishment of appropriate patrols, alarm system, pass arrangements and other procedures deemed necessary and will provide military personnel in the numbers required for the purpose. 8. Fire control for the Bomarc B Squadrons will be centralized at the Combat operation Centre (COC), North Bay. Positive control will be provided by double lock switches, one key for which will be held by the Commander of the COC (an RCAF Air vice Marshal) or his representative and one key by the Deputy Commander (a USAF Brigadier General or Colonel) or his representative. 9. Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Annex, the approval of the release of/warheads from storage and their use will be exercised as follows: (a) if, pursuant to the Exchange of Letters of September 30/0ctober 2, 1959 between the Canadian Ambassador in Washington and the Secretary of State, the two Governments authorize. CINCNORAD to increase the state of readiness of his Command to a state of �of Maximum Readiness (Air Defence Readiness) they shall determine at that time whether such authorization shall be deemed to constitute authorization for CINCNORAD to employ these weapons in event of an attack of a character which in his judgment necessitates such action; (b) if advance authorization as indicated in (a) above is not given and the situation is such that in the opinion of CINCNORAD it is necessary for him to have authority to use these weapons, he shall seek approval from the political authorities of the two governments in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph 10 hereunder. Also in accordance with these procedures, confirmation of any approval shall be transmitted directly by the political authorities through the Chairmen of the National Chiefs of Staff to the appropriate officers at the COC, North Bay, (c) Once political authorization has been granted in accordance with (a) or (b) above, CINCNORAD may employ the weapons in accordance with NORAD1s operational procedures and rules of engagement. 10. In order to ensure that the necessary authorization to employ the weapons may be obtained in time to meet operational requirements each government will establish direct-line communication facilities maintained on an instant-use basis, between the representative or representatives of the Government authorized to approve the use of the weapons, the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, CINCNORAD, and the COC, North Bay. CINCNORAD will 000064 �normally seek approval to authorize the use of the weapons through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, but is authorized simultaneously to establish direct contact with the political authorities. If approval is granted it will be the responsibility of the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to convey the information both to CINCNORAD and to the appropriate officers at the COC, North Bay* 11* Pursuant to paragraph 11 of the Annex, arrangements for the movement of the warheads into or out of.Canada will be made through the diplomatic channel* 000065 �D R A F T SECRET SCHEDULE »B» Nuclear Warheads for Anti-Submarine Purposes 1* This schedule covers the detailed procedures under which the provisions of the Annex to the Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of , 1961 will be carried out with respect to the availability of nuclear warheads for anti-submarine purposes for ships of the Royal Canadian Navy and aircraft of the Royal Canadian Air Force Maritime Command which have been or may be allocated to SACLANT in the event of an emergency. 2. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 7 of the Annex, the United States shall provide nuclear warheads in a number sufficient and of the types necessary to enable these anti-submarine forces to carry out the tasks allotted to them under SACLANT's plans for the defence of the area of his responsibility and shall maintain the stocks at all times at the required level of operational effectiveness. 3. Pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3(a) and 7 of the Annex, the United States will provide a detachment of not more than 20 officers and men at each storage site, to be responsible for safeguarding and maintaining the warheads. 4. At each storage site an inner compound will be established consisting of the magazine, buildings for the maintenance of the warheads, etc. and necessary security devices and will be surrounded by a fence of appropriate standards equipped with an alarm system. The United States will be responsible for controlling the access of this inner compound• 5. Pursuant to paragraph 3(b) of the Annex, Canada will exercise responsibility for the external security of each storage site as follows: �(a) An outer compound will be formed by the erection of a fence of appropriate standards around the perimeter of the fence establishing the limit of the inner compound and at an appropriate distance from it. (b) Canada will control access to this outer compound by the establishment of appropriate patrols, alarm system, pass arrangements and other procedures deemed necessary and will provide military personnel in the numbers required for the purpose. 6. If in a period of international tension and following consultation and agreement between the two Governments, it is deemed advisable, as a precautionary measure, to place the warheads on board any ship of the Royal Canadian Navy or aircraft of the Royal Canadian Air Force Maritime Command, they will be deemed to continue to be in storage, in which event the United States shall have the right to have a representative on board such ship or " pa*V 5^s_w ? aircraft. 7. Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Annex, approval for the release of the warheads from storage and for their use will be exercised as follows: (a) If the NATO Council should decide to authorize SACLANT to declare a reinforced or higher state of alert, the two Governments shall determine whether such a decision shall be deemed to constitute authorization for SACLANT to employ the warheads at any time when in his judgment such action is required. In the absence of such a decision by the NATO Council, should either Government be 000067 �of the opinion that the situation warrants the removal of warheads from storage and/or their use, they will consult. In either event, and should the determination be affirmative, the approval thereby given will be deemed to constitute authority for SACLANT to remove the warheads from storage and to employ them, and the necessary instructions will be issued by the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to him and to COMCANLANT who in turn will so advise the appropriate officers at the storage sites. (b) If advance authorization as indicated in (a) above is not given, or is given for release of the warheads from storage only, and the situation is such that in the opinion of SACLANT it is necessary for him to have authority to use these warheads, he shall seek approval from the political authorities of the two Governments in accordance with the procedure specified in paragraph 8 hereunder. Also in accordance with these procedures, confirmation of any approval shall be transmitted directly by the political authorities through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to SACLANT and to COMCANLANT and through the latter to the appropriate officers at the storage sites, and other appropriate officers as may be necessary. (c) Once political authorization has been granted in accordance with (a) or (b) above SACLANT may employ the weapons in accordance with his operational procedures and rules of engagement. 000068 �8. In order to ensure that the necessary author- ization to employ the weapons may be obtained in time to meet operational requirements each government will establish direct-line communication facilities maintained on an instant-use basis, between the representative or representatives of the Government authorized to approve the use of the weapons, the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, SACLANT and the senior Canadian officer at each storage site. SACLANT will normally seek approval to authorize the use of the weapons through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, but is authorized simultaneously to establish direct contact with the political authorities. If approval is granted, it will be the responsibility of the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to convey the information to SACLANT, to COMCANLANT and to the appropriate officers at each storage site. 9* Pursuant to paragraph 11 of the Annex, arrangements for the movement of the warheads into or out of Canada will be made through the diplomatic channel. 000069 �•DRAFT SECRET SCHEDULE "C" Nuclear Warheads for the 762 MM Rocket (HONEST JOHN) 1. This schedule covers the detailed procedures under which the provisions of the Annex to the Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of , I96I will be carried out with respect to the availability of nuclear warheads for the 762 MM Rocket (Honest John) for the Canadian Army in Europe. 2. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 7 of the Annex, the United States shall provide the nuclear warheads in a number sufficient to enable the Canadian Army to carry out the tasks allotted it under SACEUR's plans for the defence of the area of his responsibility, and shall maintain the stocks at all times at the required level of operational effectiveness. 3. Pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3(a) and 7 of the Annex, the United States will provide a detachment of not more than 50 officers and men at each storage site to be responsible for safeguarding and maintaining the warheads. 4. At each storage site an inner compound will be established consisting of the magazine, buildings for the maintenance of the warheads, etc. and necessary security devices and will be surrounded by a fence of appropriate standards equipped with an alarm system. The United States will be responsible for controlling the access to this inner compound. 5. Pursuant to paragraph 3(b) of the Annex, in the event Canada is the/sole user of the storage site, Canada will exercise responsibility for the external security of each storage site as follows: �(a) An outer compound will be formed by the erection of a fence of appropriate standards around the perimeter of the fence establishing the limit of the inner compound and at an appropriate distance from it. (b) Canada will control access to this outer compound by the establishment of appropriate patrols, alarm system, pass arrangements^ and other procedures deemed necessary and will provide military personnel in the numbers required for the purpose. 6. In the event Canada is a joint user of a storage site, the manner in which the responsibility for the external security of such a storage site will be exercised will be a matter for agreement between the governments concerned. 7. Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Annex, approval for the release of the warheads from storage and for their use will be exercised as follows: (a) If the NATO Council should decide to authorize SACEUR to declare a Simple or higher state of alert, the two Governments shall determine whether such a decision shall be deemed to constitute authorization for SACEUR to employ the warheads at any time when in his judgment such action is required. In the absence of such a decision by the NATO Council, should either Government be of the opinion that the situation warrants the removal of warheads from storage and/or their use, they will consult. In either event, and should the determination be affirmative, the approval thereby given �will be deemed to constitute authority for SACEUR to remove the warheads from storage and to employ them, and the necessary instructions will be issued by the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to SACEUR who in turn will so advise the appropriate officers at the storage sites. (b) If advance authorization as indicated in (a) above is not given, or is given for release of the warheads from storage only, and the situation is such that in the opinion of SACEUR it is necessary for him to have authority to use these warheads, he shall seek approval from the political authorities of the two Governments in accordance with the procedure specified in paragraph 8 hereunder. Also in accordance with these procedures, confirmation of any approval shall be transmitted directly by the political authorities through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to SACEUR and through him to the appropriate officers at the storage sites, and other appropriate officers as may be necessary. (c) Once political authorization has been granted in accordance with (a) or (b) above SACEUR may employ the weapons in accordance with his operational procedures. 8. In order to ensure that the necessary author- ization to employ the weapons may be obtained in time to meet operational requirements, each government will establish direct-line communication facilities maintained on an instantuse basis, between the representative or representatives of �the Government authorized to approve the use of the weapons, the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, SACEUR and the senior Canadian officer at each storage site. SACEUR will normally seek approval to authorize the use of the weapons through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, but is authorized simultaneously to establish direct contact with the political authorities. If approval is granted, it will be the responsibility of the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to convey the information to SACEUR, and to the appropriate officers at each storage site. �'••'•• D R A F T '•:'.•• SECRET SCHEDULE "D" Nuclear Warheads for Air-to-Ground Weapons for the FIRST AIR DIVISION. RCAF ' 1. This schedule covers the detailed procedures under which the provisions of the Annex to the Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of , 1961 will be carried out with respect to the availability of nuclear warheads for air-to-ground weapons for aircraft of the First Air Division, Royal Canadian Air Force. 2. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 7 of the Annex, the United States shall provide the nuclear warheads in a number sufficient and the type necessary to enable the aircraft of the First Air Division to carry out the tasks allotted them under SACEUR's plans for the defence of the area of his responsibility, and shall maintain the operational stocks at all times at the required level of/effectiveness. 3. Pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3(a) and 7 of the Annex, the United States will provide a detachment of not more than 20 officers and men at each storage site to be responsible for safeguarding and maintaining the warheads. 4. At each storage site an inner compound will be established consisting of the magazine, buildings for the maintenance of the warheads, etc. and necessary security devices and will be surrounded by a fence of appropriate standards equipped with an alarm system. The United States will be responsible for controlling the access of this inner compound0 5. Pursuant to paragraph 3(b) of the Annex, in the event Canada is the sole user of the storage site, Canada will exercise responsibility for the external security of each storage site as follows: �(a) An outer compound will be formed by the erection of a fence of appropriate standards around the perimeter of the fence establishing the limit of the inner compound and at an appropriate distance from it. (b) Canada will control access to this outer compound by the establishment of appropriate patrols, alarm system, pass arrangements and other procedures deemed necessary and will provide military personnel in the numbers required for the purpose. 6. In the event Canada is a joint user of a storage site, the manner in which the responsibility for the external security of such a storage site will be exercised will be a matter for agreement between the governments concerned. 7. Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Annex, approval for the release of the warheads from storage and for their use will be exercised as follows: (a) If the NATO Council should decide to authorize SACEUR to declare a Simple or higher state of alert, the two Governments shall determine whether such a decision shall be deemed to constitute authorization for SACEUR to employ the warheads at any time when in his judgment such action is required. In the absence of such a decision by the NATO Council, should either Government be of the opinion that the situation warrants the removal of warheads from storage and/or their use, they will consult. In either event, and should the determination be affirmative, the approval thereby given �will be deemed to constitute authority for SACEUR to remove the warheads from storage and to employ them, and the necessary instructions will be issued by the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to SACEUR who in turn will so advise the appropriate officers at the storage sites. (b) If advance authorization as indicated in (a) above is not given, or is given for release of the warheads from storage only, and the situation is such that in the opinion of SACEUR it is necessary for him to have authority to use these warheads, he shall seek approval from the political authorities of the two Governments in accordance with the procedure specified in paragraph 8 hereunder. Also in accordance with these procedures, confirmation of any approval shall be transmitted directly by the political authorities through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to SACEUR and through him to the appropriate officers at the storage sites, and other appropriate officers as may be necessary. (c) Once political authorization has been granted in accordance with (a) and (b) above SACEUR may employ the weapons in accordance with his operational procedures and rules of engagement. 8. In order to ensure that the necessary author- ization to employ the weapons may be obtained in time to meet operational requirements, each government will establish direct-line communication facilities maintained on an instant-use basis, between the representative or representatives �of the Government authorized to approve the use of the weapons, the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, SACEUR and the senior Canadian officer at each storage site. SACEUR will normally seek approval to authorize the use of the weapons through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, but is authorized simultaneously to establish direct contact with the political authorities. If approval is granted, it will be the responsibility of the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to convey the information to SACEUR, and to the appropriate officers at each storage site. 000077 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00213 Title A name given to the resource "Draft of the Proposed Agreement With the United States Governing the Provision of Stockpiles of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian Forces" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Acquisition And Storage Of Nuclear Weapons For Canadian Forces In Canada And Europe," RG24-B-1, vol 21439, file CSC 1888:9, part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 23-Mar-61 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/46337653af09c854fdb045cfb9b85a14.pdf 736c9c3e916637754f93c643ae0fe300 PDF Text Text •/I . ^— •- 's s< A201 eoooj^Pcscjtfss&s-Pt. D R A P T SECRET V / O t t a w a , March 2 3 , 1961 •? / 1/ DRAFT OF PROPOSED AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNING THE PROVISION OF STOCKPILES OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR CANADIAN FORCES Sir, I have the honour to refer to discussions which have taken place in the Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence and in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence regarding the terms and conditions under which nuclear warheads might be provided to and accepted by Canada.'' My Government's understanding of these conditions is set out in the Annex and Schedules attached to this Note. If your Government concurs, I propose that this Note, together with its Annex and Schedules, and your reply thereto should constitute an agreement between our two Governments. I further propose that this agreement will be brought into effect when both Governments have confirmed, by a further Exchange of Notes, their intention- to do so Accept, Sir, etc... £X •— 'icw**- A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 �y" A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 D R A l1' T SECRET A N N E X A. 1. Definitions In this Annex and attached schedules, unless the context otherwise requires: •-' "Canada" means the Government of Canada, and "United States" means the Government of the United States of America; the term "warhead" includes "weapons" where the two cannot practically be considered as physically separate components; "NATO" means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; "Allied Government" means any Government allied to Canada and the United States through membership in NATO; "Allied Commander" means the Commander of a NATO Allied Command; "SACLANT" means the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic of NATO; "COMCANLA.NT" means the Commander of the Canadian Atlantic sub-area; "SACEUR" means the Supreme Allied Commander Europe NATO; "NORAD" means North America Air Defence Command, established by Canada and the United States by an Exchange of Notes of May 12, 1958; "CINCNORAD" means the Commander in Chief of ^ NORAD; A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 000323 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 "Storage Site" means the site or sites at which the warheads are to be stored together with their appurtenant facilities such as magazines, fences and buildings deemed essential for preserving the security of the warheads together with the land on which these are to be constructed. B. 2. General Ownership of any stocks of nuclear warheads covered by this Annex and its attached schedules will remain with the United States. 3. Except in cases when the sharing of storage facilities with other Allied Governments requires otherwise, arrangements for the security of the storage sites for the warheads will be the joint responsibility of Canada and the United States, to be exercised as follows: (a) United States personnel, to be provided in the minimum numbers required, will be responsible for the safeguarding and maintenance of the warheads; (b) Canada will be responsible for the external security of the storage slte3. 4. The procedures under which the nuclear warheads will be released from the storage sites to meet logistic or operational requirements will be based on the principle of joint responsibility exercised by means of intergovernmental consultation. 5. Authorization of the use by Canadian Forces of the nuclear warheads subsequent to their release from storage in accordance with paragraph 4 will be the responsibility of Canada. They will be used only in a period of grave emergency and in accordance with the plans and procedures governing the operations of the Command concerned. A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 6. The detailed procedures under which the principles outlined in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 will be carried out are set out in the schedules to this Annex. 7. The United States will be physically and financially responsible for the provision, maintenance, modification and assembly of the nuclear warheads, including the provision of technical equipment, and of personnel in the minimum numbers required, for these functions. The warheads will be provided in numbers sufficient to enable the weapons systems for which they are intended to be maintained at all times at the level of operational effectiveness required by the plans of the Commander concerned. S. Safeguards in the design of the nuclear warheads will be the responsibility of the United States. The procedure for handling the nuclear warheads to afford the maximum protection of lives and property will be subject to the agreement of Canada. Safety procedures for maintenance, transport, loading, storage and salvage will be at least equivalent to United States standards. 9. No test firings of the warheads will take place in Canada• C. Provision of Stockpiles of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian Forces in Canada 10. The location of the stockpiles to be held in Canada will be determined by Canada in consultation with CINCNORAD or SACLANT as appropriate. 11. The United States will be responsible for the movement, in accordance with agreed procedures and in conformity with applicable Canadian laws and regulations, of the nuclear warheads to and from Canada. 12. Subject to paragraph 7, the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 11 will be applied in such a manner as to permit the return of the warheads to the United States at any time at the request of the United States. 13. Except as may otherwise be agreed, Canada will be responsible for and bear the cost of: A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 „„„„, �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 (a) provision of the land required for the storage sites and associated facilities; (b) construction of the storage site3 and associated facilities which, except for those specified in paragraph 13 (c) below, will conform with standards and criteria prevailing in NATO, and also their operation and maintenance; (c) construction, in accordance with normal Canadian standards, of the increments to Canadian administrative installations and facilities (housing, messing, offices, etc.) necessary to accommodate United States custodial and support personnel, as well as the operation and maintenance of these facilities; (d) movement of the nuclear warheads within Canada, subject always to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 above; (e) external security for all nuclear warheads during movement within Canada, and elsewhere as may be agreed, the detailed arrangements to be made by the appropriate military authorities of the Governments; (f) a reliable means of rapid communication, where necessary, to meet the purposes of this agreement as shall be agreed by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments. Ik. Canada will be responsible for arranging for reasonable administrative and logistic support, including that for United "States personnel required to implement this agreement. Details of the support for United States personnel A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 will be a matter to be mutually agreed between the appropriat agencies of the two Governments. Each Government shall bear the cost of the pay and allowances of its own personnel. 15. The status of United States personnel in Canada in accordance with the terms of this agreement will be governed by the provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon. D. 16. Provision of Stockpiles of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian forces in Europe. The location of the stockpiles to be held in Europe will be determined by the appropriate Allied Commander in consultation with Canada, the United States and the Allied Government or Governments concerned. 17» Canada and the United States will consult with regard to any notification or other form of diplomatic communication addressed to the host government concerning the proposed establishment of any stockpiles of warheads on its territory for possible Canadian use. 18. Subject always to the provisions of paragraph 4, United States forces will be responsible for the movement of the nuclear warheads into and from the Allied Command Europe Area. Responsibility for movement within this area will be as agreed between the appropriate Canadian, United States and Allied authorities. 19* Storage sites and associated facilities included in NATO infrastructure programmes and allocated for the use of Canadian forces will be subject to NATO infrastructure funding and procedures. Canada will be responsible, in accordance with the terms of Part C of this Annex, for arranging for the provision of facilities in Europe which it is mutually agreed are required for Canadian forces and United States personnel and which are not provided under common infrastructure. A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 20. Where Canada is the sole user of storage facilities in Europe, the responsibility for operation and maintenance of the facilities and administrative and logistic support for United States personnel will be in accordance with the provisions of part C of this Annex, subject to agreement with Allied host governments where appropriate. 21^ Where Canada is a joint user, with other members of NATO, of storage facilities in Europe, constructed as part of an infrastructure programme, the final determination of the division of responsibilities for the support and external security of the site or sites will be as agreed between the Governments or the Allied Command concerned as may be appropriate. 22. Canada will be responsible for and bear the cost of a reliable means of rapid communication, where necessary, to meet the purposes of this Agreement as shall be agreed by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments. E. 23. Supplementary Arrangements Supplementary arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the United States and Canada and between these authorities and Allied Commanders shall be negotiated as required for the purpose of implementing this agreement. F. 24. Review and Termination The terms of this Agreement or any of its Schedules may be reviewed by the two Governments at the request of either Government and after such review may be terminated by either Government upon six months' notice. A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 D R A F T SECRET SCHEDULE "A" Nuclear Warheads for BOMARC Installations in Canada 1. This schedule covers the detailed procedures under which the provisions of the Annex to the Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of , 1961 will be carried out with respect to the availability of nuclear warheads for the Bomarc B (TJM 99) Squadrons to be located at North Bay, Ontario and La Macaza, P.Q. under the operational control of CINCNORAD. 2. This schedule is also supplementary to the Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of , 196l governing the financing and installation and operation of facilities in Canada required to strengthen and extend the Continental air defence system (CADIN). 3. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 7 of the Annex, the United States shall provide nuclear warheads in a number sufficient to keep the 2S Bomarc missiles for each of the two Canadian squadrons at all times at the level of operational effectiveness required by CINCNORAD^ plans for the air defence of North America. 4. The nuclear warheads will be stored on the missiles and for this purpose the launching sites will be designated by Canada as storage sites. 5. Pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3(a) and 7 of the Annex, the United States will provide a detachment of not more than 20 officers and men at each launching site to be responsible for safeguarding and maintaining the warheads. 6. An inner compound will be established at each launching site consisting of the launching site for the missiles, buildings for the maintenance of the warheads and A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 necessary security devices, and will be surrounded by a fence of appropriate standards equipped with an alarm system. Canada and the United States will be jointly responsible for controlling the access to this inner compound. 7. Pursuant to paragraph 3(b) of the Annex, Canada will exercise responsibility for the external security of the site as follows: (a) An outer compound will be formed by the erection of a fence of appropriate standards around the perimeter of the fence establishing the limits of the inner compound and at an appropriate distance from it. (b) Canada will control access to this outer compound by the establishment of appropriate patrols, alarm system, pass arrangements and other procedures deemed necessary and will provide military personnel in the numbers required for the purpose. 8. Fire control for the Bomarc B Squadrons will be centralized at the Combat Operation Centre (COC), North Bay. Positive control will be provided by double lock switches, one key for which will be held by the Commander of the COC (an RCAF Air Vice Marshal) or his representative and one key by the Deputy Commander (a USAF Brigadier General or Colonel) or his representative. 9. Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Annex, the approval of the release of/warheads from storage and their use will be exercised as follows: (a) if, pursuant to the Exchange of Letters of September 30/October 2, 1959 between the Canadian Ambassador in Washington and the Secretary of State, the two Governments authorize.CINCNORAD to increase the state of readiness of his Command to a state of A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 of Maximum Readiness (Air Defence Readiness) they shall determine at that time whether such authorization shall be deemed to constitute authorization for CINCNORAD to employ these weapons in event of an attack of a character which in his judgment necessitates such action; (b) if advance authorization as indicated in (a) above is not given and the situation is such that in the opinion of CINCNORAD it is necessary for him to have authority to use these weapons, he shall seek approval from the political authorities of the two governments in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph 10 hereunder. Also in accordance with these procedures, confirmation of any approval shall be transmitted directly by the political authorities through the Chairmen of the National Chiefs of Staff to the appropriate officers at the COC, North Bay. (c) Once political authorization has been granted in accordance with (a) or (b) above, CINCNORAD may employ the weapons in accordance with NORAD*s operational procedures and rules of engagement• 10. In order to ensure that the necessary authorization to employ the weapons may be obtained in time to meet operational requirements each government will establish direct-line communication facilities maintained on an instant-use basis, between the representative or representatives of the Government authorized to approve the use of the weapons, the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, CINCNORAD, and the COC, North Bay. CINCNORAD will A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 000331 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 normally seek approval to authorize the use of the weapons through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, but is authorized simultaneously to establish direct contact with the political authorities. If approval is granted it will be the responsibility of the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to convey the information both to CINCNORAD and to the appropriate officers at the COC, North Bay. 11. Pursuant to paragraph 11 of the Annex, arrangements for the movement of the warheads into or out of Canada will be made through the diplomatic channel. A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 „„„„„„ 000332 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 D R A F T SECRET SCHEDULE »B» Nuclear Warheads for Anti-Submarine Purposes 1. This schedule covers the detailed procedures under which the provisions of the Annex to the Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of , 1961 will be carried out with respect to the availability of nuclear warheads for anti-submarine purposes for ships of the Royal Canadian Navy and aircraft of the Royal Canadian Air Force Maritime Command which have been or may be allocated to SACLANT in the event of an emergency. 2. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 7 of the Annex, the United States shall provide nuclear warheads in a number sufficient and of the types necessary to enable these anti-submarine forces to carry out the tasks allotted to them under SACLANT's plans for the defence of the area of his responsibility and shall maintain the stocks at all times at the required level of operational effectiveness. 3. Pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3(a) and 7 of the Annex, the United States will provide a detachment of not more than 20 officers and men at each storage site, to be responsible for safeguarding and maintaining the warheads. 4. At each storage site an inner compound will be established consisting of the magazine, buildings for the maintenance of the warheads, etc. and necessary security devices and will be surrounded by a fence of appropriate standards equipped with an alarm system. The United States will be responsible for controlling the access of this inner compound. 5. Pursuant to paragraph 3(b) of the Annex, Canada will exercise responsibility for the external security of each storage site as follows: A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 „„„„„„ 000333 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 (a) An outer compound will be formed by the erection of a fence of appropriate standards around the perimeter of the fence establishing the limit of the inner compound and at an appropriate distance from it. (b) Canada will control access to this outer compound by the establishment of appropriate patrols, alarm system, pass arrangements and other procedures deemed necessary and will provide military personnel in the numbers required for the purpose. 6. If in a period of international tension and following consultation and agreement between the two Governments, it is deemed advisable, as a precautionary measure, to place the warheads on board any ship of the Royal Canadian Navy or aircraft of the Royal Canadian Air Force Maritime Command, they will be deemed to continue to be in storage, in which event the United States shall have the right to have a representative on board such ship or aircraft. 7. Pursuant to paragraphs k and 5 of the Annex, approval for the release of the warheads from storage and for their use will be exercised as follows: (a) If the NATO Council should decide to authorize SACLANT to declare a reinforced or higher state of alert, the two Governments shall determine whether such a decision shall be deemed to constitute authorization for SACLANT to employ the warheads at any time when in his judgment such action is required. In the absence of such a decision by the NATO Council, should, either Government be A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 000334 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 of the opinion that the situation warrants the removal of warheads from storage arid/or their use, they will consult. In either event, and should the determination be affirmative, the approval thereby given will be deemed to constitute authority for SACLANT to remove the warheads from storage and to employ them, and the necessary instructions will be issued by the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to him and to COMCANLANT who in turn will so advise the appropriate officers at the storage sites. (b) If advance authorization as indicated in (a) above is not given, or is given for release of the warheads from storage only, and the situation is such that in the opinion of SACLANT it is necessary for him to have authority to use these warheads, he shall seek approval from the political authorities of the two Governments in accordance with the procedure specified in paragraph 8" hereunder. Also in accordance with these procedures, confirmation of any approval shall be transmitted directly by the political authorities through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to SACLANT and to COMCANLANT and through the latter to the appropriate officers at the storage sites, and other appropriate officers as may be necessary. (c) Once political authorization has been granted in accordance with (a) or (b) above SACLANT may employ the weapons in accordance with his operational procedures and rules of engagement. A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 000335 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 r 8. In order to ensure that the necessary author- ization to employ the weapons may be obtained in time to meet operational requirements each government will establish direct-line communication facilities maintained on an instant-use basis, between the representative or representatives of the Government authorized to approve the use of the weapons, the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, SACLANT and the senior Canadian officer at each storage site. SACLANT will normally seek approval to authorize the use of the weapons through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, but is authorized simultaneously to establish direct contact with the political authorities. If approval is granted, it will be the responsibility of the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to convey the information to SACLANT, to COMCANLANT and to the appropriate officers at each storage site. 9. Pursuant to paragraph 11 of the Annex, arrangements for the movement of the warheads into or out of Canada will be made through the diplomatic channel. A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 DRAFT SECRET SCHEDULE "C" Nuclear Warheads for the 762 MM Rocket (HONEST JOHN) 1. This schedule covers the detailed procedures under which the provisions of the Annex to the Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of , I96I will be carried out with respect to the availability of nuclear warheads for the 762 MM Rocket (Honest John) for the Canadian Army in Europe. 2. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 7 of the Annex, the United States shall provide the nuclear warheads in a number sufficient to enable the Canadian Army to carry out the tasks allotted it under SACEUR's plans for the defence of the area of his responsibility, and shall maintain the stocks at all times at the required level of operational effectiveness. 3. Pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3(a) and 7 of the Annex, the United States will provide a detachment of not more than 50 officers and men at each storage site to be responsible for safeguarding and maintaining the warheads. 4. At each storage site an inner compound will be established consisting of the magazine, buildings for the maintenance of the warheads, etc. and necessary security devices and will be surrounded by a fence of appropriate standards equipped with an alarm system. The United States will be responsible for controlling the access to this inner compound. 5. Pursuant to paragraph 3(b) of the Annex, in the event Canada is the sole user of the storage site, Canada will exercise responsibility for the external security of each storage site as follows: A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 „„„„„, 000337 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 (a) An outer compound will be formed by the erection of a fence of appropriate standards around the perimeter of the fence establishing the limit of the inner compound and at an appropriate distance from it. (b) Canada will control access to this outer compound by the establishment of appropriate patrols, alarm system, pass arrangements^ and other procedures deemed necessary and will provide military personnel in the numbers required for the purpose. 6. In the event Canada is a joint user of a storage site, the manner in which the responsibility for the external security of such a storage site will be exercised will be a matter for agreement between the governments concerned. 7. Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Annex, approval for the release of the warheads from storage and for their use will be exercised as follows: (a) If the NATO Council should decide to authorize SACEUR to declare a Simple or higher state of alert, the two Governments shall determine whether such a decision shall be deemed to constitute authorization for SACEUR to employ the warheads at any time when in his judgment such action is required. In the a b s e n c e °f such a decision by the NATO Council, should either Government be of the opinion that the situation warrants the removal of warheads from storage and/or their use, they will consult. In either event, and should the determination be affirmative, the approval thereby given A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 will be deemed to constitute authority for SACEUR to remove the warheads from storage and to employ them, and the necessary instructions will be issued by the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to SACEUR who in turn will so advise the appropriate officers at the storage sites. (b) If advance authorization as indicated in (a) above is not given, or is given for release of the warheads from storage only, and the situation is such that in the opinion of SACEUR it is necessary for him to have authority to use these warheads, he shall seek approval from the political authorities of the two Governments in accordance with the procedure specified in paragraph 8 hereunder. Also in accordance with these procedures, confirmation of any approval shall be transmitted directly by the political authorities through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to SACEUR and through him to the appropriate officers at the storage sites, and other appropriate officers as may be necessary. (c) Once political authorization has been granted in accordance with (a) or (b) above SACEUR may employ the weapons in accordance with his operational procedures. 8. In order to ensure that the necessary author- ization to employ the weapons may be obtained in time to meet operational requirements, each government will establish direct-line communication facilities maintained on an instantuse basis, between the representative or representatives of A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt 2 000339 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 r the Government authorized to approve the use of the weapons, the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, SACEUR and the senior Canadian officer at each storage site. SACEUR will normally seek approval to authorize the use of the weapons through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, but is authorized simultaneously to establish direct contact with the political authorities. If approval is granted, it will be the responsibility of the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to convey the information to SACEUR, and to the appropriate officers at each storage site. A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 �B • A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 D R A F T SECRET SCHEDULE »D» Nuclear Warheads for Air-to-Ground Weapons for the FIRST AIR DIVISION. RCAF 1. This schedule covers the detailed procedures under which the provisions of the Annex to the Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of , 1961 will be carried out with respect to the availability of nuclear warheads for air-to-ground weapons for aircraft of the First Air Division, Royal Canadian Air Force. 2. , Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 7 of the Annex, the United States shall provide the nuclear warheads in a number sufficient and the type necessary to enable the aircraft of the First Air Division to carry out the tasks allotted them under SACEUR's plans for the defence of the area of his responsibility, and shall maintain the operational stocks at all times at the required level of/effectiveness. 3. Pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3(a) and 7 of the Annex, the United States will provide a detachment of not more than 20 officers and men at each storage site to be responsible for safeguarding and maintaining the warheads. 4. At each storage site an inner compound will be established consisting of the magazine, buildings for the maintenance of the warheads, etc. and necessary security devices and will be surrounded by a fence of appropriate standards equipped with an alarm system. The United States will be responsible for controlling the access of this inner compound. 5. Pursuant to paragraph 3(b) of the Annex, in the event Canada is the sole user of the storage site, Canada will exercise responsibility for the external security of each storage site as follows: A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 „„„„._ 000341 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 (a) An outer compound will be formed by the erection of a fence of appropriate standards around the perimeter of the fence establishing the limit of the inner compound and at an appropriate distance from it0 (b) Canada will control access to this outer compound by the establishment of appropriate patrols, alarm system, pass arrangements and other procedures deemed necessary and will provide military personnel in the numbers required for the purpose. 6. In the event Canada is a joint user of a storage site, the manner in which the responsibility for the external security of such a storage site will be exercised will be a matter for agreement between the governments concerned. 7. Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Annex, approval for the release of the warheads from storage and for their use will be exercised as follows: (a) If the NATO Council should decide to authorize SACEUR to declare a Simple or higher state of alert, the two Governments shall determine whether such a decision shall be deemed to constitute authorization for SACEUR to employ the warheads at any time when in his judgment such action is required,, In the absence of such a decision by the NATO Council, should either Government be of the opinion that the situation warrants the removal of warheads from storage and/or their use, they will consult. In either event, and should the determination be affirmative, the approval thereby given A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 �W201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 will be deemed to constitute authority for SACEUR to remove the warheads from storage and to employ them, and the necessary instructions will be issued by the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to SACEUR who in turn will so advise the appropriate officers at the storage sites. (b) If advance authorization as indicated in (a) above is not given, or is given for release of the warheads from storage only, and the situation is such that in the opinion of SACEUR it is necessary for him to have authority to use these warheads, he shall seek approval from the political authorities of the two Governments in accordance with the procedure specified in paragraph 8 hereunder. Also in accordance with these procedures, confirmation of any approval shall be transmitted directly by the political authorities through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to SACEUR and through him to the appropriate officers at the storage sites, and other appropriate officers as may be necessary. (c) Once political authorization has been granted in accordance with (a) and (b) above SACEUR may employ the weapons in accordance with his operational procedures and rules of engagement. 8. In order to ensure that the necessary author- ization to employ the weapons may be obtained in time to meet operational requirements, each government will establish direct-line communication facilities maintained on an instant-use basis, between the representative or representatives A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 �T (201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 of the Government authorized to approve the use of the weapons, the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, SACEUR and the senior Canadian officer at each storage site. SACEUR will normally seek approval to authorize the use of the weapons through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, but is authorized simultaneously to establish direct contact with the political authorities. If approval is granted, it will be the responsibility of the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to convey the information to SACEUR, and to the appropriate officers at each storage site. A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00270 Title A name given to the resource "Draft of the Proposed Agreement With the United States Governing the Provision of Stockpiles of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian Forces" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Acquisition And Storage Of Nuclear Weapons For Canadian Forces In Canada And Europe," RG24-B-1, vol 21440, file CSC 1888:9, part 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 23-Mar-61 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ada286f2aa1cf203d44d74c09009177f.pdf 202f5b8ef8f39dbeebc5988105a6e6ea PDF Text Text A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 D R A P T SECRET Ottawa. June 1st, 1961 DRAFT OP PROPOSED AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNING THE PROVISION OF STOCKPILES OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR CANADIAN FORCES Sir, V I have the honour to refer to discussions which have taken place in the Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence and in the Permanent joint Board on Defence regarding ^the terms y and conditions under which nuclear warheads might be provided to and accepted by Canada. My Government's understanding of these conditions is set out in the Annex and Schedules attached to this Note. If your Government concurs, I propose that this Note, together with its Annex and Schedules, and your reply thereto should constitute an agreement between our two Governments. I further propose that this agreement will be brought into effect when both Governments have confirmed, by a further Exchange of Notes, their Intention to do so, Accept,'Sir, etc... A (J ^ - ^ c - o (Au^y $"* bi^*?**^"^-.. *V—V / Crf-"©*" A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 D It A V T SECRET ANN E X A. 1. Definitions In this Annex and attached schedules, unless the context otherwise requires: "Canada" means the Government of Canada, and "United States" means the Government of the United States of America; the term "warhead" includes "weapons" where the two cannot practically be considered as physically separate components; "NATO" means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; "Allied Government" means any Government allied to Canada and the United States through membership in NATO; "Allied Commander" means the Commander of a NATO Allied Command; "SACLANT" means the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic of NATO; "COMCANLANT" means the Commander of the Canadian Atlantic sub-area; "SACEUR" means the Supreme Allied Commander Europe NATO; "NORAD" means North America Air Defence Command, established by Canada and the United States by an Exchange of Notes of May 12, I958; "CIMC IJORAD" moans the Commander In Chief of NORAD; A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 000181 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 .2. "Storage Site" means the 3ite or sites at which the warheads are to be stored together with their appurtenant facilities suoh as magazines, fences and buildings deemed essential for preserving the security of the warheads together with the land on which these are to be constructed. B. General 2. Ownership of any stocks of nuclear warheads covered by this Annex and Its attached schedules will remain with the United States. 3. Except in cases when the sharing of storage facilities with other Allied Governments requires otherwise, arrangements for the security of the storage 3ites for the warheads will be the joint responsibility of Canada and the United States, to be exercised as follows: (a) United States personnel, to be provided in the minimum numbers required, will be responsible for the safeguarding and maintenance of the warheads; (b) Canada will be responsible for the external security of the storage sites. 4. The procedures under which the nuclear warheads will be released from the storage sitee to meet logistic or operational requirements will be based on the principle of Joint responsibility exercised by means of intergovernmental consultation. 5. Authorization of the use by Canadian Forces of the nuclear warheads subsequent to their release from storage in accordance with paragraph 4 will be the responsibility ..of-w, Canada. They will be used only in a period of grave emergency and in accordance with the plans and procedures governing the operations of the Command concerned. A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 „„„„„„ 000182 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 .3. 6. The detailed procedures under which the principles outlined in paragraphs 3* ^ and 5 will be carried out are set out in the schedules to this Annex. 7. The United States will be physically and financially responsible for the provision, maintenance, modification and assembly of the nuclear warheads, including the provision of technical equipment, and of personnel in the minimum numbers required, for these functions. The warheads will be provided in numbers sufficient to enable the weapons systems for which they are intended to be maintained at all times at the level of operational effectiveness required by the plans of the Commander concerned. 8. Safeguards in the design of the nuclear warheads will be the responsibility of the United States. The procedure for handling the nuclear warheads to afford the maximum protection of lives and property will be subject to the agreement of Canada. Safety procedures for maintenance, transport, loading, storage and salvage will be at least equivalent to United States standards. 9. No test firings of the warheads will take place in Canada. C. 10. Provision of Stockpiles of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian Forces in Canada The location of the stockpiles to be held in Canada will be determined by Canada in consultation with CINCNORAD or SACLANT as appropriate. 11. The United States will be responsible for the movement, in accordance with agreed procedures and in conformity with applicable Canadian laws and regulations, of the nuclear warheads to and from Canada. 12. Except as may otherwise be agreed, Canada will be responsible for and bear the cost of: A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 „„„.„„ 000183 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 A. (^a) provision of the land required for the storage sites and associated, facilities; (b) construction of tho storage sites and associated facilities which, except for those specified in paragraph 13 (c) below, will conform with standards and criteria prevailing in NATO, and also their operation and maintenance; (c) construction, in accordance with normal Canadian standards, of the Increments to Canadian administrative installations and facilities (housing, messing, offices, etc,) necessary to accommodate United States custodial and support personnel, as well as the operation and maintenance of these facilities; (d) movement of the nuclear warheads within Canada, subject always to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 above; (e) external security for all nuclear warheads during movement within Canada, and elsewhere as may be agreed, the detailed arrangements to be made by the appropriate military authorities of the Governments; (f) a reliable means of rapid communication, where necessary, to meet the purposes of this agreement as shall be agreed by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments. 13. Canada will be responsible for arranging for reasonable administrative and logistic support, Including that for United States personnel required to Implement this agreement. Details of the support for United States personnel A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 -5. • • • will be a matter to be mutually agreed between the appropriate agencies of the two Governments. Each Government shall bear the cost of the pay and allowances of its own personnel. 11^ The status of United States personnel in Canada in accordance with the terms of this agreement will be governed by the provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon. D. 15. Provision of Stockpiles of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian forces in Europe. The location of the stockpiles to be held in Europe will be determined by the appropriate Allied Commander in consultation with Canada, the United States and the Allied Government or Governments concerned. 16. Canada and the United States will consult with regard to any notification or other form of diplomatic communication addressed to the host government concerning the proposed establishment of any stockpiles of warheads on its territory for possible Canadian use. 17. Subject always to the provisions of paragraph 4, United States forces will be responsible for the movement of the nuclear warheads into and from the Allied Command Europe Area. Responsibility for movement within this area will be as agreed between the appropriate Canadian, United States and Allied authorities* 18. Storage sites and associated facilities included in NATO infrastructure programmes and allocated for the use of Canadian forces will be subject to NATO infrastructure funding and procedures. Canada will be responsible, in accordance with the terms of Part C of this Annex, for arranging for the provision of facilities in Europe which it Is mutually agreed are required for Canadian forces and United States personnel and which are not provided under common infrastructure. A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2\ .6. x 9» Where Canada is the sole user of storage facilities in Europe, the responsibility for operation and maintenance of the facilities and administrative and logistic support for United States personnel will be in accordance with the provisions of part C of this Annex, subject to agreement with Allied host governments where appropriate. 20. Where'"Canada! is a joint user, with other members of NATO, of stbrage facilities in Europe, constructed as part of an infrastructure programme, the final determination of the division of responsibilities for the support and external security of the site or sites will be as agreed between the . Governments\and; the' Allied Command concerned as may be appropriate. i 21. Canada will be responsible for and bear the cost of a reliable means of rapid communication, where necessary, to meet the purposes of this Agreement as shall be agreed by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments. E. 22. Supplementary Arrangements , Supplementary arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the United States and Canada and between these " authorities and Allied Commanders shall be negotiated as required for the purpose of implementing this agreement. F. 23* Review and Termination The terms of this Agreement or any of its Schedules may be reviewed by the two Governments at the request of either Government and after such review may be terminated by either Government upon six months" notice. A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 000186 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00284 Title A name given to the resource "Draft of the Proposed Agreement With the United States Governing the Provision of Stockpiles of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian Forces" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Acquisition And Storage Of Nuclear Weapons For Canadian Forces In Canada And Europe," RG24-B-1, vol 21440, file CSC 1888:9, part 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1-Jun-61 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/aa920432e269e350359a11884ab6917c.pdf c71ecd76b29dc66171c690e2bff00259 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act \aJASJur I'acces a I'jnfornjjat Document divulgue en vertu de \aJAaL\sur I'acces a I'jpforrffition y fl/^AA1 sU/A DR A F T SECRET O t t a w a , March 2 3 , 1961 DRAFT OP PROPOSED AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNING THE PROVISION OF STOCKPILES OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR CANADIAN FORCES Sir, . I have the honour to refer to discussions which have taken place in the Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence and in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence regarding the terms and conditions under which nuclear warheads might be provided to and. accepted by Canada. My Government's understanding of these conditions is set out in the Annex and Schedules attached to this Note. If your Government concurs, I propose that this Note, together with Its Annex and Schedules, and your reply thereto should constitute an agreement between our two Governments. I further propose that this agreement will be brought into effect when both Governments have confirmed, by a further Exchange of Notes, their intention- to do so Accept, Sir, etc... 000622 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information D R A F T SECRET ANNEX. A. 1. Definitions In this Annex and attached schedules, unless the context otherwise requires: "Canada" means the Government of Canada, and "United States" means the Government of the United States of America; the term "warhead" includes "weapons" where the two cannot practically be considered as physically separate components; "NATO" means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; "Allied Government" means any Government allied to Canada and the United States through membership in NATO; "Allied Commander" means the Commander of a NATO Allied Command; "SACLANT" means the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic of NATO; "COMCANLANT" means the Commander of the Canadian Atlantic sub-area; "SACEUR" means the Supreme Allied Commander Europe NATO; "NORAD" means North America Air Defence Command, established by Canada and the United States by an Exchange of Notes of May 12, 1958; "CINCNORAD" means the Commander in Chief of NORAD; 000623 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information "Storage Site" means the site or sites at which the warheads are to be stored together with their appurtenant facilities such as magazines, fences and buildings deemed essential for preserving the security of the warheads together with the land on which these are to be constructed. B. 2. General Ownership of any stocks of nuclear warheads covered by this Annex and its attached schedules will remain with the United States. 3. Except in cases when the sharing of storage facilities with other Allied Governments requires otherwise, arrangements for the security of the storage sites for the warheads will be the joint responsibility of Canada and the United States, to be exercised as follows: (a) United States personnel, to be provided in the minimum numbers required, will be responsible for the safeguarding and maintenance of the warheads; (b) Canada will be responsible for the external security of the storage sites. 4. The procedures under which the nuclear warheads will be released from the storage sites to meet logistic or operational requirements will be based on the principle of joint responsibility exercised by means of intergovernmental consultation. 5. Authorization of the use by Canadian Forces of the nuclear warheads subsequent to their release from storage in accordance with paragraph 4 will be the responsibility of Canada, They will be used only in a period of grave emergency and in accordance with the plans and procedures governing the operations of the Command concerned. 000624 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 6. . The detailed procedures under which the principles outlined in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 will be carried out are set out in the schedules to this Annex. 7. The United States will be physically and financially responsible for the provision, maintenance, modification and assembly of the nuclear warheads, including the provision of technical equipment, and of personnel in the minimum numbers required, for these functions. The warheads will be provided in numbers sufficient to enable the weapons systems for which they are intended to be maintained at all times at the level of operational effectiveness required by the plans of the Commander concerned. £. Safeguards in the design of the nuclear warheads will be the responsibility of the United States. The procedure for handling the nuclear warheads to afford the maximum protection of lives and property will be subject to the agreement of Canada. Safety procedures for maintenance, transport, loading, storage and salvage will be at least equivalent to United States standards. 9. No test firings of the warheads will take place in Canada• C. Provision of Stockpiles of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian Forces in Canada "~~ 10. The location of the stockpiles to be held in Canada will be determined by Canada in consultation with CINCNORAD or SACLANT as appropriate. 11. The United States will be responsible for the movement, in accordance with agreed procedures and in conformity with applicable Canadian laws and regulations, of the nuclear warheads to and from Canada. 12. Subject to paragraph 7, the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 11 will be applied in such a manner as to permit the return of the warheads to the United States at any time at the request of the United States. 13. Except as may otherwise be agreed, Canada will be responsible for and bear the cost of: 000625 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information (a) provision of the land required for the storage sites and associated facilities; (b) construction of the storage sites and associated facilities which, except for those specified in paragraph 13 (c) below, will conform with standards and criteria prevailing in NATO, and also their operation and maintenance; (c) construction, in accordance with normal Canadian standards, of the increments to Canadian administrative installations and facilities (housing, messing, offices, etc.) necessary to accommodate United States custodial and support personnel, as well as the operation and maintenance of these facilities; (d) movement of the nuclear warheads within Canada, subject always to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 above; (e) external security for all nuclear warheads during movement within Canada, and elsewhere as may be agreed, the detailed arrangements to be made by the appropriate military authorities of the Governments; (f) a reliable means of rapid communication, where necessary, to meet the purposes of this agreement as shall be agreed by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments. 14. Canada will be responsible for arranging for reasonable administrative and logistic support, including that for United'States personnel required to implement this agreement. Details of the support for United States personnel 000626 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information will be a matter to be mutually agreed between the appropriate agencies of the two Governments. Each Government shall bear the cost of the pay and allowances of its own personnel. 15. The status of United States personnel in Canada in accordance with the terms of this agreement will be governed by the provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon. D. 16. Provision of Stockpiles of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian forces in Europe. The location of the stockpiles to be held in Europe will be determined by the appropriate Allied Commander in consultation with Canada, the United States and the Allied Government or Governments concerned. 17. Canada and the United States will consult with regard to any notification or other form of diplomatic communication addressed to the host government concerning the proposed establishment of any stockpiles of warheads on its territory for possible Canadian use. Id. Subject always to the provisions of paragraph 4, United States forces will be responsible for the movement of the nuclear warheads into and from the Allied Command Europe Area. Responsibility for movement within this area will be as agreed between the appropriate Canadian, United States and Allied authorities. 19. Storage sites and associated facilities included in NATO infrastructure programmes and allocated for the use of Canadian forces will be subject to NATO infrastructure funding and procedures. Canada will be responsible, in accordance with the terms of Part C of this Annex, for arranging for the provision of facilities in Europe which it is mutually agreed are required for Canadian forces and United States personnel and which are not provided under common infrastructure. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 20. Where Canada is the sole user of storage facilities in Europe, the responsibility for operation and maintenance of the facilities and administrative and logistic support for United States personnel will be in accordance with the provisions of part C of this Annex, subject to agreement with Allied host governments where appropriate. 21^ Where Canada is a joint user, with other members of NATO, of storage facilities in Europe, constructed as part of an infrastructure programme, the final determination of the division of responsibilities for the support and external security of the site or sites will be as agreed between the Governments or the Allied Command concerned as may be appropriate. 22. Canada will be responsible for and bear the cost of a reliable means of rapid communication, where necessary, to meet the purposes of this Agreement as shall be agreed by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments, E. 23. Supplementary Arrangements Supplementary arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the United States and Canada and between these authorities and Allied Commanders shall be negotiated as required for the purpose of implementing this agreement. F, 24. Review and Termination The terms of this Agreement or any of its Schedules may be reviewed by the two Governments at the request of either Government and after such review may be terminated by either Government upon six months' notice. 000628 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information D R A F T SECRET SCHEDULE "A" Nuclear Warheads for BOMARC Installations in Canada 1. This schedule covers the detailed procedures under which the provisions of the Annex to the Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of , 1961 will be carried out with respect to the availability of nuclear warheads for the Bomarc B (UM 99) Squadrons to be located at North Bay, Ontario and La Macaza, P.Q. under the operational control of CINCNORAD, 2. This schedule is also supplementary to the Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of , 196l governing the financing and installation and operation of facilities in Canada required to strengthen and extend the Continental air defence system (CADTJ). 3. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 7 of the Annex, the United States shall provide nuclear warheads in a number sufficient to keep the 2& Bomarc missiles for each of the two Canadian squadrons at all times at the level of operational effectiveness required by CINCNORAD1s plans for the air defence of North America. 4. The nuclear warheads will be stored on the missiles and for this purpose the launching sites will be designated by Canada as storage sites. 5. Pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3(a) and 7 of the Annex, the United States will provide a detachment of not more than 20 officers and men at each launching site to be responsible for safeguarding and maintaining the warheads. 6. An inner compound will be established at each launching site consisting of the launching site for the missiles, buildings for the maintenance of the warheads and �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information necessary security devices, and will be surrounded by a fence of appropriate standards equipped with an alarm system. Canada and the United States will be jointly responsible for controlling the access to this inner compound. 7. Pursuant to paragraph 3(b) of the Annex, Canada will exercise responsibility for the external security of the site as follows: (a) An outer compound will be formed by the erection of a fence of appropriate standards around the perimeter of the fence establishing the limits of the inner compound and at an appropriate distance from it. (b) Canada will control access to this outer compound by the establishment of appropriate patrols, alarm system, pass arrangements and other procedures deemed necessary and will provide military personnel in the numbers required for the purpose. 8. Fire control for the Bomarc B Squadrons will be centralized at the Combat Operation Centre (COC), North Bay. Positive control will be provided by double lock switches, one key for which will be held by the Commander of the COC (an RCAF Air Vice Marshal) or his representative and one key by the Deputy Commander (a USAF Brigadier General or Colonel) or his representative. 9. Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Annex, the approval of the release of/warheads from storage and their use will be exercised as follows: (a) if, pursuant to the Exchange of Letters of September 30/0ctober 2, 1959 between the Canadian Ambassador in Washington and the Secretary-of State, the two Governments authorize. CINCNORAD to increase the state of readiness of his Command to a state of �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information of Maximum Readiness (Air Defence Readiness) they shall determine at that time whether such authorization shall be deemed to constitute authorization for CINCNORAD to employ these weapons in event of an attack of a character which in his judgment necessitates such action; (b) if advance authorization as indicated in (a) above is not given and the situation is such that in the opinion of CINCNORAD it is necessary for him to have authority to use these weapons, he shall seek approval from the political authorities of the two governments in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph 10 hereunder. Also in accordance with these procedures, confirmation of any approval shall be transmitted directly by the political authorities through the Chairmen of the National Chiefs of Staff to the appropriate officers at the COC, North Bay. (c) Once political authorization has been granted in accordance with (a) or (b) above, CINCNORAD may employ the weapons in accordance with NORAD1s operational procedures and rules of engagement• 10, In order to ensure that the necessary authorization to employ the weapons may be obtained in time to meet operational requirements each government will establish direct-line communication facilities maintained on an instant-use basis, between the representative or representatives of the Government authorized to approve the use of the weapons, the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, CINCNORAD, and the COC, North Bay. CINCNORAD will �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information normally seek approval to authorize the use of the weapons through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, but is authorized simultaneously to establish direct contact with the political authorities. If approval is granted it will be the responsibility of the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to convey the information both to CINCNORAD and to the appropriate officers at the COC, North Bay. 11. Pursuant to paragraph 11 of the Annex, arrangements for the movement of the warheads into or out of Canada will be made through the diplomatic channel. V/ 000632 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information D R A F T SECRET SCHEDULE »B" Nuclear Warheads for Anti-Submarine Purposes 1. This schedule covers the detailed procedures under which the provisions of the Annex to the Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of , 1961 will be carried out with respect to the availability of nuclear warheads for anti-submarine purposes for ships of the Royal Canadian Navy and aircraft of the Royal Canadian Air Force Maritime Command which have been or may be allocated to SACLANT in the event of an emergency. 2. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 7 of the Annex, the United States shall provide nuclear warheads in a number sufficient and of the types necessary to enable these anti-submarine forces to carry out the tasks allotted to them under SACLANT's plans for the defence of the area of his responsibility and shall maintain the stocks at all times at the required level of operational effectiveness. 3. Pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3(a) and 7 of the Annex, the United States will provide a detachment of not more than 20 officers and men at each storage site, to be responsible for safeguarding and maintaining the warheads, 4. At each storage site an inner compound will be established consisting of the magazine, buildings for the maintenance of the warheads, etc, and necessary security devices and will be surrounded by a fence of appropriate standards equipped with an alarm system. The United States will be responsible for controlling the access of this inner compound• 5. Pursuant to paragraph 3(b) of the Annex, Canada will exercise responsibility for the external security of each storage site as follows: �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information (a) An'outer compound will be formed by the erection of a fence of appropriate standards around the perimeter of the fence establishing the limit of the inner compound and at an appropriate distance from it. (b) Canada will control access to this outer compound by the establishment of appropriate patrols, alarm system, pass arrangements and Other procedures deemed necessary and will provide military personnel In the numbers required for the purpose. 6. If in a period of international tension and following consultation and agreement between the two Governments, it is deemed advisable, as a precautionary measure, to place the warheads on board any ship of the Royal Canadian Navy or aircraft of the Royal Canadian Air Force Maritime Command, they will be deemed to continue to be in storage, in which event the United States shall have the right to have a representative on board such ship or aircraft. 7. Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Annex, approval for the release of the warheads from storage and for their use will be exercised as follows: (a) If the NATO Council should decide to authorize SACLANT to declare a reinforced or higher state of alert, the two Governments shall determine whether such a decision shall be deemed to constitute authorization for SACLANT to employ the warheads at any time when in his judgment such action is required. In the absence of such a decision by the NATO Council, should either Government be 000634 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information of the opinion that the situation warrants the removal of warheads from storage and/or their use, they will consult. In either event, and should the determination be affirmative, the approval thereby given will be deemed to constitute authority for SACLANT to remove the warheads from storage and to employ them, and the necessary instructions will be issued by the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to him and to COMCANLANT who in turn will so advise the appropriate officers at the storage sites. (b) If advance authorization as indicated in (a) above is not given, or is given for release of the warheads from storage only, and the situation is such that in the opinion of SACLANT it is necessary for him to have authority to use these warheads, he shall seek approval from the political authorities of the two Governments in accordance with the procedure specified in paragraph S hereunder. Also in accordance with these procedures, confirmation of any approval shall be transmitted directly by the political authorities through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to SACLANT and to COMCANLANT and through the latter to the appropriate officers at the storage sites, and other appropriate officers as may be necessary, (c) Once political authorization has been granted in accordance with (a) or (b) above SACLANT may employ the weapons in accordance with his operational procedures and rules of engagement. 000635 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 8. In order to ensure that the necessary author- ization to employ the weapons may be obtained in time to meet operational requirements each government will establish direct-line communication facilities maintained on an instant-use basis, between the representative or representatives of the Government authorized to approve the use of the weapons, the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, SACLANT and the senior Canadian officer at each storage site. SACLANT will normally seek approval to authorize the use of the weapons through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, but is authorized simultaneously to establish direct contact with the political authorities. If approval is granted, it will be the responsibility of the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to convey the information to SACLANT, to COMCANLANT and to the appropriate officers at each storage site, 9. Pursuant to paragraph 11 of the Annex, arrangements for the movement of the warheads into or out of Canada will be made through the diplomatic channel. 000636 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information DRAFT SECRET SCHEDULE "C" Nuclear Warheads for the 762 MM Rocket (HONEST JOHN) 1. This schedule covers the detailed procedures under which the provisions of the Annex to the Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of , I96I will be carried out with respect to the availability of nuclear warheads for the 762 MM Rocket (Honest John) for the Canadian Army in Europe. 2. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 7 of the Annex, the United States shall provide the nuclear warheads In a number sufficient to enable the Canadian Army to carry out the tasks allotted it under SACEUR's plans for the defence of the area of his responsibility, and shall maintain the stocks at all times at the required level of operational effectiveness. 3. pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3(a) and 7 of the Annex, the United States will provide a detachment of not more than 50 officers and men at each storage site to be responsible for safeguarding and maintaining the warheads. 4. At each storage site an inner compound will be established consisting of the magazine, buildings for the maintenance of the warheads, etc. and necessary security devices and will be surrounded by a fence of appropriate standards equipped with an alarm system. The United States will be responsible for controlling the access to this inner compound. 5. Pursuant to paragraph 3(b) of the Annex, in the event Canada is the sole user of the storage site, Canada will exercise responsibility for the external security of each storage site as follows: �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information (a) An outer compound will be formed by the erection of a fence of appropriate standards around the perimeter of the fence establishing the limit of the inner compound and at an appropriate distance from it. (b) Canada will control access to this outer compound by the establishment of appropriate patrols, alarm system, pass arrangements^ and other procedures deemed necessary and will provide military personnel in the numbers required for the purpose. 6. In the event Canada is a joint user of a storage site, the manner in which the responsibility for the external security of such a storage site will be exercised will be a matter for agreement between the governments concerned. 7. Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Annex, approval for the release of the warheads from storage and for their use will be exercised as follows: (a) If the NATO Council should decide to authorize SACEUR to declare a Simple or higher state of alert, the two Governments shall determine whether such a decision shall be deemed to constitute authorization for SACEUR to employ the warheads at any time when in his judgment such action is required. In the absence of such a decision by the NATO Council, should either Government be of the opinion that the situation warrants the removal of warheads from storage and/or their use, they will consult. In either event, and should the determination be affirmative, the approval thereby given 000638 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information will be deemed to constitute authority for SACEUR to remove the warheads from storage n and to employ them, and the necessary instructions will be issued by the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to SACEUR who in turn will so advise the appropriate officers at the storage sites. (b) If advance authorization as indicated in (a) above is not given, or is given for release of the warheads from storage only, and the situation is such that in the opinion of SACEUR it is necessary for him to have authority to use these warheads, he shall seek approval from the political authorities of the two Governments in accordance with the procedure specified in paragraph 8 hereunder. Also in accordance with these procedures, confirmation of any approval shall be transmitted directly by the political authorities through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to SACEUR and through him to the appropriate officers at the storage sites, and other appropriate officers as may be necessary. (c) Once political authorization has been granted in accordance with (a) or (b) above SACEUR may employ the weapons in accordance with his operational procedures. 8, In order to ensure that the necessary author- ization to employ the weapons may be obtained in time to meet operational requirements, each government will establish direct-line communication facilities maintained on an instantuse basis, between the representative or representatives of 000639 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information the Government authorized to approve the use of the weapons, the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, SACEUR and the senior Canadian officer at each storage site. SACEUR will normally seek approval to authorize the use of the weapons through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, but is authorized simultaneously to establish direct contact with the political authorities. If approval is granted, it will be the responsibility of the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to convey the information to SACEUR, and to the appropriate officers at each storage site. 000640 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ; . D R A F T SECRET SCHEDULE "D» Nuclear Warheads for Air-to-Ground Weapons for the FIRST AIR DIVISION. RCAF 1. This schedule covers the detailed procedures under which the provisions of the Annex to the Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of , 1961 will be carried out with respect to the availability of nuclear warheads for air-to-ground weapons for aircraft of the First Air Division, Royal Canadian Air Force. 2. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 7 of the Annex, the United States shall provide the nuclear warheads in a number sufficient and the type necessary to enable the aircraft of the First Air Division to carry out the tasks allotted them under SACEUR's plans for the defence of the area of his responsibility, and shall maintain the operational stocks at all times at the required level of/effectiveness. 3. Pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3(a) and 7 of the Annex, the United States will provide a detachment of not more than 20 officers and men at each storage site to be responsible for safeguarding and maintaining the warheads. 4. At each storage site an inner compound will be established consisting of the magazine, buildings for the maintenance of the warheads, etc. and necessary security devices and will be surrounded by a fence of appropriate standards equipped with an alarm system. The United States will be responsible for controlling the access of this inner compound* 5. Pursuant to paragraph 3(b) of the Annex, in the event Canada is the sole user of the storage site, Canada will exercise responsibility for the external security of each storage site as follows: 000641 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information (a) An outer compound will be formed by the erection of a fence of appropriate standards around the perimeter of the fence establishing the limit of the inner compound and at an appropriate distance from it. (b) Canada will control access to this outer compound by the establishment of appropriate patrols, alarm system, pass arrangements and other procedures deemed necessary and will provide military personnel in the numbers required for the purpose. 6. In the event Canada is a joint user of a storage site, the manner in which the responsibility for the external security of such a storage site will be exercised will be a matter for agreement between the governments concerned. 7. Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Annex, approval for the release of the warheads from storage and for their use will be exercised as follows: (a) If the NATO Council should decide to authorize SACEUR to declare a Simple or higher state of alert, the two Governments shall determine whether such a decision shall be deemed to constitute authorization for SACEUR to employ the warheads at any time when in his judgment such action is required. In the absence of such a decision by the NATO Council, should either Government be of the opinion that the situation warrants the removal of warheads from storage and/or their use, they will consult. In either event, and should the determination be affirmative, the approval thereby given 000642 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information will be deemed to constitute authority for SACEUR to remove the warheads from ^i^ ^ storage and to employ them, and the "> necessary instructions will be issued by the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to SACEUR who in turn will so advise the appropriate officers at the storage sites. (b) If advance authorization as indicated in (a) above is not given, or is given for release of the warheads from storage only, and the situation is such that in the opinion of SACEUR it is necessary for him to have authority to use these warheads, he shall seek approval from the political authorities of the two Governments in accordance with the procedure specified in paragraph S hereunder. Also in accordance with these procedures, confirmation of any approval shall be transmitted directly by the political authorities through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to SACEUR and through him to the appropriate officers at the storage sites, and other appropriate officers as may be necessary. (c) Once political authorization has been granted in accordance with (a) and (b) above SACEUR may employ the weapons in accordance with his operational procedures and rules of engagement. #. In order to ensure that the necessary author- ization to employ the weapons may be obtained in time to meet operational requirements, each government will establish direct-line communication facilities maintained on an instant-use basis, betv/een the representative or representatives 000643 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information of the Government authorized to approve the use of the weapons, the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, SACEUR and the senior Canadian officer at each storage site. SACEUR will normally seek approval to authorize the use of the weapons through the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff, but is authorized simultaneously to establish direct contact with the political authorities. If approval is granted, it will be the responsibility of the Chairmen of the national Chiefs of Staff to convey the information to SACEUR, and to the appropriate officers at each storage site. 000644 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01650 Title A name given to the resource "Draft of the Proposed Agreement With the United States Governing the Provision of Stockpiles of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian Forces" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 23-Mar-61 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ae1fb366704b5fad6e630ce1919047a6.pdf cde4b299b13d5455326509f30ef1e64d PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue, en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a i'information 9 t$' .1' 0 &Ar T -••-; -f Ottawa, March 2>, 1961 DRAFT 0 7 PStQrObBO A0REEMR1IT WITH THE UKITSO STATES OOrSftaXBQ THE 11 MuCLSaa SAaagADS FOft CAsADlAs FOE, | Sir, 1 have tha honour to refer t o discussions whloh have taken place In the Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defease and in ths Permanent Joint Beard on Defence regarding tha terms and conditions under which nuclear warheads might be provided to and accepted by Canada. My Government's understanding of those ceaditloas i s set out in the Annex and Schedules attached to t h i s Hots. If your Government concurs, 1 propose that t h i s Hots, together with i t a Annex and Jchedules, and your reply thereto should constitute sn agreeaent effective the data of your reply. I further propose that t h i s agreement w i l l bo brought Into o f f s e t when both Governments have confirmed by a further Exchange of Kotos their intention to do so* Accept, f i r , etc �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lot sur faeces a i'information DRAFT A* 1. Uaflnltlons In t h i s Annex end attached schedules, unless the context otberwiae requiroe: "Canada** mesne tha Government of Canada, and "United States" means the Government of the United States of America; the tarn "warhead" includes "weapons" where the two cannot practically ba considered as physically separate components; "NATO" means the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; "Allied Government" means any Government, which i s a l l i e d to Canada end the United States by i t s membership i a HATO; "Allied Commander" moans the Commander of a SATO Allied Command; "SACLANT" means ths Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic ef NATO; "COMCANLANT" moans the Commander ef the Canadian Atlantic sub-area* •SACBUR" nesns the Supreme Allied Commander Surope NATO} "hQRAD" mesas berth America Air Defence Command, established by Canada and the United States by an Exchange of Notes of May 12, 195*1 "CINCfiGHAD" means the Commander in Chief of I sfsv] �Document disclosed under the Access to information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a i'information "Storage Site" means the site or sites at which the warheads are to bo etored together with their appurtenant facilities such ss magasines, feaces end buildings deemed essential for preserving tho security ef snd maintaining ths warheads together with the lsad en which these arc to be constructed* B. Qeaerel 2. Ownership of any stocks of nuclear warheads covered by thle Annex and its sttsched schedules will remain with the United States. 3. Except In cases when the charing ef storags facilities with ether Allied Governments requires otherwise, arrangements for the security of the storage sites for the warheade will be the joint responsibility of Canada and tho United States, to be exercised ss follows: (a) United States personnel, to be provided in the minimum numbers required, will ba responsible for the safeguarding aad aaintananse ef tho warheads; (b) Canada will be responsible for the external security of the storage sites. 4. The procedures under which the nuclear warheads A- will bs roleesed from ths storage sites to meet logistic or v^ 3 operational requirements will be based on tha principle of iAy ' joint responsibility exercised by means of intergovernmental consultation* 5. Authorisation of the use by Canadian forces of tho aucloar warheads subsequent to thoir ralaaae from storags in accordance with paragraph L> will be tho responsibility of Canada. They will only be used in a period of grave emergency and in accordance with tho plans and procedures governing tho operations of ths Command concerned. 000617 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 6. The detailed prooedures under which the principles outlined in paragraphs 3, 4 sad J will be carried out ara sot out in the schedules to thle Annex. 7* The United States will be physically sad financially responsible for the provision, maintenance, modification and assembly of the nuclear warheads, including the provision of technical equipment, and of personnel in the minimum numbers required, for these functions* The warheads will ba provided in numbers sufficient to enable the weapons systsas for which they ere intended to be maintained at all times at tho level of oparatienal effactlvoaoss required by tha pleas ef tha Commander concerned* I, Safeguards in the design of the nuclear warheads will be tho responsibility of the United States. The procedure for handling tho nuclear warheads to afford tho maximum protection of lives and property will bo subject to the agreement of Canada. Safety procedures for maintenance, transport, loading, storags and salvage will bo at least equivalent to United States staadards. 9* No test firings of the warheads will take place in Canada. C frevlslnn f* fl y*pil*« Qf huclaar *arhaads for Canadian rorcea in Canada 10* The location of tha stockpiles to be hold in Canada will be determined by Canada in consultation with viXCNORAD or SACLANT as appropriate. II. The United States will bo responsible for tho movement, in accordance with agreed procedures and in conformity with applicable Canadian laws and regulations, of tho nuclear warheads to and from Canada. 12. Subject te paragraph 7, the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 11 will bo applied in such a manner as to penult tha return of the warheads to the United States at any time at tho request of the United States. 13* Except as may otherwise bo agreed, Canada will be responsible for and bear tha cost ofI 000618 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de ia Loi sur I'acces a I'information • (s) provision of tho lead required for the storage sites and associated faeilitias; (b) construction of the storage sites and associated facilities which, sxsopt for those specifled in paragraph 13 (c) below, will conform with standards and criteria prevailing in NATO, and also their operation and maintenance; (c) construction, in accordance with normal Canadian standards, of the increments to Canadian administrative installations and facilities (housing, messing, offices, etc.) necessary to accommodate United Stateo custodial aad support personnel, as wall as the operation aad maintenance of those facilities; (d) movement of tho aucloar warheads within Csaeda, subject always to tho provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 above; (o) external security for all nuclear warheads during movement within Canada, and elsewhere as may ba sgrcod, the detailed arrangements to be made by the appropriate military authorities ef tho two Governments; (f) a reliable means of rapid communication, where necessary, to moot tho purposes ef this agreement as shall be agreed by tho i 14. appropriate authorities of the two J governments. j Canada will ba rssponsible for arranging for reasonable administrative and logistic support, Including that for United States personnel required to implement this agreement. Details of the support for United States personnel i 000619 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a i'information will be s astter to bo mutually agreed between the appropriate agencies of the two Governments. Rash Government shall beer the coot of tho pay and allowances of its own personnel. 15. The status of United States personnel In Canada in accordance with the terms of thia agreement will bo governed by the provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon* r r t v l ft4 16. ftf <*fc A»lrrt i 1 A pi* f'uelffx whfffv* far Tbe location of the stockpiles to be held in will be determined by the appropriate urope Iliad Commander ia consultation with Canada, tho United States and tha Allied Government or Governments concerned. 17. Canada aad the United States will consult with regard to any notification or other form of diplomatic communication addressed to the host government concerning tho proponed establishment of any stockpiles of warheads on its territory for possible Canadian use. Is* Subject always to tha provisions of paragraph 4, United States forces will be responsible for tho movement of tha nuclear warheads into aad from tbe Allied Command Europe ares* Responsibility for movement within this area will be ao agreed between the appropriate Canadian, United States and Allied authorities. 19. storage sites and associated facilities included ia NATO infrastructure programmes and allocated for the use of Canadian fereee will ba subject to NATO infrastructure funding and procedures. Canada will be responsible, in accordance with tha terms of Fart C ef this Annex, for arranging for the provision of facilities in Europe which it is mutually agreed are required for Canadian forces and United States personnel and which are not provided under common infrastructure. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act\ Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces 6 I'information 20. Where Caaads is the solo user of storsge facilities ia Europe, the responsibility for operation aad maintenance of tho facilities and administrative and logistic support for United States personnel will be in accordance with tho provisions of pert C of thle Annex, subject to agreeaent with Allied host governments where appropriate. 21* where Csaada it a Joint user, with other members of NATO, of storage facilities la Europe, constructed as part of I an infrastructure programme, the final determination of the division of responsibilities for the support and external security of the site or s i t e s will ba as agreed between the Governments or tho Allied Cn—and concerned as may be appropriate. i 22. Canada will be responsible for and bear the cost of a reliable means of rapid communication, where necessary, to aoot the purpoees of this Agreement as shall be agreed by the appropriate authorities of the two Govornmento. 23. , supplementary arrangements between the appropriate authorities of tha United States and Canada and between these authorities snd Allied Commanders shall be negotiated as required for the purpose of implementing this agreement. f* 24* ..»iH«w e nd T^iflfttlon The terms of this Agreement or any of i t s Schedules may be reviewed by tho two Governments at tho request of either Government and after such review nay be terminated by either Government upon six months' notloo* 000621 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01651 Title A name given to the resource "Draft of the Proposed Agreement With the United States Governing the Provision of Stockpiles of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian Forces" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 23-Mar-61 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/e0179631a8c2d5d181caa34ca7875a8e.pdf 19d1e9a6ac4c7d0703e4a7e055a00ccf PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information DRAFT PARAGRAPHS CONCERNING EFFECT OF NASSAU AGREEMENTS ON CANADIAN AIR DIVISION ROLE IN EUROPE Some have questioned the necessity of reviewing the role and arrangements jof our Air Division in Europe in the light of the other developments, both technical and political, in the defence field. Paragraph 6 of the Nassau Declaration on nuclear defence systems states clearly that the development of new and closer arrangements for the organization and control of strategic western defence could include allocations from tactical nuclear forces now hold in Europe. Our Canadian Air Division, being re-equipped now viith the F-1Q4 0 aircraft, will be one of the largest elements in the tactical nuclear f.orce held in Europe. The arrangements in respect of the command and control of that force in Europe, the targets on which it tfould be used, and the arrangements for the making available of nuclear weapons to it, are of first-rate importance. The arrangements for command and control previously �t\ ' Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information contemplated, as well as for the supplying and control of the nuclear weapons will surely be influenced by whatever decisions are made for the new and closer arrangements to whieh the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom made reference. It is therefore tho effect of these new arrangements upon the place of our Air Division in the alliance and its relation to the Nato commanders and to those retaining control over the release of nuclear weapons to our force which I feel must be clarified before the Government of Canada can properly decide on the detailed arrangements for the supply of weapons to the Air Division and the control over their use. I may say that we have in the weeks since the Nassau Declaration been endeavouring to secure clarification of the effect of this allocation of tactical nuclear forces upon the plans for our Air Division but so far we have not been able to get any replies in the alliance that would clarify our position. Feb. 5/63. 000808 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01792 Title A name given to the resource "Draft Paragraphs Concerning Effect of Nassau Agreements on Canadian Air Division Role in Europe" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 5-Feb-63