2 20 34845 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b948c7d5093f7130ecca0023fd7f38ba.pdf c8bc1cbf80df685cd6ceeab7b1165a86 PDF Text Text External Affairs DO Canada Document d i v u l g u w e n a / e i w d s f l a / t m i s u r I'acces^ MQTC/JOUKNAUCIHC/D088I6R Affaires exterieures Canada SECURE FACSIMILE £oUu? 1 f G* File/Oo»s<*r W " 27-11-1-2 Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow Alignez le premier caractere de la S6curlte sous cette fleche NATO -m 12 C O N F I D E N T I A PM BNATO YBGR2395 24AJJG90^ TO E X T O T V I D ^ _ _ 10 _^ '9- '^£[^22^ INFO BH NDHQOTT/DGPOLPLAN/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/ DE OTT BH CANMILREPNATO DE NAT DONNER DISTR IDD IDA INP URR USA DECISION ON NUCLEAR ARTILLERY ATTACHED IS NOTIFICATION fU£CMJ.V£i; PROW USADEI. TO EFFECT T|HAT VGA IS TERMINATING ITftfW82 155 MM ARTILLERY FIRED ATOMIC PROJECTILE PROGRAM. 2,COMCENTRE PLS COPY ATTACHED PAGE OF USNATO/DPDN/NC/9Q-2*}, ACC FILE an-\\-t DOSSIER LOC A3-VW [W^J CONFIDENTIAL! DflAFTER/ftEDACTEUfl DIVISION/DIRECTION //jf+'yj,/ TELEPHONE APPflOVED/APPROUVfi � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18596 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c3554dab5ab2774da8886ff83edea217.pdf 4bdc45bd3b3cd9aa20299bcfb0a9e75a PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information mto UNITED STATES"MIS! TO THE SODDEN VAL O )SNAT0/DPDN/NC/9O-20 NORTH ATl^ANTfC TREATY ORGANIZATION (USNATO) Brussels » 10* /• 23 August 1990 NATO CONFIDENTIAL / ACTiOM Dear Colleague, M . n ? authorities have asked us to convey to you the i0n re ardin nnuclear u J i ^ i nartillery L i ? ? ? r m a t program: S 8 termination of the M2 lSSmm w*mui In May 1990, President Bush announced that the United n n M ! L W a S . - ? ? c e l l l ! ? e i ? n y J f u r t h e r modernization of U.S. nuclear artillery shells deployed in Europe. At that tine, however, the United States had planhed to continue Now with the likely withdrawal of all nuclear artillery from Europe and a diminished need for nuclear artiller? vsj> ? ? s ^ j ^ n i t < t s t ! t e s h a s decided to t.Siiit!^ht W82 ISSram artillery fired atomic projectile (AFAP) program. g a cop •k «L s f n d il? „ r 9 u p y o£ t h i s letter to all our colleagues on ££ riSi?-?. K * K * fcAddition-uyi u.s. embassies iS NATO capitals have been asked to notify the ministries of d l f m * lilin their respective capitals of this proJrJm termination? Cordially, Frank G. Klotz'^ Colonel, USAF NATO CONFIDENTIAL NATO CONFIDENTIAL 001040 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18595 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a40d7f49e631b0c9dd2716c729d16572.pdf 59ebb781d7899a48032efca68094bc44 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act • Document divulgue en veimde \aAoisur£ag£s a I'information .-»..&£ The Secretary of State presents his compliments to Their Excellencies, Messieurs and Mesdames the Chiefs of Mission of the Governments concerned with the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, done at Moscow on August 5, 1963. In accordance with the provisions of Article III, paragraph 5 of the Treaty, the Secretary of State has the honor to inform the Chiefs of Mission that a notification of succession to the Treaty was deposited with the a Government of the United States of America by Antigua and Barbuda on November 16, 1988. The Secretary of State would be grateful if the Chiefs of Mission would forward this information to their respective governments. i^ Department of State, > ^ Washington, October 25, 1989 001041 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18594 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/d16a83d3659019ea785fdd4dfeb2914c.pdf 1277937697bc7825dafa179f8655986e PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to InformationAct Document divulgue en vertu de \aJjiLsurI'accesMl'information o :: 5Liog ; ACC F.i.r LOC NOTE NO. 89 2>:1\ C7- The British High Commission present their compliments to the Department of External Affairs and with reference to their Note Number 119 of 16 September 1985 have the honour to inform the Department, on instructions from Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, that an Instrument of Accession to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968, was deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland by the Government of the State of Qatar on 3 April 1989. The British High Commission avail themselves of this opportunity to renew to the Department the assurances of their highest consideration. BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION OTTAWA 29 May 1989 001042 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18593 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f53dd5e96b78878d7cd9e27b4a147c3d.pdf 86c3163448fedcf3248ced210c5a07aa PDF Text Text r w 25 'yy iu = 4y POL SEC CDN EMB Document disclosed under t l e Access mjAtamtgioii Act Document divulgue en vertu dc la Lbl SUf I'tiLLes u rinfor nation IS? \. .f to / '/» U N C L A S S I F I E D F A C S T ^ ^ L E - C O V E R SHFFT FSUILLE DE TRANSMISSION POUR FAC-STMlLg NON-CLASSTPTP CANADIAN EMBASSY AMBASSADE DU CANADA 501 P e n n s y l v a n i a Avenue) N.W. W a s h i n g t o n , D.C. 20001 (FAX NUMBER: 2 0 2 - 6 8 2 - 7 7 9 2 ) Oo TQ/A,;, Cd^^L '/ZL ,PH< S)*M<iMi -e<p* 20J— FROM/Dg; ~^jJ!tA~^/AJ U/fe&Sf <jj)_ ~MJ** / /HA UJA fj 4/r?jAi& £/y< SZH<J__ VfrtdiffY} DATE FILE FAX NUMftgR/NUMERO HP RPl INQt ( ^ ^ j «frfc3 * ^ / / 07-II-I DOSSIER LOC •j,,i3,u,.\ , : u -*a i. Ojib-d^ I w n ;- " i W &+£ Jl JtM/iJ*s*-^-**s s k ~~Ti ' t&JUu C^o-^i roLf boh crw ATlMj/ t/>rUy</L -C^UnsT^frfciT^) ^y. *i0-*O . . . NUMBER OP PAGES/NOMBRE DP PAGES x (including cover) (incluant cette page couverture) -Art. vn.^-«tf-<. —j - \ .' /£ SIGNATURE PATE.- UELEPHQN 202) Z^/syGfl 682-1740 001043 �o JTXTTCi.XI/^i^,K;; •1HY 25 ' 9 0 10 = 50 POL SEC CDN EMB M*W,S -fiw \hn;m vyy;gl Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information X ,.;w, • - , ^ u - , ; • - * . Weapons Will Remain onlAleri^MmbersJi * "'" v "ByR Jeffrey Smith ; a / Eg *4 ,The Department of Defense yes^S^feyk terday said it would not remove short-range, nuclear«tipped missiles from 'strategic aircraft on war :S^feft,,i "alert" before the Air Force completes a special study on the possibility that they might explode in an aircraft fire.' i' < • - ••<•.< < The decision to maintain ShortRange/Attack • Missiles-A, or « 3 t e l h W ,<• iSRAM-As, on B-1, B-52 and FB111 strategic bombers readv for .taKeott on snort notice at Air Force ..bases.came after directors „of the three U.S. nuclear weapons' labo? ratories urged that the weapons be withdrawn from service and placed in storage,' >.; ; y•-• ,„y M •The scientists have expressed strong concerns that an accidental ! aircraft fire will cause a SRAM-A to »*,«««&£? | explode, likely dispersing a fine dust £S<&M V4 JAMES D. WATKINS ' S & | 2 of cancer-causing/radioactive pluv . givss'lot of cwUt"toCheney ^ tonium or uranium from the core of .U s k w t t klU-.-S&teu&iixisjii' -£3 the W-69 nuclear warhead at .the „t L ,g. ';•'•' y' ••' 5" weapon's tip a > .^^ "'should be reconsidered In light oi Two such 'accidents in the 1960s /C e ? 3in « tV&&&*Wl!&tonJ **& 19608.,,. & ? * £ * « A 4i M £$ involving a different nuclear war- *,l5«ons head carried by U.S. strategic «*«PAnother senior ,defense .official; bombers cost millions of dollars to •'• who insisted on anonymity, similarj ' g ly accused the laboratory directors' cleanup. i.« : ' DOD spokesman Pete Williams Ji of making ipeat^of-the-pants risk : ;.'.benefit calculations" that were in-* told reporters at the Pentagon that the SRAM-A "meets all our current ^'appropriate before the SRAM-A; safety standards" and "it would be safety study wgs completed. "Ev-: unwise and premature to predict "'eryone is entitled to their view of the outcome of that [safety* study '.rhavihg those weapons on alert air-* and to make any decisions now be- • craft, but the lab directors' views' fore it's done" later this summer. are certainly not authoritative," said Undersecretary of Energy John "the official, -who deals regularly • Tuck expressed a similar view Wed- "with the topic, t f j f l ^M$$M nesday, although he added rhat his ;,• "There is one very real area'«.. agency was "going" in the direction gconcern" involving nuclear weaponS^ of the scientists' recommendation. ' -•safety, the official said,"and that 18. The Energy Department and the ',: the slowdown in [weapons] produ£, Defense Department share formal gtion in the DOE complex [which haj' responsibility for,nuclear weapons delayed] the Introduction of bombj; safety, a topic on which the direc- ; with modem safety features." He* tors of nuclear weapons laborato- g;was referring to environmental M& ries in Los Alamos",' N.M.; Albuquer ^safety hazards that have forced cl<£j..' 'for ^weapcinC que, N.M., and Livermore, Calif./,' sure.-,.,of. a.._key - plant - V^TV; ^^-••« seire as advisers. ? AQO « f n $ -i'Parts near Denver.K ViO fcS8ffl • jwiuimuj i i u p i h j c u -uic aLieu-*"'.' ysf v.'aii—....- J J ^ I ^ ^ J ^ . t Pentagon to'JAws ,;A-Missile Study .—.-^- • "ijj ii I safer method of open •^maintenance ch^ | But other officials h. jthe Pentagon "v | mentioning the SRAiv Sin a joint DOE-DOD i o\ cWJiite House on nuci. wcdj*. eapc pgfety, and also opposed estabii: frment of a special safety committ /proposed by Secretary of Ener. 'James D. Watkins' becaust of t /SRAM-A dispute, , "There were a lot.of-presaun about that" -from the Pentago Watkins said in an interview earli< : thtfe week. "But mostly it came fro: low level [officials] faceless'bureai cr|ts. You get down about the sixt level [at the Pentagon] and the •hate DOE, even the third lew He said, he we ;r, that Secretar of'Defense chard B. Chene; eventually cothe safet; report and d bt of credit for approving the safet n nit } »!«• * T r tists' unanimous recommendation ,£time some of the procedures'tli as an expression of "personal opin-f-thave been established, by the ion" that reflected more than "the'tilP?T™ *f» tec^at year* to impro scientific questions" invoryf—'"•rf— >(L " SRAM-A.g A ^ " - J r a $ One of the three" scientists" had 'I'Jpujjp must now bfejiptified during, said that the policy of stationing the *"r "alert" bomber exercises, -ahcE missiiea aboard •''afert" .aircraft,""that the Air Force had adopted'C 001044 �Document disclosed under the Access m.Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information MAY 25 "30 10;51 POL bEC CDN EMB @CB- P V DEi:"EMSt: DEPARTMENT REGULAR BR IE:FINS, BR 1EFLR;; 12:00 PM a n m , THURSDAY, MAY ::H, r;rso PETtf WILLIAMS • D - 4 - 1 pagc?# 1 dt::;st:|a,;ld „ c l o d , d e f e n s c j n u c w G M p u n , nuc whel, d e p t e n , a r m y , wedpiM'is,, r ' n s j ' J 9 1 7 d a i; a MR.. WI! LI/-': i'if"-::: Oiavy, Good a f t t r n o o i a . I have? j u s t o n e ( . • v i e f ai'ViQuncfinient f o r y o u , g e n e r a l o f f i c e r i j n n o u n c R i n e n l ; , 'jevi"ral o f you know M a j o r Qonev wii B i. L1 faff n o , W i l l i a m I-t, Reno,, who i s c u r r e n t l y t h e D i r e c t o r o f P r o g r a m A n a l y s i s a n d E v a i u a t i nn f o r t h e Army.. The Set: i" a t a r y o l Di-™fen<.;e haw a n n o u n c e d t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t h a s n o m i nats'-d !vt.:••. j>'"• s- G e n e r a l W i l l i a m i-h Rpno f o r r e a c s i g n m o n t a s Depul: y P h i ftf o f S t a f f f o r P e r s o n n e l o f t h e Arfrty a n d a p p o i n t m e n t t o L i P U t e n a n t General. born S i n c e tl-ii--, ,i ;;i, my O n l y a n n o u n c e m e n t , 1 w i l l note? t h a t h e i n S m i t h y ! 1 l e , Oklahoma, T h ^ t is my o n l y a n n o u n c e m e n t . was Char J, ,i e '•* 0. When are you yoi ng to put the 3RAMs i nto storage? them out and put them into storage"'' Take IIP. WI1.1...IAMS;: I know of no plan io do that. The*re is a study underway of thr> SRAM, and X think we should aw t u t the results of trust study. ',) What wafe t h e study prompted by, Pete? !1R„ Wi:i.„LiAMSi I ' m n o t —- we2. 1 , a c o u p l e o f t h i n g s t o b e a r i n m i n d hfi»re a b o u t s t u d i e s o f n u c l e a r w e a p o n s ; . 'H-ie fa. e s t t h i n g i s t h a t t h e r e a r c r e g u l a r r e v i KWS a l l t h e t i m e . T h e U n i t e d State-.-* d o e s n ' t j u s t d e v e l o p a n u c l e a r s y s t e m , p u t i t i n p l a c e a n d w a l k away f r o m i. t , 11 :i & p e r i od.. ,: a 11, y r e v i e w e d . T h e r ts i s p e r i o d i c r e v i t» W S , n o t o n l y o f t h e d e s i g n o f t h e s y s t e m , b u t a l s o t h e .way i t ' s e m p l o y e d , t h e w a y i t ' s h a n d l e d ; t h a p r o c e d u r e s we u s e f o r i t , Those t h i n g s a r e c o i-i t i n u a 11 y r e v i e we d . Now, w h a t p r e c i s e l y t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s t u d y o f the? SRAM-A was i-1 a r t e d b y , I d o n ' t k n o w wh &t h e r i t ? s t; h e r tssu 1 i; o f t h a t k i n d o f r o u t i n e a n a l y s i s o r w h e t h e r there.' was s o m e t h i n g e l s e . T h o r e was a • f i r o i n v o l v i n g a B~\"32 i n G r a n d F o r k s , N o r t h D a k o t a , I t h i n k i n t h e p a r l y ' 8 0 s , which I t h i n k s t a r t e d t h e whole process of l o o k i n g at t h e SRAM-A i n t e r m s o f w h e t h e r t h e r e w e r e a n y f i r e - r e l a t e d p r o b l e m s with i t , B u t t h e r e <*r® r e g u l a r r e v i e w s a l l t h e t i m e o t o u r nu".]. e a r w e a p o n s s> y s t e m s . D What's s a f e t y JjfL...I1;i>*ntf« Q AS focus tar of as this I study know, it of is the SRAM? safety, Is it yes, X-fi it on the warhsad solely? MR. WILLIAMS3 Q the Yes, as far as, T know. And what other warheads are you ••-- do you hav** safety 001045 �MAY 25 ' 9 8 113 = 52 POL SEC CDN EflB Document disclosed under the Access to.Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ?DZS ^ v ^ r ^ l ^ f ^%y- ,f <— «TE HILl. IAns D ""-l 1 page* 2 studies under way on? MR. WILLIAMS:; -•••• ' " ' '• ' 'JL We.L.1, ti-ere aro there «>'•'.'.,..:. „ t r t T e are* - - t h e r e i s .•'• g e n e r a l yevifew >: ail n u c l o a r w a r h e a d *- r i g hi t n u w . n k t h j ,., s•» j.:» .f.« •^(..imetrt •uaimeth:!:i nt As a I tblh i .. fig i-.i"^-1' •"« •- --i l u n- 'u 'n u i 'n ig You IkTnUo- w U , .•1, r«t "• me jUf:;>t s a y ag«,ri. i"1 t h d t g p r oo cc.eess ss . y o u d o n ' t J u ' r i ; d e p l o- y.- a c l±e•:/•a•• r:;,u- s isy'sV&ll, y s t e m , opuut t i ti t i «i d -•••' • n u.,-•. p g j C i , ; , 1 "sSt.lf"? .in i n s t r u c t i o n m a n u a l , a n d t h e n w a l k a w a y from it. You're; c o n s t a n t!l y l o o k i n g at t h e s e t h i n g s , p a r t l y a s a matter of r o u t i n e , p a r t l y a » m a t t e r of nr.'W t e s t i n g t e c h n o l o g i e s b e c o m i n g a v a i l a b l e . A n d t h e t h i r d t h i n g t h a t ' s i m p o r t a n t t o a m p h a i d ;•:« is that we? tsst n u c l e a r w e a p o n «ji. 1 1 ' I-, e s (,v. © n +, i a .1 •unai: we; m a i n t a i n t h e >,. a p a b i I i t y t o t e s t n u c l e a r w e a p o n s b e r a u s e t h e n u c l e a r w o a p o n s t e s t i n g p r o g r a m g i v e s u s moi-p i n f o r m a t i o n t h a c is a g a i n fed i n t o t h e s y s t e m . Bo there' a r © t w s t s g o i n g on a n d e v a l u a t i o n * ! g o i n g o n , a n d r o u t i n e e x a m i n a t i o n s g o i n g on all t h e t i m e , o f nu'ieai- weapon:::;.. We s h o u l d n ' t v i e w this a s s o m e t h i n g ;;»ac'd£?n or s ^ m e l h i n g «it « h i g h s t a t e of c o n c e r n . Q B u t w o u l d y o u — let m e Just h e m o r p s p e c ! f i c „ When y o u <•"£>• t h e r e ' s a g e n e r a l r e v i e w o f all n u c l e a r w a r h e a d s right n o w , is t h a t s o m e r e v i e w o t h e r t h a n t h e r o u t i n e o n g o i n g s t u d i e s that -••MR. WILL.IAPIS! D '• Yes. B y thi? iacr vi r:es'.' !1R.. WILLIAMS j 0 I'm a w a r e o f . B o i t ' s just continuing'? MR. W I L L IAI1S s 0 Moi; that Well, t think it's a Joint DUD-DOE d ^ u g n m e n t . But Pate •••- MR. WILLIAMS! Because - you see*, DOD has to bo involved in it because it involves not only the design, but also the handling procedures and so forth. Q So it's all warheads ehough -••- (i naudi b 1 e) Q ..Pete? D I'm s o r r y t C h a r 1 i e MR. W l L L I A M S s reviewed. All o f o u r n u c l e a r w e a p o n s we constantly being H But Pete, you're saying you don't know if this is a part of 'a routine ongoing study of SRAM, and you say you Hi riutine :«n' t know "-••V !R, WILLIAMS,'! In t h e c a s e o f B R A M . r i .J • that 'a right --• �,-.r... r n r , r M R MA." 25 ' * . W-5c FUL ^EL LDN EMB Document disclosed under the Access mMformation Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information if/"\":NSE DEPARTMENT REGULAR BR CERTNR. n p T t r r c D . VS-/:-."- r n t.eiJi.^ IHUKSDAY, MAY / / ' I , i',:,"?0 D 1 1 Page# 3 MR. 0. WILLIAMS; n c t i ; w;n.,i.... t,•••,!• IB Yes,, what prompted this review. MR,, WILLIAMS:: !a; the case oi :3RAM, my impress;, on, Charlie, is trust after this fire in North Dakota in the ear'ly '80s, we Keg&n tc look at that sort of question about fire handling procedure^ and so forth.. The SRAM-A pr ocEU'iur@s that are ussd for tht? three Aircraft which carry SRAM A •- that is to &&yt the RB 1 :1,, the B'-SI: and the B :L thoSi.s procwdur«<•:: art* constantly being modified as we continue this • th.ts taview thi <,-;> constant rwviKu. For swamp le - to giv® you some of' the:.' a xampl i™; nf modi f i t at; j. ont,, t h a t h a v s fallen pia.'yt? -~ l e t me f i n d t h e .'list h e r s , Tor example t h e r e i s 'something c a l l e d a s t a r t c a r t r i d g e i n soma a i r c r a f t t h a t hfllpiii you s t a r t the? e n g i n e r a p i d l y . . Start cartridges a r e r e mo v ad f r om a J. 1 on g i n (•:; s b e f o r e t h e r e i s an y m a r n t on a n c e isngine ''h-:'"1 on t h e B 32s and RB 1:1. I s . The? s e n i o r wing s t a f f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s have t o be n o t i f i e d and i n placn? d u r i n g any a l o r t e x e r c i s e s . Th© f i r s * department has t o bo n o t i f i e d and f i r e v<:?hic 1 ei- must ta© i n p o s i t i o n before? any e ^ r o i ss?<;„. T h a t * ' * j u s t some examples o f p r o c e d u r a l changes t h a t a r e made i n v o l v i n g t h e h a n d l i n g of t h e BRAm. So you seti, what I'm t r y i n g t o sdy CONTINUED �MO DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REGULAR U&tZF1NG, BRIEFERj 12sOO PM <EDT>, THURSDAY, MAY 2 4 , 1 9 3 0 D--4 •".•,•.: p a g e # i P F T f W i l l fAMS d e s t - d r i , d o d , riofsnsp, ru.tc weapon,, n u c w h d , d e p t e n , army., w e a p o n s , f n s l g J 3 l 7 :i a s t •+• •» m i s s :i 1 e , f r i n f data i s t h a t thHGL' pv oi.:edi.!res a r e c o n s t a n t l y u n d e r review. A n d I ' m ••• I d o n ' t »-••• w h a t I ' m a a y i n g I ' m n o t s u r e o f a n d w i l l c h e c k t o invaks» doubly sure o f p e r h a p s wt* r a n g o t y o u t h o a n s w e r b e f o r e t h e b r i w r i n g i « ovev i s t h e r e some c u r r e n t r e v i e w o f SRAM in addition t o t h i s g e n e r a l c o n t i n u i n g r e v i e w t h a t I•m t a l k i n g a b o u t . L> specific I f iJhe/efs a s p e c i f i c problem, possible indicate d problem? !"'R- WILLIAMS! No, for instance, I'm unaware of anything l i k e Q Wei 3 , y o u ' r e unaware, but there might be, could f i n d out. of some that. 1 mean, i f we MR. WILLIAMS! Well, but f'm q u i t e c e r t a i n that i t ' s not some s p e c i f i c question about the SRAM-A t h a t has caused t h i s review. I t ' s j u s t that ••-'• i t ' s i n the SRAM A, i t ' s r e a l l y a procedural, how do you handle the weapon. 0 My quest :i on swart l y . You imply tnat i t ' s a i l procedural and has nothing t o do wit h the weapon, i t has to with the way i t ' s handled'" < MR. WILL JAMS s (3 Correct. <;;•,... J-i*-- •• ,••••• MR. W I L L I A M S ; standards. Exactly,, » issue if handled properly? Tho weapon m e e t s all our current safety 0. W e l l , h o w about t h e suggestion in testimony on the Mill yesterday that y o u ' r e considering taking these out of c i r c u l a t i o n, or a m I m i s t a k e n ? MR. W I L L I A M S ! W e l l , ther e is a specific study of that question going on now, I don't know when t h e r e s u l t s are d u e o u t , sometime this summer. I think it would be u n w i s e and premature to predict the o u t c o m e of that study and to make any d e c i s i o n s now b e f o r e it's d o n e . That's what y o u do the study for. S o , i t ' s u n p r o d u c t i ve t o say now what national security p o l i c y ought t o b e based on that s t u d y. T h a t' is p o i n t o n e. Point t w o is, I think if y o u look at t h e c o m m e n t s made by t h e national laboratory d i r e c t o rs yesterday, they were not confining themselves to t h e specific question of t h e study, which i s to say, scientific q u e s t i o n s involving the weapon, they wer e also talking about the political a t m o s p h e r e and kind of giving their own personal opinions about wh©th«r w e ought to be flying around with weapons or. alert and that kind of thing in this current climate. S o their 001048 answer w a s part scientific and part political is what I'm saying. �: HOY 25 '9B 1B '3 P0L 5£C CWI Document disclosed under the Access » Wom,«fa» Actp o c l e n , d f c u ^ en vertu de „ « - * * * W * D1E //•' .njj SflMSE DEPARTMENT RDlHJLAR B R i E R I N G , B R I E F E R : .}0 PM C E D T i , THURSDAY, MAY 2 4 , 1S90 D» 4 ?. p a g e # 2 PETE W I L L I A M S w So you're saying they weris,' t a l k i n g about on], l i n g these t h i n g s , not because t h ^ r e i s ;-\ s p e c i f i c safety problem with each weapon - • MR. WILLIAMS: & ;;afVty of MR. hut Correct. for other r«a?,on•:;;,. I t had n o t h i n g do w i t h ths- t h e weapon? WILLIAMS;; X think t h e t w o were; mi y.& d .in., 0 Who o r d s - r & d t h e s t u d y , a n d i,*'- t h i s f i n d i n g i I:;» r Hcommenciat i o n m a n d a t o r y ? MR. W I L L I A M S : No, i t s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n •-- I d o n ' t w i l l r» */ t» n make a r e c o {fi m e n d a t i •-. n . Q to Is rt a D O D study? mandatory know t h a t h e DOD ordered? MR., WILLIAMS! i believe it's a joint DOD-DOE study, but let's b e clear about that, let's talus that question. • Ci Sec retary Okay, and their — findings will b e a recommendat ion t o the MR. WILLIAMS:; W e i l , a recommendation presumably to the National oommand author!bies. 13 Who .ordered this iatudy, and what •— MR. WILLIAMS. Let me I'm not positive* about that. It kind of g o e s back to your early question. Char,'! ie D When w a s the study --- MR. WILLIAMS: 0 --- started, who ordered it and what prompted it? MR, W I L L I A M S : D Ys?s. Precisely. W ei l, now •— Except it w a s b e s i d es political —• MR. WI'LLlAMSf Y e s — right — right. Q -••• besi diss political questions MR.. WILLIAMS: That's the earlier question that we took, right 0 Is t h e r e any comment on M r . A s p i n ' s blocking of the latest re? prog ramming request that I think everyone had agreed on i? x cent �^ ,.n , n i e , m e r r r w EMB MAY 25 ' * 10-54 POL ,Ec CDU EMB Document disclosed under the Access telftformatian Act a/7n/o^t^ DoCument divulgue en vertu de la to/5 U r/Wes DEPARTMENT REGULAR BRIEF IMG, BRIETERs RF.TE WI'Li JAMS lis 00 RM <:EDT) T THURSDAY, MAY 24, 19'30 D"-4 2 pagett 3 MR. WILLIAMS; Y e s , We we wish yary much that ••-- sines you mentioned him by name in your question that Mr. Aspin would siqn ^r, to the letter that the other seven committee and subcommittee chairmpn have signed onto, that would clear the way for ^ p r o g r a m m i n g which we have been trying !;o get for months, which Mr. Asp i, n't!, own committer said in last year's Appropriation Committee'.-; report is something we should do. This House Arms Services Committees was among those saying, "We expect the Department of Defense to seek i'i;-?programmuig. " We did just what they said,, Seven of Mr.. Aspin"* co]leagues in hoth the Mouse and Senate have signed on to the lett letter for rfeprogramming. We wish now that Mr., Aspin would come? into conformity with his colleague* and the direction th«tt his own r.omniittee gave* us 1 ast fa 1.1 . DF<QNSL 9. Does Mr. Cheney plan to speak wtth Mr. Asp in about this"? MR. WILL IAMB s Lot mes ans war your question this way. M r . Cheney lias spoken with Mr., Aspin repeatedly on this subject. He ha; been working the phones aggressively. Just for example, during our trip to Brussels,, he wafi; spending a great deal of time on the telephone with his former colleagues back in the Congress. He's Continuing to d o s o last night when he got back. H e ' s on —- he , iv. ^ doing it again today., He h a s worked vary hard and consulted vary closely and rigorously with his Colleagues - or his former colleagues on t h e Hill because we believe i t y s important. ..1 ... ..^ .L. ' .... . . .] K) J. ... * ... HJ I H 1 I . . . . . . Including Aspin'"1' ;VIR. WILLIAMSs Well, I don't want to get into the names of specific members that he's talked with, but he's worked this issue vei* y aygi" essx ve 1 y . 0. While we are on the Hill, do you have any comment on the Representative Rangel's asking for release of the Panama videos under the Freedom of Information Act? MR. WILLIAMS: Well, a couple oi points about that. First of all, I have talked with his staff throughout this process*. We've given them all of the nours and hours oi videotape that were released, In the specific case of the Apache gun camera video* it's the decision by the Army that that is prop&rly classified because the videotape shows how the weapon is used. In other words, it betrays or reveals operational procedures and capabilities of the Apache. Now, obviously, some of the Apache's characteristics and capabilities are out and open and public. But the specific way that it :i. s utilised, the specific procedures that are used for the Apache during combat, are betrayed by the videotape, and that's the reason the Army has it classified., C! that So there's no •—- there's no procedural •—- how do you say appeal for *-- MP., uTi i TAMe.. w , ',.,,,IT, «••• ^;s. un , you Know, certainly he can a p p e a 1 t h e d a c i s i o n , i f h e s o d e s i r e s, u n d e r t h e R r e ts d o m o f 001050 �MHY 25 "30 10:55 POL SEC CDN EMB Document disclosed under the Access mmformation Act- ^ Kurnent divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'infotfnteipn Document DL/"YlSR OEFARTMENT REGULAR CRIER I Mo, BRIEFER! PETE WILLIAMS i M i RM (EDTV THURSDAY, MAY 24, 19';*G l)--4 2 page# 4 Information Act- There's an appeal procedure, which he's cer tai n1y ent i 11 &d to follow„ Q Does he have to get ir. line behind us7' MR. WILLIAMS: (Laughs.) !•!'•• doesn't move to the head of the 1 :i. he because he's a member cf Congress, but he'll -• his request will cert a j. n 1 y g e t t h e a 11 e n tion w h :i, c h i t d c s e r v e s,, R Back t o t h e rapr ogr «immi ng, what solution d o you see to t h i s , or what arts the - sec end q u e s t i o n , what p l a n s would h a v e tc b e m a d e if t h i s doesn't gu fchrcugh? Y o u ' r e talking October I ait and thousands of people, thousands of slots,. IV!R„ WILLI AMSs Well, that's a good question, and 1st me answer it every way ev.eepi; directly, and try to explain why. I think * let me gi^e you my own personal view and sort of mi v; ,A whole bunch o f s t u f f h e r ti t o gather ,. My own personal view is that; h:'/@ry time we talk about the consequences of not getting reprogramming -—- you know, it we don't, look at all these things that'll happen --- it causes great anxiety among the men and women in the armed forces, who are to some extent depending upon this reprogrammlng authority for the size of the force, for all these things which you 'mentioned before —- the permanent change of stations: you know, whether you have to extend people's service time out; whether you can do promotions as scheduled? whether you can ail low dependents to travel. All of those questions are kind of hanging on this reprogr amming decision.. So t?ver y time we got out and ;::;ay7 "Look ^i the list of things that will happen if we don't get reprogramming," it just gets those folks all spun up. Mow, we've made uur case to th© Congress on why we need reprogramming. Indeed, this comes as no great shock to Congress ^ince, as ,1 said before, they're the one& who said in the appropriations - or the authorisation bill last y&;ir, "Hey, look, we can't fully fund your personnel accounts. WE? expect you to seek r©programming, because we want you to put personnel first,," CONTINUED �_ !_,i 1 Document disclosed under the Access » * * ^ K ^ Document divulgue en vertu de la lo/ w / ' « « « a /inffrfrffipn l_F r U .ny^ENSE D E P A R T M E N T RRQULA R 'BRJLFXNh, BRIEFER; XiKJ'JQ RM fE'DT^, T H U R S D A Y, M A Y 2 4 , ;I,9'J0 D "1--3 page* 2** Q WK; 11 > 1 don * t un d&i- st una - Q Why d i d D •••-'" t h i ? s t u d y il It's for take MR. l"t It study d o n e now.'' •.::!•.:ws s n > t Yes, it's - Icn ma j u s t take the get that i ni t j-rtnd" s- : iy h e r e . w o u l d Lie i n t e r e s t i n g WILL IAMB; Dhaty, being Well, i t ' s a do i t t h a t way. WILLIAMS J (,.,] long? i si j u s t When was t h e MR, you,, so 1930, MR,, W I L L I A M S : q u e s t i o n and w e ' l l 0 it PETE WILLIAMS we'll work to We'll know on try to one when. those. C h a r 1 i e„ Q On t h e q u e s t i o n , w h a t m a k e s y o u s o c o n f i d e n t y o u ' v e g o i n g •to get a r e s o l u t i o n ? Aspin h i s m a j o r c o m p l a i n t s were? t h d t t h e D e p a r t meir!; w a s n ' t g i v i n g e n o u g h on c e r t a i n h i g h c o s t p r o g r a m s a n d t h a t ha- w a s n ' t w i l l i n g t o g i v e o n t h i s i f t h i s D e p a r t m e n t w a s n ' t w i l l i n g t o g i v e on t h i n g s l i k e ? t h e B - 2 a n d " S t a r W a r s " a n d t h i n g s l i k e that,, I s t h e r e a n o t h e r o f f e y g o i n g up'?' MR. D WJLLJAM! : L NO. Something to appease him, something tu MR. W I L L I A M S : ' M o . We have? been around this before. Q Well - (inaudible) -— when he's a logjam here? MR, WILLIAMS: Well, let me put if this ways Partly the timing, partly the fact that it's today, and partly the fact that I think a lot of Mr. Aspin's colleagues -^r& appealing to him to join the seven other chairmen and subcommittee chairmen who have already agreed to this. He's tho lone holdout. I think he's getting some pressure from his own committee members and other members of the House; who arc eager to see a resolution to this issue, who think t h at w e * v e b a s i c. a 13, y g o n e at it I o n g e n 0 u g h. Q Getting back to t h e Q i. inaudible) - Q Getting MR. WILLIAMS:: back to Ye?s, we'll - t h e SRAM-A, get you X - a the answer to the question on 001052 �-,r , Q n i n . « pr-,1 e r r rr.N EMB MHT . 5 ' * i u . , b Fit. ,Ec LDN dIE Document disclosed under the Access &.lbformation Act -i divulgue en vertu de la to/sur/'acces a / ' / / . / o r ^ ! » Docume„t &r\-*NSE DEPARTMENT REGULAR F<R [LF1NL, uRIERER:: 12:00 PM CEDT3T THURSDAY, MAY 24, r390 D •:-'••-3 page# 3 PETF WILLIAMS when the study was ordev ed and prioi. i «ml y why. Q You said the study i s looking at th<~>. qussstj,on of grounding needs, of t a k i n g these - p u t t i n g them i n storage, right"? MR.. WILLIAMS: No,, I'm saying t h a t the general subject of tha S a f © t y ,'.< f t h e S R A11 ••- A i a t h e s u b j e c 1; o f t h a s t u d y, a n d 1 d o n»t t h i n I; i t ' s proper t o make a d e o «i on about grounding i t or not using i ! " in ixei" c j. s<?>s or whatever u n t i l we? see tho r e s u l t s of the study,, The study i s broader than j u s t t h a t question. Q Arty they two d i f f e r e n t studies, though? MR. WILL1AMS5 J Mo. f.'i Y'OU (lit:-an that the question on whether this should be q r o u n d e a i. s p ,:i ;• t o f t h er o t h e MR,. W I L L I A M S : No l e t ' s p u t i t t h i s way.. Bo f o r t ? y o u make ..••my d e c i s i o n s 5 i k e t h a t , y o u h a v e t o sec? this r e s u l t s o f t h e s t u d y . I ' m s a v i n o i t ' s ori'.-™«i-iivi-i ••.-, <*.-., !.•<.> ^ -J«-.. •. L .=.,-. •„.... ........ •,. *»*-. tsu y r u u n a i n g i t u n t i l t h e \.,ttu::ly [>:•:; f i n i s h e d . Then y o u make? those...* d e c i s i o n s . 0. 3o-you're say,.ng t h e r e ' s enough concerns about s a f e t y do a study but t h e r e ' s not concern about s a f e t y t o rtrdt^r them grounded? to MR, WILLIAMS:: I'm saying that the -URAM-A c u r r e n t l y meets a i l of the s a f e t y standard'::; for t h a t weapon. There i s nothing unsafe about the SRAM A. Mow, there i s a lutudy going on about procedures, a l l these t h i n g s t h a t we've discussed b e f o r e . Before you make any decisions about changing the procedures, l e t ' s look at the study t h a t ' s due out t h i s summer. 0. But ••'-- but Pete, i f a study i s being made on whether or not t o ground these t h i n g s or put them on a shelf or whatever, how you can say with absolute confidence t h at these things ^rw aafis and that t h e r e ' s nothing wrong with them, i f t h e y ' r e going so far ,=u; say, " w e l l , h e r d ' s the* p o s s i b i l i t y of t a k i n g these thing s o f f pianes"? MR. WILLIAMS? Sure, good q u e s t i o n , and the answer i s thi. SK The SRAM-A c u r r e n t l y meets; the US safety standards,, We c o n s t a n t l y review the design, the procedures, the general s a f e t y of our nuclear weapons, and changes and m o d i f i c a t i o n s ar& made as necessary,, Th e r e ' <3 a study going on now. I t ' s not the f i r s t Study, i t won't be the l a s t study, of nucleai* weapons. But . l e t ' s not make any d PC i. si a ft® u n t i l we? i»ee the? r e s u l t ia Of thi*» one. 0. But again -— MR. WILL/AMEJ: You make d e c i s i o n s , you •mflks? change"* i n the wayyou handle and the? way you design nuclear m a t e r i a l s , based on a constant e v a l u a t i o n . There's one coming up now. L e t ' s sp»e what the 001053 �MAY £5 ' 9 0 10=56 POL oEC CDN EflB Document disclosed under the Access to information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'infpcMatioit f O f f DEPARTMENT REGULAR B R l F F W i RPn-rp ^ MM C E D T ) r THURSDAY, MAY ^ ' ^ ^ ^ " •* .3 pagi paae-1* 4 .i--w decision is. Q "stringent, MR. !v! MR,. the You may you may change the •snd t h e n on t h e t i h e l f"'' WILLIAMS:: -- -• i t it Mo, X don't fi! e ! ? t ••::. c > i r r e n t WILLIAMS;: Q Well, '.,:>hel f y put if It do*&. it doe's, want ETE WILLIAMS « t an da ia J <=; dnij mal.:& them mors* to B e c a u s e you ^ay t h o y get into <»t a n d a r d <•». t h e n why y / ? n think about taking A r e you «•>,;;:;/i n;::i t h & weapon'"-; up i,n t o ;,?;T;ani-iar<"l& s t a n d a r d s bbuutt 0 , r v , , -., L.4-, :is irr-Mi-r, o rr h ha an n ddlliiuncgi i1.1 a r e .wa,-. h a t4. h -a-s- t o be • - i„?,a"ic.l,dui".' i;:. ff o t Ai»a MR. W I L L I A M S ; No, •|us.r.:rt i, o n , 1 s t me t r y t o )yf'„.H'3 remember t h a t -•••• it of tthhaa; : the no,, l am s a y i n g t h a t I u n r i i s r i M , a n d you g e t a t i t t h i s way. You d o n ' t , a a I s a i d,tr rj you d o n ' t jutst f i e l d CONTINUED 001054 �i'lrH'l PS -90 10 = 57 POL SEC CDN EMB Document disclosed under the Accessfoinformation Actdivulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'inforjgckipft Document ycEi DRRRM3E DEPARTMENT REGULAR JBRIRFIMG, BRlhTERi: PF'IE WILLIAMS i.'g'sOO RM <EDT;i, THURSDAY', MAY :':A, 1390 D 4 -I- E page** 1 r.'ie!.y;t !""dd , dod, defense, nucweapor:, nucwhd , a:i, r force, weapons, fni;:: 1,291 ">' dc?« t +";-m i 3s i 1fe,ph i ] i p, m 1.1 i n s t „ do•.•>, t or s;vc , a i r c, w m f o r c:i a t n a 'ayutefn and wal!. 1 away f r o m i t , , You c o n s t a n t l y r e v i e w i t . You r e v i e w i t An a r e s u l t o f b e t t e r t e s t i n g p r o c e d u r e s , t h i n g s :i. &•.;:«• o n s l e a r n e d , t h i n g s t h a t , y o u i d e n t i f y m c o n t i n u e d n u c l e a r weapons t e s t i n g . , I t ' s a continuing pre.ess. And d s you ;nake d i '-:iC0VG>r i e s , o r a::; y o u f i n d b a t t e r ways t o do t h i n g «, .;::i r a s y o u t h j, n k o f b a 11 e? r p r o c e d n r f i <s o r wh a t (J V e r , t hten y o u r e< .' v ii':' w i j e «; i (,;i n a n d y o u r e v i e w h a n cl 1 i n g., "I" h a t ' <;; a c o n t .1 n u i n g p r o c r* s ti, „ Some c h a n g e s * h a v e a l r e a d y been made? i n t h e way t h e SRAM A i s tveated •c x e r c i s e i i i , t h e s t u f f about e n g i n e c a r t r i d g e s , fire e q u i p m e n t , a i l o f tho-.;© t h i n g s . Theses change's are: c o n s t a n t l y g o i n g on. Q u e s t i o n : s h o u l d you make more c h a n g e s i n t h e way you h a n d l e gpAM-A? The? a i T ^ e r i s , 1 e t ' «j w a i t t i l l t h i s s t u d y t h a t ' s g o i n g on now i <;;; c o m p l e t e d . 0. Htivp you b t i e n ••—• Pets?,, ta i» •„. omp 1, o t e?d wh en ay a i n? MR. WILL JAMS 5 'Jiornet ime t h i s Q T t " i 5 P e i n e done- w i t h an i t , n o t w i t h -•-- t h e r e d o e s n ' t soem would r o t ire* t h o weapon, j u s t w i t h c h a n g e s i n h a n d l i n g p r o c e d u r e s and MR. W11...L 1 AMU: Q WILLIAMS: (•! Well, of retiring I've that's never WILLIAMS; being ••--- u s , what, to sudiinar, ey: a n o t the? way you c h a r a c t e r i z e d t o be much p r o s p e c t t h a t you an e y e t o w a r d ma L i n g f u r t h e r r e t a i n i n g i t xn t h e f o r c e ? No, it on© b e i n g option. why whan y o u s a i d earlier I heard i <r, n o t that s t LI d y i n g t h e p o s s i b i 1 1 1 y o f MR, is Th a t • <s c or r fee t . The o p t i o n MR. t h e .study retirin g it never said that studied? they're - -- that. I never said that. Q P e t e , d i d you answer s p e c i f i c a l l y w h e t h e r t h e A i r F o r c e w o u l d h a v e i n i t i a t e d thi< :: ; s p e c i f i c ;,r>tudy had i t n o t b e e n f o r t h e f i r e i n 19$-- •—MR* W I L L I A M S : T h a t ' s t h e q u e s t i o n w e ' v e t a k e n and 1 hope? t o g(51 y o u t h a t arvswsr <rshor 11 y . di W e r e t h e r e problems 1 , w i t h t h e W"-79s, t n a t y o u d i s c o v e r e d -and l a t e r m o d i f i e d , d i !»coveYed i n a r o u t i n e s s t u d y a-.:; w e l l ? How w e r e thence prob3 ems c l i s c o v w C Q i t ' ' 001055 MR. WILLIAMS: The - I would &ay that in the cour&o of the �- . * - p -, err ™ rt IP m y 25 '9U i y = 5,- PuL bEu . H I E.IB Document disclosed under the Access tp Information Act divulgue en vertu de la io/sur/'acces a / ' m / o r m 0 r , 0 n Document /"' DEPARTMENT REGULAR Bhli'RFiNG, 1-JPIEFRRs 12; 00 RM LEDT>7 THURSDAY, MAV a'"-a,. 5E\JM3R RETR WILLIAMS review o f our nuclear weapon*;, ;a; W^K, cieteiaru ned t h a t the W-'/O art.i. :! u-ry s h e l l d i d not meet our very high standards*. ft Anyt h i ng new on I;h;•<•> Phi 1 i ppi nes Mi-:. tJILHAMSi No, I u o n ' t t m r i ther«?' s a n y t h i n g new, h c 1 ef ' <=: go throug h the st at t.,„., O( what';. oa, i n q ,-,n fit the !:::'h i, 1 ipi„, HIO-; i can f i n d i t , because we were j u s t r e v i e w i n g t h a t t h i s morning,, if The r e t i b r i r t ion--», the personnel movement r e s t r i c t i o n s , remain „ a j../i a i... e» On-hase pr-'-sonnr-'! W& remai r.-ing on b .&•.;.; e,, Personnel l i v i n g o f f ba'=;e are t r a v e l i n g o f f base for u r g e n t , c a s e n t i d l busi n?'iE o n l y , such as goin<j t o and Tr...m w o r i . As we iaaid 1 A^>t week, those people t t'fiipo'" jn-11 y assigned t o Panama aro now on bast?.. There lis imminent Clangu-r pay i n e f f e c t , which i % an a d d i t i o n a l 15 percent of basii,; wali-try for LIB 'dt'L-en c i v i l i a n emp L oyRes, and *Ll<"> sl mouth for a l l US m i l i t a r y personnel.. Inc. t o n m i l i t a r y persuiinel must haves on b.a'!»e 1'souring a v a i l a b l e , '3o, f/ ^ danger 1 think but h i a i ' i pretty otherwise;? t h e r e ' s no change. much wnere t h i n g s 'stood l a s t weak. '?-m you e \p 1.:.111 the i.)i t f e r e m r e between the imminent pay and combat pay" MR,, WILL IAM3.v I moan, i n there a difference'' In terms ••-. f tho amount-'' 0. Ho v.'ever you'L'.i l i k e I c q u a n t i t y i t . MR, WILL I AMR: Ml-.ay, I dor.'1;, know what the I d o n ' t know what ',. ombat j.; ay how j. t ' •;•, computed. W e ' l l t r y t o OP t you t h a t ai,.:-;ws.'^. The one t h a t leaps immediately ho mind i s combat ^&iy its for those pe.ip'l, e why acted i n combat, and imminent danger pay i s for those people who l i v e i n clangor uus areas ,..,.r under dangerous concu t i vn.i. 0 Does t h e i n c l u s i o n of the imminent danger pay i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e r e ' s a heightened danger Tor dependents and t h a t u-ort of thing"' Does i t r a i s e t h e q u e s t i o n -— MR. WILLIAMS! I t ' s a r e a c t i o n , s u r e , i t ' s a r e a c t i o n t o the g e n e r a 1 c l i m a t e where t h e s e f o 1 k s 11 v e a n H w o r k. Th e r eb e 1 s h av e made i t c l e a r t h a t they consider Americans t a r g e t s . We've had some of our personnel k i l l e d . And i t ' s a r e c o g n i t i o n of t h a t climate,. (3 ever I n t h e r e any thought a s k i n g people rwfc t o b r i n g MR., WILLIAMS:: being g i v e n or dependents any plan's towards ••-- Not that I'm aware of. 0. P e t e , t h e IK p e r c e n t , t h a t ' s for State Department, I Lines, '.'.j, and DOD c i v i l i a n p e r s o n n e l , r i g h t ? MR, WILLIAMS: W e l l , t h e \.Z percent i % d e f i n i t e l y f o r c i v i l i a n L'GD per sonnel y and I b e l i e v e i t i s the same for foreign service officers. 001056 �n-11 y ?. a v 10 = 58 POL SEC CDN EMB "*•' Document disclosed under the Access ^J^ationAct-Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'infornpJioiV h\£jA!SX; DEPARTMENT REGULAR BRTiia I Hi.;, 8RIEFTR: ;:,"hoO PM f E D T v THURSDAY, MAY yy 1'i'hO ij-4' ^ - L page* RLTR WILLIAMS 3 ft J u s t c u r i e u s '. u : n o w , t h e * 1 1 0 a m o n t h f'ur i, hi? m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l w o r k s OUT t o a b o u t $ ! , 3 l . u & y,~.^r, i/nles-.... I I ' i q u r e >.. t w r o n g ; a n d y e t a c i v i l i a n DUD e m p l o y e e wh>'i J O U ! d mal.e iS-i-O,, <X.n> . d i l Cist an e : < t r a t(-.:'<Ou .\ y e a ' a s t h e I o p e r c e n t . Ulhv ;-- i h«i*-i I -r .,• 1 ' • MP., W l i L l A M S s .[ d o n ' t c i.,mpu i; r?n <iep.ur a t e 1 y . -'• Pete. .•;pp-veiicn«»L ."in o t rR.. know why I.'..: '.i-irrru a n y t h i n g the WILLIAM-::: , n.-n't. further r„; why the two ... cnt,- i I'lveuL i -yi^i: i or mar JJ-JV er<s > Ma;, tru.it i"v:,.> h e a r d ' o r g no. i>' H •.•',' a L o u t i; a.- b a ^ u i n . ' r i o t i a t 1 o n i ' MR,, WILL iAMS; Well, they'ro t h f i.:,'..p J. o r d . ., phac;e o f t cuyjo boil i o n v; •> •., c..,.imp.,', K?t e . 1'Mere ; s n u d a t e f o r r e-ium i. :ig tl-vs n e - a niui«it.r o r nei.icvt j ,-rl; ,i, t„ira.„ ftut I t h i n k t h a t wc> ,:u'e r e v i e w n q w h a t •v,-l e s r n e d i n t h e vxp L o r a t o r y t a l k ' s And we w i l , move o n . Juhn? P !•''• t h e r e ...my , ' h i n g t i n tne? ' r e q u e s t rov h,-«:iuaa» -La," •.:,? e-2"' MP. -. LHLI., I AMR; ;,i'in'. f knew or. >3 "I he'* 3 r v rart a r y wa=; prt?s«jed o n t h a t up on cn-*1 . .,(iT!t, wd h i . : , ma.; o r a i r c r a f t r e v i e w , ana h e u a i d h e was i c Li .• '-. " - t ^ r . MR. WTLLTAMSs T \ y ^ e n " t h e a r d o f a n y t h i n g . „.:, ., •. , .. , , • .. !? Thank ' you. MP. WILLiAMSs .. i hot. Okay, thank you ail vary i.,i,..,.. 1 w a s j u s t g o i n g t u %ayt a r e WP clo«ija t o g w t t t n : j a n a i n w ;•> •i«3 - '.aside.' ) ••— No"' Okay. We w i l l •-•• w h a t e v e r o u r c?qui v a . e r f p o s t i n g t h e a n s w e r , we w i l l got i t t o y o u a.i >,-. on a<-» wr- i . a n . END 001057 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18592 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/631c2a1210c7ad22f3667e0c38c59d63.pdf 74c412dc5d9bb307143c2088d23f708b PDF Text Text I.*li!|inil Alfiiii :• All.-tlii;:; imlftflutJli):; Cmnrln C;iti;ula o Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en^e'Hfu 11 ^WMkAQ'deti&t FiAjbfmition MINP/A. 1 0 USS/A-8 DMC/A-8 DMT/A-8 BMD'A-6 BMM/C-5 BFD'C-2 HOUSE OF COMMONS BOOK — BRIEFING NOTE Y LIVRE DE LA CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES ~ NOTES D'INFORMATION X URR I F B IDD IDA RBR RWR CPD /FTLE/DIARY CIRC W/F Seciion IDR-1431 SubjecliHighlighls' Sujet/Points saitants Defective Nuclear Shells Raise Weapons' Safety Concerns DATE ACC -ILE Source . Assessment / Evaluation Classificalion __1 DOSSIER 93-4AM LOC CONFIDENTIAL - A recent Washington Post article (the story of which was also picked up by CP, AP, Reuters) contends that in 1988, it was determined that W-79 artillery shells stationed in Europe did not meet safety standards. - Several reports indicate that the problem has since been corrected. - Safety concerns as regards other nuclear systems such as the short-range missile deployed on US strategic aircraft have also been raised. - The validity and extent of the situation is unclear. Canada was not informed of the 1988 problem and has not been apprised of any current problem relating to weapons safety- We have initiated enquiries at senior levels in Washington. SUGGESTED, RESPONSE - Canada does not possess a nuclear weapons capability, nor are there any nuclear weapons deployed on Canadian territory. As such, the situation does not have a direct effect on Canada. - At the same time, it shpuld be underscored that the situation is unclear and it would be premature to make any statement without confirmation of the facts. - We have directed our Embassy in Washington to ascertain the exact nature of the situation. RESPONSIVE ONLY - As regards to the 1988 incident involving a defect in the W-7 9 artillery shell, USA Secretary of Defence Cheney has indicated that there was no danger of a nuclear explosion. ProparoO by / PrApnrfl pnr ANGELA BOGDAN/kl (:.T li.ia ,nii oai Division / Diroctlon IDR Dnlu 24 May 1 9 9 0 Tut no ' N" lift Iftl 992-9360 001058 �Document disclosed under the /lecess to Information Act i 'vfr^sument divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information VrGGthor , ."Tediy: Tartly"tiSrr,y, raa'H^h 69 "low 53. y\nd 7-14 m?h t 4'j>iurKlay:ftrtly,fiiinny,possible . " •>fter^aific^'?r. High 7\.4'\ • .•.•Y«»t«nJ«yiTertVJ. range: 51-59.' •>'AQl 20. DetAlIs on Page D2. II -;a^iftt>H yMh$Mm$ < ". "•" -•-••••• — •' • •• ' X313^VE^'/:'-.. ..\ftal69 ' ftps & » - ... A rr-y.. *' * * v n- • kmh ? r , s r rtf'3 8' •• 1 g i ,, I, ' * lL\mijrtfTwm—•—*— $ ; i Js -' y~yyyA aise-saie JLone Cnn \UI:YK: "OM1 < • ' ^ . » . :£M' J • [ . VED.NESL Y: to 'JJ/.X Secretly Repairing WeaponsHit Europe'!?; • Vf). detonated, the officials and scieng^V By R. Jeffrey Smith •'•< • , (. tists said. * >'$vyx yiyyy??y. •:;••'., •» i.- ^.Wuhiifi'.aii Pa* Sua Wn:«r y—.viS-The artillery Shells, which are •Ito a series of secret moves, the ^deployed in at least three West EuU.S. government discovered—and. -,. ropean countries and in U.S. stock:is repairing-^defective nuclear ar-; g'piles, are being modified, so they •.illlery shells that could haveexplod-^'/will detonate only after being fired ged accidentally while stored in'Eu- -.'in battle, the officials said.'';: -a :>;•.,>;. , rope, and has started urgent studies yd The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a sep-g bf the" designs of two other atomic fjarate nuclear weapons safety inci- > •Jyarheads whose safety is suspect, .•/•dent, last'year ''secretly imposed Recording to ^enior U.S. officials' I special restrictions' on the handling r 'jind weapons scientists, a a ' - \ 'and deployment of a short-range >:gln the most serious incident, theg. , missiIe c ^ r r i e d by .U.S.'strategic .government in 1938 belatedly dis- ./.aircraft in order to.avoid accidental covered a defect in the W-79 short- ''explosions that could disperse can. range artillery shell after'It had .. cer-causirig, -radioactive plutonium .been deployed in Europe. "Urgent from therumissile warhead, these /orders were issued not to move the /^sources said, g ' • Warheads,'and repair teams hurried io the nuclear ammunition depots to ,'• •'•• The Department of Energy, 'in a 'gthird case, last'week agreed to a 'disable the several hundred shells ; i.- t . .. . , . .. .. „ secret congressional request an independent-scientific' inquiryfor 'into .J-J73-+.-. «o they could not b a . a c' a-'-'"^^ d e a t a""the l l y .possibility . : * , ^ ^ ^ ;that ^ ^ , a. ^nuclear . ^ , , , ^war. ^ - . Greek churah le«dor Lutfi U l t a : nzzi :i d .,.-., -..-i.--yyj neaa now oemg deployed aboard t...;;•.'. ; ... , » • fi\ -. KVi? •'-'Trident strategic iwbmartnea Could ' ! • • .fr * be detonated in a possible missile- • ^handling accident in port, according to the sources.'i' -ttV1 /^tf^aW'-^ ftttiFhe problems'Vith'^th'e 'tthrele.1* (-weapons have raised serious ques.-•..tjpns on Capitol Hill arid in the Bush in administration "about U.S.' huclear • weapons safety."Soma experts for&i . bwdisu&iJacl(8on"Diehl"...„,ii, , cast that "additional problems may .' be uncovered by Special scientific • ; GA2A CITY, May '22;fVide.-: /inquiries "at : the 'nuclear weapons clashes.between the army and ?2~ laboratories ordered '• recently ' by J estinia'p _' Jieiaoristrators. .continued Secretary of Energy James D. Wat-.." t here f^r"j\ !{hir^r diy1,today, and" h1dns. ^ ^ ) ; ' % ^ r , ^ m ? f i ^ ^ t - C ^ r ,'faeii>(jiufhorities g^fl -they -were '/- The' Hk&mmffii-W'""/Energy'' -farmed j^y'the^prdad of the wave (DOE) isYeipblislble 'fW the design'"' ( a protest'/rom tha'jgccupied terr'iand producttoH+r#flJl rrifcfearwar-g! Mkf\° ,-f.riibs in IsraS amUorda'n. ,-lheads. T.he'-DepmmentfcfDefense • ^•jir^s'.ljea'yily rclnfoKSW Army units *i(DOD) 'deterlm"oe^warneat3 '^tt^'i- ^ntinjied to bittle'ltone-<i00i059 : f WATKINS iS^,f!q^emehta"ah<ti81ewlof)» the' *'eAp^ r' ,"youth9_' for .control^ the sn^ t l 3 u,. T-K fiXi-A e. *i.' 1HU»I a 1 ••.-.j, lw^l..l.ri ence ''ffiovsanas pfPalestin �c RM ~nw Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information '*v selective vs.repair '-:r? 'W M*->mi O'i'i" ^'.inom'/iafr $m ' r :•*? Tja < .•V • ; WEAPONS IVon Al ?- v«< •* cps on which the warheads are de-, ployed. \}\J^ •-'... Watkins, while declining to dis-. cuss difficulties with specific weap- • ens, said in en interview this week that "we're not all that comfortable" ..' with the government's past approach to ecveru! eafety Issues, and '. that "we pied to focus a lot more" on measures to diminish the'risk of accidentally dispersing plutonium in warheads, g••;*.;'/.; g ! g\) il;, ' Watkins also emphasized that when weapons safety problems are uncovered, "we take the operational steps necessary to minimise those .' risks, take the weapons out of service if necessary and then look for. some mid-term and long-term fixes. We're in that process right now," . i *' He added in response to.ques- , tions that "fortunately, we don't have many [weapons] that fall into Vg J, -, I v-v. —^—fall ii . e\ «* •*/•% ' V> i *' 'WOmrn ARTILLERY [PROBLEM —-L-- .-.i :—-,,: >• •• - eciear artillery shells can be detonated accidentally, ' • causing plutonium to be -rciassad. Diagram chow b *T»i* nuclear warhead of a '••'' ' ' HIGH I • short-rango 8-Inch shell cut ^ '>/<% EXfLCSIVt - away to snow the plutonium ' -•-* ; r ccro surrounded by a layor of % '• high explosive, with humoroucf\ i'J detonators attached to the " • PLUTONIUM outside surface, n Uyi n i ii J- if «>RE. '•al-tiH..^ Itu-iJ: DETONATOR8 y ; y M.U0WNCH )3%« J HOWIUER di Y;tf!M3;W0RMAL FIRING thnt category, but J «in fell you that we're serious about those things . and we do what's necessary to make sure that we don't have any situation . . . where we can't meet our [safety] specifications." In contrast to the wide attention recently given to environmental and scientific problems of nuclear weap-' ons production, safety questions When ell detonators fire f **> •• s With a Its high density, the plutonium about individual weapons have simultaneously, the Inward-traveling core becomes supercritical, reieas'r^ scarcely been scrutinized outside detonating wava uniformly ' <' • V;. huge amounts of energy from the the tight-knit community of weapcompresses the core of plutonium. nuclear chain reaction. ••; •> ons designers and the defense of-. ficiala to whom they answer. -.'' * ••> SINGLE-POINT DETONATION Some high-level Bush adminisy i \a " tration officials say they believe that safety issues traditionally have had a much lower priority than military concerns such as Increasing a nuclear weapon's explosive power, efficiency or reliability. '"••X "'.• But Watkins, who says he "came into office in 1989 with a "very significaot sense of laxity in the safety ; i^llvd practices of DOE," has ordered'" tl what other officials say is the first ^'•'••,;'yjy«>H &>.' l?%d„y?y%,--.ir^n Ir-n comprehensive assessment of the When a single detonator' #?Jnstead of tha plutonium core being U , i»> > probability of an accident involving ;• Is fired by eccldant. or if £%;ftcbmpreas8d uniformly, it is pushed out sway tha high explosive is '• aayVvfrom me center. Without significant any of the more than 20,000 nucleaccidentally Ignited at a 'compression there may be no full-scale ar warheads deployed , with U.S. single point on the -y :\"Vnuclear explosion, but radioactive plutonium forces around the globe, g a ,•-,„' • surface by some other ft "5 Js released, If the explosion occure while the No nuclear weapon ever has been means, the detonating bhell Is In its launch tuba, the tuba will known to oxtuniuc dniiic»>u>ii; w.*a produce a nuclear/yield. However, _ there have been unexpected detonations of the volatile" chemical ex/.plaalve3 Burrounding ''the nuclear j^VftterUla-4nL'«9rariioada.''ilii'cludir!R :. n « l » w v a n d o •M*M*»i'dly1-VJiS<V»»<l»/»» u u t i n n t Ml\ th» nllltftnilim COffi dellberata compression ono fiksiy tfrom the single point, .'jags.simulating ; :. "%f£ ^'l^rtMfP™i' Pfoduclng Q significant nuclear explosion. W \ i>"f/;ooio6o SOUKS. Nttunl RMOunMftafera*Cewcili Ttit Wtshlngwi fat »•••. *S; r>r ~l �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 7! ! f several incidents' ..that, resulted in •fa' stray bu^loj-^jiactfrprn n/nf e'liif it occufrei whjj? t!ve cbnsiderabie*fra*dioactive "contami- f. by "fcattlcflfcld exp(c5io\i.\y>;nrtime'. •C re .Jon ded in 9 ide : ^ ' ^ -]-.:-,g'::nation. '•^•^^^'~S\.y-\ ' v •..A ^hil^fljptearte'fere{ice 'fi, tzer's from whlchjtney are^fjred ?• Officials say that Watkins s safety ^ t h c problem appeared in 'an uncias- '/imusual. circumstance*'Jri \*ly^:.r i*J1 concern about'the Short-Range At- .-•alfied report ^ffeued 'by Catkins ^'teut"a "senior'' military oiidli. '«;.: tack Missile-A, or SRAM-A, carried ., three mo'Aths^go/The report men- '• aTor n While, ?/e were' gJsoVs: by strategic bombers.led to estab- . .tio'ne'd that a warhead developed by that 'these things "might "go'c lishment of a special committee on f Lawrence Liverrhore National tabggthey fell off tho back of a'.r.z/. t". nuclear weapons safety last year moratory Vunder 'DOE supervision, '-'•'•landed in a certain way." '/-'.""-', '•• thai includes senior DOD and DOE /•identified only/aY "WXX," had reofficials. '. •', y.... . -,. •»••••• ,, ;. cently caused "one-point safety con- y.fcThe"officials did not j»y ho* b r £-M 'accidental explosion a W-79 S'T?*?? Although it 'will report' simulta- . cems" that were confirmed by un- ..gjnight have caused. The warhead A \ neously to Watkins and Defense derground nuclear testing. Vg'-'.-gV.'IV'Idesigried' to 'explode in'batr.e -._-.' Secretary Richard B. Cheney, the • U.S. officials subsequently con- Jj'lup .{o^n 10-kiioton /nuclear 'j~t.'dL two departments/in a conflict in- firmed that the "WXX" was the W- -{about 'two-third3 the force' cf 'tha" dicating diverging ,. priorities ,ron •\f »• —*• •**••' *%; •t;v .-v1-:-.-- c ....•.•• .:.• 'TJ1945 Hiroshima bomb/'] 0 ~ i * n weapons issues, fought .'a heated y .."Nobody waa blase about it, but 'A highly-placed foreign cff.cx. battle over who "would fChair .the ;\nobody was panicky either," said a •'<, said that after the confirm!: committee. The dispute eventually . -senior military official of the gov- clear test, a small group in the Wes: was won by DOE. • . .«. --.eminent's reaction. "We did not •• -^German government was t:!d in i "I felt it was necessary that we /foresee ah imminent catastrophe. •general way* that "there WHS S have a somewhat independent com- But when it comes to nuclear safe- 'chance of technical failure leading /J.ly, -we treat everyxning as poten- po an explosion of the 6r.»-s enc from military .requirements,' mili- .^tially.seriou?."-•-^-r j r <+—T -that'"some adjustments" to'their tary demands and focus heavily on i Computer calculations and underdesign were needed to prevent ar.y the safety issue," Watkins said. "I 2. ground testa before the start of pro/accident. •••*"••<•• " >•• • *•» ~>.- • just felt that conflict of interest -duction in "1981' had indicated no v ! Senior West German officials ought to be separated out." . u - , • safety problems. But a new safety /"were not informed explicitly" be* The information about 'recent, \ analysis at Livermore in 1988 nuclear weapons safety problems in "raised concerns that were con- an accidental nuclear bias: might this article is derived from inter- -firmed by secret underground nu- occur, the official said. "But I do sot views with more than two dozen. c l e a r tests in December 1988 and 'rule out that a more detailed brie:"jng was given to specialists" in the U.S. military and civilian officials -February 1989, officials said. and nuclear weapons Scientists. «• The tests Indicated that the W-79 " 'German ministry of defer.se, -he None was willing to be quoted by -'did not meet a secret government 'added. . . .. ..; .•'., , . . .. name, because everything about the • safety standard requiring that with • .' Officials said the information was kept otherwise secret to avoid pan* episodes is highly classified. any warhead design, under any cir- , Icking citizens or calling into ques• cumstances, there be less than a tion the viability of the U.S. nuclear The W-79 . ." : one-in-a-million chance of an acci- force in Europe, which induces dczOfficials say the most dangerous dental nuclear explosion with a '• ens of nuclear-tipped missiles, more and politically sensitive incident yield as powerful as n blast froni than 1,000 nuclear bombs and hunwas the surprise discovery Iri early about four pounds of TNT, enough dreds of older, nuclear-tipped ar1988 that W-79 artillery shells de- to destroy a small room. tillery shells. ' ployed in West Germany, Italy and Several officials said an inadver"It was obviously a politically he: the Netherlands could accidentally tent explosion of the material sur- " potato," a U.S. official said. explode if they were struck force- rounding the nuclear core was par'Another senior military official fully at a sensitive spot, perhaps by ' .ticularly likely to produce a nuclear • i #aid the episcde alarmed the Pea* v ^8^^yf<r^'. \V!&W m?m t « W I * -Oft, m. n-.v. ''*' l OMT..1 yvrr-VsW ILML4) § **/12i J4*r"*l 001061 ^ifhftfhtf^i^ �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information |';:'.Ut(l Wo WA ; &'%*>>• :,'• g -;,^-a : - : . tagob -and induced . tensions with ; DOE.;lJt >ss/the sort of problem 'that'never should have occurred," ..the/official said..."There simply was ;ribgood/excuso for ^Z, /g a'* v,••': .After ordering that all W-79 war heads be imm'obilized#at their stor ii ago ;J5it03,'vthe 'government sent ••. teama'of experts in early ,1989 to install special "safing mechanisms" ••' • tb /block ~6hy detonation of the ol,o!l», . . " . . - 1 . / / K l n l o o,iiu. ' % ' 3$f : WertiMd Dtploymtnt mode ^'U.'.'rfc^lf^v,^ ; isacal bocntwr wsapon • " ' ' •«T;»*<\*y*:ii']jp') . Strategic bomber weapon ' : r • 'ii .<> I 10 to **S W|Mons •'vg'-Pfi^ingiimigaiia ,. ., *"•«•* wtjrtfj ijwto 1,200wiotoni . ggMXmlulia ... ;,. < . . , . . , . '0.3te80kllotons' •.. wuiarMissJie. • * -— «~ «*I-I.W..«J oroisdWotonj' •; . QmK-liunchtti < ^ M ^ % Q { f t # § £ ^ > ' f } ( ] • '; Some of the warheads have been returned to' the -Pantex warhead 5 production plant in Amarillo, Tex., so the "safing mechanisms" can be 8-Inch artillery shell :j disabled and additional steel plating > .s f' ' 155mm artillery shell , ,ii 1 to 12Wtotons v installed inside the skin of the shells • 8-inch artillery shell ,•••' a k •' 'f«ss then lkllaton at particularly sensitive spots.' •', . Minuteman II missile j . 0-3 to JO Wfolonj ! Of the W-79 problem, Watkins •• 1.200 Wlotora i r Minuteman HJ mlsaile ,' ' , said ,onIy,' "Without any question,; rr W, y , 1 7 0 Motor* . Poseidon submarine missile . safety has been preserved." Penta•Short-Ranga Attack Mlssllo • <.\ , > Uili-SOkilotona j ' V t \ gori spokesman Pete Williams said .1.100 kllotons ' \ lane* missile •;;>'•?•• <*' \ -.. ' ' last night that "the point is: the "HYI; i t o 100ki'lotons ' Trident C-4 missile weapon is safe." He added that gg^inirtemin'iiimiMJie i„.ri»«ie , •• '-•• -Motons . "changes were made to the W-79, a'-.'/'Tridertt submarine missile . a ' 3S5k/lotoftj i') . but i can't discuss the details of : 5 kiktons i W "nd tafcttcal bombar weaoon ^ that." v ' - ^ g > i , g : . ' •-:; 'Strategic and tactical bomber Z "'- ; V t 'f° to : ' 4 N w , « ^ ;'.The shells are in special U.S. y, Strategic bomber weapon ^ •• • • -i-vL '•« than 1.CO0 KT 9 , 0 0 kilolon storage bunkers overseas and at the '•jTectical ° « . .auuvai aircraft jiircrsrt weapon weapon • > - ; - , '"', , : . i c . _ ^ . . . ,• . j . J^ r. | ; 1 to20kllotons Seneca Army Weapons depot In •;. y .JStrateglc bomber weapon ' 10 to 500 kltotorn New York .state, including some 'Initial medals ."'' ' '•'. .••^'0/ '^V-1-';; H ; v «. , • that are still Inoperative. Asked, IVs SOURCES; Natural R«ource» Defense Council, others why, a senior official said, "it ha3 to gdo with politics within the [West-', em] alliance." • • • • ' ' • • •; r. ••I • - : But the Nuclear Weapons Coun- ; quest that the issue be adjudicated by a special panel of three indepencil, three senior DOE and DOD of- . dent scientists cleared to review ficials who decide nuclear warhead . the nation's most sensitive nuclear m ._ w-uiu«u in,tnn _ production matters, was sufficiently weapons information. -were not obtained from < "concerned about the W-79 to decide "early this year that its design would watkins said, "I have viewed, ail ,sional,sources. ..'.W*j(" of the analysis, time and'time again" 'y^ld'^lL. .^1} . . fnot be replicated in a • slightly smaller artillery shell, the W-82. g on the W-88, as have the directors , W-69 SRAM-A yVarneafl t' "If one of these shells had a probof the three U.S. nuclear weapons ^/.->WatJ{ins?6aid that in earlv !Q/w lem, then bv ripfWji/>« *•— •*«-•laboratones, and Tm satisfied . . , ..%..• -.yw a^uu' ajaea io aix the di.•one wouid certainly have it, too, in thaf«« -»- —«i..i- iw' uu me anai-, ••' rtfct0 > s 0f t h e nation's three nuclear terms of the basic physics," one of- ysis we have to do on that weapon w e i a b o r a t o r i e s whether they ficial said. "They basically have tha without undue concern. He said it wer^ «satisfied- ^ the dgency - fl same 'primary1," or nuclear core, he now meets all nuclear explosiv«; and , ^ m ^ ^ e M. ( ^ ^ gexplalned. ,<« • '.,'»')';«< ff/;f f weapons system safety standards, j a w*s he w 8 n d 0 f l e j3 b "'••'The decision forced at least ! a ^ A t « u t h 5 r T e "? e ' ^ n s f8^ i director used the opportunity to g two-year suspension of ]rY-82 pro- X z t L ^ S ? M S ^ ' "ise strong cbncernsP5bout I V duction,'which had been'scheduled ' SJ^rS^'^TSn^-fSiS ' ftaitar.wwSm that "needed to have to begin last February.' Several ations m the early 1980s, I would , r • attention " ' " 'sources said the delay was partly at not have" made, the decision.to use ; ! f ? ^ S S S M % what the the urging of Congress, which voted k secretly last year to block W-82 fi'f'SlMi aSSrfjJSS'J W K K but oOcA another don t think that kind of decision will i a _ _ i l „ iJ.-,,-fl-j,»«. ••,. op AW a ' spending until the Bush administra- „„^.. k A - , . ^ « «» n ;^ « » J «^_*-i_i.. ? agency laentujea it as tne OKAM-A, ever be made agafn, and certainly . . . , Q »«„ ,„'„», M ™««r^« ^«««i n » * tion certified that it was safe. „,™>» K« „ . J . ,„S;u V'«, h*~*. »~A i a 1970s-vintage weapon carrying a won t be made while I m here, and I , „„_i,A„J ,1,-^ ?,eaB .kr^<,n,£. oii.Jiia '.;> President Bush announced on I,LJ'./JU..,I».I - warhead that uses tne Mine voJatiie May 3 that he wanted to halt the ; k«w«..A «„•.!. »u^ W D D J SSe^S £ S ci » * head. Roughly 14 feet in length, the rt fl : .W-82/deployment program hi "response to the declining military Volatile <«- . j S l r ^ r ^ R «r PR.H 1 Plosive materials in the W-88 W a r - ' l ^ ^ ^ ? 2 ^ ^ . £ J * * H >ead that scientists ;«ay>'uJd ex- t ^ W ^ e d ^ the^internal vn pS"^!feIfSS2' .-:•;• in y$^yy>y^m d:'d;iyd- :y- d-S '•'"'yyy^yyyy^ 001062 dd?- •dy-dyyy:' ::••;• -yd?- r-"- �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act >ocument divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Lfuiuiiieiu uivuigue cn vciiu uc ia uui sur i u i i » u i ifi/b .,...uv... pusn_.announced on May 3 that he y-Mnfo^ go fi*'< U.c ,\v-oz jippioyment. program ih're'tt issue Is fhf S "V •'•'•'• •ii,>'f/»cad,Koufchlv i i / - W w : tfvBf/' /ponse to the 'declining military r ^ t h . ' ^ In iEa.sf.ern."Europe,, A .senior I ".U.S. military official said the design I ' :defects,"tyf/lch £ush 'did,not men- forces that S S f^'6, C u e i n g npornb bay % ? , ? * ? " t h e Merea.' tion, played no rolo In the decision. ' '.eaeri bomb and boain » TI,„ * '. 0fle official said In reacts' ru?£*$n**-ini'Th6y.*99l<l . I O P , , , ^ W' W-83 Trident Warhead --.• • 5 >' Discovery" 'of & safety defect In .{he W-79 artillery shell prompted a j more • extensive review , by < the ; ..weapons laboratories of other, war- ' heads, which soon cast a shadow | v'r.j'.i,,T..1 wurq ;sfi-«use to causino nn .V . u c«»« .over the thermonuclear weapon ' 'ads rSn-'- "'^ " ' ' ^ t h e ' S j S ^ W ^ W c a l short now bofng deployed atop D-5 mison ...siles in Trident submarines, the a Platform ffit, a ? r e f ^ ! W°de. * & S 1 ^ W to « • g.. Some U.S. weapons scientists «.have alleged, based on computer 1 modeling of accident scenarios, that ' i the W-88 could be detonated accidentally if the propellant fuei in D-5 missiles catches fire as a result of ; er s at Los Ala™™ £ ^*88 de9 'S n " y feport to RHL r J d ^ a routir.a mishandling during loading opera- ; tions at the Trident bases In ^teriaj woJJ y a lees volatile ons e t o S °R th * J T 1 ^ wean! Bangor, Wash., and Kings Bay, Ga. A powerful nuclear blast or widei spread dispersal of cancer-causing «»a bwarae '£,' :S17 | J 0 » e < i H» !' held «7' £ "" l r e HHmw, !o £ ' plutonium dust would result, these * . J 2 » «?2£?£SL*! ^ *•'S S S C £ ' v i ,fi ' fTrriei»*;,l„ , ! ! " « • w* . <:.-.. scientists. say. They add that, In years past, the latter possibility has Wa,kj .been taken so seriously that Liver* » R SL2:^:5 ™ « h a « H..- .,y' more experts prepared maps of potential plutoniumftiiAw*•"•«>» oyuAo..c, nasn., near the Trident base :' at Bangor. , • «"e " i t a y f t j : , 1 * vol. ' ' - e x p i a S X ' " at Issue, ^ . • The allegations are the subject of a bitter scientific dispute at the highest levels of the Pentagon and ' DOE, according to some of the officials involved. The stakes are enormous, because the Trident mis- K ed e was j S sile system is expected to be at the ^P. John M. SpraS I m l > • well aired!'? w , ^ heart of America's strategic deterrent force for the next three decades. Although senior DOE and DOD officials say the risks are small, Watkins last week agreed to a secret, bipartisan congressional re- y^;£^y ydi&^m^ C M k • ^••"wvrc.i..,» '•'vg:^''v- : v : ' : '^ /I- • .*• \ I '•'«'..' . • ' • • .• £ ^ •0| 9A?t{ JOU pip itOlfJ SJUBOflddS 8U|fJ3J .yetp &ro;oq Supirnb—8Jwjtm|OA «,;g,uttifl wnj m* A»U.OBOJOJ) (fnnpfij^ ,g',-PI0 8l|fleq—wo*}tm|OAw^tfj ut ouo .^'juspisojy jofAogJ letrj trBstn ^twwp JfE '• }noo,e irjfAv *&}U8unrS!88B (jood opnu [.film WQ„ 'Mim#Q iwionre r>m» ••— Jpuos jo sefjdins Daw'siHv^ «. *j � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18591 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/bb80c5f20c2dd906b62d0b42dd6f70c0.pdf 20f2933cd4823577a9dbb5d2b38e6d15 PDF Text Text Document disclc Document divulgue en vertu de Ta Loi sur lacces a I information INQUIRY OF M I N I S T R W ^ 0 1 * 1 " ' CIRC M/F DEMANDE DE RENSEIGNEMENTS AU GOUVERNEMENT PREPARE IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH MARKED "TEXT'1 AND "TRANSLATION" PREPARER EN ANGLAIS ET FRANQAIS INSCRIVANT -TEXTE- ET .TRADUCTION. QUESTION NO 37-M BY - DE Mr. V o l p e SUBJECT — SUJET DATE April 12, 1989 REPLY 6Y THE SECRETARY OF STATE POR'EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPONSE PAR LE SECRETAIRE D'ETAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES Has government sought assurances that a mobile MX nuclear missile system not be based near the Canada-United States border? SIGNATURE MINISTER OR PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY MINISTRE OU SECRETAIRE PARLEMENTAlRE QUESTION 2 No. 37—Mr. Volpe—April 12,1939 Has the government sought public assurances from the government of the United States that a mobile MX nuclear missile system will not be based in an area near the Canada-United States border where it could utilize its proximity with Canada to avoid nuclear attack by moving near to the border, or even across it and, if not, is it the intention of the government to take such action before the United States government decides whether to go ahead with this MX mobile missile system? REPLY — REPONSE RfT-rnN T Fii-L F.a s*?-.t_L. ii TEXT TEXTE • TRANSLATION j TRADUCTION ! The new US Secretary of Defence, Dick Cheney, has proposed that the MX missiles currently based in silos in Wyoming could be placed on special train cars so that they can be shunted along the United States commercial rail network. This proposal is not new and is just one of several still being examined by the US military. There are no current requests to have the trains enter Canada. The USA is aware that our policies prevent them entering or transitting Canada with nuclear weapons without the prior approval of the Government. The USA has a large number of railway lines to meet any of their requirements and although Canadian security relies in part on USA deterrent, they have no need to use Canadian territory. Although five of the ten bases where these trains could be garrisoned are near the Canadian border, it is well known that in times of rising conflict the trains would be constantly on the move to make detection more difficult. To ensure these weapons act as a deterrent it is clear that they would not be bunched on the Canada/USA border or any other central point that could make their detection easier. 001064 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information INQUIRY OF MINISTRY DEMANDE DE RENSEIGNEMENTS AU GOUVERNEMENT PREPARE IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH MARKED "TEXT11 AND "TRANSLATION" PREPARER EN ANGLAIS ET FRANCAIS INSCRIVANT .TEXTE* ET .TRADUCTION- GUESTION NO DATE BY — DE 3 7-M M. Volpe SUBJECT - SUJET 12 a v r i l . J . 9 8 9 REPLY sv YHE SECRETARY OF STATE fOR"EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPONSE PAR LE SECRETAIRE D'ETAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES Groupe mobile de missiles nucleaire MX non loin de la frontiere Canadaamericaine SIGNATURE MINISTER OR PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY MINISTRE 0 0 SECRETAIRE PARLEMENTAIRE QUESTION 2 N" 37—M. Volpe—12 avril 1989 Le gouvernement a-t-il cherche a obtenir publiquement du gouvernement des Etats-Unis I'assurance qu'il n'instaltera pas un groupe mobile de missiles nucleaire MX non loin de la frontiere Canado-americaine, en un lieu ou il pourrait profiter de cette proximite pour esquiver une attaque nucleaire en le rapprochant de la frontiere, voire en la lui faisant franchir, et, sinon, le gouvernement a-t-il l'intention de faire une telle demarche avant que le gouvernement des Etats-Unis decide s'il donnera suite a un tel projet? REPLY — REPONSE TEXT TEXTE • TRANSLATE TRADUCTlCt Le nouveau secretaire americain a la Defense, M. Dick Cheney, a propose que les missiles actuellement stockes dans des silos au Wyoming soient places sur des wagons de chemin de fer speciaux de facon a pouvoir circuler sur le reseau ferroviaire commercial des Etats-Unis. Cette proposition, qui n'est pas nouvelle, n'est que l'une des possibilites dont l1etude par les autorites militaires americaines se poursuit. Aucune demande n'a ete presentee en vue de faire penetrer ces trains au Canada. Les Etats-Unis savent que notre politique s'oppose a 1'entree ou au transit d'armes nucleaires sur le territoire canadien sans autorisation prealable du gouvernement. Les Americains disposent eux-memes d'un reseau ferroviaire assez etendu pour repondre a toutes leurs exigences et, quoique la securite du Canada repose en partie sur la force de dissuasion desfitats-Unis,ceux-ci n*ont nul besoin de faire usage du territoire canadien. Bien que cinq des dix bases ou les trains en question pourraient etre stationnes soient proches de la frontiere canadienne, chacun sait qu'en periode de tension ces trains seraient constamment en mouvement, de maniere a en rendre la detection plus difficile. Si l'on veut que ces armes jouent un role de dissuasion, il est clair qu'elles ne doivent pas etre massees a la frontiere canado-americaine, ni en tout aut00l065 point ou leur regroupement faciliterait leur detection. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18590 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5c9c81b9e631432d89bcc37d574ae5dd.pdf 886c26bed67c6f2903f9bf38f2a3d199 PDF Text Text Document disfttaa^dtunderdhrc/taciess to Information Act • a I'information Document divu MWmilWmo'rWmcks External Affairs Affaires exterieures D# Canada Canada Accession/Reference MESSAGE File/Dossier ite^ Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow Alignez le premier caractere de la Securite sous cette fleche SECURITY SECURITY <C^0 N F I . D E~"rf~T I FM/DE FM EXTOTT ESN0446 A _42^5Vpo^ # j C4 t) 10 06MAR89 TO/A INFO TO TOKYO DISTR INFO DOTOTT/ACD REF DISTR PNR PND BONN JLE AECBOTT/SINDEN EMROTT/OERD/IERD ESD SUBJ/SUJ REF YOURTEL UIST0179 NAVAL NUCLEAR 01MAR PROPULSION TKS FOR YOUR R E P O R T . F I R S T , IS (MUTSU) REFTEL.WE HAVE A FEW IT IS A CIVILIAN ART 14 OF MUTSU VESSAL FURTHER A MILITARY OTHERWISE ITS S A F E G U A R D S QUESTIONS WHICH OR CIVILIAN JPN WOULD AGREEMENT. WITH HAVE ARI E FROM VESSAL? WE HAD IAEACAFTER PRESUME TO I NVOKE 1977) 0 REMOVE I*UATS<A NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFEGUARDS IAEA INAFUEL TO MUTSU IN THIS FUEL WHILE SPECIAL FOURTH,WHY WILL L E G I S L A T I ON JPN IN 1 9 9 0 ? ( T H I S APPLY AT SEA7WAS TECHNIQUE WORKE D OUT WITH HOWEVER,WE TO GATHER PREFER FOR NUCLEAR S FETY REGS REQUIRED IN THIS R^ GARD? MUTSU WELL BE USEFUL AS WE HAVE PURSUANT OR AFTER SEA UNECONOMI C SOURCE OF INFO ON BILATERA L W A T O NEGOTIATE TO ART 14 OF CDA/IAEA DRAFTER/REOACTEUR DIVISION/DIRECTION IE BURTON bm ESN SIG IS RESP SEEMS LIKE RATHER MIGHT CASAP DOES IAEA DECOMMISSIO N 2.IAEA/JENNEKENS PARTICULARLY SAFEGUARDS.SECOND,HOW R E G A R D ? T H I R D / W H A T ORG MUTSU7WAS FUEL FROM TRIALS INFO ON S UBJ . A R R A N G E M E NT AT Th IS TIME WITH IAEA RE AGREEMENT TELEPHONE 995 NEW MOVE.) BASIS SAFEGUARDS ITH RE APPRQVED/APPROUVE ISkbyh 001066 - EXT 5 1 8 - 1 ( 8 3 / 1 1 ) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18589 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/24447172e6236a0841637381524eb7e8.pdf 07cacfdca5d9322fe497c31aa1d60764 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information O SECURITY SECURITE FM/DE TO/A INFO s-Aloi ucit ^ n o tic? ns»ai)ij,~5 \ ~ ^ H J I Hr- L.*J «^-> Canada Canada ^cession/Reference MESSAGE File/Dossier Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow Alignez le premier caractere de la Securite sous cette fleche / . j ~™ -1 * "' ' •—•••-- '• IL tTjTO-'N " F I D "zn—\"\~\~ *W-ff k W]{ E N T I "A L 10 FM EXTOTT ESN0223 01FEB89 TO TOKYO DISTR INFO BONN AECBOTT/SINDEN REF DISTR JjL/Cw ESD JLE PNR 4 SUBJ/SUJ REF YOURTEL UIST0083 NAVAL NUCLEAR 3UAN PROPULSION REPORT ON JPNESE EXPERIENCE WITH QUOTE MUTSU UNQUOTE APPRJECIATED. WE ARE REPEATING BELOW TEXT OF OURTEL ESN1089 10JUN88.ANY[ COMMENTS ON JPNESE CONSIDERATION OF SAFEGUARDS ASPECTS OF FUEL FORI MUTSU MUCH APPRECIATED. 2.ESN1089 10JUN88:QU0TE WE ARE AWARE FROM LITERATURE AND PUBLIC REPORTS OF SEVERAL PREVIOUS EFFORTS BY NON-NUCLEAR WEAP0!\ STATES PARTY TO TREATY ON NON-PROLIF OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BUILD! AND OPERATE NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION S YS TEMS . COUNTRIES MENTICJNED ARE FRG AND JAPAN.WE WLD APPRECIATE OBTAINING EFFORTS IN PARTICULAR WHETHER FURTHER INFO ON* THESE CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN BY GOVTS CONCERNED TO SAFEGUARDS IMPLICATIONS OF ACQUISITION OF NA;VEL NUCLEAR PROPULSION POWER PLANTS AND,IF SO,WERE DISCUSSIONS HELD WITH IAEA ON THESE MATTERS.WE ALSO WLD APPRECIATE KNOWING1 INTENDED AND ACTUAL SOURCE OF TECH AND FUEL FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS OF THESE VESSELS.WE BELIEVE BOTH CASES INVOLVED SURFACE VESSELS BUT ONLY VESSEL NAME WE HAVE IS FRGS QUOTE OTT HAHN UNQUOTE. U| E . . .2 DRAFTER/REOACTEUR BE BURTON •^IG EXT 5 1 8 - 1 ( 8 3 / 1 1 ) DIVISION/DIRECTION TELEPHONE ESN 995 7546 APPR0VED/APPR0UVE A CTfSPRES SIG 7g2 ****c 001067 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information .ii,3 SAibritJ'e." . 0 Align first character of word " P A G E " under this arrow Alignez le premier caractere du mot "PAGE'gsous cette fleche 121 PAGE TWO ESN0223 UNDERSTAND PLANT JAPANESE DURING UNQUOTE. C 0 N F VESSEL SEA TRIALS SUFFERRED AND PROBLEMS 10 I PROBLEMS WITH NUCLEAR POWER I HAVE NEVER BEEN C O R R E C T E D . ' l_ EXT 5 1 8 - 2 001068 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18588 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/63e8722fdb207d1663ac419d3c4fa774.pdf 151f5a13cbb993c6c8f961e1a06aaada PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documenidivulgue en vertii de lalb/sur I'gtces a /Information -*j» f l ^ U *r "JiTraWT'^V . a r r w >*a» . 5 S S J ™ T -*"Etr™sk?~ « r "•' ••• •** * w r . >B«Ki»r.i::«S3i.--i- -.vfis^n-s.- "V- Gouvernement du Canada \3ernment" of Canada. TRANSMITTAL NOTE AND RECEIPT NOTE D'ENVOI ET RE£U ^"v,'»w ^j^K^r"?"**©**? FHeNo. — N°du ORIGINATOR AND ADDRESS—INITIATEUR ET ADRESSE EXTOTT/IDA C.SAPARDANIS/WSHDC n^ - $1yU Security Classification — Classification de security A Y j — ] Confidential I I Confidential QUANTITY QUANTITE • Secret • Top Secret Tres Secret U N C L A S S I F I E l T ^ ^ ~ ~ l \~\"^*"Enclosurelsl I '——I Aver, annexe(s) T-rcnr- REFERENCE/COPY NO. — N 0 DE REFERENCE DESCRIPTION LOC . ,[~~\ Without" Enclosure I—I Sans annexe y\-Mdl by- Attached p l e a s e f i n d " d i p l o m a t i c n o t e , r e c e i v e d fromD e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , r e g a r d i n g j t h e T r e a t y "on, t i r e - " * v N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n o f N u c l e a r We'apons - J u l y 1 , 1 9 6 8 . (dated 20DEC88) Received By — Repj par Originator's Signature — Signature de I'initlateur .* • .*. Signature Date • »#*?•>••»**; Signature Date GC44A 7540-21-87^1328 A D D R E S S E E —RETAIN THIS COPY AND RETURN COPY NO. 2 TO ORIGINATOR D E S T I N A T A I R E —CONSERVER CETTE COPIE ET RENVOYER LA COPIE N° 2 A L'lNiTIATEUR 001071 ^ > �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information > The Secretary of State presents his compliments to Their Excellencies, Messieurs and Mesdames the Chiefs of Mission of the Governments concerned with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weaoons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968. In accordance with the provisions of Article IX, paragraph 5, of the Treaty, the Secretary of State has the honor to inform the Chiefs of Mission that an instrument of accession to the Treaty was deposited with the Government of the United States of America by Bahrain on November 3, 1988. The final provisions of the instrument of accession read, in part, as follows: "NOW, THEREFORE, the Government of the State of Bahrain hereby accedes to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington on July 1, 1968, and undertakes faithfully to fulfill and carry out the stipulations therein contained, with the following reservation: The accession by the State of Bahrain to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons, 1968, shall in no way constitute recognition of Israel or be a cause for the establishment of any relations of anykind therewith. " The Secretary of State would be grateful if the Chiefs of Mission would forward this information to their respective Governments. Department of State, Washinaton, December 20, 1988. y hKpm 001072 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18587 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/195176aabe9915367be2c9bd84dd77cc.pdf e5f9e548b4e805649fc7391ea1a25447 PDF Text Text External Affairs Canada Document disdasedjuundercbJkRc^ccess to Information Act Document divu nformation mmwmM<mB>aZr*vi&** * /• Accession/Reference Affaires exterieures Canada O MESSAGE File/Dossier Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow Alignez le premier caractere de la Securite sous cette fleche. SECURITY SECURITE !"C FM/DE 0 N F I "D E N T I FM EXTOTT ESN0191 i <* s - ^ - \ A e A TO REFTEL RE EXPEJ RIENCE OF A L Hny 10 27JAN89 TO/A INFO TO\J UBONN UMII TOKYO I V M U DISTR :NFO *AECBOTT/SINDEN II REF DIST ESD REF OURTEL dLt®^ JLE SUBJ/SUJ NAVAL E S N 1 0 89 NUCLEAR 10JUNE88 PROPULSION WE HAVE NO/NO RECORD FRG AND JPN PURSUE THIS MATTER WITH OF RECEIVING REPLY NUCLEAR-PROPELLED AT THIS TIME AND DRAFTER/REDACTEUR DIVISION/DIRECTION BE BURTON bm ESN VES S/LS. GRTF L IF YOU C|OULD PROVIDE REPORT.TKS. TELEPHONE 995 PRCWED/APPROUVE 7546 SIG .001073 EXT 518-1 (83/11) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18586 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/21964c316858b2487f5507489982ed65.pdf bd7d6c1c4d7c0164705badead98f25ad PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act • Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ACC o feSH233. u«re FILE C O N F I D E N T I A L FM WSHDC UNGR1589 23N0V88 TO EXTCTTUDR/ISX *-c C LOC DOSSIER G - . ? - l ~ U S f i l j A3- WUcc • r Qn-\\-\ } INFO BNATO LDN PARIS BONN TT NDEQ0TT/ADMP0L/DM/CDS/DGCP0L/DIPOL/DNAPOL/DSTRATA/ADMMAT/LRAD/ LEM/ DE CAF BH EMR0TT/MORRIS0N AECBOTT/DIAMANTSTEIN/SINDEN DE OTT DISTR USS IFB IDD IDA IDAO IDAN IDAV IDRA IDRL IDX RGB UGE URD CPD URR ESN ESD EFB REF OURTEL UNEG6342 08NOV OURFAX ENERGY 423 07NOV USA DEFENCE PRODUCTION REACTORS:DETERRENT AND DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS SUMMARTtCONCERNS OVER POOR SAFETY" PRACTICES HAS LED TO CLOSING OF FOUR LARGEST USA DEFENCE NUCLEAR PLANTS AMID HIGH LEVEL OF MEDIA ATTENTION.SAVANNAH RIVER FACILITY IS ONLY DOMESTIC USA SOURCE OF TRITIUM,VITAL COMPONENT IN PROCESS OF DETONATION NUCLEAR WEAPONS.WHICH DISINTEGRATES AT A RATE OF 5.5 PERCENT ANNUALLY. USA WILL TAiE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO ENSURE CREDIBILITY CF NUCLEAR DETERRENT,AND CONTINGENCY PLANS ARE BEING FORMULATED BY DOE WHICH INCLUDE RESTART OF SAVANNAH RIVER FACILITY,A MOVE WHICH MAY BE STALLED INDEFINITELY BY ENVIRONMENTALISTS.NO DIVERSION OF TRITIUM FROM COMMERCIAL TO DEFENCE NUCLEAR REACTORS IS ANTICIPATED.OTHER THAN ENRIGHMENT OF URANIUM FOR NAVAL PROPULSION REACTORS,THERE IS NO CONNECTION BETWEEN PLUTONIUM AND TRITIUM PRODUCED AT DOE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FACILITIES AND • • • <c 001074 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information PAGE TWO UNGR1589 CONFD U . S . N A V A L REACTOR PROGRAM. REPORTS 2.ESN/JAC0BY AND EMB ON 03NOV MET WITH RICHARD DUVAL,PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASST SECTY FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS,DEPT OF ENERGY(D0E)T 0 IMPLICATIONS FOR CDA OF RECENT REVELATIONS CONCERNING PAST FM USA DEFENCE NUCLEAR F A C I L I T I E S ( R E F T E L DESCRIBES MTG)AND OTHER DEFENCE-RELATED THIS DISCUSS EMISSIONS PORTION OF QUESTIONS. 3 . T H E FOUR LARGEST USA DEFENCE NUCLEAR PLANTS ARE SHUT DOWN AT THIS TIME.THEY ARE THE FEED MATERIALS PRODUCTION FM CDN BORDER),* HANFORD PROCESSING BORDER)JNATL ENGINEERING FACILITY CENTRE ,FERNALD OE(360EM FACILI TY,RICHLAND, WA (300KM FM CDN LAB,IDAHO F A L L S , I D ; A N D THE SAVANNAH RIVER AT A l K E N , S C WHICH PRODUCES PLUTONIUM AND I S TEE ONLY USA SOURCE OF TRITIUM. 4.TRITIUM IS A RADIOACTIVE ENHANCE THE EXPLOSION FORM OF HYDROGEN WHICH I S USED TO OF NUCLEAR DEVICES WHICH THEN TRIGGER EVEN LARGE* NUCLEAR DETONATIONS IN HYDROGEN BOMBS.ALMOST EVERY WARHEAD IN USA NUCLEAR ARSENAL CONTAINS TRITIUM,WHICH WIIH A H A L F - L I F E OF 1 2 . 5 USA DEPT YEARS DISINTEGRATES 5.5 PERCENT PER YEAR. OF DEFENSE HAS NINE-MONTE SUPPLY OF TRITIUM AND DUVAL INDICATED THAT DOE WAS FORMULATING EXISTING-DOMESTIC CONTIGENCY SOURCES OF TRITIUM PLANS SHLD PROVE TO BE UNSATISFACTORY. 5 . U S A PLANS TO RESTART TEE THREE REACTORS AT THE SAVANNAH ...3 001075 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information o PAGE THREE UNGR1589 CONFD RIVER FACILITY WITH FIRST FULL POWER RESTART SCHEDULED FOR EARLY 1989,OPTIONS ICLUDE STARTING UP QUOTE N REACTOR UNQUOTE AT HANFORD FACILITY WEICH IS IN QUOTE COLD STANDBY UNQUOTE.ALTHO THERE ARE NO/NO PLANS TO RESTART N REACTOR AT THIS TIME,STUDIES BY DOE WHICH EXAMINE TECHNICAL HURDLES INVOLVED IN ADDING TRITIUM PRODUCTION TO HANFORD ARE UNDERWAY .DUVAL STRESSED THAT RESTART OF N REACTOR IN ORDER TO COVER POSSIBLE FUTURE SHORTFALL OF TRITIUM WAS CONTINGENCY WHICH WAS QUOTE FAR DOWN THE LIST UNQUOTE.HOWEVER.ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ENVIROMENT,SAFETY AND HEALTH RICHARD W STAROSTECKI SAID HE COULD NOT ESTIMATE WHEN SAVANNAH RIVER COULD RESTART .THOUGH DOE DATE FOR INITIAL RESTART OF SAVANNA RIVER REMAINED DEC/88. 5.DUVAL ALSO REFERRED TOQUOTE NEW PRODUCTION REACTORS UNQUOTE WHICH ARE CURRENTLY BEING BUILT TC REPLACE SAVANNAH RIVER FACILITY BUT WILL NOT/NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR 10-12 YEARS.DUVAL FULLY EXPECTED SAVANNAH RIVER REACTOR TO BE OPERABLE DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME.HE ACKNOWLEDGED CONGRESSIONAL AND LOCAL OPPOSITION TO RESTART OF HANFORD REACTOR.GOV EVANS AND CONGRESSMAN SID MORRISON OF WASHINGTON ARE SUPPORTIVE,HOWEVER. 6.DUVAL STATED USA GOVT WLD TAKE APPORPRIATE STEPS TO MAINTAIN CREDIBILITY OF ITS NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCES.MAIN EMPHASIS WAS ON RESTARTING SAVANNAH RIVER PLANT.HOWEVER,AS OUTLINED IN WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTICLE(REFOURFAX ENERGY423 07NOV)EARLY RESTART OF SAVANNAH RIVER MAY BE THREATENED BY APPLICATION OF NATIONAL ...4 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information PAGE FOUR UNGR1589 CONFD ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT(NEPA)WHICH REQUIRES ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STUDIES FOR QUOTE ANY MAJOR FEDERAL ACTION UNQUOTE.THESE STUDIES MAY TAKE YEARS TO FORMULATE AND CAN BE CHALLENGED IN COURTS FOR YEARS AFTERWARDS BY GROUPS SUCH AS NATIONAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL(NRDC) . 7 . I N RESPONSE TO ESN QUESTION,DUVAL STATED USA WLD NOT/NOT DIVERT TRITIUM FM COMMERCIAL REACTORS TO ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM.SHLD ALL CONTINGENCY PLANS FAIL AND USA WAS FORCED TO SEEK TRITIUM FM INNATL TRITIUM SUPPLIERS.REQUEST WLD BE MADE ON GOVT-TO-GOVT B A S I S . 8.WE QUESTIONED DUVAL AS TO WHETHER DEFENCE NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER EXAMINATION ARE RELATED IN ANY WAY WITH USA NAVAL REACTOR PROPULSION PROGRAM.WE SUGGESTED CDN ENVIRONMENTALISTS MIGHT FABRICATE SUCH A LINK TO DISCREDIT CASAP WHICH REQUIRES CHOICE BETWEEN FRENCH BOAT AND UK BOAT BASED ON U.S.NAVAL NUCLEAR PROFUSION TECHNOLOGY.DUVAL RESPONDED TEAT DOE NUCLEAR PLANTS PROVIDED PLUTONIUM AND TRITIUM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ONLY.NUCLEAR PLANTS DID SUPPLY ENRIGEMENT OF URANIUM FOR NAVAL PROPULSION REACTORS BUT USA NAVAL REACTOR PROGRAM EAD NO/NO FURTHER CONNECTION TO DOE. CCC/085 2 3 2 3 2 6 2 UNGR1589 001077 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18585 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a28ab82201b465b70a87dfe06e277280.pdf eba0639b8c8cc461395566975e508c5a PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 6 6 ipd) o ACTION SUITE A DONNER C O N F I D E N T I A L w FM CNBRA YAGR1351 02AUG39. TO EXTOTT /ESN, % INFNBO MBIOOMVXAUCKYO ROME TT MTmorvPT/rRW T}f| fj^T [ACC " F "*TI DISTR NSX ESD JLE NDHQ/CSA/SIMARD NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION C<JSSI£* 2.~±-\-% AUSTL LZ>^AJ.--\- RAN NEVER REALLY GAVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO NUCLEAR OPTION FOR ITS CURRENT PURCHASE OF SUBMARINES WHEN DECISION FOR SUBMARINES WAS BEING TAKEN IN 1978-83 PERIOD.MAIN REASON FOR NOT/NOT LOOKING AT NUCLEAR ARE:(A)OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS.AND (B)AUSTLN INDUSTRY INFRASTRUCTURE. (A)AUSTLA HAS NO/NO QUOTE UNDER ICE UNQUOTE REQUIREMENT WHICH DEMANDS EXTENDED SUBMERGED PERIODS AS IS THE CASE IN CDA.AS WELL, AUSTLN REQUIREMENT IS MAINLY FOR SUBMARINE IN LOW SPEED SURVEILLANCE ROLE WHICH IS ADEQUATELY {OR PREFERABLDCARRIED OUT BY CONVENTIONAL POWERED SUB.FURTHERMORE,THERE WAS IN LATE 70S (AND STILL IN SOME QUARTERS)CONCERN OVER SOUND SIGNATURES OF NUCLEAR SUBS, (B)AUSTLA HAS VIRTUALLY NO/NO NUCLEAR INDUSTRY.IT WOULD THEREFORE HAVE BEEN A COSTLY EXERCISE TO DEVELOP THE INFRASTRUCTURE TO EITHER GET SIGNIFICANT AUSTLN INDUSTRY INVOLVED IN BUILDING OR SUPPORTING NUCLEAR SUBMARINES. CCC/113 020324Z YAGR1351 001078 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18584 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/25b3ef50bd1944aa51bcc31b5d9ba6d8.pdf ad008fd18f8d2f01062eded577677a8e PDF Text Text n*A* M T External Affairs Canada cP TO/A Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue^n_ve.rj;u.de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Affaires exterieures Canada \i/Si RETURN TO g | (J 0 File ( t h r u Ambassador) FROM/DE |RENVOYER AU I ACC P0UR PORTE -~ ETRE ' frscWMrJSJiy'it* , :— Gonf i j d e n t i a l A c c c e s i on /Jcrf ttrvnc e R i c h a r d Beltyiveau FILE REFERENCE • RiFERENCE SUBJECT SUJET • £^yy^ K Brazilian Nuclear Submarine Program /<? JUL-/ i(\fj N umber/ATumrfro ZTGR^4?fi ENCLOSURES ANNEXES DISTRIBUTION P?1)/ EXTOTT/LSR/LST, TDD/TDO/ESN NDHQOTT/ADM/ Fowler SPALO I called on Capt.Richard Duffield, the British Naval Attache, to review what he knew of the Brazilian program to develop its own submarine capacity. He had little to offer that we did not already know. 2.The submarine program has three stages, a) purchase of one diesel-powered sub from Germany; followed by production in Brazil of three more of the same design; b) design a fully Brazilian diesel sub; and c) design a Brazilian nuclear-powered sub. 3.The process is already a little delayed; the first German sub is still on sea trials in the North Sea. Capt. Duffield estimates that the Navy Minister will visit it in the fall with the possibility of official deliviery by December. The diesel subs of German design are to be produced by NUCLEP in Rio de Janeiro. There is already in place the superstructure of an assembly sight in the harbour in Rio, but Duffield estimates that the program is somewhat behind schedule. He does not know what particular problems they may be facing. Jame' s says the subs are to be launched in 1990, but this may be an optimisitic prediction. As to the second stage of designing a fully Brazilian diesel sub, he does not know where that stands. It may be that Brazilian engineers are hoping to design a hull that can be converted for use with a nuclear power plant. 4.We know that the Brazilian navy is proceeding rapidly with the project to design and produce a nuclear sub using Brazilian enrichment technology. The centre at Ipero (Sao Paulo) under the Director General of Materiel (Navy) has been inaugurated, and is rather elaborate and apparently well financed. There it is expected that researchers will concentrate on isotope enrichment. It is not known how far advanced they are on building the 50 Megawatt prototype plant. I mentioned the date of 1995 as the target for launching a nuclear submarine ...2 EXT 407 001079 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information cP Confidential -2and he said that was extremely unlikely given current progress on stages a. and b. 5.Capt Duffield quoted the figure of US$270 million up to 1992 as the estimated cost of the nuclear submarine program, of which about $81 million had been invested up to 1988. This tallies with estimates that have appeared in public sources. 6.We speculated as to why Brazil should wish to make such a heavy investment in a nuclear submarine program when the surface fleet is so badly in need of rejuvenation. The average age of the ships of the fleet is thirty years old, and the navy is facing the spectre of block obselescence. They are desperately short of proper provisions and even the funds for fuel and operations {and top-heavy with a bloated officer class and manpower), and their own corvette building program is extremely slow. I suggested that it may have something to do with the government's foreign policy of keeping the superpowers out of the South Atlantic; one way to do this is to demonstrate that Brazil is perfectly capable of patrolling is own regional waters. A second reason of course is simply to have a national capability at the cutting edge of high technology, not letting another regional power such as Argentina get the jump on producing a nuclear powered sub, let alone a nuclear powered bomb. 7.Capt Duffield offered to share information with us regarding Brazilian naval capabilities and affairs in the future as we may require it. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18583 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4905bae6633bb6f8a7fea6437e1fbfa6.pdf 99b6f20dbb9c49c8985f672d811c2585 PDF Text Text n* txternai Affairs Canada Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divul UP en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Atiaires exterieures Canada ession/R6f6rence MESSAGE File/Dossier C=5-a Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow Alignez le premier caractere de la Securite sous cette fleche 12 ! SECURITY SECURITE C O N F I D E N T I A L FM/DE FM EXTOTT TO/A ESN1183 2 « | S B 8 22 24JUN88 REF 35z 10 j j i TO CNBRA INFO DISTR \ A r-. A i INFO DISTR SUBJ/SUJ NDHQOTT/CSA/SIMARD VPERf. BONN TOKYC ROME j i i NSXESDJLE NAVAL NUCLEAR j P R O P U L S I ON j i i WE U N D E R S T A N D THAT NUCLEAR-POWERED AUSTL CONSIDERED SUBMARINES BUT AT ONE THAT IDEA TIME NEVER ACQUISITION i i GOT OF BEYOND| i CONSIDERATION STAGE DUE TO P O L I T I C A L OPPOSITION TO PROPOSAL.WE i WOULD APPRECIATE CONSIDERATION PARTICULARLY SAFEGUARDS DRAFTER/REDACTEUR SIG EXT 518-1 (83/11) FURTHER OF A C Q U I S I T I O N WITH REGARD TO NUCLEAR NON-NUCLEAR BE BURTON RECEIVING WEAPON OF INFO ON AUSTLS NUCLEAR-POWERED PREVIOUS SUBMARINE^ TO S AF EGU AR DS ( AND N O N - A P P L I C A T I O N MATERIAL IN N O N - P R O S C R I B E D OF MILITARYlUSE IN STATE). DIVISION/DIRECTION ESN TELEPHONE 995 APPROVED/APPROUVE 7 5 4 65 ^ I R O C I H O N ' L , SIG 001081 C � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18582 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/bf264d2df3e7d5ad830fc210866077eb.pdf 1e35003fa5769b9ee52b3f764695c3fe PDF Text Text bxternai Anairs Canada 0* Artaires exterieures Canada Accession/R6f6rence D MESSAGE File/Dossier r Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow Alignez le premier caractere de la Securite sous cette fleche ro> o C< - J fQJu589 ii TO BONN ESN1089 wnSzir-rj 10 12 C O N F I D E N T I A L FM EXTOTT \ AC-. A 10JUNE88 TOKYO De c/if INFO NDHQOTT/CSA/S+M-frflD BH A E C B O T T / S I N D E N VPERM ROME DE OTT DISTR NSX ESD JLE tJO^CX ft>e St/* 1 * 1 4 - 0 NAVAL NUCLEAR P R O P U L S I O N WE ARE AWARE PREVIOUS FROM EFFORTS NON-PROLIF LITERATURE AND PUBLIC BY N O N - N U C L E AR OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WEAPON REPORTS STATES TO BUILD OF SEVERAL PARTY TO (TREATY ON AND O P E R A T E NAVAL r\ £A PROPULSION SYSTEMS. COUNTRIES MENTIONED W£*¤ NUCLEAR i FRG AND J A P A N . W E i WOULD APPRECIATE OBTAININ G FURTHER INFO ON THESE E F F O R T ^ IN i PARTICULAR WHETHER CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN BY GOVTS CONCERNED .TO i i SAFEGUARDS IMPLICATIONS OF A C Q U I S I T I O N OF NAVAL . NUCLEARi I i PROPULSION ON THESE POWER PLANTS MATTERS.WE ALSO AND,IF SO,WERE DISCUSSIONS HELI>lwiTH IAEA WOULD APPRECIAT E KNOWING INTENDED .AND PLANTS OF FOR^THESE V E S S E L S . W E BELIEVE BOTH *juckisno> fo*i£R ACTUAL SOURCE OF TECH AND FUEL CASES INVOLVED SURFACE VESSELS BUT ONLY VESSEL NAME WE ijiAVE IS • FRGS QUOTE OTTO HAHN U N Q U O T E . WE UNDERSTAN D JAPANESE VESSEL i i SUFFERRED PROBLEM S WITH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DURING SEA JRIALS AND i PROBLEMS HAVE DRAFTER/REDACTEUR B.E.BURTON mr> BWTON EXT 518-1 (83/11) NEVER BEEN CORRECTED. DIVISION/DIRECTION j TELEPHONE 995 APPROVED/APR 7546 001082 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18581 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4168f78521f56702822ba9ba6e5dabf7.pdf c1ab0373c3668f841405c2e6853f5d4f PDF Text Text caernai Attairs Canada •TO/A :RCM/DE Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Affaires exterieures Canada UETUUM TO O FOR Ej J £ RENVOVER All (5 ./ • FILING POUR - ETRE IDA/M.Collins/996-1251/jdv 1>0KTE AU DOSSIER Security /$£curite° • IDA/Lysyshyn UNCLASSIFIED REF i DATc ACC Accessiaii/i?rf/rf/t*nce • IDA/Collins /a-'-Jrg, \ - J L FTLEJZ^:^,;- DOSSIER File/Dossier t"7: WUNCB •UBJECT iUJET IDA Memos 0328 o f F e b r u a r y 2 4 , and 0280 of • F e b r u a r y 18 1988 Date Western Nuclear Strategy and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) March 1 5 , 1988 Number/Wum^fo IDA-0496 ENCLOSURES ANNEXES DISTRIBUTION thout attach/ IDD IDR Attached is an interesting article from the 1988 Number 1 issue of Comparative Strategy on "SDI and Deterrence: A Western European Perspective". The author is Robert M. Soofer, National Defence Analyst for the US Senate Republican Policy Committee. 2. Soofer makes a very strong case that general Western European adherence to the "mutual vulnerability" school of nuclear deterrence is in direct conflict with the NATO doctrine of flexible response dependent on extended deterrence provided by USA strategic nuclear forces. In a situation of mutual vulnerability there is in fact every disincentive for the USA to launch a first strategic nuclear strike at the USSR, and hence there is little extended deterrence. Europe and the USA would in large measure be decoupled. European reliance on the "doctrine of escalation uncertainty" — i.e., the chance that strategic nuclear warfare might result from a conventional Soviet attack — is not analytically"sustainable. 3. However, as Soofer points out, "... US deterrence concepts, at least in operati onal terms, are based not on mutual vulnerability, but on the ability of the United States to launch controlled, selecti ve nuclear strikes against Soviet military and political targets " (p.18). This is a polite description of a doctr ine of strategic nuclear war-fighting — in other word s initially limited nuclear strikes that, it is hoped, ca n force war termination on the USSR short of large scale nuc lear attacks on cities by either side. 4. Soofer does not quite say so, but for the USA such a strategic doctrine is the only one that can make sense in terms of providing extended deterrence to Western Europe without guaranteeing unacceptable consequences for the USA. European reluctance to face up to this reality is implicitly criticized by the article. • 2/ EXT 407 001083 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 - 5. The treatment of BMD is in my view considerably weaker and appears conditioned by partisan considerations. (There is no discussion of the technical feasibility of BMD or of various possible strategies involved — e.g., an "astrodome", point defence only, survivability of BMD itself against pre-emptive attack.) The argument that BMD might encourage a USA first strike is dismissed on the grounds that (a) USA systems are not accurate enough (this ignores amongst other things assumed future capability of the Trident D-5) and (b) BMD will in effect be deployed simultaneously the USA and the USSR. This latter reason is by no means self-evident. 6. Soofer goes on to argue that, since the current USA strategic guarantee to Europe is incredible, Europe would be no worse off in a situation in which both the USA and USSR possessed BMD. There is something in this reasoning. But the consequence is that "The inability of the Soviets to launch limited strategic nuclear strikes against the US lessens the prospects for limited war in Europe by enhancing NATO nuclear flexibility at the theater level..." (p.30) 7. The point here is that, although extended deterrence would no longer apply, the USSR would be deterred from launching a conventional attack for fear that it might be defeated by effective military use of theatre nuclear weapons. Unfortunately it is this military, as opposed to political-demonstrative, use of nuclear weapons that so worries West Germans (amongst others). 8. Soofer concludes,-perhaps a bit limply, with a plea for NATO nuclear modernization. He maintains that NATO's conventional deterrence is becoming weaker and that therefore "If it becomes necessary for NATO to rely on these (theatre nuclear) weapons and strategies, then perhaps the present weaknesses in NATO's Theater Nuclear Weapons posture will be corrected", (p.33) He does not specify what these "corrections" are or how they would reduce German angst. V ' M. Collins Arms Control & Disarmament Division � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18580 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/55e563d326891531a279db6dd2dabd70.pdf 87aa3369b76384808c24bf04e671c544 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ^••ment divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information »«/B. BUrto„/995,7S46/ab TSepnrtmmt *f £ * t m m i <&Bur* JBhtteten- .V* JUfoir«, r*tem,rr* (Smtadn SECRET OTTAWA, ONTARIO KIA OG2 December 1 8 , 1987 ESN-2428 ACC Mr. L o m e E. Green Director Nuclear and Arms Control Policy National Defence Headquarters * 101 Colonel By Drive Ottawa, Ontario KIA OK2 \ Dear Mr. Green; acquisition o? am^unUion c o n t ^ ^ fttf DATE OOSSIEK c^> - \ \- \ t h a t DND S ' 1 Proposed Phalanx c l o s e - i n T e a p o n r s y ^ r h a s ' b ^ ^ ^ U " n i ™ Mif ° r the from a non-Prolifera?ion ITSu£^p™™*£ <^ters relevant to^nr^oJt^SrofdepfetS 91u r amn d P ° fl oi cr * *•»«•» military uses, Ministers decked q 1 i ^ V f 5 i0n ° n the understanding t h a J ^ h ^ ?» the .P ro non-nuclear P°^d depleted uranium (a) is being Scqui^d " P o t i o n containing b is not designed in any wL for / " f l n ^ h e d form, (c) will not underoo anv L S nuclear use, and Canada. Under ?hele c o n d i t i o ^ I t * * ^ ^ v a l u e while in - t o Canada exempt from ^ S i i S i t T ^ ^ . S ^ ^ t . d Yours sincerely, c.c. JLE AECB/Sinden EMR/Morrison /IERB •J* Rochon Director Nuclear Division 001085 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18579 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/66a3ad130c5945964aebe860311c2f18.pdf e289ccc6addc4b01ca709400335ecff3 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information B. E. Q Burton Nuclear Division 995-7546 SECRET November 27, 1987 ESN-2280 Memorandum for: The Secretary of State for External Affairs The Minister for International Trade c.c. Minister for External Relations SUBJECT; Military Uses of Nuclear Material SUMMARY: This memorandum recommends that you approve, from a non-proliferation and safeguards policy perspective, the purchase by the Department of National Defence (DND) of ammunition containing depleted uranium from the USA. BACKGROUND: In May 1986, Ministers reviewed the policy implications related to the nuclear and non-nuclear uses of nuclear material for military purposes. They agreed to consider proposals for the military use of nuclear material on a case-by-case basis. DND is now in the process of acquiring, for non-nuclear use, depleted uranium ammunition from a U.S. supplier for the Phalanx close-in weapons system under the Canadian Patrol Frigate program and the Tribal Class Update and ModerniEation Project. This is the only source of operational ammunition for the Phalanx weapons system and DND is anxious to proceed with its procurement. However, DND has enquired of this Department whether there are nuclear non-proliferation policy considerations related to this purchase, particularly with respect to the application of IAEA safeguards. We have reviewed the DND request in light of the legal and policy issues previously identified with respect to imports of depleted uranium for non-nuclear military uses. The principal consideration affecting this case, which makes it different from previous cases, is that it is a finished product, i.e., ammunition containing depleted uranium of U.S. origin which is being imported. Thus for import purposes this ammunition would not be identified as containing nuclear material. Also, the imported ammunition containing depleted uranium is not designed in any way for nuclear use and can . . ./2 001086 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 - SECRET therefore be exempted from IAEA safeguards. The ammunition would not undergo any change in its strategic value in Canada and, consequently, would not trigger the application of Canadian nuclear policy. DND has confirmed in writing that there is no requirement or intention to alter this ammunition and that appropriate safety and security systems will be applied to ensure this. RECOMMENDATION: We recommend that DND's proposed procurement of ammunition containing depleted uranium for the Phalanx close-in weapons system be approved from a non-proliferation and safeguards perspective and that you agree to officials informing DND of this in writing. Do you agree? nnon Original Signed by Original signe pat ij. ft Taylor J.H. Taylor 001087 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18578 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a4b6a7b8dd6ad7a1835f27c8b99aaf97.pdf e5d74301b6e41d469321040c869d03f7 PDF Text Text DIV (S5^Sn¥^!£^^5:te?S^ under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information n Ju U T External AHairs Canada Affaires exterieures Canada ESN/B. Burton/995-7546/db TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'EHVOl USS ( t h r o u g h EFB and DMT) TO/A FROM/JDE ESN ( t h r o u g h ESD) suBjECT/su/ET MILITARY USES OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL Security Sfcurtte File Dossier Date S E C R E T ESN-2280 November 2 7 , 1987 pikcECtjofNTE Memorandum f o r t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r E x t e r n a l and M i n i s t e r f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r a d e (ESN-2280) DISTRIBUTION RECORD OF CONSULTATION (Names/Divisions) RAPPORT DE CONSULTATION (Noms des indjvldus/Directions} MINA MINT MINE USS DMT CMGR(2) /FILE Affairs ACTION/SU/TE A DONNER The attached memoranda are for your signature, if you agree. JLE AECB DND EFB ESD JLE AECB/Sinjden EMR/Morrison /IERE DND/DNACPOL /Gree n REQUIRED BY /DEMANDE POUR In respect of DND procurement obligations, a decision would be appreciated by December 7, 1987. R.J. Rochon Director Nuclear Division Q -33S3 TO BE RETAINED WITH FILE COPY - A CONSERVER AVEC L'EXEMPLAIRE DESTINE AU DOSSIER EXT 401 001088 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18577 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG