1 20 1 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/46a5574af3f56edae06694df7b6f2536.pdf 9d74fa89f4d753bde17c98e0a1b67113 PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project CSE ATIP A-2023-00035 CSE A220 Committees File 267-1 Part 2 PCO "Proposal for Enhanced Foreign Intelligence Collection" February 1994 (Draft) Note: this undated proposal was discussed at the IPG meeting on 24 February 1994. �'s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET INTELLIGENCE POLICY GROUP Aaenda for February 24 Meetin& 1. Rationale for an Enhanced Foreign Intelligence Collection Capability 2. Review of the Section 16 MoU and Approval Process: A Report to the IPG 3. 4. Status of S.16 Proposals 5. Other Issues A-2023-00035--00261 �DRAFr TOP SECRET PROPOSAL FOR ENHANCED FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION Introduction 0 In the past, Canadian government statements have publicly (and perhaps proudly) proclaimed that Canada was one of the only Western powers without a foreign intelligence collection capacity abroad. 0 However, for a number of reasons, there is a growing recognition by the Canadian intelligence community and its clients of the need for a capability to obtain independently foreign intelligence to support Canadian policy objectives. L Canada's foreign intelligence needs have changed in response to a New World Order. 0 The world has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War; the multi-polared world features revived ethnic, territorial and regional tensions, and troubled transitions from socialism to semi free-market economies. 0 This New World Order and the information explosion have highlighted a need to obtain value-added intelligence that is relevant to Canadian policy. 0 Key foreign and defence priorities such as support to peacekeeping missions, economic and trade issues, weapons proliferation control, counter-terrorism, and international crime will need a flexible, strategic and focused collection effort. 2. Canada's changing foreign intelligence priorities can no longer be met solely through traditional sources of intelligence. 0 The existing foreign intelligence structure reflects the fact that Canada does very little independent foreign intelligence collection and underlines our dependence for intelligence on our Allies. 0 The shared intelligence, together with that supplemented by Canada's own collection efforts, does not meet the complex and sophisticated lnfonnation policy makers require today. A-2023-00035--00262 �' '·;, 's.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET -20 The value of SIGINT, by far our most significant source of traditional intelligence, is not contested; however, it alone cannot meet the new information needs on, for e.g., economic issues and the activities of an increasing number of small and fragmented countries, whose activities need to be monitored. 0 Diplomatic reporting; though abundant and wide-ranging, needs to be corroborated and confirmed by other information; it ca.n contain deliberate disinformation by the host government. 0 While other sources of intelligence, such as military reporting and imagery, have also proven their value in very specific areas, they do not by themselves meet broader government objectives, such as economic and commercial intelligence. 3. The establishment of an independent foreign intelligence collection capacity that would be able to draw on human sources would enable us to obtain unique information from a unique perspective. 0 The foreign intelligence collection program authorized under s.16 of the CSIS Act has stimulated an interest in, and emphasized the need for, Canadian-relevant intelligence. It has also demonstrated the usefulness and cost-efficiency of foreign intelligence collection undertaken by Canadians and targeted to uniquely Canadian policy interests. 0 The use of human sources to colfoct intelligence is already successfully exploited within Canada, under s.12 and 16 of the CSIS Act, and through the Foreign Affairs Interview Program. 0 Intelligence based on human sources abroad can produce unique intelligence on a foreign government's foreign and domestic intentions, and can provide an exceptional perspective on foreign government leaders. 0 • • • • • I I -----~ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ I ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ I ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ A-2023-00035--00263 �TOP SECRET -30 HUMINT has value in verifying or corroborating information obtained from SIGINT or imagery; it is more flexible than SIGINT collection in that it can be aimed at soliciting otherwise unavailable intelligence. 0 Some examples of what a successful HUMINT capacity should be able to provide include: improved information on local conditions, e.g. to assess the risk to peacekeepers better access to economic and commercial information, such as market conditions, and upcoming contracts of interest to Canadian industry. more access to the foreign intelligence activities of our Allies, and improved liaison with foreign agencies. 4. Since Canada depends on its AHies for the majority of its foreign intelligence. we are expected to contribute to the overall Allied effort. 0 The better our contribution to the Allied effort, the better the intelligence we receive from them. 0 An enhanced and specialized collection capacity would constitute a small but meaningful Canadian contribution to the intelligence Alliance, and would undoubtedly make Canada a more valuable player. 0 A new capacity would also establish official liaison channels with foreign intelligence agencies and would thus facilitate contact with them. 5. Any new collection initiative needs to be considered within. the current fiscal context. 0 SIGINT, with its significant resource requirements, is becoming more difficult to collect and hence costlier due to technological innovation (particularly increased encryption of communications, and the use of fibre optics). 0 The use of human sources to collect intelligence would be a relatively inexpensive initiative compared with other sources of foreign intelligence. A-2023-00035--00264 �TOP SECRET 0 The proposed collection capacity could be considered a more costeffective alternative to expensive Allied collection projects (e.g. satellite communications), to which Canada is expected to contribute. Conclusion 0 The establishment of a new collection capacity should not signal an end to the continued effort to improve the exploitation of traditional sources of intelligence. 0 A HUMINT capacity abroad should be considered as a complement to these other sources of intelligence, and part of our ongoing effort to improve the value and relevance of foreign intelligence to Canadian policy makers. 0 Any new foreign intelligence collection initiative will require adequate oversight and provision for accountability at the political level. A-2023-00035--00265 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDFI00008 Title A name given to the resource PCO Proposal for Enhanced Foreign Intelligence Collection, February 1994 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 24-Feb-94 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CSE A220 Committees File 267-1 Part 2 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource CSE Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Foreign Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource A-2023-00035 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access to Information Request Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English