1 20 1 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/0ed18d42d99522361900be8c4a291c65.pdf 535cea3ad49e2beb194edd5a71570c4a PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act © e £ e n c e l>±Silst^l^&(#yjU^S&§&fe^r/etf£'Loi sur Faeces a Finformation i TOP SECRET February 17, 1955 NAL AFFAIRS DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ^froblems which might be posed for Canada, if the United States were to beeome involved in . hostilities over the Chinese offshore islands yy> ~r$>> Ea round ^ mmmrn TO ECRET RE001T h SECRtT Information has been received that there is a considerable concentration of Chinese Communist forces opposite the Matsu Islands, including a substantial number of planes and a large fleet of junks. There is a consequent possibility of United States air and naval forces in the area becoming involved in hostilities in support of Chinese Nationalist forces. Under the Congressional resolution, the President may employ United States armed forces not only to defend Formosa and the Pescadores, but also "such related positions and territories" as he judges to be necessary for that purpose. These Include the offshore islands. From what is known about United States intentions, it seems likely that the United States military authorities would ignore harassing air raids and shelling against the islands* If the Chinese Communists attacked the islands, and if the Chinese Nationalists requested help, the United States Government is expected to give it. It is understood that a formal National Security. Council decision has been taken to that effect* Because of the geographical proximity of these coastal islands to the mainland, there is a risk that action taken by United States forces in support of the Nationalists for the defence of the islands might extend hostilities to the mainland. This paper is intended as an analysis of the type of problems which might be posed for the Ganadian Government in the event that the United States were to beeome involved in hostilities oyer the offshore islands and is not intended as an appreciation of the current situation or anticipated developments* II Possible extent of involvement of the United States in military action Warlike activities arising from possible attacks by the Communist Chinese forces against the Matsu Islands might lead to the following contingencies: (a) Local armed encounters limited to the Matsu Islands and involving the use of local United States forces only, acting in support of Chinese Nationalist forces to repel attempts at landing; (b) extension of the armed encounters to the mainland, involving counter-action by local United States forces against concentrations of Chinese Communist ground, naval and air forces and supplies or "hot-pursuit" of Communist aircraft; (e) general war between the United States and China. (Because of the geographical location of these islands, contingencies 1 and 2 might tend to merge). * . • 2 000181 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation - 2 « III Possible consequent approaches to the Canadian Government from the United States Government Although the Sino-Soviet Treaty specifically provides for Soviet intervention only in the event of attack by Japan or an ally of Japan, It must be assumed that th© possibility of Soviet support in the form of military intervention cannot be ruled out by the United States Govemmsat in their evaluation of the risks* This consideration presumably accounts for the caution with which the United States military authorities are conducting their activities in relation to the Chinese offshore islands. No precise information is available on Soviet intentions. The Malenkov administration was thought to bo exercising a restraining influence m the Chinese Communists* The now Soviet Premier Bulganin, in a statement in Moscow on February 15» mads at a reception marking the fifthn anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, said* China knows it can look to us not only for sympathy but for help. This help will be forthcoming whenever necessary*. Possible United States approaches to the Canadian Government, therefore* will probably be based on the assumption that if the United States forces were to become involved in hostilities against the Chinese Communist forces, there would be at least a risk of Soviet military intervention. It must be assumed, therefore, that in addition to deployments of United States forces in support of any military action that may he undertaken against Chinese Communist forces in the area, the United States Government may take certain precautionary measures against the possibility of Soviet intervention* The nature of the possible approaches which might be expected from the United States Government in relation to each of the contingencies set out under II above Include the following* Contingency I (fighting limited to the offshore islands)j (a) request for overflight off Canadian territory for precautionary deployments of SAC aircraft and nuclear weapons to bases in Alaska; (b) precautionary alert of continental air defence* Contingency 2 (extension of fighting to the mainland)* (a) a full alert of continental air defence; (b) precautionary deployment of SAG aircraft and weapons to Goose Bay* Contingency 3 (general war between the United States and China): Request for cooperation in full mobilization measures of continental air defence and probable request for activation of base facilities, in addition to possible requests for overflights preparatory to making air strikes. • # • 9 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation •* 3 "* IV Canadian Attitude The Prime Minister defined the Canadian attitude in a statement in the House of Commons on February 14» when he said: "I should also like once more to emphasize this; Canada has no commitments regarding collective security in the Far East, and indeed no commitments of any kinji in respect of the Formosa area except those which arise out of our membership in the United Nations". This statement confirmed the Government1^ attitude as first given by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the House of Commons on January 25* when he said: "Although we are not involved in United States commitments in this area, we are of course deeply concerned over the dangerous situation existing* there and we, with other free governments, are anxious that steps should be taken to bring to an end the fighting which has now been taking place for some time along the China coast". In the absence of any United Nations decision authorizing the United States to take military action in the defence of the offshore Islands, and in the absence of any relevant treaty or collective security commitments binding Canada as indicated in these Government statements, it remains to examine to what extent, if any, Canadian interests or any principle are involved in determining what the reaction should be to the possible United States approaches outlined above. It is difficult to identify any precise Canadian interests in the denial of the coastal islands to the Chinese Communists* The considerations governing United States interests in the islands appear to be political rather than strategic* The islands may have some tactical value as a site for early warning of attack from the mainland against Formosa and vice versa and for preventing Chinese Communist shipping from using the Formosa Strait. The military importance of the is]ands, however, Is overshadowed by political considerations such as the possible effect of their loss on the morale of the nationalists and upon United States prestige in the cold war. If the question of principle is taken as a determining factor, the main consideration which would seem to arise is the "inherent right of individual and collective self defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United HatIons" (Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), If the risk of general war between the United States and Communist China were assumed to involve the risk of Soviet retaliation against the United States with nuclear weapons, the concept of Collective self defence would presumably include the protection of United States nuclear retaliatory power as well as other measures of continental air defence. Thus, especially if there were any question of nuclear weapons being used in the event that the United States were to become involved in hostilities against Communist China# It would be difficult to distinguish between requests made by the United States Government to the Canadian Government which were related strictly to the hostilities with China, as distinct from precautionary measures which would have to be taken in anticipation of Soviet intervention. • • •k 000183 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a Finformatio 4t ** The evidence available on the Intentions of the United States Government, does not indicate the likelihood of the President authorizing the use of nuclear weapons in hostilities against Communist China. The President is on record with a number of statements showing his abhorrence of nuclear warfare, such as: "War would present us with only the alternatives in degrees of destruction, and there could be no successful outcome". The President, moreover, cannot be unmindful of the deplorable effect that the use of nuclear weapons against Communist China would have on Asian opinion. Nonetheless the advantages that could be gained by striking the first blow in nuclear warfare are such that if the United States Government were to apprehend the possibility of Soviet intervention, they would almost certainly take certain precautionary measures to prepare their defences including their retaliatory atomic potential. This possibility would pose the most serious problem to the Canadian Government, in that precautionary measures of the types envisaged might lead to a chain reaction of events which would tend to precipitate general war, if the Soviet Union were to interpret such precautionary moves as indicating a risk of imminent attack, it Is imperative, therefore, that in the event that the United States were to beeome involved in hostilities against Communist China, every effort be made to limit such hostilities and to bring them to an end without precipitating general war. For this reason all precautionary measures of continental air defence would have to be taken in such a way as not to provoke Soviet reactions and to avoid as far as possible drawing public attention to them, V Conclusions It iNDuld be premature to recommend any specific course of action in relation to the conjectural possibilities outlined above. As a basis for further consideration only and taking into account the arguments set out above, one possible course of action might he: (a) Accede to a request for the precautionary alerting of continental air defence; (b) accede to a request for overflights of Canadian territory for the limited purpose of precautionary deployments of SAC aircraft and weapons to Alaska and Goose IBayj (c) refuse overflights of Canadian territory, or the use of Canadian bases for the purpose of carrying out air strikes, and participation in any full mobilization measures for continental air defence, in the absence of a prior determination by the Canadian Government that general war is imminent. 000184 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00022 Title A name given to the resource Draft Memorandum, "External Affairs Draft for Discussion Purposes" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955-02-17 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Study on Canadian National Security Policy, RG25, file 50333-40, LAC. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Early Cold War, Canadian National Security Description An account of the resource Ottawa Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en