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Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00001 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Policy on Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 14-Aug-02 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Privy Council Office Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2021-00218 PCO Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/1b1260482b131046b2fc0fdd017561eb.pdf 03ca541395cbc6ee6a4dcda9ef9bc499 PDF Text Text ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^uocumenttiscTosed under the Access to Information Act^ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informatic whihiiimih^ ft •rtxeees-00TS5 ; rr • ■ [DWH Pol). Cabinet du minist de la Defense nat Office of the Minister of National Defence mcu# MCU2003-00765 Doc #66450 SEChlI TEMPORARY DOCKET - DOSSIER TEMPORAIRE TEMPORARY DOCKETS ARE NOT TO BE TRANSFERRED OUT OF THE MINISTER'S OFFICE LES DOSSIERS TEMPORAIRES NE DOIVENT EN AUCUN CAS QUITTER LE BUREAU DU MINISTRE MINISTER'S VISIT WASHINGTON DC 8 10 JANUARY 2003 SUBJI SUJE' P.A. RANGER TO A c REMARKS REMARQUES Date Init. Date Inrt. B.F. RAPPEL Date Cancel Annuler in co o o co o o CM ZD o It z> o s . =■ 8 t5 * |aq —— = INSTRUCTIONS Temporary Dockets are to deal WITH ONE CASE ONLY. Les dossiers temporaires sont crees a regard d'un SEUL CAS. TD No. together with main file number to be quoted on all correspondence originated. Mentionner le numero du dossier temporaire et le numdro de reference du dossier principal dans toute correspondance. ✓ Action should be taken as soon as possible in order that main file may be kept up to date. If action cannot be taken within 48 working hrs., BF docket. Donner suite le plus t6t possible, afin de tenir le dossier principal a jour. Si non realisable dans les 48 heures ouvrables, acheminer et inscrire une date de rappel. TDs to be requisitioned, passed, BF’d, etc., in the same manner as main files. Utiliser la methode applicable aux dossiers principaux pour les demandes, acheminements, rappels, etc., des dossiers temporaires. DND 51 000001 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces d /'information SECRET-CEO VISIT OF The Honourable John McCallum Minister of National Defence MND REGISTRY REGISTRE DU MDN ' Referred to J Transmis a_____________ FEB 1 2003 Z wxu i co-. ws Charged to Charge a TO Washington, DC 8-10 January 2003 Prepared by: DWH Pol 000002 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la toi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET-CEO VISIT OF The Honourable John McCallum Minister of National Defence Washington, DC 8-10 January 2003 Prepared by: DWH Pol 000003 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informotion VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON, DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 TABLE OF CONTENTS TAB1 ITINERARY TAB 2 SCENARIO BRIEF TAB 3 IRAQ TAB 4 CANADIAN FORCES CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM TAB 5 ENHANCING CANADA-US MILITARY COOPERATION TAB 6 NORAD TAB 7 BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE TAB 8 FOLLOW-UP TO PRAGUE SUMMIT SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL TAB 9 DEFENCE BUDGET TAB 10 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT TABU CANADA-US RELATIONS BACKGROUND PROVIDED BY CDN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON TAB 12 BIOGRAPHY OF DONALD RUMSFELD 000004 �Document disclosedunder the Access to Informotil Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'inf 000005 ■I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON, DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 ITINERARY Canadian Embassy Contact: Francis Furtado First Secretary (Defence) Tel: 202-682-1740 (Ext 7451) Fax: 202-682-7792 Hotel: Four Seasons (Georgetown) 2800 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Tel: 202-342-0444 Fax: 202-944-2076 Wednesday. January 8 1330 Depart Shell Aerocentre Ottawa 1500 Arrive Andrews Air Force Base Minister and delegation arrive. -17:00 Minister and delegation check into hotel. 19:00 Dinner Minister with the Ambassador Transport: Minister to the Ambassador’s residence (18:30). Delegation with RAdm Mack Transport: Delegation to RAdm Mack’s residence (18:30). Transport: Minister returns to hotel. Delegation returns to hotel. Thursday. January 9 (9:00) Minister/delegation depart hotel for Embassy. 09:30 Embassy briefing Issues: Iraq Canada-US defence cooperation Missile defence NATO post-Prague Congress and interest groups 000006 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information (11:15) Minister and delegation departfor Pentagon 11:45-12:30 Meeting with US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld (12:40) Minister/delegation/Pentagon guests depart for Embassy 13:00 -14:30 Lunch with US officials (Minister will participate for one hour, before holding a strategy session with some of his officials prior to making himself available to the media). 14:15 -15:15 Minister’s media interviews Capitol Hill (to be determined, pending availability) 19:00 Dinner (Location to be determined) Friday, January 10 Capitol Hill (to be determined, pending availability) 11:00 Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W. John Hamre (former Undersecretary of Defense, Clinton Administration) Kurt Campbell (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia) John Alterman (Director, CSIS Middle East Program) Celeste Wallander (Director, Russia/Eurasia Program) Christopher Sands (Director, Canada Program) Heritage Foundation (Timings and venue to be determined) 000007 �Document disclosed under the Access to Informat Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'in i I; i! 000008 11 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 SCENARIO BRIEF 8 January 2003 • You arrive in Washington at 1500 at Andrews Air Force Base and will be staying at the Four Seasons Hotel in Georgetown. • A private dinner with the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Michael Kergin, is scheduled for you at 1900. The Canadian Delegation will have dinner with Rear-Admiral I. Mack. 9 January 2003 • You will be briefed by Canadian Ambassador at the Embassy from 0930-1115. • You will meet Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon from 1145-1230. The briefing book contains a list of potential topics that we have confirmed with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The US added Afghanistan to our original list. • The Canadian delegation will include: o o o o o o o MND EA/MND DM ADM(Pol) Ambassador Kergin Francesco Del Bianco (will not attend meeting with SECDEF) Randy Mylyk (will not attend meeting with SECDEF) • The US side will be composed of: o o o o o o o SECDEF Senior Military Assistant to SECDEF (LGen Craedock) Undersecretary for Policy (D. J. Feith) Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy (J.D. Crouch) Deputy Assistant Secretary for NATO and Europe (I. Brzezinski) Joint Chiefs of Staff rep (uniformed) Notetaker (S. Sanok) 1/3 000009 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information • The Embassy has scheduled a lunch with US officials at the Embassy from 13:00-1430. The following US officials have either confirmed or were invited: National Security Council Robert Joseph / Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Proliferation Counter-proliferation and Arms Control Stephen Hadley /Deputy National Security Advisor (TBC) Sam Brock /Director for Canada and Mexico (TBC) Department of State Mark Grossman / Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (TBC) John Wolf / Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation Lincoln Bloomfield / Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs Nancy Mason 7 Director, Office of Canadian Affairs Department of Defense Paul Wolfowitz / Deputy Secretary of Defense (TBC) (alternate: Douglas Feith / Under Secretary ofDefensefor Policy) J.D. Crouch / Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (TBC) Steve Cambone / Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (TBC) • 30 minutes has been allocated for you to have a strategy session with your officials prior to conducting media interviews for an hour, from 14:15-15:15. The Embassy is currently trying to organize meetings with the chair of the Senate Armed Services Committees and the Chair of the Senate Appropriation Committee on Capitol Hill. These meetings would happen either at the end of the afternoon or the next morning. A dinner/reception with senior American politicians is planned for the evening (timing and location to be confirmed). 10 January 2003 • You will visit the Center for Strategic and International Studies, John Hopkins University, at 11:00. A visit to the Heritage Foundation is also being organized. • You will depart Washington after the day’s events are complete. 2/3 000010 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Prepared by: Director: Director General: Responsible Group Principal: Updated on: Nigel Thalakada, DWH Pol 5,996-0063 Martin Benjamin, D/DWH Pol, 992-4423 Col R.M. Williams, DWH Pol, 992-3960 MGen C. Ross, DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Kenneth J. Calder, ADM(Pol), 992-3458 03 January 2003 i 3/3 000011 �Document disclosed under the Access to Informotii Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'inj I 000012 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 UPDATE ON POSSIBLE ACTION AGAINST IRAQ SPEAKING POINTS Key messages • Canada remains committed to the UN Security Council process and an effective UN weapons inspection and destruction program and will assist that process where possible. • Canada strongly prefers that Iraq be disarmed peacefully. • Should Iraq fail to meet its obligations and the Security Council explicitly authorizes the use of force, Canada will participate in a military coalition to enforce Council resolutions. • Should the UN process ultimately fail and no explicit authorization of force is given, Canada will at that time decide whether to participate in a proposed military coalition. • Notwithstanding our ultimate level of participation, Canada will leave exchange and liaison officers in their present positions. • The Canadian Forces will undertake military-to-military discussions with US planners to gather information and discuss possible Canadian contributions. Issues • Determine what kind of military contribution Canada could most usefully provide. • An early US decision to begin military action could limit Canadian participation to post-combat operations. SECRET 000013 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET Desired outcome • US is comfortable with Canada’s efforts to seek additional information about US military planning without a firm commitment to make a military contribution at this stage. SECRET 000014 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON, DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 UPDATE ON POSSIBLE ACTION AGAINST IRAQ BRIEFING NOTE ISSUE • To provide an update on the potential for unilateral or multilateral action against Iraq and the developing Canadian policy position. This remains a dynamic issue and events will continue to unfold rapidly. BACKGROUND • Iraq has thus far met the deadlines imposed by Security Council Resolution 1441: it has accepted the terms of the resolution and produced a 12,000 page declaration of its nuclear, chemical, biological and missile programs. In discussions between the Canadian and Iraqi Permanent Representatives in New York, Iraq indicated that although it disagrees with many of the premises of Resolution 1441, it will cooperate with United Nations weapons inspectors. • Both the US and the UK have categorically emphasized that the resolution provides for “serious consequences” if Iraq is found in violation of its obligations. President Bush has said Resolution 1441 “presents the Iraqi regime with a final test”, and Prime Minister Blair indicated that the “consequences are clear”. The US has stated that while it will consult the Security Council before engaging in any action against Iraq, its position is that the US does not require UN approval for US-led military action if Iraq fails to disarm. Most allies will likely accept efforts to disarm Iraq of proven weapons of mass destruction capabilities as a basis for US-led military action. DISCUSSION • On 19 December, in their first formal briefing to the Security Council following Iraq’s declaration regarding its weapons programs, UN inspectors indicated that they still require “much more cooperation” from Iraq. The inspectors also said that the declaration leaves many unanswered questions and contains very little by way of evidence concerning weapons of mass destruction programs. This briefing was merely a preliminary assessment of the content of the declaration; a full UN assessment of all data provided by Iraq will likely be completed by mid- to lateJanuary. Following the briefing, the US administration reiterated its view that Iraq remains in “material breach of Resolution 1441”, but that this failure to comply does not yet constitute a trigger for the use of force. 1/3 SECRET 000015 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET • Open sources confirm that the US is proceeding with a build-up of forces and logistics in the Persian Gulf area. It is estimated that the US already have 50,000 land-based personnel in the region and all of the key elements necessary to begin an air campaign and light ground force operations will be in place by the beginning of January. If the ground forces build-up continues at the current rate, armored forces could be ready for action by mid- to late-January during what is known as the best “campaign season”. While the first official UN inspection report is not expected until mid-May, inspectors are scheduled to provide an interim report to the Security Council on 27 January (in accordance with Resolution 1441). • On 5 December, Canada provided a preliminary response to the US request for a contribution of military assets to any possible action against Iraq. As a first step, the Canadian Forces will seek information for use in developing options for the Government while at the same time discussing possible Canadian contributions in detail. A command and control exercise, INTERNAL LOOK, occurred from 9 to 16 December, but Canada’s decision to engage in military-to-military discussions occurred too late for a Canadian officer to observe the exercise. The Chief of the Defence Staff has since spoken with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; subsequently three Canadian Forces officers have deployed to Tampa to begin initial discussions with US planners. Any decision to commit Canadian Forces assets would be predicated on a Security Council authorization of the use of force or, absent such explicit authorization, would be decided according to the circumstances at the time. The US has indicated that other allies, including Spain and Italy, have placed similar caveats on their participation in a campaign against Iraq. • US officials have said that while they would prefer unconditional military commitments from allies at this stage, Canada’s position is “understandable” in light of the evolving international situation. The US is looking forward to moving ahead with military consultations and, as such, welcomed Canada’s decision to engage in discussions regarding possible military contributions in the event that use of force becomes necessary. In discussions with senior officials from National Defence and Foreign Affairs, the US political director indicated that the US is not committed to military action at this stage; the President has yet to take a decision. CANADIAN POSITION • The Canadian position on the Iraq situation has not changed. The Government has been very much in favor of a strong resolution that addresses the need for Iraq to comply with all of its obligations to UN resolutions and that indicates that there will be serious consequences for non-compliance. Resolution 1441 provides inspectors with the full backing of the international community to perform their duty without interference. It is now up to Iraq to fulfill its responsibilities without condition or delay. • The Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have noted Canada’s concern about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs, but have indicated our preference 2/3 SECRET 000016 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET that the issue be dealt with through the UN (i.e., through the re-establishment of the present UN inspection mechanism). On 10 October, the Prime Minister indicated that if UN inspections determined that Iraq continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, Canada would support military action. • Canada is not privy to Iraq’s declaration of its weapons programs, which was submitted to the inspectors and the Security Council. As such, Canada looks forward to the Security Council’s full assessment of the documents. • Should Canada decide to participate in a military coalition against Iraq, Canada may contribute assets from among a range of sea, land and air capabilities, including, but not necessarily restricted to those currently dedicated to the coalition campaign against terrorism (2 ships, 2 maritime patrol aircraft and 2 to 3 transport aircraft). Prepared By: Responsible Director: Responsible Director-General Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Updated: 3/3 SECRET Corri Barr, D PK Pol 6. 996-1741 Col G. C6t6, DPK Pol, 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross. DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-3458 9 December 2002 2 January 2003 000017 �Document disclosed under the Access to Informal Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'ir I I I ! 4 I ! I o . i i 000018 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 CANADIAN FORCES CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM SPEAKING POINTS Key messages • Canada supports the creation of a stable Afghan central authority capable of providing for its own security needs and preventing the resurgence of terrorist networks within the country. As such, Canada welcomes the establishment of training initiatives for the new Afghan army, police and border forces. • Canada has made significant military commitments to the campaign against terrorism, the Balkans and elsewhere. Decisions regarding additional commitments have not yet been taken and would require a careful assessment of Canada’s capacity to do more. Issues • How does the US view the transition from combat operations to stability operations unfolding? • Does the US see a new military role for the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan? Desired Outcome • US is reassured that Canada is committed to the coalition campaign against terrorism, but recognizes Canada’s desire to limit further military engagement in Afghanistan given competing demands elsewhere. CONFIDENTIAL 000019 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /’information CONFIDENTIAL VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 CANADIAN FORCES CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM BRIEFING NOTE ISSUE • To outline Canada’s contribution to the US-led coalition campaign against terrorism. BACKGROUND • Beginning almost immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001, the Canadian Forces (CF) began making a significant contribution to the international campaign against terrorism. On September 20, more than 100 CF personnel serving on exchange programs in the US and with other allied military forces were authorized to participate in operations conducted by their host units in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. On October 7, Prime Minister Chretien announced that Canada would contribute to the international coalition campaign against terrorism. Operation APOLLO was then established in support of the US initiative (nick-named Operation ENDURING FREEDOM). Approximately 960 maritime, land and air force personnel are currently assigned to Operation APOLLO. DISCUSSION • Maritime Forces - There are currently two Canadian ships conducting maritime interdiction operations in the region: HMCS MONTREAL and WINNIPEG. • Land Forces - In response to a request from the US for ground forces in Afghanistan, Canada deployed the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI) Battle Group to Kandahar as part of the US Army task force. This Battle Group redeployed to Canada at the end of July after completing its six-month deployment. Canada’s special operations force, Joint Task Force 2, has also redeployed to Canada. • There are three CF members deployed to Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan with the US/Coalition Combined Joint Task Force headquarters. Canada also recently deployed a military adviser to Kabul in support of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). He will act as a liaison between International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), coalition forces and UNAMA, which is a civilian mission to support reform and reconstruction in Afghanistan. 1/3 CONFIDENTIAL 000020 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information CONFIDENTIAL • Air Forces - Two Aurora long-range/maritime surveillance and maritime patrol aircraft, crews and support personnel have been deployed to provide essential air surveillance in the area of operation and support the coalition with maritime surveillance and intelligence gathering. A tactical airlift detachment comprised of three Hercules transport aircraft has also been deployed to provide transport for coalition supplies and, if required, to support in delivery of humanitarian relief. A strategic airlift detachment with one Polaris (Airbus A310) strategic lift aircraft, three flight crews and one air-cargo handling team returned to Canada in May after having supported coalition operations in the Persian Gulf region for six months. • Command Assets - Approximately 55 CF personnel are now employed in the Canadian National Command Element (NCE) located at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. The NCE is part of the Canadian Joint Task Force South West Asia (JTFSWA) and is commanded by Brigadier-General W.A. Watt. As Commander of the NCE, he exercises operational command of the various CF components assigned to Op APOLLO. CF assets always remain under Canadian command, operating under Canadian rules of engagement, and in compliance with Canadian and international laws. • ISAF - On 27 November, the Security Council authorized a one-year extension of the ISAF mandate and welcomed a joint letter for the Foreign Ministers of Germany and the Netherlands expressing their willingness to jointly assume command of the force, with some planning and force generation support from NATO. Canada had been approached by the US to consider a leadership role in the ISAF (and was also asked by Germany to consider a military contribution), but declined participation, in part, because of significant concerns regarding the operational challenges inherent in such a role as well as the absence of a clear exit strategy. The CF previously determined that there is no battle group available for deployment before June-July 2003; highly skilled enabling troops are also in short supply. In recent departmental discussions regarding strategic objectives for the CF, it has also been recommended that Canada limit further participation to operations in Afghanistan. • Joint Regional Teams - Although no expansion of the ISAF beyond the Kabul area has been authorized, CENTCOM is developing a novel concept for the deployment of small, mobile “Joint Regional Teams” to establish a more visible international presence outside of Kabul and assist in the coordination of a range of nation-building activities. This concept is likely to be the subject of a forthcoming Request for Forces from the US, however, following trilateral meetings between the US, the UK and Canada on 11 December, we understand that the plan has not yet received Pentagon support. An operational assessment of the feasibility and desirability of CF participation in Joint Regional Teams is being undertaken in anticipation of any eventual US request. • Security Sector Reform - Under Canadian chairmanship, the G-8, along with UNAMA and the Afghan Transitional Authority, is acting as a “contact group” on Afghan security issues to steer programs and strategies for security sector reform. A 2/3 CONFIDENTIAL 000021 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information CONFIDENTIAL number of G-8 countries have agreed to lead various aspects of security sector reform ranging from the UK’s assistance in counter-narcotics and German support to train Afghan police to US and French efforts to train new battalions for a national army. Canada has not been involved in any of these initiatives. The Canadian International Development Agency allocated $15 million for peacebuilding initiatives in Afghanistan, but this funding will not include any training or capacity building for military institutions. Instead, programs involving the RCMP (civilian police assistance), Elections Canada (support for democratic elections), and Justice/Corrections (prison reform) are being planned. CANADIAN POSITION • Canada supports the creation of a stable Afghan central authority capable of providing for its own security needs and preventing the resurgence of terrorist networks within the country. As such, Canada welcomes the establishment of training initiatives for the new Afghan army, police and border forces. • Canada’s contribution to the coalition campaign against terrorism, along with our other current commitments in Bosnia and to United Nations peacekeeping, raises sustainability issues that will have an impact on our ability to commit elsewhere. • Canada is currently considering possible modest follow on contributions to Afghanistan given the redeployment of the Battle Group. Any decision to deploy additional troops would be based on the requirement at that time, as well as Canada’s other military commitments. Prepared by: Director: Director General: Responsible Group Principal: Date prepared: C.Barr, DPKPol 6,996-1741 Col G. Cote, D PK Pol, 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross, DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr. KJ. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-3458 18 December 2002 3/3 CONFIDENTIAL 000022 �Document disclosed under the Access to Informoti Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'ir 000023 i �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information VISIT OF MINISTER McCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 ENHANCING CANADA-US MILITARY COOPERATION SPEAKING POINTS Key messages • I have instructed my department to assign officers to the bi-national Planning Group as soon as possible. • I would be interested in your plans for implementing this agreement. • I would also be interested to know whether you have decided through whom the Head of the Planning Group will report to US authorities - ie, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or through Commander US Northern Command? Issue • Success of Planning Group will depend on a US commitment to fully support the bi-national Planning Group in information sharing, planning, and reporting/attack assessment to both governments. Desired outcome • Rumsfeld commits to support Planning Group activities and ensure rapid and adequate US staffing. 000024 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information VISIT OF MINISTER McCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 ENHANCING CANADA-US MILITARY COOPERATION BRIEFING NOTE ISSUE • To provide an update on the status of the creation of a bi-national Planning Group to enhance Canada-US military cooperation. BACKGROUND • Following the events of September 11th, 2001, Canada and the US examined existing military plans and structures to respond to major crises - such as a terrorist attack or natural disaster. Both governments found that bi-national cooperation is best enhanced by strengthening linkages, rather than relying on ad hoc arrangements. • Formal negotiations to enhance military cooperation began with Cabinet authority given in July 2002. The Canadian and the US negotiating teams reached an interim agreement in November 2002. The Government approved this military cooperation agreement on 03 December. • Key Provisions. The main features of the agreement are: o o o o o o o 1/2 Creation of a “Planning Group” to prepare contingency plans, conduct surveillance, share intelligence, provide governments with attack warning and threat assessment, and validate plans for potential maritime, land and civil support responses; Planning Group will be located at NORAD Headquarters in Colorado Springs, to take advantage of existing infrastructure, proven capabilities and expertise; Development of detailed decision-making arrangements clearly describing the process to be followed to seek governmental approval to act in the event of a crisis; No standing command and control structure or assignment of forces are included; The Planning Group will report to a Canadian, the Deputy Commander NORAD, who will in turn report to both governments; Both governments will exchange classified information pertaining to the missions of the Planning Group; Operational cooperation between respective military forces will occur only under conditions approved by both governments, on a case-by-case basis. 000025 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information o Regular meetings will occur between senior officials from both countries’ departments of defence, foreign affairs, and lead civil agencies (e.g. Solicitor General, Transport, PCO, OCIPEP and relevant US federal departments) to provide policy guidance to the Planning Group. DFAIT is the lead on implementing this provision. • These arrangements will ensure that Canadian sovereignty is protected and will at the same time strengthen military cooperation and support to civilian authorities. DISCUSSION • The initial Canadian participation in the Planning Group will consist of about 15 CF officers. These officers will be in place or posted no later than April 2003. Some positions (about 6-8 personnel) will be filled immediately by existing NORAD Canadian personnel that will be transferred from their current position or will be dual-tasked. A second group of officers will be posted during the summer 2003 period. Additionally, a small number of positions will be filled by Canadian or US contractors. The aim is to have the Planning Group operating by the end of summer 2003. • US plans regarding the implementation of this agreement are not known at the moment. We anticipate that it will not be a problem for the US as Northern Command Headquarters (about 500 in total) will support the Planning Group. We still do not know to whom the head of the Planning Group will report on the US side. It will either be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Commander of US Northern Command. • Initial activity in Colorado Springs includes an intensive three-day planning session on 7-9 January 2003. CONCLUSION • The Planning Group provides an opportunity to work together with the US as sovereign partners, to find ways of enhancing our security, based on our mutual interests, where it makes sense to do so. This initiative is a creative and necessary bilateral response to a heightened security environment that concerns both Canadians and Americans. Prepared by: Director: Director General: Responsible Group Principal: Date: 2/2 Mr Martin Benjamin, D/DWH Pol, 992-4423 Col Richard Williams, DWH Pol, 992-3960 MGen Cameron Ross, DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr Kenneth J. Calder, ADM(Pol), 992-3458 09 Dec 02 000026 �Document disclosed under the Access to Infocmatii Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'inj 000027 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 NORAD SPEAKING POINTS Key messages • Our decision to co-locate the Planning Group with NORAD reaffirms our commitment to bi-national defence of the continent, capitalizes on NORAD’s expertise and capabilities and reinforces a keystone of our defence relationship • Full employment of Canadians in senior NORAD positions is increasingly hampered by imposition of releasibility and disclosure limitations • To sustain effective Canadian participation in NORAD we must be vigilant of these limitations and work to resolve them expeditiously, respecting the laws and policies of our respective countries Issues • Canadian NORAD personnel are frequently being denied access to classified information required for their primary duties through the application of US National Disclosure Policy. • Such limitations are often administrative interpretations based on existing US or Canadian policies (or, in the case of information operations or missile defence, the lack of approved policies), access to information concerning US relationships with other nations (as in the case of theatre ballistic missile launch information), or increasing US sensitivity to Canadian policies on space. • In the past, partial resolution of these situations was possible due in part to the close relationship and collocation of NORAD and Space Command. But, with the reallocation of Space Command to Strategic Command in Omaha, 000028 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Nebraska, these limitations are increasingly evident and more difficult to resolve. And the problem will get more difficult: further development of the missile defence system will require closer integration of sensitive space and ground systems to support NORAD and Strategic Command missions. • Assignment of Canadian Forces officers to senior NORAD positions (including as Command Director in Cheyenne Mountain and Director of Operations for NORAD) is increasingly limited and could be threatened in the longer term if we do not resolve this problem. • More broadly, the Canadian Forces relies on information gained in part by this relationship for the conduct of its domestic and international operations wherein Canada can leverage US military space capabilities and policy, can integrate computer network defence planning, and can foster missile defence policy development. Desired outcome • Secretary Rumsfeld is aware that this problem has potential to hinder our close and effective NORAD and defence relationships • He recognizes that Canada is anxious to deal with such limitations expeditiously while fully respectful of US national disclosure policy. • He is potentially willing to influence US Strategic Command to work cooperatively with NORAD to resolve key issues. 000029 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I’information SECRET VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 NORAD BRIEFING NOTE ISSUE • To provide an update on classified information restrictions imposed by the US on Canadian NORAD personnel. BACKGROUND • Access to classified space-related information is critical to the NORAD surveillance mission. Owing to the previous close relationship between NORAD and US Space Command (Commander NORAD was dual-hatted as Commander US Space Command), Canadian NORAD personnel enjoyed unprecedented access to US space operations and information. Six Canadian NORAD personnel occupied dual-hatted positions in US Space Command. Canadians also occupy space-related positions at other US military installations, such as US Air Force Space Command headquarters, the 21st Space Wing, and various Space Warning Squadrons. • Canadian insight into US space operations and information is being curtailed for two reasons. The first is Canada’s non-participation in US missile defence plans, which relies heavily on space surveillance and communications assets. The second reason is the move of US Space Command from Colorado Springs to Nebraska, where it has been merged into US Strategic Command. The new US Strategic Command is expected to receive responsibility for global management of US missile defence assets. DISCUSSION • Canadian NORAD personnel rely on US space operations and information to carry out their bi-national mission. Canadian NORAD personnel are currently involved in a number of missile warning and space activities within the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, including the Missile Warning Center and the Space Analysis Center. • Canadian access to space operations and information has been diminishing, however. Four of the six Canadian personnel previously occupying US Space Command positions have been asked to return to NORAD. Canadians have been asked to leave the Space Control Center in the Cheyenne Mountain. Canadians stationed at US Air Force Space Command have already been moved or relegated SECRET • 1/2 000030 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET to positions of lesser importance due to US-imposed foreign disclosure restrictions. There is also a push by US Strategic Command to move the Missile Warning Center out of Cheyenne Mountain, which will likely have an impact on Canadian manning in the center. • As space-based infrared sensors and ground-based radars are upgraded by the US for the missile defence of North America, many of which will be controlled in Cheyenne Mountain, the rationale for Canadian positions at the radar sites and in Cheyenne Mountain may be questioned if Canada decides not to participate in missile defence. • If, as expected, the next US Unified Command Plan assigns global responsibility for missile defence to US Strategic Command, Canadian access to space-related information may be further reduced. Command and control for regional missile defence assets will be controlled by the respective regional unified commanders, eg, US Central Command. Command of missile defence assets in North America could go to either NORAD or US Northern Command. In either case, Cheyenne Mountain will house the necessary infrastructure. • It is difficult to predict how a missile defence mission placed in Cheyenne Mountain will affect future Canadian manning in the Command Center if Emergency Defence Operations are ordered post-September 2004, when a rudimentary missile defence capability is expected to become operational. In particular, it is unclear how Canadians will be affected by the existence of two separate chains of command - one for aerospace surveillance/missile warning and another for missile defence operations. • Canadian insight into US missile defence plans has also been reduced. By virtue of their role in space activities, Canadian NORAD personnel had access to the evolving US missile defence concept of operations. Canadian access has now been denied. Furthermore, Canadians involved in missile defence simulation at the Joint National Integration Center have been moved to the international programs office, resulting in reduced access to missile defence information. CONCLUSION • Reduced Canadian access to US space information could impede Canadian NORAD personnel in carrying out their bi-national mission. • There are signs that Canadians may be marginalized increasingly in the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center if Canada decides not to participate in missile defence. Mr. N. Thalakada, DWH Pol 5 996-0063 Mr M Benjamin, D/DWH Pol, 992-4423 Director: Col R. Williams, DWH Pol, 992-3960 Director General: MGen H.C. Ross, DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Responsible Group Principal: Kenneth J. Calder, ADM(Pol), 992-3458 Date: 17 Dec 02 Prepared by: Consulted: SECRET 2/2 000031 �Document disclosed under the Access to Informal! Document divulgue en vertu de la lai sur I'acces a /'ml J 000032 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET VISIT OF MINISTER McCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE SPEAKING POINTS Key Messages • Canada is ready to intensify discussions with the US with a view to reaching a decision soon. • In order to reach such a decision, we need answers from the US to some fundamental questions. Issues • General: What kind of commitments would be required to secure “insight and influence”? How much of a say is the US prepared to let us have in decision-making in the program? • Participation: What could the US need from Canada? • Industrial Model: Is a government-to-government agreement necessary for the participation of Canadian industries? • Command Arrangements: What role, if any, for NORAD? • Current Bilateral Activities: Are we in danger of being denied any and all access to US space information, technology and assets pending a decision on participation? Desired outcomes • The US is reassured that we will make a decision on participation soon. • The US agrees to provide answers on fundamental issues as well as insight into development of the program. SECRET 000033 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lai sur I'acces a /'information SECRET VISIT OF MINISTER McCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE BRIEFING NOTE ISSUE • To provide an update on recent Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) developments. BACKGROUND • Free from ABM Treaty constraints, the Bush Administration has approached NATO and other US allies about participating in a possible global ballistic missile defence system. Over this past summer, United States delegations visited a number of Allied capitals, including Ottawa, with a view to increasing political support and opening the door to potential industrial participation, with briefings that were clearly aimed at European allies. The US has also tried to advance BMD within the Alliance writ large; at the Prague Summit, Heads of State and Government agreed to language suggested by the US supporting the need to “examine options to address the increasing missile threat.” • On 17 December, President Bush confirmed that the US would be deploying a BMD system within two years. While the President’s announcement has been widely reported in the media as a ‘new’ policy direction or a ‘major’ decision, he, in fact, merely reaffirmed his commitments to programs that have been underway for some years now. The President announced that the US would deploy 16 interceptors at the BMD test-bed under construction in Alaska, and would add a second site with 4 interceptors at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Twenty naval interceptors and short-range Army systems will be purchased as planned, and work on space and ground sensors will continue. The budget for BMD will be raised, with another US$1.5 billion being added over the next two years. Now standing at approximately US$9 billion annually, the BMD budget has been roughly tripled since Bush took office. • Although most of the 17 December announcement was unremarkable, there were two noteworthy pieces of information. Implicit in Bush’s commitment to deployment is a shift in emphasis away from research and testing - the time has come to begin deployment, albeit on an admittedly modest scale. The Administration has now publicly committed, at the highest level, to a deployment in 2004. While consistent with Pentagon plans, the US had never officially set an in-service date for BMD, perhaps fearing the political consequences of failing to meet that objective. Second, and more significantly, the US has officially SECRET 1/4 000034 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET requested the use of American radar warning facilities on British and Danish territory. • Reaction to the Bush announcement has been modest. Dmitri Rogozin, the head of the Russian Duma’s international affairs committee, succinctly noted that “in fact, this news is two years old.” Neither President Putin, nor his Defence and Foreign Ministers, nor any other senior officials chose to comment on the Bush announcement, although Russia’s Foreign Ministry released an unsigned statement expressing “regret.” This is the same language Moscow used in commenting upon the passing of the ABM Treaty, and may signal Russia’s tacit acceptance of a situation it has little influence over. The Russian statement also noted that Moscow is seeking “a noticeable role” for its industry in cooperative Theatre Missile Defence programs, either with the US bilaterally or through the Russia-NATO Council. China’s response was equally muted: its Foreign Ministry expressed “worry about the possible impact on regional stability.” In a message likely aimed at Taiwan, Beijing hoped that “relevant parties will act prudently.” Reaction throughout Europe was equally slight, prompting the New York Times to observe that “the most vociferous criticism came not from overseas, but from Canada” - a reference to Minister Graham’s comments quoted in the Canadian press. This follows last week’s statement in The Guardian that Prime Minister Chretien was “not interested” in BMD participation. DISCUSSION • Allied political support for BMD has increased; however, some NATO counties have expressed frustration that the US could not be more precise on such matters as architecture, timelines or command arrangements for this expanded global system. For its part, Washington seems taken aback that not every ally finds the case for joining BMD readily apparent. • While we have questioned US officials in a variety of fora, they have never clearly articulated how they wish to see Canada contribute to a BMD system for North America. For this reason, it remains uncertain what role Canadian territory and/or NORAD could play. The US does not explicitly need either. US Strategic Command and US Element NORAD operate many of the space and warning systems needed for BMD. Similarly, the US will be concentrating on upgrading existing sensor and radars which already provide missile warning, and any potential Canadian contribution would only be to supplement these systems down the road. However, should the US be unable to secure permission from Denmark to use the space-tracking radar at Thule Air Force Base in Greenland, • Assuming Canada agreed to participate in missile defence, our preferred option has always been that this mission should be assigned - or re-assigned - to s.15(1) SECRET 2/4 000035 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I’information SECRET NORAD. As we have it, however, current US thinking envisions Strategic Command having overall command of global BMD resources, with regional commanders exerting direct control over defending their own geographic areas of responsibility. If so, responsibility for continental missile defence could go to either US Northern Command or NORAD. A Canadian decision not to participate in missile defence would almost assuredly lead to a US decision to place continental missile defence responsibility in Northern Command. s.15(1) • The BMD model that Washington has been pitching to allies offers varying degrees of ‘insight and influence’ as well as The details, however, remain murky, partly as a result of the US Missile Defense Agency being a new organization which is still experiencing problems coordinating efforts within the US military. Establishing an international industrial framework under these circumstances will be no easy task. US Undersecretary for Acquisition Pete Aldridge has indicated that he will be writing to ADM (Mat) shortly to answer some questions raised on the margins of a NATO meeting in late October. CONCLUSION • Canada has not yet reached a decision on participation in a North American missile defence system, nor has Washington issued a direct invitation. Washington is likely to intensify its bilateral discussions with allies on this issue, however, notwithstanding its efforts to discuss BMD in NATO and a European context. Much of this attention could well focus on Canada, depending on how receptive we decide to be. Officials have begun delivering the message to the US that Canada is ready to intensify bilateral discussions on BMD, but that we need answers to some fundamental questions before such a decision can be reached recognizing full well that we may never have all the answers we want. • We must recognize that the US will proceed with deployment of a missile defence system regardless of any Canadian decision on participation. No matter what we ultimately decide, we must ensure that NORAD’s role is not diminished. NORAD’s evolving links with Northern Command and US Strategic Command remain of critical importance. Canada might already be in danger of being frozen out of some NORAD/Strategic Command activities, as the US waits for us to make up our mind. • Many in Europe have greeted the President’s 17 December announcement with little more than a “shrug”, in the words of The New York Times-, after all, construction of a global system to defend Europe remains entirely conceptual. The Canadian situation is different, by virtue of our geography and close defence relationship with the US. The construction of a North American system is already underway, and is picking up momentum. Decisions are being made - without Canadian input - which could shape our options for future participation. SECRET 3/4 000036 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur facets a /’information SECRET • An implicit invitation to participate in BMD has been open for some time, and some in Washington question why we continue to delay. Political signals from Ottawa may well have frustrated Washington even further. Setting out clear goals for Canadian policy on BMD and engaging the US as soon as possible will be essential if we are to have any leverage. Continuing to avoid a decision will have diplomatic costs, and will certainly alter how we are viewed as a partner in North American security. Prepared by: Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Corey Michael Dvorkin, DG Pol Plan/D Pol Dev 2, 995-2797 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol) 19 Dec 2002 SECRET 4/4 000037 �Document disclosed under the Access to Informatl Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'irl 000038 I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I’acc&s a /'information NATO CONFIDENTIAL VISIT OF MINISTER McCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 FOLLOW-UP TO PRAGUE SUMMIT SPEAKING POINTS Key messages • Canada fully supports the Prague Capabilities Commitment. • We strongly support the concept of a NATO Response Force, which would provide an alternative to reliance on ad hoc coalitions. • Canada would be interested in contributing to a multi-national brigade. • Exercises and training should not only take place in Europe, but in North America as well. Issue • Our ability to meet the Prague Capabilities Commitment and contribute to the NATO Response Force will in part depend on a budget increase. Desired outcome • Rumsfeld notes our desire to do all we can afford to meet the Prague Capabilities Commitment. NATO CONFIDENTIAL 000039 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information NATO CONFIDENTIAL VISIT OF MINISTER McCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 FOLLOW-UP TO PRAGUE SUMMIT BRIEFING NOTE ISSUE • To provide an update on Prague Summit issues of particular interest to the CanadaUS defence relationship. BACKGROUND • The US has long been critical of the Alliance’s reluctance to commit the funding necessary to address critical operational deficiencies within NATO. These “gaps” were first identified at the Washington Summit in 1999 with the Defence Capabilities Initiative. A number of the most significant (and costly) of these were never addressed and had to be subsequently rolled over into a second program - the Prague Capabilities Commitment - which was approved at the NATO Summit last month. • While the 1999 Defence Capabilities Initiative has been credited with resolving 50 of the 59 “issues” identified for action, the program was also frequently criticized. In particular, the credibility of the Initiative was at issue since no defined measures of success were ever developed to determine if a gap actually had been closed. As well, timelines were exceedingly flexible and individual countries were not required to make concrete financial commitments to any of the goals. With the Prague Capabilities Commitment, both the Sec Gen and the US were very aggressive in their campaign for a smaller, more focussed approach. They also insisted that countries make firm fiscal commitments and agree to defined timelines. DISCUSSION • Neither the US nor the Sec Gen were pleased with the lacklustre response by most nations to the process leading up to the signing of the Capabilities Commitment at Prague in November 2002; nor were they shy in expressing their displeasure. Partially in response to this mediocre reaction, the US introduced the NATO Response Force concept at the Informal Defence Ministers’ meeting in Warsaw in September 2002. The Response Force was intended as a focal point for the Prague Capabilities Commitment as it offered the potential of bringing together a number of the individual initiatives and would provide a significant capability enhancement across the full spectrum of potential operational missions. 1/3 NATO CONFIDENTIAL 000040 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'acc&s d /'information NATO CONFIDENTIAL • Further pressure to support the Prague Capabilities Commitment came in the form of a “Signing Ceremony” which the Sec Gen set up at the last minute at the Summit to cajole members nations to sign up to possible multinational solutions to some of the most pressing operational shortfalls under the aegis of a volunteer lead nation. Germany was lead nation for strategic airlift; first Denmark and then Norway led assured strategic sealift; Spain directed the strategic air-to-air refuelling initiative and the Netherlands’s acted as lead country for F-16 Precision Guided Munitions. Canada signed both the German strategic airlift and the Norwegian strategic sealift Statements of Intent to explore particular options. • In addition to the 12 deficiencies identified in the Prague Capability Commitment, the Sec Gen also urged each Defence Minister to commit to providing additional capabilities at Prague. Canada’s response to this request was as follows: o Acquire new generation support ships (Fully accepted)-, o Fund Canada’s share of the design and development phase of the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance to ensure completion by 2005 (Fully accepted)-, o Acquire tactical Unmanned Air Vehicles for the army by 2004 (Partially accepted)-, and o Stand up a Special Operations Task Group by 2003 (Partially accepted). CANADA’S POSITION • While Canada has been a strong, vocal supporter of both the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the NATO Response Force, tangible commitments are another matter. Until the NATO staffs develop a concept of operations for the NATO Response Force, any commitment of actual forces would be premature. That said, a “quicklook” by DGSP in November suggested Canada might be in a position to commit the following: o Air - 2 x Strategic Air-to-Air Refuelling Aircraft & 6 x CF-18 fighters with Precision Guided Munitions o Land - Light Infantry Battalion Group; Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition Squadron; and Tactical Air Defence or Land Electronic Warfare elements o Sea- Frigate • Canada’s national commitment to the Prague Capabilities Commitment is outlined in the attached list (together with the US commitment). Most of the Canadian commitments reflect projects and/or activities currently in progress. With the matter of the Defence Review/Update still unresolved, Canada is not in a position to make the longer term commitments that the US and the Sec Gen have been pressuring allies to make. 2/3 NATO CONFIDENTIAL 000041 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information NATO CONFIDENTIAL • The goal of the review will be to ensure that Canada’s defence programme is affordable, sustainable and effectively structured to carry out its defence missions. In particular, the review will assess current defence capabilities with a view to ensuring that readiness levels and force structure are in line with available, and with any luck, new resources. Prepared by: Director: Director General: Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Cdr C.D. Gunn, D NATO Pol 3,995-9172 Col J M Snell, DNATO Pol, 995-9155 MGen Cameron Ross, DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr Kenneth J. Calder, ADM(Pol), 992-3458 4 December 2002 3/3 NATO CONFIDENTIAL 000042 �Document disclosed under the Access to Informal^ Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'inl b 000043 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information VISIT OF MINISTER McCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 DEFENCE BUDGET SPEAKING POINTS Key messages • Our recently completed defence update concluded that basic policy assumptions remain valid, but the CF require additional funds. • lam optimistic that government will provide new money in this February’s budget. Issues • US pressure on all allies to make a greater effort. • What the US sees as an insufficient effort may be perceived as a Canadian s.15(1) decision not to help the US defend itself. • US focused on North American defence; it is very aware of what we lack and will do by itself what we cannot help with. • It is no secret that Canada is facing defence budget pressures, the result primarily of Government efforts to reduce public sector debt in the 1990s. • Many critics focus on defence spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product. However, there is another side to the story. • Not all comparisons are unfavourable to us, particularly if one considers that in terms of actual spending, Canada ranks 6th among NATO countries, right after the US, UK, France, Germany and Italy. In fact, Canada ranks 14th in the world by this same measure, after other countries with significantly greater ambitions than us - or neighbours who give them greater cause to spend on defence than Ambassador Celucci’s speeches! 000044 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information • We must also remember that the Government will invest $5.1 billion in National Defence from December 2001 to 2006-07. These additional funds have been most welcome. • Nevertheless, I have made the point publicly that I would like to see us spend more than we do - to take care of our people and allow the Canadian Forces to continue operating as they are today. I have also said that we need to spend more on transformation initiatives to ensure that we do not mortgage our future. • I believe the time is right to address this problem and, to that end, I have asked the Government to provide defence with additional resources. I am optimistic that we’II receive some good news with the next federal budget in February 2003. • In the meantime, the Canadian Forces continue to examine what they do in terms of capabilities and how they can redirect resources to high priority areas. Desired outcomes • US acknowledges that Canada is making efforts to increase defence spending and enhance military capabilities. • US is satisfied that Canada is a reliable partner in defence of North America. • US is satisfied that Canada is a solid ally in NATO and the world. 000045 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 DEFENCE BUDGET BRIEFING NOTE ISSUE • MND’s meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld on 9 January 2003. BACKGROUND • The need to address the problem of public sector debt led to significant cuts in most areas of Canadian Government spending after the Liberals came to power in 1993. National Defence did its part in contributing to this overriding government priority. • The Defence Services Program incurred significant budget reductions as a result of Budget 1994 as well as Program Reviews I and II. As part of the Government’s deficit-reduction plan, National Defence’s funding envelope was cut by $10.8 billion between 1994/95 and 1998/99. In real terms, defence funding declined by 22% over this period. • Canada was certainly not alone in cutting defence spending. Many allies, including the United States, reduced defence expenditures in the early 1990s in anticipation of a post-Cold War “peace dividend”. More recently, some countries have increased spending in response to emerging security threats, including the events of 11 September. The U.S., for example, has recently increased its defence budget for FY2003 to just under US$400 billion, up from about US$354 billion in FY2002. (Since taking office, the Bush Administration has added US$96B to its annual military spending - more than two and a half times the total budget of any NATO ally. In fact, the US spends about twice as much as all of the rest of NATO combined). The U.K. and France have also announced spending increases. At the same time, other countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, are cutting their defence spending. • Although Canada faces budget pressures, it is one of the countries increasing its military budget. The Government will invest $5.1 billion in National Defence from December 2001 to 2006-07. As part of the Defence Update, of course, you have also requested additional funds from the Government in order to stabilize the defence program over the short to medium term. 1 000046 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information DISCUSSION • The U.S. has widely criticized allies over defence spending. American embassies in many countries have been instructed to press governments on this issue, and US officials have done the same in NATO meetings. Given our proximity to the U.S. and our close defence relationship, Canada’s defence spending has been of particular concern to the U.S. post-11 September. Ambassador Celucci has spoken out on the subject on numerous occasions. Secretary Rumsfeld, while very complimentary of Canada’s role in the war on terrorism, stated in November that “there isn’t a country on the face of the earth that can’t afford to spend 2 or 3 (or) 4 per cent of their GDP to contribute to peace and stability in the world”. • U.S. criticism in this area has reflected the views of commentators at home. Many newspaper editorials, for example, have echoed U.S. concerns, while various polls have shown that the Canadian public supports increased defence spending. The House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence and a host of stakeholder groups have also called for increases to the defence budget. The Senate Committee, for example, has called for an additional $4 billion for defence. These reports have tended to focus on increasing defence spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product or per capita. Canada currently ranks 17lh in NATO as a percentage of GDP, while the U.S. ranks 3rd ‘ (see attached tables for more details). • Not all comparisons are unfavourable, particularly if one considers that, in terms of actual spending, Canada ranks 6th among NATO countries, right after the U.S., UK, France, Germany and Italy. By the same measure, Canada ranks 14th in the world after countries with significantly greater ambitions — or more hostile neighbours — than us (the US ranks first in actual spending, but only 53rd as a percentage of GDP). Responsible Group Principal: Prepared by: Consulted: Date: Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-3458 Vincent Rigby, DG Pol Plan/D Pol Dev, 995-2894 Capt (N) E.M. St-Jean, D Budget/DG Fin, 992-4646 19 December 2002 2 000047 �. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information TABLE I Defence Expenditure, 2001 - Top Twenty Countries (US$bn at 2000 constant prices) Rank Country Defence Exp. 1st U.S. 322.365 nd Russia 63.684 ord D China 46.049 4<h Japan 39.513 5 th U.K. 34.714 6Ih France 32.909 •7 th Germany 26.902 8th Saudi Arabia 24.266 The source for these figures is The Military Balance 2002/2003. For consistency in the estimating process, the IISS applies the NATO definition of military spending to all its defence­ expenditure estimates. Although in some cases the figures represent only approximations, it is our view that they provide a reasonable depiction of the order of magnitude of defence expenditures. Comparisons with figures cited in previous editions are difficult because the IISS continually updates its numbers from year to year. Figures can also differ from one source to another (e.g., SIPRI) depending on their definition of terms. 9<h Italy 20.966 NOTES 10th Korea, South 11.165 11th Brazil 10.511 1) U.S. expenditures were roughly equivalent to expenditures of the next 11 highest-spending countries. 12lh Taiwan 10.432 2) NATO’s total was $472.9 bn. Canada ranked 6th. 13th Israel 10.375 14h Canada 7.745 3) U.S. share of NATO expenditures totals about 64.7%. 15th Turkey 7.219 16th Spain 6.938 17th Australia 6.752 18th Netherlands 6.257 19th Mexico 5.733 20th Greece 5.517 4) OECD’s total was $562.3 bn. ranked 8th of 30 countries. Canada 5) “Western” military spending (OECD countries) continues to represent about 67.3% of global defence expenditure as estimated by the IISS for 2001. Source: “The Military Balance 2002-2003", IISS, Oct 02 (Table 26) 000048 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /’information TABLE II Defence Expenditure as % of GDP, 2001 - Top Twenty Countries (2000 constant prices) Rank Country % of GDP 1st Eritrea 20.9 7 nd Angola 17.0 3 rd Oman 14.4 4th Saudi Arabia 14.1 5th Afghanistan 12.2 6th Kuwait 12.1 7th Korea, North 11.6 8th Syria 10.9 9th Ethiopia 9.8 10th Israel 9.5 11th Iraq 9.3 12th DROC 8.9 13th Jordan 8.5 14th Yemen 8.1 15th Vietnam 7.2 16th Qatar 7.1 17th Maldives 6.7 18th Armenia 6.5 19th Algeria 6.3 FRY (Serbia/Montenegro) 6.3 The source for these figures is The Military Balance 2002/2003. For consistency in the estimating process, the IISS applies the NATO definition of military spending to all its defence-expenditure estimates. Although in some cases the figures represent only approximations, it is our view that they provide a reasonable depiction of the order of magnitude of defence expenditures. Comparisons with figures cited in previous editions are difficult because the IISS continually updates its numbers from year to year. Figures can also differ from one source to another (e.g., SIPRI) depending on their definition of terms. NOTES 1) Canada ranked 138th of 170 countries at 1.1% (tied with Haiti, Nicaragua and Paraguay). 2) The U.S. ranked 53 rd at 3.2% (tied with Turkmenistan). 3) Russia ranked 38 th at 4.3% (tied with Sudan). 4) China ranked 43rd at 4.0%. 5) NATO’s average was 2.2%. Canada ranked 17th (out of 18; Iceland not included in data). 6) OECD’s average was 1.8%. Canada ranked 24th of 30 countries. Responsible DG: Daniel L. Bon, DG Pol Plan Prepared by: LCol J.E. Vos, D Pol Dev 3,995-2790 Date: 14 Nov 02 Source: “The Military Balance 2002-2003", IISS, Oct 02 (Table 26) 000049 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information NATO Rankings by Defence Ex ure and % of GDP on Defence (using NATO and IISS data) NATO RESTRICTED Ranking of NATO Countries on Defence Spending in 2001 Ranking of NATO Countries on Defence Spending in 2001 (Data extracted from NATO Semestrial Statistical Memorandum, 21 Jun 02 ($BY)) (Source: "The Military Balance 2002-2003”, IISS, Oct 02 (Table 26)) Rank Country 2 U.S. 2 U.K. 3 France________ 4 Germany______ 5 Italy___________ 6 Canada_______ 7 Turkey________ 8 Spain_________ 9 Netherlands 10|Greece 11 Poland________ Belgium_______ Norway________ Denmark______ Portugal_______ Czech Republic 17 Hungary_______ 18| Luxembourg 12 13 14 15 16 Total Spending 2001 Def Exp ($M US) $305,886 $34,225 $33,496 $27,387 $21,263 $7,368 $7,007 $6,327 $5,590 $3,490 $3,074 $2,986 $2,458 $2,252 $1,190 $926 $148 %of NATO Spending in 2001 Rank 2 Turkey 64.7% 7.2% 7.1% 5.8% 4.5% 2| Greece 3 4 5 6 7 1.6% 1.5% 1.3% 1.2% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% Country U.S. France U.K.___________ Czech Republic Portugal_______ 8 Poland 9 Italy___________ To Norway 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% $472,933 11 Hungary 12 Netherlands 13 Denmark 14 15 16 17 18 2001 Def Exp as a % of GDP Country Rank 5.12 4.79 1 U.S. 2|U.K. 3.00 3 France 4 Germany 5 Italy 2.57 2.40 2.11 2.05 1.97 1.95 1.82 1.79 1.67 1.51 1.48 1.34 Germany Belgium Spain______ Canada Luxembourg 1.12 0.75 .Average % GDP 2.52 1.20 6 Canada 7 Turkey________ 8 Spain_________ 9 Netherlands 10| Greece 11 Poland________ 12 Belgium_______ 13 Norway______ 14 15 16 17 18 Denmark______ Portugal_______ Czech Republic Hungary_______ Luxembourg Total Spending 2001 Def Exp ($M US) %of NATO Spending in 2001 $322,365 $34,714 $32,909 $26,902 $20,966 66.1% 7.1% 6.7% 5.5% $7,219 $6,938 $6,257 $5,517 $3,408 $3,017 $2,967 $2,409 $2,226 $1,167 $909 $145 1.5% 1.4% 1.3% $487,780 4.3% 1.1% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% Rank 1 2 3 4 Country Turkey________ Greece________ U.S.___________ France________ 5 U.K.___________ 6 Czech Republic 7 Italy 8 Poland________ 9 Portugal_______ 10|Hungary 11 Norway________ 12|Netheriands 13 Denmark______ 14 Germany______ 15 Belgium_______ 16 Spain_________ 17 Canada 18 Luxembourg Average % GDP 2001 Def Exp as a % of GDP 5X £8 Z2 Z6 Z£ Z2 ZC ZO ZO 1.8 1.8 12 JI _L5 JI JI JI 0.8 2.2 NATO RESTRICTED Updated 14 November 2002 World Stats 1/2/2003 - 3:56 PM by LCol J.E. Vos, DG Pol Plan/D Pol Dev 3 000050 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lolsur I'acces a I'informotion International Comparison of Defence Expenditures for 2001 - in Constant 2000 $US Billions (Source: IISS Military Balance 2002/2003) $B = $Billion USA (38.6%) S322.4B Russia (7.6%) S63.7B 1 REST OF NATO: NATO minus USA. \ China (5.5%) $46B \ Other (14.1%) S117.5B LIKE-MINDED: Rest of OECD (Australia, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, South Korea, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Switzerland), Israel and Saudi Arabia. STATES OF CONCERN: Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, Syria and Sudan. OTHERS: Includes all others not listed above. NATO (USA + REST OF NATO): 58.4% r States of Concern (1.3%) $11.IB JAPAN: 4.7% V USA + REST OF NATO + LIKE-MINDED: 71.5% ( Like-Minded (13.1%) S109.1B Rest of NATO (19.8%) S165.4B Updated 26 November 2002 By LCol J.E. Vos, DGPol Plan/D Pol Dev 3 000051 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT BRIEFING NOTE ISSUE • To provide an update on US efforts to engage Canada in a bilateral agreement seeking exemption from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. BACKGROUND • Based in The Hague, the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for the most horrific of crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. These crimes are carefully defined under international law and are recognized by the entire international community. Canada provided leadership to international efforts to create the International Criminal Court and was the first country to adopt comprehensive implementing legislation - the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act. • Very clear safeguards are written into the Rome Statute to provide appropriate checks and balances that will preclude politically motivated prosecutions. Nevertheless, fearing that its troops and officials abroad could be tried in a court that is not accountable to US laws or officials, the US is seeking to negotiate agreements to exempt US personnel from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. DISCUSSION • On 24 July, the US Embassy in Ottawa demarched Foreign Affairs, proposing that the US and Canada enter into a bilateral agreement to preclude the surrender of both countries’ nationals to the Court. The US has similarly approached every state in the world with which it has relations; while fifteen smaller states have signed agreements, many European allies and like-minded countries, including Finland, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, have refused. • On 28 October, Minister Graham decided that Canada would not enter into any new agreement with the US. This decision has been relayed through appropriate Foreign Affairs channels. Canada believes that existing bilateral agreements, including the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, provide sufficient protection and that the US proposal, as drafted, was inconsistent with the International Criminal Court Statute. 1/2 000052 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /’information • Canada’s position was determined in light of Canada’s obligations under the International Criminal Court Statute, international law and the views of allies. In addition, Canada believes that launching negotiations with the US to reach a mutually acceptable agreement are unlikely to be successful and would send the wrong signal internationally about Canada’s leadership role in establishing the International Criminal Court. • The US has rejected this line of reasoning and would prefer a separate arrangement that refers directly to international tribunals, including the International Criminal Court. The US will likely continue to seek a bilateral agreement by engaging in discussions on the issue in a variety of forums. The US Ambassador on the International Criminal Court met with Foreign Affairs and Defence officials on 19 December. Canada again indicated that it would not enter into any new agreement with the US. No further discussions are planned at this time. Drafted by: Consulted: Responsible Director: Responsible Director General: Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Updated: Corn Barr, DPK Pol 6, 996-1741 D Law I Col G. Cotd, DPK Pol, 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross, DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-3458 9 December 2002 30 December 2002 2/2 000053 �Document disclosed under the Access to Informatit Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'ini 101 I i 000054 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT SPEAKING POINTS Key messages • Canada believes law-abiding states have nothing to fear from the court, which has rigorous safeguards to protect against any frivolous investigations. • We believe that existing Status of Forces Agreements provide US forces in Canada sufficient protection. As such, Canada will not sign a new bilateral agreement. Issues • The US has rejected the Canadian position and would prefer a separate arrangement to exempt US personnel from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. • Washington may ask Ottawa to sign ad hoc pledges of immunity for US forces before joint operations are approved. Desired outcome • The US agrees to continue to engage in broader dialogue regarding the International Criminal Court, but accepts Canada’s decision not to enter into a bilateral agreement. 000055 �K. Document disclosed under the Access to Informoti] Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /7nl 000056 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'inforeflation FURTADO Francis -WSHDC -GR -C4 December 4,2002 11:13AM -EXTOTT -MML -C4 -EXTOTT -USS -C4; -EXTOTT -DMT -C4; -EXTOTT -DMA -C4; EXTOTT -MDM -C4; -EXTOTT -MJW -C4; -EXTOTT,-MDW -C4; EXTOTT -MJM -C4; -EXTOTT -CPP -C4; -EXTOTT -CPD -C4; EXTOTT -NAD -C4; -EXTOTT -IDD -C4; -EXTOTT -NUR -C4; EXTOTT -NUE -C4; -EXTOTT -NUB -C4; -EXTOTT -EAD -C4; EXTOTT -EAI-C4; -EXTOTT -EAT -C4; -EXTOTT -EAR -C4; EXTOTT -EPS -C4; -EXTOTT -IMD -C4; -EXTOTT -IMO -C4; EXTOTT -ISD -C4; -EXTOTT -ISI-C4; -EXTOTT -IDR -C4; -EXTOTT IDC -C4; -EXTOTT -IDA -C4; -EXTOTT -GMR -C4; -EXTOTT -GMD C4; -NDHQ OTT ADM (POL) -C4; -NDHQ OTT DG POL PLAN -C4; NDHQ OTT DGISPOL -C4; -NDHQ OTT D POL DEV -C4; -NDHQ OTT DWH POL -C4; -NDHQ OTT D Cabinet Ln -C4; Privy Council Office -C4R; Privy Council Office I Foreign & Defence Policy -C4R; BFALO -SFAX DE OTT; -CHCGO -SFAX DE OTT; -DALAS -SFAX DE OTT; -DTROT -SFAX DE OTT; -LNGLS -SFAX DE OTT; -MIAMI SFAX DE OTT; -MNPLS -SFAX DE OTT; -CNGNY -SFAX DE OTT; SEATL -SFAX DE OTT; -PRMOAS -HOM -C4; -PRMOAS -C4; KERGIN Michael -WSHDC -HOM -C4; COTE Berlin -WSHDC D/HOM -CDM/A -C4; BOEHM Peter -WSHDC -GR -C4; FORTIER Patricia -WSHDC -GR -C4; -WSHDC -CDLS(W) -DR -C4; -WSHDC EC -C4; -WSHDC -IM -C4; -WSHDC -PA -C4; -WSHDC -PL -C4; WSHDC -TD -C4; -WSHDC -GR -C4; CCATS UNGR0341: Canada-US Relations - Background Material From: Sent: To: Co: Subject: CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) DND: Please pass to DM/Bloodworth/Vigneault, Assoc. DM/Purdy PCO: Please pass to Assoc. Clerk/Bilodeau, Ops/Fonberg, Borders Task Force/Flack/Wiebe We have attached some background material on Canada-US relations that was prepared in advance of Ambassador Kergin's presentation to Cabinet on November 19th. CDA-US.1page.wpd Drafted/Consulted: Approved: CDA-US.text.wpd Embassy sections P. Fortier 000057 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /’information CANADA-US RELATIONS - OVERVIEW The mid-term Congressional elections were a triumph for the Republicans, underwritten by ongoing concerns about security, coupled with the voter’s endorsement of George Bush as a wartime leader. • The results reflect the lasting impact of September 11th on the US psyche. The US is a country already at war, and may be about to expand the conflict to Iraq. • At home, a far-reaching sense of insecurity pervades the US body politic, and the Administration is about to proceed with the most significant changes to US government since the Second World War to address this threat. • As far as Canada-US relations is concerned, Secretary Powell’s visit to Ottawa was encouraging in that it reflected a US desire to engage Canada, and resulted in usefully clarifying both sides’ understanding of key issues. • Nevertheless, the prevailing environment in the US dominated by the campaign against terrorism abroad and sweeping measures to strengthen security at home stands to challenge long-standing assumptions that have governed the way in which we manage our relationship with the US, both in North America and in terms of our approach to international issues. • The US no longer automatically factors allied concerns into its decisions simply because they are traditional allies. Influential allies will be those which self-select. We can choose to partner with them ^or not, but they will take note of our decisions. Our decisions on Iraq stand to shape US perceptions of ^Canada as a dependable ally. • At home, the US focus on homeland security has major implications for the border, and each country’s each country’s conception of the border may be diverging. For us, it is about preserving access for Canadians as well as Canadian goods, services, and investment. For the US, it is about ensuring security from the potential threats that come with access. • The prospect of the US taking action across a wide variety of sectors (immigration, law enforcement, defence) to support the strategic goal of strengthening homeland security could have far-reaching implications for Canada. Considered of itself, each US initiative might look like an incremental change in a discrete area. However, the initiatives will be part of a broader agenda, the cumulative effect of which could recast our personality as a North American country. • In the area of trade and energy policy, the advent of the 108th Congress may provide reasons for guarded optimism, allowing for the fact that our terms of reference are the outgoing 107th Congress. We should not expect the Administration or Congress to reverse itself on major environmental issues (Kyoto, the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge), but we may see progress taken at the local level and, to a lesser extent, by private enterprise. • Managing the operational aspects of the bilateral relationship in the post-election environment will require us to stay out in front of the issues, define our objectives, s.15(1) 000058 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information CONTEXT The political scene. The mid-term Congressional elections were a triumph for the Republicans, underwritten by ongoing concerns about security, coupled with the voter’s endorsement of George Bush as a wartime leader. Although the Republicans do not have a completely free hand with the social and economic aspects of their agenda, Americans have united behind Bush and the Republicans on security, which remains the dominant political issue. The election results were a remarkable achievement for the Republicans. Yes, voter turnout remained low (39%), and after the most expensive congressional election in US history (approximately $1 billion), less than two percent of the seats to be contested in the House, and 15 percent in the Senate, changed hands. Nevertheless, for the first time in over 100 years, the party of an incumbent Administration regained control of the Senate. The Republican win is all the more remarkable given the economic downturn, and financial scandals that have prompted questions about important aspects of the US economy - particularly in the area of corporate governance. Against this backdrop, the election clearly demonstrated the considerable political strengths of President Bush who made an exceptional effort -- in terms of time and fund-raising - on behalf of Republican candidates. In the electoral game, the Democrats chose not only the wrong plays (absenting themselves from the debate on Iraq), but the wrong game plan, by highlighting issues, (the economy or the future of social programs) where there was little in the way of policy to distinguish them from the Republicans. Policy Issues: Security First The elections underscored the abiding importance of security — domestic and international - on the US political scene. This is the issue that the Republicans on which the Republicans won, and one that will remain a key focus for at least the next two years. It is also the prism through which the country at large has come to view many issues. International security. Sometimes, it is strangely easy to forget this, but the US is at war. Its military personnel are engaged in ongoing operations in Afghanistan, other parts of South Asia, and the Hom of Africa, and Iraq may be next. All of this has produced a wartime mentality that is often lost on other countries. Eighteen months ago, it would have been fashionable to say that the US was ‘unilateralist’ - quite willing to impose its will on the world. Since then, the US has demonstrated a willingness to work with other countries. They have done this bilaterally (with various partners in the campaign in Afghanistan) and multilaterally (as evidenced by a 15-0 vote on the question of Iraq at the UN Security Council). All of this is encouraging, but we should bear in mind that the Administration (supported by sentiment in Congress and the public at large) continues to the evaluate the international response to current issues very carefully. Who is with us? Who isn’t? 000059 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgu# en vertu de la Loi sur I'acc&s a I'information Iraq will bring this way of looking at the world to the forefront. The US (led, within the US government, by Colin Powell) worked hard to gain a UN Security Council resolution that makes clear Iraq’s obligation to divest itself of any weapons of mass destruction, or face the prospect of being disarmed by force. The US regards us not only as a potential ally in this campaign, but as one of the countries that urged it to work for a UN resolution. So they are looking to us to support them, whether the resolution brings about the peaceful disarmament of Iraq or not. At the end of the day, our decisions on Iraq may have a significant impact on US perceptions of Canada as a dependable ally. Defence. The US is on a campaign to get all of its allies to spend more on defence. This may be less a matter of specific dollar figures (although more money is always nice) than the level of useful military capability that the US can count on allies to field. The US will be watching for indications that we will make the investments that will enable us to continue to play our historic role in international security. The new focus on homeland security has also raised the salience of Canadian geography as potential avenue of attack against the US - so the US will want us to be a reliable partner there too. Missile defence is the other major bilateral defence issue on the horizon. Although the deployment of a system is several years away, planning is underway now, and decisions on command and control are not far off. If we want to influence the development of a system that will have the potential to defend Canadian territory, the time is drawing near for us to indicate our interest in participation. Domestic security. Quite apart from the memory of September 11th and the possibility of war with Iraq, the ensuing anthrax scares, periodic security alerts, heightened security at all ports of entry, and the sniper attacks in Washington have produced a situation where domestic security has become a prominent, pervasive influence on the US agenda. With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and Northern Command, the US government is poised to embark on the most significant reorganization of itself since the end of the Second World War. With the founding legislation of the DHS now signed into law - and the resources there for the asking - the DHS stands to become a juggernaut that will sweep a lot of other interests, national and bilateral, aside. The Border. Canada and the US have a shared interest in the co-management of the border, and we’ve worked well on the issue so far. But the days of the ‘undefended border’ are over. What stands to become more significant, however, are the divergent conceptions that the two countries appear to be developing about what the border means. For the Americans, successful border management is increasingly about containing the potential threats that integration poses to their safety. For Canada, successful border management is about preserving the access that Canadians and Canadian goods, services, and investment have to the US. The first impulse of US officials when it comes to our border issues is to liken it to those which they face on their southern frontiers (Mexico). Moreover, there are competing views within the executive and legislative branch as to whether the border is about ensuring the free 000060 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information movement of people and goods (which benefits both countries) or about law enforcement and immigration policy. Taken together, this suggests that, as much as has already been done to tighten control of the border, the prospect of additional measures will remain on the agenda. With security holding the edge over trade in the battle for priorities, it is not at all clear that we will be able to secure exemptions from NSEERS or similar additional measures to come (as illustrated by the recent Congressional initiative to have a full-scale entry/exit program in place by 2005, which threatens the progress achieved on the Smart Border Accord, and the nature of border access as a whole). The need to ensure the safe and efficient movement of people and goods across the most economically valuable border is obvious - as are our shared objectives with respect to countering terrorism and crime. The individual sectors (customs, immigration, intelligence) work well together, and have done so for years. However, the current US political dynamic (security first) and growing bureaucratic momentum (the creation of the leviathan Department of Homeland Security) confronts us with a new situation. Indeed, the prospect of the US taking action across a wide variety of sectors (immigration, law enforcement, defence) to support the strategic goal of strengthening homeland security could have far-reaching implications for Canada. Considered of itself, each US imitative might look like an incremental change in a discrete area. However, the initiatives will be part of a broader agenda, the cumulative effect of which could recast our personality as a North American country. Economic, Trade, Energy and the Environment: Room for Guarded Optimism? Economic policy. President Bush has promised a new “economic stimulus” package early next year, which was widely expected to include significant tax cuts. Republican leaders have suggested that this package will include a number of relatively modest tax measures. While tax cuts remain high on the GOP agenda, they are competing with demands for higher spending on defence and homeland security as well as a politically-popular prescription drug benefit for seniors. The Republican tax strategy will have two key elements. The first will be a political push to make last year’s SI.35 trillion tax cut package permanent. The second will be a stimulus package tied to economic recovery. This could include an immediate increase in the child tax credit, a rise in contribution limits for retirement savings accounts and an expansion of tax breaks for business investment. Strategically, the Republicans will try to shoehom many of these tax cuts into the budget reconciliation exercise, which requires only a simple majority in the Senate rather than the 60 votes that are required for most measures. Even with modest tax cuts, private sector forecasters expect that the US budget deficit will rise from SI60 billion this year to S200250 billion in fiscal 2003. Trade policy. It will be useful to remember that the 108th Congress will not be more willing than the 107th to endorse changes to US trade laws. Nor will it deal away protections for entrenched agricultural sectors, the steel trade, textiles and lumber. And a Republican Administration will be anxious to demonstrate that the system of trade agreements is serving US interests and to show its determination to enforce those agreements. That said, the starting point for debate will be more positive than what we saw with the 107th Congress. 000061 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information In terms of the forward trade agenda for the 108th Congress, there are three dimensions of interest to Canada. First, the impact on bilateral trade files. Second, the implications for US compliance with WTO decisions. Finally, the prospects for future trade deals requiring Congressional approval. We anticipate that the prospects for a negotiated, long-term, policy-based solution to the softwood lumber dispute will improve. The results of the election help to create an environment in which the Administration is better able to defy extremist demands from the US Lumber Coalition in Congress. The change in Congressional leadership will assist an Administration that is eager to demonstrate its free-trade credentials, including a message that US trade laws do work to achieve market-opening and “fair trade”. Other contentious issues -- such as agriculture and steel — may also be easier to address. On wheat, the Administration’s earlier promises to pursue a WTO case against the Canadian Wheat Board will not have the same urgency. On steel, the US industry can continue to count on influential supporters in Congress. Canada’s decision on safeguard actions against steel imports will be watched closely, and we can expect a swift negative reaction from Congress if US exports are included in the action. That said, the Parliamentary Steel Caucus has established a good working relationship with its Congressional counterpart and this will generate support for a North American initiative on steel. Creation of a government-led, North American forum to discuss issues relating to the steel trade may help to shield Canadian producers from the numerous protectionist actions promoted by the US industry. Apart from bilateral trade issues, we will watch how the new Congress deals with major WTO decisions. These disputes will put to the test Congressional willingness to uphold the US Government position since the establishment of the WTO that the US will abide by WTO dispute settlement decisions. The 107th Congress saw much criticism of specific WTO decisions and the Trade Promotion Authority bill contains a negotiating objective calling for the Administration to “rein in” the WTO Appellate Body in instances where it is considered to have overstepped its authority (particularly in relation to decisions finding against US trade law). Looking ahead to further negotiations to liberalize trade, Ambassador Zoellick will see the new Republican-controlled Congress as more receptive to the Administration’s ambitions for trade agreements with a growing list of bilateral partners (Chile and Singapore first, followed by Central America, Morocco, Southern Africa, Australia and down the road, the ASEAN countries). Similarly, US leadership in WTO and FTAA negotiations is more likely in a Republican-controlled Congress with an Administration that has nailed its colours to the mast of open markets as the best hope to achieve economic, political and social development at home and abroad. Energy. Aided by a Republican-controlled Senate, an energy bill will be vigorously pursued in the new Congress and we are likely to face challenges to our interests similar to those found in the last bill (Alaskan pipeline subsidies, electricity policy). Advancing Canadian energy interests will benefit from a pro-active strategy that engages 000062 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information the Administration on our mutual energy objectives. More intensive work with the US on energy (whether in bilateral or trilateral fora) offers an opportunity to underscore Canada’s special relationship with the US in a vital economic sector and will assist in managing the inevitable problems that re-emerge in an energy bill. Environment. At first blush, the elections would not seem to have handed us a propitious climate for forward-looking environmental policy. And, to an extent, that’s true: we will not see the U.S. ratify Kyoto, and any future energy bill is likely to contain provisions for drilling in the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge. The Administration and Congress are also likely to move in favour of reducing the environmental regulatory burden on private enterprise and devolve more of the responsibility for environmental stewardship to the state and local level. That said, this dynamic could yield limited progress - at the state and/or local level (to which most eyes will be turned, as little is expected at the federal level) and possibly in terms of limited government funding for S&T or R&D advances by private enterprise (which may see money to be made in environmentally-friendly technologies). MANAGING THE RELATIONSHIP The ongoing challenge will be to manage the relationship in a way that balances security and prosperity, and shores up our image as one of a select group of American allies. Secretary Powell’s visit to Ottawa was encouraging in that it reflected a US desire to engage Canada, and resulted in usefully clarifying both sides’ understanding of key issues. However, the new environment challenges long-standing assumptions that have governed how we manage our relationship with the US. The US no longer automatically factors in the views of traditional allies when it makes its decisions on foreign and security policy. The countries that will influence US policy will be those that choose to engage with them - effectively, self-selecting allies and partners. We can choose to engage or not - but they will take note of our decisions, and deal us in or out of future decisions accordingly. In North America, the comfortable era of Canadian exceptionalism may well be over. The emergence of these factors will confront us with fundamental questions about how we manage the bilateral relationship, and what type of country we want to be. We will also be dealing with new partners (nine new border state governors, a leviathan Department of Homeland Security). The key for us will be to stay out in front of emerging problems, identify our interests, and take advantage of our small size to exploit our power of proposal: the opportunity that we have to be the first to propose solutions and set the agenda s.15(1) 000063 �Document disclosed under the Access to Informail Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a l'in\ i i 12 ■ 000064 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'occis a I'information THE HONORABLE DONALD RUMSFELD f S' Secretary of Defense r<--— £. I Donald H. Rumsfeld was sworn in as the 21st Secretary of Defense on January 20, 2001. Before assuming his present post, the former Navy pilot had also served as the 13th Secretary of Defense, White House Chief of Staff, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, U.S. Congressman and chief executive officer of two Fortune 500 companies. Secretary Rumsfeld is responsible for directing the actions of the Defense Department in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The war is being waged against a backdrop of major change within the Department of Defense. The department has developed a new defense strategy and replaced the old model for sizing forces with a newer approach more relevant to the 21st century. Secretary Rumsfeld proposed and the President approved a significant reorganization of the worldwide command structure, known as the Unified Command Plan, that resulted in the establishment of the U.S. Northern Command and the U.S. Strategic Command, the latter charged the responsibilities formerly held by the Strategic and Space Commands which were disestablished. The Department also has refocused its space capabilities and fashioned a new concept of strategic deterrence that increases security while reducing strategic nuclear weapons. To help strengthen the deterrent, the missile defense research and testing program has been reorganized and revitalized, free of the restraints of the ABM treaty. Mr. Rumsfeld attended Princeton University on academic and NROTC scholarships (A.B., 1954) and served in the U.S. Navy (1954-57) as an aviator and flight instructor. In 1957, he transferred to the Ready Reserve and continued his Naval service in flying and administrative assignments as a drilling reservist until 1975. He transferred to the Standby Reserve when he became Secretary of Defense in 1975 and to the Retired Reserve with the rank of Captain in 1989. In 1957, he came to Washington, DC to serve as Administrative Assistant to a Congressman. After a stint with an investment banking firm, he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from Illinois in 1962, at the age of 30, and was re-elected in 1964, 1966, and 1968. Mr. Rumsfeld resigned from Congress in 1969 during his fourth term to join the President's Cabinet. From 1969 to 1970, he served as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity and Assistant to the President. From 1971 to 1972, he was Counsellor to the President and Director of the Economic Stabilization Program. In 1973, he left Washington, DC, to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels, Belgium (1973-1974). In August 1974, he was called back to Washington, DC, to serve as Chairman of the transition to the 000065 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information Presidency of Gerald R. Ford. He then became Chief of Staff of the White House and a member of the President's Cabinet (1974-1975). He served as the 13th U.S. Secretary of Defense, the youngest in the country's history (1975-1977). From 1977 to 1985 he served as Chief Executive Officer, President, and then Chairman of G.D. Searle & Co., a worldwide pharmaceutical company. The successful turnaround there earned him awards as the Outstanding Chief Executive Officer in the Pharmaceutical Industry from the Wall Street Transcript (1980) and Financial World (1981). From 1985 to 1990 he was in private business. Mr. Rumsfeld served as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of General Instrument Corporation from 1990 to 1993. General Instrument Corporation was a leader in broadband transmission, distribution, and access control technologies. Until being sworn in as the 21st Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld served as Chairman of the Board of Gilead Sciences, Inc., a pharmaceutical company. Before returning for his second tour as Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld chaired the bipartisan U.S. Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, in 1998, and the U.S. Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organization, in 2000. During his business career, Mr. Rumsfeld continued his public service in a variety of Federal posts, including: • • • • • • • • • • Member of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control (1982 - 1986); Special Presidential Envoy on the Law of the Sea Treaty (1982 - 1983); Senior Advisor to the President's Panel on Strategic Systems (1983 - 1984); Member of the U.S. Joint Advisory Commission on U.S./Japan Relations (1983 - 1984); Special Presidential Envoy to the Middle East (1983 - 1984); Member of the National Commission on Public Service (1987 - 1990); Member of the National Economic Commission (1988 - 1989); Member of the Board of Visitors of the National Defense University (1988 - 1992); Member of the Commission on U.S./Japan Relations (1989 - 1991); and Member of the U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission (1999 - 2000). While in the private sector, Mr. Rumsfeld's civic activities included service as a member of the National Academy of Public Administration and a member of the boards of trustees of the Gerald R. Ford Foundation, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and the National Park Foundation, and as Chairman of the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships, Inc. In 1977, Mr. Rumsfeld was awarded the nation's highest civilian award, the Presidential Medal of Freedom. http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/secdef_bio.html 000066 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00002 Title A name given to the resource Minister's Visit Washington DC 9-10 January, 2003 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource January 8-10, 2003 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived BAN 2014-01289-X, Box 12, File no. MCU2003-00765 – Ministers Visit Washington DC 8-10 January 2003, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10029 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/aa2bb86e7e995905b65a490a5531d160.pdf c1c707cf29290ce887d29e9171809fff PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 UPDATE ON POSSIBLE ACTION AGAINST IRAQ SPEAKING POINTS Key messages • Canada remains committed to the UN Security Council process and an effective UN weapons inspection and destruction program and will assist that process where possible. • Canada strongly prefers that Iraq be disarmed peacefully. • Should Iraq fail to meet its obligations and the Security Council explicitly authorizes the use of force, Canada will participate in a military coalition to enforce Council resolutions. • Should the UN process ultimately fail and no explicit authorization of force is given, Canada will at that time decide whether to participate in a proposed military coalition. • Notwithstanding our ultimate level of participation, Canada will leave exchange and liaison officers in their present positions. • The Canadian Forces will undertake military-to-military discussions with US planners to gather information and discuss possible Canadian contributions. Issues • Determine what kind of military contribution Canada could most usefully provide. • An early US decision to begin military action could limit Canadian participation to post-combat operations. SECRET 000013 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET Desired outcome • US is comfortable with Canada’s efforts to seek additional information about US military planning without a firm commitment to make a military contribution at this stage. SECRET 000014 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00003 Title A name given to the resource Update on Possible Action Against Iraq (Speaking Points) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource January 8-10, 2003 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived BAN 2014-01289-X, Box 12, File no. MCU2003-00765 – Ministers Visit Washington DC 8-10 January 2003, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10029 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5e6f77dcb7eb1b4e2225ea654cb17fb7.pdf 99e803ba1230d70da91ddf6b75f8d749 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON, DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 UPDATE ON POSSIBLE ACTION AGAINST IRAQ BRIEFING NOTE ISSUE • To provide an update on the potential for unilateral or multilateral action against Iraq and the developing Canadian policy position. This remains a dynamic issue and events will continue to unfold rapidly. BACKGROUND • Iraq has thus far met the deadlines imposed by Security Council Resolution 1441: it has accepted the terms of the resolution and produced a 12,000 page declaration of its nuclear, chemical, biological and missile programs. In discussions between the Canadian and Iraqi Permanent Representatives in New York, Iraq indicated that although it disagrees with many of the premises of Resolution 1441, it will cooperate with United Nations weapons inspectors. • Both the US and the UK have categorically emphasized that the resolution provides for “serious consequences” if Iraq is found in violation of its obligations. President Bush has said Resolution 1441 “presents the Iraqi regime with a final test”, and Prime Minister Blair indicated that the “consequences are clear”. The US has stated that while it will consult the Security Council before engaging in any action against Iraq, its position is that the US does not require UN approval for US-led military action if Iraq fails to disarm. Most allies will likely accept efforts to disarm Iraq of proven weapons of mass destruction capabilities as a basis for US-led military action. DISCUSSION • On 19 December, in their first formal briefing to the Security Council following Iraq’s declaration regarding its weapons programs, UN inspectors indicated that they still require “much more cooperation” from Iraq. The inspectors also said that the declaration leaves many unanswered questions and contains very little by way of evidence concerning weapons of mass destruction programs. This briefing was merely a preliminary assessment of the content of the declaration; a full UN assessment of all data provided by Iraq will likely be completed by mid- to lateJanuary. Following the briefing, the US administration reiterated its view that Iraq remains in “material breach of Resolution 1441”, but that this failure to comply does not yet constitute a trigger for the use of force. 1/3 SECRET 000015 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET • Open sources confirm that the US is proceeding with a build-up of forces and logistics in the Persian Gulf area. It is estimated that the US already have 50,000 land-based personnel in the region and all of the key elements necessary to begin an air campaign and light ground force operations will be in place by the beginning of January. If the ground forces build-up continues at the current rate, armored forces could be ready for action by mid- to late-January during what is known as the best “campaign season”. While the first official UN inspection report is not expected until mid-May, inspectors are scheduled to provide an interim report to the Security Council on 27 January (in accordance with Resolution 1441). • On 5 December, Canada provided a preliminary response to the US request for a contribution of military assets to any possible action against Iraq. As a first step, the Canadian Forces will seek information for use in developing options for the Government while at the same time discussing possible Canadian contributions in detail. A command and control exercise, INTERNAL LOOK, occurred from 9 to 16 December, but Canada’s decision to engage in military-to-military discussions occurred too late for a Canadian officer to observe the exercise. The Chief of the Defence Staff has since spoken with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; subsequently three Canadian Forces officers have deployed to Tampa to begin initial discussions with US planners. Any decision to commit Canadian Forces assets would be predicated on a Security Council authorization of the use of force or, absent such explicit authorization, would be decided according to the circumstances at the time. The US has indicated that other allies, including Spain and Italy, have placed similar caveats on their participation in a campaign against Iraq. • US officials have said that while they would prefer unconditional military commitments from allies at this stage, Canada’s position is “understandable” in light of the evolving international situation. The US is looking forward to moving ahead with military consultations and, as such, welcomed Canada’s decision to engage in discussions regarding possible military contributions in the event that use of force becomes necessary. In discussions with senior officials from National Defence and Foreign Affairs, the US political director indicated that the US is not committed to military action at this stage; the President has yet to take a decision. CANADIAN POSITION • The Canadian position on the Iraq situation has not changed. The Government has been very much in favor of a strong resolution that addresses the need for Iraq to comply with all of its obligations to UN resolutions and that indicates that there will be serious consequences for non-compliance. Resolution 1441 provides inspectors with the full backing of the international community to perform their duty without interference. It is now up to Iraq to fulfill its responsibilities without condition or delay. • The Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have noted Canada’s concern about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs, but have indicated our preference 2/3 SECRET 000016 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET that the issue be dealt with through the UN (i.e., through the re-establishment of the present UN inspection mechanism). On 10 October, the Prime Minister indicated that if UN inspections determined that Iraq continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, Canada would support military action. • Canada is not privy to Iraq’s declaration of its weapons programs, which was submitted to the inspectors and the Security Council. As such, Canada looks forward to the Security Council’s full assessment of the documents. • Should Canada decide to participate in a military coalition against Iraq, Canada may contribute assets from among a range of sea, land and air capabilities, including, but not necessarily restricted to those currently dedicated to the coalition campaign against terrorism (2 ships, 2 maritime patrol aircraft and 2 to 3 transport aircraft). Prepared By: Responsible Director: Responsible Director-General Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Updated: 3/3 SECRET Corri Barr, D PK Pol 6. 996-1741 Col G. C6t6, DPK Pol, 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross. DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-3458 9 December 2002 2 January 2003 000017 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00004 Title A name given to the resource Update on Possible Action Against Iraq (Briefing Note) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource January 8-10, 2003 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived BAN 2014-01289-X, Box 12, File no. MCU2003-00765 – Ministers Visit Washington DC 8-10 January 2003, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10029 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/2192d959f220899aad29d34a8a4e6ed7.pdf c85580678107b3986a1cd8353b431d80 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'inforeflation From: Sent: To: Co: Subject: CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) FURTADO Francis -WSHDC -GR -C4 December 4,2002 11:13AM -EXTOTT -MML -C4 -EXTOTT -USS -C4; -EXTOTT -DMT -C4; -EXTOTT -DMA -C4; EXTOTT -MDM -C4; -EXTOTT -MJW -C4; -EXTOTT,-MDW -C4; EXTOTT -MJM -C4; -EXTOTT -CPP -C4; -EXTOTT -CPD -C4; EXTOTT -NAD -C4; -EXTOTT -IDD -C4; -EXTOTT -NUR -C4; EXTOTT -NUE -C4; -EXTOTT -NUB -C4; -EXTOTT -EAD -C4; EXTOTT -EAI-C4; -EXTOTT -EAT -C4; -EXTOTT -EAR -C4; EXTOTT -EPS -C4; -EXTOTT -IMD -C4; -EXTOTT -IMO -C4; EXTOTT -ISD -C4; -EXTOTT -ISI-C4; -EXTOTT -IDR -C4; -EXTOTT IDC -C4; -EXTOTT -IDA -C4; -EXTOTT -GMR -C4; -EXTOTT -GMD C4; -NDHQ OTT ADM (POL) -C4; -NDHQ OTT DG POL PLAN -C4; NDHQ OTT DGISPOL -C4; -NDHQ OTT D POL DEV -C4; -NDHQ OTT DWH POL -C4; -NDHQ OTT D Cabinet Ln -C4; Privy Council Office -C4R; Privy Council Office I Foreign & Defence Policy -C4R; BFALO -SFAX DE OTT; -CHCGO -SFAX DE OTT; -DALAS -SFAX DE OTT; -DTROT -SFAX DE OTT; -LNGLS -SFAX DE OTT; -MIAMI SFAX DE OTT; -MNPLS -SFAX DE OTT; -CNGNY -SFAX DE OTT; SEATL -SFAX DE OTT; -PRMOAS -HOM -C4; -PRMOAS -C4; KERGIN Michael -WSHDC -HOM -C4; COTE Berlin -WSHDC D/HOM -CDM/A -C4; BOEHM Peter -WSHDC -GR -C4; FORTIER Patricia -WSHDC -GR -C4; -WSHDC -CDLS(W) -DR -C4; -WSHDC EC -C4; -WSHDC -IM -C4; -WSHDC -PA -C4; -WSHDC -PL -C4; WSHDC -TD -C4; -WSHDC -GR -C4; CCATS UNGR0341: Canada-US Relations - Background Material DND: Please pass to DM/Bloodworth/Vigneault, Assoc. DM/Purdy PCO: Please pass to Assoc. Clerk/Bilodeau, Ops/Fonberg, Borders Task Force/Flack/Wiebe We have attached some background material on Canada-US relations that was prepared in advance of Ambassador Kergin's presentation to Cabinet on November 19th. CDA-US.1page.wpd Drafted/Consulted: Approved: CDA-US.text.wpd Embassy sections P. Fortier 000057 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /’information CANADA-US RELATIONS - OVERVIEW The mid-term Congressional elections were a triumph for the Republicans, underwritten by ongoing concerns about security, coupled with the voter’s endorsement of George Bush as a wartime leader. • The results reflect the lasting impact of September 11th on the US psyche. The US is a country already at war, and may be about to expand the conflict to Iraq. • At home, a far-reaching sense of insecurity pervades the US body politic, and the Administration is about to proceed with the most significant changes to US government since the Second World War to address this threat. • As far as Canada-US relations is concerned, Secretary Powell’s visit to Ottawa was encouraging in that it reflected a US desire to engage Canada, and resulted in usefully clarifying both sides’ understanding of key issues. • Nevertheless, the prevailing environment in the US dominated by the campaign against terrorism abroad and sweeping measures to strengthen security at home stands to challenge long-standing assumptions that have governed the way in which we manage our relationship with the US, both in North America and in terms of our approach to international issues. • The US no longer automatically factors allied concerns into its decisions simply because they are traditional allies. Influential allies will be those which self-select. We can choose to partner with them ^or not, but they will take note of our decisions. Our decisions on Iraq stand to shape US perceptions of ^Canada as a dependable ally. • At home, the US focus on homeland security has major implications for the border, and each country’s each country’s conception of the border may be diverging. For us, it is about preserving access for Canadians as well as Canadian goods, services, and investment. For the US, it is about ensuring security from the potential threats that come with access. • The prospect of the US taking action across a wide variety of sectors (immigration, law enforcement, defence) to support the strategic goal of strengthening homeland security could have far-reaching implications for Canada. Considered of itself, each US initiative might look like an incremental change in a discrete area. However, the initiatives will be part of a broader agenda, the cumulative effect of which could recast our personality as a North American country. • In the area of trade and energy policy, the advent of the 108th Congress may provide reasons for guarded optimism, allowing for the fact that our terms of reference are the outgoing 107th Congress. We should not expect the Administration or Congress to reverse itself on major environmental issues (Kyoto, the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge), but we may see progress taken at the local level and, to a lesser extent, by private enterprise. • Managing the operational aspects of the bilateral relationship in the post-election environment will require us to stay out in front of the issues, define our objectives, s.15(1) 000058 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information CONTEXT The political scene. The mid-term Congressional elections were a triumph for the Republicans, underwritten by ongoing concerns about security, coupled with the voter’s endorsement of George Bush as a wartime leader. Although the Republicans do not have a completely free hand with the social and economic aspects of their agenda, Americans have united behind Bush and the Republicans on security, which remains the dominant political issue. The election results were a remarkable achievement for the Republicans. Yes, voter turnout remained low (39%), and after the most expensive congressional election in US history (approximately $1 billion), less than two percent of the seats to be contested in the House, and 15 percent in the Senate, changed hands. Nevertheless, for the first time in over 100 years, the party of an incumbent Administration regained control of the Senate. The Republican win is all the more remarkable given the economic downturn, and financial scandals that have prompted questions about important aspects of the US economy - particularly in the area of corporate governance. Against this backdrop, the election clearly demonstrated the considerable political strengths of President Bush who made an exceptional effort -- in terms of time and fund-raising - on behalf of Republican candidates. In the electoral game, the Democrats chose not only the wrong plays (absenting themselves from the debate on Iraq), but the wrong game plan, by highlighting issues, (the economy or the future of social programs) where there was little in the way of policy to distinguish them from the Republicans. Policy Issues: Security First The elections underscored the abiding importance of security — domestic and international - on the US political scene. This is the issue that the Republicans on which the Republicans won, and one that will remain a key focus for at least the next two years. It is also the prism through which the country at large has come to view many issues. International security. Sometimes, it is strangely easy to forget this, but the US is at war. Its military personnel are engaged in ongoing operations in Afghanistan, other parts of South Asia, and the Hom of Africa, and Iraq may be next. All of this has produced a wartime mentality that is often lost on other countries. Eighteen months ago, it would have been fashionable to say that the US was ‘unilateralist’ - quite willing to impose its will on the world. Since then, the US has demonstrated a willingness to work with other countries. They have done this bilaterally (with various partners in the campaign in Afghanistan) and multilaterally (as evidenced by a 15-0 vote on the question of Iraq at the UN Security Council). All of this is encouraging, but we should bear in mind that the Administration (supported by sentiment in Congress and the public at large) continues to the evaluate the international response to current issues very carefully. Who is with us? Who isn’t? 000059 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgu# en vertu de la Loi sur I'acc&s a I'information Iraq will bring this way of looking at the world to the forefront. The US (led, within the US government, by Colin Powell) worked hard to gain a UN Security Council resolution that makes clear Iraq’s obligation to divest itself of any weapons of mass destruction, or face the prospect of being disarmed by force. The US regards us not only as a potential ally in this campaign, but as one of the countries that urged it to work for a UN resolution. So they are looking to us to support them, whether the resolution brings about the peaceful disarmament of Iraq or not. At the end of the day, our decisions on Iraq may have a significant impact on US perceptions of Canada as a dependable ally. Defence. The US is on a campaign to get all of its allies to spend more on defence. This may be less a matter of specific dollar figures (although more money is always nice) than the level of useful military capability that the US can count on allies to field. The US will be watching for indications that we will make the investments that will enable us to continue to play our historic role in international security. The new focus on homeland security has also raised the salience of Canadian geography as potential avenue of attack against the US - so the US will want us to be a reliable partner there too. Missile defence is the other major bilateral defence issue on the horizon. Although the deployment of a system is several years away, planning is underway now, and decisions on command and control are not far off. If we want to influence the development of a system that will have the potential to defend Canadian territory, the time is drawing near for us to indicate our interest in participation. Domestic security. Quite apart from the memory of September 11th and the possibility of war with Iraq, the ensuing anthrax scares, periodic security alerts, heightened security at all ports of entry, and the sniper attacks in Washington have produced a situation where domestic security has become a prominent, pervasive influence on the US agenda. With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and Northern Command, the US government is poised to embark on the most significant reorganization of itself since the end of the Second World War. With the founding legislation of the DHS now signed into law - and the resources there for the asking - the DHS stands to become a juggernaut that will sweep a lot of other interests, national and bilateral, aside. The Border. Canada and the US have a shared interest in the co-management of the border, and we’ve worked well on the issue so far. But the days of the ‘undefended border’ are over. What stands to become more significant, however, are the divergent conceptions that the two countries appear to be developing about what the border means. For the Americans, successful border management is increasingly about containing the potential threats that integration poses to their safety. For Canada, successful border management is about preserving the access that Canadians and Canadian goods, services, and investment have to the US. The first impulse of US officials when it comes to our border issues is to liken it to those which they face on their southern frontiers (Mexico). Moreover, there are competing views within the executive and legislative branch as to whether the border is about ensuring the free 000060 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information movement of people and goods (which benefits both countries) or about law enforcement and immigration policy. Taken together, this suggests that, as much as has already been done to tighten control of the border, the prospect of additional measures will remain on the agenda. With security holding the edge over trade in the battle for priorities, it is not at all clear that we will be able to secure exemptions from NSEERS or similar additional measures to come (as illustrated by the recent Congressional initiative to have a full-scale entry/exit program in place by 2005, which threatens the progress achieved on the Smart Border Accord, and the nature of border access as a whole). The need to ensure the safe and efficient movement of people and goods across the most economically valuable border is obvious - as are our shared objectives with respect to countering terrorism and crime. The individual sectors (customs, immigration, intelligence) work well together, and have done so for years. However, the current US political dynamic (security first) and growing bureaucratic momentum (the creation of the leviathan Department of Homeland Security) confronts us with a new situation. Indeed, the prospect of the US taking action across a wide variety of sectors (immigration, law enforcement, defence) to support the strategic goal of strengthening homeland security could have far-reaching implications for Canada. Considered of itself, each US imitative might look like an incremental change in a discrete area. However, the initiatives will be part of a broader agenda, the cumulative effect of which could recast our personality as a North American country. Economic, Trade, Energy and the Environment: Room for Guarded Optimism? Economic policy. President Bush has promised a new “economic stimulus” package early next year, which was widely expected to include significant tax cuts. Republican leaders have suggested that this package will include a number of relatively modest tax measures. While tax cuts remain high on the GOP agenda, they are competing with demands for higher spending on defence and homeland security as well as a politically-popular prescription drug benefit for seniors. The Republican tax strategy will have two key elements. The first will be a political push to make last year’s SI.35 trillion tax cut package permanent. The second will be a stimulus package tied to economic recovery. This could include an immediate increase in the child tax credit, a rise in contribution limits for retirement savings accounts and an expansion of tax breaks for business investment. Strategically, the Republicans will try to shoehom many of these tax cuts into the budget reconciliation exercise, which requires only a simple majority in the Senate rather than the 60 votes that are required for most measures. Even with modest tax cuts, private sector forecasters expect that the US budget deficit will rise from SI60 billion this year to S200250 billion in fiscal 2003. Trade policy. It will be useful to remember that the 108th Congress will not be more willing than the 107th to endorse changes to US trade laws. Nor will it deal away protections for entrenched agricultural sectors, the steel trade, textiles and lumber. And a Republican Administration will be anxious to demonstrate that the system of trade agreements is serving US interests and to show its determination to enforce those agreements. That said, the starting point for debate will be more positive than what we saw with the 107th Congress. 000061 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information In terms of the forward trade agenda for the 108th Congress, there are three dimensions of interest to Canada. First, the impact on bilateral trade files. Second, the implications for US compliance with WTO decisions. Finally, the prospects for future trade deals requiring Congressional approval. We anticipate that the prospects for a negotiated, long-term, policy-based solution to the softwood lumber dispute will improve. The results of the election help to create an environment in which the Administration is better able to defy extremist demands from the US Lumber Coalition in Congress. The change in Congressional leadership will assist an Administration that is eager to demonstrate its free-trade credentials, including a message that US trade laws do work to achieve market-opening and “fair trade”. Other contentious issues -- such as agriculture and steel — may also be easier to address. On wheat, the Administration’s earlier promises to pursue a WTO case against the Canadian Wheat Board will not have the same urgency. On steel, the US industry can continue to count on influential supporters in Congress. Canada’s decision on safeguard actions against steel imports will be watched closely, and we can expect a swift negative reaction from Congress if US exports are included in the action. That said, the Parliamentary Steel Caucus has established a good working relationship with its Congressional counterpart and this will generate support for a North American initiative on steel. Creation of a government-led, North American forum to discuss issues relating to the steel trade may help to shield Canadian producers from the numerous protectionist actions promoted by the US industry. Apart from bilateral trade issues, we will watch how the new Congress deals with major WTO decisions. These disputes will put to the test Congressional willingness to uphold the US Government position since the establishment of the WTO that the US will abide by WTO dispute settlement decisions. The 107th Congress saw much criticism of specific WTO decisions and the Trade Promotion Authority bill contains a negotiating objective calling for the Administration to “rein in” the WTO Appellate Body in instances where it is considered to have overstepped its authority (particularly in relation to decisions finding against US trade law). Looking ahead to further negotiations to liberalize trade, Ambassador Zoellick will see the new Republican-controlled Congress as more receptive to the Administration’s ambitions for trade agreements with a growing list of bilateral partners (Chile and Singapore first, followed by Central America, Morocco, Southern Africa, Australia and down the road, the ASEAN countries). Similarly, US leadership in WTO and FTAA negotiations is more likely in a Republican-controlled Congress with an Administration that has nailed its colours to the mast of open markets as the best hope to achieve economic, political and social development at home and abroad. Energy. Aided by a Republican-controlled Senate, an energy bill will be vigorously pursued in the new Congress and we are likely to face challenges to our interests similar to those found in the last bill (Alaskan pipeline subsidies, electricity policy). Advancing Canadian energy interests will benefit from a pro-active strategy that engages 000062 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information the Administration on our mutual energy objectives. More intensive work with the US on energy (whether in bilateral or trilateral fora) offers an opportunity to underscore Canada’s special relationship with the US in a vital economic sector and will assist in managing the inevitable problems that re-emerge in an energy bill. Environment. At first blush, the elections would not seem to have handed us a propitious climate for forward-looking environmental policy. And, to an extent, that’s true: we will not see the U.S. ratify Kyoto, and any future energy bill is likely to contain provisions for drilling in the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge. The Administration and Congress are also likely to move in favour of reducing the environmental regulatory burden on private enterprise and devolve more of the responsibility for environmental stewardship to the state and local level. That said, this dynamic could yield limited progress - at the state and/or local level (to which most eyes will be turned, as little is expected at the federal level) and possibly in terms of limited government funding for S&T or R&D advances by private enterprise (which may see money to be made in environmentally-friendly technologies). MANAGING THE RELATIONSHIP The ongoing challenge will be to manage the relationship in a way that balances security and prosperity, and shores up our image as one of a select group of American allies. Secretary Powell’s visit to Ottawa was encouraging in that it reflected a US desire to engage Canada, and resulted in usefully clarifying both sides’ understanding of key issues. However, the new environment challenges long-standing assumptions that have governed how we manage our relationship with the US. The US no longer automatically factors in the views of traditional allies when it makes its decisions on foreign and security policy. The countries that will influence US policy will be those that choose to engage with them - effectively, self-selecting allies and partners. We can choose to engage or not - but they will take note of our decisions, and deal us in or out of future decisions accordingly. In North America, the comfortable era of Canadian exceptionalism may well be over. The emergence of these factors will confront us with fundamental questions about how we manage the bilateral relationship, and what type of country we want to be. We will also be dealing with new partners (nine new border state governors, a leviathan Department of Homeland Security). The key for us will be to stay out in front of emerging problems, identify our interests, and take advantage of our small size to exploit our power of proposal: the opportunity that we have to be the first to propose solutions and set the agenda s.15(1) 000063 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00005 Title A name given to the resource Background Material on Canada-US Relations Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 04-Dec-02 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived BAN 2014-01289-X, Box 12, File no. MCU2003-00765 – Ministers Visit Washington DC 8-10 January 2003, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10029 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a6e2b831f7ffe0a3161927f6c160fc7a.pdf 57ef09760e14422fa3dfdda31b522d78 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ CONFIDENTIAL I CONFIDENTIEL 8C0001 FILE No. DOSSIER | 1812D-18-8 DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS V Sec 3 CON 0 ODWi International Plans and Operations Iraq CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS MINISTRE - MME M. BLOODWORTH Plans et operations internationals Iraq »2 P.A. RANGER CIRCULATION *: o u o PC Q TO A I> ” REMARKS REMARQUES Date Init. Date B.F. RAPPEL_____ Date REGISTRY ONLY DEPOT CENTRAL Cancel Inspected Annuler Inspects Date MAN f QO I 00 -< g Q Eh CM <D oi s Is i 8 Uh CM oo UNO 703 (07-00) 7530-21-876-1638 Design: Forms Management 993-4050 - Conception : Gestion des formulaires 993-3778 (05-03) 000001 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information FILE MAINTENANCE CHECKLIST LISTE DE CONTRdLE POUR UENTRETIEN DU DOSSIER Protect all files and records as official property. Profeger tous les dossiers et les documents comme dtant la proprfete officielle. Clean records prior to adding them to files. Nettoyer les documents avant de les ajouter & leur dossier respectit Remove all envelopes, flags, tags, pins, spikes, clips and superfluous staples. Entever tout articles inutiles (enveloppes, papillons, etiquettes, dplngles, trombones, attachefeullles, agrafes etc.). File papers and TDs chronologically, the latest date on top. Classer les documents en ordre clironologlque, la date la plus rdcente sur le dessus. Prepunch holes at the top left comer of the papers. Percer des trous du coin supGrieur gauche du document Attach papers to the file by a paper spike for easy handling. Pour faciliter la manutention, attacher les documents au dossier au moyen d’une attache-feuille. When a file becomes thicker than 2", a subsequent volume should be created. Lorsque le dossier a plus de 2" d’epaisseur, creer un nouveau volume. .. Destroy duplicate material, keep a copy only if it has additional information. Detruir? tous les duplicatas qui ne contiennent aucun renseignement supplementaire. Verify the security classification of new documents added to the file. Upgrade the file to the required level as required.' a $ / , Verifier la cote de sdcuritd des nouveaux documents ajoute au dossier • Augmenter la cote de security si necessaire. * < 000002 �Document disclosed under theA ccess to Information Act f CONFIDENTIAL eh vertu d/iM^Tacces a /'information / Chief of the Defence Staff National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Chef d’etat-major de la Def Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 February 2004 The Minister POTENTIAL EXCHANGE OFFICER DEPLOYMENT TO IRAQ COL APPLETON (MAR - JUN 04) I I Reference: CDLS (W) 3350-1 (Comd) 26 Jan 04 (enclosed) Col Appleton is presently an exchange Officer at the United States Army War College (USAWC) in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Last year he attended the USAWC and was asked to remain on staff as part of the Warfighting Department. Col Appleton is being considered by the USAWC for a potential 3-month deployment to Iraq starting in March 2004. I fully support this planned deployment but wanted to consult you prior to approving it because Col Appleton is in a training billet not an operational billet. The USAWC has for several years been dispatching selected Officers to active theatres as part of a Visitation program. These programs last between two weeks to four months and have three primary roles: it keeps the operational focus of the USAWC, assist staff in various theatres and assist other nations in their own strategic development. In the last year this program has been very successfully used in Iraq, Afghanistan and Macedonia. The USAWC usually do not ask Foreign Officers to participate in this program. The USAWC Commandant has personally selected Col Appleton because he brings a powerfully unique perspective to the College and the combination of his experience and intellect make him an excellent choice for this program. Col Appleton would be stationed at the Coalition Force Land Component Command (CFLCC) in Baghdad, Iraq, where Canada maintained an Op ATHENA Liaison Officer until his redeployment in December 2003. His intended employment will be with either a Special Initiative Group or in the Operations and Plans cell. His position may require his movement to other parts of Iraq on a periodic basis. The risks involved with this type of deployment are known and manageable. The duties and responsibilities intended for Col Appleton do not envision command over United States military personnel. E dfe S National Defense @ * E Defence nationale CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Canada 000003 �CONFIDENTIAL Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information >7 This deployment is an excellent opportunity for the Canadian Forces and will serve to advance Col Appleton's own professional learning and development. [ Concur)/ Do Not Conciu^ R.R. Henault General Enclosure: 1 cc: DM Hon D. Pratt MND £</ Feb 04 2/2 CONFIDENTIAL 000004 �^information Act icces a /'information Document disclosed under the Document diwlgue en vertu de l<u Confidential / Confidentiel Unclassified Without Enclosure / Non-Classifi6 sans les Documents DCDS DMCS Transit Document ublished ■canned File Name: Sequence Number / Numero de Sequence ----------------- --------------------------- -| 35614 ate oF Document / Date du document: 3=EeteB4* UaO'J r >ject / Sujet: [E: Feb-04 fEXCHANGE File # / # de Filiere: 5380'^ ,3pfO©- 4 ^os) SW I Precedence / Priorite: ROUTINE PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT TO/A DCDS: For Concurrence (Please rtn doc to Cos J3 CR for further processing once signed) Action Comments / Commentaires F<>, z. INIT CR me co -n-^. a /^I^D pt//b ^FC/oieJ- (P>pt & pp 000005 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00006 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2004-01-01 to 2004-07-31 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10028 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c8ad8e91f68b51b6dae8f9f71d589300.pdf f043a94a3edd15970c39873a75b6b221 PDF Text Text — Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act _______ CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIEL FILE No. DOSSIER ir~=2G 8C0001 1812D-18-8 2 Sec CON DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS International Plans and Operations Iraq .. .. ’.... W Plans et operations int Iraq 8 gU RA. RANGER CIRCULATION TO A O cl REMARKS REMARQUES Date Init. Date B.F. RAPPEL Init. Date REGISTRY ONLY DEPOT CENTRAL Cancel Inspected Annuler Inspects Date CM cr £ 9 o QO I 00 . X ° § N O H CM 0© 43 ? § 9 E S O c o O CM ■ OO == DND 703 (07-00) 7530-21-876-1638 Design: Forms Management 993-4050 - Conception: Gestion des formulaires 993-3778 (05-03) 000006 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information FILE MAINTENANCE CHECKLIST LISTE DE CONTRdLE POUR L’ENTRETIEN DU DOSSIER □ □ □ □ Protect all files and records as official property. Protoger tous les dossiers et les documents comme dtant la propriety offidella Clean records prior to adding them to files. - Nettoyer les documents avant de les ajouter & leur dossier respectit Remove all envelopes, flags, tags, pins, spikes, clips and superfluous staples. . ° Enlever tout articles inutiles (enveloppes, papillons, etiquettes, eplngles, trombones, attachefeullles, agrafes etc.). Hie papers and TDs chronologically, the latest date on top. Classer les documents en ordre chronologique, la date la plus r6centesurle dessus. Prepunch holes at the top left * comer of the papers. Percer des trous du coin supdrieur gauche du document Attach papers to the file by a paper spike for easy handling. Pour faciliter la manutention, attocher les documents au dossier au moyen d’une attoche-feuille. When a file becomes thicker than 2", a subsequent volume should be created. Lorsque le dossier a plus de 2" d’epalsseur, creer un nouveau volume. .' - Destroy duplicate material, keep a copy only if it has additional Information. Detruire tous les duplicates qui ne contiennent aucun renseignement supplementaire. Verify the security classification of new documents added to the file. Verifier la cote de sdcurite des nouveaux documents ajoute au dossier Upgrade the file to the required level as required. . Augmenter la cote de securite si necessaire. ' ■ 000007 �Document disclosed urjfia- tb^Accfss tadnforfnatipaAct Document divulgue en vertMe'J^La^Jr,l^^e(j^'igI$rmation CONFIDENTIAL " I 7 CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) CDN EYES ONLY ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D'ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: Possibel Press Article on Location of Camp Mirage File # I Numero de reference:) J? aI ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) I 05 1§ DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI Date: Apr 04 DM/SM Xto c<yvYvrHvv^.a*.- |_jt_ ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) Date: «TYAo <Aa a _ Apr 04 CONFIDENTIAL CDN EYES ONLY CDN EYES ONLY CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) WJDENHAL ATN0SM3W yfr000008 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) POSSIBLE PRESS ARTICLE ON LOCATION OF CAMP MIRAGE BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE DEPUTY MINISTER ISSUE • The intention of the Globe and Mail to publish an article that includes information about the UAE being the country in which Camp Mirage is located. BACKGROUND • In reaching an agreement with the UAE for the establishment of Camp Mirage, the Government of Canada officials assured the UAE that Canada would not disclose the location of Camp Mirage. While this condition is not recorded in the cunent Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), or the draft Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), it is the UAE expectation that we will continue to avoid public linking of the UAE and their support to the Operation Enduring Freedom forces, including by not revealing our camp’s location. • Canadian policy is to respect the UAE’s wish. The success of the CF in the campaign against terrorism and in ISAF owes much to the UAE’s generous provision of bases and port facilities, and to the excellent relations we have enjoyed at all levels in our dealings with the UAE Armed Forces. For the foreseeable future, the Arabian Gulf will present significant challenges to Canadian security interests, likely requiring a continued ability to operate or be based in the region, principally from the UAE. • On 23 April 2004, a reporter from the Globe and Mail enquired why Canada, in spite of what he described as the many slips and mistakes made by senior Government of Canada officials that revealed Camp Mirage’s location, still refused to disclose that Camp Mirage is in the UAE. This inquiry was made in the course of writing an article about those occasions when the camp’s location has been accidentally revealed. • Also on 23 April 2004, the MND spoke to the Globe and Mail’s Foreign Editor to encourage the paper to refrain from publishing the camp’s location. The reporter still intends to see his article published. Although as of 30 April the article has yet to be published, it most likely will be in the near term. DISCUSSION • Deliberate public disclosure of the UAE’s support by the Government of Canada would likely have a negative impact on ongoing relations, especially if publicized by the Government of Canada in the region. Such revelations might negatively impact the renewal of the MOU (every six months at NDHQ’s request), the negotiation of the SOFA and the continued presence of CF members in the UAE. • On the other hand, the UAE understands that Canada cannot prevent public disclosure of the UAE’s ongoing support by the media in Canada. Over the last week our 1/2 CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) 000009 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) embassy in Abu Dhabi briefed the UAE General Headquarters, and FAC briefed the local UAE embassy, about the possibility of a national newspaper article revealing the location of Camp Mirage. The UAE officials indicated their appreciation for our efforts to prevent the information from being published, and for our having kept them informed. They appeared unconcerned by the possibility of such an article at this time. CONCLUSION • Canada should continue to respect the UAE’s desire that we avoid having any Government of Canada official link the UAE with our operations in the region. Prepared by: Director: Director General: Responsible Group Principal: Date prepared: J. Cloutier. DPK Pol 6.996-1741 Col R.V. Blanchette. D PK Pol, 992-1872 RAdm D. Robertson. DG1S Pol. 992-2769 Dr. KJ. Calder, ADM (Pol). 992-3458 29 April 2004 2/2 CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) 000010 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00007 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2004-01-01 to 2004-07-31 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10028 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/d59c725096b99c1ca2f2e258580600a2.pdf 64cafb0f68ec46236b1a7bc626ef20c7 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information ___________________________■ E 8C0001 2G 1 1812D-18-8 Sec SEC ■ DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS M. BLOODWORTH — “CIO SEO Iraq ■F ffEL M ff CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS MjNISl|fe_- MM^l. Plans et ;.W Iraq WORTH- WEYES ONLY i' u O Id CD CO cn gw 0 CM r—I CT M 0° =—™ I CM 00 SESSS5 O O 7 7= ™ 04 O E- co CM O O ® OJ Mima Q I rH ■ 11 11 ■> co o E o o o I O ■ H r- Q T-r-rCM 00 000025 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulg.ue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information FILE MAINTENANCE CHECKUST LISTEDE CONTRdLE POUR CENTRETIEN DU DOSSIER □ Protect all files and records as official property. ProtEger tous les dossiers et les documents comme Etant la proprietE officielle. Clean records prior to adding them to files. Nettoyer les documents avant de les ajouter 4 leur dossier respectif. Remove all envelopes, flags, tags, pins, spikes, clips and superfluous staples. Enlever tout articles inutiles (enveloppes, papillons, Etiquettes, Epingles, trombones, attachesfeuilles, agrafes etc.). File papers and TDs chronologically, the latest date on top. Classer les documents en ordre chronologique, la date la plus rEcente sur le dessus. Prepunch holes at the top. left • corner of the papers. Percer des trous du coin superieur' gauche du document. Attach papers to the file by a paper spike for easy handling. Pour faciliter la manutention, attacher les documents au dossier au moyen d’une attache-feuille. When a file becomes thicker than 2", a subsequent volume should be created. Lorsque le dossier a plus de 2” d'Epaisseur, crEer uri nouveau volume. Destroy duplicate material. Keep a copy only if it has additional information. DEtruire tous les duplicates qui ne contiennent aucun renseignements supplementaires. Verify the security classification of new documents added to the file. Verifier la cote de sEcuritE des nouveaux documents ajoutE au dossier. Upgrade the file to the required level as required. Augmenter la cote de sEcuritE si nEcessaire. . 000026 �Document disclosed untfer the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en v(rp drA^tc^yir n^esjt I'mjbrmation 1*1 iaV iC k National Defence Defense nationale National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 NO V 2 1 2QC2 The Minister BRIEFING NOTE ON CANADIAN ACCESS TO US PLANNING Enclosed for your information is a briefing note on the requirement for early militaryto-military discussions between Canada and the US regarding any possible future Canadian contribution to action against Iraq. R.R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff Margaret Bloodworth Deputy Minister Encl (1) Canada CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) 000027 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur facets a /'information 04^'/ /X s TAa Xa s ’^La AIx x a ^s 'c A o X^s z _o <_J^ ~L(v \ 5 L VAA-r IX 2Ab^- 1U^ v k m J!1 \t )CSLj ^L. ~4d Va g O^—P '^-J--- \ . A—000028 �CONFIDENTIAL CANADIAN (UNCLASSIFIED Without Enclosure) -------- General Correspondence No^ber 19, 2002 " ’ v ccmMercury Manual Docket Slip Doc Date: 19/11/2002 BF Date: 3%? Document: 644913 Control: CDS2002-337834 File No.: 3000-1 Input Date: 19/11/2002 Due Date: Org/Gp: CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF Subject: BN FOR MND - ON CANADIAN ACCES TO US PLANNING Comment: Author: K CALDER XRef: DATE L1U CHG TO 50 Orf ^0 Grp/Sct: ADMPOL INTL REMARKS Az L C<^V\ \AT-l jyufu^ li ajkq a ^- CONFIDENT (UNCLAS: _______ . 000029 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information • CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: Briefing Note on Canadian Access to US Military Planning File #/Numero de reference: 3450-1 (Corri Barr, D PK Pol 6) DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI FROM/DE: J.J. Gauvin Cmdre Concur :COS J3_____ COS J3/CEM J3 Date: D PK Pol/D Pol MP Z Date: 1$ Al 2.COZ- ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) FROM/DE: Concur d g i S Po T/d g Poi Si (J Date: DCDS^CEMD Date: CDS/CEMD DM/SM FROM/DE: ADM Pol/SMA Pol Date: Sous-Ministre de la Defense Rationale CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) NOV 1 9 2002 Deputy Minister of Notional Defence REF: 34G63 000030 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ISSUE • Any delay in a Canadian government decision to engage in military-to-military planning on Iraq could seriously compromise Canada’s ability to provide an effective and timely contribution to any future campaign. BACKGROUND • With the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1441 on the situation in Iraq, the US is moving into a more active and public phase in its coalition-building and military planning for any possible future action in the event of Iraqi non-compliance with the terms of the inspections. DISCUSSION • The US Embassy has formally demarched Canada to engage in planning and to gauge what contributions - including combat troops and combat support - it could provide should military means be required to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. The US has indicated that it would prefer to act with the broadest possible international coalition and would welcome Canada’s support. • A delay in Canadian access to military planning would erode the Canadian Forces flexibility to participate should the international community determine that force is, indeed, required. Such access at this juncture would also serve to inform Canada’s decision-making process. If the Canadian Government decides to deploy Canadian Forces against Iraq, thus putting Canadian lives at risk, that decision should be informed by the fullest possible understanding of US plans. • The Canadian Embassy in Washington reports its interlocutors have said that, barring the outbreak of hostilities in the coming weeks, there is still adequate time for allies to volunteer and integrate forces into ongoing planning. However, US officials also stress that the longer a Canadian decision to engage in military-to-military discussions takes, the less relevant and credible any potential Canadian military contribution would be. • Rather than committing Canada to joining a campaign irrespective of the outcome of the United Nations inspection process, early participation in US planning would be extremely prudent - particularly if Canada could become involved in any action against Iraq (as the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs have both publicly suggested). Canadian Forces access to planning at this stage would not constitute acceptance of any specific task or the commitment of resources. Canada would simply be engaging in prudent military planning and preparation. 1/2 CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) 000031 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) Prepared By: Responsible Director: Responsible Director-General Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Com Barr. D PK Pol 6,996-1741 Col G. C6te, DPK Pol. 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross. DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder. ADM (Pol), 992-3458 15 Nov 02 2/2 CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) 000032 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de^e.Loi surliacces a I'information SECRET(CEO) M'l 2 ^MEMORANDUM 3450-1 (DPK Pol 6) 7 "1 / / <S°^002 / ■ 1 Nov 02 ■ Dist List REQUEST FOR REVIEW OF DFAIT IRAQ PAPER pi> 1. Enclosed for your review and comments is a paper on Iraq drafted by DFAIT with some preliminary input from DND/CF. The only portion that has been formally approved by DND/CF is the “Options for military contributions” on pages 8 and 9; we have not yet provided input to the rest of the paper. In particular, your review should focus on any strategic issues that may not be 2. addressed (i.e., Is there a case to be made for intervention? What are the overriding implications for Canada? etc.), the legal basis for action, military options and advice, and the overall structure of the paper. Additionally, given the paper’s current length, suggestions to eliminate repetition and wordiness would be appreciated. In order that we may provide substantive comments to DFAIT in a user-friendly format, please forward your input to the Directorate of Peackekeeping Policy no later than the close of business on 5 November 2002. DPK Pol will consolidate all comments and forward them to DFAIT for inclusion in a new document. The finished product is intended to be a joint document guiding deliberations on the issue and will, therefore, need to be agreed to in its entirety by both Departments. j. 4. Please accept my regrets regarding the unavoidably tight deadline. Any comments or questions should be addressed to Corri Barr, DPK Pol 6, at 996-1741. H.Cameron Ross MGen DGIS Pol 992-2769 Encl (1) Action DG Pol Plan COS J3 JAG 1/2 SECRET(CEO) 000033 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information < SECRET(CEO) Information ADM(Pol) EA/DM D Pol Dev D Strat A D Law I DPK Pol 2/2 SECRET(CEO) 000034 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /‘information J -1- Michael Walma Defence and Security Relations Division 992-6205 Graeme McIntyre Middle East Division 944-5995 SECRET (Ct-O} 23 October 2002 IDR0360 Information Memorandum for: The Minister of Foreign Affairs c.c. Minister for International Trade c.c. Minister for International Cooperation and c.c. Secretary of State (Asia-Pacific) c.c. Secretary of State (Central and Eastern Europe and Middle East) c.c. Secretary of State (Latin America and Africa) (Francophonie) ISSUE: Memo on Iraq Policy Implications 1. This memo deals with Security Council scenarios and possible military contributions. It complements earlier broader analyses in memos GMR0595 (Aug 14) and GMR0589 (Aug 06). SUMMARY: 2. Indications that the Security Council may be nearing a decision on a draft resolution on Iraq will necessitate increased Canadian political and diplomatic management of the issue. Timelines for decisions will become shorter, the issues to be addressed more difficult and, equally important, the need for well-crafted communications lines more vital. This memo outlines four possible scenarios based on broad potential outcomes from the UN Security Council’s discussion of Iraq and identifies the legal, military, diplomatic and communications issues that each would present. The four potential outcomes are: A. B. C. D. No new resolution is adopted One or more resolutions are adopted but the authorisation of force is ambiguous; One or more resolutions are adopted, the authorisation of force is clear, but gridlock in the Security Council prevents a finding of Iraqi non-compliance; or There is a clear authorisation of force and the Security Council agrees that Iraq is in breach. With today’s indications that the Security Council may be close to agreeing on a resolution, outcomes B) and D) appear most likely, but outcome C) remains a lesser possibility. Should we face option B), we are almost certain to see the return of inspectors, which would delay the need for a decision on Canadian participation in military action for a short time. However, we would ultimately need to weigh the implication that participation could be seen as a weakened commitment to international law against the impact of non-participation on our relations with the United States. Clear evidence of non-compliance will factor heavily in our final decision. Option D), although unlikely to occur, would create the clearest conditions for Canada, politically and legally, as the Prime Minister has said that Canada will participate in a military campaign under these conditions. However, our ability to participate will be severely limited by short time lines and our non-participation in current US military planning. This memo reviews military options as comprehensively as possible, including that of 3. 000035 �4 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'accis a I’information * -2backfilling for the US in the Balkans or Afghanistan as a substitute for or complement to, direct participation. While does not favour backfilling due to resource constraints and possible troop morale issues, DFAIT believes possible backfilling scenarios must remain on the table to maximise the government’s future policy flexibility. BACKGROUND: 4. To date, with President Bush’s 12 September speech to the UN General Assembly and in the absence of any overt US pressure to support and contribute to a unilateral military option, policy options and the communications strategy for explaining our approach have been easy - uncomplicated and free of difficult issues. 5. This will soon change. For Canada, the political, legal and diplomatic management of the Iraq issue is about to enter a new, more complex and increasingly unpredictable phase. Timelines for decisions and, equally importantly, well-crafted communications lines, will become shorter and the issues to be addressed, much more difficult. 6. Whilst the situation in NY is too dynamic to predict, reports today (Friday) indicate that the US may well be nearing agreement with France on a draft resolution. This would be the first step in a consultative process to be engaged by the US with the other P5 and then the E10. The draft resolution is likely to be officially tabled quickly. 7. The compromise between the US and French positions will probably be reflected in a single resolution that essentially contains within it (a) the two stages that had originally be requested by France and (b) language that gives the US the trigger or automaticity elements they had been seeking. However, the use of force language may be weaker than that originally sought by the US. Rather than using the usual terms of art for military action (e.g. all necessary means), it may instead refer to the need for full compliance....in order to restore international peace and security. It is already becoming apparent that the US and France are reading the resolution in two quite different ways. 8. Although it is dangerous to make predictions on the outcome of the consultative process and eventual language of the resolution, it seems that intense consultations took place over the weekend and on Monday with the prospect of a tabling of the resolution for consideration, but no agreement has been found. For Canada, an approved resolution will mean we will be moving into another level of ambiguity and complexity in managing Canadian policy responses to Iraq. The UN Security Council will likely be unclear in terms of the key issues of determination of breach and the decision-making process regarding the use of force. At the same time, the global political environment is becoming more obscured and complicated with, inter alia, Korean nuclear weapons programmes revelations, the Bali bombing and the Yemen and Kuwait attacks. 9. The Government of Canada will soon have to move beyond easy appeals to the US and others to use the UN, and will face questions regarding possible Canadian political support for or military involvement in an eventual US-led military operation which may - or may not - derive its mandate and legitimacy from a UN Security Council decision. The political and legal uncertainties in the current situation require us to think through the options, possible responses and the way in which Ministers speak publicly about this issue. The following paper outlines the cunent state of play, some of the possible scenarios that we may be 10. faced with in the coming weeks and draft communications lines for dealing with these questions. 1. CURRENT SITUATION: 000036 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -X -3- 11. ^p.t present, the scenarios presented in our August memo (Ref:GMR0595, 14 August 2002) still largely pertain. Canada has been able to assert that concerns about Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council resolutions must be considered the continuing responsibility of the Council and that all action be directed to, and through, that forum. We have even been able to say that we have seen some success in this approach - the US has engaged the UN process, at least to now. 12. Canada has been able to accompany this overall UN approach with an active bilateral diplomatic effort (at the level of Ministers, the PM and officials) aimed at: engaging the US and encouraging them to work through the UN; working with other key allies such as the UK; encouraging the other P5 to live up to their responsibilities; and, pressing influential regional partners in the Middle East such as Egypt to engage Iraq directly in dialogue to encourage full cooperation and compliance with its obligations. We have clearly stated at the UN that we need an unambiguous resolution that would contain serious consequences for Iraqi non-compliance. 13. US position: The US remains determined to depose Saddam Hussein, working from the premise that Saddam’s government poses a fundamental threat to US strategic interests. While the Bush Administration has focused in public on Iraq’s WMD capacity and ambitions (and sought to connect Iraq to al Qaeda), a broader case for regime change is being pursued in Washington. Military action will probably begin in January-February 2003, although an earlier campaign cannot be excluded. Only a coup d’etat or Saddam’s assassination would be likely to avert a war against Iraq. 14. Within the Administration, views differ on whether to focus narrowly on deposing Saddam and eliminating Iraq’s capacity to threaten its neighbours, or to opt for a highly ambitious plan that would turn Iraq into a second pillar of support for the US in the Persian Gulf and send a democratising shock wave through the Arab world; there appears to be increasing support in the US for the latter option. More cautious opinions are still being expressed, notably by Secretary of State Powell, but the general thrust of US policy is clear. American efforts to secure a new Security Council resolution on weapons inspectors should be seen in 15. this light. Washington has concluded that Iraq’s WMD programmes cannot be destroyed through inspections, and that the only way to reduce or eliminate this threat is to replace the government in Baghdad. In short, Washington is interested in the UN process mainly in so far as it can legitimise a war that will depose Saddam. Key partners: Our key partners are facing the same dilemma that is before us. UK PM Tony Blair has 16. come under considerable fire at home for his decision to back the US both politically and militarily. France and Russia are balancing their opposition to the current Anglo-American resolution against their broader bilateral relationships with the US; there are indications that both are nearing a deal with the US. China remains on the sidelines, and is expected to follow Russia and France. Germany is seen to have crossed a line during the recent election campaign. Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark are all fairly supportive of the US position, while other European states such as Belgium have voiced their opposition. Regional views: Arab states remain publicly critical of US moves toward a war with Iraq, seeing this 17. as unjust on its own merits and egregious given what they perceive as a double standard toward Israel. At the end of the day, pro-US states such as Jordan, Kuwait and Qatar will likely acquiesce to US use of bases or airspace in If a war against Iraq, though a new Security Council resolution emerges, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states may also provide quiet support. s.15(1) Regional impact: With or without the backing of a UN Security Council resolution, US action against 18. Iraq can be expected to provoke a strong backlash in the Arab world. Even if the US achieves a rapid victory with minimal Iraqi casualties, there will be a strong tendency in the Arab world to regard this as yet another “humiliation”. 000037 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -419. ^^NMOVIC situation: Talks held two weeks ago between UNMOVIC, the IAEA and Iraq went smoothly. Nevertheless, Dr. Hans Blix, the Head of UNMOVIC has said that he sees no point in returning to Iraq when the Security Council is still considering changing his mandate. Dr. Blix has been walking a careful line between asserting his own independence and maintaining good relations with the P5, especially the US. 20. He is known, however, to have serious reservations about some aspects of the initial US draft, including the question of armed escorts, the issue of removing Iraqi informants and their families from Iraq and the matter of direct P-5 participation in and tasking of the inspection teams. On the other hand, he does not underestimate the importance of resisting Iraqi duplicity and intransigence on key issues such as access to Presidential sites. Should a Security Council resolution be adopted, we would expect that UN and IAEA inspectors would be able to return to Iraq in short order, and begin their work. What is not clear, and will not be until a resolution is adopted, is how and on what timetable UNMOVIC will report to the Council; and, by whom and how a judgement of a breach of obligations will be reached. 2. SECURITY COUNCIL SCENARIOS: 21. We can foresee four broad possible outcomes from the UN Security Council’s discussion of Iraq: A. B. C. No new resolution is adopted One or more resolutions are adopted but the authorisation of force is ambiguous; One or more resolutions are adopted, the authorisation of force is clear, but gridlock in the Security Council prevents a finding of Iraqi non-compliance; or There is a clear authorisation of force and the Security Council agrees that Iraq is in breach. D. In considering each of these scenarios, we must bear in mind that US military planning is already well 22. underway. If Canada waits until the action in the Security Council is played out before deciding whether to participate in a US-led attack on Iraq, our decision will come so late as to severely hinder preparations for Canadian military involvement in a January campaign. However, the alternative, to begin participation in US planning now, or after the first of a two-resolution package is adopted, would commit us to joining a campaign regardless of the outcome of the UN process. This would be interpreted by the Canadian public as the discounting of diplomatic avenues. A. Negotiations in the Security Council break down and no new resolution is adopted. s.15(1) This could come about if the US loses patience with the slow process of adopting a new resolution or 23. fears a veto from another P5 state. In this situation the US would attack Iraq unilaterally, possibly with a limited “coalition of the willing”. The US would likely cite previous Council resolutions and/or (preemptive) selfdefence as a basis for its actions, while simultaneously criticising the Council for failing to rise to the present challenge. Factors influencing a Canadian decision: Previous policy statements: PM Chretien has said that Canada would not participate in a war against 24. Iraq without a new UN resolution. 000038 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acc&s a I'information -5- 25. ^Lcgal: A legal right to use force in self-defence will only exist if there is evidence that Iraq poses an “imminent” threat. Any acceptance of Iraq’s WMD potential as a basis for using force in self-defence would require careful scrutiny of the evidence, including a study of Iraq’s current and potential WMD capacity and its future intentions viewed against context of past conduct. 26. Alternatively, the U.S. as in its 1993 and 1998 attacks against Iraq may seek to rely upon past Security Council Resolutions which have expressly authorized the use of force. In particular they may attempt to rely on Resolution 678 (1991) which authorized the “use of all necessary means” to implement “all subsequent relevant resolutions” relating to the restoration of international peace and security in the area. Resolution 678 would provide, at best, a weak legal basis upon which force could now be used. 27. Communications/domestic considerations: Our government would not be able to say that all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted. Canadian public opinion is firmly against attacking Iraq without a Council mandate, and could further harden if the US gives the appearance of having been indifferent to the UN. Depending on the circumstances of the breakdown, we would be able to suggest that Council had failed to live up to its obligations, as we have been insisting. From a legal perspective any public statements must not compromise Canada’s past and future actions. For legal reasons it would not be prudent to make definitive statements on the lawfulness of using force in self-defence or with respect to the sufficiency of evidence asserted in support of that basis. This includes reference to the evidence publicly disclosed by the UK or the Bush doctrine of preemptive self-defence. 28. Military: While highly problematic from many perspectives, an early end to diplomatic manoeuvring could, in theory, allow us to join current US planning early enough to make a direct military contribution. Alternatively, we could backfill for the US elsewhere (for example Afghanistan), freeing up US forces for the attack on Iraq. These assignments tend to be low on recognition and long-term. 29. Diplomatic: With the possible exception of the UK, our key partners would likely not support US action. Short-term implications: A decision to participate militarily would instantly relieve US pressure on us. 30. Joint planning could begin immediately. Communicating a rationale for this course of action to the Canadian public, Parliament and to our non-US allies would prove a challenge. A decision to not participate would not pose these challenges, and should also be manageable with respect to the United States as it will be expecting this decision in view of the Prime Minister’s stated position. Longer-term implications: In the absence of clear evidence demonstrating an imminent threat, a decision 31. to participate could be viewed by some as a weakened commitment to international law. It would also signal a lessened commitment to the UN and to the multilateral system. A decision to not participate would leave us on firmer footing, but could exacerbate the view of some within the United States that Canada cannot be relied upon. This problem could be attenuated to some extent by the offering of political support and by providing military assistance in other areas (backfilling) to free up US forces for its campaign. Any Canadian support would gamer some respect from the US Administration and Congress, who would appreciate that Canada was an ally willing to take political risks. B. Authorisation of force is ambiguous. 32. The Security Council could adopt a resolution that only implies an authorisation of force, as it did in Kosovo. Council members could deliberately seek this outcome in order to avoid a confrontation. The US would use this resolution to justify an attack on Iraq. 000039 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information -6- Factors^^fluencing a Canadian decision: • Previous Policy Statements: In the Iraq context, we have been careful to avoid publicly addressing this scenario, except to reiterate the need for the Security Council to live up to its responsibilities. This scenario resembles that of the Kosovo war and the use of force against Iraq in 1993 and 1998 in the sense of the ambiguity, but not from the overwhelming humanitarian need. Legal: Unlike a resolution which expressly authorized “all necessary means”, the legal foundation for an enforcement action would be questionable and be based upon a weak controversial doctrine of “implied” authorization. In 1993 and 1998 various Security Council statements and resolutions used phrases such as “gravest consequences” and “serious consequences” in place of the familiar “all necessary means”. The US is currently using similar diplomatic code as possible wording within a new resolution. Communications/Domestic considerations: A great deal will depend on the wording of the resolution and any evidence of continued Iraqi non-compliance. Clear evidence of Iraqi non-compliance could make a decision not to participate difficult to explain. Similarly, if the evidence is not clear, a decision to participate would not be well understood. The legal problems that such an ambiguous resolution would pose would not likely be well understood. Once again, we will have available to us the message that we believe that the Council has failed to meets its obligations. From a legal perspective public statements on the type of resolution Canada is seeking should avoid use of terms such as “gravest consequences” or “serious consequences” given that the Government of Canada has not decided to support the use of force on the basis of an implied authorization. Military: Under this scenario, military action would likely following very quickly on the heels of a finding, whether by the US or UN, that Iraq is in breach. It would be extremely difficult for proper planning to take place in time for Canada to be able to make an extensive contribution. Diplomatic: Such a resolution would allow countries a much larger degree of flexibility in determining their positions, as each could interpret the resolution as it chooses. At the same time, US pressure on Canada and other allies would be much stronger in this scenario, as it would be looking for support in order to justify its own position. We would need to take into account the positions of others, especially of the P5, and should consult them as soon as possible following the adoption of such a resolution. Short term implications: Adoption of a resolution would almost certainly mean a return of inspectors to Iraq, which should push the need for a decision off by a short period of time. A decision to participate would be warmly received by the US and would be justifiable to others. A decision not to participate would not please the US but would still be justifiable to others. Clear evidence of non-compliance will factor heavily. Longer term implications: In the absence of clear evidence demonstrating an imminent threat, a decision to participate could be viewed as a weakened commitment to international law. It would also signal a lessened commitment to the UN and to the multilateral system. A decision to not participate would leave us on firmer footing, but could exacerbate the view of some within the United States that Canada cannot be relied upon. This problem could be attenuated to some extent by the offering of political support and by providing military assistance in other areas (backfilling) to free up US forces for its campaign. Any Canadian support would gamer some respect from the US Administration and Congress, who would appreciate that Canada was an ally willing to take political risks. C. Gridlock in Council 000040 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -733. ^In this scenario, the Council adopts a resolution which would clearly authorise force (or states that the Counci^pil authorise force in the face of continued non-compliance) but balks at finding Iraq in breach or at adopting the follow-on resolution. Of the scenarios which would place Canada in a difficult position, this is the most likely. Factors influencing a Canadian decision: Previous Policy Statements: We have been careful to avoid publicly addressing this scenario, except to reiterate the need for the Security Council to live up to its responsibilities. Legal: The legal foundation for military action would be controversial. The clarity of the language, in particular regarding the “reporting” and “trigger” mechanism and the way in which any authorized force is delegated to member states will be crucial. In the absence of express language the Security Council’s failure to act does not provide a clear legal basis to use force. Communications/Domestic considerations: A great deal will depend on the wording of the resolution and any evidence of continued Iraqi non-compliance. Reporting from New York suggests that the Council may adopt ‘one and a half resolutions, that is, it would authorise force on recognition of a breach, but would be unclear as to how and by whom that determination would be made, opening the door to the US deciding for itself. Clear evidence of Iraqi non-compliance could make a decision not to participate difficult to explain. Similarly, if the evidence is not clear, a decision to participate would not be well understood. The legal problems that gridlock would pose would also not likely be well understood. Once again, we will have available to us the message that we believe that the Council has failed to meets its obligations. In order to avoid communications difficulties, our messages from the beginning of a two-stage process should emphasise our insistence that the Council must live up to its responsibilities to find Iraq in breach of its obligations if that is what the evidence indicates. Military: Under this scenario, military action would likely follow very quickly on the heels of a finding, whether by the US or UN, that Iraq is in breach. It would be well-nigh impossible for proper planning to take place in time for Canada to be able to make any real contribution. Diplomatic: Such a resolution would allow countries a much larger degree of flexibility in determining their positions, as each could interpret the resolution as it chooses. At the same time, US pressure on Canada and other allies would be much stronger in this scenario, as it would be looking for support in order to justify its own position. We would need to take into account the positions of others, especially of the P5, and should consult them as soon as possible following the adoption of the first resolution. Short term implications: Adoption of a resolution would almost certainly mean a return of inspectors to Iraq, which would push the need for a decision off by at least two weeks. A decision to participate would be warmly received by the US and would be justifiable to others. A decision not to participate would not please the US but would still be justifiable to others. Clear evidence of non-compliance will factor heavily. Longer term implications: This scenario could be considered 'worst-case' since it could see Canada having to choose between helping to discredit the UN or vainly attempting to maintain its credibility, risking the anger of the US. A decision to participate may be viewed as a weakened commitment to international law and could leave us open to further legal challenges. It would also signal a lessened commitment to the UN and to the multilateral system. A decision to not participate would leave us on firmer footing, but could exacerbate the view of some within the United States that Canada cannot be relied upon. This problem could be attenuated to some extent by the offering of political support and by providing military assistance in other areas (backfilling) to free up US forces for its campaign. Any 000041 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -8Canadian support would gamer some respect from the US Administration and Congress, who would ^^ppreciate that Canada was an ally willing to take political risks. D. Council unanimity on the need for force Should the UNSC adopt a resolution authorising force and if it then finds Iraq in breach, the matter is 34. simple for Canada, politically and legally. Under these circumstances, the Prime Minister has said that Canada will participate in the military campaign. We would not find ourselves internationally isolated, and the legal basis would be clear. Domestically, the implications for the government will focus on explaining its position to the public and deciding on the role of Parliament. Our ability to participate will be severely limited by short times lines (we would expect an attack in these circumstances to follow very shortly after the finding Iraq in breach) and our non-participation in current US planning. 3, Options for military contributions (prepared by National Defence) A. Direct military support 35. Should the Government of Canada elect to provide direct military support, it could contribute the assets currently dedicated to Operation APOLLO: two ships, three Hercules transport aircraft and two Aurora maritime patrol aircraft. These assets are already in theatre and, with appropriate diplomatic clearances, could be maintained until December 2003. Deployment of additional military resources for operations in the Iraqi theatre would be dependent on 36. time as follows: Short term (Jan-Feb 2003): The resources dedicated to Op APOLLO plus six CF 18 fighters 37. (incremental cost of $50M) and two additional ships (incremental cost of S60M); Medium Term (March-April 2003): A squadron of Special Operations Forces (JTF2 would be 38. available by 15 March 2003, costs TBD); and 39. Long Term (June-July 2003): An infantry light battle group (incremental cost of S122M) or a mechanized battle group, complete with tanks, mine clearing equipment, etc., (incremental cost of S166M). A June-July deployment will alleviate the requirements for personnel waivers. Early access to joint planning with the US and other coalition partners is considered key in being able to 40. determine an appropriate Canadian contribution within an overall coalition force package. Although Canada has no detailed knowledge of US planning, a campaign would likely begin sometime in January or February 2003. Depending on the force package selected by the Canadian Government, varying degrees of warning time will be required to ensure timely and effective deployments. Sufficient time will need to be allotted for the negotiation of Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) or Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) and acquisition of the necessary equipment and supplies. v 41. Combat operations would also require the support of other high value CF assets that are always in short supply. These include engineers; a nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) countermeasures capability; medical support; linguists; and command and control assets. Operations against Iraq within the next two to three months would pose substantial logistical risk given the CF’s dependence on materiel already deployed in support of Operation APOLLO and the long lead-time for the procurement of materiel and ammunition. Problem areas range 000042 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'accis a I’information -9- from Unavailability of vehicle spare parts to a limited stock of precision-guided munitions and targeting pods for the CF^s. B. Indirect military support 42. One option could be for Canadian troops to backfill US (or possibly other coalition) troops that could be redeployed to support a campaign against Iraq. If the CF were to be used in a backfill role, Canada would risk an increased commitment in areas such as the Balkans or Afghanistan (with contributions to the International Security Assistance Force, a Battalion/Battle Group combat operation, such as in Khandahar and possibly further staff support to Headquarters such as Coalition Joint Task Force 180 in Bagram) for longer periods than we might wish. Moreover, such a measure could have a profoundly negative impact on the morale of CF members should the repetitive, low-intensity deployments to Bosnia-Herzegovina, or other such missions, increase. As well, “backfilling” troops would be from elements of the CF that are already under stress due to the personnel deployment tempo, which would be compounded by these traditionally longer duration missions with no clear exit strategies. Backfilling is, therefore, not recommended by National Defence. James R. Wright Assistant Deputy Minister Global and Security Policy Deputy Minister 000043 �Document disclosed under the Access to InformationAcf k . Document divulgue enj^tujl^lad^f - 1*1 a reformation SECRET(CEO) National Defence Defense nationale ^Vnal Defence Headquarters OHawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Ottawa (Ontario) Quartier general de la Defense nationals K1A0K2 Ki 'I S 2002 The Minister DND INPUT TO DFAIT MEMO ON IRAQ AND AIDE-MEMOIRE FOR MND Enclosed is an aide-memoire to the Minister of National Defence and DND input to a Foreign Affairs-led memorandum on Iraq, which will form the basis of discussion on 21 October. mZ R.R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff Margaret Bloodworth Deputy Minister Encl (2) Canada SECRET(CEO) 000044 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET(CEO) ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: DND INPUT TO DFAIT MEMO ON IRAQ AND AIDE-MEMOIRE FOR MND File #/Numero de reference: 3450-1 (Corri Barr, D PK P0I6) DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI Conoar: COS J3/CEM ‘J3 FROM/DE: Date: ftOclci D PK Pol/D Pol MP Date: \~7. \o. z ~ ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) FROM/DE: ^DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI Date: ^WSTC^lSfr Concur DCDS/SCEMD Date: /7 — o/oZ' DM/SM FROM/DE: ADM Pol/SMA Pol Date: )? SECRET(CEO) REF: 34423 000045 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET (CEO) DND INPUT TO DFAIT MEMO ON IRAQ Should the Government of Canada elect to provide direct military support, it could contribute the assets currently dedicated to Operation APOLLO: two ships, three Hercules transport aircraft and two Aurora maritime patrol aircraft. These assets are already in theatre and, with appropriate diplomatic clearances, could be maintained until December 2003. Deployment of additional military resources for operations in the Iraqi theatre would be dependent on time as follows: Short term (Jan-Feb 2003): The resources dedicated to Op APOLLO plus six CF 18 fighters (incremental cost of $50M) and two additional ships (incremental cost of $60M); Medium Term (March-April 2003): A squadron of Special Operations Forces (JTF2 would be available by 15 March 2003, costs TBD); and Long Term (June-July 2003): An infantry light battle group (incremental cost of S122M) or a mechanized battle group, complete with tanks, mine clearing equipment, etc (incremental cost of $166M). A June-July deployment will alleviate the requirements for personnel waivers. Early access to joint planning with the US and other coalition partners is considered key in being able to determine an appropriate Canadian contribution within an overall coalition force package. Although Canada has no detailed knowledge of US planning, a campaign would likely begin sometime in January or February 2003. Depending on the force package selected by the Canadian Government, varying degrees of warning time will be required to ensure timely and effective deployments. Sufficient time will need to be allotted for the negotiation of Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) or Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) and acquisition of the necessary equipment and supplies. Combat operations would also require the support of other high value CF assets that are always in short supply. These include engineers; a nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) countermeasures capability; medical support; linguists; and command and control assets. Operations against Iraq within the next two to three months would pose substantial logistical risk given the CF’s dependence on materiel already deployed in support of Operation APOLLO and the long lead-time for the procurement of materiel and ammunition. Problem areas range from the availability of vehicle spare parts to a limited stock of precision-guided munitions and targeting pods for the CF-18s. SECRET (CEO) 000046 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgud en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET (CEO) 3 AIDE-MEMOIRE FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE CANADIAN FORCES CAPABILITIES FOR ACTION AGAINST IRAQ • Should the Government of Canada elect to provide direct military support, it could contribute the assets currently dedicated to Operation APOLLO: two ships, three Hercules transport aircraft and two Aurora maritime patrol aircraft. These assets are already in theatre and, with appropriate diplomatic clearances, could be maintained until December 2003 (incremental cost - $150 million). • Deployment of additional military resources for operations in the Iraqi theatre would be dependent on time as follows: Short term (Jan-Feh-2003): The resources dedicated to Op APOLLO plus six CF 18 fighters (incremental cost of $50M) and two additional ships (incremental cost of $60M) Medium Term (March-April 2003): A squadron of Special Operations Forces (JTF2 would be available by 15 March 2003, costs TBD); and Long Term (June-July 2003): An infantry light battle group (incremental cost of $122M) or a mechanized battle group, complete with tanks, mine clearing equipment, etc (incremental cost of $166M). A June-July deployment will alleviate the requirements for personnel waivers. • Early access to joint planning with the US and other coalition partners is considered key in being able to determine an appropriate Canadian contribution within an overall coalition force package. • Any of the force packages could be deployed independently under operational control of the US or another Coalition partner. • Other considerations: Combat operations against Iraq would also require the support of other high value CF assets that are always in short supply. These include engineers; a nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) countermeasures capability; medical support; linguists; and command and control assets. Operations against Iraq within the next two to three months would pose substantial logistical risk. The limiting factors are the dependence on materiel already deployed in support of Operation APOLLO and the long lead-time for the procurement of materiel and s.15(1) 1/2 SECRET(CEO) 000047 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET (CEO) ammunition. Problem areas range from the availability of vehicle spare parts to a limited stock of precision-guided munitions and targeting pods for the CF-18s. • Secondments: About 200 CF personnel are serving on exchange with US forces and/or the armed forces of countries that may elect to join a coalition. A letter to the Prime Minister from the Minister of National Defence recommending that secondees’ status not change in the event of a conflict is being staffed. Minister Graham concurs with this recommendation. Prepared By: Consultation: Responsible Director: Responsible Director-General Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Col G. C6t6. DPK Pol. 992-1872 LCol J.R. Forcstell, DPK Pol 3, Corri Barr, D PK Pol 6 Col G. Cote, DPK Pol. 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross. DGIS Pol. 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder. ADM (Pol). 992-3458 16 October 2002 2/2 SECRET (CEO) 000048 �Q'/lf " 1*1 , t Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act de la Loi surVGIc/ia I'informatigp/'' |£-'Ji SECRET(CEO) National Defence Defense nationale National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 AUG 2 7 $$ The Minister BRIEFING NOTE ON IRAQ Enclosed is a briefing note that outlines the recent situation in Iraq and the developing Canadian policy position. You may wish to discuss this issue with Minister Graham and other Cabinet colleagues in advance of any possible US request for assistance and the Prime Minister’s scheduled 9 September meeting with President Bush. R.R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff 0 /\ Margaret Bloodworth Av Deputy Minister Encl (1) Canada SECRET(CEO) 000049 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I’information SECRET (CEO) BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ISSUE 1. To provide an update on the recent situation in Iraq and the developing Canadian policy position. BACKGROUND 2. The US Administration is clearly focused on Iraq and is edging closer to Presidential decisions regarding how and when, rather than whether, to begin military action. The European Allies (except for, perhaps, the UK) are struggling to come to terms with American policies and perceptions, some of which they do not share, and with their own sense of vulnerability and lack of clout. 3. Regardless of diverging views and objectives, fundamental trans-Atlantic political and security interests are essentially the same: the international community recognizes the security threat posed by Iraq’s failure to comply with United Nations resolutions and Iraq’s continued development of weapons of mass destruction. Although few allies will accept the notion of regime change as a basis for action, evidence linking Iraq to terrorist activity or increased efforts to enhance its chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological weapons capabilities may compel allies to act in concert with the US. 4. National Defence has been participating in an interdepartmental group, led by Foreign Affairs, which defined a range of policy options on Iraq for Minister Graham. Foreign Affairs has recommended continuing diplomatic efforts to try to convince Iraq to accept the unconditional return of UN arms inspectors and to engage allies and partners in seeking appropriate legal and political solutions to the Iraqi situation. In the event the US approaches Canada for a political endorsement and for forces to participate in military action, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has been advised to consider the following factors in making a decision about how to respond: the importance for bilateral Canada-US relations; the legal and political justifications used for the attack; the reaction of our allies and partners; and the implications for Iraq and the region. DISCUSSION 5. The US Administration has repeatedly expressed its goal of regime change within Iraq. Canadian Embassy officials in Washington, D.C., are reporting that working groups on issues such as military options, interim governing structures and global financial implications have been meeting for months and their papers have already been circulated to senior levels within the Pentagon, State Department and White House. Six of Iraq’s most prominent opposition groups, including the Iraqi National Congress and the Iraqi National Accord, met with US officials over the weekend of 9 August in an attempt to resolve their differences and unite in preparation for the end of Saddam Hussein’s rule. The US will not invade Iraq without having a credible plan on both the pre- and post1/5 SECRET (CEO) 000050 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgud en vertu de la Loisur facets d I’information SECRET (CEO) invasion phases of any action. There may be a role for an international stabilization force or other significant international presence in Iraq for several years after the cessation of any offensive military action. 6. Reports indicate that Saddam Hussein is convinced that Iraq will face a US-led military attack, to begin by the end of this year or early in 2003, and is personally focused on his own survival and that of his regime. In the coming months, Iraq will continue a multifaceted strategy of defensively preparing for the coming war. This will include a concerted effort to build and repair regional relationships, continuing covert development of WMD and ballistic missiles, sanctions-busting and encouraging a variety of distractions internationally to try and restrain the United States through its allies. Intelligence assessments indicate that with the exception of probable accelerated work on WMD programs, Iraqi war preparations will remain defensive, not offensive. 7. Iraq had advanced biological, chemical and nuclear programs long before the Gulf War. There is much evidence, both direct and circumstantial, that Iraq has retained and continued developing robust biological and chemical weapons capabilities. Recent intelligence reports suggest increased activity at several Iraqi facilities suspected of supporting the production, testing, and storage of WMD, including that of nuclear weapons. Saddam believes the asymmetric threat posed by Iraqi WMD is his best chance at deterring a regime-threatening conventional attack. His commitment to WMD has been demonstrated by his personal choice to absorb billions of dollars in economic losses from sanctions, rather than allow the return of the UN inspectors that were evicted in December 1998. 8. Within the international community, the US has received bilateral support for military action from allies such as the UK and Australia. Other countries, including Germany and Jordan, have publicly opposed direct intervention in Iraq, The support of regional partners, such as Kuwait, Qatar and especially Turkey, will be required to facilitate any decisive military action. The US has stepped up efforts to secure their agreement, as well as to gauge the support of Saudi Arabia, an essential partner in the 1991 Gulf War, which has been publicly hostile to the idea of renewed US intervention. Israel will also figure prominently; kcould well find itself a target for Iraqi retaliation in the event of military action - perhaps even with WMD. Unlike in the Gulf War, Israel has not promised to resist the temptation to strike back. s .15(1) 9. Fear of their own publics has increased pressure on other Arab regimes to avoid articulating open support of US intervention in Iraq, although at the end of the day, most regional governments will likely be unwilling to risk relations with the US and should be able to contain any popular dissent. Jordan, in particular because of its Palestinian population, will face considerable pressures in trying to reconcile US requests with popular opinion. Neighbours such as Syria and Iran will probably remain opposed to military intervention since they will not accept that a sovereign country could have its regime changed forcibly by the US. Additionally, US military intervention would likely 2/5 SECRET(CEO) 000051 J �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informotion SECRET (CEO) provoke a new exodus of Iraqi refugees - something that neighbours would be illequipped to cope with. Similarly, all Arab countries, and many European, are concerned by the potential impact on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. 10. There has been very little real multilateral progress towards bringing Iraq into compliance with UN resolutions concerning weapons inspections and the import and export of various commodities, including weapons components and oil. After numerous discussions with Iraq, the United Nations Security Council has decided that there will be no further high-level talks until there are concrete indications from Iraq that they are ready to accept UN weapons inspections unconditionally. Although any decision to resume the Secretary General’s participation in such talks would not be taken without first holding a full discussion of the situation within the Council, low-level technical discussions between the UN and Iraqi specialists will be permitted to continue. Russia and China support continuing the dialogue; Russia, in particular, fears that the US is seeking to close down diplomatic options to resolve the conflict. 11. The legal basis to use armed force exists under customary international law (e.g., humanitarian intervention and self defence) and the UN Charter. Article 51 and Chapter VII of the UN Charter provide two exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force. Article 51 preserves the inherent right of individual and collective self defence. Operation APOLLO is being conducted in exercise of self defence. Under Chapter VII, the Security Council can authorize the use of armed force by way of a Security Council Resolution upon making a determination that there exists a threat to or breach of international peace and security. For example, Security Council Resolution 678 provided a legal basis for states to use force against Iraq in the Gulf War. 12. Historically, the US. UK and, to a lesser extent, France have conducted a number of postGulf War military operations against Iraq while relying upon a number of asserted legal bases. These include the enforcement of No-Fly zones (humanitarian intervention); attacking the Iraqi integrated air defence system (self defence); attacking Iraqi intelligence facilities (self defence arising from a plot to assassinate the first President Bush); and destruction of suspected weapons facilities (enforcement of resolution 687 and subsequent resolutions relating to weapons inspections). Any future use of force by the US against Iraq, as with previous uses offeree in the Gulf since 1990, will raise complex legal issues. For example, questions concerning the nature and scope of the right of self defence arise from recent US statements regarding a doctrine of “preemptive self defence” and the use of force against states hosting terrorists. 13. Given the historical complexity of the issue, any determination of the legality of a future use of force will require careful scrutiny of the evidentiary bases upon which a claim to use force is asserted. For example, evidence that demonstrates that Iraq is producing WMD and intends to use them against the US or others, or to assist others in using them, would have to be analyzed to determine whether the requirements of self defence under international law have been met. 3/5 SECRET (CEO) 000052 I �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accds a I'information SECRET (CEO) CANADIAN POSITION 14. Canadian policy regarding Iraq remains consistent: the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs continue to reaffirm the position that Canada, as always, will assess the situation as it evolves and make a decision at the time. Both have noted Canada’s concern about Iraq’s WMD programs, but have indicated our preference that the issue be dealt with through the UN (i.e., through the re-establishment of the UN inspection mechanism). Canada’s primary goals remain to ensure that Iraq’s threat to international peace and security is eliminated and to re-integrate Iraq into the international community. Canada would also like to see a restoration of the Security Council’s primacy in dealing with Iraq. We will want to do (or be seen to have done) everything possible to resolve the conflict in a peaceful manner; however, consideration will have to be given to the effect of any policy choices on Canada’s overall relations with the US. 15. While it is anticipated that the US is prepared to deal with Iraq unilaterally if need be, military contributions from allies will be welcomed and, indeed, may be expected. It is anticipated that the US will deliver a formal demarche by the end of August; a Canadian military contribution may well be requested at that time. Condemnation or expressions of regret will not be well received in Washington. At the very least, allies will be expected to endorse the operation. Recent comments by the US Ambassador to Canada that the US wants Canada at its side if it attacks Iraq provide an indication of US thinking. US President Bush told the Prime Minister that the US would ‘consult’ Canada prior to mounting any military operations. At this stage, however, Canada has no direct • insight into US planning. Having already volunteered to commit forces, it is possible that the UK and Australia have been made privy to these plans. 16. Should Canada decide to both endorse US military action and to participate militarily in any intervention, National Defence will need to determine the extent to which the Canadian Forces can participate given competing demands on limited resources. Since 1991, Canada has periodically sent ships to participate in Maritime Interdiction Operations established to monitor and enforce UN resolutions. As part of our NORAD commitment, Canada also assigns Canadian Forces personnel to US airforce Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft in the US, who may be deployed for the monitoring of the No-Fly zones over northern and southern Iraq at any time. Canadian military resources available for new military action are essentially the same forces identified for the long term sustainment of Operation APOLLO (i.e., deployment to Afghanistan or Iraq, but not both): • two ships; • up to three Hercules tactical transport aircraft and two Aurora Maritime Patrol aircraft. Canada had also offered six CF-18 fighter aircraft at the beginning of the campaign in Afghanistan, however, the US did not request their deployment. Prior to the commitment of any type of aircraft (including those 4/5 SECRET(CEO) 000053 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET (CEO) currently deployed on Operation APOLLO) for use against Iraq, a detailed staff check would have to be completed based on the location and tactical tasks assigned in order to determine feasibility and to mitigate the risk inherent to operations in this area. Furthermore, the commitment of CF-18 aircraft would be limited to a single rotation given current commitments to Operation NOBLE EAGLE; • Given the current operational tempo, it was already confirmed that a Canadian Forces light infantry battalion would not be available for deployment until the summer of 2003 for a possible deployment to Afghanistan. Any commitment of ground troops to a campaign in Iraq would, therefore, be largely dependent on the timing of the campaign and the required force structure; and • headquarters and service support staff. The threat to Canadian Forces personnel and assets would vary according to the specific options selected, however, given the prospect of Iraq’s use of WMD, any deployment would entail significant risk. A military contribution would also require considerable diplomatic support from Foreign Affairs. 17. Irrespective of Canada’s military capability, any Canadian decision to support US action will ultimately be based on a number of legal and policy concerns, but will remain fundamentally a foreign policy issue. The decision will require a fine balance between the long-established principles of Canadian foreign policy and the realpolitik considerations of Canada-US relations. Should a decision to provide military support to the US be taken, consideration could be given to proactively approaching the US, rather than waiting to be asked, if it is assessed that doing so would be in Canada’s national interests. Prepared By: Consultations: Responsible Director: Responsible Director-General Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Corri Barr. D PK Pol 6, 996-1741 Col Grant, J3 Inti, 992-3400 LCol Abbott. D Law I, 992-0600 Col St-John. IDC/DFAIT M. Walma. IDR/DFAIT C. Hull. GMR/DFAIT Col G. Cote. DPK Pol. 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross. DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder. ADM (Pol). 992-3458 19 Aug 02 5/5 SECRET(CEO) 000054 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00008 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 27-08-2002 to 31-12-2002 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10025 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c6d1e3f350c75fffbdf9c4efe3e9f87b.pdf 762536d3077a7bd577c77786877dda14 PDF Text Text CONFIDENTIAL CANADIAN (UNCLASSIFIED Without Enclosure) -------- General Correspondence No^ber 19, 2002 " ’ v ccmMercury Manual Docket Slip Doc Date: 19/11/2002 BF Date: 3%? Document: 644913 Control: CDS2002-337834 File No.: 3000-1 Input Date: 19/11/2002 Due Date: Org/Gp: CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF Subject: BN FOR MND - ON CANADIAN ACCES TO US PLANNING Comment: Author: K CALDER XRef: DATE L1U CHG TO 50 Orf ^0 Grp/Sct: ADMPOL INTL REMARKS Az L C<^V\ \AT-l jyufu^ li ajkq a ^- CONFIDENT (UNCLAS: _______ . 000029 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information • CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: Briefing Note on Canadian Access to US Military Planning File #/Numero de reference: 3450-1 (Corri Barr, D PK Pol 6) DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI FROM/DE: J.J. Gauvin Cmdre Concur :COS J3_____ COS J3/CEM J3 Date: D PK Pol/D Pol MP Z Date: 1$ Al 2.COZ- ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) FROM/DE: Concur d g i S Po T/d g Poi Si (J Date: DCDS^CEMD Date: CDS/CEMD DM/SM FROM/DE: ADM Pol/SMA Pol Date: Sous-Ministre de la Defense Rationale CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) NOV 1 9 2002 Deputy Minister of Notional Defence REF: 34G63 000030 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ISSUE • Any delay in a Canadian government decision to engage in military-to-military planning on Iraq could seriously compromise Canada’s ability to provide an effective and timely contribution to any future campaign. BACKGROUND • With the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1441 on the situation in Iraq, the US is moving into a more active and public phase in its coalition-building and military planning for any possible future action in the event of Iraqi non-compliance with the terms of the inspections. DISCUSSION • The US Embassy has formally demarched Canada to engage in planning and to gauge what contributions - including combat troops and combat support - it could provide should military means be required to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. The US has indicated that it would prefer to act with the broadest possible international coalition and would welcome Canada’s support. • A delay in Canadian access to military planning would erode the Canadian Forces flexibility to participate should the international community determine that force is, indeed, required. Such access at this juncture would also serve to inform Canada’s decision-making process. If the Canadian Government decides to deploy Canadian Forces against Iraq, thus putting Canadian lives at risk, that decision should be informed by the fullest possible understanding of US plans. • The Canadian Embassy in Washington reports its interlocutors have said that, barring the outbreak of hostilities in the coming weeks, there is still adequate time for allies to volunteer and integrate forces into ongoing planning. However, US officials also stress that the longer a Canadian decision to engage in military-to-military discussions takes, the less relevant and credible any potential Canadian military contribution would be. • Rather than committing Canada to joining a campaign irrespective of the outcome of the United Nations inspection process, early participation in US planning would be extremely prudent - particularly if Canada could become involved in any action against Iraq (as the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs have both publicly suggested). Canadian Forces access to planning at this stage would not constitute acceptance of any specific task or the commitment of resources. Canada would simply be engaging in prudent military planning and preparation. 1/2 CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) 000031 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) Prepared By: Responsible Director: Responsible Director-General Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Com Barr. D PK Pol 6,996-1741 Col G. C6te, DPK Pol. 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross. DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder. ADM (Pol), 992-3458 15 Nov 02 2/2 CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) 000032 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00009 Title A name given to the resource Briefing Note for the Minister of National Defence Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 15-Nov-02 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10025 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/27f2feaef92bea01c35274accee6c012.pdf 85529a4817f66f276078cf67bbbb39b9 PDF Text Text Q'/lf " 1*1 , t Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act de la Loi surVGIc/ia I'informatigp/'' |£-'Ji SECRET(CEO) National Defence Defense nationale National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 AUG 2 7 $$ The Minister BRIEFING NOTE ON IRAQ Enclosed is a briefing note that outlines the recent situation in Iraq and the developing Canadian policy position. You may wish to discuss this issue with Minister Graham and other Cabinet colleagues in advance of any possible US request for assistance and the Prime Minister’s scheduled 9 September meeting with President Bush. R.R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff 0 /\ Margaret Bloodworth Av Deputy Minister Encl (1) Canada SECRET(CEO) 000049 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I’information SECRET (CEO) BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ISSUE 1. To provide an update on the recent situation in Iraq and the developing Canadian policy position. BACKGROUND 2. The US Administration is clearly focused on Iraq and is edging closer to Presidential decisions regarding how and when, rather than whether, to begin military action. The European Allies (except for, perhaps, the UK) are struggling to come to terms with American policies and perceptions, some of which they do not share, and with their own sense of vulnerability and lack of clout. 3. Regardless of diverging views and objectives, fundamental trans-Atlantic political and security interests are essentially the same: the international community recognizes the security threat posed by Iraq’s failure to comply with United Nations resolutions and Iraq’s continued development of weapons of mass destruction. Although few allies will accept the notion of regime change as a basis for action, evidence linking Iraq to terrorist activity or increased efforts to enhance its chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological weapons capabilities may compel allies to act in concert with the US. 4. National Defence has been participating in an interdepartmental group, led by Foreign Affairs, which defined a range of policy options on Iraq for Minister Graham. Foreign Affairs has recommended continuing diplomatic efforts to try to convince Iraq to accept the unconditional return of UN arms inspectors and to engage allies and partners in seeking appropriate legal and political solutions to the Iraqi situation. In the event the US approaches Canada for a political endorsement and for forces to participate in military action, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has been advised to consider the following factors in making a decision about how to respond: the importance for bilateral Canada-US relations; the legal and political justifications used for the attack; the reaction of our allies and partners; and the implications for Iraq and the region. DISCUSSION 5. The US Administration has repeatedly expressed its goal of regime change within Iraq. Canadian Embassy officials in Washington, D.C., are reporting that working groups on issues such as military options, interim governing structures and global financial implications have been meeting for months and their papers have already been circulated to senior levels within the Pentagon, State Department and White House. Six of Iraq’s most prominent opposition groups, including the Iraqi National Congress and the Iraqi National Accord, met with US officials over the weekend of 9 August in an attempt to resolve their differences and unite in preparation for the end of Saddam Hussein’s rule. The US will not invade Iraq without having a credible plan on both the pre- and post1/5 SECRET (CEO) 000050 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgud en vertu de la Loisur facets d I’information SECRET (CEO) invasion phases of any action. There may be a role for an international stabilization force or other significant international presence in Iraq for several years after the cessation of any offensive military action. 6. Reports indicate that Saddam Hussein is convinced that Iraq will face a US-led military attack, to begin by the end of this year or early in 2003, and is personally focused on his own survival and that of his regime. In the coming months, Iraq will continue a multifaceted strategy of defensively preparing for the coming war. This will include a concerted effort to build and repair regional relationships, continuing covert development of WMD and ballistic missiles, sanctions-busting and encouraging a variety of distractions internationally to try and restrain the United States through its allies. Intelligence assessments indicate that with the exception of probable accelerated work on WMD programs, Iraqi war preparations will remain defensive, not offensive. 7. Iraq had advanced biological, chemical and nuclear programs long before the Gulf War. There is much evidence, both direct and circumstantial, that Iraq has retained and continued developing robust biological and chemical weapons capabilities. Recent intelligence reports suggest increased activity at several Iraqi facilities suspected of supporting the production, testing, and storage of WMD, including that of nuclear weapons. Saddam believes the asymmetric threat posed by Iraqi WMD is his best chance at deterring a regime-threatening conventional attack. His commitment to WMD has been demonstrated by his personal choice to absorb billions of dollars in economic losses from sanctions, rather than allow the return of the UN inspectors that were evicted in December 1998. 8. Within the international community, the US has received bilateral support for military action from allies such as the UK and Australia. Other countries, including Germany and Jordan, have publicly opposed direct intervention in Iraq, The support of regional partners, such as Kuwait, Qatar and especially Turkey, will be required to facilitate any decisive military action. The US has stepped up efforts to secure their agreement, as well as to gauge the support of Saudi Arabia, an essential partner in the 1991 Gulf War, which has been publicly hostile to the idea of renewed US intervention. Israel will also figure prominently; kcould well find itself a target for Iraqi retaliation in the event of military action - perhaps even with WMD. Unlike in the Gulf War, Israel has not promised to resist the temptation to strike back. s .15(1) 9. Fear of their own publics has increased pressure on other Arab regimes to avoid articulating open support of US intervention in Iraq, although at the end of the day, most regional governments will likely be unwilling to risk relations with the US and should be able to contain any popular dissent. Jordan, in particular because of its Palestinian population, will face considerable pressures in trying to reconcile US requests with popular opinion. Neighbours such as Syria and Iran will probably remain opposed to military intervention since they will not accept that a sovereign country could have its regime changed forcibly by the US. Additionally, US military intervention would likely 2/5 SECRET(CEO) 000051 J �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informotion SECRET (CEO) provoke a new exodus of Iraqi refugees - something that neighbours would be illequipped to cope with. Similarly, all Arab countries, and many European, are concerned by the potential impact on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. 10. There has been very little real multilateral progress towards bringing Iraq into compliance with UN resolutions concerning weapons inspections and the import and export of various commodities, including weapons components and oil. After numerous discussions with Iraq, the United Nations Security Council has decided that there will be no further high-level talks until there are concrete indications from Iraq that they are ready to accept UN weapons inspections unconditionally. Although any decision to resume the Secretary General’s participation in such talks would not be taken without first holding a full discussion of the situation within the Council, low-level technical discussions between the UN and Iraqi specialists will be permitted to continue. Russia and China support continuing the dialogue; Russia, in particular, fears that the US is seeking to close down diplomatic options to resolve the conflict. 11. The legal basis to use armed force exists under customary international law (e.g., humanitarian intervention and self defence) and the UN Charter. Article 51 and Chapter VII of the UN Charter provide two exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force. Article 51 preserves the inherent right of individual and collective self defence. Operation APOLLO is being conducted in exercise of self defence. Under Chapter VII, the Security Council can authorize the use of armed force by way of a Security Council Resolution upon making a determination that there exists a threat to or breach of international peace and security. For example, Security Council Resolution 678 provided a legal basis for states to use force against Iraq in the Gulf War. 12. Historically, the US. UK and, to a lesser extent, France have conducted a number of postGulf War military operations against Iraq while relying upon a number of asserted legal bases. These include the enforcement of No-Fly zones (humanitarian intervention); attacking the Iraqi integrated air defence system (self defence); attacking Iraqi intelligence facilities (self defence arising from a plot to assassinate the first President Bush); and destruction of suspected weapons facilities (enforcement of resolution 687 and subsequent resolutions relating to weapons inspections). Any future use of force by the US against Iraq, as with previous uses offeree in the Gulf since 1990, will raise complex legal issues. For example, questions concerning the nature and scope of the right of self defence arise from recent US statements regarding a doctrine of “preemptive self defence” and the use of force against states hosting terrorists. 13. Given the historical complexity of the issue, any determination of the legality of a future use of force will require careful scrutiny of the evidentiary bases upon which a claim to use force is asserted. For example, evidence that demonstrates that Iraq is producing WMD and intends to use them against the US or others, or to assist others in using them, would have to be analyzed to determine whether the requirements of self defence under international law have been met. 3/5 SECRET (CEO) 000052 I �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accds a I'information SECRET (CEO) CANADIAN POSITION 14. Canadian policy regarding Iraq remains consistent: the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs continue to reaffirm the position that Canada, as always, will assess the situation as it evolves and make a decision at the time. Both have noted Canada’s concern about Iraq’s WMD programs, but have indicated our preference that the issue be dealt with through the UN (i.e., through the re-establishment of the UN inspection mechanism). Canada’s primary goals remain to ensure that Iraq’s threat to international peace and security is eliminated and to re-integrate Iraq into the international community. Canada would also like to see a restoration of the Security Council’s primacy in dealing with Iraq. We will want to do (or be seen to have done) everything possible to resolve the conflict in a peaceful manner; however, consideration will have to be given to the effect of any policy choices on Canada’s overall relations with the US. 15. While it is anticipated that the US is prepared to deal with Iraq unilaterally if need be, military contributions from allies will be welcomed and, indeed, may be expected. It is anticipated that the US will deliver a formal demarche by the end of August; a Canadian military contribution may well be requested at that time. Condemnation or expressions of regret will not be well received in Washington. At the very least, allies will be expected to endorse the operation. Recent comments by the US Ambassador to Canada that the US wants Canada at its side if it attacks Iraq provide an indication of US thinking. US President Bush told the Prime Minister that the US would ‘consult’ Canada prior to mounting any military operations. At this stage, however, Canada has no direct • insight into US planning. Having already volunteered to commit forces, it is possible that the UK and Australia have been made privy to these plans. 16. Should Canada decide to both endorse US military action and to participate militarily in any intervention, National Defence will need to determine the extent to which the Canadian Forces can participate given competing demands on limited resources. Since 1991, Canada has periodically sent ships to participate in Maritime Interdiction Operations established to monitor and enforce UN resolutions. As part of our NORAD commitment, Canada also assigns Canadian Forces personnel to US airforce Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft in the US, who may be deployed for the monitoring of the No-Fly zones over northern and southern Iraq at any time. Canadian military resources available for new military action are essentially the same forces identified for the long term sustainment of Operation APOLLO (i.e., deployment to Afghanistan or Iraq, but not both): • two ships; • up to three Hercules tactical transport aircraft and two Aurora Maritime Patrol aircraft. Canada had also offered six CF-18 fighter aircraft at the beginning of the campaign in Afghanistan, however, the US did not request their deployment. Prior to the commitment of any type of aircraft (including those 4/5 SECRET(CEO) 000053 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET (CEO) currently deployed on Operation APOLLO) for use against Iraq, a detailed staff check would have to be completed based on the location and tactical tasks assigned in order to determine feasibility and to mitigate the risk inherent to operations in this area. Furthermore, the commitment of CF-18 aircraft would be limited to a single rotation given current commitments to Operation NOBLE EAGLE; • Given the current operational tempo, it was already confirmed that a Canadian Forces light infantry battalion would not be available for deployment until the summer of 2003 for a possible deployment to Afghanistan. Any commitment of ground troops to a campaign in Iraq would, therefore, be largely dependent on the timing of the campaign and the required force structure; and • headquarters and service support staff. The threat to Canadian Forces personnel and assets would vary according to the specific options selected, however, given the prospect of Iraq’s use of WMD, any deployment would entail significant risk. A military contribution would also require considerable diplomatic support from Foreign Affairs. 17. Irrespective of Canada’s military capability, any Canadian decision to support US action will ultimately be based on a number of legal and policy concerns, but will remain fundamentally a foreign policy issue. The decision will require a fine balance between the long-established principles of Canadian foreign policy and the realpolitik considerations of Canada-US relations. Should a decision to provide military support to the US be taken, consideration could be given to proactively approaching the US, rather than waiting to be asked, if it is assessed that doing so would be in Canada’s national interests. Prepared By: Consultations: Responsible Director: Responsible Director-General Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Corri Barr. D PK Pol 6, 996-1741 Col Grant, J3 Inti, 992-3400 LCol Abbott. D Law I, 992-0600 Col St-John. IDC/DFAIT M. Walma. IDR/DFAIT C. Hull. GMR/DFAIT Col G. Cote. DPK Pol. 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross. DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder. ADM (Pol). 992-3458 19 Aug 02 5/5 SECRET(CEO) 000054 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00010 Title A name given to the resource Briefing Note on Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 19-Aug-02 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10025 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/74c7d87ffbd282bc721281907e978426.pdf 397dd468bfeb3daa0863b3a217852bf7 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /‘information J -1- Michael Walma Defence and Security Relations Division 992-6205 Graeme McIntyre Middle East Division 944-5995 SECRET (Ct-O} 23 October 2002 IDR0360 Information Memorandum for: The Minister of Foreign Affairs c.c. Minister for International Trade c.c. Minister for International Cooperation and c.c. Secretary of State (Asia-Pacific) c.c. Secretary of State (Central and Eastern Europe and Middle East) c.c. Secretary of State (Latin America and Africa) (Francophonie) ISSUE: Memo on Iraq Policy Implications 1. This memo deals with Security Council scenarios and possible military contributions. It complements earlier broader analyses in memos GMR0595 (Aug 14) and GMR0589 (Aug 06). SUMMARY: 2. Indications that the Security Council may be nearing a decision on a draft resolution on Iraq will necessitate increased Canadian political and diplomatic management of the issue. Timelines for decisions will become shorter, the issues to be addressed more difficult and, equally important, the need for well-crafted communications lines more vital. This memo outlines four possible scenarios based on broad potential outcomes from the UN Security Council’s discussion of Iraq and identifies the legal, military, diplomatic and communications issues that each would present. The four potential outcomes are: A. B. C. D. No new resolution is adopted One or more resolutions are adopted but the authorisation of force is ambiguous; One or more resolutions are adopted, the authorisation of force is clear, but gridlock in the Security Council prevents a finding of Iraqi non-compliance; or There is a clear authorisation of force and the Security Council agrees that Iraq is in breach. With today’s indications that the Security Council may be close to agreeing on a resolution, outcomes B) and D) appear most likely, but outcome C) remains a lesser possibility. Should we face option B), we are almost certain to see the return of inspectors, which would delay the need for a decision on Canadian participation in military action for a short time. However, we would ultimately need to weigh the implication that participation could be seen as a weakened commitment to international law against the impact of non-participation on our relations with the United States. Clear evidence of non-compliance will factor heavily in our final decision. Option D), although unlikely to occur, would create the clearest conditions for Canada, politically and legally, as the Prime Minister has said that Canada will participate in a military campaign under these conditions. However, our ability to participate will be severely limited by short time lines and our non-participation in current US military planning. This memo reviews military options as comprehensively as possible, including that of 3. 000035 �4 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'accis a I’information * -2backfilling for the US in the Balkans or Afghanistan as a substitute for or complement to, direct participation. While does not favour backfilling due to resource constraints and possible troop morale issues, DFAIT believes possible backfilling scenarios must remain on the table to maximise the government’s future policy flexibility. BACKGROUND: 4. To date, with President Bush’s 12 September speech to the UN General Assembly and in the absence of any overt US pressure to support and contribute to a unilateral military option, policy options and the communications strategy for explaining our approach have been easy - uncomplicated and free of difficult issues. 5. This will soon change. For Canada, the political, legal and diplomatic management of the Iraq issue is about to enter a new, more complex and increasingly unpredictable phase. Timelines for decisions and, equally importantly, well-crafted communications lines, will become shorter and the issues to be addressed, much more difficult. 6. Whilst the situation in NY is too dynamic to predict, reports today (Friday) indicate that the US may well be nearing agreement with France on a draft resolution. This would be the first step in a consultative process to be engaged by the US with the other P5 and then the E10. The draft resolution is likely to be officially tabled quickly. 7. The compromise between the US and French positions will probably be reflected in a single resolution that essentially contains within it (a) the two stages that had originally be requested by France and (b) language that gives the US the trigger or automaticity elements they had been seeking. However, the use of force language may be weaker than that originally sought by the US. Rather than using the usual terms of art for military action (e.g. all necessary means), it may instead refer to the need for full compliance....in order to restore international peace and security. It is already becoming apparent that the US and France are reading the resolution in two quite different ways. 8. Although it is dangerous to make predictions on the outcome of the consultative process and eventual language of the resolution, it seems that intense consultations took place over the weekend and on Monday with the prospect of a tabling of the resolution for consideration, but no agreement has been found. For Canada, an approved resolution will mean we will be moving into another level of ambiguity and complexity in managing Canadian policy responses to Iraq. The UN Security Council will likely be unclear in terms of the key issues of determination of breach and the decision-making process regarding the use of force. At the same time, the global political environment is becoming more obscured and complicated with, inter alia, Korean nuclear weapons programmes revelations, the Bali bombing and the Yemen and Kuwait attacks. 9. The Government of Canada will soon have to move beyond easy appeals to the US and others to use the UN, and will face questions regarding possible Canadian political support for or military involvement in an eventual US-led military operation which may - or may not - derive its mandate and legitimacy from a UN Security Council decision. The political and legal uncertainties in the current situation require us to think through the options, possible responses and the way in which Ministers speak publicly about this issue. The following paper outlines the cunent state of play, some of the possible scenarios that we may be 10. faced with in the coming weeks and draft communications lines for dealing with these questions. 1. CURRENT SITUATION: 000036 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -X -3- 11. ^p.t present, the scenarios presented in our August memo (Ref:GMR0595, 14 August 2002) still largely pertain. Canada has been able to assert that concerns about Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council resolutions must be considered the continuing responsibility of the Council and that all action be directed to, and through, that forum. We have even been able to say that we have seen some success in this approach - the US has engaged the UN process, at least to now. 12. Canada has been able to accompany this overall UN approach with an active bilateral diplomatic effort (at the level of Ministers, the PM and officials) aimed at: engaging the US and encouraging them to work through the UN; working with other key allies such as the UK; encouraging the other P5 to live up to their responsibilities; and, pressing influential regional partners in the Middle East such as Egypt to engage Iraq directly in dialogue to encourage full cooperation and compliance with its obligations. We have clearly stated at the UN that we need an unambiguous resolution that would contain serious consequences for Iraqi non-compliance. 13. US position: The US remains determined to depose Saddam Hussein, working from the premise that Saddam’s government poses a fundamental threat to US strategic interests. While the Bush Administration has focused in public on Iraq’s WMD capacity and ambitions (and sought to connect Iraq to al Qaeda), a broader case for regime change is being pursued in Washington. Military action will probably begin in January-February 2003, although an earlier campaign cannot be excluded. Only a coup d’etat or Saddam’s assassination would be likely to avert a war against Iraq. 14. Within the Administration, views differ on whether to focus narrowly on deposing Saddam and eliminating Iraq’s capacity to threaten its neighbours, or to opt for a highly ambitious plan that would turn Iraq into a second pillar of support for the US in the Persian Gulf and send a democratising shock wave through the Arab world; there appears to be increasing support in the US for the latter option. More cautious opinions are still being expressed, notably by Secretary of State Powell, but the general thrust of US policy is clear. American efforts to secure a new Security Council resolution on weapons inspectors should be seen in 15. this light. Washington has concluded that Iraq’s WMD programmes cannot be destroyed through inspections, and that the only way to reduce or eliminate this threat is to replace the government in Baghdad. In short, Washington is interested in the UN process mainly in so far as it can legitimise a war that will depose Saddam. Key partners: Our key partners are facing the same dilemma that is before us. UK PM Tony Blair has 16. come under considerable fire at home for his decision to back the US both politically and militarily. France and Russia are balancing their opposition to the current Anglo-American resolution against their broader bilateral relationships with the US; there are indications that both are nearing a deal with the US. China remains on the sidelines, and is expected to follow Russia and France. Germany is seen to have crossed a line during the recent election campaign. Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark are all fairly supportive of the US position, while other European states such as Belgium have voiced their opposition. Regional views: Arab states remain publicly critical of US moves toward a war with Iraq, seeing this 17. as unjust on its own merits and egregious given what they perceive as a double standard toward Israel. At the end of the day, pro-US states such as Jordan, Kuwait and Qatar will likely acquiesce to US use of bases or airspace in If a war against Iraq, though a new Security Council resolution emerges, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states may also provide quiet support. s.15(1) Regional impact: With or without the backing of a UN Security Council resolution, US action against 18. Iraq can be expected to provoke a strong backlash in the Arab world. Even if the US achieves a rapid victory with minimal Iraqi casualties, there will be a strong tendency in the Arab world to regard this as yet another “humiliation”. 000037 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -419. ^^NMOVIC situation: Talks held two weeks ago between UNMOVIC, the IAEA and Iraq went smoothly. Nevertheless, Dr. Hans Blix, the Head of UNMOVIC has said that he sees no point in returning to Iraq when the Security Council is still considering changing his mandate. Dr. Blix has been walking a careful line between asserting his own independence and maintaining good relations with the P5, especially the US. 20. He is known, however, to have serious reservations about some aspects of the initial US draft, including the question of armed escorts, the issue of removing Iraqi informants and their families from Iraq and the matter of direct P-5 participation in and tasking of the inspection teams. On the other hand, he does not underestimate the importance of resisting Iraqi duplicity and intransigence on key issues such as access to Presidential sites. Should a Security Council resolution be adopted, we would expect that UN and IAEA inspectors would be able to return to Iraq in short order, and begin their work. What is not clear, and will not be until a resolution is adopted, is how and on what timetable UNMOVIC will report to the Council; and, by whom and how a judgement of a breach of obligations will be reached. 2. SECURITY COUNCIL SCENARIOS: 21. We can foresee four broad possible outcomes from the UN Security Council’s discussion of Iraq: A. B. C. No new resolution is adopted One or more resolutions are adopted but the authorisation of force is ambiguous; One or more resolutions are adopted, the authorisation of force is clear, but gridlock in the Security Council prevents a finding of Iraqi non-compliance; or There is a clear authorisation of force and the Security Council agrees that Iraq is in breach. D. In considering each of these scenarios, we must bear in mind that US military planning is already well 22. underway. If Canada waits until the action in the Security Council is played out before deciding whether to participate in a US-led attack on Iraq, our decision will come so late as to severely hinder preparations for Canadian military involvement in a January campaign. However, the alternative, to begin participation in US planning now, or after the first of a two-resolution package is adopted, would commit us to joining a campaign regardless of the outcome of the UN process. This would be interpreted by the Canadian public as the discounting of diplomatic avenues. A. Negotiations in the Security Council break down and no new resolution is adopted. s.15(1) This could come about if the US loses patience with the slow process of adopting a new resolution or 23. fears a veto from another P5 state. In this situation the US would attack Iraq unilaterally, possibly with a limited “coalition of the willing”. The US would likely cite previous Council resolutions and/or (preemptive) selfdefence as a basis for its actions, while simultaneously criticising the Council for failing to rise to the present challenge. Factors influencing a Canadian decision: Previous policy statements: PM Chretien has said that Canada would not participate in a war against 24. Iraq without a new UN resolution. 000038 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acc&s a I'information -5- 25. ^Lcgal: A legal right to use force in self-defence will only exist if there is evidence that Iraq poses an “imminent” threat. Any acceptance of Iraq’s WMD potential as a basis for using force in self-defence would require careful scrutiny of the evidence, including a study of Iraq’s current and potential WMD capacity and its future intentions viewed against context of past conduct. 26. Alternatively, the U.S. as in its 1993 and 1998 attacks against Iraq may seek to rely upon past Security Council Resolutions which have expressly authorized the use of force. In particular they may attempt to rely on Resolution 678 (1991) which authorized the “use of all necessary means” to implement “all subsequent relevant resolutions” relating to the restoration of international peace and security in the area. Resolution 678 would provide, at best, a weak legal basis upon which force could now be used. 27. Communications/domestic considerations: Our government would not be able to say that all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted. Canadian public opinion is firmly against attacking Iraq without a Council mandate, and could further harden if the US gives the appearance of having been indifferent to the UN. Depending on the circumstances of the breakdown, we would be able to suggest that Council had failed to live up to its obligations, as we have been insisting. From a legal perspective any public statements must not compromise Canada’s past and future actions. For legal reasons it would not be prudent to make definitive statements on the lawfulness of using force in self-defence or with respect to the sufficiency of evidence asserted in support of that basis. This includes reference to the evidence publicly disclosed by the UK or the Bush doctrine of preemptive self-defence. 28. Military: While highly problematic from many perspectives, an early end to diplomatic manoeuvring could, in theory, allow us to join current US planning early enough to make a direct military contribution. Alternatively, we could backfill for the US elsewhere (for example Afghanistan), freeing up US forces for the attack on Iraq. These assignments tend to be low on recognition and long-term. 29. Diplomatic: With the possible exception of the UK, our key partners would likely not support US action. Short-term implications: A decision to participate militarily would instantly relieve US pressure on us. 30. Joint planning could begin immediately. Communicating a rationale for this course of action to the Canadian public, Parliament and to our non-US allies would prove a challenge. A decision to not participate would not pose these challenges, and should also be manageable with respect to the United States as it will be expecting this decision in view of the Prime Minister’s stated position. Longer-term implications: In the absence of clear evidence demonstrating an imminent threat, a decision 31. to participate could be viewed by some as a weakened commitment to international law. It would also signal a lessened commitment to the UN and to the multilateral system. A decision to not participate would leave us on firmer footing, but could exacerbate the view of some within the United States that Canada cannot be relied upon. This problem could be attenuated to some extent by the offering of political support and by providing military assistance in other areas (backfilling) to free up US forces for its campaign. Any Canadian support would gamer some respect from the US Administration and Congress, who would appreciate that Canada was an ally willing to take political risks. B. Authorisation of force is ambiguous. 32. The Security Council could adopt a resolution that only implies an authorisation of force, as it did in Kosovo. Council members could deliberately seek this outcome in order to avoid a confrontation. The US would use this resolution to justify an attack on Iraq. 000039 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information -6- Factors^^fluencing a Canadian decision: • Previous Policy Statements: In the Iraq context, we have been careful to avoid publicly addressing this scenario, except to reiterate the need for the Security Council to live up to its responsibilities. This scenario resembles that of the Kosovo war and the use of force against Iraq in 1993 and 1998 in the sense of the ambiguity, but not from the overwhelming humanitarian need. Legal: Unlike a resolution which expressly authorized “all necessary means”, the legal foundation for an enforcement action would be questionable and be based upon a weak controversial doctrine of “implied” authorization. In 1993 and 1998 various Security Council statements and resolutions used phrases such as “gravest consequences” and “serious consequences” in place of the familiar “all necessary means”. The US is currently using similar diplomatic code as possible wording within a new resolution. Communications/Domestic considerations: A great deal will depend on the wording of the resolution and any evidence of continued Iraqi non-compliance. Clear evidence of Iraqi non-compliance could make a decision not to participate difficult to explain. Similarly, if the evidence is not clear, a decision to participate would not be well understood. The legal problems that such an ambiguous resolution would pose would not likely be well understood. Once again, we will have available to us the message that we believe that the Council has failed to meets its obligations. From a legal perspective public statements on the type of resolution Canada is seeking should avoid use of terms such as “gravest consequences” or “serious consequences” given that the Government of Canada has not decided to support the use of force on the basis of an implied authorization. Military: Under this scenario, military action would likely following very quickly on the heels of a finding, whether by the US or UN, that Iraq is in breach. It would be extremely difficult for proper planning to take place in time for Canada to be able to make an extensive contribution. Diplomatic: Such a resolution would allow countries a much larger degree of flexibility in determining their positions, as each could interpret the resolution as it chooses. At the same time, US pressure on Canada and other allies would be much stronger in this scenario, as it would be looking for support in order to justify its own position. We would need to take into account the positions of others, especially of the P5, and should consult them as soon as possible following the adoption of such a resolution. Short term implications: Adoption of a resolution would almost certainly mean a return of inspectors to Iraq, which should push the need for a decision off by a short period of time. A decision to participate would be warmly received by the US and would be justifiable to others. A decision not to participate would not please the US but would still be justifiable to others. Clear evidence of non-compliance will factor heavily. Longer term implications: In the absence of clear evidence demonstrating an imminent threat, a decision to participate could be viewed as a weakened commitment to international law. It would also signal a lessened commitment to the UN and to the multilateral system. A decision to not participate would leave us on firmer footing, but could exacerbate the view of some within the United States that Canada cannot be relied upon. This problem could be attenuated to some extent by the offering of political support and by providing military assistance in other areas (backfilling) to free up US forces for its campaign. Any Canadian support would gamer some respect from the US Administration and Congress, who would appreciate that Canada was an ally willing to take political risks. C. Gridlock in Council 000040 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -733. ^In this scenario, the Council adopts a resolution which would clearly authorise force (or states that the Counci^pil authorise force in the face of continued non-compliance) but balks at finding Iraq in breach or at adopting the follow-on resolution. Of the scenarios which would place Canada in a difficult position, this is the most likely. Factors influencing a Canadian decision: Previous Policy Statements: We have been careful to avoid publicly addressing this scenario, except to reiterate the need for the Security Council to live up to its responsibilities. Legal: The legal foundation for military action would be controversial. The clarity of the language, in particular regarding the “reporting” and “trigger” mechanism and the way in which any authorized force is delegated to member states will be crucial. In the absence of express language the Security Council’s failure to act does not provide a clear legal basis to use force. Communications/Domestic considerations: A great deal will depend on the wording of the resolution and any evidence of continued Iraqi non-compliance. Reporting from New York suggests that the Council may adopt ‘one and a half resolutions, that is, it would authorise force on recognition of a breach, but would be unclear as to how and by whom that determination would be made, opening the door to the US deciding for itself. Clear evidence of Iraqi non-compliance could make a decision not to participate difficult to explain. Similarly, if the evidence is not clear, a decision to participate would not be well understood. The legal problems that gridlock would pose would also not likely be well understood. Once again, we will have available to us the message that we believe that the Council has failed to meets its obligations. In order to avoid communications difficulties, our messages from the beginning of a two-stage process should emphasise our insistence that the Council must live up to its responsibilities to find Iraq in breach of its obligations if that is what the evidence indicates. Military: Under this scenario, military action would likely follow very quickly on the heels of a finding, whether by the US or UN, that Iraq is in breach. It would be well-nigh impossible for proper planning to take place in time for Canada to be able to make any real contribution. Diplomatic: Such a resolution would allow countries a much larger degree of flexibility in determining their positions, as each could interpret the resolution as it chooses. At the same time, US pressure on Canada and other allies would be much stronger in this scenario, as it would be looking for support in order to justify its own position. We would need to take into account the positions of others, especially of the P5, and should consult them as soon as possible following the adoption of the first resolution. Short term implications: Adoption of a resolution would almost certainly mean a return of inspectors to Iraq, which would push the need for a decision off by at least two weeks. A decision to participate would be warmly received by the US and would be justifiable to others. A decision not to participate would not please the US but would still be justifiable to others. Clear evidence of non-compliance will factor heavily. Longer term implications: This scenario could be considered 'worst-case' since it could see Canada having to choose between helping to discredit the UN or vainly attempting to maintain its credibility, risking the anger of the US. A decision to participate may be viewed as a weakened commitment to international law and could leave us open to further legal challenges. It would also signal a lessened commitment to the UN and to the multilateral system. A decision to not participate would leave us on firmer footing, but could exacerbate the view of some within the United States that Canada cannot be relied upon. This problem could be attenuated to some extent by the offering of political support and by providing military assistance in other areas (backfilling) to free up US forces for its campaign. Any 000041 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -8Canadian support would gamer some respect from the US Administration and Congress, who would ^^ppreciate that Canada was an ally willing to take political risks. D. Council unanimity on the need for force Should the UNSC adopt a resolution authorising force and if it then finds Iraq in breach, the matter is 34. simple for Canada, politically and legally. Under these circumstances, the Prime Minister has said that Canada will participate in the military campaign. We would not find ourselves internationally isolated, and the legal basis would be clear. Domestically, the implications for the government will focus on explaining its position to the public and deciding on the role of Parliament. Our ability to participate will be severely limited by short times lines (we would expect an attack in these circumstances to follow very shortly after the finding Iraq in breach) and our non-participation in current US planning. 3, Options for military contributions (prepared by National Defence) A. Direct military support 35. Should the Government of Canada elect to provide direct military support, it could contribute the assets currently dedicated to Operation APOLLO: two ships, three Hercules transport aircraft and two Aurora maritime patrol aircraft. These assets are already in theatre and, with appropriate diplomatic clearances, could be maintained until December 2003. Deployment of additional military resources for operations in the Iraqi theatre would be dependent on 36. time as follows: Short term (Jan-Feb 2003): The resources dedicated to Op APOLLO plus six CF 18 fighters 37. (incremental cost of $50M) and two additional ships (incremental cost of S60M); Medium Term (March-April 2003): A squadron of Special Operations Forces (JTF2 would be 38. available by 15 March 2003, costs TBD); and 39. Long Term (June-July 2003): An infantry light battle group (incremental cost of S122M) or a mechanized battle group, complete with tanks, mine clearing equipment, etc., (incremental cost of S166M). A June-July deployment will alleviate the requirements for personnel waivers. Early access to joint planning with the US and other coalition partners is considered key in being able to 40. determine an appropriate Canadian contribution within an overall coalition force package. Although Canada has no detailed knowledge of US planning, a campaign would likely begin sometime in January or February 2003. Depending on the force package selected by the Canadian Government, varying degrees of warning time will be required to ensure timely and effective deployments. Sufficient time will need to be allotted for the negotiation of Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) or Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) and acquisition of the necessary equipment and supplies. v 41. Combat operations would also require the support of other high value CF assets that are always in short supply. These include engineers; a nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) countermeasures capability; medical support; linguists; and command and control assets. Operations against Iraq within the next two to three months would pose substantial logistical risk given the CF’s dependence on materiel already deployed in support of Operation APOLLO and the long lead-time for the procurement of materiel and ammunition. Problem areas range 000042 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'accis a I’information -9- from Unavailability of vehicle spare parts to a limited stock of precision-guided munitions and targeting pods for the CF^s. B. Indirect military support 42. One option could be for Canadian troops to backfill US (or possibly other coalition) troops that could be redeployed to support a campaign against Iraq. If the CF were to be used in a backfill role, Canada would risk an increased commitment in areas such as the Balkans or Afghanistan (with contributions to the International Security Assistance Force, a Battalion/Battle Group combat operation, such as in Khandahar and possibly further staff support to Headquarters such as Coalition Joint Task Force 180 in Bagram) for longer periods than we might wish. Moreover, such a measure could have a profoundly negative impact on the morale of CF members should the repetitive, low-intensity deployments to Bosnia-Herzegovina, or other such missions, increase. As well, “backfilling” troops would be from elements of the CF that are already under stress due to the personnel deployment tempo, which would be compounded by these traditionally longer duration missions with no clear exit strategies. Backfilling is, therefore, not recommended by National Defence. James R. Wright Assistant Deputy Minister Global and Security Policy Deputy Minister 000043 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00011 Title A name given to the resource Memo on Iraq Policy Implications Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 23-Oct-02 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10025 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/7dd4cf9acbf843d03b7ce1c2344aba98.pdf 0c9508f6fa7386de0a14bb0464ce03c9 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lot sur I'acces a /’information — SECRET 8C0001 I 15G Sec 1 SEC 1812D-18-8 MS M. BLOODWORTH DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE International Plans and Operations Iraq CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS NIS1 Plans et operations r na1 n Iraq SSS/RDS _________ CIRCULATION TO A U o CD [d on CQ REMARKS REMARQUES Init B.F. RAPPEL Cancel Date Annular REGISTRY ONLY DEPOT CENTRAL JAN U IO r-1 r—I O’ co L| M 04 00 O ■ o 7 Q=t 04 c\jm o Jh 00 t- 0T cr> 1-1 04 O O CD csl I TT'n’- I . rH Q35 ■> OJ O '! • ■ ■ I— 4 _____ T7! § E rH H O o------- P I o O M 04 U »uija„ - k o CO 705A (7-94) 7530-21-902-0364 ■- I • I II Printed on recycled paper - Imprime' sur du papier recycle I ,I ' II ■ . ■_________ | Design - Dessin: DCA-D Admin M (2-2-2) 000055 I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgu^n \jfti^e la &st^fac^e^a /'information Y- 1*1 SECRET(CC) National Defence Defense nationale Deputy Minister Sous-ministre National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Canada K1A 0K2 Quartier gSndral de la Ddfense nationale Ottawa, Canada K1A 0K2 £>M'/$7cS- DEC 2 - W CANADIAN FORCES MEMBERS SECONDED TO ALLIED COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN A POSSIBLE MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST IRAQ The Minister Enclosed for your signature is a letter to the Chief of the Defence Staff on the Canadian Forces members seconded to allied countries in the context of a possible military operation against Iraq. This letter has been drafted in view of the Prime Minister’s response to your letter dated 25 October 2002, which was written in close consultation with Foreign Affairs. Margaret Bloodworth Encl (3) Canada SECRET(CC) 000056 �Document disclosed under the Access to information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accts a I'information SECRET (CC) General R. R. Henault Chief of the Defence Staff National Defence Headquarters Dear General Henault: Canadian Forces Members Seconded to Allied Countries Participating in a Possible Military Operation Against Iraq This letter forwards the Prime Minister’s concurrence with the recommendation that seconded Canadian Forces members be allowed to continue their duties in the event of a possible military operation against Iraq. These members would include those serving with the armed forces of any country that elects to join a coalition for future operations against Iraq, including the United States, the United Kingdom and France. If such a military operation were to take place, I am determined that the Canadian Forces be in a position to play a meaningful role within the context of a set of Canadian strategic objectives and scope of operations agreed jointly with my colleague, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. As the situation evolves, I will rely on your advice to assist the Governmental decision-making process. Sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence SECRET (CC) 000057 �----- Document d/sc/oM^ VffiSljthe Accfts to Informatton ATT Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I’accts it /'information SECRET OTTAWA, K1A 0A2 November 19. 2002 Dear Colleague: Thank you for your letter of October 25. 2002 on the Canadian Forces members seconded :o allied countries in the context of a possible military operation against Iraq. I recognize the potential negative impact on our bilateral relations and I concur with your recommendation that we should not recall Canadian Forces officers seconded to an ally which might elect to participate in such an operation. Thank you again for your letter and keeping me apprised of developments related to the Canadian Forces. Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum Minister of National Defence Room 110, Justice Building House of Commons Ottawa, Ontario K1A0A6 000058 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00012 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 02-12-2002 to 31-12-2002 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10025 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/2b05941fa51e9a12fb9ebe59c72956b2.pdf c1c386443bbd056a3e8c89139ff1ec2c PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I’acces a /'information SECRET FILE No. DOSSIER Sec SEC 1812D-18-8 8C0001 DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS M. BLOODWORTH international Plans and Operations Iraq ■ CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS M Plans et operations inte Iraq B.F JLATION u U w tu> CQ ARKS TO A HLOISIHY ONLY SArHtL Date Cancel Date Init. dEpOt central Inspected Date co _______ > rH -4” — ____ = — O’ — H CT) ...... mis -------- re t-i CM O o i as co a== id ==== ■. ------------ 7 Q= CM id — CO o t •H «= E- co H ■‘•'T'... . • CM o o m c -j TCiiiirM -r-srai=, — — II,1 : Q I r-i sissss —— •• r-t O g r-l O S=2S= O || o hl... !! _ M CM o ■MBS CO [X4 705 (03-00) 7530-21-894-4101 Design: Forms Management 993-4050 - Conception : Gestion des formulaires 993-3778 (11-02) 000001 �Documen^isclose^jnae^n^cces^^nformatior^c^^ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information ’3f.' •A- • - s:: Protect all files and records as official property. Protdger tous les dossiers et les documents comme dtant la propridtd officielle. Clean records prior to adding them to files. Nettoyer les documents avant de les ajouter a leur dossier respectif. Remove all envelopes, flags, tags, pins, spikes, clips and superfluous staples. Enlever tout articles inutiles (enveloppes, papillons, etiquettes, dpingles, trombones, attachesfeuilles, agrafes etc.). File papers and TDs chronologically, the latest date on top. Classer les documents en ordre chronologique, la date la plus rdcente sur le dessus. Prepunch holes at the top left corner of the papers. Percer des trous du coin supdriedr gauche du document. Attach papers to the file by a paper spike for easy handling. Pour faciliter la manutentien, attacher les documents au dossier au moyen d’une attache-feuille. When a file becomes thicker than 2”, a subsequent volume should be created. Lorsque le dossier a plus de 2" d’epaisseur, order un nouveau volume. Destroy duplicate material. Keep a copy only if it has additional information. Detruire tous les duplicates qui ne contiennent aucun renseignements suppldmsntaires. Verify the security classification of new documents added to the file. Verifier la cote de sdcuritd des nouveaux documents ajoute au dossier. Upgrade the file to the required level as required. Augmenter la cote de securite si ndcessaire. ! ’ n I t ! I I I I I i 000002 �Pages 3 to I a 5 are withheld pursuant to section sont retenues en vertu de Particle 15(1) of the Access to Information Act de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information �Document disclosed uhder^he Accystajnformatidd Act Document divulgue en vertu^^a tOi^um^accfs^tmf^rryation I DPK POL'fP' -b^g~C ^.€>02 3^^ DIRECTORATE OF PEACEKEEPING POLICY/ DIRECTION DE LA POLITIQUE DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX I Oso- n- D POL MP TO/A REMARKS/REMARQITS DATE INITIALS I ________ —-—*jaSCJII^BaiZWPA g-igr^t] 'frz^'x 3 : J ------ -------- 0 Co -g / E j fk u H *« ZES / 73 F 6' 7^- < ZI ' j i / - w^- iy ~r 3 Q^L. , : ■ 4s<9 dA7 I I A1 rt// nl 44—- ' 2^7- j ^//2- Ao I ~\xr/s—j zfu J )i AJL^ K^fO .nl44— | flriM ^P_iN zt^L E4oo i I 2__ j cz^S T_____ // ^p' /UA/A 4/'(71(012//^, i __ i I i; 000006 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information A •SECRET ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL)/ • 1 % Subject/Objet: STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS IN THE GULF REGION File #/Numero de reference: 3450-1 (Corri Barr, D PK Pol 6) / // .. / • i’- • ■■■ - v J DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI FROM/DE: J J. Gauvin Cmdre r D PK Pol/D Pol MP Date: . VL, 'L/L /Q_ Concur :COSJ3 COSJ3/ECM\J3 Date:^ ADM(Pol)/SMA(P,ol)' FROM/DE: DGIS Pol/D(\Pol SI Da,e: Concur:__ JAG Date: / Concur: DCDSZD8WT Date : c d s /c emM*v V DM/SM FROM/DE: ^AMPol/SMA Pol /Date: /2//Z/>Z. SECRET REF: 34762 000007 �Pages 8 to I a 13 are withheld pursuant to section sont retenues en vertu de Particle 15(1) of the Access to Information Act de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vjrtijQpi^loi tfrI'be&s ^information UNCLASSIFIED National Defence Defense nationale Deputy Minister Sous-ministre National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Canada K1A 0K2 Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa, Canada K1A 0K2 PfrlW -6-/9^. NOV 1 2 The Minister BRIEFING NOTE - UN RESOLUTION ON IRAQ Enclosed is a briefing note outlining the text of the final UN Resolution on Iraq. Margaret Bloodworth Encl (2) Canada UNCLASSIFIED 000014 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur facets a /’information UNCLASSIFIED !1 ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: UN RESOLUTION ON IRAQ File #/Numero de reference: 3450-1 (Corri Barr, D PK P0I6) DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI . FROM/DE: (? D PK Pol/D Pol MP Date: ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) FROM/DE; DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI Date: £^’7 DM/SM FROM/DE: - 0^ A W io £GLu -, ADM Pol/SMA Pol Date:^ O Z- UNCLASSIFIED REF: 34618 000015 �~Doc^nent disclosed under the Access to Information Act* Document divulgue en vertu de to loi sur faeces a /’information D PK POL I DIRECTORATE OF PEACEKEEPING POLICY/ DIRECTION DE LA POLITIQUE DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX & fe I D POL MP TQ/A s \MliU__ REMA RKS/REM ARQUES m PA! /;//?/A DATE INITIALS r/iW \ 16 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information V UPDATE FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ISSUE • A new United Nations Security Council Resolution on Iraq has been adopted. DISCUSSION • The United Nations Security Council unanimously approved a resolution on Iraq on Friday 8 November 2002 (text attached). The resolution sets out a number of specific deadlines: Iraq has seven days to accept the terms of the resolution; within 30 days (8 December), Iraq must send the UN a full and final list of its weapons; and within 45 days (23 December), Iraq must allow inspections to begin. • On 15 November, Dr. Blix, head of the UN inspection team, is expected to arrive in Iraq, with the advance inspection team arriving in Baghdad on 25 November. The first inspection report is not expected before the end of February. • The resolution stipulates that Iraq will give inspectors “unrestricted rights of entry” into and out of Iraq, the right to “free, unrestricted and immediate” movement to and from inspection sites, and the right to inspect any sites and buildings, including “immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access” to all sites, including'g Presidential Sites. • Following adoption of the resolution, the US administration reiterated that while it will consult the Security Council before engaging in any action against Iraq, its position is that the US does not require UN approval for US-led military action if Iraq fails to comply. The US Ambassador to the UN said Iraq will be disarmed “one way or another.” The UK believes that the resolution is clear and unambiguous and is showing UN resolve to compel Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions. • Both the US and the UK have categorically emphasized that the resolution provides for “serious consequences” if Iraq continues to violate its obligations. President Bush has said the resolution “presents the Iraqi regime with a final test”, and Prime Minister Blair indicated that the “consequences are clear”. • France, Russia and China will likely table a joint letter in the Security Council; this document may include a statement regarding the additional Security Council consultations expected prior to any action against Iraq. To this end, the letter may also encapsulate the concerns these countries had previously voiced regarding any hidden “automaticity” in the resolution with respect to authorization for use of force. 1/2 000017 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I’information I! • The Canadian position has not changed. The Government has been very much in favor of a strong resolution that addresses the need for Iraq to comply with all of its obligations to UN resolutions and that indicates that there will be serious consequences for non-compliance. The new resolution provides inspectors with the full backing of the international community to perform their duty without interference. It is now up to Iraq to fulfill its responsibilities without condition or delay. • A note analyzing the legal implications of the approved text is being prepared by JAG staff and will be forwarded separately. Prepared By: Responsible Director: Responsible Director General Responsible Group Principal: Date: 2/2 Corri Barr. D PK Pol 6. 996-1741 Col G. Cote, DPK Pol. 992-1872 MGen H. C. Ross. DG1S Pol, 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-3458 8 November 2002 000018 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /’information t Provisional text of the resolution on Iraq acted upon by the Security Council on Friday, 8 November 2002. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution The Security Council, Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, and 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements of its President, Recalling also its resolution 1382 (2001) of 29 November 2001 and its intention to implement it fully, Recognizing the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security, Recalling that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area, Further recalling that its resolution 687 (1991) imposed obligations on Iraq as a necessary step for achievement of its stated objective of restoring international peace and security in the area, Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material, Deploring further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), failed to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), and ultimately ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998, Deploring the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required by relevant resolutions, of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, in spite of the Council’s repeated demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the United Nations Monitoring. Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), established in resolution 1284 (1999) as the successor organization to UNSCOM, and the IAEA, and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people. Deploring also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its commitments pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) with regard to terrorism, pursuant to resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population and to provide 071101 EE 000019 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information t S/2002/1198 access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in Iraq, and pursuant to resolutions 686 (1991), 687 (1991), and 1284 (1999) to return or cooperate in accounting for Kuwaiti and third country nationals wrongfully detained by Iraq, or to return Kuwaiti property wrongfully seized by Iraq, Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein. Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions and recalling that the resolutions of the Council constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance, Recalling that the effective operation of UNMOVIC, as the successor organization to the Special Commission, and the IAEA is essential for the implementation of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions, Noting the letter dated 16 September 2002 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General is a necessary first step toward rectifying Iraq’s continued failure to comply with relevant Council resolutions, Noting further the letter dated 8 October 2002 from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq laying out the practical arrangements, as a follow-up to their meeting in Vienna, that are prerequisites for the resumption of inspections in Iraq by UNMOVIC and the IAEA, and expressing the gravest concern at the continued failure by the Government of Iraq to provide confirmation of the arrangements as laid out in that letter. Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, Kuwait, and the neighbouring States, Commending the Secretary-General and members of the League of Arab States and its Secretary-General for their efforts in this regard, Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq’s failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991); 2. Decides, while acknowledging paragraph I above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council; 3. Decides that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, in addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not 2 000020 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information t S/2002/1198 later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of ail aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, subcomponents, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material; 4. Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below; 5. Decides that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC's or the IAEA’s choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates; further decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi Government; and instructs UNMOVIC and requests the IAEA to resume inspections no later than 45 days following adoption of this resolution and to update the Council 60 days thereafter; 6. Endorses the 8 October 2002 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq, which is annexed hereto, and decides that (he contents of the letter shall be binding upon Iraq; 7. Decides further that, in view of the prolonged interruption by Iraq of the presence of UNMOVIC and the IAEA and in order for them to accomplish the tasks set forth in this resolution and all previous relevant resolutions and notwithstanding prior understandings, the Council hereby establishes the following revised or additional authorities, which shall be binding upon Iraq, to facilitate their work in Iraq: -UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall determine the composition of their inspection teams and ensure that these teams are composed of the most qualified and experienced experts available; - All UNMOVIC and IAEA personnel shall enjoy the privileges and immunities, corresponding to those of experts on mission, provided in the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA; -UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have unrestricted rights of entry into and out of Iraq, the right to free, unrestricted, and immediate movement to and from inspection sites, and the right to inspect any sites and buildings, including 3 000021 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'occes a /'information f S/2 002/1198 immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to Presidential Sites equal to that at other sites, notwithstanding the provisions of resolution 1154 (1998); - UNMOVIC and (he IAEA shall have the right to be provided by Iraq the names of all personnel currently and formerly associated with Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile programmes and the associated research, development, and production facilities; - Security of UNMOVIC and IAEA facilities shall be ensured by sufficient United Nations security guards; -UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to declare, for the purposes of freezing a site to be inspected, exclusion zones, including surrounding areas and transit corridors, in which Iraq will suspend ground and aerial movement so that nothing is changed in or taken out of a site being inspected; - UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the free and unrestricted use and landing of fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft, including manned and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles; - UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right at their sole discretion verifiably to remove, destroy, or render harmless all prohibited weapons, subsystems, components, records, materials, and other related items, and the right to impound or close any facilities or equipment for the production thereof; and - UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to free import and use of equipment or materials for inspections and to seize and export any equipment, materials, or documents taken during inspections, without search of UNMOVIC or IAEA personnel or officialor personal baggage; 8. Decides further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or the IAEA or of any Member Stale taking action to uphold any Council resolution; 9. Requests the Secretary'-General immediately to notify Iraq of this resolution, which is binding on Iraq; demands that Iraq confirm within seven days of that notification its intention to comply fully with this resolution; and demands further that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA; 10. Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by recommending sites to be inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews, and data to be collected, the results of which shall be reported to the Council by UNMOVIC and the IAEA; 11. Directs the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution; 12. Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for 4 000022 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I’information < S/2002/1198 full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security; 13. Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations; 14. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 5 000023 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information »• i November 8, 2002 Immediate STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER Prime Minister Jean Chretien today issued this statement on the news of the unanimous passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq : “Canada welcomes the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq and the decision to have inspectors return to Iraq. This is a key and constructive step by the international community and the United Nations to address the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Canada has long advocated the adoption of a resolution that spells out clearly what is expected of Iraq, both in terms of its international obligations and the consequences of continued Iraqi non-compliance. We are very pleased to see the Security Council speaking with one voice as well as the international community’s commitment to work together to address this serious issue. This is what Canada has been working for. The onus is now on Iraq to meet its international obligations. The adoption of this resolution affords Iraq a final opportunity to comply. We call upon Iraq to fulfill its responsibilities without condition or delay. Failing that, the Security Council will reconvene immediately to consider the situation and the need to secure international peace and security.” -SO- PMO Press Office: 957-5555 This document is also available on our Internet site: http://pm.gc.ca 000024 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00013 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 12-11-2002 to 31-12-2002 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10025 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/925a3de8a075d38145097fe38125d8fc.pdf d928de769e489ab6a2bf3543a118e85a PDF Text Text ������������������������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00014 Title A name given to the resource Cables from Canadian Mission to the United Nations Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1, 2003 - March 17, 2003 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Global Affairs Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2021-01097 GAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/139b5f48fb5eeb2a6ec6f7d027d76b36.pdf c857efe5dfd2ef6cc59a322d32388529 PDF Text Text ���� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00015 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Policy on Iraq [Heavily Sanitized] Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 14-Aug-02 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Privy Council Office Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2021-00218 PCO Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b368c3fa1a051ffaa798ee9e7e768ee3.pdf 3c0902050bf9271f774be1efce14f61b PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces d /'information 8COOO1 1812D-18-8 10G Sec i SEC DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS M. BLOODWORTH International Plans and Operations Iraq © CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS MINISTRE - MME M. BLOODWORTH SSS/RDS Plans et operations internationals Iraq P.A.. RANGER CIRCULATION TO A ■ REMARKSi REMARQUES pate Date- Init. I Init. B.F. RAPPEL Cancel Annular REGISTRY ONLY DEPOT CENTRAL Inspected Inspects Date g- f - f mi CT - 00 I 00 < § A CT H O 00 o 1 2 o CT Ll - §H co 4D 70S (0360) 7530-21-694-4101 DesIon; Forms ManaoementSSMOSO - Conception —I— ) 000001 �^^DoajmentdiscTosedijndertneAccesst^nfomwtionAct^ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information -az ;.$<• :JL ‘ .' -‘..L jUAI; ,.-» , - A. •. 'L-. -..'-(.'A • i'uf? . 1 Protect all fibs and records os ( official proparty. ’ i. j Protegsr tous Ise dossiers St las 1 docurnonts comms Etsnt la . pzopriito official's. 1 . ______________ _________ 1 i Clean records prior io adding them : L.l | 1____ L-_________ _______ __ | ' to.t-j|S3> I----- 1 ____ • Clacser Isa docurr.snto an ordre 1 chronolcgiqus, 'a deto la plus • r.'oonta cur !e dessus. * w >w ifeikvwk v nw I > »V|rf« • ! 'A't.pn e fils becomes thicker then ,T, uHJubaequent volume ehoulci •! beersated. . ■ ______ DeelvOy duplicate materiel. Iteap e copy only if it hes additional information. 9 | Verify the security .classification of | new documents added to tine the file. fils. 1_____ ‘ I L I_ _J 1 o r our tecllilar la manuianuon, ailacher les.,documents .. . au . dossier ... -j cu moyen d una atiacns-feullls. > I Lorequa le dossier a plus de ?" d’fipaisseur, crier un nouvaau t volume. 1 Ditruiretoue Iso duplicates qui ne J corrilannsni uucun ransoignamenls ‘ si'polimei <iciren. . *1 1 ’ ’----- 1 I. Fere ar des Irous du coin supirieur | gr.uone du document . , Aitech papers to tha filo by a paper spike for eery handling. 1 ■. papara and TDe ;, File r Icaily, iiie laiest datachror.eloon top. <<*»Z*** m.^w ) ;3.3purch holos ci St s top (sit comer of ths papers j— - . I . Enlever tout articles inuiiles (enveloppoe, paplllons, Etiquettes,. eplnglcs, trombones, ailaches13011133, agrflfca sic.) f,amove ell envelopes, ficoc, tegs, pnj-i uy ii Pina, aplksu, clips and superfluous , atopies. | ! CL _______________________________________________________ _________ — _ . to. to .■ I i i } •*•**•* wvj| i <° Mcitoyar las o’oeumants avarri ds rS • -------- -- • ----------loo pouter 6 Isur dossier rsspsctli. ' ’ • . | Upgrade the filo to the required | tev-jl au required. I Virifi-jr. la cola d3 s6cur(l6 des houveaux documents ajouti au I dossier. Augmsntar la cote da sEcuritE si n&cas'scfre. r o 000002 �Document disci i£nt divulgu SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) SECRET / h CDN-USEYESONLt^x Chief of the Defence Staff '3 Chef d’etat-major de la Defer? Of JJce National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 September 2003 The Minister UPCOMING EXCHANGE OFFICER DEPLOYMENT TO IRAQ BGen Natynczyk is presently one of the Deputy Commanding Generals of III Corps in Fort Hood, Texas. He has been asked by US authorities to deploy to Iraq for one year, likely commencing in Jan 04 although this could change. Ill Corps HQ will form the nucleus of the Land Component Commander’s staff working alongside the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. BGen Natynczyk would be employed as the Corps CJ5 Strategic Plans and Policy, rather than his present position of Deputy Commanding General, because the US intends to increase.the rank of the senior Corps HQ staff by one rank, with the Deputy Commanding General positions being filled by MGens. V. I 10 8 2S S3 § Of significant note, under US war planning, III Corps is identified for contingency operations in the Korean Peninsula and the decision to deploy them to Iraq would ' be a significant strategic shift in policy. Their deployment to Iraq is a very sensitive issue and has yet to be announced. As a CF exchange officer employed with III Corps, BGen Natynczyk plays a critical role in the planning and execution of operations conducted by the Corps in both garrison and in tactical environments. Under the Foreign Military Exchange program, our exchange personnel are expected to participate in all activities and I or tactical operations conducted by the host unit. I have authorized his deployment. R.R. Henault General /~cc'DM^j ~ « 1*1 National Defence q pc ppt * SECRET MUS EYES ONLY Defense nationale rrAN/i is; p v p s c imi vi Canad'a' 000003 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00016 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003-01-12-31 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-100289 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/3c89c2176341edba4942720675e2c0f2.pdf ee3e8493876af6db0cadb4ec9205eaee PDF Text Text >sea under the Access to Information ArtH I Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a I'informa^^^ A 8C0001 1812D-18-8 15G Sec 2 SEC DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS M. BLOODWORTH International Plans and Operations n i Iraq CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS MINISTRE - MME M. BLOODWORTH U ^n Iraq et CWRDENCES SSS/RDS CIRCULATION • RANGER --- ---------------- 1’ TO . A • REMARKS REMARQUES Date • ' -■ * .1 InM ln* I Date Init B.F.' RAPPEL JJRY T CE n. FtBWW <Z1 O I ' “------- :—■—4--------- - -------------------- k> J ■! r X, I -X —------- 1 I 4 1 QO CN 00 mI '< £> Q o o 2 H o w J, 00 -r-r «■ - io = — oo 705 TSJO^I <94-4101 □00004 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulgue en vertu de ia Loi sur I'acces a /'information FILE MAINTENANCE CHECKLIST USTE DE CONTR6LE POUREENTRETIEN DU DOSSIER Protect all files and records as officialproperty. • ■ Clean records prio(te adding them to files. Remove all envelopes, flags, tags, pins, spikes, clips and superfluous . staples. ProtEger tous les dossiers et les documents comma Etant la propriety officielle. Nettoyer les documents avant de les ajouter a leur dossier respectif. \ '* Enlever tout articles inutiles (enveloppes, papilloris, Etiquettes,. Epingles, trombones, attachesfeuiRes, agrafes etc.). ■ □ File papers and TDs chronologically, the latest date on top. Classer Jes documents en ordre chrpnotogique, la date la plus rEcente sur le dessus. Prepunch holes at the top. left corner'of the papers. Percer des trous du coin supErieur gauche du document. Attach papers to the file by a paper spike for easy handling. Pour faoiliter.la manutention, attacher les documents au dossier au moyen d’une attache-feuiHe. . When a file becomes thicker than 2", a subsequent volume should Jje created. Lorsque'le dossier a plus de 2” d’Epaisseur, crEer un nouveau volume. Destroy duplicate material. Keep a copy only if it has additional information: DEtruire tous les duplicates qui ne contiennent aucun renseignements supplEmentaires. Verify the security classification of new documents added to the file. Verifier la cote da security des houveaux documents ajoutE au dossier. ; Upgrade the file to the required level as required. Augmenter la cote de sEcuritE si nEcessaire. - a I ■ 1 SK-? 000005 ’I .'a �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information \j c _Aa a j e_c-v~\ v> 'JCl't X Ki-' c c. ot-\ \s. >—A-\ Va v ~*s .-€_ 3> v^<=^ VA\^S.C- \s»s»'_A e_c\ . A S>e.c_c=> w cX-x4xvx^e_ 'ZXZX CK<X 'Ajcxs Ca v x v x o x av x c - e-wx«yx\ CT.\<=. c^=i'xx^:> • C_-^-.vv -e_v\V- v <_v &xOv-x \s o j tvr\ s» • O.\-O.x.000006 xr \ ----- ' V« - ic. �Document disclosed under the Acc^ss.to.lnfofmgtion Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lcf^ur !jacf& OjiJnf3^!S)ion\zl SECRET National Defence Defense nationale National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 SECRET (CC) JUN 0 9 2003 The Minister DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN FORCES’ EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION 1. On 18 March 2003, the Prime Minister approved continued Canadian Forces participation in Operation Enduring Freedom in light of the imminent US-led military operation against Iraq. Within the context of this direction, restrictions were imposed that Canadian Forces transport aircraft operating in the Persian Gulf region were not to be used to support, directly or indirectly, military action against Iraq. In addition, all Canadian operations were to be undertaken within the existing Operation Apollo area of responsibility, excluding Iraq and that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North). 2. On 22 May 2003, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1483. Resolution 1483 lifted all prohibitions related to trade with Iraq under previous Security Council Resolutions with the exception of prohibitions concerning arms and related material. Further, Resolution 1483 calls upon all member states in a position to do so to respond immediately to the humanitarian appeals of the United Nations and other international organizations. Consequently, Resolution 1483 provides a framework within which Canada and other non-occupying power states may work with the US and British occupying powers referred to as “the Authority” Subsequently, the Prime Minister directed that Canadian Forces transport aircraft 3. were to be offered to the Authority to provide airlift in support of stabilization and reconstruction missions. The first mission to Iraq was flown on 2 June. These aircraft, deployed in the United Arab Emirates, are tasked in support of the upcoming deployment to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul. These aircraft will also be used to provide the agreed support to the UN mandated mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This UN mission will nominally employ two of the four aircraft in theatre. Therefore, support to the Iraq mission will be subject to operational priorities and aircraft serviceability. In order to facilitate operational and logistical arrangements, Canadian Forces 4. participation in stabilization and reconstruction activities will continue to be conducted under the operational control of “the Authority” as defined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483. At all times, Canadian Forces members remain under the 1/2 Canada SECRET SECRET (CC) 000007 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET command of the Chief of the Defence Staff. Additionally, the previous geographic restriction on Canadian Forces operations meant that Canadian Forces aircraft had been unable to accept transport taskings to and from Kuwait under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom. 5. To enable the Canadian Forces to execute the Prime Minister’s direction, the restrictions in respect of airlift by Canadian Forces transport aircraft in support of Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction missions and the geographic restrictions on Canadian Forces operations in Iraq and in that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North) have been removed. The removal of the restriction permits Canadian Forces aircraft to conduct missions through Kuwait for the delivery of loads exclusively in support of the campaign against terrorism and in accordance with Canadian national objectives. 6. Finally, the removal of the geographic restriction has also permitted the Canadian naval task group to conduct Operation Apollo missions in the Northern Persian Gulf in accordance with Canadian national objectives or other missions as may be directed by the Government of Canada. 7. If you agree, we recommend that you sign the enclosed letter to the Prime Minister. Foreign Affairs and the Privy Council Office have been consulted and concur with this approach. a/ R.R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff Margaret Bloodworth Deputy Minister Enclosures: 1 APPROVE Date: The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. 2/2 000008 SECRET �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information 1 SECRET (CO The Right Honourable Jean Chretien, P.C., Q.C., M.P., LL.L, LL.D., Prime Minister of Canada Langevin Block 80 Wellington Street Ottawa ON K1A0A2 Dear Prime Minister: This letter seeks to confirm your verbal direction of 22 May removing certain restrictions in respect of Canadian Forces operations in the Persian Gulf region. Within the context of existing direction, which you approved on 18 March 2003, Canadian Forces transport aircraft in the Persian Gulf region were not to be used to support, directly or indirectly, military action against Iraq. In addition, all Canadian operations were to be undertaken within the existing Operation Apollo area of responsibility, excluding Iraq and that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North). On 22 May 2003, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1483. Resolution 1483 lifted all prohibitions related to trade with Iraq under previous Security Council Resolutions with the exception of prohibitions concerning arms and related material. Further, Resolution 1483 calls upon all member states in a position to do so to respond immediately to the humanitarian appeals of the United Nations and other international organizations. Consequently, Resolution 1483 provides a framework within which Canada and other non-occupying power states may work with the US and British occupying powers referred to as “the Authority.” Further to your verbal direction of 22 May 2003, Canadian Forces transport aircraft were tasked to provide airlift in support of stabilization and reconstruction missions to Iraq. The first mission to Iraq was flown on 2 June. These aircraft, deployed in the United Arab Emirates, are tasked in support of the upcoming deployment to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul. These aircraft will also be used to provide the agreed support to the UN mandated mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This UN mission will nominally employ two of the four aircraft in theatre. Therefore, support to the Iraq mission will be subject to operational priorities and aircraft serviceability. In order to facilitate operational and logistical arrangements, Canadian Forces • participation in stabilization and reconstruction activities will continue to be conducted under the operational control of “the Authority” as defined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483. At all times, Canadian Forces members remain under the command of the Chief of the Defence Staff. Additionally, the previous geographic restriction on Canadian Forces operations meant that Canadian Forces aircraft had been 000009 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lbi sur I'acces a /'information unable to accept transport taskings to and from Kuwait under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom. To enable the Canadian Forces to execute your direction, the restrictions in respect of airlift by Canadian Forces transport aircraft in support of Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction missions and the geographic restrictions on Canadian Forces operations in Iraq and in that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North) have been removed. The removal of the restriction permits Canadian Forces aircraft to conduct missions through Kuwait for the delivery of loads exclusively in support of the campaign against terrorism and in accordance with Canadian national objectives. Finally, the removal of the geographic restriction has also permitted the Canadian naval task group to conduct Operation Apollo missions in the Northern Persian Gulf in accordance with Canadian national objectives or other missions as may be directed by the Government of Canada. Minister Graham has also been apprised of your verbal direction and concurs with the present conduct of operations. Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. r-3.-V- 000010 �SECRET (CC) Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information * Zip Sid SECRET C C (UNCLASSIFIED Without Enclosure) ccmMercury Routing Slip W'/ £ General Correspondence Wednesday, June 04, 2003 Document Date: 5/1/2003 BF : Input Date: 5/2/2003 Due Date: 6/5/2003 Org/Gp: CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF Document: 674270 Control No: CDS2003-366036 File No: 3451-6 Subject: DIRECTION CF TRANSPORT OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES TO IRAQ - DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION Author: Sect/Dept: Org: DR. KENNETH J. CALDER ADM POL Assigned Date: Inti: Task: Routing BF: Assigned To: REC’D 5/2/2003 CDS SO 5/2/2003 SODM FOR SIGNATURE 5/2/2003 DMEA FOR DM SIGNATURE 5/5/2003 MCU DM HAS SIGNED 6/3/2003 CDS SO 6/3/2003 SODM TO BE RESIGNED 6/3/2003 SODM FOR DM SIGNATURE AGAIN (AMENDED BY CDS) 6/4/2003 ADMPOL REC’D FROM DPK POL WITH CORRECTIONS FYA/PICK-UP BY LCOL THOMPSON SECRET C C SECRET (CC) (UNCLASSIFIED Without Enclosure) 000011 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET (UNCLASSIFIED Without Enclosure) / Sous-/M ccmMercury Routing SiiPfeni General Correspondence 3-Jun-03 / Document: 674270 Control No: CDS2003-366036 File No: 3451-6 ® 0 3 Zt-'J Document Date: 01/05/£00§epufy (vJ(. BF : Input Date: 02/05«GC^21*£na/>• Due Date: 05/06/2003 Org/Gp: CHIEF OF THED?FEn £| STAFF Subject: DIRECTION CF TRANSPORT OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES TO IRAQ - DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION Author: Sect/Dept: Org: DR. KENNETH J. CALDER ADM POL Assigned Date: Assigned To: Task: Inti: Routing BF: 02/05/2003 CDS SO 02/05/2003 SODM FOR SIGNATURE 02/05/2003 DMEA FOR DM SIGNATURE 05/05/2003 MCU DM HAS SIGNED 03/06/2003 CDS SO 03/06/2003 SODM REC'D REC'D FROM DPK POL WITH CORRECTIONS TO BE RESIGNED SECRET (UNCLASSIFIED Without Enclosure) 000012 �^Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act D^cyment divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information 1*1 Director Asia Pacific Policy Directeur des Politiques Asie Pacifique 22 Hy o3 KJlF [i^iOvx '$ T’cc Iv-i5 ;• /- (JC-CCC 'fit iU Lo. t-vx 4 V' * IV1 Co w \w a *>'*^3 T) PACT* ftrkr Cc^^tkvv, "^itr ij;\ rCv P.D. McFadden Capt(N) DAP Pol 995-9059 .v'i<r^A rL'ir (-. j IbC. (BUoJ? •< 2S ^3 000013 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information , SECRET ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN FORCES’ EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION File #/Numero de reference: 3450-1 (Corri Barr, D PK Pol 6) DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI FROM/DE: r MLm V” D PkPol/DIpol MP Date: W Concur: COS J3/CEM J3 Date: 4J ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) FROM/DE: /^GlW/DG Pol SI I V Date: 22_^u\^5 Concur: -xigj JAG/JAG Date: Concur: I >" J I) d c d s /s Cemd Date: ^.£<4J CDS/CEMD DM/SM FROM/DE: ADM Pol/SMA Pol Date: SECRET REF: 35538 000014 �MAY.26.2003 2:21PM DLAWOPS OTTAWA Document discf^Q'tl^ffir the to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de Io Loi sur I'accis a /'information EUHBI ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVO! DE SMA(POL) -----------Subject/Objet DIRECTION-REGARDINGCANADIAN-FORCES'EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION File #/Num6ro de reference: 34S0»1 (Corri Barr, D PK Pol 6) DGISPol/DQ Pol SI FROM/DE: Date: 'ol/D fol MP IXol loo * Concur1 COSJ3/CEMJ3 * Date: ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) • FROM/DE: il/DQ Pol SI V Cats: 22.4, Concur i~r/^4^- JA3/JAG . . „ Date:^/9^0’ Concur ■ DCDS/SCEMD Date: CDS/CEMD DM/SM FROM/DE: ADM Pol/SMAPol Date: SECRET REF: 36538 • -.'Jftte. 000015 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET MINUTE 22 May 03 MCU Direction for CF in the Gulf Region 1. An amended version of the “Direction Regarding CF Employment Restrictions in the Gulf Region” (ref: MCU2003-02923C). 2. The file had already been signed off by both the CDS and DM, however, subsequent direction from the PM and the adoption of a UNSCR lifting sanctions on Iraq necessitated a number of cli&nges in the document. Isl J.R. Fofestell Cq /Co I x D PK Pol 992-1872 SECRET 000016 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divtigif: egnertu d&Ja Loi sur I'accis a /'information 7 jo X D PK POL % DIRECTORATE OF PEACEKEEPING POLICY/ DIRECTION DE LA POLITIQUE DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX D POL MP TO/A REMARKS/REMARQUES ^ CA GO s &Or>ZoG- Dg Dj OC.&5 c VSJ&O3 -3 (,6 ottfo q^o} <^^./MX-AAL^-C-g -Ox^e «., ■» ^ < ■ 7^ DATE INITIALS / Li /1^>A n Oj^. 43 yO^ ft/r<Xz0' yex^ Gpp-o->il. 23 S Za I-x _____ APf£o\jAL DM fe_ Go I3P /(, fa? S’/ZA/AT<J£i> o3 <03 63 To 000017 �S*l Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET National Defence Defense nationale National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 MAY 0 5 20© The Minister DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN FORCES’ EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION On 18 March 2003, the Prime Minister approved continued Canadian Forces 1. participation in Operation Enduring Freedom in light of the imminent US-led military operation against Iraq. Within the context of this direction, restrictions were imposed that Canadian Forces transport aircraft operating in the Persian Gulf region were not to be used to support, directly or indirectly, military action against Iraq. In addition, all Canadian operations were to be undertaken within the existing Operation Apollo area of responsibility, excluding Iraq and that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North). 2. With the active phase of the armed conflict in Iraq at an end, Canada is about to participate in humanitarian relief operations and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The use of Canadian Forces assets will provide visible Canadian assistance to US-led or other internationally directed relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and will reinforce the multidisciplinary nature of Canada’s overall approach to the crisis. 3. It is therefore recommended that the restrictions in respect of delivery of humanitarian aid by Canadian Forces transport aircraft to Iraq and the geographic restrictions on Canadian Forces operations in Iraq and in that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North) be removed. Such removal will permit the Canadian Forces to action any requests for support in the delivery of humanitarian relief assistance and reconstruction materials by Canadian Forces transport aircraft to Iraq in accordance with normal staffing procedures requiring policy, operational and legal sign-off. Requests will be individually considered given that legal issues exist as a consequence of the United Nations sanctions regime against Iraq remaining in place at the present time. Additionally, the current geographic restriction on Canadian operations means that Canadian Forces aircraft have been unable to accept transport taskings to and from Kuwait under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom. Given that it is possible to distinguish between loads intended to support Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, the removal of the restriction will permit the Canadian Forces aircraft to resume missions through Kuwait for the delivery of loads exclusively in support of the campaign against terrorism and in accordance with Canadian national objectives. 1/2 Canada SECRET 000018 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'accis a I'information SECRET 4. The removal of the restrictions will also permit the Canadian naval task group to conduct Operation Apollo missions in the Northern Persian Gulf in accordance with Canadian national objectives or other missions as may be directed by the Government of Canada. 5. If you agree, we recommend that you sign the enclosed letter to the Prime Minister. &R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff Margaret Bloodworth Deputy Minister Enclosures: 2 APPROVE The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. 2/2 Date: iiiingiiiiiiiiiiniiiiiiiiM -cuass-reK?: ~ • ENTERED: 09:21.2003-05-06 (DM). Doc #70399 SECRET mc u # MCU2003-02923C 000019 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET (CO The Right Honourable Jean Chretien, P.C., Q.C., M.P., LL.L, LL.D., Prime Minister of Canada Langevin Block 80 Wellington Street Ottawa ON K1A0A2 Dear Prime Minister: This letter seeks your direction to remove certain restrictions in respect of Canadian Forces operations in the Persian Gulf region. Within the context of existing direction, which you approved on 18 March 2003, Canadian Forces transport aircraft in the Persian Gulf region are not to be used to support, directly or indirectly, military action against Iraq. In addition, all Canadian operations are to be undertaken within the existing Operation Apollo area of responsibility, excluding Iraq and that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North). With the active phase of the armed conflict in Iraq at an end, Canada is about to participate in humanitarian relief operations and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The use of Canadian Forces assets will provide visible Canadian assistance to US-led or other internationally directed relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and will reinforce the multidisciplinary nature of Canada’s overall approach to the crisis. Therefore I recommend that the restrictions in respect of delivery of humanitarian aid by Canadian Forces transport aircraft to Iraq and the geographic restrictions on Canadian Forces operations in Iraq and in that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North) be removed. Such removal will permit the Canadian Forces to action any requests for support in the delivery of humanitarian relief assistance and reconstruction materials by Canadian Forces transport aircraft to Iraq. Requests will be individually considered given that legal issues exist as a consequence of the United Nations sanctions regime against Iraq remaining in place at the present time. Additionally, the current geographic restriction on Canadian operations means that Canadian Forces aircraft have been unable to accept transport taskings to and from Kuwait under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom. Given that it is possible to distinguish between loads intended to support Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, the removal of the restriction will permit the Canadian Forces aircraft to resume missions through Kuwait for the delivery of loads exclusively in support of the campaign against terrorism and in accordance with Canadian national objectives. 000020 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information The removal of the restrictions will also permit the Canadian naval task group to conduct Operation Apollo missions in the Northern Persian Gulf in accordance with Canadian national objectives or other missions as may be directed by the Government of Canada. [Minister Graham has been consulted and concurs with this approach. If you agree, I have also enclosed a draft letter of reply for your signature.] TBC Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. 000021 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET OTTAWA, KIA OA2 May, 2003 Dear Colleague: Thank you for your correspondence of May XX, 2003, in which you sought the removal of restrictions with regard to Canadian Forces operations in the Persian Gulf region. I agree that if an appropriate role in assisting the delivery of humanitarian relief or supporting Operation Apollo objectives in an expanded area of operations is identified, the Canadian Forces should be in a position to consider the request in a timely manner. I therefore concur with the change in direction sought in your letter. Thank you for continuing to keep me apprised of these very important issues. Yours sincerely, 000022 �»3 I. z^W *j Z • ZU c -t- co 3. c^4-\OfO-<.cxxX. _<^v 'KAl'T icvCfi.-pzcooLc.cl un=U- Jbhu^4 AA/iUfl 6 t-vvczAzizvvvv-ejz— arrceo- <?i?6 -/V1-/! 000023 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /’information © .SECRET ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN FORCES’ TRANSPORT OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES TO IRAQ File #/Numero de reference: 3450-1 (Coni Barr, D PK Pol 6) DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI FROM/DE: Concur: D PK Pol/D Pol MP Date: COSJ3/CEM J3 Date: - ADM(Pol)/SMAi FROM/DE: i DGIS PolJDG Pol SI Date: . )3> CDS/CEMD DM/SM FROM/DE: ADM Pbl/SMA Pol Date: / ^3 SECRET REF: 35538 000024 �nor HTK. oo. tiocu r-w-rs^i SECRET Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Sublect/Objet: DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN FORCES’ TRANSPORT OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES TO IRAQ File #/Num6ro de reference! 3450-1 (Corri Bair, D PKPol 8) Concur: Date: V SECRET . 4/^ o REF: 35538 000025 �7 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information * D PK POL sr o DIRECTORATE OF PEACEKEEPING POLICY/ DIRECTION DE LA POLITIQUE DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX o 4, ,'*o. 3 vr/ - £ D POL MP TO/A REMARKS/RE MARQUES '”/(A C’c->v^uu'Vuvvcc_ '■MA. <_Xoc DATE c'’ D ?v 4l g | L-evtZ- '^PcA, D PkPo) OCOJ Stj INITIALS 26/r c^-JCs^ficX £A/AbM(&) -ccl ; £S &A- QCQZ . ^n,. A u ^/u ^k jz / 9o frM 000026 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00017 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003-01-12-31 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-100289 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/1b122d3e75ea86ebaa5797fc99688088.pdf bbc2577c5ce093d4f3df3caca08921c8 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 8C0001 18G Sec 1 SEC 1812D-18-8 DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS M. BLOODWORTH International Plans and Operations | L.J Iraq LZZ) /7 f CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS MINISTRE - MME M. BLOODWORTH Plans et operation^^d^^^i^sjj Iraq '"S/Rd s TO- REMARKS ■ REMARQUES A init. D&te Date Init. < Date lc*,ncel ’ ' Annuler REGISTRY ONLY I IDEPOT CENTRAL Inspected -ti w Inspect^ ■ Date . IT ' . .'' I II - — ■ RAPPEL ?no' ?00l[ -+-FS o 00 - U aF < RwiSfeR-.'' CIRCULATION’ -- ----■ ■it - ’.yi: -< 7 ■& ■ §r ■ • -?— 00 ■ 00 ,= |.< 2a eg I 3 H 8 er I . ■ BS I -; -- -■ <u ■ o ■, ■ ° =— la£ !s :_____ ______. jL_ 00 = Fenns Management 893-4C > des tonnulaires 993-3 000027 V.v - �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information " FILE MAINTENANCE CHECKLIST USTE DE CONTR&LE POUR HENTRETIEN DU DOSSIER Protect all files and records as official property. ProtEger tous les dossiers et les documents comme Etantla propriEtE officielle. / Clean records prior to adding them to files. Nettoyer les documents ayant de lesaj'outer E leur dossier respectif. Remove all envelopes, flags, tags, pins, spikes, clips and superfluous staples. Enlever tout articles inutiles (enveloppes, papiHons, Etiquettes, Epingies, trombones, attaches: feuilles, agrafes etc.). File papers and TDs chronologically, the latest date on top. Glasser les documents eh ordre chronologique, la date la plus. recente sur Je dessus. : Prepunch holes at the top left corner of the papers.. Percef des trous du coin supErieur gauche du document. Attach papers to the file by a paper spike for easy handling. Pour facilrter la manutention, attacher les documents au dossier , au moyen d’une attache-feuille. When a file becomes thicker than • 2’, a subsequent volume should be created. Lorsque le dossier a plus de 2” d’Epaisseur, crEer un nouveau volume. Destroy duplicate material. Keep a copy only If it has additional Information. DEtruire tous les duplicates qui ne contiennent aucun renseignements supplEmentaires. Verify the security classification of. new documents added to the file. Verifier la cote de sEcuritE des nouveaux documents ajoutE au dossier. Upgrade the,file' to the required level as required. Augmenter la cote de sEcuritE si . nEcessaire. 000028 — �Docupteqt disclosed under the Access to Information A Docum([rt djju^tejm^r^ie la Loi sur faeces a /’inform □>fr\ ) T'\^€io jx-z^x GW-n 000029 �L Document disclosed under the Access tojnformation Act '.wffeDtdiyjjIgu&en vertuAe latyi s&l'acc& cfl'inQpmation SECRET (CEO) SECRET (CC) -iSia-oChief of the Defence Staff National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Chef d’etat-major de la Defense SECRET (CO CBN EYES OMY Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 O WtS2-' JAN 3 0 » The Minister DEPLOYMENT OF A CANADIAN FORCES LIAISON TEAM TO QATAR 1. For operational security, and to ensure that appropriate attention continues to be paid to the campaign against terrorism, US Central Command is dividing its headquarters into two staffs: one focused on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and one dedicated to planning for possible action against Iraq. To further reinforce this division of responsibilities, the US has now deployed its staff focused on Iraq planning to Qatar. As such, Canadian Forces officers currently in Tampa have now lost access to knowledge of planning for any eventual action against Iraq. In order that they may maintain effective contact with US forces, we recommend that you agree to the deployment of a team of Canadian Forces liaison officers to Qatar. We also wish to emphasize that a decision in this regard is considered a matter of urgency - the train may literally leave the station, without the Canadian Forces, if the recommended deployment is not authorized at this time. 2. Deploying the Canadian liaison team to Qatar to interface with all staff functions of the US deployed headquarters is essential, at least initially, to allow maximum exposure to all facets of operational planning for a possible campaign against Iraq. This deployment would in no way prejudge the final decision to be made by the Government of Canada with respect to possible military participation in any potential campaign against Iraq. It would, however, preserve the Government’s ability to make an informed decision and to ensure that the required information is available both to the Government and, in the event that Canada elected to participate militarily, to Canadian Forces military planners. We have been informed that both Australia and the United Kingdom intend to deploy liaison teams to Qatar and have already pre-positioned equipment within the region, notwithstanding the fact that their participation in any eventual military action will still be subject to national decisions taken at the appropriate time. A decision to simply retain a liaison presence at CENTCOM in Tampa would severely compromise the initial progress made in gaining insight into US planning efforts. Additionally, our liaison officers attached to the US Component SECRET (CO EYES ONLY 1/2 1*1 National Defence Defense nationale SECRET (CEO) SECRET (CC) Canada 000030 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET (CEO) Commands in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are in discussions regarding the military capabilities Canada is considering. 3. Time is of the essence. If you approve, we will so inform the Privy Council Office and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. We further recommend that you sign the enclosed letter to the Prime Minister. R.R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff Margaret Bloodworth Deputy Minister Enclosures: 2 Approve John McCallum Minister of National Defence Date 2/2 SECRET (CEO) 000031 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET(CC) The Right Honourable Jean Chretien, P.C..Q.C., M.P..LL.L, LL.D., Prime Minister of Canada Langevin Block 80 Wellington Street Ottawa ON K1A0A2 Dear Prime Minister: Deployment of a Canadian Forces Liaison Team to Qatar For operational security, and to ensure that appropriate attention continues to be paid to the campaign against terrorism, US Central Command is dividing its headquarters into two staffs: one focused on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and one dedicated to planning for possible action against Iraq. To further reinforce this division of responsibilities, the US has deployed its staff focused on Iraq planning to Qatar. As such, Canadian Forces officers currently in Tampa have now lost access to knowledge of planning for any eventual action against Iraq. This is to inform you that I have authorized the deployment of a Canadian Forces liaison team to Qatar to preserve access to US military planning for possible action against Iraq. This deployment will in no way prejudge the final decision to be made by the Government of Canada with respect to possible military participation in any potential campaign against Iraq. It would, however, preserve the Government’s ability to make an informed decision and ensure that the required information is available both to the Government and, in the event that Canada elected to participate militarily, to Canadian Forces military planners. We have been informed that both Australia and the United Kingdom intend to deploy liaison teams to Qatar and have already pre-positioned equipment within the region, notwithstanding the fact that their participation in any eventual military action will still be subject to national decisions taken at the appropriate time. Minister Graham has been advised and concurs. Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence Cc The Honourable Bill Graham, P.O., M.P. ^CRET(CC) SECRET (CC) 000032 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET (CEO) BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ISSUE • Whether a Canadian Forces liaison team be deployed to Qatar, and currently deployed liaison officers at Coalition Forces Land, Maritime and Air Component Command headquarters continue to conduct liaison with respect to potential military action against Iraq. BACKGROUND • On 4 December, Canada responded to a US request regarding a possible Canadian contribution to a potential coalition against Iraq by suggesting that military authorities begin discussions on a possible Canadian contribution. For Canada, the purpose of these military-to-military discussions was to seek information for use in developing options for the Government and to ensure that the Canadian Forces are well prepared for all contingencies and for cooperation with other partners in the event of future military action, if approved by the Government of Canada. • US operational planning is well-advanced and continues to be refined daily in order that US forces are prepared to implement any political decision to commence initial operations against Iraq as early as mid-February or early March. The Canadian liaison team, which arrived at CENTCOM in Tampa, Florida, in late December 2002, has been made privy to much of the planning process and has been instrumental in assisting National Defence Headquarters’ development of plausible options for governmental consideration. j DISCUSSION • For operational security, and to ensure that appropriate attention continues to be paid to the campaign against terrorism, CENTCOM is dividing its headquarters into two staffs: one focused on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and one dedicated to planning for possible action against Iraq. To further reinforce this division of responsibilities, CENTCOM has deployed its staff focused on Iraq planning to Qatar. Additionally, operational planning for possible military action against Iraq is being conducted at the Coalition Forces Land (Kuwait), Air (Saudi Arabia) and Maritime (Bahrain) Component Command headquarters. • Canadian Forces officers currently in Tampa have now lost access to planning for any eventual action against Iraq. In order that they may continue their liaison activities in an effective manner, consideration should be given to sending a small liaison team to Qatar in conjunction with the CENTCOM deployment. We have been informed that both Australia and the United 1/2 SECRET(CEO) 000034 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET(CEO) Kingdom intend to deploy liaison teams to Qatar and have already prepositioned equipment within the region, notwithstanding the fact that their participation in any eventual military action will still be subject to national decisions taken at the appropriate time. • The deployment of a liaison team to Qatar, and having the currently deployed liaison officers at Coalition Forces’ Land, Maritime and Air Component headquarters continue their discussions on Iraq, would in no way prejudge the final political decision to be made by the Government of Canada with respect to possible military participation in any potential campaign against Iraq. It would, however, preserve the Government’s ability to make an informed decision by ensuring that the required information is available both to the Government and, in the event that Canada elected to participate militarily, to Canadian Forces military planners. A decision to simply retain a liaison presence at CENTCOM in Tampa would severely compromise the initial progress made in gaining insight into US planning efforts on Iraq. • The incremental cost for deployment of the Canadian liaison team to Qatar over a six-month period has been estimated at $250,000 for a team comprising 14 planners and 11 communications/support staff that would be capable of continuous operations, i.e. 24 hours per day, 7 days per week (24/7). • The deployment would also be contingent on Canada seeking appropriate diplomatic clearances. If you agree, preparations for deploying the liaison team could begin immediately. • The Department of Foreign Affairs has been consulted and concurs. A letter to the Prime Minister is enclosed for the Minister of National Defence’s signature. Prepared by: Consulted: Responsible Director: Responsible Director General: Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Corn Barr, DPK Pol 6, 996-1741 LCol J.R. Forestell. DPK Pol 3, 992-3976 J3 Int'l Col G. C0t6, DPK Pol, 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross, DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM(Pol), 992-3458 16 January 2003 2/2 SECRET(CEO) 000033 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00018 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003-01-12-31 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-100289 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/3c059bad852418ea5f4d98f127575104.pdf fd3bc3dc029295fa3d10ea0ebec80b16 PDF Text Text ao.rtosedmeAcci- ■■■ to Infcrntohtn A Sec 8C0001 1812D-18-8 2 SEC £©©[>© DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS M. BLOODWORTH International Plans and Operations 44 Zz ___ ____ Iraq □ CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS MINISTRE - MME M. BLOODWORTH LT i U Plans et operations internationals SSS/RDS Iraq a TO A CZ> REMARQUES Date InH Date tret. REGISTRY ONLY DEPOTCENTRAL B.F; ' RAPPEL P.A. * RANGER Date I Cancel sr I Annular Inspected Inspects F ' I ■- ■■ 71 <4 rt 4=^ ______ - l— ---- F" ~lr~ I EI ___ r ___ •____ ■ r f 4 4 I coI 04 j- - QO ■ QO ■< 4 Q 2H 4s 22^^ > 00 — ---------Q <D O ' _ - — \ I' '■ 4 __ t °o §■ ; J - j 4_2Z1___ u- ID 705 7530-21-894-4101 ■ DesIgrt.Fomw Manasament 893^050.-Conception ■■ Geslion des ft 000035 ’.'I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en ve'rtu de la Loi sur facets a {'information >a FILE MAINTENANCE CHECKLIST USTE DECONTR&LE POUR IIENTRETIEN DU DOSSIER □ Protect all filesand repords as. , official property. Clean records prior to adding them to files. □ Protdger tous les dossiers et les , documents comma dtant la proprldtd ofticielle. . t Nettoyer les documents avant de les ajouter & leur dossier respectif. Remove all envelopes, flags, .tags, pins, spikes, clips and superfluous ■ staples. ,. Enlever tout articles inutiles (enveloppes, papilldns, dtlquettes, dpirigles, trombones, attachesfeuilles, agrafes etc.). ’ File papers and TDs chronolo, gically, the latest'date on top. . Classer les documents ert ordre ohronologique, la date la plus rdeente sur ledessus. Prepunch holes at the top left corner of the papers. Percer des trous du coin supdrieur gauche du document. Attach papers to the file by a paper spike for easy handling. ■ Pour faclllter la manutention, attacher les documents au dossier au moyen d'uneattache-feuille. When a file becomes thicker than 2", a subsequent volume should be created. Lorsque le dossier a plus de 2” d'dpaisseur, order un n&uveau volume. Destroy duplicate material. Keep a copy only if it has additional information. Ddtruire tous les duplicates qui ne coptiennent aucun renseignements suppldmentaires. Verify the security classification of new documents added to the file. Vdrifier la cote de sScuritd des nouveaux documents ajoutd au dossier. . Upgrade the file to the required level as required. ' Augmenter la cote de sdcurite si ndeessaire. ■ • . i S' 5 - ■? 'Cl “ ■■ J ■ I sit _____ 000036 �Pages 37 to / a 39 are withheld pursuant to section sont retenues en vertu de Particle 15(1) of the Access to Information Act de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information 4504 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF CABINET DU CHEF DE L’ETAT-MAJOR DE LA DEFENSE Date 13-Aug-O3 To /Destinataire SO DM c.c. Sous-Ministre de la ' Defense Nationale AOUT AUG 1 3 2003 Deputy Minister of National Defence From / De SO CDS APPROVAL SOFA KUWAIT □ □ [_J l_! I i Li S?; Acknowledgement / Accuse de reception Reply for CDS’s signature I Reponse pour la signature du CEMD Reply with cc to CDS I Reponse et cc pour le CEMD Briefing Note / Note de synthese For your information / A titre d’information For action, as appropriate / Pour execution, suivant le cas For action, as per remarks / Pour execution, selon les observations Remarks / Observations !For signature i I Reply in I Repondre en CZ English / anglais i_ French / fran^ais 000040 �- Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'acces a /'information (39 --- - 1DPK POL DIRECTORATE OF PEACEKEEPING POLICY/ DIRECTION DE LA POLITIQUE DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX BP 4W D POL MP REMARKS/REMARQUES TO/A J3 t’oiC DATE Qo<2 c uiZSfij C O ''■foOK INITIALS V <3 S-d^.ol &Jo? ^ufPuzAua,—ex--------- ---------------- (I .oT-o-s Daos gThfa? OS 6<s> Grr 0)5 I f~~ S/> bM I ___________ i I OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADV0C.A7? >T?.AL Directorate »f Law Inttrnafei 3 1 2^ Sous-Ministr de la Defense NariknaU u <h :. ■ Directors! '.-i *C>KAL national ® 1 j 2003 Deputy Minister of National Defence 000041 �r Document disclosed talnfprmation Act Document divulgueen WtiMJtoTfurMfas it /‘information I - ' CONFIDENTIAL ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA) WITH KUWAIT : BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFFENCE File #/Numero de reference: 3450-1 (Joey Cloutier, D PK Pol 6) DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI FRj l/l Cj- DPKPol/DPoIMP Date: 26X1^3 ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) FROM/DE: DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI Date: ■ Concur tOS"J3/CEM J3 Date : e> 3 Concur: I'M fit* JAG/JAG Date 3 fy-f fc-) 7k/ o Concur: / / yOCDS/SCEMD Date Q'b DM/SM CDS/CEMD FROM/DE: ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) Date: 7OX CONFIDENTIAL REF: 36130 000042 •J �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act “rrrtnmt djynlqyA pn vprtu de la Loi sur I'acces a {'information Sn j’f'Ministre de 'a Wag J^£C£.e -L_ zgj-a<ioiral-mT^rr i <<.___ -dLcc^i^—^Q^ui^Qji. c<--'. ru _____ — 4=0 (Lf JLO- -Z-xZV^/g^A -f . l AJL f/ji. _jazwa4_i Lo 2^^<x £0 000043 �1 VI------ .-Lj-V r Document disclosed under the Acces&tW thfb'riMlftfbn Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information A w . * P ft < M E Mi (-> ( S T Z « ?R EM i C« M l H I ST RE OTTAWA, K1A 0A2 July 21, 2003 Dear Colleague: I am writing to clarify my letter of July 3, 2003, which dealt with the strategic objectives of Canadian Forces (CF) contingent deploying to Afghanistan and the removal of certain restrictions with respect to CF operations in the Persian Gulf region. I wish, therefore, to confirm my agreement that all CF assets, including naval and ground, be allowed to conduct operations north of the 28“30' of latitude North, through Kuwait, when required and in accordance with authorized CF objectives. Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum Minister of National Defence Room 110, Justice Building House of Commons Ottawa, Ontario K1A0A6 & => SECBET 000044 J �Document disclosed under the Acfft^ftMcicoiation Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Li*2UfltPHf[ffiJJ$Jmation CONFIDENTIAL Sour MEMORANDUM 2200-1 (DNATO Pol 4) Iv D<?fe a pr 2 8 20Q^ Apr 03 Dist List SITREP: POSSIBLE NATO ROLE IN POST-CONFLICT IRAQ 1. While NATO awaits the 28 April release of NATO Secretary-General Robertson’s Food-For-Thought paper on possible NATO involvement in Iraq, the US has begun approaching selected Allies on a bilateral basis to request involvement in the stabilization period in Iraq. Canada has been approached by the US to contribute to stabilization/ reconstruction efforts in Iraq, and has prepared its response, to be delivered to the US Embassy on Monday, 5 May. Most European countries have also been approached, though notably, not France or Germany. 2. The US is interested in NATO playing a role in reconstruction efforts. However, discussions in the NATO context are at a very early stage, and though rhetoric for NATO involvement has been positive, there is clearly no great enthusiasm on the part of our Allies for concrete NATO involvement at this time. Further, discussions will be limited in scope until the level of UN involvement in post-conflict reconstruction is clear. 3. Given Allies’ troop commitments in the Balkans, Afghanistan, to the UN and to Iraq (already committed on a bilateral basis), it will be difficult for most NATO states to make a further contribution to a future NATO mission in Iraq. 4. We expect that NATO will continue to discuss involvement in Iraq, as a “fence mending” exercise, but this is not an option that is being seriously considered in most capitals. 5. Based on the Canadian response to the American request, we have consulted with DFAIT on this issue. Canada’s intervention in the NATO context will emphasize that we would not want any NATO role in Iraq that would undermine the NATO support already committed and essential to the Canadian deployment this summer to IS AF. Col J. Michael Snell D NATO Pol 995-9155 CONFIDENTIAL 1/2 C0WFmSoo45 �CONFIDENTIAL Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information I Dist List EA/MND EAZDM EA/CDS EA/DCDS EA/VCDS EAZADM(Pol) EA/DG Pol Plan EA/DGIS Pol EA/COS J3 DPK Pol CONFIDENTIAL 2/2 000046 I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document^iv^gue^e^/ertu ^^a Loi^urJ^rces a Information e :M\s igoi JAPAN ^^255 SUSSEX DRIVE OTTAWA. ONTARIO K1N 9E6 TELEPHONE: (613) 241-8541 FAX: (613) 241-7415 f/V ^7/5?/ Sous-Ministre de la Defense Nationale 1 6 2003 Deputy Minister of National Defence April 14, 2003 Dear Sir or Madam, Please find enclosed a complimentary copy of the April 2003 issue of the Japan Echo journal, published bimonthly by Japan Echo Inc. in Japan. Each issue of Japan Echo contains significant articles and essays by prominent commentators. In this month’s issue, we would like to draw your attention to the article by Japan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kawaguchi Yoriko, on page 24. The article, entitled “A Foreign Policy to Consolidate Peace”, calls on the Japanese people to ponder and debate the question of Japan’s role in global security in light of the present situation in Iraq. We hope that you will take the time to read it as well as the other pieces in Japan Echo. We hope that you will add this publication to your collection and that it will be useful to you in the future. Sincerely, Information and Culture Section Embassy of Japan 000047 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Memorandum 1560-1 (D Strat A) . 14 Mar 03 H Sous-Ministre de la Defense Nationale z Deputy Minister of National Defence Dist List POTENTIAL WAR IN IRAQ For your information, please find attached an updated briefing note on “Allies’ contributions for a potential intervention in Iraq” prepared by Dr. Nebojsa Bjelakovic, D Strat A, 992-4532. Daniel L. Bon DG Pol PlarT~ 992-0799 Dist List [d m f CDS ADM (Pol) SA/MND (Del Bianco) DCDS DG Pol Plan DG Pol Coord DGIS Pol D Pol Dev DAPC Pol DPK Pol D Pari A DFAIT-IDC (St. John Geoffrey) 000048 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information ALLIES’ CONTRIBUTIONS FOR A POTENTIAL INTERVENTION IN IRAQ BRIEFING NOTE AIM To provide a summary of selected contributions, firm and conditional, to an American-led intervention in Iraq. Our data are compiled from open sources and, therefore, may be freely used in public forums. Whenever possible, these data have been checked against classified information to ensure their general accuracy. BACKGROUND United States Diplomatic efforts to achieve UN-sponsored disarmament of Iraq are approaching a stalemate and an American -led military intervention seems very likely in weeks, if not in days. As of March 14, 2003, an estimated 230,000 American personnel are deployed in the Gulf region, while 30,000 additional troops are en route. Although Washington has frequently expressed readiness to fight Saddam on its own, it has approached almost 50 countries for potential troop and other contributions. So far, only the UK has indicated that it would join US-led offensive operations in Iraq. Many U.S. allies have units deployed in the area serving in various missions. However, most of the allies, to a lesser or greater extent, remain reluctant to commit troops or treasure to a possible intervention. FIRM AND CONDITIONAL COMMITMENTS NATO Allies Belgium: The government has not offered any comments on potential Belgian participation in an intervention in Iraq, but has stated that it aims to concentrate its military assets on the missions in Afghanistan and Africa. Czech Republic: Prague has deployed its anti-chemical warfare unit to Kuwait. The Czech government is also considering providing other troops, such as a field hospital or a rapid reaction brigade. Denmark: Denmark is prepared to offer a submarine and troops were the UN to authorize an intervention in Iraq, but the government has not yet decided whether Danish soldiers would be sent into combat. France: France favours allowing for a longer and more thorough arms inspection process and has frequently indicated that it might use its Security Council veto to oppose a military action against Iraq. 1 000049 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Germany: Germany allowed the U.S. to use its airspace and bases, but has indicated that it would commit no troops to an intervention against Iraq. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder asserted on January 21, 2003, that Germany would not vote for, nor go to war under any circumstances. However, in order to help contain any Iraqi threat Germany has deployed two Patriot missile units to Israel and one to Turkey, and its servicemen will serve on board of the AW ACS. A German anti-chemical warfare unit has been in Kuwait since 1991. Hungary: Budapest has authorized the training of Iraqi exiles at Taszar military base in Hungary. American troops are training between 1,000 and 4,000 Iraqi opposition members primarily as translators and scouts. Hungary will send 2,000 gas masks and chemical protection suits to Turkey. Italy: Rome is willing to support the coalition indirectly, by allowing the use of air space and military bases. Netherlands: Government sources have indicated that Dutch participation, if any, would likely be limited to ships already in the region. On February 7, 2003, ahead of the NATO decision, the Dutch government decided to deploy, on a bilateral basis, three Patriot missile units for the protection of Turkey. Norway: The Norwegian PM has indicated that there would have to be a clear UN mandate before Norway would even consider joining an intervention in Iraq. Poland: On January 16, 2003, Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski stated that his country supports the U.S. intervention against Iraq and has promised to contribute troops to a possible war with Baghdad. Portugal: Portugal allowed the U.S. to use its airspace and bases. Spain: The Spanish government has repeatedly said it would back a US-led military intervention in Iraq, but has given no details of troop commitments. Turkey: Turkey would provide an excellent staging ground for an attack from the north were an international coalition to intervene in Iraq. The Turkish cabinet has agreed to allow 62,000 American combat troops and over 300 aircraft to use their territory. However, the Turkish parliament narrowly failed to endorse this agreement on March 1, 2003, but a second vote on the issue may be held soon. Turkey has had a few thousand troops in Northern Iraq since the early nineties. Reportedly, Ankara has been deploying troops along the border with Iraq. Some reports indicate that Turkey could contribute between 10,000 and 50,000 troops if the U.S. were to attack from the north. UK: Over 1,300 naval and air force personnel are already in the Gulf, serving in various missions, including the enforcement of no-fly zones over Iraq, and London is also offering its military bases in England and Diego Garcia for U.S. long-range bombers and tanker aircraft. 2 000050 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information On January 7, 2003, despite reported divisions in the Blair government, London called up 1,500 reserve personnel and dispatched to the Gulf an amphibious naval task force including at least 3,000 marines. This task force consists of the amphibious ship HMS Ocean, destroyers HMS Edinburgh and HMS York, supply ships Argus, Fort Rosalie, Fort Austin, landing and logistic ships Sir Galahad, Sir Tristram, Sir Percivale, and anti-mine ships HMS Grimsby and HMS Ledbury. The UK also sent 14 combat aircraft to previously scheduled exercise in Jordan. On January 12, 2003, Britain also sent to the region a carrier naval taskforce comprised of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, the destroyer HMS Liverpool, the frigate HMS Marlborough, the supply ship Fort Victoria, the tanker Orange Leaf, and a few submarines. On January 20, 2003, Britain announced a major deployment to the region of an additional 26,000 troops. These troops consist of Headquarters 1 (UK) Armoured Division, 7th Armoured Brigade, 16th Air Assault Brigade, and 102 Logistics Brigade. This deployment includes 120 Challenger tanks and 150 Warrior armoured personnel carriers, as well as mobile artillery units. These troops will be stationed in Kuwait by the middle of February. On January 30, 2003, London called up another 4,500 reserve personnel. On February 6, 2003, London announced sending additional 7,000 RAF personnel to the Gulf as well as 75 aircraft, including 27 Puma and Chinook helicopters, Jaguar and Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, E3D Sentry airborne command aircraft, Hercules transporters, VC10 and Tristar refuelling aircraft, Tornado F3's for air defence, Tornado GR4 and Harrier GR7 offensive jets. In all, Britain has decided to deploy 42,000 troops to the Gulf, including 29,000 ground troops. Other Like-Minded Countries Australia: The Australian government has dispatched forces to the Persian Gulf as part of contingency arrangements for a possible war against Iraq including a contribution of Special Forces, three warships, a squadron of up to 14 F/A-18 Hornet fighters, three C130 Hercules transport aircraft, a P3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft, CH-47 helicopters, and an air-to-air refuelling aircraft. On January 22, 2003, the government announced a forward deployment to the region of the amphibious transport ship Kanimbla, lead elements of a Special Forces Task Group, and a Royal Australian Air Force reconnaissance team. On February 7, 2003, Australia sent another 450 troops to the Persian Gulf. In all, Australia could reportedly deploy 2,000 troops there. Canberra prefers to have a new Security Council resolution authorizing an attack on Iraq, though it does not believe that a new resolution is necessary. Slovakia: Slovakia has deployed a 75-member contingent to complement the Czech antichemical warfare unit already deployed in Kuwait. Bulgaria: The parliament decided to make available a 150-member anti-chemical warfare unit and to allow the United States to use Bulgaria’s airspace and one base. 3 000051 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Romania: The parliament agreed to make available 278 non-combat troops and to allow the United States to use Romania’s airspace and bases. Albania: The cabinet decided to make available a commando unit and to allow the U.S. to use Albania’s airspace. Ukraine: The government is negotiating with Kuwait on the status of the decontamination battalion, which can be sent to the area. Middle Eastern Countries Israel: The current U.S. position is that Israel should not be part of the coalition against Iraq. The Israeli government has clearly stated, however, that it would launch aerial counter attacks if attacked. Syria: Most likely would remain neutral and eventually may grant the use of its air space for search and rescue missions. Iran: Most likely would remain neutral and eventually may grant the use of its air space for search and rescue missions. Jordan: Most likely will offer radar and special operations bases, but is unlikely to say so publicly. Saudi Arabia: Most likely will offer airfields, and sites for anti-missile batteries. More than 3,000 Saudi troops have deployed in Kuwait as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force. Kuwait: Kuwait would be one of the primary staging grounds for an attack from the south. Oman: U.S. troops already use air bases for maintenance and refuelling. Oman deployed one battalion as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force to help defend Kuwait. United Arab Emirates: U.S. troops already use air bases for refuelling. The United Arab Emirates intend to deploy tanks, attack helicopters, warships and about 4,000 troops as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force to help defend Kuwait. Bahrain: U.S. troops already use port facilities. Bahrain is the headquarters for the U.S. 5th Fleet. Bahrain government said that it was sending a frigate and ground troops as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force to help defend Kuwait. Qatar: U.S. troops already use several military bases. Qatar is the forward HQ for U.S. Gulf forces. It was also the locale for exercise “Internal Look,” simulating an attack on Iraq, in December 2002. 4 000052 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS FOR AN INTERVENTION IN IRAQ Military Air forces bases Ground troops Navy Financial contribution Postconflict deployment NATO Countr es UK* Not needed Not needed Not needed No___ Yes Yes Yes Not needed Not needed Not needed Yes Yes Most likely Yes U.S.* Yes Australia* Not needed Belgium* Czech Republic* Denmark* France* Germany* Hungary Italy*______ Netherlands* Norway* Poland* Portugal Spain* Turkey* No No No No No No 361 troops No Yes Likely Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering No No No No No No No No No No No_______ No_______ No_______ No_______ Considering No_______ No_______ No_______ No_______ Considering Likely Likely No______ Likely Considering No No No No Likely No No Considering No Considering No_______ Considering Most likely No_______ Considering Most likely No_______ Considering No No_______ Considering No Likely Considering Most likely Yes Most likely Yes Yes Yes Likely Yes Likely 2 aircraft carrier taskforces 600-1,000 100,000 to 5 to 6 aircraft 150,000 aircraft carrier troops taskforces Like-Minded Countries 3 ships 10-20 150 troops (special aircraft forces) 75 troops No No 100-140 aircraft 29,000 troops Not Slovakia* _____ needed * Countries that have forces in the region serving in other missions. Responsible Group Principal: Prepared by: Date: Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-4358 Dr. Nebojsa Bjelakovic, DG Pol Plan/D Strat A, 992-4532 14 Mar 03 5 000053 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur facets a /’information Sous-Ministre de la Defense Nationale 4 In ri32M3 Memorandum 1560-1 (D Strat A) Minister of ional Defence 21 Feb 03 Dist List POTENTIAL WAR IN IRAQ For your information, please find attached an updated briefing note on “Allies’ contributions for a potential intervention in Iraq” prepared by Dr. Nebojsa Bjelakovic, D Strat A, 992-4532. Daniel L. Bon DG Pol Plan 992-0799 Dist List [DM / CDS ADM (Pol) SA/MND (Del Bianco) DCDS DG Pol Plan DG Pol Coord DGIS Pol D Pol Dev DAPC Pol DPK Pol D Pari A 000054 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information ALLIES’ CONTRIBUTIONS FOR A POTENTIAL INTERVENTION IN IRAQ BRIEFING NOTE AIM To provide a summary of selected contributions, firm and conditional, to an Americanled intervention in Iraq. Our data are compiled from open sources and, therefore, may be freely used in public forums. Whenever possible, these data have been checked against classified information to ensure their general accuracy. BACKGROUND United States A military intervention in Iraq is possible in 2003. Most reports indicate that the U.S. would deploy between 200,000 and 250,000 of its own troops, with the entire coalition contingent totalling between 250,000 and 300,000 troops. Although Washington has frequently expressed readiness to fight Saddam on its own, it has approached almost 50 countries for potential troop and other contributions. As of February 21, 2003 an estimated 150,000 American personnel are deployed in the Gulf region including about 65,000 ground troops, most of them in Kuwait. The pace of the U.S. military build-up will see the number of U.S. troops in the area approach 200,000 by the end of February. So far, only the UK has indicated that it would join US-led offensive operations in Iraq. To a lesser or greater extent, all other U.S. allies remain reluctant to commit troops or treasure to a possible intervention. FIRM AND CONDITIONAL COMMITMENTS NATO Allies Belgium: The government has not offered any comments on potential Belgian participation in an intervention in Iraq, but has stated that it aims to concentrate its military assets on the missions in Afghanistan and Africa. Czech Republic: Prague seems to have committed its anti-chemical warfare unit currently based in Kuwait. The Czech government is also considering providing other troops, such as a field hospital or a rapid reaction brigade. Denmark: Denmark is prepared to offer military hardware and troops were the UN to authorize an intervention in Iraq, but the government has not yet decided whether Danish soldiers would be sent into combat. 1 000055 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information I? France: France favours allowing for a longer and more thorough arms inspection process and indicated on January 20, 2003, that it might use its Security Council veto to oppose a military action against Iraq. Germany: Germany allowed the U.S. to use its airspace and bases, but has indicated that it would commit no troops to an intervention against Iraq. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder asserted on January 21, 2003, that Germany would not vote for, nor go to war under any circumstances. However, in order to help contain any Iraqi threat Germany has deployed two Patriot missile units to Israel and one to Turkey, and its servicemen will serve on board of the AWACS. A German anti-chemical warfare unit has been in Kuwait since 1991. Hungary: Budapest has authorized the training of Iraqi exiles at Taszar military base in Hungary. American troops are training between 1,000 and 4,000 Iraqi opposition members primarily as translators and scouts. Italy: Rome is willing to support the coalition indirectly, by allowing the use of air space and military bases. Netherlands: Government sources have indicated that Dutch participation, if any, would likely be limited to ships already in the region. On February 7, 2003, ahead of the NATO decision, the Dutch government decided to deploy, on a bilateral basis, three Patriot missile units for the protection of Turkey. Norway: The Norwegian PM has indicated that there would have to be a clear UN mandate before Norway would even consider joining an intervention in Iraq. Poland: Polish officials have indicated that Warsaw might offer some token military support to an intervention in Iraq, but have not given any specifics. Spain: The Spanish government has repeatedly said it would back a US-led military intervention in Iraq, but has given no details of troop commitments. Turkey: Turkey would provide an excellent staging ground for an attack from the north were an international coalition to intervene in Iraq. The full extent of Turkish participation, including the use of bases and airfields, is still being intensely negotiated with Washington. Turkey has had a few thousand troops in Northern Iraq since the early nineties. Reportedly, Ankara has been deploying troops along the border with Iraq. Some reports indicate that Turkey could contribute between 10,000 and 50,000 troops if the U.S. were to attack from the north. UK: Over 1,300 naval and air force personnel are already in the Gulf, serving in various missions, including the enforcement of no-fly zones over Iraq, and London is also offering its military bases in England and Diego Garcia for U.S. long-range bombers and tanker aircraft. 2 000056 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgud en vertu de la Loi sur I'acc&s a /'information J On January 7,2003, despite reported divisions in the Blair government, London called up 1,500 reserve personnel and dispatched to the Gulf an amphibious naval task force including at least 3,000 marines. This task force consists of the amphibious ship HMS Ocean, destroyers HMS Edinburgh and HMS York, supply ships Argus, Fort Rosalie, Fort Austin, landing and logistic ships Sir Galahad, Sir Tristram, Sir Percivale, and antimine ships HMS Grimsby and HMS Ledbury. The UK also sent 14 combat aircraft to previously scheduled exercise in Jordan. On January 12, 2003, Britain also sent to the region a carrier naval taskforce comprised of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, the destroyer HMS Liverpool, the frigate HMS Marlborough, the supply ship Fort Victoria, the tanker Orange Leaf, and a few submarines. On January 20, 2003, Britain announced a major deployment to the region of an additional 26,000 troops. These troops consist of Headquarters 1 (UK) Armoured Division, 7th Armoured Brigade, 16“ Air Assault Brigade, and 102 Logistics Brigade. This deployment includes 120 Challenger tanks and 150 Warrior armoured personnel carriers, as well as mobile artillery units. These troops will be stationed in Kuwait by the middle of February. On January 30, 2003, London called up another 4,500 reserve personnel. On February 6, 2003, London announced sending additional 7,000 RAF personnel to the Gulf as well as 75 aircraft, including 27 Puma and Chinook helicopters, Jaguar and Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, E3D Sentry airborne command aircraft, Hercules transporters, VC 10 and Tristar refuelling aircraft, Tornado F3's for air defence. Tornado GR4 and Harrier GR7 offensive jets. In all, Britain has decided to deploy 42,000 troops to the Gulf, including 29,000 ground troops. Other Like-Minded Countries Australia: The Australian government has dispatched forces to the Persian Gulf as part of contingency arrangements for a possible war against Iraq including a contribution of Special Forces, three warships, a squadron of up to 14 F/A-18 Hornet fighters, three C130 Hercules transport aircraft, a P3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft, CH-47 helicopters, and an air-to-air refuelling aircraft. On January 22, 2003, the government announced a forward deployment to the region of the amphibious transport ship Kanimbla, lead elements of a Special Forces Task Group, and a Royal Australian Air Force reconnaissance team. On February 7, 2003, Australia sent another 450 troops to the Persian Gulf. In all, Australia could reportedly deploy 2,000 troops there. Canberra prefers to have a new Security Council resolution authorizing an attack on Iraq, though it does not believe that a new resolution is necessary. 3 000057 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information I Slovakia: Assuming there would be a second Security Council resolution, Slovakia has given indications that it would provide a 75-member contingent to complement the Czech anti-chemical warfare unit already deployed in Kuwait. Bulgaria: The parliament decided to make available a 150-member anti-chemical warfare unit and to allow the United States to use Bulgaria’s airspace and one base. Romania: The parliament agreed to make available 278 non-combat troops and to allow the United States to use Romania’s airspace and bases. Middle Eastern Countries Israel: The current U.S. position is that Israel should not be part of the coalition against Iraq. The Israeli government has clearly stated, however, that it would launch aerial counter attacks if attacked. Syria: Most likely would remain neutral and eventually may grant the use of its air space for search and rescue missions. Iran: Most likely would remain neutral and eventually may grant the use of its air space for search and rescue missions. Jordan: Most likely will offer radar and special operations bases, but is unlikely to say so publicly. Saudi Arabia: Most likely will offer airfields, and sites for anti-missile batteries. Kuwait: Kuwait would be one of the primary staging grounds for an attack from the south. Oman: U.S. troops already use air bases for maintenance and refuelling. United Arab Emirates: U.S. troops already use air bases for refuelling. The United Arab Emirates intend to deploy tanks, attack helicopters, warships and about 4,000 troops as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force to help defend Kuwait. Bahrain: U.S. troops already use port facilities. Bahrain is the headquarters for the U.S. 5th Fleet. Bahrain government said that it was sending a frigate and ground troops as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force to help defend Kuwait. Qatar: U.S. troops already use several military bases. Qatar is the forward HQ for U.S. Gulf forces. It was also the locale for exercise “Internal Look,” simulating an attack on Iraq, in December 2002. 4 000058 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information * POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS FOR AN INTERVENTION IN IRAQ Military Air forces bases Ground troops Navy Financial Postcontribution conflict deployment \'ATO Countries Belgium Czech Republic Not needed Not needed Not needed No___ France Yes Germany Yes Hungary Italy______ Yes Netherlands Not needed Not Norway needed Poland Not needed Spain Yes Turkey Most likely Yes UK Denmark U.S. Yes Australia Not needed Slovakia Not needed Responsible Group Principal: Prepared by: Date: No No No No No Likely No Yes 361 troops (chemical warfare unit)______ Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering No No No No No No No No No No No No_______ No_______ No_______ No_______ Considering No_______ No_______ No_______ No_______ Considering Likely Likely No_______ Likely Considering No No No No Likely No No Considering No Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering ’ No Most likely Most likely Most likely No 2 aircraft carrier taskforces 100,000 to 5 to 6 600-1,000 aircraft aircraft 150,000 carrier troops taskforces Like-Minded Countries 150 troops 3 ships 10-20 (special aircraft forces) 75 troops No No 100-140 aircraft 29,000 troops Yes Most likely Yes Yes Yes Likely Yes Likely Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-4358 Dr. Nebojsa Bjelakovic, DG Pol Plan/D Strat A, 992-4532 21 Feb 03 5 000059 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Sous-Ministre de la 1 0 2003 Memorandum Deputy Minister of National Defence 1560-1 (D Strat A) . 07 Feb 03 Di st List POTENTIAL WAR IN IRAQ For your information, please find attached an updated briefing note on “Allies’ contributions for a potential intervention in Iraq” prepared by Dr. Nebojsa Bjelakovic, D Strat A, 992-4532. Daniel L. Bon DG Pol Plan 992-0799 Di st List I I DM CDS ADM (Pol) SA/MND (Del Bianco) DG Pol Plan DG Pol Coord DGIS Pol D Pol Dev DAPC Pol DPK Pol D Pari A 000060 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I’information ALLIES’ CONTRIBUTIONS FOR A POTENTIAL INTERVENTION IN IRAQ BRIEFING NOTE AIM To provide a summary of selected contributions, firm and conditional, to an Americanled intervention in Iraq. Our data are compiled from open sources and, therefore, may be freely used in public forums. Whenever possible, these data have been checked against classified information to ensure their general accuracy. BACKGROUND United States A military intervention in Iraq is possible in 2003. Most reports indicate that the U.S. would deploy between 200,000 and 250,000 of its own troops, with the entire coalition contingent totalling between 250,000 and 300,000 troops. Although Washington has frequently expressed readiness to fight Saddam on its own, it has approached almost 50 countries for potential troop and other contributions. As of February 7, 2003 an estimated 110,000 American personnel are deployed in the Gulf region including about 40,000 ground troops, most of them in Kuwait. The pace of the U.S. military build-up will see the number of U.S. troops in the area approach 180,000 by the middle of February. So far, only the UK has indicated that it would join the US-led intervention in Iraq even without an additional Security Council resolution. Many U.S. allies remain more or less reluctant to commit troops or treasure to a possible intervention in Iraq. This would likely change, however, if Iraq were found to be in “material breach” of the Security Council resolutions. FIRM AND CONDITIONAL COMMITMENTS NATO Allies Belgium: The government has not offered any comments on potential Belgian participation in an intervention in Iraq, but has stated that it aims to concentrate its military assets on the missions in Afghanistan and Africa. Czech Republic: Prague seems to have committed its anti-chemical warfare unit currently based in Kuwait. The Czech government is also considering providing other troops, such as a field hospital or a rapid reaction brigade. 1 000061 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information Denmark: Denmark is prepared to offer military hardware and troops were the UN to authorize an intervention in Iraq, but the government has not yet decided whether Danish soldiers would be sent into combat. France: France favours allowing for a longer and more thorough arms inspection process and indicated on January 20, 2003, that it might use its Security Council veto to oppose a military action against Iraq. Germany: Germany has indicated that it would let the U.S. use its airspace and bases, but would commit no troops to an intervention against Iraq. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder asserted on January 21, 2003, that Germany would not vote for, nor go to war under any circumstances. Hungary: Budapest has authorized the training of Iraqi exiles at Taszar military base in Hungary. American troops are training between 1,000 and 4,000 Iraqi opposition members primarily as translators and scouts. Italy: Rome is willing to support the coalition indirectly, by allowing the use of air space and military bases. Netherlands: Government sources have indicated that Dutch participation, if any, would likely be limited to ships already in the region. Norway: The Norwegian PM has indicated that there would have to be a clear UN mandate before Norway would even consider joining an intervention in Iraq. Poland: Polish officials have indicated that Warsaw might offer some token military support to an intervention in Iraq, but have not given any specifics. Spain: The Spanish government has repeatedly said it would back a US-led military intervention in Iraq, but has given no details of troop commitments. Turkey: Turkey would provide an excellent staging ground for an attack from the north were an international coalition to intervene in Iraq. Ankara has reluctantly agreed to offer some bases and airfields to about 20,000 coalition forces, but the full extent of Turkish participation is still being negotiated with Washington. Turkey has had a few thousand troops in Northern Iraq since the early nineties. Reportedly, Ankara has been deploying troops along the border with Iraq. Some reports indicate that Turkey could contribute between 10,000 and 50,000 troops if the U.S. were to attack from the north. UK: Over 1,300 naval and air force personnel are already in the Gulf, serving in various missions, including the enforcement of no-fly zones over Iraq, and London is also offering its military bases in England and Diego Garcia for U.S. long-range bombers and tanker aircraft. 2 000062 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information On January 7, 2003, despite reported divisions in the Blair government, London called up 1,500 reserve personnel and dispatched to the Gulf an amphibious naval task force including at least 3,000 marines. This task force consists of the amphibious ship HMS Ocean, destroyers HMS Edinburgh and HMS York, supply ships Argus, Fort Rosalie, Fort Austin, landing and logistic ships Sir Galahad, Sir Tristram, Sir Percivale, and antimine ships HMS Grimsby and HMS Ledbury. The UK also sent 14 combat aircraft to previously scheduled exercise in Jordan. On January 12, 2003, Britain also sent to the region a carrier naval taskforce comprised of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, the destroyer HMS Liverpool, the frigate HMS Marlborough, the supply ship Fort Victoria, the tanker Orange Leaf, and a few submarines. On January 20, 2003, Britain announced a major deployment to the region of an additional 26,000 troops. These troops consist of Headquarters 1 (UK) Armoured Division, 7th Armoured Brigade, 16lfi Air Assault Brigade, and 102 Logistics Brigade. This deployment includes 120 Challenger tanks and 150 Warrior armoured personnel carriers, as well as mobile artillery units. These troops will be stationed in Kuwait by the middle of February. On January 30, 2003, London called up another 4,500 reserve personnel. On February 6, 2003, London announced sending additional 7,000 RAF personnel to the Gulf as well as 75 aircraft, including 27 Puma and Chinook helicopters, Jaguar and Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, E3D Sentry airborne command aircraft, Hercules transporters, VC 10 and Tristar refuelling aircraft, Tornado F3's for air defence, Tornado GR4 and Harrier GR7 offensive jets. In all, Britain has decided to deploy 42,000 troops to the Gulf, including 29,000 ground troops. Other Like-Minded Countries Australia: The Australian government has dispatched forces to the Persian Gulf as part of contingency arrangements for a possible war against Iraq including a contribution of Special Forces, three warships, a squadron of up to 14 F/A-18 Hornet fighters, a P3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft, and an air-to-air refuelling aircraft. On January 22, 2003, the government announced a forward deployment to the region of the amphibious transport ship Kanimbla, lead elements of a Special Forces Task Group, and a Royal Australian Air Force reconnaissance team. On February 7, 2003, Australia sent another 450 troops to the Persian Gulf. In all, Australia could reportedly deploy 2,000 troops there. Canberra prefers to have a new Security Council resolution authorizing an attack on Iraq, though it does not believe that a new resolution is necessary. 3 000063 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Slovakia: Assuming there would be a second Security Council resolution, Slovakia has given indications that it would provide a 75-member contingent to complement the Czech anti-chemical warfare unit already deployed in Kuwait. Middle Eastern Countries Israel: The current U.S. position is that Israel should not be part of the coalition against Iraq. The Israeli government has clearly stated, however, that it would launch aerial counter attacks if attacked. Syria: Most likely would remain neutral and eventually may grant the use of its air space for search and rescue missions. Iran: Most likely would remain neutral and eventually may grant the use of its air space for search and rescue missions. Jordan: Most likely will offer radar and special operations bases, but is unlikely to say so publicly. Saudi Arabia: Most likely will offer airfields, and sites for anti-missile batteries. Kuwait: Kuwait would be one of the primary staging grounds for an attack from the south. Oman: U.S. troops already use air bases for maintenance and refuelling. United Arab Emirates: U.S. troops already use air bases for refuelling. Bahrain: U.S. troops already use port facilities. Bahrain is the headquarters for the U.S. 5th Fleet. Qatar: U.S. troops already use several military bases. Qatar is the forward HQ for U.S. Gulf forces. It was also the locale for exercise “Internal Look,” simulating an attack on Iraq, in December 2002. 4 000064 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Lol sur I'acces a I'information POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS Military Air forces bases Ground troops Navy Financial Postcontribution conflict deployment ''lATO Countries Belgium Czech Republic Not needed Not needed Not needed No___ France Germany Yes Hungary Yes Italy______ Yes Netherlands Not needed Not Norway needed Poland Not needed Not Spain needed Most Turkey likely UK Yes Denmark U.S. Yes Australia Not needed Slovakia Not needed Responsible Group Principal: Prepared by: Date: No No No No No Likely 250 troops No Yes (chemical warfare unit)______ Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering No No No No No No No No No No No No_______ No_______ No_______ No_______ Considering No_______ No_______ No_______ No_______ Considering Likely Likely No_______ Likely Considering No No No No Likely No No Considering No Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering Most likely Most likely No 2 aircraft carrier taskforces 5 to 6 600-1,000 100,000 to aircraft aircraft 150,000 carrier troops taskforces Like-Minded Countries 150 troops 3 ships 10-20 aircraft (special forces) 75 troops No No 100-140 aircraft 29,000 troops No Most likely Yes Most likely Yes Yes Yes Likely Yes Likely Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-4358 Dr. Nebojsa Bjelakovic, DG Pol Plan/D Strat A, 992-4532 07 Feb 03 5 000065 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -j/ment divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 000 National Defence Defense nationale i^^Vate Deputy Minister Sous-ministre d6!6gu6e CanadS 000066 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act " ‘ * “jen vertuh^oi$r l^aa^^l'information Government of Canada Privy Council Office Sous-Ministre de la Defense Nationale/ Gouvernement du Canada Bureau du Conseil prive Ottawa, Canada K1A0A3 Deputy Minister of National Defence SECRET (with enclosure) Mr. Ken Dobell Deputy Minister to the Premier and Cabinet Secretary Government of British Columbia Parliament Buildings 272A West Annex Victoria, British Columbia V8V 1X4 Dear Mr. Dobell: I am pleased to provide you with a copy of the national threat assessment prepared by the Government of Canada on possible implications for Canada in the event of a war in Iraq. In distributing the assessment, the Government of Canada is committed to strengthening our partnership in the fight against terrorism by sharing relevant and timely data on threats to our national security. The assessment represents an analysis of the risks as presently known. It is designed to provide relevant information that can assist in briefing your Premier and selected Ministers and in setting the context for strategic preparations in your role as first responders to a terrorist incident. You will note that there are no specific threats to the security of Canada or Canadians identified at this time. The assessment has been classified as “secret”. Due to the sensitivity of the information, it is important that appropriate procedures be undertaken to protect its unauthorized distribution. The document must be kept in a locked cabinet and communicated on a “need to know” basis. Any unauthorized disclosure of the information could result in serious injury to the national interest. The document is being distributed because the prospect of war with Iraq warrants such action. It is critical that we continue to pursue security clearances for identified provincial and territorial employees. Your cooperation is acknowledged and appreciated, and will help ensure we have a future network of individuals with appropriate clearances to receive such information. Canada SBB 000067 �UM!1!1 M MJWMDWI ill1! Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis d /'information 4 . ’ *■ > * -2- SECRET (with enclosure) Our success to-date in fighting terrorism is the result of the close working relationships enjoyed between the law enforcement, intelligence and emergency preparedness communities at both levels of government. We will continue to monitor the threat situation in Canada. Future threat assessments may be sent to you if the situation warrants. Should an event require intervention, federal-provincial-territorial coordination will take place through well established protocols and practices. The intent of this threat assessment process is not to replace such processes or your role as first responders to an incident, but rather to contribute to more informed decision making at the highest levels of governments. It is important, as well, to emphasize that a coordinated approach to communications, both federally and provincially/territorially, is essential to avoid alarming Canadians needlessly and to emphasize that our enforcement, security and intelligence communities are working together to protect Canadians. If you have any questions or concerns about this document, please do not hesitate to contact Anthony Ritchie, Senior Policy Advisor, National Security, Security and Intelligence Secretariat of the Privy Council Office at (613) 957-5657. Yours sincerely, Ronald Bilodeau Associate Secretary to the Cabinet, Deputy Minister to the Deputy Prime Minister and Security and Intelligence Coordinator Enclosure 000068 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information SECRET February 6, 2003 This document is classified SECRET and is the property of the Government of Canada. It is provided to you in confidence, along with the covering letter, for official use with your Premier/Govemment Leader and selected Ministers. It must not be reclassified or disseminated, in any way, in whole or in part, without the consent of the originator. Contact: Security and Intelligence Secretariat, Privy Council Office, (613) 957-5657 i Implications for Canada in the Event of a War with Iraq SUMMARY: 1) An attack on Iraq would result in terrorist-related threats to Western interests throughout the world, including in Canada. Possible targets would likely be, in order of priority, U.S. interests, Israeli interests and then any Western country which actively supports the U.S. invasion. The threat could emanate from surrogate groups used by the Iraqi regime, including the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), or other groups which may use the conflict as an excuse to launch a terrorist attack. There is no specific information indicating that other terrorist groups will use an invasion of Iraq as a rationale for terrorism against the West. This could change should Israel be drawn into any hostilities with Iraq. 2) The response from AL QAIDA to an attack against Iraq is less certain, although AL QAIDA's ability to launch terrorist attacks on a global scale is unquestioned. The specific mention of Canada in a recording made by OSAMA BIN LADEN that aired on the Al Jazeera network on November 12, 2002, threatening future violence increases the possibility of potential threats to Canadian interests internationally. 3) There is currently no specific intelligence pointing to terrorist attacks against Western tarsets-hvJraq or to indicate that the Government of Iraq would target Canadians or Canadian interests in Canada or abroad. It is judged unlikely that SADDAM HUSSEIN would^attempt pre-emptive attacks against the U.S. or otheralignea countries prior to exhausting diplomatic and public relations options. Plots with the potential to disrupt coalition war planning efforts would likely receive first consideration for pre-emptive activity. 4) As there is only one Iraqi diplomadn-Canada. this will limit the Iraqi government’s capability to conduct intelligence activity in Canada, including its ability to monitor d i ssi dentsi ' ' : ‘ 000069 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information -2- SECRET 5) Iraq has aggressively and covertly pursued the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the past. SADDAM HUSSEIN may use them if the collapse of his regime is imminent. Attacks with chemical or biological weapons are plausible, although such operations would require significant logistical support. 6) In Canada, there will likely be a renewal of protest activity at the U.S. and coalition embassies, the Iraqi Embassy, Parliament Hill and provincial legislatures. Protest activity will be determined by events as they unfold. Recent anti-war demonstrations across Canada have taken place without reported incident. Protests will likely continue in the short term. These demonstrations could be highly emotional and acts of spontaneous or premeditated violence may take place. The RCMP is in active contact with provincial and municipal police forces as part of regular operations to anticipate and provide law enforcement at demonstrations, where necessary. 7) A military intervention in Iraq might trigger multiple hoaxes (eg. anthrax). There could also be media reporting rumours and claims from unnamed sources speculating about threats can also be anticipated. A coordinated approach to communications, both federally and provincially, is essential to avoid alarming Canadians needlessly and to remind them that our enforcement, security, and intelligence communities are working together to protect Canadians. Premature responses can also disrupt intelligence gathering activities. 8) Actions taken over the last 15 months by the federal and provincial governments have enhanced information sharing, investigative and intelligence gathering tools as well as response capacity to a number of contingencies, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents. These areas are all covered by federal-provincial contingency plans, agreements, protocols and/or agency arrangements. Any information about specific threats should be directed immediately to local police or RCMP. BACKGROUND: 9) The prospect of a U.S.-led military strike against Iraq raises a concern about the possibility of terrorist reprisals against U.S. and other participating nations' interests. SADDAM HUSSEIN’s regime has demonstrated its willingness and capability to mount operations against its opponents. In addition, there is the possibility that the regime may support terrorist groups that are active against Iraq's enemies. On the eve of the 1991 Gulf War, the SADDAM HUSSEIN government used select groups and teams to mount terrorist attacks against coalition forces and the interests of those forces' countries. 000070 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -3- SECRET IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS): 10) The primary responsibility of the IIS is to protect SADDAM HUSSEIN’S regime. The ability of the IIS to mount operations against perceived or real enemies of the Iraqi regime is a major concern. However, the willingness of IIS officers and their agents to carry out attacks against the U.S. or coalition countries is uncertain. 11) The primary focus of IIS activity in Canada is locating and monitoring oppositionists, dissidents, expatriate scientists, defectors or resettled diplomats and military officers. 12) There are three diplomatic positions at the Iraqi Embassy in Ottawa. However, only one is currently occupied. AFFILIATED TERRORIST GROUPS: 13) Iraq is known to directly support numerous terrorist groups, including the Iranian dissident organization, the MUJAHEDIN - E - KHALQ (MEK), and several Palestinian groups engaged in terrorist activity against Israel. 14) The MEK is based in northern Iraq from which it launches military and terrorist attacks into neighbouring Iran. The MEK has held public demonstrations in Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. 15) Iraq's support of numerous Palestinian groups stems from one common denominator: the mutual hatred of Israel. The SADDAM HUSSEIN regime has been active in providing select Palestinian groups with financial backing (including payment to the families of suicide bombers). In the event of a war with the U.S., it is likely that a request could be made by the Iraqi regime for further assistance. The reaction to such a request will likely be mixed, with individuals, not necessarily groups, responding to the call. AL QAIDA: 16) Historically, Iraq and AL QAIDA have viewed each other with disdain. In the past several months, however, AL QAIDA has relocated an indeterminate portion of its operations to the Kurdish-held region in Northern Iraq with the knowledge of the Iraqi regime. The regime, using the IIS as a conduit, has courted AL QAIDA commanders / members in northern Iraq. In the event of military hostilities with the U.S., AL QAIDA would likely strike at the U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq or conduct terrorist operations against the West. 000071 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information -4- SECRET 17) There are individuals in Canada who are believed to support OSAMA BIN LADEN, AL QAIDA and other international Islamic extremist causes. Although many Islamic extremist supporters have been deported, arrested on immigration charges or extradited to foreign countries, others who remain are believed to be committed to the extremist cause. 18) On November 12, 2002, the Al Jazeera network aired an audio tape attributed to BIN LADEN in which he praised recent attacks, including those in Bali, Yemen, Kuwait and Moscow. In an address to countries participating in the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism, including Canada, he went on to say that 'just like you kill us, we will kill you' and threatened further violence should the U.S. declare war on Iraq. The specific mention of Canada in this recording increases the possibility of potential threats to Canadian interests internationally. 19) Although the Government of Canada has no specific information regarding any particular threats, Canadian interests have become a focus of direct AL QAIDA threats worldwide. In the past, after the release of video or audio tapes, attacks have occurred. After the release of the last OSAMA BIN LADEN videotape a series of small attacks took place culminating in the bombing in Mombassa, Kenya. AL QAIDA's history has shown that it typically strikes when ready and when there is a good chance of being successful. REACTION WITHIN CANADA: MUSLIM COMMUNITY: 20) Not unlike the 1991 Gulf War and the current "war on terrorism," there would be a perception within some quarters of the Canadian Muslim population that an attack on Iraq is in fact an attack on Islam. This could be particularly evident within Canadian Arab circles. 21) The continuing presence of a significant number of Maghreb Islamic extremists in Canada is of particular concern. Montreal remains the primary centre for these individuals, many of whom are Canadian citizens or permanent residents. In Europe, there is evidence that Islamic extremists are using the structured presence of Maghreb networks in Europe to stage terrorist attacks. In Canada, similar patterns are emerging. KURDISH COMMUNITY: 22) We are currently unaware of any serious expressions of concern within the Canadian Kurdish community in anticipation of a war in Iraq. If Kurdish groups are dislodged from their sanctuary in Iraq, they would not hesitate to blame the West and the U.S. in particular. As a result, demonstrations could be expected in Canada, and such protests would have the potential to become violent. 000072 �, Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information » -5- SECRET DEMONSTRATIONS: 23) In the event of military hostilities with Iraq, demonstrations are likely to target coalition diplomatic establishments both in Canada and abroad, as well as businesses and other high-profile entities throughout the world. They could also be aimed at other countries' facilities or personnel, particularly those involved in the military campaign or who are strongly supportive of U.S. actions. Should the military campaign inflict large numbers of Iraqi civilian casualties, demonstrations are likely to intensify. 24) Should the U.S. launch an attack against Iraq, there will likely be local protests in major Canadian cities by a wide variety of groups, among them, anti-war and anti-globalization groups. Demonstrations around the U.S. Embassy or Consulates General can be expected. 25) It is possible that demonstrations by anti-war groups, in conjunction with elements of anti-globalization groups, will result in violence. Anti-globalization activism continues to be directed primarily against multinational corporate power, international monetary institutions and global economic agreements. Since September 11, 2001, there have been indications that elements of the North American anti-globalization movement have begun to add an anti-war and anti-violence message in reaction to the American military response in Afghanistan. During the last year, anti-globalization supporters protested in cities such as Vancouver, Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal and Halifax. These demonstrations occurred without violence. In the past, certain anti-globalization groups have indicated they would target various government buildings and establishments, although this did not occur to any great extent. CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS ABROAD: 26) The Government of Canada regularly updates travel reports for countries assessed to pose security, terrorism or other threats to Canadians. On November 15, 2002, Canadians were advised to leave Iraq immediately. A global security advisory was also issued warning Canadians that demonstrations, strikes and civil unrest can occur worldwide, and urging Canadians to exercise extreme caution. 27) In the event of a war with Iraq, there will be a significant risk to coalition forces in the Middle East and worldwide. This risk could take the form of traditional terrorist attacks (assassinations, suicide bombings) or chemical or biological attacks. 28) Iraq has aggressively and covertly pursued nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs in the past. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq used artillery, tactical fighter aircraft and helicopters to deliver chemical agents, loaded in bombs and rockets. 000073 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'accds d /'information SECRET February 6, 2003 ___I Le present document est cote SECRET et est la propriete du gouvemement du Canada. 11 vous est envoye avec une lettre d’accompagnement et seuls le premier ministre/chef de votre gouvemement et certains ministres selectionnes ont aussi le droit d’en prendre connaissance. Le document ne doit etre ni recote ni diffuse de quelque faqon que ce soit, en tout ou en partie, sans le consentement de 1’auteur. Contact: Secretariat de la securite et du renseignement, Bureau du Conseil prive (613) 957-5657 Repercussions sur le Canada d’une guerre eventuelle contre 1’Irak , EVALUATION : 1) Une attaque contre 1’Irak pourrait faire peser des menaces terroristes sur les interets occidentaux partout dans le monde, y compris au Canada. Au nombre des cibles possibles figureraient vraisemblablement, par ordre de priorite, les interets americains et israeliens, puis ceux de tout pays occidental qui soutient activement les projets d’invasion des Americains. La menace pourrait provenir de groupes a la solde du regime irakien, par exemple le service de renseignement irakien (SRI), ou d’autres groupes qui pourraient se servir du conflit comme pretexte pour perpetrer un attentat terroriste. Il n’y a pas d’information qui laisse croire que d’autres groupes terroristes invoqueraient 1’invasion de 1’Irak pour justifier une campagne terroriste contre 1’Occident. Par contre, la situation pourrait changer si Israel participait au conflit. 2) On ignore comment Al-Qaida reagirait a une attaque contre 1’Irak, mais nul doute que cette organisation est en mesure de perpetrer des attentats terroristes partout dans le monde. Les interets canadiens a travers le monde sont d’autant plus menaces qu’Oussama Ben Laden mentionne precisement le Canada dans son message diffuse le 12 novembre 2002 par la chaine Al-Jazira, et laisse entrevoir que d’autres actes de violence pourraient etre commis. 3) Il n’existe a 1’heure actuelle aucun renseignement precis qui autoriserait a croire que 1’Irak commettra des attentats terroristes contre des cibles occidentales ou visera les Canadiens ou les interets canadiens au Canada ou a 1’etranger. On estime peu probable que Saddam Hussein commette des attentats terroristes preventifs contre les E.-U. ou d’autres pays alignes avant d’avoir epuise tous les recours sur les plans de la diplomatie et des relations publiques. A cet egard, il envisagerait vraisemblablement en premier lieu de perturber les preparatifs de guerre de la coalition. 000074 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information -2- I SECRET 4) Comme il n’y a qu’un seul diplomate irakien au Canada, cela limitera la capacite du gouvemement irakien a mener des activites de renseignement au Canada, ainsi qu’a surveiller les dissidents. 5) Dans le passe, 1 ’Irak a poursuivi activement et secretement le developpement d’armes de destruction massive (ADM). Saddam Hussein pourrait les utiliser si 1’effondrement de son regime est imminent. Des attaques et des attentats irakiens a 1’arme chimique ou biologique sont plausibies, mais ils exigeraient un important soutien logistique. 6) Au Canada, les manifestations reprendront vraisemblablement devant 1’ambassade des Etats-Unis et les ambassades des pays membres de la coalition et celle de 1’Irak ainsi que sur la colline du Parlement et devant les assemblies legislatives provinciales. Ces activites seront organisees suivant le deroulement des evenements. Au Canada, les manifestations recentes centre la guerre se sont deroulees sans qu’aucun incident ne soit signale. Les manifestations se poursuivront vraisemblablement a court terme. Toutefois, etant donne que les passions y sont souvent exacerbees, la possibility d’actes de violence spontanes ou premedites ne peut etre exclue. La GRC travaille etroitement avec les corps policiers provinciaux et municipaux dans le cadre d’operations regulieres, afin de prevoir et d’assurer, s’il y a lieu, la presence de forces de 1’ordre lors de manifestations. 7) Une intervention militaire en Irak pourrait declencher toutes sortes de canulars (p. ex. charbon). On pourrait aussi lire et entendre dans les medias des rumeurs et des affirmations de sources inconnues speculant sur diverses menaces. La coordination des communications, a 1’echelle federate et provincial, est essentielle pour eviter d’alarmer inutilement les Canadiens et leur rappeler que nos collectivites de la police, de la securite et du renseignement travaillent de concert pour les proteger. Des reactions prematurees pourraient en outre perturber les activites de collecte de renseignements. 8) Les mesures prises ces 15 demiers mois par les gouvemements federal et provinciaux ont permis d’ameliorer les outils d’echange d’informations, d’enquete et de collecte de renseignements ainsi que la capacite a parer a differentes eventualites, notamment des incidents chimiques, biologiques, radiologiques et nucleates (CBR.N). Ces secteurs sont tous vises par des plans d’urgence, ententes, protocoles federaux-provinciaux et/ou des arrangements entre organismes. Toute information sur des menaces precises doit etre communiquee immediatement a la police locale ou a la GRC. 000075 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -3- SECRET CONTEXTS: 9) L’eventualite d’une attaque militaire contre l’lrak par une coalition dirigee par les Etats-Unis souleve la possibility de represailles terroristes contre les E.-U. et d’autres Etats participants. Le regime de Saddam Hussein a montre qu’il est pret a mener des operations contre ses adversaires et qu’il en est capable. En outre, il est possible que le regime appuie les groupes terroristes qui operent contre les ennemis de l’lrak. A la veille de la guerre du Golfe en 1991, le regime de Saddam Hussein avait choisi des groupes et des commandos bien precis pour perpetrer des attentats terroristes contre les forces de la coalition et les interets des pays membres. SERVICE DE RENSEIGNEMENTS IRAKIEN (SRI): 10) Le role premier du SRI est de proteger le regime de Saddam Hussein. Sa capacity de mener des operations contre des ennemis reels ou potentiels du regime irakien constitue une preoccupation majeure. Toutefois, la volonte des officiers du SRI et de leurs agents de perpetrer des attentats contre les E.-U. ou les membres de la coalition est inconnue. U) Au Canada, le SRI cherche avant tout a reperer et a surveiller les opposants, les dissidents, les scientifiques expatries, les transfuges ainsi que les diplomates et les militaires reinstalles. 12) L’lrak compte trois postes de diplomate a son ambassade a Ottawa, mais seulement un est occupe actuellement. GROUPES TERRORISTES AFFILIES: 13) Il est connu que l’lrak apporte un soutien direct a de nombreux groupes terroristes, dont les MOUDJAHIDIN DU PEUPLE (MEK), 1’organisation dissidente iranienne, et plusieurs groupes palestiniens qui menent des activites terroristes contre Israel. 14) Les MEK sont bases dans le nord de l’lrak, d’ou ils lancent des attaques militaires et terroristes contre I Tran voisin. Ils ont organise des manifestations a Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal et Vancouver. 15) Un denominates commun amene l’lrak a appuyer de nombreux groupes palestiniens : la haine d’lsrael. Le regime irakien apporte un appui financier a certains groupes palestiniens (dont le versement d’une somme d’argent aux families des kamikazes). En cas de guerre avec les E.-U., le regime irakien demanderait probablement davantage d’aide. Or ce sont vraisemblablement des particuliers qui repondraient a cette demande, pas forcement des groupes. 000076 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue.en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information -4- SECRET AL-QAIDA: 16) L’lrak n’a toujours eu que du dedain pour Al-Qaida et inversement. Depuis quelques mois toutefois, Al-Qaida mene un nombre indetermine d’operations depuis la region du nord de l’lrak sous controle kurde, au vu et au su du regime irakien. Ce demier, par 1’intermediaire du SRI, courtise les commandants et les membres d’Al-Qaida dans le nord du pays. En cas de conflit avec les E.-U., Al-Qaida attaquerait probablement les Americains et les forces de la coalition en Irak ou menerait des operations terroristes contre 1’Occident. 17) On croit que certaines personnes au Canada soutiennent Oussama Ben Laden, Al-Qaida et d’autres causes de 1’islamisme mondial. Bien que de nombreux partisans de 1’extremisme islamique aient ete expulses, arretes pour des inculpations liees a 1’immigration ou extrades vers d’autres pays, ceux qui restent sont censes etre engages dans la cause extremiste. 18) Le 12 novembre 2002, la chaine Al-Jazira a diffuse un enregistrement dans laquelle la voix, qui serait celle de Oussama Ben Laden, fait 1'eloge des recents attentats, dont ceux perpetres a Bali, au Yemen, au Koweit et a Moscou. S'adressant aux pays membres de la coalition contre le terrorisme dirigee par les E.-U., dont le Canada, la voix declare : « Nous vous tuerons, comme vous nous tuez ». Elie affirme que d'autres actes de violence seront commis si les E.-U. declarent la guerre a 1'Irak. La mention precise du Canada fait davantage craindre la menace de represailles contre les interets canadiens dans le monde. 19) Meme si le gouvemement du Canada ne possede aucune information precise sur quelque menace que ce soit, les menaces d'Al-Qaida sont maintenant dirigees contre les interets canadiens partout dans le monde. Par le passe, des attentats ont ete commis suite a la diffusion d'enregistrements audio ou video. Apres la diffusion de la demiere bande video de Oussama Ben Laden, une serie de petits attentats ont ete commis, atteignant un sommet avec celui perpetre a Mombassa au Kenya. Al-Qaida a generalement 1'habitude de frapper lorsqu'il est pret et lorsque ses chances de reussite sont bonnes. REACTION AU CANADA: COMMUNAUTE MUSULMANE: 20) Comme cela a ete le cas lots de la guerre du Golfe en 1991 et comme aujourd’hui dans la « guerre contre le terrorisme », certains secteurs de la communaute musulmane du Canada pourraient croire qu’une attaque contre l’lrak equivaut a une attaque contre 1’islam. Cela pourrait etre particulierement evident dans les cercles arabes du Canada. 000077 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accts a /'information -5- SECRET 21) La presence au Canada d’un nombre important d’extremistes islamistes maghrebins inquiete tout particulierement. Montreal demeure leur principal point de convergence, et bon nombre d’entre eux sont citoyens canadiens ou residents permanents. En Europe, il est evident que les extremistes islamistes utilisent les reseaux maghrebins structures pour commettre des attentats terroristes. L’amorce d’un phenomene semblable a ete constatee au Canada. COMMUNAUTE KURDE: 22) Nous n’avons jusqu’ici constate dans la communaute kurde du Canada aucune expression d’inquietude serieuse au sujet d’une eventuelle guerre en Irak. Si les groupes kurdes etaient chasses de leur sanctuaire en Irak, ils n’hesiteraient pas a blamer 1’Occident et les E.-U. en particulier. Le Canada pourrait done s’attendre a des manifestations sur son territoire, et celles-ci pourraient devenir violentes. MANIFESTATIONS: 23) En cas de conflit militaire avec 1’Irak, des manifestations seraient vraisemblablement organisees contre les etablissements diplomatiques des membres de la coalition au Canada et a 1’etranger, de meme que contre des entreprises et d’autres organisations importantes dans le monde entier. Des manifestations pourraient egalement etre organisees contre les installations ou le personnel d’autres pays, surtout ceux qui prennent part a la campagne militaire ou appuient sans reserve les E.-U. Les manifestations s’intensifieront vraisemblablement si la campagne militaire fait un grand nombre de morts et de blesses parmi la population civile en Irak. 24) Si les Americains lancent une attaque contre 1’Irak, des groupes de toutes sortes, dont ceux qui sont opposes a la guerre et a la mondialisation, manifesteront vraisemblablement dans les grandes villes du Canada. Il faut s’attendre a des manifestations devant 1’ambassade ou les consulats des E.-U. 25) Il est possible que des manifestations des groupes opposes a la guerre, en collaboration avec certains elements des groupes antimondialisation, degenerent en violence. Les militants antimondialisation continuent de s’en prendre surtout aux multinationales, aux institutions monetaires intemationales et aux accords economiques mondiaux. Depuis le 11 septembre 2001, il y a lieu de croire que des elements du mouvement antimondialisation nord-americain ont commence a ajouter a leurs propos des messages centre la guerre et la violence en reaction a 1’intervention de 1’armee americaine en Afghanistan. L’an demier, des partisans de 1’antimondialisation ont manifesto a Vancouver, Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Calgary et Halifax, sans qu’aucun acte de violence ne soit signale. Dans le passe, certains groupes antimondialisation ont exprime leur intention de prendre pour cibles divers immeubles et institutions du gouvemement, mais cela ne s’est pas concretise sur une grande echelle. 000078 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information -------------- -■ V ' -6- SECRET CAPACITES ET INTENTIONS A L’ETRANGER: 26) Le gouvemement du Canada actualise regulierement les renseignements consulaires aux voyageurs afin de les sensibiliser a tout ce qui pourrait menacer leur securite. Ainsi, le 15 novembre 2002, les Canadiens ont ete informes de quitter l’lrak immediatement. Un avis de securite mondiale a egalement ete publie afin d’avertir les Canadiens que des manifestions, des greves et des troubles civils pourraient survenir a 1’echelle du globe, et de les inviter a etre extremement prudents. 27) Si la guerre est declaree a l’lrak, les forces de la coalition au Moyen-Orient et ailleurs courront un grave danger. Par exemple, elles pourraient faire 1’objet d’attaques terroristes traditionnelles (assassinats, attentats suicide a la bombe) ou d’attaques a I’arme chimique ou biologique. 28) L’lrak a poursuivi activement et secretement par le passe des programmes de developpement d’armes nucleates, chimiques et biologiques. Durant la guerre avec 1’Iran, l’lrak a utilise 1’artillerie ainsi que des chasseurs et des helicopteres tactiques pour lancer des roquettes et des bombes contenant des agents chimiques. 29) On estime que si l’lrak a des armes nucleates, sa capacite de lancer une attaque nucleaire est faible. L’lrak a par ailleurs demontre sa capacite de mener une attaque a I’arme chimique et biologique. Il existe peu d’informations indiquant que l’lrak a mis au point des applications et des methodes destinees a 1’utilisation d’armes chimiques et biologiques a des fins terroristes. Il existe en revanche des renseignements qui autorisent a croire que Saddam Hussein compte utiliser des agents chimiques et biologiques contre ses voisins, dont Israel, le Koweit, I’Arabie saoudite, la Jordanie et la Turquie, mais seulement en cas de defaite imminente. Il pourrait utiliser a cette fin des lance-missiles mobiles. Le charbon demeure 1’agent de menace de guerre biologique le plus plausible. Bien qu’il n’y ait pas confirmation que l’lrak possede des stocks de variole (s’ils existent), la variole constitue une autre menace importante. 30) Sans 1’exclure completement, le risque d’exposition a la variole en meme temps qu’un conflit possible en Irak est tres faible. Sante Canada negocie 1’achat de vaccins antivarioliques pour immuniser les Canadiens contre une eventuelle attaque bioterroriste et mieux preparer le Canada a faire face a une telle urgence. 31) L’une des strategies qu’emploiera peut-etre l’lrak dans sa guerre contre une coalition dirigee par les E.-U. consistera, comme cela a ete le cas lors de la guerre du Golfe, a attaquer Israel au moyen de missiles Scud. Israel a dit qu’il ripostera si l’lrak 1’attaque, ce qui accroitrait les tensions et pourrait influencer les pays arabes a former une coalition. Il existe aussi une possibility que des groupes terroristes opposes aux Israeliens, dont des extremistes palestiniens et le Hezbollah, profitent de la situation pour lancer contre Israel des attaques terroristes ou militaires a partir du Liban. 000079 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Lol sur I'accds d /'information 1 -7- SECRET 32) Le regime irakien envisage aussi de mener des operations informatiques en cas de guerre. 11 y a lieu de croire que des pirates pourraient mener des actions independantes ou communes dans le cadre d’une attaque coordonnee contre les E.-U. et la coalition occidentale. Divers groupes terroristes, dont Al-Qaida et le Hezbollah, maitrisent de mieux en mieux Internet et les autres technologies informatiques. 33) Un « appel » adresse aux opposants a la guerre et aux E.-U. circule actuellement sur Internet, les invitant a s’unir et a lancer une cyber-attaque centre les E.-U. et leurs allies. Selon certaines informations, ces opposants, particuliers et groupes, preparent des cyber-represailles a une agression contre 1’Irak. 000080 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00019 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003-01-12-31 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-100289 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f0496a5e483995faa7daa93c0c053395.pdf a741aaf55a2774c7f1536471a90a41cf PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Acc^ss.to.lnfofmgtion Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lcf^ur !jacf& OjiJnf3^!S)ion\zl SECRET National Defence Defense nationale National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 SECRET (CC) JUN 0 9 2003 The Minister DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN FORCES’ EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION 1. On 18 March 2003, the Prime Minister approved continued Canadian Forces participation in Operation Enduring Freedom in light of the imminent US-led military operation against Iraq. Within the context of this direction, restrictions were imposed that Canadian Forces transport aircraft operating in the Persian Gulf region were not to be used to support, directly or indirectly, military action against Iraq. In addition, all Canadian operations were to be undertaken within the existing Operation Apollo area of responsibility, excluding Iraq and that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North). 2. On 22 May 2003, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1483. Resolution 1483 lifted all prohibitions related to trade with Iraq under previous Security Council Resolutions with the exception of prohibitions concerning arms and related material. Further, Resolution 1483 calls upon all member states in a position to do so to respond immediately to the humanitarian appeals of the United Nations and other international organizations. Consequently, Resolution 1483 provides a framework within which Canada and other non-occupying power states may work with the US and British occupying powers referred to as “the Authority” Subsequently, the Prime Minister directed that Canadian Forces transport aircraft 3. were to be offered to the Authority to provide airlift in support of stabilization and reconstruction missions. The first mission to Iraq was flown on 2 June. These aircraft, deployed in the United Arab Emirates, are tasked in support of the upcoming deployment to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul. These aircraft will also be used to provide the agreed support to the UN mandated mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This UN mission will nominally employ two of the four aircraft in theatre. Therefore, support to the Iraq mission will be subject to operational priorities and aircraft serviceability. In order to facilitate operational and logistical arrangements, Canadian Forces 4. participation in stabilization and reconstruction activities will continue to be conducted under the operational control of “the Authority” as defined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483. At all times, Canadian Forces members remain under the 1/2 Canada SECRET SECRET (CC) 000007 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET command of the Chief of the Defence Staff. Additionally, the previous geographic restriction on Canadian Forces operations meant that Canadian Forces aircraft had been unable to accept transport taskings to and from Kuwait under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom. 5. To enable the Canadian Forces to execute the Prime Minister’s direction, the restrictions in respect of airlift by Canadian Forces transport aircraft in support of Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction missions and the geographic restrictions on Canadian Forces operations in Iraq and in that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North) have been removed. The removal of the restriction permits Canadian Forces aircraft to conduct missions through Kuwait for the delivery of loads exclusively in support of the campaign against terrorism and in accordance with Canadian national objectives. 6. Finally, the removal of the geographic restriction has also permitted the Canadian naval task group to conduct Operation Apollo missions in the Northern Persian Gulf in accordance with Canadian national objectives or other missions as may be directed by the Government of Canada. 7. If you agree, we recommend that you sign the enclosed letter to the Prime Minister. Foreign Affairs and the Privy Council Office have been consulted and concur with this approach. a/ R.R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff Margaret Bloodworth Deputy Minister Enclosures: 1 APPROVE Date: The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. 2/2 000008 SECRET �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information 1 SECRET (CO The Right Honourable Jean Chretien, P.C., Q.C., M.P., LL.L, LL.D., Prime Minister of Canada Langevin Block 80 Wellington Street Ottawa ON K1A0A2 Dear Prime Minister: This letter seeks to confirm your verbal direction of 22 May removing certain restrictions in respect of Canadian Forces operations in the Persian Gulf region. Within the context of existing direction, which you approved on 18 March 2003, Canadian Forces transport aircraft in the Persian Gulf region were not to be used to support, directly or indirectly, military action against Iraq. In addition, all Canadian operations were to be undertaken within the existing Operation Apollo area of responsibility, excluding Iraq and that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North). On 22 May 2003, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1483. Resolution 1483 lifted all prohibitions related to trade with Iraq under previous Security Council Resolutions with the exception of prohibitions concerning arms and related material. Further, Resolution 1483 calls upon all member states in a position to do so to respond immediately to the humanitarian appeals of the United Nations and other international organizations. Consequently, Resolution 1483 provides a framework within which Canada and other non-occupying power states may work with the US and British occupying powers referred to as “the Authority.” Further to your verbal direction of 22 May 2003, Canadian Forces transport aircraft were tasked to provide airlift in support of stabilization and reconstruction missions to Iraq. The first mission to Iraq was flown on 2 June. These aircraft, deployed in the United Arab Emirates, are tasked in support of the upcoming deployment to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul. These aircraft will also be used to provide the agreed support to the UN mandated mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This UN mission will nominally employ two of the four aircraft in theatre. Therefore, support to the Iraq mission will be subject to operational priorities and aircraft serviceability. In order to facilitate operational and logistical arrangements, Canadian Forces • participation in stabilization and reconstruction activities will continue to be conducted under the operational control of “the Authority” as defined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483. At all times, Canadian Forces members remain under the command of the Chief of the Defence Staff. Additionally, the previous geographic restriction on Canadian Forces operations meant that Canadian Forces aircraft had been 000009 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lbi sur I'acces a /'information unable to accept transport taskings to and from Kuwait under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom. To enable the Canadian Forces to execute your direction, the restrictions in respect of airlift by Canadian Forces transport aircraft in support of Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction missions and the geographic restrictions on Canadian Forces operations in Iraq and in that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North) have been removed. The removal of the restriction permits Canadian Forces aircraft to conduct missions through Kuwait for the delivery of loads exclusively in support of the campaign against terrorism and in accordance with Canadian national objectives. Finally, the removal of the geographic restriction has also permitted the Canadian naval task group to conduct Operation Apollo missions in the Northern Persian Gulf in accordance with Canadian national objectives or other missions as may be directed by the Government of Canada. Minister Graham has also been apprised of your verbal direction and concurs with the present conduct of operations. Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. r-3.-V- 000010 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00020 Title A name given to the resource Direction Regarding Canadian Forces' Employment Restrictions in the Persian Gulf Region Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 09-Jun-03 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-100289 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en