1 20 34 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5d21368c5a761856fd4dcff34519b277.pdf 1c97c3981fe22cbce2fd66861ca3088b PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information iiiimiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiN^ *MCU2003-07276RR* Graham, William MCU# M C U2003-07276 Doc #72986 Office of the Minister of National Defence Cabinet du ministre de la Defense natio SECRET TEMPORARY DOCKET - DOSSIER TEMPORAIRE TEMPORARY DOCKETS ARE NOT TO BE TRANSFERRED OUT OF THE MINISTER S OFFICE LES DOSSIERS TEMPORAIRES NE DOIVENT EN AUCUN CAS QUITTER LE BUREAU DU MINISTRE SUBJEC SUJET: DFAIT PRESENTATION FOR IRAQ MEETING B GRAHAM S WHELAN AND MINISTER 9 ARPIL 2003 RA. RANGER TO A CQ REMARKS REMARQUES Date Init. Date Init. oUUN037 | “t B.F. RAPPEL Date Cancel Annuler INSTRUCTIONS Temporary Dockets are to deal WITH ONE CASE ONLY. Les dossiers temporaires sont crees a regard d’un SEUL CAS. CD N O co o o C D o ij TD No. together with main file number to be quoted on all correspondence originated. Mentionner le numero du dossier temporaire et le numro de reference du dossier principal dans toute correspondance. Action should be taken as soon as possible in order that main file may be kept up to date. If action cannot be taken within 48 working hrs., BF docket. Donner suite le plus t6t possible, afin de tenir le dossier principal a jour. Si non realisable dans les 48 heures ouvrables, acheminer et inscrire une date de rappel. TDs to be requisitioned, passed, BF'd, etc., in the same manner as main files. Utiliser la methode applicable aux dossiers principaux pour les demandes, acheminements, rappels, etc., des dossiers temporaires. DND 5118 (05-00) = 5 g #ft =8 2 8 == W o 000001 �meya « , -sheomppemtppep 00; < ‘00 eba a w gapa i s topr r 3 90 , ' DbuzentdivalgueensertiactrotgCooane R0M8e* 88, s ¥ fSempppypmses ".,,..... ... . 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PN 0l<*samnpn ‘H .90 Azoadad test — '--------- - z {000002 o . . �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ RECENED" Document divulgue en v^rtu dp la l ni cur rnrrhr n-l'infomerh on NDHQ OTT ADM (POL) -C4 A AR $ 4 008 Flvm=// 68. From: Sent: To: Cc: . WALMA Michael -IDR -C4 BY MCU April 9, 2003 3:24 PM -EXTOTT -MINA -C4 NDHQ OTT ADM (POL) -C4; CIDA -C4R; Privy Council Office -C4R; -EXTOTT -USS -C4; EXTOTT -DMA -C4; -EXTOTT -DMT -C4; -EXTOTT -MJW -C4; -EXTOTT -MJM -C4; EXTOTT -IDD -C4; -EXTOTT -GMD -C4; -EXTOTT -NAD -C4; -EXTOTT -IDR -C4; -EXTOTT -GMR -C4; -EXTOTT -NUR -C4; -EXTOTT -CPD -C4; -EXTOTT -CPP -C4; HOFFMANN Ron -IDR -C4; -EXTOTT -IDC -C4; -EXTOTT -AGH -C4; CCATS IDR0104-DFAIT presentation for Wednesday Iraq meeting of three Ministers Subject: ) 20030409_blue_sky_fin al.shw SECRET For DND ADM(POL) - Please also pass to the office of your Minister and Deputy Minister For CIDA - Please pass to the office of your Minister and Deputy Minister, as well as BFM/Devlin For PCO - Please pass to FDP/Laverdure/Ausman/Chapdelaine and lAS/Fyffe/Barnes For PCO - grateful you pass attachment in electronic format to IAS Note on printing in black and white - In Corel Presentations, press 'Print', then 'Details', then deselect 'Print in Colour' and 'Print Background', then select 'Print Slide Numbers', and finally press 'Print'. Attached is the DFAIT presentation to be made at the Wednesday Iraq meeting of Ministers Graham, McCallum and Whalen. Hard copies are being provided to O/MINA, USS, DMA and DMT. The presentation also includes separate CI DA slides, found at the end of the presentation. Drafted: IDR/Walma Consulted: GMR, NUR Approved: MJW, USS MND REGISTRY REGISTRE DU MDN ' I Referred to I Transmis 4 24 JUN 2 4 2003 No. de Dossia/2Ozu.2)022e 0 727 Charged to Charge a_ C3 A at" ” w y." i 000003 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information Conflict in Iraq —= 5*55"*m5yyy* =******* = 550*5 " —P •* ***** **********. =*** *** 12 3 Challenges and Questions for Canada 000004 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information . ) Key Issues ■ Canada/US relations • world economy • international institutions, including UN and NATO / • the transatlantic relationship ■ peace in the Middle East, especially resolution of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict • 1 ■ terrorism ■ avoiding US unilateralism or isolationalism / ' 000005 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la'Loi sur l'acces a I'information Effects of the conflict in Iraq: Regionally ■ threatens to destabilise region, particularly moderate states • could provoke terrorist response • could damage US credibility in the region s ► knock-on effect on the West or • create impetus for reform in region ■ strengthen US leadership hand ■ ( 000006 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information And Internationally zas Clash of Civilisations - West against the Rest strains international institutions, including the UN, EU, G8 and NATO tensions between Allies on stabilisation and reconstruction ■ real or perceived diversion of resources/attention to Iraq and away from others ( ) i■ / ■uncertainty could have considerable impact on world and regional economies 000007 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information, The US could win the war but lose the peace itteconkscaaid ■ the US, UK and other have responsibilities as occupying powers j ■ but they cannot not do post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction alone • because of US electoral politics and enormous cost ■ they must have partners, but ■ the US could make conditions for partners difficult ■the US may be viewed as conqueror, undercutting its broader regional democracy agenda 000008 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information US ‘failure’ in Iraq could bring about isolationism - I ■ retreat to Fortress USA, withdrawing from Allies ■ US to Canada: are you with us or against us? ■ hostile/aggressive tendencies to perceived threats ► Syria, Iran, DPRK • economically driven protectionist tendencies increase ■ possible increased concern over secure energy sources 000009 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information US ‘success’: positive and negative outcomes possible ■Iraqis feel liberated and a threat removed ■ reform in the region given a boost ■ US turns to Israeli/Palestinian conflict ■ other'rogues'may think twice but also: ■ the US may be tempted into similar ventures elsewhere ■may further undercut US support for institutions and alliances 000010 �. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information There are some that would like to see the US stumble ■ those who resent an active US may want to see it humbled ■this could include traditional adversaries - Iran, Syria, DPRK • but also France, China and Russia which would like to see a multipolar world ■ as well as extremists and resentful public opinion 000011 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information Lessons for 'Rogues' Whether the US ‘succeeds’ or ‘fails’ asymmetric threats work, conventional forces do not go nuclear first, then engage the US (DPRK) the international community is divided ■ ) 000012 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information' A Conundrum for Canada and other Allies A ■ the US is the indispensable super power • we can afford neither an unqualified US success nor a complete failure 000013 . \ 16 : �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information Canadian Challenges - at home &“02MmMRmmm ******* mhirn . ****** ***** hhats imtimtti mm* ■ priorities - domestic versus international ■ prioritising - ODA, military, political • Iraq vs Africa, security sector vs basic needs • Iraq vs Afghanistan vs peacekeeping ► US vs building alternatives vs multilateral • economic impact will be felt differently in different Canadian regions • increasingly conflicted views of a diverse Canadian public ■ immigration and refugee policy 000014 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue enveriu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information Canadian Challenges: With the US d ■ US seeking to exploit Canadian sense of guilt ■ coalitions of the willing vs UN/NATO mandates ■ US military action motivated by homeland security ■ Communications - US perceptions against Canadian realities ► individual Americans versus US leadership ■vulnerability to US protectionism ■maintenance of Canadian sovereignty and policy , independence 000015 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information Discussion Questions: What should Canada do L ud Domestically ■ in communicating on Canada/US relations? ■ to protect ourselves from economic fall-out? • to protect ourselves from an increased terrorist threat? V 000016 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information ) What should Canada do: *( with the US on bilateral issues ■to keep US protectionism in check? ■ to keep a safe and open border? • on continental security/defence? ■to improve US perceptions of Canada? 000017 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documentdivulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information What should Canada do: In the trans-Atlantic setting “to rebuild US/Europe links? • to keep NATO moving forward? • to foster our own European links? ■ in cooperation with the UK?, with France?, with Germany? 000018 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information What should Canada do: In the Middle East region • in supporting Middle East peace? • in resolving the Israeli/Palestinian conflict? • mitigating the regional impact of the conflict? • to help Iraqis? • Canada's 'value added', regionally and in Iraq? / 000019 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information What should Canada do: Multilaterally ( • in catalysing change at the UN and other multilateral institutions in order to allow them to meet real challenges ■ in keeping the US engaged in the multilateral process? ■ to strengthen international humanitarian law? 000020 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur.l'acces a /'information What should Canada do: A Internationally in mitigating the world-wide economic impact? in addressing the risk of increased terrorism? in combatting proliferation and promoting disarmament? 000021 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces al'information 1 What should Canada do: _ndid ODA Policies and Priorities Challenged. Can Strengthening Aid Effectiveness Policy be maintained in responding to Iraq? ■ Concentrating in poor countries vs Iraq • Iraqi role — country ownership of reconstruction priorities vs supply driven aid ■ Draining finite resource away from Africa and Asia to crisis managing ■ Maintenance of multilateral coordination vs bilateral approach 000022 �- ' Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces aTinformation ODA Dimension to Canada’s Response to the Iraqi Crisis ODA strategy for Iraq • Timebound - Iraq is oil rich ■ Primary attention to humanitarian needs ■ Need to be strategic, targeted and commensurate to our capabilities ■ Preference for close collaboration with the UN, along side the US-Coalition and others ■ Early ownership by Iraqis - not supply driven ■ Minimize risks and obligations within legally ) enabling environment 000023 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information ODA Dimension to Canada’s Response to the Iraqi Crisis ...... .. , .... - ... . . . . . • . ... . - . . ... . •■ - . ... • . ?. M =. * international and regional implications ■ Continue to demonstrate support for the UN • Simultaneously support US effort in Iraq ■ Avoid misconception of Canadian aid as supporting a perceived colonialist enterprise ■ Enhance support to regional partners - a positive message “Continue aid as a means to foster peace in the Middle East 000024 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00034 Title A name given to the resource DFAIT PRESENTATION FOR IRAQ MEETING B GRAHAM S WHELAN AND MINISTER 9 ARPIL 2003 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24, 2014-01289-X, box 74, MCU2003-07276. Library and Archives Canada. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Description An account of the resource LAC ATIP A-2023-01339 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/70e2b221e753f78e8a88edfe7cb07753.pdf 0248c381001c2c327c9d16ada680f625 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information iiiMiiiiiiiiiiiiiiim *MCU2003- 02206 IFR* [CDS], de •‘s 0 Office of the Minister of National Defence (2oxeralike 022, Doc #67895 Cabinet du ministre de la Defense natio. CONFIDENTIAL CC MCU# M C U2003-02206 I CONFIDENTIEL TEMPORARY DOCKET - DOSSIER TEMPORAIRE TEMPORARY DOCKETS ARE NOT TO BE TRANSFERRED OUT OF THE MINISTER’S OFFICE LES DOSSIERS TEMPORAIRES NE DOIVENT EN AUCUN CAS QUITTER LE BUREAU DU MINISTRE BRIEFING NOTE FOR MINISTER DEPLOYMENT OF HMCS FREDERICTON 5 MARCH 2003 SUBJECT: SUJET: TO A T RA. RANGER REMARKS REMARQUES co o O Init. Date Init Date Cancel Annuler 227 Coy CO O CM CM O Date B.F. RAPPEL INSTRUCTIONS Temporary Dockets are to deal WITH ONE CASE ONLY. Les dossiers temporaires sont crees a I’egard d’un SEUL CAS. I C O 1 O) ======= d st8 T -------------- CJ 8 =S co . CD co i Mentionner le numdro du dossier temporaire et le numero de reference du dossier principal dans toute correspondance. Action should be taken as soon as possible in order that main file may be kept up to date. If action cannot be taken within 48 working hrs., BF docket. Donner suite le plus tot possible, afin de tenir le dossier principal a jour. Si non realisable dans les 48 heures ouvrables, acheminer et inscrire une date de rappel. TDs to be requisitioned, passed, BF’d, etc., in the same manner as main files. Utiliser la methode applicable aux dossiers principaux pour les demandes, acheminements, rappels, etc., des dossiers temporaires. DND 5120 (05-00) Q 8 O 8 000001 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL noiaegj felet Chief of the Defence Staff ade National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 T/Y Chef d’etat-major de la Defense Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 21 February 2003 The Minister BRIEFING NOTE - DEPLOYMENT OF HMCS FREDERICTON The enclosed Briefing Note provides the background leading to the decision to sail HMCS FREDERICTON on, or about, 5 March 2003 in order to maintain the revised three ship Naval Task Group contribution to Operation APOLLO. R.R. Henault General cc DM ■IIIIIIHIIIIIHIillllllllllMIIIIIIIMIMI *MCU2003-02205 AR:* [CDS], Doc #67895 ENTERED: 08:37, 2003-02-27 MCU#MCU2003-02206 i DeD National Defence Defense nationale CONFIDENTIAL Canada 000002 �Document iiscloset^f^g 1f^^Q^^“^p^formation \ct Document divi Igue REGIstAeBUMb I'infon lotion CONFIDENTIAL @IEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER DEPLOYMENT OF HMCS FREDERICTON ISSUE Referred to Transmis a________________ _ FEB 2 7 2003 isheN9:44Ha003-0aacb $ i Charged to Charge 6.... . 1. The deployment of HMCS FREDERICTON (FRE) in order to maintain a three ship Naval Task Group contribution to Operation APOLLO. BACKGROUND 2. The decision to accept the duties of Commander Task Force 151 within Operation ENDURING FREEDOM necessitated the deployment of HMCS IROQUOIS (IRO) to provide the required Command and Control capabilities to effectively carry out the associated responsibilities. Given the increased Canadian command responsibility it was decided to return the Canadian naval effort to the original Op APOLLO force level of a three-ship Naval Task Group (TG 307.1). These decisions necessitated a revision to the planned deployment schedule for ships. 3. FRE was originally scheduled to deploy in the mid-Feb 03 timeframe with a Helicopter Air Detachment (HELAIRDET) embarked. The requirement to deploy IRO and provide her a HELAIRDET necessitated a delay in the sailing of FRE while an additional HELAIRDET was prepared. DISCUSSION 4. Presently, Rotation Two of TG 307.1 is in theatre and is comprised of HMC Ships MONTREAL (MON) and WINNIPEG (WIN), each with a HELAIRDET. The Commander of the Task Group (CTG), along with his staff, are currently embarked in MON executing the duties of CTF 151. Rotation Three will comprise IRO with HELAIRDET and CTG embarked (Flagship), FRE with HELAIRDET and REGINA (REG) without a HELAIRDET. 5. REG sailed for the USCENTCOM AOR 31 Jan 03 and is scheduled to arrive in theatre 15 Mar 03, as originally scheduled. Her arrival will constitute the start of the increase to a three-ship Task Group. IRO sailed for the USCENTCOM AOR 24 Feb 03 and is scheduled to arrive in theatre 19 Mar 03. When IRO arrives and is declared operationally ready for employment, it will permit the release of WIN (29 Mar). 6. MON will conduct a transfer of the CTG and staff to IRO in the end Mar timeframe, but to maintain a three ship Task Group she will remain in theatre until relieved by FRE. If MON is to be relieved as planned (9 Apr) FRE must deploy on or about 5 Mar 03. 1/2 CONFIDENTIAL 000003 �Document disclosed under tine Access to Information A'ct Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information CONFIDENTIAL UMMARY 7. The decision to deploy IRO and to increase TG 307.1 to a three-ship TG commencing with the arrival in theatre of REG resulted in the need to adjust originally scheduled deployment and redeployment dates. Among them is the need for MARLANT to deploy FRE on or about 5 Mar 03. Prepared by: Responsible Group Principal: Responsible Director General: Responsible Director: Date Prepared: Maj D.J. Marshall, J3 Inti 2-4, 996-9945 VAdm G.R. Maddison, DCDS Cmdre J.J. Gauvin, COS J3 Col J.M.M. Hainse, J3 Intl 25 February 2003 2/2 CONFIDENTIAL 000004 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00033 Title A name given to the resource BRIEFING NOTE FOR MINISTER DEPLOYMENT OF HMCS FREDERICTON 5 MARCH 2003 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24, 2014-01289-X, box 25, MCU2003-02206. Library and Archives Canada. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Description An account of the resource LAC ATIP A-2023-00620 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/75e45e0a146b9b486d92a678c76db4d7.pdf 4796b8b2f007ba5c817c59995ed83bd7 PDF Text Text • • SABRE Integrated National Security Assessment Ccntrc (INSAC) INSAC CIESN V.; ` /I/Coltre inter d'evaluanon de la securite nanonale (CIESN) frisk /A;P TM/ i'fiVe — /"? 1.) / UNCLASSIFIED/ 4°/ su FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY c, • NON - CLASSIFIE/ RESERVE A DES FIN OFFICIELLES '`vib/., 200393 20 • ',..-17/047:4..s 11/ s- 14, 03/07 This cement.(SAB rEi Vb 0W.101.41; "SE tii•i itcy..li li33ilividid.611!Olitigeii44-eiirtexiiCit.cteiteleilie;indigiir piopritte dir!laSet*icitatedevir• is i&iirittniticintlel(CIES141N • ittfictiOley PeurtnefOle'tit •• 1...4 .• • I, %tine ' • ;00 ' r vevi11 e; 9̀`9 7' TO fl P.,9,j 1440 Fq IMPLICATIONS kO2 A DURING T141,0,14H IRAQ. ON A Ale '="1./s / IRAQ /SUR %AI 444 4'14( 1/1, 1) CSIS assessment is that thereigitinues to be no known specific threat to Canada or Canadian interests related to the crisis in Iraq at this time. An attack on Iraq will, however, precipitate a general terrorist threat to Western interests throughout the world, including Canada. 2) On 16 March, 2003, HUSSEIN warned that if Iraq is attacked, it will take the war anywhere in the world "wherever there is sky, land or water." On the same date HUSSEIN issued a decree placing Iraq on a war footing. 3) Orilf/A9 144k5 h, 2003, US President George W. BUSH gave Iraqi Presidet* ,HUSSEIN and his two sons final notice to A surrender'*y iri.k.pd exit Iraq within forty-eight hours or face lArar. .`'•This ul um was jected by HUSSEIN and war was declared t,44 kg by)VDe US ning of 19 March, 2003. Over the paseZ„i fho /0?"Ki!t 1174014 exchange of missiles and tha ground Offen gcialli commenced at 1300 hours EST 20 March,2003. G4ccAFiii ,t. 0/ s ,111/7-S t °1`i' . (4 ['/A/p_ ult14/41'11/A/ 7,1 3103(18f09) �• • 7*I61140,6.6))./A/p0/41 qCy ART 03/07 4O/,9O& ;:i.Al!,,DA/t. RESERVE "ESC- 4 ssinED/ t1N%-rs E ONLY suit./ NON:m.r.CLIELLES 7rivPu0Af941:2r1"9.,50 -If N, TERRORIST GROUPS AL QAIDA / ISLAMIC EXTREMIST GROUPS In November 2002 Canada was named by BINLADEN as a 4) 'legitimate' AL QAIDA target due to its participation in operations in Afghanistan and its support of strong measures against terrorism. The)iassessment drawn from this announcement is that Islamiq,„extFemiSts may undertake terrorist operations in Canada, or againSt tanadian interests ab ad. -4,40 ACC 5) In the wake of the recent captur4'1/qCKhalid Shaikh MOHAMMED and Yasser AL - JAZEERI, a Moroccan national and AL QAIDA financier, it is anticipated that more information will surface regarding the AL QAIDA network and its operational planning. • 6) Recent voice recordings which are being 4Attributed by experts to Osama BINLADEN provide indicationg that, while he may not support the regime of Saddam HUSSEIN, BINLADEN supports Iraqi resistance to, and retribution against, possible allied military intervention in Iraq. 7) On 14 March, 2003, Iraq's top religious leader urged Muslims worldwide to attack American interests in a holy struggle or jihad to defend Iraq against a US invasion. In a sermon at Baghdad 's Mother Of All Battles mosque, Abdul - Razzaq SAADOUN also called on fe.low Muslims to sink American and British ships p and asked God 65, 4rown their leaders, President George W. BUSH ki and Prime Minist.056Tony BLAIR. . ,), -"A 8) -ar4.0.--, 304,F against Iraq garner solid levels of support for the Trail Ipvernment position prom Palestinians in the West Bank and Jordan, and will likely result in various levels of unrest on 444 -) C-1100a 04/A t w144 ri°11/ . 2_ �1NOkes •••0•1111==, y IMIIII.4 4P,9 21247 0c :rallittr FSS Pti.„,, il 6,10._ *4,1 AAirk 03/07 414tt Co, t°14741711I''vP VU N:LASSIFIED/ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NON - CLASSIFIE/ RESERVE A DES FIN OFFICIELLES 2003 93 20 ON both sides of the Jordan River. Should this happen, the Israeli military would then be prompted to seize control over various locations in the West Bank in an effort to create a buffer zone between the Palestinian Territories and Israel proper. If this occurs, it would elevate tensions in the region even higher and could include a reaction from the Lebanese based HIZBALLAH as well In the event that Israel becomes directly involved in the 9) war with Iraq, we may N(4,tness increased attacks by Palestinian terrorist groups / elements. In a recent statement to the media, the HIZBALLAH leadership indicated that HIZBALLAH will not launch terrorist or military i'ftacks unless directly attacked in Lebanon. It is expected theft-Israeli preparations for or direct involvement in the Iraqi conflict will generate additional tensions within the international Aiab and IslamiC communities, including those in Canada. CANADIANS IN IRAQ: 10) On 17 March, 2003, Prime Minister CHRETIEN confirmed that Canada will not take part in non-UN sanctioned hostilities in Iraq. The Prime Minister did, however, state that Canadian forces personnel currently on exchange with either the American or British forces would continue to fulfill their responsi0a#4As within their assigned units. MS piRpoNsTRkTtoy$ - POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE: - war demonstrations around the world have occurred 11) since midiFebruary 2003, The number of demonstrations and participants has been escalating, as demonstrated by the international day LASof action on 15 March, 2003. Of note is that ;'Aft,S,(1AN A 1./A/pl-F,9,9-1 OiyA„ ONAI 3 "q474047Zs 3103(18i0. �• • 4c.A*4114 ID PI, PPP I Pc ,S 03/07 OFD 440; /14:) ' UNCLASSIFIED/ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY .NON - CLASSIFIE/ RESERVE A DES FIN OFFICIELLES - 2003 03 20 Ill/A0 I ti'v *I-S anti-American demonstrations occurred in Iraq on the same day. With the US - led attack against Iraq, the likelihood of further demonstrations in major Canadian cities by a wide variety of groups remains. There is a potential for violence. 12) It is possible that demonstrations by anti - war organizations, in conjunction with elements of anti globalization groups, could result in violence. Since 11 September, 20°;,, there been indications that elements of the North Americapz4At ilpiobalization movement have begun to add an anti - war message in reaction to the American military response in Afghanistan. In the past, certain anti - globalization groups have indicated they would target various government buildings and establishments. 13) 14) During the military action against Iraq, the Iraqi Intellig ce Service (IIS) will likely organize anti - coalition demonstra ions worldwide. There is currently only one Iraqi diplomat ted to Ottawa. DEVELOPMENTS IN CANADA CANADIAN INTERESTS 15) The US Department of Homeland Security elevated its colourcoded alert rating to orange, or high, from yellow, or elevated, pt.691.4 "VPO" 8 O/v. )%1444 , c4' :4; �• 1Ct, . LIP 7-67° Ofv06. "" vP lY/17( 1(4 0,94,, ti 4€si11/ fr UNCLASSIFIED/ 1.44 0/ s iNrp AlOFFICIAL USE ONLY .• NON - CLASSIFIE/ RESERVE A OFFICIELLES 46' 2003 03 20 03/07 417/0A", (s the evening of 17 March 2003 as US President Bush was issuing the 48 - hour ultimatum to HUSSEIN and his sons to leave Iraq or face war. On this same date, the US also put into place regulations stipulating that individuals not holding Canadian passports will have to obtain a visa in order to enter the US from Canada. The initial effect on Canada of this elevated state of alert and the new visa regulation will cause delays at the Canada - US border. The US alert rating remains, orange. 16) In response :to the heighterild thteat levels in the United States, the Ontario government increased staff levels at its emergency response operations:op Ontario-wide contingency plan is in place to manage border dierupt4ons during the US action against Iraq and changes to the alex±) levels. According to the Ontario's Public Safety and Seciatite irtinister, the various options include turning highway truck stops into pre-clearance areas, posting emergency signs and sharing mote police information. 17) The increased prospect of terrorist attacks in retaliation to the war on Iraq has resulted in a policy by Ottawa to increase its security along Canada's border with the United States. This includes a heightened level of vehicle inspections at border crossings and random inspections of vehicles crossing into the US from Canada upon request by the Americans, in contrast to the usual per tice of searching only suspicious vehicles. Vigilance at airpo s,Apd maritime ports has also been augmented. CSIS continues t5 work with the RCMP, along with other agencies wlith securit4Vand enforcement responsibilities. Updated AssessmenttwiIXcontlilitte to84e issued as changes occur in the threat envI)x•onment:A Local police are also increasing security ft.1 , 40/.0 '4 AlP0 1%A, /11,p. /1/4-5S /ON �• • P/b?o's/044:y3 oc€, --ss 03/07 ‘WiOpi. 4#16c10 0 IIL91 4/ %/i,l/•91-0 /344 UNCL_SSTFIED/ icIAL USE ONLY 4 4CVSC,;? kV4 NON CLASSIFIE/ 1COLL. RESERVE A FIN OFFICIELLES 9003 03 20 0/i.,/147 DES around vital infrastructure points such as hydro facilities, as well as institutions such as synagogues and mosques. ASSESSMENT: 19) To date there is no indication of an imminent or specific threat to Canadian interests in Canada by IIS agents during a war in Iraq. There is a possibili r that Canadian interests abroad, along with those of the US andlother allied interests, could become targetwAor Iraqi agentikli tempting to disrupt coalition 0„no activities. 0 /0 yc r,IA, vo nt, 20) With consideration0of the possible link between AL QAIDA and Iraq, the Iraqi, regime may see AL QAIDA as a convenient ally and joint operational planning between AL QAIDA operatives and Iraqi agents cannot be ruled out at this Iime,04.L-Such planning may threaten Canadian interests world - wide:tiT O,1./ 6 21) Although there is no information regarding specific dates, times and methods of these attacks, AL QAIDA has proven capabilities in a wide range of terrorist operations, including mass - casualty attacks with improvised explosive devices, aircraft hijacking, as well as assassinations, kidnapping and armed assault operations. Taken as a whole and consistent with previous assessments, it is judged that there is a direct threat to Canadakand Canadians interests world - wide. while we assess prospectpyforpikOW attack as remote, particularly in a domestic context, thex!Ti`s now a Canadian dimension to this threat. 22) Iraq 'is ability 5yleinch a nuclear attack continues to be assessed as low, however the regime may have the ability and the means to' arry out AA chemical Biological Weapons (CBW) attack in the region. It is assessed that HUSSEIN may use these weapons if �• • laid* =5 1/1S/0P'90C„cQA-7. `• )ks L4 Po QA/O,P , AYS76 /A/Ph, k3A/k/O -C. 4 UNCLASycinED/ fpR OFFICIAL US. ` ONLY NON - CLASSIFIE/ RESERVE A DES FIN OFFICIELLES lit/P(1 2003 03 20 474: 03/07 the collapse of his regime is imminent. Given that Canadian forces personnel are seconded to US and British military units in the region, the possibility exists that they could be directly affected. **************************************************** AlcO% 5;%;"O ,s,&n r N og: un,% v 7;* :41ipololvstis;4: pAOC PO% LIS/ONS OP1* 4CC, 387ip C (),44 F7'/OUO-1 7-kg- Npl2/4 if‘14')-4/ S~A C 44CCFS Z17&12) OIsoo 4, k9N/§)1147-8/%44V/I4k M./POO/L."4770N 3103(18/09) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Implications for Canada During the War with Iraq - CSIS SABRE 03/07 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 20, 2003 Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Description An account of the resource CSIS ATIP 117-2023-98 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource CSIS Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CSIS ATI Release 117-2023-98 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource En Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00032 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/85993a99dbc11c06c29ebb8dcad04f3d.pdf db484b0c503c51dd41932d9a6cd2a629 PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00031 Title A name given to the resource Iraq Crisis Meeting with Schroeder's Diplomatic Adviser Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24, 2014-01289-X, box 19, MCU2003-01476. Library and Archives Canada. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Description An account of the resource LAC ATIP A-2023-00614 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/e6ab262eaf404d1474cea43a3f5d5746.pdf 8db91a92d42ab368db59590c2abaa720 PDF Text Text ������������ Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00030 Title A name given to the resource Canada to Assume Command of TF 151 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24, 2014-01289-X, box 19, MCU2003-01500 (include B and C). Library and Archives Canada. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Description An account of the resource LAC ATIP A-2023-00614 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5482e99f85710796ac71f801998ab146.pdf d6de43b0abb3ac78736b00c862b1e82d PDF Text Text ���������������������������������������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00029 Title A name given to the resource T D'Aquino Invitation Address Council Members 7 9 April 2003 Washington "Security and Prosperity" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24, 2014-01289-X, box 19, MCU2003-01487. Library and Archives Canada. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Description An account of the resource LAC ATIP A-2023-00614 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c9b8d3baaab97f8c782ec8812167c6a2.pdf 6cbb27ac228b92dda76155727040acde PDF Text Text ������������������������������������������������������ Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00028 Title A name given to the resource Letter to J Chretien Seeking Direction to the Canadian Forces in the Event of US Led Attack Against Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24 2014-01289-X, box 32, MCU2003-02923 and dockets with same number ending B, C, D, E and F. Library and Archives Canada. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Description An account of the resource LAC ATIP A-2023-00585 Release Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/463dcf84b2d837260628fc4999b1d9b9.pdf 96cc09320a27f42f675649c47b681864 PDF Text Text ������������ Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00027 Title A name given to the resource Email - [Sanitized] US Award Bronze Medal to Canadians Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24, 2014-01289-X, box 26, MCU2003-02325, Library and Archive Canada. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Description An account of the resource LAC ATIP A-2023-00583 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/288ae00ad9c3fe8a9d69c4c23bdeae41.pdf ccb350380bbd8244f5c0c04c17cd8d9f PDF Text Text L DciC'ameht disclosed under the Access to Informal^ Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loisur I'acces a I'infc ■■■inn ..... ■mi •nztecea-32355 [CDS], Doc #68046 ‘^Cabinet du n de la Defensi Office of the Minister of National Defence mcu# MCU2003-02355 SEuHti TEMPORARY DOCKET - DOSSIER TEMPORAIRE TEMPORARY DOCKETS ARE NOT TO BE TRANSFERRED OUT OF THE MINISTER'S OFFICE ,REAU DU MINISTRE LES DOSSIERS TB BRIEFING NOTE FOR MINISTER THE OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF CANADIAN NON INVOLVEMENT IN A COALITION CAMPAIGN AGAINST IRAQ SUBJECT: SUJET: PA. RANGER UIHUULA1ILJIN REMARKS REMARQUES TO A Date Init. Date Init. B.F. RAPPEL Date Cancel Annuler 0A v yu^/zfA/ , X/o/x ^3 CJ- 6.T.X. "4 V A ■" ( ID ID CO C\l o■ co o o CM ZD O 3 O 5 ■L ■p £ s <D O Q INSTRUCTIONS Temporary Dockets are to deal WITH ONE CASE ONLY. Les dossiers temporaires sont crees a Ifegard d'un SEUL CAS. TD No. together with main file number to be quoted on all correspondence originated. Mentionner le numero du dossier temporaire et le numero de reference du dossier principal dans toute correspondance. Action should be taken as soon as possible in order that main file may be kept up to date. If action cannot be taken within 48 working hrs., BF docket. Donner suite le plus tdt possible, afin de tenir le dossier principal & jour. Si non realisable dans les 48 heures ouvrables, acheminer et inscrire une date de rappel. TDs to be requisitioned, passed, BF’d, etc., in the same manner as main files. Utiliser la mdthode applicable aux dossiers principaux pour les demandes, acheminements, rappels, etc., des dossiers temporaires. DND 51'000001 �^^Uocumennisclose^inde^nwcces^^njormatior^c^^ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information SECRET (CEO) (SECRET LESS ENCLOSURES) F l 4 Chief of the Defence Staff National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Chef d’etat-major de la Defense Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 February 2003 The Minister BRIEFING NOTE - THE OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF CANADIAN NON-INVOLVEMENT IN A COALITION CAMPAIGN AGAINST IRAQ The subject Briefing Note outlines the potential impact on the conduct of current operations by Op APOLLO units, and in particular CTF 151, should the Government of Canada decide not to participate in a future coalition campaign against Iraq. Reviewed R.R. Henault General Enclosures: 3 cc: Deputy Minister (CDS), Doc #68046 □ 00 National Defence Defense nationale mcu# MCU2003-02355 SECRET (CEO) (SECRET LESS ENCLOSURES) Canada 000002 _________________________ �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document d vulgue RE'GISTRY 's °1 'n rmation ^ECRET (CEO) (SECRET LESS ENCLOSURES) REG1STRE DU MDN Referred to Transmis a__________________ - BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER OPERATIONAL IMPACTCANADIAN NON-INVOLVEMENT IN A COALITION CAMPAIGN ISSUE MAR - 3 2003 AfemPQ j Charged to ! Charge a----------------- ----------------- 1. A decision by the Government of Canada (GoC) not to participate in an armed conflict against Iraq will have an impact on the operations of Canadian Forces (CF) units and personnel currently deployed on Operation APOLLO in the Southwest Asia theatre. BACKGROUND 2. Operation APOLLO is Canada’s commitment to the US-led Campaign Against Terrorism (CAT), Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). Op APOLLO consists of a National Command Element (NCE), a National Support Unit (NSU), three CC-130 Hercules aircraft, two CP-140 Aurora aircraft and a Naval Task Group comprising a command staff, CH-124 helicopters and two ships, with a third ship enroute. 3. In Dec 02, the CF was authorized to deploy a liaison team to enter into discussions with US military staffs to determine a viable military contribution to any potential campaign against Iraq should there be a GoC decision to participate. In Feb 03, Canada assumed the duties of Commander Task Force 151 (CTF 151) for the direction of OEF maritime operations, within Canadian national objectives, in the majority of the Arabian Gulf and out into the Gulf of Oman. The US concept of ops for CTF 151 allows for an expansion of responsibilities of this position to include the conduct of maritime operations, within this geographic area, for a future campaign against Iraq, subject to a GoC decision to participate. In the event that hostilities commence against Iraq and the GoC chooses not to participate, there will be a requirement to conduct operations so as to ensure that Canada does not inadvertently become a party to the armed conflict. 4. DISCUSSION 5. The impact on Op APOLLO operations due to potential Canadian non­ participation in an armed conflict against Iraq can be categorized into protection and support issues. Currently, CTF 151 and Op APOLLO maritime units are authorized to protect naval forces of OEF coalition nations in the theatre irrespective of those naval force’s mission (Flag). Canadian Rules of Engagement also authorize Op APOLLO personnel and units to protect all other land and air coalition forces participating in or supporting OEF, within Canadian national objectives. Currently, Canadian support is provided to forces of any coalition nation unless those forces are designated solely for operations against Iraq. 1/2 SECRET (CEO) (SECRET LESS ENCLOSURES) 000003 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ^ECRET (CEO) (SECRET LESS ENCLOSURES) 6. Should hostilities commence against Iraq and Canada decides not to participate, then Canadian protection of coalition maritime, land and airforces should only be extended to those nations participating solely in the CAT in order to avoid Canada inadvertently becoming involved as a party to the armed conflict against Iraq. CTF 151’s ability to execute his escort commander’s responsibilities would likely be reduced from its current scope. At^minimum it is expected that assets from nationsjsiuijmitted to the campaign against Iraq w^TTbed°e=assigi ledTrom CTF-45frtO"alJScommanded Task Force, which would affect CTF 151’s ability to execute the currently assigned mission. 7 7. Additionally, Canadian support arrangements would have to be adjusted to eliminate support to the forces of those nations which have been dedicated solely to a campaign against Iraq. This could affect the current CF support arrangements with the Australians in Camp Mirage and, depending upon their national positions on Iraq, possibly the Dutch and future New Zealand arrangements as well. Given the factors of time and space it is probable that CC-130 airlift support to the US-led CJTF-180 and OEF coalition efforts in Afghanistan could continue but such operations would need to be closely monitored in order to ensure that Canada does not inadvertently become a party to hostilities with Iraq. CONCLUSION 8. A decision by the GoC not to participate in any future armed conflict against Iraq , will significantly affect the current OEF operations conducted by Op APOLLO units in terms of their ability to extend protection to and support for current OEF coalition forces. This could in turn degrade the overall effectiveness of Canada's contribution to the CAT. Prepared by: Responsible Director: Responsible Director General: Responsible Group Principal: Cdr R.J. Hitesman, J3 Inti 2, 995-2311 Col J.M.M. Hainse, J3 Inti, 992-3400 Cmdre J.J. Gauvin, COS J3, 992-6191 VAdm G.R. Maddison, DCDS, 992-3355 Flag - Prime Minister’s Letter to the Minister of National Defence 10 February 2003 2/2 SECRET (CEO) (SECRET LESS ENCLOSURES) 000004 �Dofumerit ifycjdsijjfidir fyeAccess to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur facets a /'information ■ J >. It ’! •i .•tW'LU'uXOCi •'.i v. i n- OTTAWA, K1ACA2 Fecruary 1Q, 2003 □ear Colleague: Thank you for your letters of January 3C 3 and February 6, 2003 asking for my approval of seme changes in ■e Canadian Forces navy roles within Operation Enduring Freedom. With reg a re to the first letter, I concur with you that it would be difficult, if not impractical, to discriminate the type cf protection mjr-mrtly provided to Coalition naval forces operating in support of the campaign against terrorism and those operating in support cf a potential campaign against Iraq. I, therefore, agree that cur naval forces working as part of Operation Apollo should provide necessary protection indiscriminately of specific Coalition naval forces' missions. Concerning the second Setter, 4 also agree with tasking the OF navy to take on the leadership of Command “ask Force 151 as can cf □Deration Enduring Freedom. This is a meaningful new role for Canada and it shbuld be accomplished with commensurate resources to the increased roie offered to Canada. Hence, sneuid you feel it necessary. I agree te'any necessary contribution cf a third ship. Finally, as you pointed out clearly, tnese acditicnal roies will need to be reassessed in advance of an immire-t armed conflict with irac. The Honourable John McCallum Minister of National Defence Room 110, Justice Building House of Commons Ottawa, Ontario KIA 0A6 000005 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de to Loi sur facets a /'information -2Thank ycu again for your letters anc for continuing tc keep me aoprisec of these important issues. Ycurs sincerely, 000006 H � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00026 Title A name given to the resource Briefing Note for Minister - The Operational Impact of Canadian Non Involvement in a Coalition Campaign Against Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24, 2014-01289-X, box 26, MCU2003-02355, Library and Archive Canada. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Description An account of the resource LAC ATIP A-2023-00583 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b63ace00b2537768bb2258667e6ce017.pdf 2e2ace4af7f41ac0464e7b1b4f2a373a PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act 'liar, CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIEL FILE No. DOSSIER V 8C0001 2 1812C-18-8 DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE Sec CON MR. International Plans and Operatic Iraq CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS-M Plans et Operations in M\ \J . at s u CD cn TO A REMARKS REMARQUES B.F. RAPPEL PARANGER CIRCULATION z o o D Date Init. Date Init. Date REGISTRY ONLY DEPOT CENTRAL Cancel Inspected Annuler Inspect^ Date > CM O’ ns M o o CM t o E- co ===== is 7 r4 rH CO o o <D o) Q i . > N O Soo ===== o i O _ __ ■eg'Tcm U H CO IND 703 (07-00) 7530-21-876-1638 Design: Forms Management 993-4050 - Conception : Gestion des formulaires 993-3778 (04-02) 000001 �Document disclosed under the 4^cess to Information'Act i Document divulgud en yertu de \a Loi sur I'accts a information I FILE MAINTENANCE CHECKLIST USTE DE CONTR6LE POUR EENTRETIEN DU DOSSIER o Protect all files and records as official property. ProtEger tous les dossiers et les documents comme Etant la propriEtE officielle. Clean records prior to adding them to files. Nettoyer les documents avant de les ajouter & leur dossier respectif. Remove all envelopes, flags, tags, pins, spikes, clips and superfluous staples. Enlever tout articles inutiles (enveloppes, papillons, Etiquettes, epingles, trombones, attachesfeuilles, agrafes etc.). File papers and TDs chronolo­ gically, the latest date on top. Classer les documents en ordre chronologique, la date la plus rEcente sur le dessus. Prepunch holes at the top left corner of the papers. Percer des trous db coin supErieur gauche du document. Attach papers to the file by a paper spike for easy handling. Pour faciliter la manutention, attacher les documents au dossier au moyen d'une attache-feuille. When a file becomes thicker than 2", a subsequent volume should be created. Lorsque le dossier a plus de 2" d’Epaisseur, crEer un nouveau volume. Destroy duplicate material. Keep a copy only if it has additional information. DEtruire tous les duplicatas qui ne contiennent aucun renseignements supplEmentaires. Verify the security classification of new documents added to the file. VErifier la cote de sEcuritE des nouveaux documents aJoutE au dossier. Upgrade the file to the required level as required. Augmenter la cote de sEcuritE si nEcessaire. 000002 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act* Document diyulgue ea-vertu de I? Loi sur I'acce^ a I'information 6 UUt 1 s 3J C.3 m I i/iL ________ \£>- ytyjf-'._iaa£^— _ __ _ _ w ---------------------------------- __. no^nnrM 000003 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information 06-/5 7 Oo" <54-^V , T... uo-< IK? AO/V\ Pol //% Ml O' < '^LU. ■''fy-c -T^^t -'t&f 5 nJcultlffl beC.jo^i'yZ. ~^> 'Hu /-'/'-tisi fo ^Z. cj^dadz. c Ac' ^000004 fllOCif 13 (-2-/0 ( �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - 1*1 :6s a i'information NatUh&l Sous-ministre Z-fz> '/f~7 /C//fszsr /Z_ z//v /PfS ATrf^i • , //"■ 7 2 A-A,^ 41 Tic iso: ■V'. A ____ Jo de Fiiiere: TO/A tolJIFOUgWft D^S3% d/te ■■"I* 1 ’••’ mn -WTW* | 000005 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la to/'sur I'occisd /'information > 1 CONFIDENTIAL (UNCLASSIFIED Without Enclosure) Document: Control : File: Org/Gp: 500652 DM2001-261822 XX Document Date: Input Date: CHG TO 29/01/2001 ^SODM 31/01/2001 admp5l~~ 3( BF Date: Due Date: REVISED OPERATION AUGMENTATION PROGRAMME JMG BARIL DATE 29/01/2001 29/01/2001 DEPUTY MINISTER Subject : HMCS CHARLETTETOWN Author: 09:30 CCM PLUS Docket Slip General Corr. 31/01/2001 Org: CDS INIT REMARKS FOR DM INFO SEE DM NOTE' 1 vsk ftift/r' fa! /?) 2/)XZ^0( I JAN 31 2(W i i CONFIDENTIAL (UNCLASSIFIED Without Enclosure) 000006 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la to/'sur I'occiso /'information CONFIDENTIAL (“l-js-n National Defense Uy LI Defence nationale Minute /7 (4) ADM(Pol) through Acting IS Pol/D PK Pol/ Pol RE: HMCS CHARLOTTETOWN REVISED OPERATION AUGMENTATION PROGRAMME 1. As noted in earlier Minutes to DGIS Pol, subject issue is being pursued by DCDS Group/J3 International staff. In staffing the enclosed 29 Jan 01 letter to MND, the DGIS Pol Middle East desk officer (D PK Pol 3 - LCol A. Couture) was consulted by J3 International for concurrence. 2. DFAIT geographic branches are consulted on ship deployment issues on an ongoing basis as required, and more formally on a semi-annual basis through the DND/DFAIT Ship Deployment Planning Meetings (normally May and December of each year). In that forum, DFAIT geographic Divisions table their approved port visit priorities which are then considered in concert with ADM(Pol)/DGIS Pol geographic desk officers and CMS staff. During the latest (December 2000) meeting, the impact that the terrorist attack on the USS COLE would have on HMCS CHARLOTTETOWN'S operational programme was not yet known; however, the scheduled port visits to Barcelona, Spain, and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, reflected DFAIT priorities identified at that meeting. Once the need to revise the CHARLOTTETOWN programme was known, the opportunity to visit the DFAIT priority port of Alexandria, Egypt was identified, and DCDS/CMS are currently awaiting CTF 60 (USN COMSIXTHFLT) concurrence for this change. A response is anticipated as early as Tues 13 Feb 01. 3. The remainder of the port visits noted (Adriatic, Sicily and Malta) reflect the need to permit CHARLOTTETOWN to remain in relatively close proximity to CTF 60 deployed forces for operational/training requirements. Once the final programme is confirmed and coordinated with ADM(Pol) staff, DCDS Group will submit a revised Briefing Note for the Minister to that effect. G.R. Nield Cdr DWH Pol 4 992-3963 12 Feb 01 CONFIDENTIAL 000007 �Mown Ll lJzAilL Chief of the Defence Staff National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information Chef d’etat-major de la Defense Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 January 2001 The Minister HMCS CHARLETTETOWN REVISED OPERATION AUGMENTATION PROGRAMME The enclosed Briefing Note outlines a change to HMCS Charlottetown’s OPERATION AUGMENTATION sailing programme. I concur with the assessment of the DCDS and CMS that the change will provide an excellent training opportunity for the crew of HMCS Charlettetown, while at the same time supporting a broader DFAIT agenda at a lesser overall cost. Accordingly, I have approved the revised programme. Baril al Enclosure: 1 c.c.: Deputy Minister 506 GSl 1*1 National Defencee Defense nationair nationale__ _ .—. ,—, nni--- 3 n f"\ fl Canada 000008 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information l .CONFIDENTIAL RIEFING NOTE TO THE MINISTER OP AUGMENTATION 2001-1 REVISED PROGRAMME FOR HMCS CHARLOTTETOWN ISSUE 1. To inform the Minister of changes to the sailing programme of HMCS CHARLOTTETOWN, which departed Halifax 12 Jan 01. BACKGROUND 2. The Minister had previously approved the Jan-Jul 01 deployment of HMCS CHARLOTTETOWN with USN forces to participate in the Arabian Gulf (AG) Multinational Interception Force (MIF) in support of UN Security Resolutions (UNSCR) against Iraq. The original plan had the ship departing Halifax (12 Jan) in company with two US Ships and rendezvousing with the TRUMAN Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) in the Mediterranean Sea, where the ships would exercise until the end of Feb 01 prior to sailing for the AG. 3. From a national perspective, the objective of any OP AUGMENTATION deployment is the reinforcement of Canadian support of the UNSCR against Iraq. In addition, these deployments develop our interoperability with our USN counterparts. USN resources in logistics, operational and training support to these deployments could neither be made available, nor be affordable, to Canada under any other arrangement. As a result, sailing with the USN for any significant period of time reaps considerable benefits in the development of our sailors as well as reinforcing our credibility as a first-rate Navy. 4. The October 2000 terrorist attack carried out against the USS COLE in Aden, Yemen, has caused the USN to order their forces to a heightened state of preparedness and activity in the AG. As a result, USN ships are not conducting any in-port activities in theatre except for urgent resupply. With this increased tempo of operations, fewer ships are required by the AG MIF as all assigned ships are spending more time on patrol and consequently ships assigned to the MIF are serving for shorter durations. This new posture is expected to remain in effect for at least the first 4-6 months of this year. DISCUSSION 5. In early Dec, the USN informed the CF that the intended sailing programme for the CHARLOTTETOWN was undergoing significant revision. Following an options analysis and consultation with USN authorities, CMS concluded that the best option would be for CHARLOTTETOWN to deploy as follows: a. sail 12 Jan in company with US Ships MITSCHER and CARR; 1/2 CONFIDENTIAL 000009 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information .CONFIDENTIAL b. operate in the Mediterranean under the Operational Control of US Commander Sixth Fleet and the TRUMAN CVBG until mid April, vice the end of February. During her time in the Mediterranean, CHARLOTTETOWN would participate in training exercises in the Adriatic as well as in the major multinational exercise ADVENTURER EXPRESS. The opportunity to operate in the Mediterranean is a positive development as Canada rarely has the opportunity to work with the Sixth Fleet in this important area of the world. Priorities with respect to port visits during this deployment have been coordinated with ADM Pol and DFAIT, and will include support DFAIT during the visits to Albania, Malta, Sicily and the Red Sea port of Jeddah Saudi Arabia; c. transit the Suez Canal and Red Sea in time to arrive in the AG 22 Apr; d. conduct MIO patrols under the Operational Control of US Commander Fifth Fleet in May; and e. depart the AG at the end of May, to arrive in Halifax 10 Jul. 6. While the exact programme for CHARLOTTETOWN in the Mediterranean is still being developed with the USN, its latest version is attached as Annex A. 7. The revised programme realizes a savings of approximately $300K and has no QOL implications for the ships company. 8. Despite the changes to the original sailing plan, the new programme meets national objectives in support of UNSCR, meets our interoperability objectives for this initial MARLANT/USN Second Fleet deployment and enables support to several DFAIT missions that the Navy could not otherwise afford to support. Prepared by: Responsible Group Principal: Date prepared: Maj R. Gundling, J3 Inti 2-3, 992-2492 /)./ LGen R.R. Henault, DCDS, 992-3355 26 Jan 01 Annex: Annex A (HMCS Charlottetown Programme to 15 Apr 01) 7 2/2 CONFIDENTIAL I 000010 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information CONFIDENTIAL Annex A to MND BN ^Jan 01 HMCS CHARLOTTETOWN PROGRAMME TO 15 APR 01 DATE(S) EVENT 21 Jan 01 23-27 Jan 27-28 Jan 28 Jan 29 Jan - 02 Feb 02-08 Feb 03 Feb 03-04 Feb 09-13 Feb 13-18 Feb 19-23 Feb INCHOP C6F Port visit Barcelona CO-directed training Western Mediterranean At-sea replenishment Port visit Civitavecchia, Italy Underwater training Western Mediterranean At-sea replenishment Task Force (TF) 60 NBCD exercise scenario Port visit Valetta, Malta CO-directed training Western Mediterranean IASW Patrol Live Fire exercises with TF 60 and TF 61 at Capo Teulada, Italy At-sea replenishment CO-directed training Central Mediterranean and with TF 60 Port visit Souda Bay (MARLANT attempting to coordinate maintenance availability and change location to La Madellana, Sardinia) CO-directed training Central Mediterranean / Adriatic Sea Port visit Split, Croatia CO-directed training Adriatic Sea with TF 60 Port visit Trieste (maintenance period) CO-directed training Central / Eastern Mediterranean (possible port visit TBC) Suez Canal transit / INCHOP C5F 22 Feb 24-25 Feb 26 Feb - 02 Mar 02-07 Mar 08-13 Mar 13-18 Mar 19-31 Mar 01-14 Apr 15 Apr CONFIDENTIAL 000011 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00025 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Mr. J. Judd - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2001 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, 2006-0314 OFRC, 2008-00176-8. File number 8C0001, Box 19, File 1812C-18-8, date: 12-02-01-31-12-01. Library and Archives Canada. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Description An account of the resource LAC ATIP A-2022-11495 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/fd59dd9843107caf490d1eefde94bc75.pdf b82e33d6378f3ea52051be944fdbe22b PDF Text Text to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information IIIIIHISI1IIIIHWIIIIW SECRET [CDS], CABINET CONFIDENCE RENSEIGNEMENTS PRIVILEGES DU CABINET KET - EC mc u #MCU2003-00658 Doc #66343 du ministre ifense nation; I IIIIIIIHIIIM ;• •tiDjaeeG-eeGseB > TEMPORARY DOCKETJ5 AHk Nd I lb BE TRAb Chretien. Jean mc u #MCU2003-00658B Doc #66344 LES DOSSIERS TEMPORAIRES NE DOIVENT EN Z SUBJECT: SUJET: BRIEFING NOTE FOR MINISTER DEPLOYMENT OF A CANADIAN FORCES LIAISON TEAM TO QATAR PA. RANGER REMARKS REMARQUES TO A Date Date Init. B.F. RAPPEL Date Cancel Annuler o pt 3‘ z co co IO co o oI co o o CM 2D O o o 5 =: 38 5 co ■I ■ Si <0 g <o . <0 3 <o <D * R o 52 Q INSTRUCTIONS Temporary Dockets are to deal WITH ONE CASE ONLY. Les dossiers temporaires sont crees a regard d'un SEUL CAS. TD No. together with main file number to be quoted on all correspondence originated. Mentionner le numSro du dossier temporaire et le numdro de reference du dossier principal dans toute correspondance. Action should be taken as soon as possible in order that main file may be kept up to date. If action cannot be taken within 48 working hrs., BF docket. Donner suite le plus t6t possible, afin de tenir le dossier principal & jour. Si non realisable dans les 48 heures ouvrables, acheminer et inscrire une date de rappel. TDs to be requisitioned, passed, BF’d, etc., in the same manner as main files. Utiliser la methode applicable aux dossiers principaux podr les demandes, acheminements, rappels, etc., des dossiers temporaires. DND 51 000009 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET(CC) Minister of National Defence jgj| Ministre , : de la Defense nationale Ottawa, Canada K1A0K2 JAN 3 1 2003 (YiCiA- The Right Honourable Jean Chretien, P.C., Q.C., M.P., LL.L, LL.D., Prime Minister of Canada Langevin Block 80 Wellington Street Ottawa ON K1A0A2 3'9**'3 Dear Prime Minister: For operational security, and to ensure that appropriate attention continues to be paid to the campaign against terrorism, US Central Command is dividing its headquarters into two staffs: one focussed on Operation Enduring Freedom, and the other on planning for possible action against Iraq. To reinforce this division, the United States has deployed the latter staff to Qatar. As a result, Canadian Forces officers in Tampa have now lost access to US planning for any eventual action against Iraq. Following our conversation, I am writing to confirm that I have authorized the deployment of a Canadian Forces liaison team to Qatar to preserve access to US military planning for possible action against Iraq. This deployment will in no way prejudge the final decision to be made by the Government of Canada on possible military participation in a campaign against Iraq. It will, however, preserve the Government’s ability to make informed decisions and ensure that information is available to the Government and, in the event that Canada elected to participate militarily, to Canadian Forces planners. Australia and the United Kingdom intend to deploy liaison teams to Qatar, and they have already positioned equipment in the region. Their participation in any military action will remain subject to national decisions taken at the appropriate time. Minister Graham has been advised and concurs. Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. c: The Honourable Bill Graham, P.C., M.P. Canada 6 0 ^000010 3 �Document disclosed under tne access ro inform oiiOTTfiCt Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET(CC) The Right Honourable Jean Chretien, P.C..Q.C., M.P..LL.L, LL.D., Prime Minister of Canada Langevin Block 80 Wellington Street Ottawa ON K1A0A2 Dear Prime Minister: Deployment of a Canadian Forces Liaison Team to Qatar For operational security, and to ensure that appropriate attention continues to be paid to the campaign against terrorism, US Central Command is dividing its headquarters into two staffs: one focused on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and one dedicated to planning for possible action against Iraq. To further reinforce this division of responsibilities, the US has deployed its staff focused on Iraq planning to Qatar. As such, Canadian Forces officers currently in Tampa have now lost access to knowledge of planning for any eventual action against Iraq. This is to inform you that I have authorized the deployment of a Canadian Forces liaison team to Qatar to preserve access to US military planning for possible action against Iraq. This deployment will in no way prejudge the final decision to be made by the Government of Canada with respect to possible military participation in any potential campaign against Iraq. It would, however, preserve the Government’s ability to make an informed decision and ensure that the required information is available both to the Government and, in the event that Canada elected to participate militarily, to Canadian Forces military planners. We have been informed that both Australia and the United Kingdom intend to deploy liaison teams to Qatar and have already pre-positioned equipment within the region, notwithstanding the fact that their participation in any eventual military action will still be subject to national decisions taken at the appropriate time. Minister Graham has been advised and concurs. Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence Cc The Honourable Bill Graham, P.C., M.P. 000011 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a rinfornwtlfjP SECRET(CEO) Chief of the Defence Staff National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Chef d’etat-major de la Defense Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 3 V) $ JAN 3 0 » The Minister DEPLOYMENT OF A CANADIAN FORCES LIAISON TEAM TO QATAR 1. For operational security, and to ensure that appropriate attention continues to be paid to the campaign against terrorism, US Central Command is dividing its headquarters into two staffs: one focused on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and one dedicated to planning for possible action against Iraq. To further reinforce this division of responsibilities, the US has now deployed its staff focused on Iraq planning to Qatar. As such, Canadian Forces officers currently in Tampa have now lost access to knowledge of planning for any eventual action against Iraq. In order that they may maintain effective contact with US forces, we recommend that you agree to the deployment of a team of Canadian Forces liaison officers to Qatar. We also wish to emphasize that a decision in this regard is considered a matter of urgency - the train may literally leave the station, without the Canadian Forces, if the recommended deployment is not authorized at this time. 2. Deploying the Canadian liaison team to Qatar to interface with all staff functions of the US deployed headquarters is essential, at least initially, to allow maximum exposure to all facets of operational planning for a possible campaign against Iraq. This deployment would in no way prejudge the final decision to be made by the Government of Canada with respect to possible military participation in any potential campaign against Iraq. It would, however, preserve the Government's ability to make an informed decision and to ensure that the required information is available both to the Government and, in the event that Canada elected to participate militarily, to Canadian Forces military planners. We have been informed that both Australia and the United Kingdom intend to deploy liaison teams to Qatar and have already pre-positioned equipment within the region, notwithstanding the fact that their participation in any eventual military action will still be subject to national decisions taken at the appropriate time. A decision to simply retain a liaison presence at CENTCOM in Tampa would severely compromise the initial progress made in gaining insight into US planning efforts. Additionally, our liaison officers attached to the US Component 1/2 HI National Defence Defense nationale SECRET (CEO) Canada 000012 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET(CEO) Commands in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are in discussions regarding the military capabilities Canada is considering. 3. Time is of the essence. If you approve, we will so inform the Privy Council Office and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. We further recommend that you sign the enclosed letter to the Prime Minister. R.R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff Margaret Bloodworth Deputy Minister Enclosures: 2 Approve 3/ John McCallum Minister of National Defence 2/2 Date IIIIIIIMIH [CDS], Doc #66343 SECRET (CEO) 03 ENTERED: 14:02, 2003-01-30 mc u # MCU2003-00658 000013 �Document a Document divul 'ueen MND REGISTRY' /'inform ition REGISTRE DU MDN SECRET (CEO) Referred to Transinis a------------------------- — BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ISSUE • JAN 3 0 2003 ’F-'eNO" ; No. de Dossier-------------2— ■ Charged to Whether a Canadian Forces liaison team be deployed to Qatar? Staffi-Arrgntfr deployed liaison officers at Coalition Forces Land, Maritime and Air Component Command headquarters continue to conduct liaison with respect to potential military action against Iraq. ....... BACKGROUND • On 4 December, Canada responded to a US request regarding a possible Canadian contribution to a potential coalition against Iraq by suggesting that military authorities begin discussions on a possible Canadian contribution. For Canada, the purpose of these military-to-military discussions was to seek information for use in developing options for the Government and to ensure that the Canadian Forces are well prepared for all contingencies and for cooperation with other partners in the event of future military action, if approved by the Government of Canada. • US operational planning is well-advanced and continues to be refined daily in order that US forces are prepared to implement any political decision to commence initial operations against Iraq as early as mid-February or early March. The Canadian liaison team, which arrived at CENTCOM in Tampa, Florida, in late December 2002, has been made privy to much of the planning process and has been instrumental in assisting National Defence Headquarters’ development of plausible options for governmental consideration. DISCUSSION • For operational security, and to ensure that appropriate attention continues to be paid to the campaign against terrorism, CENTCOM is dividing its headquarters into two staffs: one focused on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and one dedicated to planning for possible action against Iraq. To further reinforce this division of responsibilities, CENTCOM has deployed its staff focused on Iraq planning to Qatar. Additionally, operational planning for possible military action against Iraq is being conducted at the Coalition Forces Land (Kuwait), Air (Saudi Arabia) and Maritime (Bahrain) Component Command headquarters. • Canadian Forces officers currently in Tampa have now lost access to planning for any eventual action against Iraq. In order that they may continue their liaison activities in an effective manner, consideration should be given to sending a small liaison team to Qatar in conjunction with the CENTCOM deployment. We have been informed that both Australia and the United 1/2 SECRET(CEO) i 000014 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'occes a I'information SECRET(CEO) Kingdom intend to deploy liaison teams to Qatar and have already prepositioned equipment within the region, notwithstanding the fact that their participation in any eventual military action will still be subject to national decisions taken at the appropriate time. • The deployment of a liaison team to Qatar, and having the currently deployed liaison officers at Coalition Forces' Land, Maritime and Air Component headquarters continue their discussions on Iraq, would in no way prejudge the final political decision to be made by the Government of Canada with respect to possible military participation in any potential campaign against Iraq. It would, however, preserve the Government’s ability to make an informed decision by ensuring that the required information is available both to the Government and, in the event that Canada elected to participate militarily, to Canadian Forces military planners. A decision to simply retain a liaison presence at CENTCOM in Tampa would severely compromise the initial progress made in gaining insight into US planning efforts on Iraq. • The incremental cost for deployment of the Canadian liaison team to Qatar over a six-month period has been estimated at $250,000 for a team comprising 14 planners and 11 communications/support staff that would be capable of continuous operations, i.e. 24 hours per day, 7 days per week (24/7). • The deployment would also be contingent on Canada seeking appropriate diplomatic clearances. If you agree, preparations for deploying the liaison team could begin immediately. • The Department of Foreign Affairs has been consulted and concurs. A letter to the Prime Minister is enclosed for the Minister of National Defence's signature. Prepared by: Consulted: Responsible Director: Responsible Director General: Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Corri Barr, DPK Pol 6, 996-1741 LCol J.R. Forestell. DPK Pol 3, 992-3976 J3 Int'l Col G. Coth, DPK Pol, 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross, DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM(Pol), 992-3458 16 January 2003 2/2 SECRET(CEO) 000015 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information 3 b- COL J.M.M. HAINSE J3 INTERNATIONAL S/6-/Oflzz^-S/ SuPPO^i ■ 24 /? oPs 000016 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lol sur I'accis a /'information SECRET (CEO) " ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) ' //<Z Subject/Objet: BRIEFING NOTE FOR MND ON DEPLOYMENT OF A CANADIAN FORCES LIAISON TEAM TO QATAR File #/Numero de reference: 3450-1 (Corri Barr, D PK Pol 6) DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI FROM/DE: D PK Pol/D Pol MP ' Date: 2c . \ , Concur: COS J3/ECM J3 Date: L ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) FROM/DE: DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI Date: Concur DCDS/^CEMD Date : ^Z /.s 3 CDS/CEMD DM/SM FROM/DE: ADM Pol/SMA Pol Date: Sous-Ministre de la Defense Nationale JAN 2 9 2003 SECRET (CEO) Deputy Minister of National Defence REF: 34964 000017 J �------ .i.uvjuan.MHniT| MULh WUPS Ui i h Wh SECRET(CEO) * - 4* Document disclose^updeMie Acceptjo Information Act Document divulgue en verfu'dela Loi sur 1‘acces d /'information ‘ ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: BRIEFING NOTE FOR MND ON DEPLOYMENT OF A CANADIAN FORCES LIAISON TEAM TO QATAR File fr/Numero de France: 3450-1 (Corri Barr, D PK Pol 6) Concur: JAG/JAG" , , Date: • ,• J • • • • * . ■ *. 000018 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00024 Title A name given to the resource Briefing Note for Minister - Deployment of a Canadian Forces Liaison Team to Qatar Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, 2014-01289-X, box 11, MCU2003-00658. Library and Archives Canada. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Description An account of the resource LAC ATIP A-2022-11067 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b5251a7acf1bb0859ba50dae3336854b.pdf 9ede0c1a8dcd3642b569b953b4a9d350 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information SECRET February 6, 2003 This document is classified SECRET and is the property of the Government of Canada. It is provided to you in confidence, along with the covering letter, for official use with your Premier/Govemment Leader and selected Ministers. It must not be reclassified or disseminated, in any way, in whole or in part, without the consent of the originator. Contact: Security and Intelligence Secretariat, Privy Council Office, (613) 957-5657 i Implications for Canada in the Event of a War with Iraq SUMMARY: 1) An attack on Iraq would result in terrorist-related threats to Western interests throughout the world, including in Canada. Possible targets would likely be, in order of priority, U.S. interests, Israeli interests and then any Western country which actively supports the U.S. invasion. The threat could emanate from surrogate groups used by the Iraqi regime, including the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), or other groups which may use the conflict as an excuse to launch a terrorist attack. There is no specific information indicating that other terrorist groups will use an invasion of Iraq as a rationale for terrorism against the West. This could change should Israel be drawn into any hostilities with Iraq. 2) The response from AL QAIDA to an attack against Iraq is less certain, although AL QAIDA's ability to launch terrorist attacks on a global scale is unquestioned. The specific mention of Canada in a recording made by OSAMA BIN LADEN that aired on the Al Jazeera network on November 12, 2002, threatening future violence increases the possibility of potential threats to Canadian interests internationally. 3) There is currently no specific intelligence pointing to terrorist attacks against Western tarsets-hvJraq or to indicate that the Government of Iraq would target Canadians or Canadian interests in Canada or abroad. It is judged unlikely that SADDAM HUSSEIN would^attempt pre-emptive attacks against the U.S. or otheralignea countries prior to exhausting diplomatic and public relations options. Plots with the potential to disrupt coalition war planning efforts would likely receive first consideration for pre-emptive activity. 4) As there is only one Iraqi diplomadn-Canada. this will limit the Iraqi government’s capability to conduct intelligence activity in Canada, including its ability to monitor d i ssi dentsi ' ' : ‘ 000069 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information -2- SECRET 5) Iraq has aggressively and covertly pursued the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the past. SADDAM HUSSEIN may use them if the collapse of his regime is imminent. Attacks with chemical or biological weapons are plausible, although such operations would require significant logistical support. 6) In Canada, there will likely be a renewal of protest activity at the U.S. and coalition embassies, the Iraqi Embassy, Parliament Hill and provincial legislatures. Protest activity will be determined by events as they unfold. Recent anti-war demonstrations across Canada have taken place without reported incident. Protests will likely continue in the short term. These demonstrations could be highly emotional and acts of spontaneous or premeditated violence may take place. The RCMP is in active contact with provincial and municipal police forces as part of regular operations to anticipate and provide law enforcement at demonstrations, where necessary. 7) A military intervention in Iraq might trigger multiple hoaxes (eg. anthrax). There could also be media reporting rumours and claims from unnamed sources speculating about threats can also be anticipated. A coordinated approach to communications, both federally and provincially, is essential to avoid alarming Canadians needlessly and to remind them that our enforcement, security, and intelligence communities are working together to protect Canadians. Premature responses can also disrupt intelligence gathering activities. 8) Actions taken over the last 15 months by the federal and provincial governments have enhanced information sharing, investigative and intelligence gathering tools as well as response capacity to a number of contingencies, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents. These areas are all covered by federal-provincial contingency plans, agreements, protocols and/or agency arrangements. Any information about specific threats should be directed immediately to local police or RCMP. BACKGROUND: 9) The prospect of a U.S.-led military strike against Iraq raises a concern about the possibility of terrorist reprisals against U.S. and other participating nations' interests. SADDAM HUSSEIN’s regime has demonstrated its willingness and capability to mount operations against its opponents. In addition, there is the possibility that the regime may support terrorist groups that are active against Iraq's enemies. On the eve of the 1991 Gulf War, the SADDAM HUSSEIN government used select groups and teams to mount terrorist attacks against coalition forces and the interests of those forces' countries. 000070 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -3- SECRET IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS): 10) The primary responsibility of the IIS is to protect SADDAM HUSSEIN’S regime. The ability of the IIS to mount operations against perceived or real enemies of the Iraqi regime is a major concern. However, the willingness of IIS officers and their agents to carry out attacks against the U.S. or coalition countries is uncertain. 11) The primary focus of IIS activity in Canada is locating and monitoring oppositionists, dissidents, expatriate scientists, defectors or resettled diplomats and military officers. 12) There are three diplomatic positions at the Iraqi Embassy in Ottawa. However, only one is currently occupied. AFFILIATED TERRORIST GROUPS: 13) Iraq is known to directly support numerous terrorist groups, including the Iranian dissident organization, the MUJAHEDIN - E - KHALQ (MEK), and several Palestinian groups engaged in terrorist activity against Israel. 14) The MEK is based in northern Iraq from which it launches military and terrorist attacks into neighbouring Iran. The MEK has held public demonstrations in Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. 15) Iraq's support of numerous Palestinian groups stems from one common denominator: the mutual hatred of Israel. The SADDAM HUSSEIN regime has been active in providing select Palestinian groups with financial backing (including payment to the families of suicide bombers). In the event of a war with the U.S., it is likely that a request could be made by the Iraqi regime for further assistance. The reaction to such a request will likely be mixed, with individuals, not necessarily groups, responding to the call. AL QAIDA: 16) Historically, Iraq and AL QAIDA have viewed each other with disdain. In the past several months, however, AL QAIDA has relocated an indeterminate portion of its operations to the Kurdish-held region in Northern Iraq with the knowledge of the Iraqi regime. The regime, using the IIS as a conduit, has courted AL QAIDA commanders / members in northern Iraq. In the event of military hostilities with the U.S., AL QAIDA would likely strike at the U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq or conduct terrorist operations against the West. 000071 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information -4- SECRET 17) There are individuals in Canada who are believed to support OSAMA BIN LADEN, AL QAIDA and other international Islamic extremist causes. Although many Islamic extremist supporters have been deported, arrested on immigration charges or extradited to foreign countries, others who remain are believed to be committed to the extremist cause. 18) On November 12, 2002, the Al Jazeera network aired an audio tape attributed to BIN LADEN in which he praised recent attacks, including those in Bali, Yemen, Kuwait and Moscow. In an address to countries participating in the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism, including Canada, he went on to say that 'just like you kill us, we will kill you' and threatened further violence should the U.S. declare war on Iraq. The specific mention of Canada in this recording increases the possibility of potential threats to Canadian interests internationally. 19) Although the Government of Canada has no specific information regarding any particular threats, Canadian interests have become a focus of direct AL QAIDA threats worldwide. In the past, after the release of video or audio tapes, attacks have occurred. After the release of the last OSAMA BIN LADEN videotape a series of small attacks took place culminating in the bombing in Mombassa, Kenya. AL QAIDA's history has shown that it typically strikes when ready and when there is a good chance of being successful. REACTION WITHIN CANADA: MUSLIM COMMUNITY: 20) Not unlike the 1991 Gulf War and the current "war on terrorism," there would be a perception within some quarters of the Canadian Muslim population that an attack on Iraq is in fact an attack on Islam. This could be particularly evident within Canadian Arab circles. 21) The continuing presence of a significant number of Maghreb Islamic extremists in Canada is of particular concern. Montreal remains the primary centre for these individuals, many of whom are Canadian citizens or permanent residents. In Europe, there is evidence that Islamic extremists are using the structured presence of Maghreb networks in Europe to stage terrorist attacks. In Canada, similar patterns are emerging. KURDISH COMMUNITY: 22) We are currently unaware of any serious expressions of concern within the Canadian Kurdish community in anticipation of a war in Iraq. If Kurdish groups are dislodged from their sanctuary in Iraq, they would not hesitate to blame the West and the U.S. in particular. As a result, demonstrations could be expected in Canada, and such protests would have the potential to become violent. 000072 �, Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information » -5- SECRET DEMONSTRATIONS: 23) In the event of military hostilities with Iraq, demonstrations are likely to target coalition diplomatic establishments both in Canada and abroad, as well as businesses and other high-profile entities throughout the world. They could also be aimed at other countries' facilities or personnel, particularly those involved in the military campaign or who are strongly supportive of U.S. actions. Should the military campaign inflict large numbers of Iraqi civilian casualties, demonstrations are likely to intensify. 24) Should the U.S. launch an attack against Iraq, there will likely be local protests in major Canadian cities by a wide variety of groups, among them, anti-war and anti-globalization groups. Demonstrations around the U.S. Embassy or Consulates General can be expected. 25) It is possible that demonstrations by anti-war groups, in conjunction with elements of anti-globalization groups, will result in violence. Anti-globalization activism continues to be directed primarily against multinational corporate power, international monetary institutions and global economic agreements. Since September 11, 2001, there have been indications that elements of the North American anti-globalization movement have begun to add an anti-war and anti-violence message in reaction to the American military response in Afghanistan. During the last year, anti-globalization supporters protested in cities such as Vancouver, Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal and Halifax. These demonstrations occurred without violence. In the past, certain anti-globalization groups have indicated they would target various government buildings and establishments, although this did not occur to any great extent. CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS ABROAD: 26) The Government of Canada regularly updates travel reports for countries assessed to pose security, terrorism or other threats to Canadians. On November 15, 2002, Canadians were advised to leave Iraq immediately. A global security advisory was also issued warning Canadians that demonstrations, strikes and civil unrest can occur worldwide, and urging Canadians to exercise extreme caution. 27) In the event of a war with Iraq, there will be a significant risk to coalition forces in the Middle East and worldwide. This risk could take the form of traditional terrorist attacks (assassinations, suicide bombings) or chemical or biological attacks. 28) Iraq has aggressively and covertly pursued nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs in the past. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq used artillery, tactical fighter aircraft and helicopters to deliver chemical agents, loaded in bombs and rockets. 000073 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'accds d /'information SECRET February 6, 2003 ___I Le present document est cote SECRET et est la propriete du gouvemement du Canada. 11 vous est envoye avec une lettre d’accompagnement et seuls le premier ministre/chef de votre gouvemement et certains ministres selectionnes ont aussi le droit d’en prendre connaissance. Le document ne doit etre ni recote ni diffuse de quelque faqon que ce soit, en tout ou en partie, sans le consentement de 1’auteur. Contact: Secretariat de la securite et du renseignement, Bureau du Conseil prive (613) 957-5657 Repercussions sur le Canada d’une guerre eventuelle contre 1’Irak , EVALUATION : 1) Une attaque contre 1’Irak pourrait faire peser des menaces terroristes sur les interets occidentaux partout dans le monde, y compris au Canada. Au nombre des cibles possibles figureraient vraisemblablement, par ordre de priorite, les interets americains et israeliens, puis ceux de tout pays occidental qui soutient activement les projets d’invasion des Americains. La menace pourrait provenir de groupes a la solde du regime irakien, par exemple le service de renseignement irakien (SRI), ou d’autres groupes qui pourraient se servir du conflit comme pretexte pour perpetrer un attentat terroriste. Il n’y a pas d’information qui laisse croire que d’autres groupes terroristes invoqueraient 1’invasion de 1’Irak pour justifier une campagne terroriste contre 1’Occident. Par contre, la situation pourrait changer si Israel participait au conflit. 2) On ignore comment Al-Qaida reagirait a une attaque contre 1’Irak, mais nul doute que cette organisation est en mesure de perpetrer des attentats terroristes partout dans le monde. Les interets canadiens a travers le monde sont d’autant plus menaces qu’Oussama Ben Laden mentionne precisement le Canada dans son message diffuse le 12 novembre 2002 par la chaine Al-Jazira, et laisse entrevoir que d’autres actes de violence pourraient etre commis. 3) Il n’existe a 1’heure actuelle aucun renseignement precis qui autoriserait a croire que 1’Irak commettra des attentats terroristes contre des cibles occidentales ou visera les Canadiens ou les interets canadiens au Canada ou a 1’etranger. On estime peu probable que Saddam Hussein commette des attentats terroristes preventifs contre les E.-U. ou d’autres pays alignes avant d’avoir epuise tous les recours sur les plans de la diplomatie et des relations publiques. A cet egard, il envisagerait vraisemblablement en premier lieu de perturber les preparatifs de guerre de la coalition. 000074 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information -2- I SECRET 4) Comme il n’y a qu’un seul diplomate irakien au Canada, cela limitera la capacite du gouvemement irakien a mener des activites de renseignement au Canada, ainsi qu’a surveiller les dissidents. 5) Dans le passe, 1 ’Irak a poursuivi activement et secretement le developpement d’armes de destruction massive (ADM). Saddam Hussein pourrait les utiliser si 1’effondrement de son regime est imminent. Des attaques et des attentats irakiens a 1’arme chimique ou biologique sont plausibies, mais ils exigeraient un important soutien logistique. 6) Au Canada, les manifestations reprendront vraisemblablement devant 1’ambassade des Etats-Unis et les ambassades des pays membres de la coalition et celle de 1’Irak ainsi que sur la colline du Parlement et devant les assemblies legislatives provinciales. Ces activites seront organisees suivant le deroulement des evenements. Au Canada, les manifestations recentes centre la guerre se sont deroulees sans qu’aucun incident ne soit signale. Les manifestations se poursuivront vraisemblablement a court terme. Toutefois, etant donne que les passions y sont souvent exacerbees, la possibility d’actes de violence spontanes ou premedites ne peut etre exclue. La GRC travaille etroitement avec les corps policiers provinciaux et municipaux dans le cadre d’operations regulieres, afin de prevoir et d’assurer, s’il y a lieu, la presence de forces de 1’ordre lors de manifestations. 7) Une intervention militaire en Irak pourrait declencher toutes sortes de canulars (p. ex. charbon). On pourrait aussi lire et entendre dans les medias des rumeurs et des affirmations de sources inconnues speculant sur diverses menaces. La coordination des communications, a 1’echelle federate et provincial, est essentielle pour eviter d’alarmer inutilement les Canadiens et leur rappeler que nos collectivites de la police, de la securite et du renseignement travaillent de concert pour les proteger. Des reactions prematurees pourraient en outre perturber les activites de collecte de renseignements. 8) Les mesures prises ces 15 demiers mois par les gouvemements federal et provinciaux ont permis d’ameliorer les outils d’echange d’informations, d’enquete et de collecte de renseignements ainsi que la capacite a parer a differentes eventualites, notamment des incidents chimiques, biologiques, radiologiques et nucleates (CBR.N). Ces secteurs sont tous vises par des plans d’urgence, ententes, protocoles federaux-provinciaux et/ou des arrangements entre organismes. Toute information sur des menaces precises doit etre communiquee immediatement a la police locale ou a la GRC. 000075 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -3- SECRET CONTEXTS: 9) L’eventualite d’une attaque militaire contre l’lrak par une coalition dirigee par les Etats-Unis souleve la possibility de represailles terroristes contre les E.-U. et d’autres Etats participants. Le regime de Saddam Hussein a montre qu’il est pret a mener des operations contre ses adversaires et qu’il en est capable. En outre, il est possible que le regime appuie les groupes terroristes qui operent contre les ennemis de l’lrak. A la veille de la guerre du Golfe en 1991, le regime de Saddam Hussein avait choisi des groupes et des commandos bien precis pour perpetrer des attentats terroristes contre les forces de la coalition et les interets des pays membres. SERVICE DE RENSEIGNEMENTS IRAKIEN (SRI): 10) Le role premier du SRI est de proteger le regime de Saddam Hussein. Sa capacity de mener des operations contre des ennemis reels ou potentiels du regime irakien constitue une preoccupation majeure. Toutefois, la volonte des officiers du SRI et de leurs agents de perpetrer des attentats contre les E.-U. ou les membres de la coalition est inconnue. U) Au Canada, le SRI cherche avant tout a reperer et a surveiller les opposants, les dissidents, les scientifiques expatries, les transfuges ainsi que les diplomates et les militaires reinstalles. 12) L’lrak compte trois postes de diplomate a son ambassade a Ottawa, mais seulement un est occupe actuellement. GROUPES TERRORISTES AFFILIES: 13) Il est connu que l’lrak apporte un soutien direct a de nombreux groupes terroristes, dont les MOUDJAHIDIN DU PEUPLE (MEK), 1’organisation dissidente iranienne, et plusieurs groupes palestiniens qui menent des activites terroristes contre Israel. 14) Les MEK sont bases dans le nord de l’lrak, d’ou ils lancent des attaques militaires et terroristes contre I Tran voisin. Ils ont organise des manifestations a Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal et Vancouver. 15) Un denominates commun amene l’lrak a appuyer de nombreux groupes palestiniens : la haine d’lsrael. Le regime irakien apporte un appui financier a certains groupes palestiniens (dont le versement d’une somme d’argent aux families des kamikazes). En cas de guerre avec les E.-U., le regime irakien demanderait probablement davantage d’aide. Or ce sont vraisemblablement des particuliers qui repondraient a cette demande, pas forcement des groupes. 000076 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue.en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information -4- SECRET AL-QAIDA: 16) L’lrak n’a toujours eu que du dedain pour Al-Qaida et inversement. Depuis quelques mois toutefois, Al-Qaida mene un nombre indetermine d’operations depuis la region du nord de l’lrak sous controle kurde, au vu et au su du regime irakien. Ce demier, par 1’intermediaire du SRI, courtise les commandants et les membres d’Al-Qaida dans le nord du pays. En cas de conflit avec les E.-U., Al-Qaida attaquerait probablement les Americains et les forces de la coalition en Irak ou menerait des operations terroristes contre 1’Occident. 17) On croit que certaines personnes au Canada soutiennent Oussama Ben Laden, Al-Qaida et d’autres causes de 1’islamisme mondial. Bien que de nombreux partisans de 1’extremisme islamique aient ete expulses, arretes pour des inculpations liees a 1’immigration ou extrades vers d’autres pays, ceux qui restent sont censes etre engages dans la cause extremiste. 18) Le 12 novembre 2002, la chaine Al-Jazira a diffuse un enregistrement dans laquelle la voix, qui serait celle de Oussama Ben Laden, fait 1'eloge des recents attentats, dont ceux perpetres a Bali, au Yemen, au Koweit et a Moscou. S'adressant aux pays membres de la coalition contre le terrorisme dirigee par les E.-U., dont le Canada, la voix declare : « Nous vous tuerons, comme vous nous tuez ». Elie affirme que d'autres actes de violence seront commis si les E.-U. declarent la guerre a 1'Irak. La mention precise du Canada fait davantage craindre la menace de represailles contre les interets canadiens dans le monde. 19) Meme si le gouvemement du Canada ne possede aucune information precise sur quelque menace que ce soit, les menaces d'Al-Qaida sont maintenant dirigees contre les interets canadiens partout dans le monde. Par le passe, des attentats ont ete commis suite a la diffusion d'enregistrements audio ou video. Apres la diffusion de la demiere bande video de Oussama Ben Laden, une serie de petits attentats ont ete commis, atteignant un sommet avec celui perpetre a Mombassa au Kenya. Al-Qaida a generalement 1'habitude de frapper lorsqu'il est pret et lorsque ses chances de reussite sont bonnes. REACTION AU CANADA: COMMUNAUTE MUSULMANE: 20) Comme cela a ete le cas lots de la guerre du Golfe en 1991 et comme aujourd’hui dans la « guerre contre le terrorisme », certains secteurs de la communaute musulmane du Canada pourraient croire qu’une attaque contre l’lrak equivaut a une attaque contre 1’islam. Cela pourrait etre particulierement evident dans les cercles arabes du Canada. 000077 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accts a /'information -5- SECRET 21) La presence au Canada d’un nombre important d’extremistes islamistes maghrebins inquiete tout particulierement. Montreal demeure leur principal point de convergence, et bon nombre d’entre eux sont citoyens canadiens ou residents permanents. En Europe, il est evident que les extremistes islamistes utilisent les reseaux maghrebins structures pour commettre des attentats terroristes. L’amorce d’un phenomene semblable a ete constatee au Canada. COMMUNAUTE KURDE: 22) Nous n’avons jusqu’ici constate dans la communaute kurde du Canada aucune expression d’inquietude serieuse au sujet d’une eventuelle guerre en Irak. Si les groupes kurdes etaient chasses de leur sanctuaire en Irak, ils n’hesiteraient pas a blamer 1’Occident et les E.-U. en particulier. Le Canada pourrait done s’attendre a des manifestations sur son territoire, et celles-ci pourraient devenir violentes. MANIFESTATIONS: 23) En cas de conflit militaire avec 1’Irak, des manifestations seraient vraisemblablement organisees contre les etablissements diplomatiques des membres de la coalition au Canada et a 1’etranger, de meme que contre des entreprises et d’autres organisations importantes dans le monde entier. Des manifestations pourraient egalement etre organisees contre les installations ou le personnel d’autres pays, surtout ceux qui prennent part a la campagne militaire ou appuient sans reserve les E.-U. Les manifestations s’intensifieront vraisemblablement si la campagne militaire fait un grand nombre de morts et de blesses parmi la population civile en Irak. 24) Si les Americains lancent une attaque contre 1’Irak, des groupes de toutes sortes, dont ceux qui sont opposes a la guerre et a la mondialisation, manifesteront vraisemblablement dans les grandes villes du Canada. Il faut s’attendre a des manifestations devant 1’ambassade ou les consulats des E.-U. 25) Il est possible que des manifestations des groupes opposes a la guerre, en collaboration avec certains elements des groupes antimondialisation, degenerent en violence. Les militants antimondialisation continuent de s’en prendre surtout aux multinationales, aux institutions monetaires intemationales et aux accords economiques mondiaux. Depuis le 11 septembre 2001, il y a lieu de croire que des elements du mouvement antimondialisation nord-americain ont commence a ajouter a leurs propos des messages centre la guerre et la violence en reaction a 1’intervention de 1’armee americaine en Afghanistan. L’an demier, des partisans de 1’antimondialisation ont manifesto a Vancouver, Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Calgary et Halifax, sans qu’aucun acte de violence ne soit signale. Dans le passe, certains groupes antimondialisation ont exprime leur intention de prendre pour cibles divers immeubles et institutions du gouvemement, mais cela ne s’est pas concretise sur une grande echelle. 000078 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information -------------- -■ V ' -6- SECRET CAPACITES ET INTENTIONS A L’ETRANGER: 26) Le gouvemement du Canada actualise regulierement les renseignements consulaires aux voyageurs afin de les sensibiliser a tout ce qui pourrait menacer leur securite. Ainsi, le 15 novembre 2002, les Canadiens ont ete informes de quitter l’lrak immediatement. Un avis de securite mondiale a egalement ete publie afin d’avertir les Canadiens que des manifestions, des greves et des troubles civils pourraient survenir a 1’echelle du globe, et de les inviter a etre extremement prudents. 27) Si la guerre est declaree a l’lrak, les forces de la coalition au Moyen-Orient et ailleurs courront un grave danger. Par exemple, elles pourraient faire 1’objet d’attaques terroristes traditionnelles (assassinats, attentats suicide a la bombe) ou d’attaques a I’arme chimique ou biologique. 28) L’lrak a poursuivi activement et secretement par le passe des programmes de developpement d’armes nucleates, chimiques et biologiques. Durant la guerre avec 1’Iran, l’lrak a utilise 1’artillerie ainsi que des chasseurs et des helicopteres tactiques pour lancer des roquettes et des bombes contenant des agents chimiques. 29) On estime que si l’lrak a des armes nucleates, sa capacite de lancer une attaque nucleaire est faible. L’lrak a par ailleurs demontre sa capacite de mener une attaque a I’arme chimique et biologique. Il existe peu d’informations indiquant que l’lrak a mis au point des applications et des methodes destinees a 1’utilisation d’armes chimiques et biologiques a des fins terroristes. Il existe en revanche des renseignements qui autorisent a croire que Saddam Hussein compte utiliser des agents chimiques et biologiques contre ses voisins, dont Israel, le Koweit, I’Arabie saoudite, la Jordanie et la Turquie, mais seulement en cas de defaite imminente. Il pourrait utiliser a cette fin des lance-missiles mobiles. Le charbon demeure 1’agent de menace de guerre biologique le plus plausible. Bien qu’il n’y ait pas confirmation que l’lrak possede des stocks de variole (s’ils existent), la variole constitue une autre menace importante. 30) Sans 1’exclure completement, le risque d’exposition a la variole en meme temps qu’un conflit possible en Irak est tres faible. Sante Canada negocie 1’achat de vaccins antivarioliques pour immuniser les Canadiens contre une eventuelle attaque bioterroriste et mieux preparer le Canada a faire face a une telle urgence. 31) L’une des strategies qu’emploiera peut-etre l’lrak dans sa guerre contre une coalition dirigee par les E.-U. consistera, comme cela a ete le cas lors de la guerre du Golfe, a attaquer Israel au moyen de missiles Scud. Israel a dit qu’il ripostera si l’lrak 1’attaque, ce qui accroitrait les tensions et pourrait influencer les pays arabes a former une coalition. Il existe aussi une possibility que des groupes terroristes opposes aux Israeliens, dont des extremistes palestiniens et le Hezbollah, profitent de la situation pour lancer contre Israel des attaques terroristes ou militaires a partir du Liban. 000079 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Lol sur I'accds d /'information 1 -7- SECRET 32) Le regime irakien envisage aussi de mener des operations informatiques en cas de guerre. 11 y a lieu de croire que des pirates pourraient mener des actions independantes ou communes dans le cadre d’une attaque coordonnee contre les E.-U. et la coalition occidentale. Divers groupes terroristes, dont Al-Qaida et le Hezbollah, maitrisent de mieux en mieux Internet et les autres technologies informatiques. 33) Un « appel » adresse aux opposants a la guerre et aux E.-U. circule actuellement sur Internet, les invitant a s’unir et a lancer une cyber-attaque centre les E.-U. et leurs allies. Selon certaines informations, ces opposants, particuliers et groupes, preparent des cyber-represailles a une agression contre 1’Irak. 000080 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00023 Title A name given to the resource [National Threat Assessment] Implications for Canada in the Event of a War with Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 06-Feb-03 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-100289 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/75dd7afc1440800973adc547d73fbcb7.pdf ba20002d1e4d14cb6ebee0bb123ae323 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information ALLIES’ CONTRIBUTIONS FOR A POTENTIAL INTERVENTION IN IRAQ BRIEFING NOTE AIM To provide a summary of selected contributions, firm and conditional, to an American-led intervention in Iraq. Our data are compiled from open sources and, therefore, may be freely used in public forums. Whenever possible, these data have been checked against classified information to ensure their general accuracy. BACKGROUND United States Diplomatic efforts to achieve UN-sponsored disarmament of Iraq are approaching a stalemate and an American -led military intervention seems very likely in weeks, if not in days. As of March 14, 2003, an estimated 230,000 American personnel are deployed in the Gulf region, while 30,000 additional troops are en route. Although Washington has frequently expressed readiness to fight Saddam on its own, it has approached almost 50 countries for potential troop and other contributions. So far, only the UK has indicated that it would join US-led offensive operations in Iraq. Many U.S. allies have units deployed in the area serving in various missions. However, most of the allies, to a lesser or greater extent, remain reluctant to commit troops or treasure to a possible intervention. FIRM AND CONDITIONAL COMMITMENTS NATO Allies Belgium: The government has not offered any comments on potential Belgian participation in an intervention in Iraq, but has stated that it aims to concentrate its military assets on the missions in Afghanistan and Africa. Czech Republic: Prague has deployed its anti-chemical warfare unit to Kuwait. The Czech government is also considering providing other troops, such as a field hospital or a rapid reaction brigade. Denmark: Denmark is prepared to offer a submarine and troops were the UN to authorize an intervention in Iraq, but the government has not yet decided whether Danish soldiers would be sent into combat. France: France favours allowing for a longer and more thorough arms inspection process and has frequently indicated that it might use its Security Council veto to oppose a military action against Iraq. 1 000049 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Germany: Germany allowed the U.S. to use its airspace and bases, but has indicated that it would commit no troops to an intervention against Iraq. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder asserted on January 21, 2003, that Germany would not vote for, nor go to war under any circumstances. However, in order to help contain any Iraqi threat Germany has deployed two Patriot missile units to Israel and one to Turkey, and its servicemen will serve on board of the AW ACS. A German anti-chemical warfare unit has been in Kuwait since 1991. Hungary: Budapest has authorized the training of Iraqi exiles at Taszar military base in Hungary. American troops are training between 1,000 and 4,000 Iraqi opposition members primarily as translators and scouts. Hungary will send 2,000 gas masks and chemical protection suits to Turkey. Italy: Rome is willing to support the coalition indirectly, by allowing the use of air space and military bases. Netherlands: Government sources have indicated that Dutch participation, if any, would likely be limited to ships already in the region. On February 7, 2003, ahead of the NATO decision, the Dutch government decided to deploy, on a bilateral basis, three Patriot missile units for the protection of Turkey. Norway: The Norwegian PM has indicated that there would have to be a clear UN mandate before Norway would even consider joining an intervention in Iraq. Poland: On January 16, 2003, Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski stated that his country supports the U.S. intervention against Iraq and has promised to contribute troops to a possible war with Baghdad. Portugal: Portugal allowed the U.S. to use its airspace and bases. Spain: The Spanish government has repeatedly said it would back a US-led military intervention in Iraq, but has given no details of troop commitments. Turkey: Turkey would provide an excellent staging ground for an attack from the north were an international coalition to intervene in Iraq. The Turkish cabinet has agreed to allow 62,000 American combat troops and over 300 aircraft to use their territory. However, the Turkish parliament narrowly failed to endorse this agreement on March 1, 2003, but a second vote on the issue may be held soon. Turkey has had a few thousand troops in Northern Iraq since the early nineties. Reportedly, Ankara has been deploying troops along the border with Iraq. Some reports indicate that Turkey could contribute between 10,000 and 50,000 troops if the U.S. were to attack from the north. UK: Over 1,300 naval and air force personnel are already in the Gulf, serving in various missions, including the enforcement of no-fly zones over Iraq, and London is also offering its military bases in England and Diego Garcia for U.S. long-range bombers and tanker aircraft. 2 000050 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information On January 7, 2003, despite reported divisions in the Blair government, London called up 1,500 reserve personnel and dispatched to the Gulf an amphibious naval task force including at least 3,000 marines. This task force consists of the amphibious ship HMS Ocean, destroyers HMS Edinburgh and HMS York, supply ships Argus, Fort Rosalie, Fort Austin, landing and logistic ships Sir Galahad, Sir Tristram, Sir Percivale, and anti-mine ships HMS Grimsby and HMS Ledbury. The UK also sent 14 combat aircraft to previously scheduled exercise in Jordan. On January 12, 2003, Britain also sent to the region a carrier naval taskforce comprised of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, the destroyer HMS Liverpool, the frigate HMS Marlborough, the supply ship Fort Victoria, the tanker Orange Leaf, and a few submarines. On January 20, 2003, Britain announced a major deployment to the region of an additional 26,000 troops. These troops consist of Headquarters 1 (UK) Armoured Division, 7th Armoured Brigade, 16th Air Assault Brigade, and 102 Logistics Brigade. This deployment includes 120 Challenger tanks and 150 Warrior armoured personnel carriers, as well as mobile artillery units. These troops will be stationed in Kuwait by the middle of February. On January 30, 2003, London called up another 4,500 reserve personnel. On February 6, 2003, London announced sending additional 7,000 RAF personnel to the Gulf as well as 75 aircraft, including 27 Puma and Chinook helicopters, Jaguar and Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, E3D Sentry airborne command aircraft, Hercules transporters, VC10 and Tristar refuelling aircraft, Tornado F3's for air defence, Tornado GR4 and Harrier GR7 offensive jets. In all, Britain has decided to deploy 42,000 troops to the Gulf, including 29,000 ground troops. Other Like-Minded Countries Australia: The Australian government has dispatched forces to the Persian Gulf as part of contingency arrangements for a possible war against Iraq including a contribution of Special Forces, three warships, a squadron of up to 14 F/A-18 Hornet fighters, three C130 Hercules transport aircraft, a P3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft, CH-47 helicopters, and an air-to-air refuelling aircraft. On January 22, 2003, the government announced a forward deployment to the region of the amphibious transport ship Kanimbla, lead elements of a Special Forces Task Group, and a Royal Australian Air Force reconnaissance team. On February 7, 2003, Australia sent another 450 troops to the Persian Gulf. In all, Australia could reportedly deploy 2,000 troops there. Canberra prefers to have a new Security Council resolution authorizing an attack on Iraq, though it does not believe that a new resolution is necessary. Slovakia: Slovakia has deployed a 75-member contingent to complement the Czech antichemical warfare unit already deployed in Kuwait. Bulgaria: The parliament decided to make available a 150-member anti-chemical warfare unit and to allow the United States to use Bulgaria’s airspace and one base. 3 000051 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Romania: The parliament agreed to make available 278 non-combat troops and to allow the United States to use Romania’s airspace and bases. Albania: The cabinet decided to make available a commando unit and to allow the U.S. to use Albania’s airspace. Ukraine: The government is negotiating with Kuwait on the status of the decontamination battalion, which can be sent to the area. Middle Eastern Countries Israel: The current U.S. position is that Israel should not be part of the coalition against Iraq. The Israeli government has clearly stated, however, that it would launch aerial counter attacks if attacked. Syria: Most likely would remain neutral and eventually may grant the use of its air space for search and rescue missions. Iran: Most likely would remain neutral and eventually may grant the use of its air space for search and rescue missions. Jordan: Most likely will offer radar and special operations bases, but is unlikely to say so publicly. Saudi Arabia: Most likely will offer airfields, and sites for anti-missile batteries. More than 3,000 Saudi troops have deployed in Kuwait as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force. Kuwait: Kuwait would be one of the primary staging grounds for an attack from the south. Oman: U.S. troops already use air bases for maintenance and refuelling. Oman deployed one battalion as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force to help defend Kuwait. United Arab Emirates: U.S. troops already use air bases for refuelling. The United Arab Emirates intend to deploy tanks, attack helicopters, warships and about 4,000 troops as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force to help defend Kuwait. Bahrain: U.S. troops already use port facilities. Bahrain is the headquarters for the U.S. 5th Fleet. Bahrain government said that it was sending a frigate and ground troops as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force to help defend Kuwait. Qatar: U.S. troops already use several military bases. Qatar is the forward HQ for U.S. Gulf forces. It was also the locale for exercise “Internal Look,” simulating an attack on Iraq, in December 2002. 4 000052 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS FOR AN INTERVENTION IN IRAQ Military Air forces bases Ground troops Navy Financial contribution Postconflict deployment NATO Countr es UK* Not needed Not needed Not needed No___ Yes Yes Yes Not needed Not needed Not needed Yes Yes Most likely Yes U.S.* Yes Australia* Not needed Belgium* Czech Republic* Denmark* France* Germany* Hungary Italy*______ Netherlands* Norway* Poland* Portugal Spain* Turkey* No No No No No No 361 troops No Yes Likely Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering No No No No No No No No No No No_______ No_______ No_______ No_______ Considering No_______ No_______ No_______ No_______ Considering Likely Likely No______ Likely Considering No No No No Likely No No Considering No Considering No_______ Considering Most likely No_______ Considering Most likely No_______ Considering No No_______ Considering No Likely Considering Most likely Yes Most likely Yes Yes Yes Likely Yes Likely 2 aircraft carrier taskforces 600-1,000 100,000 to 5 to 6 aircraft 150,000 aircraft carrier troops taskforces Like-Minded Countries 3 ships 10-20 150 troops (special aircraft forces) 75 troops No No 100-140 aircraft 29,000 troops Not Slovakia* _____ needed * Countries that have forces in the region serving in other missions. Responsible Group Principal: Prepared by: Date: Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-4358 Dr. Nebojsa Bjelakovic, DG Pol Plan/D Strat A, 992-4532 14 Mar 03 5 000053 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00022 Title A name given to the resource Allies' Contributions for a Potential Intervention in Iraq (Briefing Note) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 14-Mar-03 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-100289 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/15433743f7245a7f1be65f35a29bf33e.pdf 36c90ed30bdf52124608f1c43af220f9 PDF Text Text L Document disclosed under the Access tojnformation Act '.wffeDtdiyjjIgu&en vertuAe latyi s&l'acc& cfl'inQpmation SECRET (CEO) SECRET (CC) -iSia-oChief of the Defence Staff National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Chef d’etat-major de la Defense SECRET (CO CBN EYES OMY Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 O WtS2-' JAN 3 0 » The Minister DEPLOYMENT OF A CANADIAN FORCES LIAISON TEAM TO QATAR 1. For operational security, and to ensure that appropriate attention continues to be paid to the campaign against terrorism, US Central Command is dividing its headquarters into two staffs: one focused on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and one dedicated to planning for possible action against Iraq. To further reinforce this division of responsibilities, the US has now deployed its staff focused on Iraq planning to Qatar. As such, Canadian Forces officers currently in Tampa have now lost access to knowledge of planning for any eventual action against Iraq. In order that they may maintain effective contact with US forces, we recommend that you agree to the deployment of a team of Canadian Forces liaison officers to Qatar. We also wish to emphasize that a decision in this regard is considered a matter of urgency - the train may literally leave the station, without the Canadian Forces, if the recommended deployment is not authorized at this time. 2. Deploying the Canadian liaison team to Qatar to interface with all staff functions of the US deployed headquarters is essential, at least initially, to allow maximum exposure to all facets of operational planning for a possible campaign against Iraq. This deployment would in no way prejudge the final decision to be made by the Government of Canada with respect to possible military participation in any potential campaign against Iraq. It would, however, preserve the Government’s ability to make an informed decision and to ensure that the required information is available both to the Government and, in the event that Canada elected to participate militarily, to Canadian Forces military planners. We have been informed that both Australia and the United Kingdom intend to deploy liaison teams to Qatar and have already pre-positioned equipment within the region, notwithstanding the fact that their participation in any eventual military action will still be subject to national decisions taken at the appropriate time. A decision to simply retain a liaison presence at CENTCOM in Tampa would severely compromise the initial progress made in gaining insight into US planning efforts. Additionally, our liaison officers attached to the US Component SECRET (CO EYES ONLY 1/2 1*1 National Defence Defense nationale SECRET (CEO) SECRET (CC) Canada 000030 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET (CEO) Commands in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are in discussions regarding the military capabilities Canada is considering. 3. Time is of the essence. If you approve, we will so inform the Privy Council Office and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. We further recommend that you sign the enclosed letter to the Prime Minister. R.R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff Margaret Bloodworth Deputy Minister Enclosures: 2 Approve John McCallum Minister of National Defence Date 2/2 SECRET (CEO) 000031 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET(CC) The Right Honourable Jean Chretien, P.C..Q.C., M.P..LL.L, LL.D., Prime Minister of Canada Langevin Block 80 Wellington Street Ottawa ON K1A0A2 Dear Prime Minister: Deployment of a Canadian Forces Liaison Team to Qatar For operational security, and to ensure that appropriate attention continues to be paid to the campaign against terrorism, US Central Command is dividing its headquarters into two staffs: one focused on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and one dedicated to planning for possible action against Iraq. To further reinforce this division of responsibilities, the US has deployed its staff focused on Iraq planning to Qatar. As such, Canadian Forces officers currently in Tampa have now lost access to knowledge of planning for any eventual action against Iraq. This is to inform you that I have authorized the deployment of a Canadian Forces liaison team to Qatar to preserve access to US military planning for possible action against Iraq. This deployment will in no way prejudge the final decision to be made by the Government of Canada with respect to possible military participation in any potential campaign against Iraq. It would, however, preserve the Government’s ability to make an informed decision and ensure that the required information is available both to the Government and, in the event that Canada elected to participate militarily, to Canadian Forces military planners. We have been informed that both Australia and the United Kingdom intend to deploy liaison teams to Qatar and have already pre-positioned equipment within the region, notwithstanding the fact that their participation in any eventual military action will still be subject to national decisions taken at the appropriate time. Minister Graham has been advised and concurs. Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence Cc The Honourable Bill Graham, P.O., M.P. ^CRET(CC) SECRET (CC) 000032 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00021 Title A name given to the resource Deployment of a Canadian Forces Liaison Team to Qatar Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 03-Jan-03 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-100289 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f0496a5e483995faa7daa93c0c053395.pdf a741aaf55a2774c7f1536471a90a41cf PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Acc^ss.to.lnfofmgtion Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lcf^ur !jacf& OjiJnf3^!S)ion\zl SECRET National Defence Defense nationale National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 SECRET (CC) JUN 0 9 2003 The Minister DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN FORCES’ EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION 1. On 18 March 2003, the Prime Minister approved continued Canadian Forces participation in Operation Enduring Freedom in light of the imminent US-led military operation against Iraq. Within the context of this direction, restrictions were imposed that Canadian Forces transport aircraft operating in the Persian Gulf region were not to be used to support, directly or indirectly, military action against Iraq. In addition, all Canadian operations were to be undertaken within the existing Operation Apollo area of responsibility, excluding Iraq and that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North). 2. On 22 May 2003, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1483. Resolution 1483 lifted all prohibitions related to trade with Iraq under previous Security Council Resolutions with the exception of prohibitions concerning arms and related material. Further, Resolution 1483 calls upon all member states in a position to do so to respond immediately to the humanitarian appeals of the United Nations and other international organizations. Consequently, Resolution 1483 provides a framework within which Canada and other non-occupying power states may work with the US and British occupying powers referred to as “the Authority” Subsequently, the Prime Minister directed that Canadian Forces transport aircraft 3. were to be offered to the Authority to provide airlift in support of stabilization and reconstruction missions. The first mission to Iraq was flown on 2 June. These aircraft, deployed in the United Arab Emirates, are tasked in support of the upcoming deployment to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul. These aircraft will also be used to provide the agreed support to the UN mandated mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This UN mission will nominally employ two of the four aircraft in theatre. Therefore, support to the Iraq mission will be subject to operational priorities and aircraft serviceability. In order to facilitate operational and logistical arrangements, Canadian Forces 4. participation in stabilization and reconstruction activities will continue to be conducted under the operational control of “the Authority” as defined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483. At all times, Canadian Forces members remain under the 1/2 Canada SECRET SECRET (CC) 000007 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET command of the Chief of the Defence Staff. Additionally, the previous geographic restriction on Canadian Forces operations meant that Canadian Forces aircraft had been unable to accept transport taskings to and from Kuwait under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom. 5. To enable the Canadian Forces to execute the Prime Minister’s direction, the restrictions in respect of airlift by Canadian Forces transport aircraft in support of Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction missions and the geographic restrictions on Canadian Forces operations in Iraq and in that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North) have been removed. The removal of the restriction permits Canadian Forces aircraft to conduct missions through Kuwait for the delivery of loads exclusively in support of the campaign against terrorism and in accordance with Canadian national objectives. 6. Finally, the removal of the geographic restriction has also permitted the Canadian naval task group to conduct Operation Apollo missions in the Northern Persian Gulf in accordance with Canadian national objectives or other missions as may be directed by the Government of Canada. 7. If you agree, we recommend that you sign the enclosed letter to the Prime Minister. Foreign Affairs and the Privy Council Office have been consulted and concur with this approach. a/ R.R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff Margaret Bloodworth Deputy Minister Enclosures: 1 APPROVE Date: The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. 2/2 000008 SECRET �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information 1 SECRET (CO The Right Honourable Jean Chretien, P.C., Q.C., M.P., LL.L, LL.D., Prime Minister of Canada Langevin Block 80 Wellington Street Ottawa ON K1A0A2 Dear Prime Minister: This letter seeks to confirm your verbal direction of 22 May removing certain restrictions in respect of Canadian Forces operations in the Persian Gulf region. Within the context of existing direction, which you approved on 18 March 2003, Canadian Forces transport aircraft in the Persian Gulf region were not to be used to support, directly or indirectly, military action against Iraq. In addition, all Canadian operations were to be undertaken within the existing Operation Apollo area of responsibility, excluding Iraq and that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North). On 22 May 2003, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1483. Resolution 1483 lifted all prohibitions related to trade with Iraq under previous Security Council Resolutions with the exception of prohibitions concerning arms and related material. Further, Resolution 1483 calls upon all member states in a position to do so to respond immediately to the humanitarian appeals of the United Nations and other international organizations. Consequently, Resolution 1483 provides a framework within which Canada and other non-occupying power states may work with the US and British occupying powers referred to as “the Authority.” Further to your verbal direction of 22 May 2003, Canadian Forces transport aircraft were tasked to provide airlift in support of stabilization and reconstruction missions to Iraq. The first mission to Iraq was flown on 2 June. These aircraft, deployed in the United Arab Emirates, are tasked in support of the upcoming deployment to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul. These aircraft will also be used to provide the agreed support to the UN mandated mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This UN mission will nominally employ two of the four aircraft in theatre. Therefore, support to the Iraq mission will be subject to operational priorities and aircraft serviceability. In order to facilitate operational and logistical arrangements, Canadian Forces • participation in stabilization and reconstruction activities will continue to be conducted under the operational control of “the Authority” as defined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483. At all times, Canadian Forces members remain under the command of the Chief of the Defence Staff. Additionally, the previous geographic restriction on Canadian Forces operations meant that Canadian Forces aircraft had been 000009 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lbi sur I'acces a /'information unable to accept transport taskings to and from Kuwait under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom. To enable the Canadian Forces to execute your direction, the restrictions in respect of airlift by Canadian Forces transport aircraft in support of Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction missions and the geographic restrictions on Canadian Forces operations in Iraq and in that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North) have been removed. The removal of the restriction permits Canadian Forces aircraft to conduct missions through Kuwait for the delivery of loads exclusively in support of the campaign against terrorism and in accordance with Canadian national objectives. Finally, the removal of the geographic restriction has also permitted the Canadian naval task group to conduct Operation Apollo missions in the Northern Persian Gulf in accordance with Canadian national objectives or other missions as may be directed by the Government of Canada. Minister Graham has also been apprised of your verbal direction and concurs with the present conduct of operations. Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. r-3.-V- 000010 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00020 Title A name given to the resource Direction Regarding Canadian Forces' Employment Restrictions in the Persian Gulf Region Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 09-Jun-03 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-100289 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/3c059bad852418ea5f4d98f127575104.pdf fd3bc3dc029295fa3d10ea0ebec80b16 PDF Text Text ao.rtosedmeAcci- ■■■ to Infcrntohtn A Sec 8C0001 1812D-18-8 2 SEC £©©[>© DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS M. BLOODWORTH International Plans and Operations 44 Zz ___ ____ Iraq □ CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS MINISTRE - MME M. BLOODWORTH LT i U Plans et operations internationals SSS/RDS Iraq a TO A CZ> REMARQUES Date InH Date tret. REGISTRY ONLY DEPOTCENTRAL B.F; ' RAPPEL P.A. * RANGER Date I Cancel sr I Annular Inspected Inspects F ' I ■- ■■ 71 <4 rt 4=^ ______ - l— ---- F" ~lr~ I EI ___ r ___ •____ ■ r f 4 4 I coI 04 j- - QO ■ QO ■< 4 Q 2H 4s 22^^ > 00 — ---------Q <D O ' _ - — \ I' '■ 4 __ t °o §■ ; J - j 4_2Z1___ u- ID 705 7530-21-894-4101 ■ DesIgrt.Fomw Manasament 893^050.-Conception ■■ Geslion des ft 000035 ’.'I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en ve'rtu de la Loi sur facets a {'information >a FILE MAINTENANCE CHECKLIST USTE DECONTR&LE POUR IIENTRETIEN DU DOSSIER □ Protect all filesand repords as. , official property. Clean records prior to adding them to files. □ Protdger tous les dossiers et les , documents comma dtant la proprldtd ofticielle. . t Nettoyer les documents avant de les ajouter & leur dossier respectif. Remove all envelopes, flags, .tags, pins, spikes, clips and superfluous ■ staples. ,. Enlever tout articles inutiles (enveloppes, papilldns, dtlquettes, dpirigles, trombones, attachesfeuilles, agrafes etc.). ’ File papers and TDs chronolo, gically, the latest'date on top. . Classer les documents ert ordre ohronologique, la date la plus rdeente sur ledessus. Prepunch holes at the top left corner of the papers. Percer des trous du coin supdrieur gauche du document. Attach papers to the file by a paper spike for easy handling. ■ Pour faclllter la manutention, attacher les documents au dossier au moyen d'uneattache-feuille. When a file becomes thicker than 2", a subsequent volume should be created. Lorsque le dossier a plus de 2” d'dpaisseur, order un n&uveau volume. Destroy duplicate material. Keep a copy only if it has additional information. Ddtruire tous les duplicates qui ne coptiennent aucun renseignements suppldmentaires. Verify the security classification of new documents added to the file. Vdrifier la cote de sScuritd des nouveaux documents ajoutd au dossier. . Upgrade the file to the required level as required. ' Augmenter la cote de sdcurite si ndeessaire. ■ • . i S' 5 - ■? 'Cl “ ■■ J ■ I sit _____ 000036 �Pages 37 to / a 39 are withheld pursuant to section sont retenues en vertu de Particle 15(1) of the Access to Information Act de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information 4504 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF CABINET DU CHEF DE L’ETAT-MAJOR DE LA DEFENSE Date 13-Aug-O3 To /Destinataire SO DM c.c. Sous-Ministre de la ' Defense Nationale AOUT AUG 1 3 2003 Deputy Minister of National Defence From / De SO CDS APPROVAL SOFA KUWAIT □ □ [_J l_! I i Li S?; Acknowledgement / Accuse de reception Reply for CDS’s signature I Reponse pour la signature du CEMD Reply with cc to CDS I Reponse et cc pour le CEMD Briefing Note / Note de synthese For your information / A titre d’information For action, as appropriate / Pour execution, suivant le cas For action, as per remarks / Pour execution, selon les observations Remarks / Observations !For signature i I Reply in I Repondre en CZ English / anglais i_ French / fran^ais 000040 �- Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'acces a /'information (39 --- - 1DPK POL DIRECTORATE OF PEACEKEEPING POLICY/ DIRECTION DE LA POLITIQUE DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX BP 4W D POL MP REMARKS/REMARQUES TO/A J3 t’oiC DATE Qo<2 c uiZSfij C O ''■foOK INITIALS V <3 S-d^.ol &Jo? ^ufPuzAua,—ex--------- ---------------- (I .oT-o-s Daos gThfa? OS 6<s> Grr 0)5 I f~~ S/> bM I ___________ i I OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADV0C.A7? >T?.AL Directorate »f Law Inttrnafei 3 1 2^ Sous-Ministr de la Defense NariknaU u <h :. ■ Directors! '.-i *C>KAL national ® 1 j 2003 Deputy Minister of National Defence 000041 �r Document disclosed talnfprmation Act Document divulgueen WtiMJtoTfurMfas it /‘information I - ' CONFIDENTIAL ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA) WITH KUWAIT : BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFFENCE File #/Numero de reference: 3450-1 (Joey Cloutier, D PK Pol 6) DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI FRj l/l Cj- DPKPol/DPoIMP Date: 26X1^3 ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) FROM/DE: DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI Date: ■ Concur tOS"J3/CEM J3 Date : e> 3 Concur: I'M fit* JAG/JAG Date 3 fy-f fc-) 7k/ o Concur: / / yOCDS/SCEMD Date Q'b DM/SM CDS/CEMD FROM/DE: ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) Date: 7OX CONFIDENTIAL REF: 36130 000042 •J �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act “rrrtnmt djynlqyA pn vprtu de la Loi sur I'acces a {'information Sn j’f'Ministre de 'a Wag J^£C£.e -L_ zgj-a<ioiral-mT^rr i <<.___ -dLcc^i^—^Q^ui^Qji. c<--'. ru _____ — 4=0 (Lf JLO- -Z-xZV^/g^A -f . l AJL f/ji. _jazwa4_i Lo 2^^<x £0 000043 �1 VI------ .-Lj-V r Document disclosed under the Acces&tW thfb'riMlftfbn Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information A w . * P ft < M E Mi (-> ( S T Z « ?R EM i C« M l H I ST RE OTTAWA, K1A 0A2 July 21, 2003 Dear Colleague: I am writing to clarify my letter of July 3, 2003, which dealt with the strategic objectives of Canadian Forces (CF) contingent deploying to Afghanistan and the removal of certain restrictions with respect to CF operations in the Persian Gulf region. I wish, therefore, to confirm my agreement that all CF assets, including naval and ground, be allowed to conduct operations north of the 28“30' of latitude North, through Kuwait, when required and in accordance with authorized CF objectives. Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum Minister of National Defence Room 110, Justice Building House of Commons Ottawa, Ontario K1A0A6 & => SECBET 000044 J �Document disclosed under the Acfft^ftMcicoiation Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Li*2UfltPHf[ffiJJ$Jmation CONFIDENTIAL Sour MEMORANDUM 2200-1 (DNATO Pol 4) Iv D<?fe a pr 2 8 20Q^ Apr 03 Dist List SITREP: POSSIBLE NATO ROLE IN POST-CONFLICT IRAQ 1. While NATO awaits the 28 April release of NATO Secretary-General Robertson’s Food-For-Thought paper on possible NATO involvement in Iraq, the US has begun approaching selected Allies on a bilateral basis to request involvement in the stabilization period in Iraq. Canada has been approached by the US to contribute to stabilization/ reconstruction efforts in Iraq, and has prepared its response, to be delivered to the US Embassy on Monday, 5 May. Most European countries have also been approached, though notably, not France or Germany. 2. The US is interested in NATO playing a role in reconstruction efforts. However, discussions in the NATO context are at a very early stage, and though rhetoric for NATO involvement has been positive, there is clearly no great enthusiasm on the part of our Allies for concrete NATO involvement at this time. Further, discussions will be limited in scope until the level of UN involvement in post-conflict reconstruction is clear. 3. Given Allies’ troop commitments in the Balkans, Afghanistan, to the UN and to Iraq (already committed on a bilateral basis), it will be difficult for most NATO states to make a further contribution to a future NATO mission in Iraq. 4. We expect that NATO will continue to discuss involvement in Iraq, as a “fence mending” exercise, but this is not an option that is being seriously considered in most capitals. 5. Based on the Canadian response to the American request, we have consulted with DFAIT on this issue. Canada’s intervention in the NATO context will emphasize that we would not want any NATO role in Iraq that would undermine the NATO support already committed and essential to the Canadian deployment this summer to IS AF. Col J. Michael Snell D NATO Pol 995-9155 CONFIDENTIAL 1/2 C0WFmSoo45 �CONFIDENTIAL Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information I Dist List EA/MND EAZDM EA/CDS EA/DCDS EA/VCDS EAZADM(Pol) EA/DG Pol Plan EA/DGIS Pol EA/COS J3 DPK Pol CONFIDENTIAL 2/2 000046 I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document^iv^gue^e^/ertu ^^a Loi^urJ^rces a Information e :M\s igoi JAPAN ^^255 SUSSEX DRIVE OTTAWA. ONTARIO K1N 9E6 TELEPHONE: (613) 241-8541 FAX: (613) 241-7415 f/V ^7/5?/ Sous-Ministre de la Defense Nationale 1 6 2003 Deputy Minister of National Defence April 14, 2003 Dear Sir or Madam, Please find enclosed a complimentary copy of the April 2003 issue of the Japan Echo journal, published bimonthly by Japan Echo Inc. in Japan. Each issue of Japan Echo contains significant articles and essays by prominent commentators. In this month’s issue, we would like to draw your attention to the article by Japan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kawaguchi Yoriko, on page 24. The article, entitled “A Foreign Policy to Consolidate Peace”, calls on the Japanese people to ponder and debate the question of Japan’s role in global security in light of the present situation in Iraq. We hope that you will take the time to read it as well as the other pieces in Japan Echo. We hope that you will add this publication to your collection and that it will be useful to you in the future. Sincerely, Information and Culture Section Embassy of Japan 000047 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Memorandum 1560-1 (D Strat A) . 14 Mar 03 H Sous-Ministre de la Defense Nationale z Deputy Minister of National Defence Dist List POTENTIAL WAR IN IRAQ For your information, please find attached an updated briefing note on “Allies’ contributions for a potential intervention in Iraq” prepared by Dr. Nebojsa Bjelakovic, D Strat A, 992-4532. Daniel L. Bon DG Pol PlarT~ 992-0799 Dist List [d m f CDS ADM (Pol) SA/MND (Del Bianco) DCDS DG Pol Plan DG Pol Coord DGIS Pol D Pol Dev DAPC Pol DPK Pol D Pari A DFAIT-IDC (St. John Geoffrey) 000048 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information ALLIES’ CONTRIBUTIONS FOR A POTENTIAL INTERVENTION IN IRAQ BRIEFING NOTE AIM To provide a summary of selected contributions, firm and conditional, to an American-led intervention in Iraq. Our data are compiled from open sources and, therefore, may be freely used in public forums. Whenever possible, these data have been checked against classified information to ensure their general accuracy. BACKGROUND United States Diplomatic efforts to achieve UN-sponsored disarmament of Iraq are approaching a stalemate and an American -led military intervention seems very likely in weeks, if not in days. As of March 14, 2003, an estimated 230,000 American personnel are deployed in the Gulf region, while 30,000 additional troops are en route. Although Washington has frequently expressed readiness to fight Saddam on its own, it has approached almost 50 countries for potential troop and other contributions. So far, only the UK has indicated that it would join US-led offensive operations in Iraq. Many U.S. allies have units deployed in the area serving in various missions. However, most of the allies, to a lesser or greater extent, remain reluctant to commit troops or treasure to a possible intervention. FIRM AND CONDITIONAL COMMITMENTS NATO Allies Belgium: The government has not offered any comments on potential Belgian participation in an intervention in Iraq, but has stated that it aims to concentrate its military assets on the missions in Afghanistan and Africa. Czech Republic: Prague has deployed its anti-chemical warfare unit to Kuwait. The Czech government is also considering providing other troops, such as a field hospital or a rapid reaction brigade. Denmark: Denmark is prepared to offer a submarine and troops were the UN to authorize an intervention in Iraq, but the government has not yet decided whether Danish soldiers would be sent into combat. France: France favours allowing for a longer and more thorough arms inspection process and has frequently indicated that it might use its Security Council veto to oppose a military action against Iraq. 1 000049 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Germany: Germany allowed the U.S. to use its airspace and bases, but has indicated that it would commit no troops to an intervention against Iraq. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder asserted on January 21, 2003, that Germany would not vote for, nor go to war under any circumstances. However, in order to help contain any Iraqi threat Germany has deployed two Patriot missile units to Israel and one to Turkey, and its servicemen will serve on board of the AW ACS. A German anti-chemical warfare unit has been in Kuwait since 1991. Hungary: Budapest has authorized the training of Iraqi exiles at Taszar military base in Hungary. American troops are training between 1,000 and 4,000 Iraqi opposition members primarily as translators and scouts. Hungary will send 2,000 gas masks and chemical protection suits to Turkey. Italy: Rome is willing to support the coalition indirectly, by allowing the use of air space and military bases. Netherlands: Government sources have indicated that Dutch participation, if any, would likely be limited to ships already in the region. On February 7, 2003, ahead of the NATO decision, the Dutch government decided to deploy, on a bilateral basis, three Patriot missile units for the protection of Turkey. Norway: The Norwegian PM has indicated that there would have to be a clear UN mandate before Norway would even consider joining an intervention in Iraq. Poland: On January 16, 2003, Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski stated that his country supports the U.S. intervention against Iraq and has promised to contribute troops to a possible war with Baghdad. Portugal: Portugal allowed the U.S. to use its airspace and bases. Spain: The Spanish government has repeatedly said it would back a US-led military intervention in Iraq, but has given no details of troop commitments. Turkey: Turkey would provide an excellent staging ground for an attack from the north were an international coalition to intervene in Iraq. The Turkish cabinet has agreed to allow 62,000 American combat troops and over 300 aircraft to use their territory. However, the Turkish parliament narrowly failed to endorse this agreement on March 1, 2003, but a second vote on the issue may be held soon. Turkey has had a few thousand troops in Northern Iraq since the early nineties. Reportedly, Ankara has been deploying troops along the border with Iraq. Some reports indicate that Turkey could contribute between 10,000 and 50,000 troops if the U.S. were to attack from the north. UK: Over 1,300 naval and air force personnel are already in the Gulf, serving in various missions, including the enforcement of no-fly zones over Iraq, and London is also offering its military bases in England and Diego Garcia for U.S. long-range bombers and tanker aircraft. 2 000050 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information On January 7, 2003, despite reported divisions in the Blair government, London called up 1,500 reserve personnel and dispatched to the Gulf an amphibious naval task force including at least 3,000 marines. This task force consists of the amphibious ship HMS Ocean, destroyers HMS Edinburgh and HMS York, supply ships Argus, Fort Rosalie, Fort Austin, landing and logistic ships Sir Galahad, Sir Tristram, Sir Percivale, and anti-mine ships HMS Grimsby and HMS Ledbury. The UK also sent 14 combat aircraft to previously scheduled exercise in Jordan. On January 12, 2003, Britain also sent to the region a carrier naval taskforce comprised of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, the destroyer HMS Liverpool, the frigate HMS Marlborough, the supply ship Fort Victoria, the tanker Orange Leaf, and a few submarines. On January 20, 2003, Britain announced a major deployment to the region of an additional 26,000 troops. These troops consist of Headquarters 1 (UK) Armoured Division, 7th Armoured Brigade, 16th Air Assault Brigade, and 102 Logistics Brigade. This deployment includes 120 Challenger tanks and 150 Warrior armoured personnel carriers, as well as mobile artillery units. These troops will be stationed in Kuwait by the middle of February. On January 30, 2003, London called up another 4,500 reserve personnel. On February 6, 2003, London announced sending additional 7,000 RAF personnel to the Gulf as well as 75 aircraft, including 27 Puma and Chinook helicopters, Jaguar and Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, E3D Sentry airborne command aircraft, Hercules transporters, VC10 and Tristar refuelling aircraft, Tornado F3's for air defence, Tornado GR4 and Harrier GR7 offensive jets. In all, Britain has decided to deploy 42,000 troops to the Gulf, including 29,000 ground troops. Other Like-Minded Countries Australia: The Australian government has dispatched forces to the Persian Gulf as part of contingency arrangements for a possible war against Iraq including a contribution of Special Forces, three warships, a squadron of up to 14 F/A-18 Hornet fighters, three C130 Hercules transport aircraft, a P3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft, CH-47 helicopters, and an air-to-air refuelling aircraft. On January 22, 2003, the government announced a forward deployment to the region of the amphibious transport ship Kanimbla, lead elements of a Special Forces Task Group, and a Royal Australian Air Force reconnaissance team. On February 7, 2003, Australia sent another 450 troops to the Persian Gulf. In all, Australia could reportedly deploy 2,000 troops there. Canberra prefers to have a new Security Council resolution authorizing an attack on Iraq, though it does not believe that a new resolution is necessary. Slovakia: Slovakia has deployed a 75-member contingent to complement the Czech antichemical warfare unit already deployed in Kuwait. Bulgaria: The parliament decided to make available a 150-member anti-chemical warfare unit and to allow the United States to use Bulgaria’s airspace and one base. 3 000051 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Romania: The parliament agreed to make available 278 non-combat troops and to allow the United States to use Romania’s airspace and bases. Albania: The cabinet decided to make available a commando unit and to allow the U.S. to use Albania’s airspace. Ukraine: The government is negotiating with Kuwait on the status of the decontamination battalion, which can be sent to the area. Middle Eastern Countries Israel: The current U.S. position is that Israel should not be part of the coalition against Iraq. The Israeli government has clearly stated, however, that it would launch aerial counter attacks if attacked. Syria: Most likely would remain neutral and eventually may grant the use of its air space for search and rescue missions. Iran: Most likely would remain neutral and eventually may grant the use of its air space for search and rescue missions. Jordan: Most likely will offer radar and special operations bases, but is unlikely to say so publicly. Saudi Arabia: Most likely will offer airfields, and sites for anti-missile batteries. More than 3,000 Saudi troops have deployed in Kuwait as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force. Kuwait: Kuwait would be one of the primary staging grounds for an attack from the south. Oman: U.S. troops already use air bases for maintenance and refuelling. Oman deployed one battalion as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force to help defend Kuwait. United Arab Emirates: U.S. troops already use air bases for refuelling. The United Arab Emirates intend to deploy tanks, attack helicopters, warships and about 4,000 troops as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force to help defend Kuwait. Bahrain: U.S. troops already use port facilities. Bahrain is the headquarters for the U.S. 5th Fleet. Bahrain government said that it was sending a frigate and ground troops as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force to help defend Kuwait. Qatar: U.S. troops already use several military bases. Qatar is the forward HQ for U.S. Gulf forces. It was also the locale for exercise “Internal Look,” simulating an attack on Iraq, in December 2002. 4 000052 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS FOR AN INTERVENTION IN IRAQ Military Air forces bases Ground troops Navy Financial contribution Postconflict deployment NATO Countr es UK* Not needed Not needed Not needed No___ Yes Yes Yes Not needed Not needed Not needed Yes Yes Most likely Yes U.S.* Yes Australia* Not needed Belgium* Czech Republic* Denmark* France* Germany* Hungary Italy*______ Netherlands* Norway* Poland* Portugal Spain* Turkey* No No No No No No 361 troops No Yes Likely Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering No No No No No No No No No No No_______ No_______ No_______ No_______ Considering No_______ No_______ No_______ No_______ Considering Likely Likely No______ Likely Considering No No No No Likely No No Considering No Considering No_______ Considering Most likely No_______ Considering Most likely No_______ Considering No No_______ Considering No Likely Considering Most likely Yes Most likely Yes Yes Yes Likely Yes Likely 2 aircraft carrier taskforces 600-1,000 100,000 to 5 to 6 aircraft 150,000 aircraft carrier troops taskforces Like-Minded Countries 3 ships 10-20 150 troops (special aircraft forces) 75 troops No No 100-140 aircraft 29,000 troops Not Slovakia* _____ needed * Countries that have forces in the region serving in other missions. Responsible Group Principal: Prepared by: Date: Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-4358 Dr. Nebojsa Bjelakovic, DG Pol Plan/D Strat A, 992-4532 14 Mar 03 5 000053 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur facets a /’information Sous-Ministre de la Defense Nationale 4 In ri32M3 Memorandum 1560-1 (D Strat A) Minister of ional Defence 21 Feb 03 Dist List POTENTIAL WAR IN IRAQ For your information, please find attached an updated briefing note on “Allies’ contributions for a potential intervention in Iraq” prepared by Dr. Nebojsa Bjelakovic, D Strat A, 992-4532. Daniel L. Bon DG Pol Plan 992-0799 Dist List [DM / CDS ADM (Pol) SA/MND (Del Bianco) DCDS DG Pol Plan DG Pol Coord DGIS Pol D Pol Dev DAPC Pol DPK Pol D Pari A 000054 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information ALLIES’ CONTRIBUTIONS FOR A POTENTIAL INTERVENTION IN IRAQ BRIEFING NOTE AIM To provide a summary of selected contributions, firm and conditional, to an Americanled intervention in Iraq. Our data are compiled from open sources and, therefore, may be freely used in public forums. Whenever possible, these data have been checked against classified information to ensure their general accuracy. BACKGROUND United States A military intervention in Iraq is possible in 2003. Most reports indicate that the U.S. would deploy between 200,000 and 250,000 of its own troops, with the entire coalition contingent totalling between 250,000 and 300,000 troops. Although Washington has frequently expressed readiness to fight Saddam on its own, it has approached almost 50 countries for potential troop and other contributions. As of February 21, 2003 an estimated 150,000 American personnel are deployed in the Gulf region including about 65,000 ground troops, most of them in Kuwait. The pace of the U.S. military build-up will see the number of U.S. troops in the area approach 200,000 by the end of February. So far, only the UK has indicated that it would join US-led offensive operations in Iraq. To a lesser or greater extent, all other U.S. allies remain reluctant to commit troops or treasure to a possible intervention. FIRM AND CONDITIONAL COMMITMENTS NATO Allies Belgium: The government has not offered any comments on potential Belgian participation in an intervention in Iraq, but has stated that it aims to concentrate its military assets on the missions in Afghanistan and Africa. Czech Republic: Prague seems to have committed its anti-chemical warfare unit currently based in Kuwait. The Czech government is also considering providing other troops, such as a field hospital or a rapid reaction brigade. Denmark: Denmark is prepared to offer military hardware and troops were the UN to authorize an intervention in Iraq, but the government has not yet decided whether Danish soldiers would be sent into combat. 1 000055 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information I? France: France favours allowing for a longer and more thorough arms inspection process and indicated on January 20, 2003, that it might use its Security Council veto to oppose a military action against Iraq. Germany: Germany allowed the U.S. to use its airspace and bases, but has indicated that it would commit no troops to an intervention against Iraq. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder asserted on January 21, 2003, that Germany would not vote for, nor go to war under any circumstances. However, in order to help contain any Iraqi threat Germany has deployed two Patriot missile units to Israel and one to Turkey, and its servicemen will serve on board of the AWACS. A German anti-chemical warfare unit has been in Kuwait since 1991. Hungary: Budapest has authorized the training of Iraqi exiles at Taszar military base in Hungary. American troops are training between 1,000 and 4,000 Iraqi opposition members primarily as translators and scouts. Italy: Rome is willing to support the coalition indirectly, by allowing the use of air space and military bases. Netherlands: Government sources have indicated that Dutch participation, if any, would likely be limited to ships already in the region. On February 7, 2003, ahead of the NATO decision, the Dutch government decided to deploy, on a bilateral basis, three Patriot missile units for the protection of Turkey. Norway: The Norwegian PM has indicated that there would have to be a clear UN mandate before Norway would even consider joining an intervention in Iraq. Poland: Polish officials have indicated that Warsaw might offer some token military support to an intervention in Iraq, but have not given any specifics. Spain: The Spanish government has repeatedly said it would back a US-led military intervention in Iraq, but has given no details of troop commitments. Turkey: Turkey would provide an excellent staging ground for an attack from the north were an international coalition to intervene in Iraq. The full extent of Turkish participation, including the use of bases and airfields, is still being intensely negotiated with Washington. Turkey has had a few thousand troops in Northern Iraq since the early nineties. Reportedly, Ankara has been deploying troops along the border with Iraq. Some reports indicate that Turkey could contribute between 10,000 and 50,000 troops if the U.S. were to attack from the north. UK: Over 1,300 naval and air force personnel are already in the Gulf, serving in various missions, including the enforcement of no-fly zones over Iraq, and London is also offering its military bases in England and Diego Garcia for U.S. long-range bombers and tanker aircraft. 2 000056 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgud en vertu de la Loi sur I'acc&s a /'information J On January 7,2003, despite reported divisions in the Blair government, London called up 1,500 reserve personnel and dispatched to the Gulf an amphibious naval task force including at least 3,000 marines. This task force consists of the amphibious ship HMS Ocean, destroyers HMS Edinburgh and HMS York, supply ships Argus, Fort Rosalie, Fort Austin, landing and logistic ships Sir Galahad, Sir Tristram, Sir Percivale, and antimine ships HMS Grimsby and HMS Ledbury. The UK also sent 14 combat aircraft to previously scheduled exercise in Jordan. On January 12, 2003, Britain also sent to the region a carrier naval taskforce comprised of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, the destroyer HMS Liverpool, the frigate HMS Marlborough, the supply ship Fort Victoria, the tanker Orange Leaf, and a few submarines. On January 20, 2003, Britain announced a major deployment to the region of an additional 26,000 troops. These troops consist of Headquarters 1 (UK) Armoured Division, 7th Armoured Brigade, 16“ Air Assault Brigade, and 102 Logistics Brigade. This deployment includes 120 Challenger tanks and 150 Warrior armoured personnel carriers, as well as mobile artillery units. These troops will be stationed in Kuwait by the middle of February. On January 30, 2003, London called up another 4,500 reserve personnel. On February 6, 2003, London announced sending additional 7,000 RAF personnel to the Gulf as well as 75 aircraft, including 27 Puma and Chinook helicopters, Jaguar and Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, E3D Sentry airborne command aircraft, Hercules transporters, VC 10 and Tristar refuelling aircraft, Tornado F3's for air defence. Tornado GR4 and Harrier GR7 offensive jets. In all, Britain has decided to deploy 42,000 troops to the Gulf, including 29,000 ground troops. Other Like-Minded Countries Australia: The Australian government has dispatched forces to the Persian Gulf as part of contingency arrangements for a possible war against Iraq including a contribution of Special Forces, three warships, a squadron of up to 14 F/A-18 Hornet fighters, three C130 Hercules transport aircraft, a P3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft, CH-47 helicopters, and an air-to-air refuelling aircraft. On January 22, 2003, the government announced a forward deployment to the region of the amphibious transport ship Kanimbla, lead elements of a Special Forces Task Group, and a Royal Australian Air Force reconnaissance team. On February 7, 2003, Australia sent another 450 troops to the Persian Gulf. In all, Australia could reportedly deploy 2,000 troops there. Canberra prefers to have a new Security Council resolution authorizing an attack on Iraq, though it does not believe that a new resolution is necessary. 3 000057 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information I Slovakia: Assuming there would be a second Security Council resolution, Slovakia has given indications that it would provide a 75-member contingent to complement the Czech anti-chemical warfare unit already deployed in Kuwait. Bulgaria: The parliament decided to make available a 150-member anti-chemical warfare unit and to allow the United States to use Bulgaria’s airspace and one base. Romania: The parliament agreed to make available 278 non-combat troops and to allow the United States to use Romania’s airspace and bases. Middle Eastern Countries Israel: The current U.S. position is that Israel should not be part of the coalition against Iraq. The Israeli government has clearly stated, however, that it would launch aerial counter attacks if attacked. Syria: Most likely would remain neutral and eventually may grant the use of its air space for search and rescue missions. Iran: Most likely would remain neutral and eventually may grant the use of its air space for search and rescue missions. Jordan: Most likely will offer radar and special operations bases, but is unlikely to say so publicly. Saudi Arabia: Most likely will offer airfields, and sites for anti-missile batteries. Kuwait: Kuwait would be one of the primary staging grounds for an attack from the south. Oman: U.S. troops already use air bases for maintenance and refuelling. United Arab Emirates: U.S. troops already use air bases for refuelling. The United Arab Emirates intend to deploy tanks, attack helicopters, warships and about 4,000 troops as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force to help defend Kuwait. Bahrain: U.S. troops already use port facilities. Bahrain is the headquarters for the U.S. 5th Fleet. Bahrain government said that it was sending a frigate and ground troops as a part of a Persian Gulf regional force to help defend Kuwait. Qatar: U.S. troops already use several military bases. Qatar is the forward HQ for U.S. Gulf forces. It was also the locale for exercise “Internal Look,” simulating an attack on Iraq, in December 2002. 4 000058 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information * POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS FOR AN INTERVENTION IN IRAQ Military Air forces bases Ground troops Navy Financial Postcontribution conflict deployment \'ATO Countries Belgium Czech Republic Not needed Not needed Not needed No___ France Yes Germany Yes Hungary Italy______ Yes Netherlands Not needed Not Norway needed Poland Not needed Spain Yes Turkey Most likely Yes UK Denmark U.S. Yes Australia Not needed Slovakia Not needed Responsible Group Principal: Prepared by: Date: No No No No No Likely No Yes 361 troops (chemical warfare unit)______ Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering No No No No No No No No No No No No_______ No_______ No_______ No_______ Considering No_______ No_______ No_______ No_______ Considering Likely Likely No_______ Likely Considering No No No No Likely No No Considering No Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering ’ No Most likely Most likely Most likely No 2 aircraft carrier taskforces 100,000 to 5 to 6 600-1,000 aircraft aircraft 150,000 carrier troops taskforces Like-Minded Countries 150 troops 3 ships 10-20 (special aircraft forces) 75 troops No No 100-140 aircraft 29,000 troops Yes Most likely Yes Yes Yes Likely Yes Likely Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-4358 Dr. Nebojsa Bjelakovic, DG Pol Plan/D Strat A, 992-4532 21 Feb 03 5 000059 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Sous-Ministre de la 1 0 2003 Memorandum Deputy Minister of National Defence 1560-1 (D Strat A) . 07 Feb 03 Di st List POTENTIAL WAR IN IRAQ For your information, please find attached an updated briefing note on “Allies’ contributions for a potential intervention in Iraq” prepared by Dr. Nebojsa Bjelakovic, D Strat A, 992-4532. Daniel L. Bon DG Pol Plan 992-0799 Di st List I I DM CDS ADM (Pol) SA/MND (Del Bianco) DG Pol Plan DG Pol Coord DGIS Pol D Pol Dev DAPC Pol DPK Pol D Pari A 000060 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I’information ALLIES’ CONTRIBUTIONS FOR A POTENTIAL INTERVENTION IN IRAQ BRIEFING NOTE AIM To provide a summary of selected contributions, firm and conditional, to an Americanled intervention in Iraq. Our data are compiled from open sources and, therefore, may be freely used in public forums. Whenever possible, these data have been checked against classified information to ensure their general accuracy. BACKGROUND United States A military intervention in Iraq is possible in 2003. Most reports indicate that the U.S. would deploy between 200,000 and 250,000 of its own troops, with the entire coalition contingent totalling between 250,000 and 300,000 troops. Although Washington has frequently expressed readiness to fight Saddam on its own, it has approached almost 50 countries for potential troop and other contributions. As of February 7, 2003 an estimated 110,000 American personnel are deployed in the Gulf region including about 40,000 ground troops, most of them in Kuwait. The pace of the U.S. military build-up will see the number of U.S. troops in the area approach 180,000 by the middle of February. So far, only the UK has indicated that it would join the US-led intervention in Iraq even without an additional Security Council resolution. Many U.S. allies remain more or less reluctant to commit troops or treasure to a possible intervention in Iraq. This would likely change, however, if Iraq were found to be in “material breach” of the Security Council resolutions. FIRM AND CONDITIONAL COMMITMENTS NATO Allies Belgium: The government has not offered any comments on potential Belgian participation in an intervention in Iraq, but has stated that it aims to concentrate its military assets on the missions in Afghanistan and Africa. Czech Republic: Prague seems to have committed its anti-chemical warfare unit currently based in Kuwait. The Czech government is also considering providing other troops, such as a field hospital or a rapid reaction brigade. 1 000061 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information Denmark: Denmark is prepared to offer military hardware and troops were the UN to authorize an intervention in Iraq, but the government has not yet decided whether Danish soldiers would be sent into combat. France: France favours allowing for a longer and more thorough arms inspection process and indicated on January 20, 2003, that it might use its Security Council veto to oppose a military action against Iraq. Germany: Germany has indicated that it would let the U.S. use its airspace and bases, but would commit no troops to an intervention against Iraq. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder asserted on January 21, 2003, that Germany would not vote for, nor go to war under any circumstances. Hungary: Budapest has authorized the training of Iraqi exiles at Taszar military base in Hungary. American troops are training between 1,000 and 4,000 Iraqi opposition members primarily as translators and scouts. Italy: Rome is willing to support the coalition indirectly, by allowing the use of air space and military bases. Netherlands: Government sources have indicated that Dutch participation, if any, would likely be limited to ships already in the region. Norway: The Norwegian PM has indicated that there would have to be a clear UN mandate before Norway would even consider joining an intervention in Iraq. Poland: Polish officials have indicated that Warsaw might offer some token military support to an intervention in Iraq, but have not given any specifics. Spain: The Spanish government has repeatedly said it would back a US-led military intervention in Iraq, but has given no details of troop commitments. Turkey: Turkey would provide an excellent staging ground for an attack from the north were an international coalition to intervene in Iraq. Ankara has reluctantly agreed to offer some bases and airfields to about 20,000 coalition forces, but the full extent of Turkish participation is still being negotiated with Washington. Turkey has had a few thousand troops in Northern Iraq since the early nineties. Reportedly, Ankara has been deploying troops along the border with Iraq. Some reports indicate that Turkey could contribute between 10,000 and 50,000 troops if the U.S. were to attack from the north. UK: Over 1,300 naval and air force personnel are already in the Gulf, serving in various missions, including the enforcement of no-fly zones over Iraq, and London is also offering its military bases in England and Diego Garcia for U.S. long-range bombers and tanker aircraft. 2 000062 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information On January 7, 2003, despite reported divisions in the Blair government, London called up 1,500 reserve personnel and dispatched to the Gulf an amphibious naval task force including at least 3,000 marines. This task force consists of the amphibious ship HMS Ocean, destroyers HMS Edinburgh and HMS York, supply ships Argus, Fort Rosalie, Fort Austin, landing and logistic ships Sir Galahad, Sir Tristram, Sir Percivale, and antimine ships HMS Grimsby and HMS Ledbury. The UK also sent 14 combat aircraft to previously scheduled exercise in Jordan. On January 12, 2003, Britain also sent to the region a carrier naval taskforce comprised of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, the destroyer HMS Liverpool, the frigate HMS Marlborough, the supply ship Fort Victoria, the tanker Orange Leaf, and a few submarines. On January 20, 2003, Britain announced a major deployment to the region of an additional 26,000 troops. These troops consist of Headquarters 1 (UK) Armoured Division, 7th Armoured Brigade, 16lfi Air Assault Brigade, and 102 Logistics Brigade. This deployment includes 120 Challenger tanks and 150 Warrior armoured personnel carriers, as well as mobile artillery units. These troops will be stationed in Kuwait by the middle of February. On January 30, 2003, London called up another 4,500 reserve personnel. On February 6, 2003, London announced sending additional 7,000 RAF personnel to the Gulf as well as 75 aircraft, including 27 Puma and Chinook helicopters, Jaguar and Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, E3D Sentry airborne command aircraft, Hercules transporters, VC 10 and Tristar refuelling aircraft, Tornado F3's for air defence, Tornado GR4 and Harrier GR7 offensive jets. In all, Britain has decided to deploy 42,000 troops to the Gulf, including 29,000 ground troops. Other Like-Minded Countries Australia: The Australian government has dispatched forces to the Persian Gulf as part of contingency arrangements for a possible war against Iraq including a contribution of Special Forces, three warships, a squadron of up to 14 F/A-18 Hornet fighters, a P3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft, and an air-to-air refuelling aircraft. On January 22, 2003, the government announced a forward deployment to the region of the amphibious transport ship Kanimbla, lead elements of a Special Forces Task Group, and a Royal Australian Air Force reconnaissance team. On February 7, 2003, Australia sent another 450 troops to the Persian Gulf. In all, Australia could reportedly deploy 2,000 troops there. Canberra prefers to have a new Security Council resolution authorizing an attack on Iraq, though it does not believe that a new resolution is necessary. 3 000063 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Slovakia: Assuming there would be a second Security Council resolution, Slovakia has given indications that it would provide a 75-member contingent to complement the Czech anti-chemical warfare unit already deployed in Kuwait. Middle Eastern Countries Israel: The current U.S. position is that Israel should not be part of the coalition against Iraq. The Israeli government has clearly stated, however, that it would launch aerial counter attacks if attacked. Syria: Most likely would remain neutral and eventually may grant the use of its air space for search and rescue missions. Iran: Most likely would remain neutral and eventually may grant the use of its air space for search and rescue missions. Jordan: Most likely will offer radar and special operations bases, but is unlikely to say so publicly. Saudi Arabia: Most likely will offer airfields, and sites for anti-missile batteries. Kuwait: Kuwait would be one of the primary staging grounds for an attack from the south. Oman: U.S. troops already use air bases for maintenance and refuelling. United Arab Emirates: U.S. troops already use air bases for refuelling. Bahrain: U.S. troops already use port facilities. Bahrain is the headquarters for the U.S. 5th Fleet. Qatar: U.S. troops already use several military bases. Qatar is the forward HQ for U.S. Gulf forces. It was also the locale for exercise “Internal Look,” simulating an attack on Iraq, in December 2002. 4 000064 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Lol sur I'acces a I'information POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS Military Air forces bases Ground troops Navy Financial Postcontribution conflict deployment ''lATO Countries Belgium Czech Republic Not needed Not needed Not needed No___ France Germany Yes Hungary Yes Italy______ Yes Netherlands Not needed Not Norway needed Poland Not needed Not Spain needed Most Turkey likely UK Yes Denmark U.S. Yes Australia Not needed Slovakia Not needed Responsible Group Principal: Prepared by: Date: No No No No No Likely 250 troops No Yes (chemical warfare unit)______ Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering No No No No No No No No No No No No_______ No_______ No_______ No_______ Considering No_______ No_______ No_______ No_______ Considering Likely Likely No_______ Likely Considering No No No No Likely No No Considering No Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering Considering Most likely Most likely No 2 aircraft carrier taskforces 5 to 6 600-1,000 100,000 to aircraft aircraft 150,000 carrier troops taskforces Like-Minded Countries 150 troops 3 ships 10-20 aircraft (special forces) 75 troops No No 100-140 aircraft 29,000 troops No Most likely Yes Most likely Yes Yes Yes Likely Yes Likely Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-4358 Dr. Nebojsa Bjelakovic, DG Pol Plan/D Strat A, 992-4532 07 Feb 03 5 000065 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -j/ment divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 000 National Defence Defense nationale i^^Vate Deputy Minister Sous-ministre d6!6gu6e CanadS 000066 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act " ‘ * “jen vertuh^oi$r l^aa^^l'information Government of Canada Privy Council Office Sous-Ministre de la Defense Nationale/ Gouvernement du Canada Bureau du Conseil prive Ottawa, Canada K1A0A3 Deputy Minister of National Defence SECRET (with enclosure) Mr. Ken Dobell Deputy Minister to the Premier and Cabinet Secretary Government of British Columbia Parliament Buildings 272A West Annex Victoria, British Columbia V8V 1X4 Dear Mr. Dobell: I am pleased to provide you with a copy of the national threat assessment prepared by the Government of Canada on possible implications for Canada in the event of a war in Iraq. In distributing the assessment, the Government of Canada is committed to strengthening our partnership in the fight against terrorism by sharing relevant and timely data on threats to our national security. The assessment represents an analysis of the risks as presently known. It is designed to provide relevant information that can assist in briefing your Premier and selected Ministers and in setting the context for strategic preparations in your role as first responders to a terrorist incident. You will note that there are no specific threats to the security of Canada or Canadians identified at this time. The assessment has been classified as “secret”. Due to the sensitivity of the information, it is important that appropriate procedures be undertaken to protect its unauthorized distribution. The document must be kept in a locked cabinet and communicated on a “need to know” basis. Any unauthorized disclosure of the information could result in serious injury to the national interest. The document is being distributed because the prospect of war with Iraq warrants such action. It is critical that we continue to pursue security clearances for identified provincial and territorial employees. Your cooperation is acknowledged and appreciated, and will help ensure we have a future network of individuals with appropriate clearances to receive such information. Canada SBB 000067 �UM!1!1 M MJWMDWI ill1! Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis d /'information 4 . ’ *■ > * -2- SECRET (with enclosure) Our success to-date in fighting terrorism is the result of the close working relationships enjoyed between the law enforcement, intelligence and emergency preparedness communities at both levels of government. We will continue to monitor the threat situation in Canada. Future threat assessments may be sent to you if the situation warrants. Should an event require intervention, federal-provincial-territorial coordination will take place through well established protocols and practices. The intent of this threat assessment process is not to replace such processes or your role as first responders to an incident, but rather to contribute to more informed decision making at the highest levels of governments. It is important, as well, to emphasize that a coordinated approach to communications, both federally and provincially/territorially, is essential to avoid alarming Canadians needlessly and to emphasize that our enforcement, security and intelligence communities are working together to protect Canadians. If you have any questions or concerns about this document, please do not hesitate to contact Anthony Ritchie, Senior Policy Advisor, National Security, Security and Intelligence Secretariat of the Privy Council Office at (613) 957-5657. Yours sincerely, Ronald Bilodeau Associate Secretary to the Cabinet, Deputy Minister to the Deputy Prime Minister and Security and Intelligence Coordinator Enclosure 000068 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information SECRET February 6, 2003 This document is classified SECRET and is the property of the Government of Canada. It is provided to you in confidence, along with the covering letter, for official use with your Premier/Govemment Leader and selected Ministers. It must not be reclassified or disseminated, in any way, in whole or in part, without the consent of the originator. Contact: Security and Intelligence Secretariat, Privy Council Office, (613) 957-5657 i Implications for Canada in the Event of a War with Iraq SUMMARY: 1) An attack on Iraq would result in terrorist-related threats to Western interests throughout the world, including in Canada. Possible targets would likely be, in order of priority, U.S. interests, Israeli interests and then any Western country which actively supports the U.S. invasion. The threat could emanate from surrogate groups used by the Iraqi regime, including the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), or other groups which may use the conflict as an excuse to launch a terrorist attack. There is no specific information indicating that other terrorist groups will use an invasion of Iraq as a rationale for terrorism against the West. This could change should Israel be drawn into any hostilities with Iraq. 2) The response from AL QAIDA to an attack against Iraq is less certain, although AL QAIDA's ability to launch terrorist attacks on a global scale is unquestioned. The specific mention of Canada in a recording made by OSAMA BIN LADEN that aired on the Al Jazeera network on November 12, 2002, threatening future violence increases the possibility of potential threats to Canadian interests internationally. 3) There is currently no specific intelligence pointing to terrorist attacks against Western tarsets-hvJraq or to indicate that the Government of Iraq would target Canadians or Canadian interests in Canada or abroad. It is judged unlikely that SADDAM HUSSEIN would^attempt pre-emptive attacks against the U.S. or otheralignea countries prior to exhausting diplomatic and public relations options. Plots with the potential to disrupt coalition war planning efforts would likely receive first consideration for pre-emptive activity. 4) As there is only one Iraqi diplomadn-Canada. this will limit the Iraqi government’s capability to conduct intelligence activity in Canada, including its ability to monitor d i ssi dentsi ' ' : ‘ 000069 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information -2- SECRET 5) Iraq has aggressively and covertly pursued the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the past. SADDAM HUSSEIN may use them if the collapse of his regime is imminent. Attacks with chemical or biological weapons are plausible, although such operations would require significant logistical support. 6) In Canada, there will likely be a renewal of protest activity at the U.S. and coalition embassies, the Iraqi Embassy, Parliament Hill and provincial legislatures. Protest activity will be determined by events as they unfold. Recent anti-war demonstrations across Canada have taken place without reported incident. Protests will likely continue in the short term. These demonstrations could be highly emotional and acts of spontaneous or premeditated violence may take place. The RCMP is in active contact with provincial and municipal police forces as part of regular operations to anticipate and provide law enforcement at demonstrations, where necessary. 7) A military intervention in Iraq might trigger multiple hoaxes (eg. anthrax). There could also be media reporting rumours and claims from unnamed sources speculating about threats can also be anticipated. A coordinated approach to communications, both federally and provincially, is essential to avoid alarming Canadians needlessly and to remind them that our enforcement, security, and intelligence communities are working together to protect Canadians. Premature responses can also disrupt intelligence gathering activities. 8) Actions taken over the last 15 months by the federal and provincial governments have enhanced information sharing, investigative and intelligence gathering tools as well as response capacity to a number of contingencies, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents. These areas are all covered by federal-provincial contingency plans, agreements, protocols and/or agency arrangements. Any information about specific threats should be directed immediately to local police or RCMP. BACKGROUND: 9) The prospect of a U.S.-led military strike against Iraq raises a concern about the possibility of terrorist reprisals against U.S. and other participating nations' interests. SADDAM HUSSEIN’s regime has demonstrated its willingness and capability to mount operations against its opponents. In addition, there is the possibility that the regime may support terrorist groups that are active against Iraq's enemies. On the eve of the 1991 Gulf War, the SADDAM HUSSEIN government used select groups and teams to mount terrorist attacks against coalition forces and the interests of those forces' countries. 000070 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -3- SECRET IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS): 10) The primary responsibility of the IIS is to protect SADDAM HUSSEIN’S regime. The ability of the IIS to mount operations against perceived or real enemies of the Iraqi regime is a major concern. However, the willingness of IIS officers and their agents to carry out attacks against the U.S. or coalition countries is uncertain. 11) The primary focus of IIS activity in Canada is locating and monitoring oppositionists, dissidents, expatriate scientists, defectors or resettled diplomats and military officers. 12) There are three diplomatic positions at the Iraqi Embassy in Ottawa. However, only one is currently occupied. AFFILIATED TERRORIST GROUPS: 13) Iraq is known to directly support numerous terrorist groups, including the Iranian dissident organization, the MUJAHEDIN - E - KHALQ (MEK), and several Palestinian groups engaged in terrorist activity against Israel. 14) The MEK is based in northern Iraq from which it launches military and terrorist attacks into neighbouring Iran. The MEK has held public demonstrations in Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. 15) Iraq's support of numerous Palestinian groups stems from one common denominator: the mutual hatred of Israel. The SADDAM HUSSEIN regime has been active in providing select Palestinian groups with financial backing (including payment to the families of suicide bombers). In the event of a war with the U.S., it is likely that a request could be made by the Iraqi regime for further assistance. The reaction to such a request will likely be mixed, with individuals, not necessarily groups, responding to the call. AL QAIDA: 16) Historically, Iraq and AL QAIDA have viewed each other with disdain. In the past several months, however, AL QAIDA has relocated an indeterminate portion of its operations to the Kurdish-held region in Northern Iraq with the knowledge of the Iraqi regime. The regime, using the IIS as a conduit, has courted AL QAIDA commanders / members in northern Iraq. In the event of military hostilities with the U.S., AL QAIDA would likely strike at the U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq or conduct terrorist operations against the West. 000071 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information -4- SECRET 17) There are individuals in Canada who are believed to support OSAMA BIN LADEN, AL QAIDA and other international Islamic extremist causes. Although many Islamic extremist supporters have been deported, arrested on immigration charges or extradited to foreign countries, others who remain are believed to be committed to the extremist cause. 18) On November 12, 2002, the Al Jazeera network aired an audio tape attributed to BIN LADEN in which he praised recent attacks, including those in Bali, Yemen, Kuwait and Moscow. In an address to countries participating in the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism, including Canada, he went on to say that 'just like you kill us, we will kill you' and threatened further violence should the U.S. declare war on Iraq. The specific mention of Canada in this recording increases the possibility of potential threats to Canadian interests internationally. 19) Although the Government of Canada has no specific information regarding any particular threats, Canadian interests have become a focus of direct AL QAIDA threats worldwide. In the past, after the release of video or audio tapes, attacks have occurred. After the release of the last OSAMA BIN LADEN videotape a series of small attacks took place culminating in the bombing in Mombassa, Kenya. AL QAIDA's history has shown that it typically strikes when ready and when there is a good chance of being successful. REACTION WITHIN CANADA: MUSLIM COMMUNITY: 20) Not unlike the 1991 Gulf War and the current "war on terrorism," there would be a perception within some quarters of the Canadian Muslim population that an attack on Iraq is in fact an attack on Islam. This could be particularly evident within Canadian Arab circles. 21) The continuing presence of a significant number of Maghreb Islamic extremists in Canada is of particular concern. Montreal remains the primary centre for these individuals, many of whom are Canadian citizens or permanent residents. In Europe, there is evidence that Islamic extremists are using the structured presence of Maghreb networks in Europe to stage terrorist attacks. In Canada, similar patterns are emerging. KURDISH COMMUNITY: 22) We are currently unaware of any serious expressions of concern within the Canadian Kurdish community in anticipation of a war in Iraq. If Kurdish groups are dislodged from their sanctuary in Iraq, they would not hesitate to blame the West and the U.S. in particular. As a result, demonstrations could be expected in Canada, and such protests would have the potential to become violent. 000072 �, Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information » -5- SECRET DEMONSTRATIONS: 23) In the event of military hostilities with Iraq, demonstrations are likely to target coalition diplomatic establishments both in Canada and abroad, as well as businesses and other high-profile entities throughout the world. They could also be aimed at other countries' facilities or personnel, particularly those involved in the military campaign or who are strongly supportive of U.S. actions. Should the military campaign inflict large numbers of Iraqi civilian casualties, demonstrations are likely to intensify. 24) Should the U.S. launch an attack against Iraq, there will likely be local protests in major Canadian cities by a wide variety of groups, among them, anti-war and anti-globalization groups. Demonstrations around the U.S. Embassy or Consulates General can be expected. 25) It is possible that demonstrations by anti-war groups, in conjunction with elements of anti-globalization groups, will result in violence. Anti-globalization activism continues to be directed primarily against multinational corporate power, international monetary institutions and global economic agreements. Since September 11, 2001, there have been indications that elements of the North American anti-globalization movement have begun to add an anti-war and anti-violence message in reaction to the American military response in Afghanistan. During the last year, anti-globalization supporters protested in cities such as Vancouver, Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal and Halifax. These demonstrations occurred without violence. In the past, certain anti-globalization groups have indicated they would target various government buildings and establishments, although this did not occur to any great extent. CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS ABROAD: 26) The Government of Canada regularly updates travel reports for countries assessed to pose security, terrorism or other threats to Canadians. On November 15, 2002, Canadians were advised to leave Iraq immediately. A global security advisory was also issued warning Canadians that demonstrations, strikes and civil unrest can occur worldwide, and urging Canadians to exercise extreme caution. 27) In the event of a war with Iraq, there will be a significant risk to coalition forces in the Middle East and worldwide. This risk could take the form of traditional terrorist attacks (assassinations, suicide bombings) or chemical or biological attacks. 28) Iraq has aggressively and covertly pursued nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs in the past. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq used artillery, tactical fighter aircraft and helicopters to deliver chemical agents, loaded in bombs and rockets. 000073 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'accds d /'information SECRET February 6, 2003 ___I Le present document est cote SECRET et est la propriete du gouvemement du Canada. 11 vous est envoye avec une lettre d’accompagnement et seuls le premier ministre/chef de votre gouvemement et certains ministres selectionnes ont aussi le droit d’en prendre connaissance. Le document ne doit etre ni recote ni diffuse de quelque faqon que ce soit, en tout ou en partie, sans le consentement de 1’auteur. Contact: Secretariat de la securite et du renseignement, Bureau du Conseil prive (613) 957-5657 Repercussions sur le Canada d’une guerre eventuelle contre 1’Irak , EVALUATION : 1) Une attaque contre 1’Irak pourrait faire peser des menaces terroristes sur les interets occidentaux partout dans le monde, y compris au Canada. Au nombre des cibles possibles figureraient vraisemblablement, par ordre de priorite, les interets americains et israeliens, puis ceux de tout pays occidental qui soutient activement les projets d’invasion des Americains. La menace pourrait provenir de groupes a la solde du regime irakien, par exemple le service de renseignement irakien (SRI), ou d’autres groupes qui pourraient se servir du conflit comme pretexte pour perpetrer un attentat terroriste. Il n’y a pas d’information qui laisse croire que d’autres groupes terroristes invoqueraient 1’invasion de 1’Irak pour justifier une campagne terroriste contre 1’Occident. Par contre, la situation pourrait changer si Israel participait au conflit. 2) On ignore comment Al-Qaida reagirait a une attaque contre 1’Irak, mais nul doute que cette organisation est en mesure de perpetrer des attentats terroristes partout dans le monde. Les interets canadiens a travers le monde sont d’autant plus menaces qu’Oussama Ben Laden mentionne precisement le Canada dans son message diffuse le 12 novembre 2002 par la chaine Al-Jazira, et laisse entrevoir que d’autres actes de violence pourraient etre commis. 3) Il n’existe a 1’heure actuelle aucun renseignement precis qui autoriserait a croire que 1’Irak commettra des attentats terroristes contre des cibles occidentales ou visera les Canadiens ou les interets canadiens au Canada ou a 1’etranger. On estime peu probable que Saddam Hussein commette des attentats terroristes preventifs contre les E.-U. ou d’autres pays alignes avant d’avoir epuise tous les recours sur les plans de la diplomatie et des relations publiques. A cet egard, il envisagerait vraisemblablement en premier lieu de perturber les preparatifs de guerre de la coalition. 000074 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information -2- I SECRET 4) Comme il n’y a qu’un seul diplomate irakien au Canada, cela limitera la capacite du gouvemement irakien a mener des activites de renseignement au Canada, ainsi qu’a surveiller les dissidents. 5) Dans le passe, 1 ’Irak a poursuivi activement et secretement le developpement d’armes de destruction massive (ADM). Saddam Hussein pourrait les utiliser si 1’effondrement de son regime est imminent. Des attaques et des attentats irakiens a 1’arme chimique ou biologique sont plausibies, mais ils exigeraient un important soutien logistique. 6) Au Canada, les manifestations reprendront vraisemblablement devant 1’ambassade des Etats-Unis et les ambassades des pays membres de la coalition et celle de 1’Irak ainsi que sur la colline du Parlement et devant les assemblies legislatives provinciales. Ces activites seront organisees suivant le deroulement des evenements. Au Canada, les manifestations recentes centre la guerre se sont deroulees sans qu’aucun incident ne soit signale. Les manifestations se poursuivront vraisemblablement a court terme. Toutefois, etant donne que les passions y sont souvent exacerbees, la possibility d’actes de violence spontanes ou premedites ne peut etre exclue. La GRC travaille etroitement avec les corps policiers provinciaux et municipaux dans le cadre d’operations regulieres, afin de prevoir et d’assurer, s’il y a lieu, la presence de forces de 1’ordre lors de manifestations. 7) Une intervention militaire en Irak pourrait declencher toutes sortes de canulars (p. ex. charbon). On pourrait aussi lire et entendre dans les medias des rumeurs et des affirmations de sources inconnues speculant sur diverses menaces. La coordination des communications, a 1’echelle federate et provincial, est essentielle pour eviter d’alarmer inutilement les Canadiens et leur rappeler que nos collectivites de la police, de la securite et du renseignement travaillent de concert pour les proteger. Des reactions prematurees pourraient en outre perturber les activites de collecte de renseignements. 8) Les mesures prises ces 15 demiers mois par les gouvemements federal et provinciaux ont permis d’ameliorer les outils d’echange d’informations, d’enquete et de collecte de renseignements ainsi que la capacite a parer a differentes eventualites, notamment des incidents chimiques, biologiques, radiologiques et nucleates (CBR.N). Ces secteurs sont tous vises par des plans d’urgence, ententes, protocoles federaux-provinciaux et/ou des arrangements entre organismes. Toute information sur des menaces precises doit etre communiquee immediatement a la police locale ou a la GRC. 000075 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -3- SECRET CONTEXTS: 9) L’eventualite d’une attaque militaire contre l’lrak par une coalition dirigee par les Etats-Unis souleve la possibility de represailles terroristes contre les E.-U. et d’autres Etats participants. Le regime de Saddam Hussein a montre qu’il est pret a mener des operations contre ses adversaires et qu’il en est capable. En outre, il est possible que le regime appuie les groupes terroristes qui operent contre les ennemis de l’lrak. A la veille de la guerre du Golfe en 1991, le regime de Saddam Hussein avait choisi des groupes et des commandos bien precis pour perpetrer des attentats terroristes contre les forces de la coalition et les interets des pays membres. SERVICE DE RENSEIGNEMENTS IRAKIEN (SRI): 10) Le role premier du SRI est de proteger le regime de Saddam Hussein. Sa capacity de mener des operations contre des ennemis reels ou potentiels du regime irakien constitue une preoccupation majeure. Toutefois, la volonte des officiers du SRI et de leurs agents de perpetrer des attentats contre les E.-U. ou les membres de la coalition est inconnue. U) Au Canada, le SRI cherche avant tout a reperer et a surveiller les opposants, les dissidents, les scientifiques expatries, les transfuges ainsi que les diplomates et les militaires reinstalles. 12) L’lrak compte trois postes de diplomate a son ambassade a Ottawa, mais seulement un est occupe actuellement. GROUPES TERRORISTES AFFILIES: 13) Il est connu que l’lrak apporte un soutien direct a de nombreux groupes terroristes, dont les MOUDJAHIDIN DU PEUPLE (MEK), 1’organisation dissidente iranienne, et plusieurs groupes palestiniens qui menent des activites terroristes contre Israel. 14) Les MEK sont bases dans le nord de l’lrak, d’ou ils lancent des attaques militaires et terroristes contre I Tran voisin. Ils ont organise des manifestations a Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal et Vancouver. 15) Un denominates commun amene l’lrak a appuyer de nombreux groupes palestiniens : la haine d’lsrael. Le regime irakien apporte un appui financier a certains groupes palestiniens (dont le versement d’une somme d’argent aux families des kamikazes). En cas de guerre avec les E.-U., le regime irakien demanderait probablement davantage d’aide. Or ce sont vraisemblablement des particuliers qui repondraient a cette demande, pas forcement des groupes. 000076 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue.en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information -4- SECRET AL-QAIDA: 16) L’lrak n’a toujours eu que du dedain pour Al-Qaida et inversement. Depuis quelques mois toutefois, Al-Qaida mene un nombre indetermine d’operations depuis la region du nord de l’lrak sous controle kurde, au vu et au su du regime irakien. Ce demier, par 1’intermediaire du SRI, courtise les commandants et les membres d’Al-Qaida dans le nord du pays. En cas de conflit avec les E.-U., Al-Qaida attaquerait probablement les Americains et les forces de la coalition en Irak ou menerait des operations terroristes contre 1’Occident. 17) On croit que certaines personnes au Canada soutiennent Oussama Ben Laden, Al-Qaida et d’autres causes de 1’islamisme mondial. Bien que de nombreux partisans de 1’extremisme islamique aient ete expulses, arretes pour des inculpations liees a 1’immigration ou extrades vers d’autres pays, ceux qui restent sont censes etre engages dans la cause extremiste. 18) Le 12 novembre 2002, la chaine Al-Jazira a diffuse un enregistrement dans laquelle la voix, qui serait celle de Oussama Ben Laden, fait 1'eloge des recents attentats, dont ceux perpetres a Bali, au Yemen, au Koweit et a Moscou. S'adressant aux pays membres de la coalition contre le terrorisme dirigee par les E.-U., dont le Canada, la voix declare : « Nous vous tuerons, comme vous nous tuez ». Elie affirme que d'autres actes de violence seront commis si les E.-U. declarent la guerre a 1'Irak. La mention precise du Canada fait davantage craindre la menace de represailles contre les interets canadiens dans le monde. 19) Meme si le gouvemement du Canada ne possede aucune information precise sur quelque menace que ce soit, les menaces d'Al-Qaida sont maintenant dirigees contre les interets canadiens partout dans le monde. Par le passe, des attentats ont ete commis suite a la diffusion d'enregistrements audio ou video. Apres la diffusion de la demiere bande video de Oussama Ben Laden, une serie de petits attentats ont ete commis, atteignant un sommet avec celui perpetre a Mombassa au Kenya. Al-Qaida a generalement 1'habitude de frapper lorsqu'il est pret et lorsque ses chances de reussite sont bonnes. REACTION AU CANADA: COMMUNAUTE MUSULMANE: 20) Comme cela a ete le cas lots de la guerre du Golfe en 1991 et comme aujourd’hui dans la « guerre contre le terrorisme », certains secteurs de la communaute musulmane du Canada pourraient croire qu’une attaque contre l’lrak equivaut a une attaque contre 1’islam. Cela pourrait etre particulierement evident dans les cercles arabes du Canada. 000077 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accts a /'information -5- SECRET 21) La presence au Canada d’un nombre important d’extremistes islamistes maghrebins inquiete tout particulierement. Montreal demeure leur principal point de convergence, et bon nombre d’entre eux sont citoyens canadiens ou residents permanents. En Europe, il est evident que les extremistes islamistes utilisent les reseaux maghrebins structures pour commettre des attentats terroristes. L’amorce d’un phenomene semblable a ete constatee au Canada. COMMUNAUTE KURDE: 22) Nous n’avons jusqu’ici constate dans la communaute kurde du Canada aucune expression d’inquietude serieuse au sujet d’une eventuelle guerre en Irak. Si les groupes kurdes etaient chasses de leur sanctuaire en Irak, ils n’hesiteraient pas a blamer 1’Occident et les E.-U. en particulier. Le Canada pourrait done s’attendre a des manifestations sur son territoire, et celles-ci pourraient devenir violentes. MANIFESTATIONS: 23) En cas de conflit militaire avec 1’Irak, des manifestations seraient vraisemblablement organisees contre les etablissements diplomatiques des membres de la coalition au Canada et a 1’etranger, de meme que contre des entreprises et d’autres organisations importantes dans le monde entier. Des manifestations pourraient egalement etre organisees contre les installations ou le personnel d’autres pays, surtout ceux qui prennent part a la campagne militaire ou appuient sans reserve les E.-U. Les manifestations s’intensifieront vraisemblablement si la campagne militaire fait un grand nombre de morts et de blesses parmi la population civile en Irak. 24) Si les Americains lancent une attaque contre 1’Irak, des groupes de toutes sortes, dont ceux qui sont opposes a la guerre et a la mondialisation, manifesteront vraisemblablement dans les grandes villes du Canada. Il faut s’attendre a des manifestations devant 1’ambassade ou les consulats des E.-U. 25) Il est possible que des manifestations des groupes opposes a la guerre, en collaboration avec certains elements des groupes antimondialisation, degenerent en violence. Les militants antimondialisation continuent de s’en prendre surtout aux multinationales, aux institutions monetaires intemationales et aux accords economiques mondiaux. Depuis le 11 septembre 2001, il y a lieu de croire que des elements du mouvement antimondialisation nord-americain ont commence a ajouter a leurs propos des messages centre la guerre et la violence en reaction a 1’intervention de 1’armee americaine en Afghanistan. L’an demier, des partisans de 1’antimondialisation ont manifesto a Vancouver, Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Calgary et Halifax, sans qu’aucun acte de violence ne soit signale. Dans le passe, certains groupes antimondialisation ont exprime leur intention de prendre pour cibles divers immeubles et institutions du gouvemement, mais cela ne s’est pas concretise sur une grande echelle. 000078 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information -------------- -■ V ' -6- SECRET CAPACITES ET INTENTIONS A L’ETRANGER: 26) Le gouvemement du Canada actualise regulierement les renseignements consulaires aux voyageurs afin de les sensibiliser a tout ce qui pourrait menacer leur securite. Ainsi, le 15 novembre 2002, les Canadiens ont ete informes de quitter l’lrak immediatement. Un avis de securite mondiale a egalement ete publie afin d’avertir les Canadiens que des manifestions, des greves et des troubles civils pourraient survenir a 1’echelle du globe, et de les inviter a etre extremement prudents. 27) Si la guerre est declaree a l’lrak, les forces de la coalition au Moyen-Orient et ailleurs courront un grave danger. Par exemple, elles pourraient faire 1’objet d’attaques terroristes traditionnelles (assassinats, attentats suicide a la bombe) ou d’attaques a I’arme chimique ou biologique. 28) L’lrak a poursuivi activement et secretement par le passe des programmes de developpement d’armes nucleates, chimiques et biologiques. Durant la guerre avec 1’Iran, l’lrak a utilise 1’artillerie ainsi que des chasseurs et des helicopteres tactiques pour lancer des roquettes et des bombes contenant des agents chimiques. 29) On estime que si l’lrak a des armes nucleates, sa capacite de lancer une attaque nucleaire est faible. L’lrak a par ailleurs demontre sa capacite de mener une attaque a I’arme chimique et biologique. Il existe peu d’informations indiquant que l’lrak a mis au point des applications et des methodes destinees a 1’utilisation d’armes chimiques et biologiques a des fins terroristes. Il existe en revanche des renseignements qui autorisent a croire que Saddam Hussein compte utiliser des agents chimiques et biologiques contre ses voisins, dont Israel, le Koweit, I’Arabie saoudite, la Jordanie et la Turquie, mais seulement en cas de defaite imminente. Il pourrait utiliser a cette fin des lance-missiles mobiles. Le charbon demeure 1’agent de menace de guerre biologique le plus plausible. Bien qu’il n’y ait pas confirmation que l’lrak possede des stocks de variole (s’ils existent), la variole constitue une autre menace importante. 30) Sans 1’exclure completement, le risque d’exposition a la variole en meme temps qu’un conflit possible en Irak est tres faible. Sante Canada negocie 1’achat de vaccins antivarioliques pour immuniser les Canadiens contre une eventuelle attaque bioterroriste et mieux preparer le Canada a faire face a une telle urgence. 31) L’une des strategies qu’emploiera peut-etre l’lrak dans sa guerre contre une coalition dirigee par les E.-U. consistera, comme cela a ete le cas lors de la guerre du Golfe, a attaquer Israel au moyen de missiles Scud. Israel a dit qu’il ripostera si l’lrak 1’attaque, ce qui accroitrait les tensions et pourrait influencer les pays arabes a former une coalition. Il existe aussi une possibility que des groupes terroristes opposes aux Israeliens, dont des extremistes palestiniens et le Hezbollah, profitent de la situation pour lancer contre Israel des attaques terroristes ou militaires a partir du Liban. 000079 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Lol sur I'accds d /'information 1 -7- SECRET 32) Le regime irakien envisage aussi de mener des operations informatiques en cas de guerre. 11 y a lieu de croire que des pirates pourraient mener des actions independantes ou communes dans le cadre d’une attaque coordonnee contre les E.-U. et la coalition occidentale. Divers groupes terroristes, dont Al-Qaida et le Hezbollah, maitrisent de mieux en mieux Internet et les autres technologies informatiques. 33) Un « appel » adresse aux opposants a la guerre et aux E.-U. circule actuellement sur Internet, les invitant a s’unir et a lancer une cyber-attaque centre les E.-U. et leurs allies. Selon certaines informations, ces opposants, particuliers et groupes, preparent des cyber-represailles a une agression contre 1’Irak. 000080 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00019 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003-01-12-31 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-100289 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/1b122d3e75ea86ebaa5797fc99688088.pdf bbc2577c5ce093d4f3df3caca08921c8 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 8C0001 18G Sec 1 SEC 1812D-18-8 DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS M. BLOODWORTH International Plans and Operations | L.J Iraq LZZ) /7 f CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS MINISTRE - MME M. BLOODWORTH Plans et operation^^d^^^i^sjj Iraq '"S/Rd s TO- REMARKS ■ REMARQUES A init. D&te Date Init. < Date lc*,ncel ’ ' Annuler REGISTRY ONLY I IDEPOT CENTRAL Inspected -ti w Inspect^ ■ Date . IT ' . .'' I II - — ■ RAPPEL ?no' ?00l[ -+-FS o 00 - U aF < RwiSfeR-.'' CIRCULATION’ -- ----■ ■it - ’.yi: -< 7 ■& ■ §r ■ • -?— 00 ■ 00 ,= |.< 2a eg I 3 H 8 er I . ■ BS I -; -- -■ <u ■ o ■, ■ ° =— la£ !s :_____ ______. jL_ 00 = Fenns Management 893-4C > des tonnulaires 993-3 000027 V.v - �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information " FILE MAINTENANCE CHECKLIST USTE DE CONTR&LE POUR HENTRETIEN DU DOSSIER Protect all files and records as official property. ProtEger tous les dossiers et les documents comme Etantla propriEtE officielle. / Clean records prior to adding them to files. Nettoyer les documents ayant de lesaj'outer E leur dossier respectif. Remove all envelopes, flags, tags, pins, spikes, clips and superfluous staples. Enlever tout articles inutiles (enveloppes, papiHons, Etiquettes, Epingies, trombones, attaches: feuilles, agrafes etc.). File papers and TDs chronologically, the latest date on top. Glasser les documents eh ordre chronologique, la date la plus. recente sur Je dessus. : Prepunch holes at the top left corner of the papers.. Percef des trous du coin supErieur gauche du document. Attach papers to the file by a paper spike for easy handling. Pour facilrter la manutention, attacher les documents au dossier , au moyen d’une attache-feuille. When a file becomes thicker than • 2’, a subsequent volume should be created. Lorsque le dossier a plus de 2” d’Epaisseur, crEer un nouveau volume. Destroy duplicate material. Keep a copy only If it has additional Information. DEtruire tous les duplicates qui ne contiennent aucun renseignements supplEmentaires. Verify the security classification of. new documents added to the file. Verifier la cote de sEcuritE des nouveaux documents ajoutE au dossier. Upgrade the,file' to the required level as required. Augmenter la cote de sEcuritE si . nEcessaire. 000028 — �Docupteqt disclosed under the Access to Information A Docum([rt djju^tejm^r^ie la Loi sur faeces a /’inform □>fr\ ) T'\^€io jx-z^x GW-n 000029 �L Document disclosed under the Access tojnformation Act '.wffeDtdiyjjIgu&en vertuAe latyi s&l'acc& cfl'inQpmation SECRET (CEO) SECRET (CC) -iSia-oChief of the Defence Staff National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Chef d’etat-major de la Defense SECRET (CO CBN EYES OMY Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 O WtS2-' JAN 3 0 » The Minister DEPLOYMENT OF A CANADIAN FORCES LIAISON TEAM TO QATAR 1. For operational security, and to ensure that appropriate attention continues to be paid to the campaign against terrorism, US Central Command is dividing its headquarters into two staffs: one focused on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and one dedicated to planning for possible action against Iraq. To further reinforce this division of responsibilities, the US has now deployed its staff focused on Iraq planning to Qatar. As such, Canadian Forces officers currently in Tampa have now lost access to knowledge of planning for any eventual action against Iraq. In order that they may maintain effective contact with US forces, we recommend that you agree to the deployment of a team of Canadian Forces liaison officers to Qatar. We also wish to emphasize that a decision in this regard is considered a matter of urgency - the train may literally leave the station, without the Canadian Forces, if the recommended deployment is not authorized at this time. 2. Deploying the Canadian liaison team to Qatar to interface with all staff functions of the US deployed headquarters is essential, at least initially, to allow maximum exposure to all facets of operational planning for a possible campaign against Iraq. This deployment would in no way prejudge the final decision to be made by the Government of Canada with respect to possible military participation in any potential campaign against Iraq. It would, however, preserve the Government’s ability to make an informed decision and to ensure that the required information is available both to the Government and, in the event that Canada elected to participate militarily, to Canadian Forces military planners. We have been informed that both Australia and the United Kingdom intend to deploy liaison teams to Qatar and have already pre-positioned equipment within the region, notwithstanding the fact that their participation in any eventual military action will still be subject to national decisions taken at the appropriate time. A decision to simply retain a liaison presence at CENTCOM in Tampa would severely compromise the initial progress made in gaining insight into US planning efforts. Additionally, our liaison officers attached to the US Component SECRET (CO EYES ONLY 1/2 1*1 National Defence Defense nationale SECRET (CEO) SECRET (CC) Canada 000030 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET (CEO) Commands in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are in discussions regarding the military capabilities Canada is considering. 3. Time is of the essence. If you approve, we will so inform the Privy Council Office and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. We further recommend that you sign the enclosed letter to the Prime Minister. R.R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff Margaret Bloodworth Deputy Minister Enclosures: 2 Approve John McCallum Minister of National Defence Date 2/2 SECRET (CEO) 000031 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET(CC) The Right Honourable Jean Chretien, P.C..Q.C., M.P..LL.L, LL.D., Prime Minister of Canada Langevin Block 80 Wellington Street Ottawa ON K1A0A2 Dear Prime Minister: Deployment of a Canadian Forces Liaison Team to Qatar For operational security, and to ensure that appropriate attention continues to be paid to the campaign against terrorism, US Central Command is dividing its headquarters into two staffs: one focused on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and one dedicated to planning for possible action against Iraq. To further reinforce this division of responsibilities, the US has deployed its staff focused on Iraq planning to Qatar. As such, Canadian Forces officers currently in Tampa have now lost access to knowledge of planning for any eventual action against Iraq. This is to inform you that I have authorized the deployment of a Canadian Forces liaison team to Qatar to preserve access to US military planning for possible action against Iraq. This deployment will in no way prejudge the final decision to be made by the Government of Canada with respect to possible military participation in any potential campaign against Iraq. It would, however, preserve the Government’s ability to make an informed decision and ensure that the required information is available both to the Government and, in the event that Canada elected to participate militarily, to Canadian Forces military planners. We have been informed that both Australia and the United Kingdom intend to deploy liaison teams to Qatar and have already pre-positioned equipment within the region, notwithstanding the fact that their participation in any eventual military action will still be subject to national decisions taken at the appropriate time. Minister Graham has been advised and concurs. Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence Cc The Honourable Bill Graham, P.O., M.P. ^CRET(CC) SECRET (CC) 000032 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET (CEO) BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ISSUE • Whether a Canadian Forces liaison team be deployed to Qatar, and currently deployed liaison officers at Coalition Forces Land, Maritime and Air Component Command headquarters continue to conduct liaison with respect to potential military action against Iraq. BACKGROUND • On 4 December, Canada responded to a US request regarding a possible Canadian contribution to a potential coalition against Iraq by suggesting that military authorities begin discussions on a possible Canadian contribution. For Canada, the purpose of these military-to-military discussions was to seek information for use in developing options for the Government and to ensure that the Canadian Forces are well prepared for all contingencies and for cooperation with other partners in the event of future military action, if approved by the Government of Canada. • US operational planning is well-advanced and continues to be refined daily in order that US forces are prepared to implement any political decision to commence initial operations against Iraq as early as mid-February or early March. The Canadian liaison team, which arrived at CENTCOM in Tampa, Florida, in late December 2002, has been made privy to much of the planning process and has been instrumental in assisting National Defence Headquarters’ development of plausible options for governmental consideration. j DISCUSSION • For operational security, and to ensure that appropriate attention continues to be paid to the campaign against terrorism, CENTCOM is dividing its headquarters into two staffs: one focused on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and one dedicated to planning for possible action against Iraq. To further reinforce this division of responsibilities, CENTCOM has deployed its staff focused on Iraq planning to Qatar. Additionally, operational planning for possible military action against Iraq is being conducted at the Coalition Forces Land (Kuwait), Air (Saudi Arabia) and Maritime (Bahrain) Component Command headquarters. • Canadian Forces officers currently in Tampa have now lost access to planning for any eventual action against Iraq. In order that they may continue their liaison activities in an effective manner, consideration should be given to sending a small liaison team to Qatar in conjunction with the CENTCOM deployment. We have been informed that both Australia and the United 1/2 SECRET(CEO) 000034 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET(CEO) Kingdom intend to deploy liaison teams to Qatar and have already prepositioned equipment within the region, notwithstanding the fact that their participation in any eventual military action will still be subject to national decisions taken at the appropriate time. • The deployment of a liaison team to Qatar, and having the currently deployed liaison officers at Coalition Forces’ Land, Maritime and Air Component headquarters continue their discussions on Iraq, would in no way prejudge the final political decision to be made by the Government of Canada with respect to possible military participation in any potential campaign against Iraq. It would, however, preserve the Government’s ability to make an informed decision by ensuring that the required information is available both to the Government and, in the event that Canada elected to participate militarily, to Canadian Forces military planners. A decision to simply retain a liaison presence at CENTCOM in Tampa would severely compromise the initial progress made in gaining insight into US planning efforts on Iraq. • The incremental cost for deployment of the Canadian liaison team to Qatar over a six-month period has been estimated at $250,000 for a team comprising 14 planners and 11 communications/support staff that would be capable of continuous operations, i.e. 24 hours per day, 7 days per week (24/7). • The deployment would also be contingent on Canada seeking appropriate diplomatic clearances. If you agree, preparations for deploying the liaison team could begin immediately. • The Department of Foreign Affairs has been consulted and concurs. A letter to the Prime Minister is enclosed for the Minister of National Defence’s signature. Prepared by: Consulted: Responsible Director: Responsible Director General: Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Corn Barr, DPK Pol 6, 996-1741 LCol J.R. Forestell. DPK Pol 3, 992-3976 J3 Int'l Col G. C0t6, DPK Pol, 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross, DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM(Pol), 992-3458 16 January 2003 2/2 SECRET(CEO) 000033 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00018 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003-01-12-31 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-100289 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/3c89c2176341edba4942720675e2c0f2.pdf ee3e8493876af6db0cadb4ec9205eaee PDF Text Text >sea under the Access to Information ArtH I Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a I'informa^^^ A 8C0001 1812D-18-8 15G Sec 2 SEC DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS M. BLOODWORTH International Plans and Operations n i Iraq CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS MINISTRE - MME M. BLOODWORTH U ^n Iraq et CWRDENCES SSS/RDS CIRCULATION • RANGER --- ---------------- 1’ TO . A • REMARKS REMARQUES Date • ' -■ * .1 InM ln* I Date Init B.F.' RAPPEL JJRY T CE n. FtBWW <Z1 O I ' “------- :—■—4--------- - -------------------- k> J ■! r X, I -X —------- 1 I 4 1 QO CN 00 mI '< £> Q o o 2 H o w J, 00 -r-r «■ - io = — oo 705 TSJO^I <94-4101 □00004 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulgue en vertu de ia Loi sur I'acces a /'information FILE MAINTENANCE CHECKLIST USTE DE CONTR6LE POUREENTRETIEN DU DOSSIER Protect all files and records as officialproperty. • ■ Clean records prio(te adding them to files. Remove all envelopes, flags, tags, pins, spikes, clips and superfluous . staples. ProtEger tous les dossiers et les documents comma Etant la propriety officielle. Nettoyer les documents avant de les ajouter a leur dossier respectif. \ '* Enlever tout articles inutiles (enveloppes, papilloris, Etiquettes,. Epingles, trombones, attachesfeuiRes, agrafes etc.). ■ □ File papers and TDs chronologically, the latest date on top. Classer Jes documents en ordre chrpnotogique, la date la plus rEcente sur le dessus. Prepunch holes at the top. left corner'of the papers. Percer des trous du coin supErieur gauche du document. Attach papers to the file by a paper spike for easy handling. Pour faoiliter.la manutention, attacher les documents au dossier au moyen d’une attache-feuiHe. . When a file becomes thicker than 2", a subsequent volume should Jje created. Lorsque'le dossier a plus de 2” d’Epaisseur, crEer un nouveau volume. Destroy duplicate material. Keep a copy only if it has additional information: DEtruire tous les duplicates qui ne contiennent aucun renseignements supplEmentaires. Verify the security classification of new documents added to the file. Verifier la cote da security des houveaux documents ajoutE au dossier. ; Upgrade the file to the required level as required. Augmenter la cote de sEcuritE si nEcessaire. - a I ■ 1 SK-? 000005 ’I .'a �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information \j c _Aa a j e_c-v~\ v> 'JCl't X Ki-' c c. ot-\ \s. >—A-\ Va v ~*s .-€_ 3> v^<=^ VA\^S.C- \s»s»'_A e_c\ . A S>e.c_c=> w cX-x4xvx^e_ 'ZXZX CK<X 'Ajcxs Ca v x v x o x av x c - e-wx«yx\ CT.\<=. c^=i'xx^:> • C_-^-.vv -e_v\V- v <_v &xOv-x \s o j tvr\ s» • O.\-O.x.000006 xr \ ----- ' V« - ic. �Document disclosed under the Acc^ss.to.lnfofmgtion Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lcf^ur !jacf& OjiJnf3^!S)ion\zl SECRET National Defence Defense nationale National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 SECRET (CC) JUN 0 9 2003 The Minister DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN FORCES’ EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION 1. On 18 March 2003, the Prime Minister approved continued Canadian Forces participation in Operation Enduring Freedom in light of the imminent US-led military operation against Iraq. Within the context of this direction, restrictions were imposed that Canadian Forces transport aircraft operating in the Persian Gulf region were not to be used to support, directly or indirectly, military action against Iraq. In addition, all Canadian operations were to be undertaken within the existing Operation Apollo area of responsibility, excluding Iraq and that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North). 2. On 22 May 2003, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1483. Resolution 1483 lifted all prohibitions related to trade with Iraq under previous Security Council Resolutions with the exception of prohibitions concerning arms and related material. Further, Resolution 1483 calls upon all member states in a position to do so to respond immediately to the humanitarian appeals of the United Nations and other international organizations. Consequently, Resolution 1483 provides a framework within which Canada and other non-occupying power states may work with the US and British occupying powers referred to as “the Authority” Subsequently, the Prime Minister directed that Canadian Forces transport aircraft 3. were to be offered to the Authority to provide airlift in support of stabilization and reconstruction missions. The first mission to Iraq was flown on 2 June. These aircraft, deployed in the United Arab Emirates, are tasked in support of the upcoming deployment to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul. These aircraft will also be used to provide the agreed support to the UN mandated mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This UN mission will nominally employ two of the four aircraft in theatre. Therefore, support to the Iraq mission will be subject to operational priorities and aircraft serviceability. In order to facilitate operational and logistical arrangements, Canadian Forces 4. participation in stabilization and reconstruction activities will continue to be conducted under the operational control of “the Authority” as defined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483. At all times, Canadian Forces members remain under the 1/2 Canada SECRET SECRET (CC) 000007 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET command of the Chief of the Defence Staff. Additionally, the previous geographic restriction on Canadian Forces operations meant that Canadian Forces aircraft had been unable to accept transport taskings to and from Kuwait under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom. 5. To enable the Canadian Forces to execute the Prime Minister’s direction, the restrictions in respect of airlift by Canadian Forces transport aircraft in support of Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction missions and the geographic restrictions on Canadian Forces operations in Iraq and in that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North) have been removed. The removal of the restriction permits Canadian Forces aircraft to conduct missions through Kuwait for the delivery of loads exclusively in support of the campaign against terrorism and in accordance with Canadian national objectives. 6. Finally, the removal of the geographic restriction has also permitted the Canadian naval task group to conduct Operation Apollo missions in the Northern Persian Gulf in accordance with Canadian national objectives or other missions as may be directed by the Government of Canada. 7. If you agree, we recommend that you sign the enclosed letter to the Prime Minister. Foreign Affairs and the Privy Council Office have been consulted and concur with this approach. a/ R.R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff Margaret Bloodworth Deputy Minister Enclosures: 1 APPROVE Date: The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. 2/2 000008 SECRET �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information 1 SECRET (CO The Right Honourable Jean Chretien, P.C., Q.C., M.P., LL.L, LL.D., Prime Minister of Canada Langevin Block 80 Wellington Street Ottawa ON K1A0A2 Dear Prime Minister: This letter seeks to confirm your verbal direction of 22 May removing certain restrictions in respect of Canadian Forces operations in the Persian Gulf region. Within the context of existing direction, which you approved on 18 March 2003, Canadian Forces transport aircraft in the Persian Gulf region were not to be used to support, directly or indirectly, military action against Iraq. In addition, all Canadian operations were to be undertaken within the existing Operation Apollo area of responsibility, excluding Iraq and that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North). On 22 May 2003, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1483. Resolution 1483 lifted all prohibitions related to trade with Iraq under previous Security Council Resolutions with the exception of prohibitions concerning arms and related material. Further, Resolution 1483 calls upon all member states in a position to do so to respond immediately to the humanitarian appeals of the United Nations and other international organizations. Consequently, Resolution 1483 provides a framework within which Canada and other non-occupying power states may work with the US and British occupying powers referred to as “the Authority.” Further to your verbal direction of 22 May 2003, Canadian Forces transport aircraft were tasked to provide airlift in support of stabilization and reconstruction missions to Iraq. The first mission to Iraq was flown on 2 June. These aircraft, deployed in the United Arab Emirates, are tasked in support of the upcoming deployment to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul. These aircraft will also be used to provide the agreed support to the UN mandated mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This UN mission will nominally employ two of the four aircraft in theatre. Therefore, support to the Iraq mission will be subject to operational priorities and aircraft serviceability. In order to facilitate operational and logistical arrangements, Canadian Forces • participation in stabilization and reconstruction activities will continue to be conducted under the operational control of “the Authority” as defined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483. At all times, Canadian Forces members remain under the command of the Chief of the Defence Staff. Additionally, the previous geographic restriction on Canadian Forces operations meant that Canadian Forces aircraft had been 000009 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lbi sur I'acces a /'information unable to accept transport taskings to and from Kuwait under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom. To enable the Canadian Forces to execute your direction, the restrictions in respect of airlift by Canadian Forces transport aircraft in support of Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction missions and the geographic restrictions on Canadian Forces operations in Iraq and in that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North) have been removed. The removal of the restriction permits Canadian Forces aircraft to conduct missions through Kuwait for the delivery of loads exclusively in support of the campaign against terrorism and in accordance with Canadian national objectives. Finally, the removal of the geographic restriction has also permitted the Canadian naval task group to conduct Operation Apollo missions in the Northern Persian Gulf in accordance with Canadian national objectives or other missions as may be directed by the Government of Canada. Minister Graham has also been apprised of your verbal direction and concurs with the present conduct of operations. Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. r-3.-V- 000010 �SECRET (CC) Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information * Zip Sid SECRET C C (UNCLASSIFIED Without Enclosure) ccmMercury Routing Slip W'/ £ General Correspondence Wednesday, June 04, 2003 Document Date: 5/1/2003 BF : Input Date: 5/2/2003 Due Date: 6/5/2003 Org/Gp: CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF Document: 674270 Control No: CDS2003-366036 File No: 3451-6 Subject: DIRECTION CF TRANSPORT OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES TO IRAQ - DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION Author: Sect/Dept: Org: DR. KENNETH J. CALDER ADM POL Assigned Date: Inti: Task: Routing BF: Assigned To: REC’D 5/2/2003 CDS SO 5/2/2003 SODM FOR SIGNATURE 5/2/2003 DMEA FOR DM SIGNATURE 5/5/2003 MCU DM HAS SIGNED 6/3/2003 CDS SO 6/3/2003 SODM TO BE RESIGNED 6/3/2003 SODM FOR DM SIGNATURE AGAIN (AMENDED BY CDS) 6/4/2003 ADMPOL REC’D FROM DPK POL WITH CORRECTIONS FYA/PICK-UP BY LCOL THOMPSON SECRET C C SECRET (CC) (UNCLASSIFIED Without Enclosure) 000011 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET (UNCLASSIFIED Without Enclosure) / Sous-/M ccmMercury Routing SiiPfeni General Correspondence 3-Jun-03 / Document: 674270 Control No: CDS2003-366036 File No: 3451-6 ® 0 3 Zt-'J Document Date: 01/05/£00§epufy (vJ(. BF : Input Date: 02/05«GC^21*£na/>• Due Date: 05/06/2003 Org/Gp: CHIEF OF THED?FEn £| STAFF Subject: DIRECTION CF TRANSPORT OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES TO IRAQ - DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION Author: Sect/Dept: Org: DR. KENNETH J. CALDER ADM POL Assigned Date: Assigned To: Task: Inti: Routing BF: 02/05/2003 CDS SO 02/05/2003 SODM FOR SIGNATURE 02/05/2003 DMEA FOR DM SIGNATURE 05/05/2003 MCU DM HAS SIGNED 03/06/2003 CDS SO 03/06/2003 SODM REC'D REC'D FROM DPK POL WITH CORRECTIONS TO BE RESIGNED SECRET (UNCLASSIFIED Without Enclosure) 000012 �^Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act D^cyment divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information 1*1 Director Asia Pacific Policy Directeur des Politiques Asie Pacifique 22 Hy o3 KJlF [i^iOvx '$ T’cc Iv-i5 ;• /- (JC-CCC 'fit iU Lo. t-vx 4 V' * IV1 Co w \w a *>'*^3 T) PACT* ftrkr Cc^^tkvv, "^itr ij;\ rCv P.D. McFadden Capt(N) DAP Pol 995-9059 .v'i<r^A rL'ir (-. j IbC. (BUoJ? •< 2S ^3 000013 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information , SECRET ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN FORCES’ EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION File #/Numero de reference: 3450-1 (Corri Barr, D PK Pol 6) DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI FROM/DE: r MLm V” D PkPol/DIpol MP Date: W Concur: COS J3/CEM J3 Date: 4J ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) FROM/DE: /^GlW/DG Pol SI I V Date: 22_^u\^5 Concur: -xigj JAG/JAG Date: Concur: I >" J I) d c d s /s Cemd Date: ^.£<4J CDS/CEMD DM/SM FROM/DE: ADM Pol/SMA Pol Date: SECRET REF: 35538 000014 �MAY.26.2003 2:21PM DLAWOPS OTTAWA Document discf^Q'tl^ffir the to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de Io Loi sur I'accis a /'information EUHBI ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVO! DE SMA(POL) -----------Subject/Objet DIRECTION-REGARDINGCANADIAN-FORCES'EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION File #/Num6ro de reference: 34S0»1 (Corri Barr, D PK Pol 6) DGISPol/DQ Pol SI FROM/DE: Date: 'ol/D fol MP IXol loo * Concur1 COSJ3/CEMJ3 * Date: ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) • FROM/DE: il/DQ Pol SI V Cats: 22.4, Concur i~r/^4^- JA3/JAG . . „ Date:^/9^0’ Concur ■ DCDS/SCEMD Date: CDS/CEMD DM/SM FROM/DE: ADM Pol/SMAPol Date: SECRET REF: 36538 • -.'Jftte. 000015 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET MINUTE 22 May 03 MCU Direction for CF in the Gulf Region 1. An amended version of the “Direction Regarding CF Employment Restrictions in the Gulf Region” (ref: MCU2003-02923C). 2. The file had already been signed off by both the CDS and DM, however, subsequent direction from the PM and the adoption of a UNSCR lifting sanctions on Iraq necessitated a number of cli&nges in the document. Isl J.R. Fofestell Cq /Co I x D PK Pol 992-1872 SECRET 000016 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divtigif: egnertu d&Ja Loi sur I'accis a /'information 7 jo X D PK POL % DIRECTORATE OF PEACEKEEPING POLICY/ DIRECTION DE LA POLITIQUE DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX D POL MP TO/A REMARKS/REMARQUES ^ CA GO s &Or>ZoG- Dg Dj OC.&5 c VSJ&O3 -3 (,6 ottfo q^o} <^^./MX-AAL^-C-g -Ox^e «., ■» ^ < ■ 7^ DATE INITIALS / Li /1^>A n Oj^. 43 yO^ ft/r<Xz0' yex^ Gpp-o->il. 23 S Za I-x _____ APf£o\jAL DM fe_ Go I3P /(, fa? S’/ZA/AT<J£i> o3 <03 63 To 000017 �S*l Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET National Defence Defense nationale National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 MAY 0 5 20© The Minister DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN FORCES’ EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION On 18 March 2003, the Prime Minister approved continued Canadian Forces 1. participation in Operation Enduring Freedom in light of the imminent US-led military operation against Iraq. Within the context of this direction, restrictions were imposed that Canadian Forces transport aircraft operating in the Persian Gulf region were not to be used to support, directly or indirectly, military action against Iraq. In addition, all Canadian operations were to be undertaken within the existing Operation Apollo area of responsibility, excluding Iraq and that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North). 2. With the active phase of the armed conflict in Iraq at an end, Canada is about to participate in humanitarian relief operations and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The use of Canadian Forces assets will provide visible Canadian assistance to US-led or other internationally directed relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and will reinforce the multidisciplinary nature of Canada’s overall approach to the crisis. 3. It is therefore recommended that the restrictions in respect of delivery of humanitarian aid by Canadian Forces transport aircraft to Iraq and the geographic restrictions on Canadian Forces operations in Iraq and in that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North) be removed. Such removal will permit the Canadian Forces to action any requests for support in the delivery of humanitarian relief assistance and reconstruction materials by Canadian Forces transport aircraft to Iraq in accordance with normal staffing procedures requiring policy, operational and legal sign-off. Requests will be individually considered given that legal issues exist as a consequence of the United Nations sanctions regime against Iraq remaining in place at the present time. Additionally, the current geographic restriction on Canadian operations means that Canadian Forces aircraft have been unable to accept transport taskings to and from Kuwait under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom. Given that it is possible to distinguish between loads intended to support Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, the removal of the restriction will permit the Canadian Forces aircraft to resume missions through Kuwait for the delivery of loads exclusively in support of the campaign against terrorism and in accordance with Canadian national objectives. 1/2 Canada SECRET 000018 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'accis a I'information SECRET 4. The removal of the restrictions will also permit the Canadian naval task group to conduct Operation Apollo missions in the Northern Persian Gulf in accordance with Canadian national objectives or other missions as may be directed by the Government of Canada. 5. If you agree, we recommend that you sign the enclosed letter to the Prime Minister. &R. Henault General Chief of the Defence Staff Margaret Bloodworth Deputy Minister Enclosures: 2 APPROVE The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. 2/2 Date: iiiingiiiiiiiiiiniiiiiiiiM -cuass-reK?: ~ • ENTERED: 09:21.2003-05-06 (DM). Doc #70399 SECRET mc u # MCU2003-02923C 000019 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET (CO The Right Honourable Jean Chretien, P.C., Q.C., M.P., LL.L, LL.D., Prime Minister of Canada Langevin Block 80 Wellington Street Ottawa ON K1A0A2 Dear Prime Minister: This letter seeks your direction to remove certain restrictions in respect of Canadian Forces operations in the Persian Gulf region. Within the context of existing direction, which you approved on 18 March 2003, Canadian Forces transport aircraft in the Persian Gulf region are not to be used to support, directly or indirectly, military action against Iraq. In addition, all Canadian operations are to be undertaken within the existing Operation Apollo area of responsibility, excluding Iraq and that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North). With the active phase of the armed conflict in Iraq at an end, Canada is about to participate in humanitarian relief operations and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The use of Canadian Forces assets will provide visible Canadian assistance to US-led or other internationally directed relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and will reinforce the multidisciplinary nature of Canada’s overall approach to the crisis. Therefore I recommend that the restrictions in respect of delivery of humanitarian aid by Canadian Forces transport aircraft to Iraq and the geographic restrictions on Canadian Forces operations in Iraq and in that portion of the Persian Gulf region north of the southern border of Kuwait (28° 30' of latitude North) be removed. Such removal will permit the Canadian Forces to action any requests for support in the delivery of humanitarian relief assistance and reconstruction materials by Canadian Forces transport aircraft to Iraq. Requests will be individually considered given that legal issues exist as a consequence of the United Nations sanctions regime against Iraq remaining in place at the present time. Additionally, the current geographic restriction on Canadian operations means that Canadian Forces aircraft have been unable to accept transport taskings to and from Kuwait under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom. Given that it is possible to distinguish between loads intended to support Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, the removal of the restriction will permit the Canadian Forces aircraft to resume missions through Kuwait for the delivery of loads exclusively in support of the campaign against terrorism and in accordance with Canadian national objectives. 000020 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information The removal of the restrictions will also permit the Canadian naval task group to conduct Operation Apollo missions in the Northern Persian Gulf in accordance with Canadian national objectives or other missions as may be directed by the Government of Canada. [Minister Graham has been consulted and concurs with this approach. If you agree, I have also enclosed a draft letter of reply for your signature.] TBC Yours sincerely, The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. 000021 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET OTTAWA, KIA OA2 May, 2003 Dear Colleague: Thank you for your correspondence of May XX, 2003, in which you sought the removal of restrictions with regard to Canadian Forces operations in the Persian Gulf region. I agree that if an appropriate role in assisting the delivery of humanitarian relief or supporting Operation Apollo objectives in an expanded area of operations is identified, the Canadian Forces should be in a position to consider the request in a timely manner. I therefore concur with the change in direction sought in your letter. Thank you for continuing to keep me apprised of these very important issues. Yours sincerely, 000022 �»3 I. z^W *j Z • ZU c -t- co 3. c^4-\OfO-<.cxxX. _<^v 'KAl'T icvCfi.-pzcooLc.cl un=U- Jbhu^4 AA/iUfl 6 t-vvczAzizvvvv-ejz— arrceo- <?i?6 -/V1-/! 000023 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /’information © .SECRET ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN FORCES’ TRANSPORT OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES TO IRAQ File #/Numero de reference: 3450-1 (Coni Barr, D PK Pol 6) DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI FROM/DE: Concur: D PK Pol/D Pol MP Date: COSJ3/CEM J3 Date: - ADM(Pol)/SMAi FROM/DE: i DGIS PolJDG Pol SI Date: . )3> CDS/CEMD DM/SM FROM/DE: ADM Pbl/SMA Pol Date: / ^3 SECRET REF: 35538 000024 �nor HTK. oo. tiocu r-w-rs^i SECRET Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D’ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Sublect/Objet: DIRECTION REGARDING CANADIAN FORCES’ TRANSPORT OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES TO IRAQ File #/Num6ro de reference! 3450-1 (Corri Bair, D PKPol 8) Concur: Date: V SECRET . 4/^ o REF: 35538 000025 �7 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information * D PK POL sr o DIRECTORATE OF PEACEKEEPING POLICY/ DIRECTION DE LA POLITIQUE DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX o 4, ,'*o. 3 vr/ - £ D POL MP TO/A REMARKS/RE MARQUES '”/(A C’c->v^uu'Vuvvcc_ '■MA. <_Xoc DATE c'’ D ?v 4l g | L-evtZ- '^PcA, D PkPo) OCOJ Stj INITIALS 26/r c^-JCs^ficX £A/AbM(&) -ccl ; £S &A- QCQZ . ^n,. A u ^/u ^k jz / 9o frM 000026 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00017 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003-01-12-31 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-100289 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b368c3fa1a051ffaa798ee9e7e768ee3.pdf 3c0902050bf9271f774be1efce14f61b PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces d /'information 8COOO1 1812D-18-8 10G Sec i SEC DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS M. BLOODWORTH International Plans and Operations Iraq © CORRESPONDANCE DU SOUS MINISTRE - MME M. BLOODWORTH SSS/RDS Plans et operations internationals Iraq P.A.. RANGER CIRCULATION TO A ■ REMARKSi REMARQUES pate Date- Init. I Init. B.F. RAPPEL Cancel Annular REGISTRY ONLY DEPOT CENTRAL Inspected Inspects Date g- f - f mi CT - 00 I 00 < § A CT H O 00 o 1 2 o CT Ll - §H co 4D 70S (0360) 7530-21-694-4101 DesIon; Forms ManaoementSSMOSO - Conception —I— ) 000001 �^^DoajmentdiscTosedijndertneAccesst^nfomwtionAct^ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information -az ;.$<• :JL ‘ .' -‘..L jUAI; ,.-» , - A. •. 'L-. -..'-(.'A • i'uf? . 1 Protect all fibs and records os ( official proparty. ’ i. j Protegsr tous Ise dossiers St las 1 docurnonts comms Etsnt la . pzopriito official's. 1 . ______________ _________ 1 i Clean records prior io adding them : L.l | 1____ L-_________ _______ __ | ' to.t-j|S3> I----- 1 ____ • Clacser Isa docurr.snto an ordre 1 chronolcgiqus, 'a deto la plus • r.'oonta cur !e dessus. * w >w ifeikvwk v nw I > »V|rf« • ! 'A't.pn e fils becomes thicker then ,T, uHJubaequent volume ehoulci •! beersated. . ■ ______ DeelvOy duplicate materiel. Iteap e copy only if it hes additional information. 9 | Verify the security .classification of | new documents added to tine the file. fils. 1_____ ‘ I L I_ _J 1 o r our tecllilar la manuianuon, ailacher les.,documents .. . au . dossier ... -j cu moyen d una atiacns-feullls. > I Lorequa le dossier a plus de ?" d’fipaisseur, crier un nouvaau t volume. 1 Ditruiretoue Iso duplicates qui ne J corrilannsni uucun ransoignamenls ‘ si'polimei <iciren. . *1 1 ’ ’----- 1 I. Fere ar des Irous du coin supirieur | gr.uone du document . , Aitech papers to tha filo by a paper spike for eery handling. 1 ■. papara and TDe ;, File r Icaily, iiie laiest datachror.eloon top. <<*»Z*** m.^w ) ;3.3purch holos ci St s top (sit comer of ths papers j— - . I . Enlever tout articles inuiiles (enveloppoe, paplllons, Etiquettes,. eplnglcs, trombones, ailaches13011133, agrflfca sic.) f,amove ell envelopes, ficoc, tegs, pnj-i uy ii Pina, aplksu, clips and superfluous , atopies. | ! CL _______________________________________________________ _________ — _ . to. to .■ I i i } •*•**•* wvj| i <° Mcitoyar las o’oeumants avarri ds rS • -------- -- • ----------loo pouter 6 Isur dossier rsspsctli. ' ’ • . | Upgrade the filo to the required | tev-jl au required. I Virifi-jr. la cola d3 s6cur(l6 des houveaux documents ajouti au I dossier. Augmsntar la cote da sEcuritE si n&cas'scfre. r o 000002 �Document disci i£nt divulgu SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) SECRET / h CDN-USEYESONLt^x Chief of the Defence Staff '3 Chef d’etat-major de la Defer? Of JJce National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 Quartier general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A0K2 September 2003 The Minister UPCOMING EXCHANGE OFFICER DEPLOYMENT TO IRAQ BGen Natynczyk is presently one of the Deputy Commanding Generals of III Corps in Fort Hood, Texas. He has been asked by US authorities to deploy to Iraq for one year, likely commencing in Jan 04 although this could change. Ill Corps HQ will form the nucleus of the Land Component Commander’s staff working alongside the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. BGen Natynczyk would be employed as the Corps CJ5 Strategic Plans and Policy, rather than his present position of Deputy Commanding General, because the US intends to increase.the rank of the senior Corps HQ staff by one rank, with the Deputy Commanding General positions being filled by MGens. V. I 10 8 2S S3 § Of significant note, under US war planning, III Corps is identified for contingency operations in the Korean Peninsula and the decision to deploy them to Iraq would ' be a significant strategic shift in policy. Their deployment to Iraq is a very sensitive issue and has yet to be announced. As a CF exchange officer employed with III Corps, BGen Natynczyk plays a critical role in the planning and execution of operations conducted by the Corps in both garrison and in tactical environments. Under the Foreign Military Exchange program, our exchange personnel are expected to participate in all activities and I or tactical operations conducted by the host unit. I have authorized his deployment. R.R. Henault General /~cc'DM^j ~ « 1*1 National Defence q pc ppt * SECRET MUS EYES ONLY Defense nationale rrAN/i is; p v p s c imi vi Canad'a' 000003 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00016 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003-01-12-31 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-100289 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/139b5f48fb5eeb2a6ec6f7d027d76b36.pdf c857efe5dfd2ef6cc59a322d32388529 PDF Text Text ���� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00015 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Policy on Iraq [Heavily Sanitized] Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 14-Aug-02 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Privy Council Office Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2021-00218 PCO Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en