1 20 1 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/aa16bb495e87bfa00070dfb0890646a9.pdf 39098667261e8aca8604b0889a1ac22f PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I’accis a I'information 134-1 CONFIDENTIAL National Support Unit Joint Task Force South West Asia PO Box 5105 Station Forces Belleville, Ontario, Canada K8N 5W6 1000-1 (CO NSU) 29 July 2003 Commander Joint Task Force South West Asia Canadian National Command Element Eagle Village 7115 South Boundary Boulevard MacDill Air Force Base Tampa, Florida, United States of America 33621 OP APOLLO ROTO TWO END-TOUR REPORT- NATIONAL SUPPORT UNIT Reference: DDIO Revise One Annex A to Chapter 3 Introduction 1. This report is submitted in accordance with reference, to include events and activities undertaken by the Joint Task Force South West Asia (JTFSWA) National Support Unit (NSU) at Camp Mirage (CM) in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), between the dates of 22 February 2003 and 30 July 2003, inclusive. General Overview 2. Over the reporting period, the regional threat level steadily climbed as the threat of a regional war increased. This was reflected in increased attention to Force Protection (FP) issues that were either reviewed or instigated. As directed on 18 March 2003, CM restricted travel off-camp to Duty purposes only, in anticipation of the launch of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM by the US-led coalition. Non-duty walking-out privileges were re-instated, with some restrictions, on 19 April 2003 with CA JTFSWA approval. 1/10 CONFIDENTIAL 000051 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL 3. This reporting period saw the arrival of increased FP resources to Camp Mirage (defensive works, Defense & Security (D&S) Platoon) in March 2003. They are now fully integrated into CM operations. D&S Pl has been tasked into theatre on rotating 56day engagements, with the first two rotations established at 38 personnel sourced from 1 PPCLI in Edmonton. The third rotation, which began on 27 June 2003 and will run into August, is comprised of 30 personnel from 1 RCHA. Summary of NSU Activities 4. Mission. The mission of the NSU is to provide logistics, administrative and technical support to CTG 307.1, the Long-Range Patrol (LRP) Detachment (until their departure on 19 Jun 03), the Tactical Air-Lift (TAL) Detachment, the National Command, Control and Information Services (NCCIS) Squadron, and Liaison Officers deployed in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Afghanistan. 5. Tasks. The NSU provides the following functions and services: a. NSU Headquarters. The headquarters performs the following functions: (1) Operations Centre. The NSU Ops Centre coordinates logistic and administrative support on a 24/7 basis, and now includes separate cells for Intelligence, Training, NBCD, and Planning. (2) Legal. A legal officer under the operational command of the Judge Advocate General, but responsive to the commanding officers of OP APOLLO, is attach-posted to the NSU at Camp Mirage. The Legal Officer’s role is to provide advice to the chains of command, particularly in the UAE, on issues relating to operational law (including Law Of Armed Combat and Rules Of Engagement), discipline, international law, personnel matters, contracting, claims and other legal matters. (3) Public Affairs. This section coordinates media requests related to deployed forces in the UAE, in close coordination with JTFSWA NCE PAffO and in collaboration with CTG 307.1 PAffO. (4) Chaplain Services. Plans and provides chaplain services to the NSU and its supported units, including re-integration briefings for outgoing rotation personnel. 2/10 CONFIDENTIAL 000052 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accts a /'information J CONFIDENTIAL (5) Force Protection. Expertise and support as required, concerning FP issues locally and abroad within the JTFSWA AOR. (6) Visits. Coordinates logistical and administrative support to all visitors to Camp Mirage. (7) Liaison to Host Nation. A Canadian officer (Major) from the NSU is currently stationed in Abu Dhabi as HN Liaison. He is the primary point of contact between the NSU and Host Nation for clearances, visas, etc. as well as the primary augmentee for the newly-formed HN Coalition Coordination Centre (CCC) at Al Dhafra Air Force Base. b. Forward Logistics Site (FLS). The FLS plans, coordinates and provides sustainment, movement of personnel, and coordinates maintenance support to all HMC ships deployed in the JTFSWA AOR; c. Combat Service Support (CSS). The CSS Sqn provides first and second line support (Transport, Supply and Materiel Distribution, Engineering, EME services, Food services and Movement Control and Materiel Management) to all air detachments, the NCCIS, the NCE Forward Liaison Team, and all Liaison Officers deployed in the Middle East region. In addition, the Sqn provides Food Services and Aircraft Refueling to the Australian, Dutch and New Zealand Contingents; d. General Support (GS) Company. Provides administration and financial service to NSU-supported units; e. Health Service Support (HSS) Company. HSS Coy ensures that all personnel deployed to JTFSWA AOR have access to proper medical care. It provides Role 1 integral HSS to all Camp Mirage elements. It is responsible for tracking and reporting deployed JTFSWA casualties in Role 2-4 facilities, and has Forward Medical Equipment Depot (FMED) responsibility for medical stores, supplies and equipment; f. Military Police (MP) Company. MP Coy provides Policing, Operational Security (OpSec) and FP support for Camp Mirage and supported units, including FP assessments of ports and other local locations, and MSASO duties on TAL Det flights; and 3/10 CONFIDENTIAL 000053 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information CONFIDENTIAL g- Comptroller. The Comptroller organization provides financial management and cashier services to NSU-supported units. The challenge function is also mandated to the Comptroller. Operations and Lessons Observed 6. Lessons Observed are attached at Annex A. Rotation Plans 7. A Rotation Plan for the transition between Roto 2 and Op ATHENA Camp Mirage Roto 0 was submitted in April 2003, but strategic guidance was not received in a timely manner. As result, the rotation plan was not promulgated to the force generators in time to meet out-rotation timings for departing Roto 2 personnel. In order to maintain the operational effectiveness of the NSU, more than 40 personnel were extended up to three weeks to accommodate the force generation of replacements. It is recommended that guidance on the Rotation Plan be received within the first month of the tour for planning purposes, and that actual rotation dates, rather than ‘left and right arc’ tour dates, be entered at least two months in advance in CFTPO. NSU Organization and Manning The CSS TO&E was reduced with the expectation that the tasks at Camp Mirage 8. would be reduced with the closure of the BG and the SLOC. In fact the reverse has been true. IAs have been implemented calling on the staff to provide logistics support (Food Services, Transport/aircraft refuelling) for the Dutch (20 pers up to their departure on 26 Jun 03), the Australians (160 pers) and the New Zealanders (40 pers). 9. This has placed a significant demand on the MWO in charge of the Kitchen. In addition to supervising 14 CF cooks, 2 New Zealand and 5 Australian cooks, he also manages 32 LEP food preparers and chefs as well as invoice the nations for support to their contingents including keeping records of diner strength. The requirement for a Food Services officer has been identified in previous correspondence to provide the seniorlevel leadership and administration of the flight. 10. The majority of issues involving support within the theatre fall within the realm of Supply. As supported in previous correspondence with respect to the transition to Op ATHENA Camp Mirage Roto 0, the flight and the supported organizations will benefit from the establishment of a Supply Officer and Senior Technician MWO to provide the necessary leadership and subject matter expertise in resolving higher level issues. 4/10 CONFIDENTIAL 000054 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information s.15(1) CONFIDENTIAL 11. The OC of CSS has been established as a Capt and the Maj position deleted after Roto 0, yet all three incumbents have been a major. The scope and breadth of the responsibilities are clearly beyond the capabilities that can be expected of a junior officer. This position must be filled by a Major. 12. The addition of the Hazardous Materials Packaging qualification and the Hazardous Materials Handling and Storage qualification for four Supply Tech positions has been rectified for Op ATHENA Camp Mirage Roto 0. One individual from Op APOLLO Roto 2 was given a priority placement on the recent Hazardous Materials Packaging Course, eliminating the requirement for TAVs to perform this function. 13. A number of Engineer Flight positions were deleted to create offsets for the D&S Platoon. Unfortunately, some of these deletions created serious deficiencies in the ongoing maintenance support to the Camp Infrastructure. These deficiencies were consequently corrected in the Op ATHENA Camp Mirage Roto 0 TO&E. 14. As well, a recent Ammo TAV to inspect the administration of ammunition and technical support for the handling of ammo clearly spelled out a requirement for a fulltime ammunition technician at Camp Mirage. Personnel Administration 15. During this reporting period, significant focus was placed on reviewing local standing and administrative orders. The development of the Roto Plan and adjustment to service flight schedules proved challenging for GS Coy. Transient and living-in accommodation problems were exacerbated by 56-day rotations, increases in personnel, ISB activity, and visits. With the change to a ‘five-and-one’ rotation concept, there was significant strain on the organization to ensure that all personnel took their HLTA at an appropriate time and also had the opportunity to avail themselves of R&R. 16. The Command Comptroller Inspection conducted at the end of this reporting period also spent a fair amount of time focusing on GS Coy activities. Many constructive comments were made and personnel implemented changes, such as policies for claiming for R&R, that streamlined the process while still adhering to national regulations. Intelligence 5/10 CONFIDENTIAL 000055 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lol sur I'acces a I'information s.15(1) CONFIDENTIAL Security 18. During this period, the MP Coy completed various force protection duties at Camp Mirage, Dubai, UAE and at the Port of Jebel Ali, UAE. The MP Coy also completed 55 investigations covering traffic accidents, drunkenness, lost articles, and security concerns. A further 17 security assessments were conducted of various establishments (including Hotels) in the UAE to determine any security concerns that may be present for CF pers proceeding on R&R in the UAE. The MP Coy also provided VIP, cash and sensitive documents(Passports) escorts, MSASO duties to the CC-130s in theatre and liaison with Host Nation security and police authorities. Other taskings included security of the Sea King Helos and CC-150 Airbus in Fujairah airport, food and water inspections (in conjunction with foods pers), ship launches for HMC Ships operating in theatre, and nightly FP patrols of local establishments in Dubai. OPSEC is still a concern with respect to use of cellphones; this is being addressed through constant security awareness briefings and other informational techniques. Logistics. Finance & Movement 19. FLS. Over this period the number of ships and naval personnel in theatre increased from two to five ships and from approximately 530 to 1300 Naval personnel, respectively, in mid-March. Subsequently this force was reduced to two ships on 19 May 03 with a combined compliment of approximately 750 personnel. HMCS IROQUOIS departed theatre in June 03 and released command of the CTG to coalition partners, leaving one ship in-theatre at the time of writing of this report. FLS activities to support this rapid turnover in ships and personnel were significant and accordingly the period was very busy for the FLS. 20. CSS. Supply continued to experience problems related to verification of accounts. A DMMD TA V in Dec 02 identified that the NSU Supply had been set up with the wrong account structure and recommended that the district be changed to ensure accountability for repairable parts; a fix has been implemented with the transition to Op ATHENA. Problems identified on previous rotations with movement of freight via commercial means appear to have been resolved. FedEx is now the shipper of choice for high priority requisitions and shipments have been received within the expected 72 hours from Canada. This has greatly increased the mission success rate of the air detachments. 21. Comptroller. On 23 March 2003, the Comptroller position was filled after the restriction was lifted in February 2003. Over the course of the last few months, 6/10 CONFIDENTIAL 000056 i �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'occes a I'information CONFIDENTIAL significant detail was paid to the delegation of financial authorities, accounts receivable, financial planning and application of policies concerning items such as allowances and hospitality. A Command Comptroller Inspection was conducted from 19 to 23 May. A robust team of five auditors concentrated on financial management, invoices, cashier, pay, claims, orderly room services and non-public funds accounting. CIMIC 22. Not applicable. Engineering 23. It is our belief that the Camp infrastructure bed-down was prematurely declared complete. Role and structure of NSU organization has not yet stabilized to the point where all functions in suitable temporary standard accommodations. The pertinent issues are summarized below in paragraphs 24 through 27. 24. RTC Kitchen Addition and Food Storage. The addition for food production is critical to the ability of the NSU to provide support to all CF units deployed to CM as well as coalition partners who have negotiated catering support through various IAs and MOUs (current commitment is 630 diners). Of paramount concern is the safe handling of food as well as the safety of all personnel who work in the production area. Adequate facilities to store the fresh and frozen rations is also critical to ensure adequate stocks of food and to reduce costs associated with storing food in leased refrigerated containers. As a stopgap measure in the interim, a trailer for the preparation of flight meals and salads has been leased and is in full operation. A recent Food Services TAV has made recommendations for improvements including an extension to the work area, which cannot proceed until the moratorium of infrastructure projects is lifted. RTC Warehouses. NSU is holding 19 leased sea containers and refrigerated sea 25. containers at a monthly cost of $7900 or $95,000 per year. We currently have 4 x sections of MEX 26 tentage and require an additional 5 sections to meet the demand for storage space and reduce the number of leased sea containers. Construction of additional warehousing has two benefits: reduced rental costs and increased visibility over stores thereby potentially reducing duplicate orders and increased transportation costs. 26. EME Shelter. The lack of indoor facilities prevents the effective repair of vehicles and equipment and fails to protect the parts from the blowing sand. The MEX 26 shelter that was approved during Roto 1 had to be re-sited and has been erected. Review of EME requirements has determined that an additional 4 x sections of MEX 26 7/10 CONFIDENTIAL 000057 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information s.15(1) CONFIDENTIAL tentage will satisfy the requirement for the vehicle and equipment maintenance workshop; and 27. Aircraft Maint Facility. Current facilities meet tactical standard and do not adequately protect equipment and parts resulting in $40k in write-off of tooling and test equipment thus far. Intent is to build a facility to address shortfalls to bring the Camp up to the temporary standard. Projected savings estimated at more than $200K over a 12 month period. 28. Operational Law: Long Range Patrol Detachment personnel have received initial and refresher training on rights and responsibilities with respect to transit passage, rights of aircraft in distress and sovereign immunity for state aircraft. Tactical Airlift personnel forming part of Op Caravan have also been briefed on the legal framework for use of force in that operation, pending release of ROE. 29. Discipline: Due to the historically high proportion of disciplinary incidents (primarily charges of Drunkeness) involving those of the rank of Warrant Officer or above (one-third), access to an officer with powers of a Superior Commander in Kabul is an improvement. Presiding Officer training was available for Camp Mirage personnel. There are currently no outstanding charges. 30. International Law: and DFAIT was dispatched to scene chain of command and legal advisor. To that end a legal team from NDHQ with input from the on- 31. Personnel and Administrative: There has been a miscellany of personnel and administrative issues with legal content arising, including a number of legal aid cases and summary investigations. 32. Claims and Contracts: The negotiation of vehicle rentals with liability insurance has greatly simplified the claims issues for the accidents occurring within the UAE. As well, the CF has contracted on retainer the services of a local Canadian/Arabic lawyer for liaison with the UAE law enforcement authorities in the event a CF member is detained. 8/10 CONFIDENTIAL 000058 ' �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informotion CONFIDENTIAL Public Affairs 33. The Imaging Technician and the Public Affairs Officer both flew to Kandahar in s.15(1) March t0 cover a Humanitarian Aid mission involving a Foundation from the Arabian Gulf Region. Unfortunately, the group who was supposed to receive the load in Kandahar was not able to meet the crew on the tarmac i 34. A large number of photos were sent to Combat Camera during this reporting period and published in various military publications across Canada as well as on Internet. Interest for the operation’s photos was high in Canada. 35. With the launch of the US-led coalition in Op IRAQI FREEDOM, the CM PAO was instrumental in maintaining timely awareness of breaking news and public opinion in Canada. Media monitoring activity was significant and constant communication with NCE PAO in Tampa was required. 36. A Combat Camera TAV was deployed to the Persian Gulf region to conduct as tasking with the CTG. There were plans to stage the team through Camp Mirage, which the PAO strongly advised against due to Host Nation media restrictions with respect to the presence and use of video cameras in our location. With the forecasted draw-down of Op APOLLO, the Camp Mirage PAO was 37. redeployed to NCE Tampa in May 2003. CIS 38. N/A 9/10 CONFIDENTIAL 000059 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accds a /'information CONFIDENTIAL Summary and Commentary on the Operation 39. The personnel of Op APOLLO NSU Roto 2 have faced and overcome many challenges during this reporting period. Supporting no fewer than four separate operations from this location - Ops APOLLO, IRIS, CARAVAN and ATHENA - has tested the capabilities and capacity of Camp Mirage to the fullest. I am pleased to report that all obstacles were over-come and mission-focus maintained throughout the tour. JPJ LeBlanc Colonel Commanding Officer National Support Unit Annex A: Lessons Observed 10/10 CONFIDENTIAL 000060 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information ANNEX A TO 1000-1 (CO NSU) 29 JULY 2003 LESSONS OBSERVED OP APOLLO ROTO 2 000061 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I’acc&s a I'information Observations OP APOLLO The following observation is: Submitter: Observation: Unclassified Maj Peet DH, OC CSS NSU 4158 RSAT teams were not tasked for NSU Roto 0, or for TAL and LRP Rotos 0 and 1. RSATs should be tasked for every unit rotation Discussion: RSATs form a major role in every Change of Command BOI in order to verfiy the materiel accounts for each incoming CO. RSATs were only ordered for NSU Roto 1 and Roto 2, TAL Roto 2 and LRP closure. Many of the accounts for these very distinct units hold much in the way of expensive and complicated materiel. It is extremely difficult to do investigations in account discrepancies when the accounts have not been verified on each roto. In the case of LRP, because the BOI TOR did not specify involvement of NSU Supply, transition from roto 0 to Roto 1 and subsequently Roto 2 were not complete and the CO’s were unaware of several accounts that were dormant from the stand-up of the original air det. The same was also true for the TAL Det. In the case of the NSU, the complexity and sheer numbers of stock precluded any effective control over materiel until Roto 2. Added to this was the transfer of many of the CSS functions from the Air Dets to the NSU when that unit was stood up. There was no verification of the holdings transferred from the Dets to the NSU; many accounts were left on the Air Dets responsibility, but oversight of these accounts was lost. An RSAT at the time of the activation of the NSU to verify the holdings and to close out the no longer required accounts would have prevented many of the problems associated with trying to investigate the many losses and surpluses. Recommendation: RSAT should be convened for every rotation requiring a Change of Command BOI. Lesson Observed: Keywords: RSATs must be a part of every unit rotation or when there is a major change in the structure. RSAT, BOI, Change of Command, materiel accountability The following observation is: Submitter: Observation: Unclassified Maj Peet DH, OC CSS NSU 4158 Authorities for CEL Items needs to be delegated to the Operational Level Commander Discussion: There were occasions during Roto 2, particularly with the start-up of and support of the Op ATHENA TAT where the TFC in Tampa did not have the authority to assist with the required degree of timeliness with CEL items, specifically defensive stores including Hesco Bastion and combat stores such as IMPs. In addition the control on computer peripherals, ie replacement of defective items meant that the NCOS could not provide the required support on behalf of its supported units without manpower-consuming and lengthy delays just trying to prove the existence of the requirement. Recommendation: TF Comds be given the authority to acquire CEL items under specific circumstances or when under a certain dollar limit. Lesson Observed: Keywords: ATHENA, TAT, CEL Page 1 of 6 000062 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgueen vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information I .' The following observation is: Submitter: Observation: Unclassified Maj Peet DH, OC CSS NSU 4158 DMMD Instructions WRT closure of units and or transition to a new operation must be timely and accurate. Discussion: During Roto 2, the NSU was tasked along with the 3 CSG Transition team to conduct the transition of the TAL, NSU and NCCIS accounts from Op APOLLO to Op ATHENA, while at the same time having to do the verifications of all the accounts (41 in all) for the rotations that had been compressed to meet Op ATHENA timelines, The instructions were received late and further compressed an already very tight schedule and impacted directly on the personnel affected, ie suspension of R&R and other restrictions and increased working hours. Timely arrival of the instructions would allow for a rational approach to getting the tasks completed. Recommendation: Instructions for any transition, closure, rotation must be issued early and should arrive well before the RSAT. Lesson Observed: Keywords: DMMD, RSAT, transition The following observation is: Submitter: Observation: I|_ Unclassified Maj MN Ouellet, OC GS Coy, NSU OP Apollo Temporary-Attach Posting. Pers that are temp-attach, continue to arrive in theatre with no split allotment set up and with moving claims instead of TD claims. Pre-determined pay has been set up in some instances but this is not the way to go as the POP amount is included in the NME. The elk has to look to see if the mbr has PDP and you are always having to subtract the amount of the PDP from the NME which in theatre is represented by the total amount of the allowances only. If the split allowance has been set up, often the banking has not been ceased at the appropriate time. Discussion: Refer to observation section. Recommendation: For the deploying URS, firmer emphasis should be placed on the following the procedures identified in the DDIO. Problems arise due to the fact that the deploying base URS does not understand the impact created at the theatre level. This seems to be directly related to a lack of theatre experience. Lesson Observed: Constant communication must take place between NSU and URS. Keywords: The following observation is: Submitter: Observation: Unclassified Maj MN Ouellet, OC GS Coy, NSU OP Apollo Passports with 2 yr residency visas. Anyone departing the host nation on repat to Canada who has been away for six months or more cannot re-enter the host nation with the passport that has the 2 yr visa in it. Discussion: After six months, the two yr visa is automatically cancelled and will not be re-issued without the express consent of the original sponsor, which in our case is the host nation military. Anyone returning to host nation under these circumstances must be issued a new passport. Recommendation: Anyone returning to host nation under these circumstances must be issued a new passport. Lesson Observed: Home unit must ensure a new green passport is re-issued. Keywords: Page 2 of 6 000063 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information The following observation is: Unclassified Maj MN Ouellet, OC GS Coy, NSU OP Apollo Submitter: Passport Photos. A lot of personnel do not arrive theatre with passport pictures. Observation: Discussion: All mbrs must arrive in theatre with photos including passport photos. For personnel who return to theatre, they cannot assume that their picture will be kept indefinitely. With no Imaging Tech aval at CM, we are limited in our ability to take photos other than instant polariod for camp pass purposes. A force protection issue arises out of pers going into town to get passport photos taken on a regular basis. Recommendation: Personnel arriving in theatre must arrive with six small photos and four passport photos. Force generator must ensure this requirement is adhered to. Lesson Observed: Members must arrive theatre with four to six passport pictures. Keywords: The following observation is: Unclassified | Maj MN Ouellet, OC GS Coy. NSU OP Apollo Submitter: Rotation plan guidance must be provided within the first month of the tour. Observation: Discussion: Rotation of personnel for OP Apollo roto 2 was extremely difficult as the NSU did not receive strategic guidance on the roto plan until latein the game. Based on the sequence of events observed, it appears that the roto plan provided by the NSU never reached the appropriate force generators and the CFTPO had never reflected the proposed rotation dates by the NSU thus creating many difficulties and delaying the repat of many NSU personnel. Recommendation: Rotation guidance must be received within the first month of the tour and rotation plan must be submitted to the NCE so the rotation dates are inserted at least two months in advance in the CFTPO. Lesson Observed: Self-explanatory. Keywords: The following observation is: Submitter: Observation: Unclassified | Maj AH Snow, OC HSS MedEvac through the Inti Airport created significant and unacceptable delays. Discussion: Initial plans to move patients through the international airport resulted in delays of up to 3 hours. Also, using our ambulance was not allowed and a civilian ambulance was required to move the patient to a public hospital, and not one of our choice. The initial work-around was to contact Executive Flight Services who expedite VIPs through customs, but this was also unsatisfactory. Finally, developed SOP for bringing patients directly to Camp Mirage where they are seen first by our MO and then road transported to an appropriate facility. This reduced delays considerably and dramatically improved patient care. Recommendation: Continue current procedure of medevac’ing patients through Camp Mirage. Lesson Observed: Delays significantly reduced and patient care improved by minimizing dependance on HN government bureaucracy. Keywords: medevac airport patient Page 3 of 6 000064 �■ Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I’information The following observation is: Submitter: Observation: ___________________ Unclassified Maj AH Snow, OC HSS Medical Emergency Response Plan. Ideally, the Host Nation would have an established and efficient procedure for recall and response to aircraft incidents. In fact, they are not consistently notified of in-flight emergencies and do not have a mass casualty plan. Discussion: Efforts were made to develop a coordinated emergency response plan with Host Nation medical personnel. They are not consistently informed of in-flight emergencies by the tower, do not have a mass casualty evacuation plan, and have only one person on the base after hours for medical emergencies. Additionally, they are dependent on a Host Nation police helicopter for medical response in emergency situations. Dr Khalid was interested in combining efforts and was keen on incorporating our plans and personnel into a larger-scoped Base plan, but he has since been dispatched by Host Nation on training. In his absence, resistance to any further collaboration in this area has been encountered. Recommendation: Our current Medical Emergency Response Plan functions independantly of Host Nation participation. A need still exists to continue liaising with Host Nation medical staff, especially upon the return of Dr Khalid, and develop coordinated responses. Lesson Observed: Keywords: Self-sufficiency is required for emergency response at Camp Mirage. ERP medical emergency response plan The following observation is: Submitter: Observation: Unclassified Major T S Langs OC MP Coy Lack of ASO's to support flying operations Discussion: During the past six months the MP Coy has had to support a a very high tempo pace of flying operations with five individuals. For the most part the TAL Det operated two lines of taskings with four crews. As a resulted there was very limited downtime for recovery between missions for the ASO’s. With so few pers to conduct MSASO missions, and once HLTA leave plans kicked in the situation became critical. Recommendation: The number of MSASO’s should be based on both the numbers of crews not just the lines of taskings. The normal ratio is two MSASO’s per crew. This would enable the MSASO’s to be fully integrated into the crew concept and prevent early fatigue. It would also provide some flexibility within the MSASO fit as the support the various flying ops. Lesson Observed: Keywords: For every crew there should be two MSASO’s identified. MSASO, MP Coy, Crew Page 4 of 6 000065 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information The following observation is: Submitter: Observation: L Unclassified Major T S Langs OC MP Coy No explosive detection capability Discussion: During the last 18 months there has been NO explosive detection capability. It was assessed the number one threat to the camp was the use of an VBIED. To mitigate this we established a veh search area, however we had no explosive detection capability. Due to the high volume of civilian traffic in and out of the camp and the lack of screening, this concern remains. The units were ordered seven months ago and are still waiting approval. Recommendation: Portable explosive detection kits be part of a standard kit issue for security units. Lesson Observed: Keywords: The following observation is: Submitter: Observation: In areas where there is an increased threat from VBIED's appropriate detection equipment needs to made available. Explosives, VBIED, Detection Kits Unclassified Co! JPJ LeBlanc, CO NSU, 4155 The Roto 2 Command and Control structure for Camp Mirage was cumbersome and caused frequent breakdowns in inter-unit communications. Discussion: Camp Mirage was comprised of four separate units, all reporting to the Comd in Tampa, FLA. The only delegated authority that separated CO NSU as the senior Canadian officer from his peers was his appointment as Camp Commandant. As such, CO NSU was granted authority for overall Camp Mirage Force Protection and camp-specific administration. Communication between units occasionally broke down and required resolution from NCE Tampa, 8 hours removed from the theatre’s time zone. The lack of a duly appointed Commander in-situ was the cause of frequent delays in issue resolution and obtaining necessary direction from higher authority. Recommendation: The senior officer at Camp Mirage should be designated the local Commanding Officer in all respects, not merely for Force Protection purposes. Lesson Observed: Keywords: The following observation is: Submitter: Observation: Four unit CO's reporting to a Comd eight time zones away does not make for a good Command and Control relationship. command control Unclassified Maj PJ Comeau, NSU Ops O, 4184 An in-theatre training plan was not available at the beginning of Roto 2. Discussion: The lack of a dedicated training cell at Camp Mirage was keenly felt. Attempts to 'double-hat' the D&S PI Comd and WO with Training Officer duties failed, due to the nature of the 56-day rotations that those positions were subject to. The Camp NBCDO was used as an ad-hoc training officer, and he developed basic training plans and instructions with respect to NBCD issues and Defensive Bunker SOPs. Recommendation: Training Offr duties, whether as a primary or secondary duty, must be assigned to someone on the ground at Camp Mirage. Lesson Observed: An in-theatre training plan must be finalized early in the tour and executed accordingly. Training Officer duties must be assigned to appropriate personnel. Keywords: training plans NBCD Page 5 of 6 000066 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I’information The following Unclassified observation is: Submitter: Maj PJ Comeau, NSU Ops O, 4184 Observation: Pers have been DAG’d 'GREEN' and deployed into theatre without all the training required as per DDIO Revise One. Discussion: There have been several occurences where people have been deployed into theatre without missionessential training and clearances, including weapons training, NBCD training, first-aid qualifications, and security clearances. NSU was forced to provide 'dry-land' training for weapons, NBC drills and First-Aid for selected individuals. One situation in particular involved an incoming Ops Duty Officer whose security clearance of record was Enhanced Reliability, despite the requirement for his position of 'Secret' as a minimum. Luckily, it was eventually discovered that the individual in question did, in fact, have a Level II clearance - but this fact should have been noted in pre-deployment screening and his records updated accordingly prior to being flown into theatre. Recommendation: Force Generators must be held accountable to ensure that their pers have been trained and prepared in accordance with DDIO Revise One prior to signing off on an individual’s deployment screening checklist. Lesson Observed: Force Generators should ensure all deploying pers are trained and prepared in accordance DDIO Revise One. Keywords: force generation DAG training DDIO Page 6 of 6 000067 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDAF (Operation APOLLO) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource End Tour Report Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource July 29, 2003 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2019-03645 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Library and Archives Canada, RG24, 3350-134-1 pt3 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDAA20003