1 20 3 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/04421e040b887e96ede92045aa9800b1.pdf 48d9980250df953391e3af6959291a63 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de lo Loi sur /'occes a /'information o , oto r 3, 1 l _j i �Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces a /'information r • �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de lo Loi sur /'occes a /'information 000191 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDEX01119 Title A name given to the resource "Consultation with Parliment on Disposition of Canadian Forces" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 23-Oct-51 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Soviet air attacks in Germany - Possible employment of RCAF, RG25-A-3-b, Volume number: 6030, File number: 50290-40, File part: 1. Library and Archives Canada. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2023-05125 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en IIIF Item Metadata UUID 9e6c9a97-3f79-4d45-9011-45e9828d1a0d https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/05d5de81cfa499484e77b54ce6126047.pdf ef7a8c203529ae11a5d5f19487338135 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi surl’acces a /’information Minute Sheet WSSEEEcREr October 23rd, 1951. Mr. M: Mr. Ignatieff. < Mr—LePan ■ brr Mr. Gampbell.&C There are three supplementary questions which came up during my talks in Ottawa which I forgot to include in my earlier memo on Wiser matters. First, External Affairs has received no information on the discussions between General Walsh and A.V.M. Miller about the possibility of distinguishing between routine flights to or over Canadian territory with atomic weapons and politically significant flights. I told- them that we had heard here from the State Department that progress was being made, and I think that they will get after the Airforce in Ottawa. Secondly, Mr. Dean's speech and some other public statements, especially Senator Lodge's proposal that atomic weapons be used in Korea, had caused a slight concern in Ottawa that we might be confronted with an early proposal. I found that the messages I had sent just before leaving for Ottawa, based principally on Mr. Lovett's speech of October 15th (copy attached), had removed this concern for the time being, and I was not pressed on the point at all. Thirdly, I brought up the questions which had been mentioned in the Wiser Consultations and in other connections about the point at which the Government would feel compelled to consult Parliament if an act of aggression took place. Mr. Pearson was very emphatic that the Government had and would exercise the authority in case of need to authorize without parliamentary consultation the use of facilities in Canada for operational purposes by the S.A.C., as well as to permit the Canadian contribution to the Integrated Force to go into action. He and others stated flatly that there was no constitutional obligation to consult Parliament even about a declaration of war and that the political obligation was to summon Parliament as promptly as possible if it was not in session when the emergency arose. /N HHW: mgm 00377 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW16676 Title A name given to the resource Minute Sheet Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 23-Oct-51 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Wiser Consultations, RG25-B-2, Volume number: 3094 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/d35bb7c04bd6eddc32532c61217963b5.pdf f34fb8b63d540bdbae2fe8d94d2da429 PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project GAC ATIP A-2022-00326 GAC Special Registry File 29-1-1-Canada Part 2 DEA Glazebrook to Heeney 26 October 1951 "Memorandum on a Canadian Secret Intelligence Service" 23 October 1951 �CAG — Released under the Access to Information Act / AMC — Divulgue (s) en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a (' information A-2019-00531 - Page 22 IDS 29- 1- 1-CANADA vol.2 022 Urk, L,(41 A, 11 ,, - eJOA d••) fence Liaison ( 2)/G.deT .Glazebrook/ML October 26, 1951. jA, /. TOP SECRET 4, ? MEMORANDUM FOR MR. You will recall that when Mfr. Easton was here in July he made some suggestions as to the manner in which a secret intelligence service could be established in Canada. We had previously discussed this question several times in general terms , but, with Mr. Easton 's ideas as a starting point, we were able to draft the attached memorandum. It is intended to indicate the purpose of a secret intelligence service , the way in which it could be organized,and the job it would do. It is not intended to be an argument in favour of such a service , but merely to outline the problem. 2. I should like, if you agree, to hand copies of this memorandum to Mr. Robertson and to Superintendent McClellan. No doubt various suggestions will be made which would lead to a further draft and at that stage the question might be brought up for decision. 3. If it were decided that a secret intelligence service was to be started in Canada, I think there is no doubt that it would have to be placed within this Department. Mr. Easton suggested that, if there were tentative approval, it would be useful to send one or more officials to make a more detailed study of M.I .6 and consequently more detailed suggestions for the Canadian service . Perhaps concurrently we could set up here a small office group as suggested in the memorandum . At some early stage also it would be necessary to send personnel to M.I .6 for training. 4. As you know , this is the only form of intelligence in which Canada has not participated . I am not arguing in favour of it, although I think it would have advantages, but rather suggesting that it would be helpful to reach a decision on whether or not we should initiate an S.I.S. r•r Defence Liaison Division ( 2) 000074 �CAG — Released under the Access to Information Act / AMC — Divulgue (s) en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a(' information A-2019-00531 - Pages 1121 IDS,29-1 1-CANADA vo1.2 011 F: •r• TOP SSCBET October E3, 1951. MUMANDUIii ON A CANNADIAH SLCB>sT INTSLLIG-12 1 3 ,MMIM "Sector, my heart and manful spirit urge me to go near. the swift-raring ships, and spy out all ... To thee I will prove no vain spy ... for I will go straight to the .camp., until I may ooze to the ship of Memnon where surely the chiefs are like to hold council." - Iliad, Book Z. "It seems to us to boil down to this: when all the mystery and glamour Is- removed, espionage consists simply of finding a guy who knows sanething you want to know and having him tell'you about it." - The Nett Yorker. I INTRODUCTION It may be assured that, for an indefinite period, the first intelligence requirement of Canada and other Western powers will be a knowledge of the potential of Soviet armed might and the intention to use it. Closely allied with this requirement is a need for intelligence on the Soviet.oapability of causing internal disruption within the borders of non-Communist States, and . the particular targets within- Canada against which these weapons may be directed. Through diplomatic missions and service attaches abroad, Canada enjoys the usual facilities for the overt collection of intelligence. But the intelligence which can be obtained by observers .of this.kind is limited. Valuable intelligence is to be obtained by clandestine methods, and,this nay be more valuable.precisely because it is protected from the passive observer.. At present we obtain'somie .olandestine intelligence'through countere1 spioaage.; but have -so- tar. made. no. attempt to collect intelligence by the use of a secret intelligence service •• :that ie, a servioe-'uaacknouledged by the. governnent but devoted on itim- behalf to the collection or intelligence by secret agents working where inch intelligence is to be -found. The purpose of these notes is to ezamine in what way such a service is - a. unique ,. provider of Utelligenoe s' how it might'benefit the Government of Genada, and ho*- such a service could be 'established and operated. , ', 000063 �CAG — Released under the Access to Information Act / AMC — Divulgue (s) en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a (' information r ••.1 . IDS 29-1-VCANADA vo1.2 012 2 . II TO VAM OF A SECRET INTB 11 1 ' 11 SEMCE There are many historicalreferencesto the use of espionage by great powers faced with rivals to their power s and it is mentioned by both Xenophon and Caesar. Yore modern examples ere to be found in Walsin-*- to operations for Elizabeth against Spain , where many- of the advanced techniques used bear comparison with the methods of present day Sgrvicee ;Biohelieu+s•extensive organisation under . the Mminenoe grise „ Pore Joseph; and Frederick the Greatfi and Napoleon Bonaparte•s effective services . The present intelligence services of the great powers have continued without a break at least since the first World War , and the,Soviet Secret Services made their appearance shortly after the revolution. Since the clandestine collection of intelligence is largely unacknowledged and often unrecorded, and since nevertheless there are numerous historical references to it, it is perhaps hot unreasonable to .assume that gover=ents have made use of it throughout history. Within the limitations of what is possible , a•seoret intelligence service will provide the particular information which is demanded of it . Since it does not rely- upon chance observation or fortunate encounter, is actively and.not passively engaged in the collection of intelligence , it can be asked -to provide precisely that ,information which a government may require at any given time. It does not, as it were, stand with a basket and wait for windfalls.: it climbs into the tree by night and picks what is required. V/ It must also be emphasised that the intelligence which a secret service is able to provide will usually be continuing, since once informers become involved it is not easy for ' them to disengage themselves even if they wish to do so. Most other sources of intelligence tend to be sporadic or haphazard , but a secret intelligence service will maintain a continuity of intelligence which will refleot whatever changes may take place in the target of its operation. It is not therefore a question of the sudden appearance of a Gouzenko who ceases to be a useful source of intelligence when his interrogation is completed. A source of this kind is of great value, but his usefulness is enormously increased if he remains within the enemy vamp and continues to provide information on the intentions of our opponents . It is to this end that a secret intelligence service works, and though it will rarely secure an informer as well placed as Gouzenkc was, it will provide a continuous flow ofintelligence of as high a calibre as.circumstanoes permit: I It is of course , true .that . diplomats and service attachis do provide a regular-service of information from posts abroad. ' But if these observers stay within their terms:bf reference their opportunities for collecting intelligence are limited and must largely consist of what is freely told them (with the occasional useful indiscretion) or what they can openly observe. A clear example of, the'. essential difference between this kind of information and the intelligence provided by a secret intelligence service may be found in a case which occurred in Switzerland during 000064 �CAG — Released under the Access to Information Act / AMC — Divulgue (s) en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a(' information IDS 29-1-1-CANADA vol.2 013 30 the last war. A German foreign office official who performed regular courier duties between Berlin and Berne was induced by a secret intelligence service to work for the allies. For a great part of the war he brought regularly to agents of that service on his courier runs a continual provision of German secret official documents which could only have been obtained by these clandestine methods. If this is compared with the limited information which might perhaps have been obtained via Van Papen from the Turkish Foreign Office through diplomatic channels, the value of the clandestine method is apparent. The unique value of intelligence provided by a clandestine service then is simply this: it is information which a goverment -does not wish to be known because a knowledge.of it in the hands of an outsider is damaging to its interests. It is precisely this information which is worth having. III THE VAIBE OF A SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE TO CANADA There would now appear to be valid reasons why Canada should play a part in the collection of secret intelligence by the formstion'of secret service of limited size and with limited objectives. The security of Canada cannot be properly maintained against penetration by Soviet agents unless the agency charged with this defence is informed of the organisation, methods, activities and personnel of the two chief Soviet intelligence services. Both these services are world-wide and the fluid international character of their operations is shown clearly enough in the case of Iguacy Witzak alone, where a Soviet agent carrying false Canadian papers worked in the United States against targets in Japan. Information which is obtained today concerning Soviet intelligence operations in Western Europe may prove in the future to be of direct value to the security of Canada. Because of the effective contribution made by the Special Branch of the R.C.M.P. in the field of counterespionage, information directly and immediately concerning the security of Canada is made available to Special Branch of K.I.5 and the F.B.I. ( the Security Services of the II.g, and the U.S.A.) in return for similar information exchanged by Special Branch. Some general information concerning Soviet intelligence operations outside Canada is also made available to Special Branch, but there remains a great deal of valuable intelligence of this kind which f✓ does not find its way to Ottawa because there is no Canadian service directly concerned with operations of this kind outside the borders of Canada. A Canadian secret intelligence service would be able to command an exchange of this intelligence in scme.detail, and since counterespionage operations are most successfully mounted from the fullest knowledge of the latest targets and methods of the enemy, Special Branch would in this way be assisted. Experience has shown that a close working relationship between a security service, whose operations are 000065 �CAG — Released under the Access to Information Act / AMC — Divulgue (s) en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces (' information a IDS 29-1=1-CANADA v01.2 014 . 40 defensive, and an offensive intelligence service is invaluable and ,greatly-benefits both* services, An outstanding example of this was to be- seen in the handling of the .German agent "Garbo w in the United Kingdom during the last Var. This agent - and indeed the whole German agent network In.angland - was brought under the control or M.I.5 without the knowledge of the German service concerned. The network was- used to present a deceptive plan to cover the Overlord landings and was highly effective. The agent "Garbo"_was originally recruited on the European mainland by M.I.6, the British Secret.Intelligence'Service, and handed over to M.I.5 to operate in London. "Garbo•s " regular visits from London to his immediate'German masters in the Iberian Peninsula were assisted by the M:I.6 organisation within that area. Without the facilities of both services the operation would have been severely hampered. There can similarly be little doubt that a Canadian secret intelligence service would assist the Special Branch in its defensive operations and substantially contribute to the security of the dominion. It has been noted that Canada is able to exchange counter-intelligence with-the U.&., and the U.S.A. However, Canada is not at present able to provide foreign intelligence and consequently the return fram other centres is not as fall as Canada*s international position would seem to require. Direct_participdtion by Canada in the field of foreign intelligence would almost certainly ensure an adequate and more certain provision of intelligence to Ottawa from other goverments - most particularly if we were to assume in stages responsibility for a limited geographical area from which other friendly services might be eventually disposed to withdraw. Our position in friendly bargaining would then become more firm than it is at present. 37 A CAAADIAF . SCCEET .IA4.'ELLIMN'CE SERYICE (i) The Target An intelligence service cannot be created in a vacuum. It is an offensive weapon and must be directed towards a specific target. Certain.basio principles of operation ( largely designed to protect the organisation from disgster.) will apply to most clandestine services, but the organisation will need to be designed to attack the particular targets designated by the country it serves. It is therefore essential to decide.- If only in general terms, what the target of a Canadian secret intelligence service .might be. Canada has not -at present the facilities or manpower to attempt the collection of intelligence on a world-wide scale. Nor should we attempt to compete with existing and well established friendly services, but rather to J assist and complement them. Our object therefore would presumably be a service covering only a 000066 �CAAG — Released under the Access to Information Act / s.15(1) -International C — Divulgue (s) en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a(' information IDS 29-1-1=CANADA vol.2 015 5* limited geographical area, but producing sufficient original intelligence from that area to command a reciprocal and larger. supply of intelligence from other oentres with which we should exchange our products. A Canadian secret service would therefore operate its agents in a limited field, but would be the recipient of intelligence from world-wide sources controlled by other services. Intelligence from- its own and other sources would be received centrally in Ottawa and distributed in a useable form to government departments. An area not inconveniently placed geographically, comparatively easy to operate in, and with a limited number of -intelligence targets within its confines, There would not seem to be any other area so ideally suited as a target for a Canadian secret intelligenoe service. First.- it is_a_geographioal entity and one in which' 1 1' !-- _K 2 -The way of life in the different countries is usually sufficiently similar to enable representatives to be moved easily from one country to another without costly and time-consuming refresher courses. The area is large enough geographically for it to represent a substantial contribution on Canada's part and to ensure an adequate exchange with other intelligence services operating in other part's of the world; but because of IL __ -1-= _ 6 w and the conoentration of cultural and economic life in the capitals, it can be covered mainly_by representatives in--the capital cities. -" 1 -_ ! On the whole therefore intelligence can•be gathered with a comparatively modest budget. and it seems to be an a well within the scope of Canadian potential. There is an additional final advantage: although it is an interesting and de"loping area, it is not a vital one at present, and consequently not likely to overtax our resources in the early stages. A minimum of five representatives with staff would be required, posted perhaps as follows: T Additional representation in the subsidiary capitals might be necessary. Within this framework the organisation would attempt: (a) Penetration of local Communist Parties. 000067 �CAG — Released under the Access to Information Act / AMC — Divulgue (s) en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a(' information s.15(1) -International IDS 29-1=1=CANADA vol.2 016 6. (b) Counter-intelligence directed against . Soviet and satellite secret services. (c) Collection of political, economic and military intelligence from the countries concerned. All further recommendations in these notes will be made on the assumption that this limited target could be acceptable, since it is not possible to make any valid recommendations without some concrete objective in view. (ii) The Organisation - Stage I An examination of the structure of a secret intelligence service - of its working conditions, expenditures, equipment, personnel, techniques, etc.. will be a necessary preliminary. Air Commodore J. Easton of the British Secret Intelligence Service (M.I.6) has suggested that one or two senior Canadian officials should spend some time examining the facilities of the British Service, and on the basis of this examination report to Ottawa on the probable requirements of a Canadian Service. A similar investigation was made by representatives of another dominion and their report resulted in the formation of a secret intelligence service which is now already in operation. We should be well advised to take advantage of this offer. 1$aston has also_informed ns that 3[.I.6 have ' T -_MF I The question of the secret financing of an intelligence service is complex. An examination of this problem, together with that of what gover= ent department should provide the cover essential for such a service, has been veiled in the decent obscurity of an appendix. We need only note here that sooner or later funds will have to be provided, and that the provision of them will be equally tiresome later as now. Once the preliminary report had been accepted and financial problems resolved, recruiting and the training of staff could begin. Canada has very few trained intelligence officers. A certain mininum knowledge can be acquired from a training course,- but a capable officer can be made by only experience in the field under careful guidance. Y.I.6 has offered to train Canadian staff both in training coursesand- y subsequent employment in oll b This would be the best training ominadte. A minlaup of two and preferably three years overall training would be required to produce officers capable of assuming the responsibility of directing operations from a field station. It is of course essential that people selected for this training should be of high calibre, and salaries and conditions be designed to attract such men. Once the minimum two-year training period for officers had begun, Y.I.6 should immediately be asked to provide copies of all intelligence,reports produced 000068 �CAG — Released under the Access to Information Act / AMC — Divulgue (s) en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a (' information s.15(1) - International IDS 29.1=1=CANADA vol.2 017 ?. by To receive this intelligence a small Canadian centre would be established in Ottawa - probably as part of a division of the Department of External Affairs (see Appendix ). This centre would consist almost entirely of clerical staff and would begin to build from the material received the essential intelligence records vital to the Canadian service when it began its operations. While there are few trained Canadian intelligence officers , there exists a considerable number of able Canadian women clerks who have had years of experience in secret intelligence work during World War II both in M.I.6 headquarters and in the field. A number of these could easily be reassembled. There are also one or two Canadian women officers at present . employed by M.I.6, and no doubt one of these could be reclaimed to run the centre in its early stages. Collation and distribution to goverment departments of the intelligence received frm M.I.6's .• . could begin within a few months . Thos the housing , primitive machinery, and records of the service would have begun and would continue in much this form for two years. Once the machinery was operating satisfactorily in Ottawa and govel , ent departments are accustomed to handling this type of intelligence regularly , Canada would probably wish to ask M.I .6 to provide intelligence from other geographical areas of greater interest. Thus , apart from the training of a limited number of officers , Stage I•of the organisation envisages no commitments outside Canada but should begin to provide a useful flop of intelligence from United Kingdom sources. No doubt at sane point during this stage relations would also be established with the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington. (iii) The Organisation - Stage II The second stage of the organisation.of a Canadian secret intelligence-service - the commitment _ — of_officer$_to the field l We can confidently anticipate that requirements in other parts of the world would cause M.I.6 to welcome an opportunity to withdraw their officers. Thus we would inherit a well-established group of informants , and while there would certainly be some casualties, and while Canadian officers would wish to develop new sources, it would be shortsighted not to build on the existing facilities. In two to three years , when the centre in Ottawa had become established, trained Canadian in. telligence officers would begin to return from M.I.6, during which time they would also have been required to learn Some of these of'f'icers would be retainWto staff the headquarters 000069 �CAG — Released under the Access to Information Act / AMC — Divulgue (s) en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a(' information IDS 29 1'1=CANADA vol.2 018 s.15(1) - International 8. in Ottawa; and others, with clerical staff drawn Prow the existing staff in Ottawa. would be posted to,j These postings could take place over a period as long as a year until eventually the whole area was covered as suggested earlier in_these notes with a minimum __ of five stations at Simultaneously arrangements would be made for a close working relationship with the representatives of M.I.5 ( the British Security Service) in ■ The Canadian intelligence officers' would work, of course, under the direction and instruction of the headquarters in Ottawa. Reports received would not only be distributed to Canadian government departments, but also to M.I.6 and C.I.A. headquarters in London and Washington in order to ensure the fullest reciprocal return for Canada of intelligence from all quarters of the world. 000070 �CAG — Released under the Access to Information Act / AMC — Divulgue (s) en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a(' information IDS 29-1-PCANADA vol.2 019 TOP SEMT A P•P E N D.1 X COM AND FINANCING The cover, and consequently the subordination, together with the financing of a secret intelligence service present perhaps the most difficult problem.to be faced because all its facilities and operations will in the end depend upon this. A- secret intelligence service ideally has certain essential requirements and it will be advisable to examine a minimum of these and attempt to apply them to the Canadian governmental structure. (i) A secret intelligence service must be secret. This means that it must be absorbed as an entity within an existing and overt organisation, and that only a minimum of people within that organisation should be aware of its functions. Public knowledge should never go beyond the fact that a secret intelligence service exists. (ii) In order -to make ( i) above possible, a secret' intelligence service should have certain admitted and overt functions which it can and does perfalm openly on behalf of the goverment, These functions must fell within the general scope of the organisation to which it is attached and should be of a nature to allow its officers to perform their true and secret work with the minimum of .impediment. (iii) The organisation to which a secret intelligence service is attached must have representatives abroad. (iv) A secret intelligence service should be headed by one senior official who has direct access to a Minister. Control of operations by a committee is absolutely Impossible. A committee of interested departments can be formed to indicate intelligence requirements and priorities, but the control of operations in the field must be solely in the hands of the'service and its head: (•) The finances of a secret intelligence service cannot be opened to the detailed scrutiny of the machinery of a Treasury. First, because security requirements forbiitit, and secondly because the nature of the operations of a secret intelligence service are such that an examination of this kind is largely profitless. The salaries, living allowances, pension contributions, eta. of career officers can be handled openly as a part of the finances of the parent organisation to wwhich the service is attached:- but a large part of the 000071 �CAG — Released under the Access to Information Act / AMC — Divulgue (s) en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a(' information s.15(1) -International r= IDS 29-1-1=CANADA vol.2 020 20 expenditures of a secret intelligence service cbnsist of payments, bribes and rewards for secret agents in the field. There can be no hard criterion by which payments of this kind can be judged. Frequently a wealthy agent working for ideological reasons will provide very high-grade intelligence and require no payment beyond reimbursement of his out-ofpocket expenses: on the other hand an agent providing routine but useful intelligence may have financial difficulties and must be paid at a higher rate. Payments of this kind must of course be examined by the headquarters of the service and.measured against the intelligence forwarded, but eventually the control of expenditures must rest upon the high integrity of the officers in the field. These requirements can now be applied to the Canadian scene. Point ( iii) above immediately limits the number of departments capable of acting as the 'parent• organisation: for practical purposes it limits the choice to the Department of External Affairs and the Department of National Defence. Of these two , the former is by far the better choice because its missions abroad offer adequate facilities for covering an intelligence staff in the field. The office of a service attache abroad cannot easily absorb a staff of some half dozen persons without arousing comment, nor can an intelligence officer necessarily be expected to hale the service background which may prove essential for an adequate maintenance of his cover story. External Affairs can also meet the requirements set out as ( i) above, though the overt functions of the intelligence.officer in a mission abroad will require careful consideration because they should if possible be consistent with the functions of the division within External Affairs in Ottawa which is to act as the parent body. How these requirements are to be met must be a matter for later decision. The salaries and allowances for career officers and clerical staff would in this case be provided by the Department of External Affairs and their financial status need be no different from that of other staff. It is extremely difficult, without detailed and up-to-date knowledge of present MJ A operations_ : Ato estimate the number of persons who would be required initially and hence the expenditures involved. The following figures can only be a very rough estimate: In Stage I In the Ottawa Centre In training by M.I.6 - 1 woman officer 5 clerical staff 10 officers. 0003 000072 �CAG — Released under the Access to Information Act / AMC — Divulgue (s) en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a(' information s.15(1) -International IDS 1-1-CANADA vol.2 021 3. In Stage II In the Ottawa Centre _ In the field - 5 officers 10 clerical staff - 10 officers 10 clerical staff. The increase of 5 officers in Stage II might be met by the recruiting of acne Canadian officers or British officers now resident in Canada who were fully trained in World War II. A few of these might be persuaded to join a Canadian intelligence service. The chief problem which remains is how to obtain funds for the actual operations of the service. However they are obtained, they certainly cannot be accounted for publicly, and it would therefore seem inevitable that eventually a vote of secret funds would be required. Initially, however, some temporary financial arrangement with M.I.6 might be ;considered. 000073 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDFI00001 Title A name given to the resource George Glazebrook to Arnold Heeney, Memorandum on a Canadian Secret Intelligence Service, 23 October 1951 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 23-Oct-51 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived GAC Special Registry File 29-1-1-Canada Part 2 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Foreign Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource A-2022-00326 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access to Information Request Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English