1 20 1 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/0208a2c77179d1abe5cfbbf742c36015.pdf 91bde0feef515a9231ce7264b0a14068 PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project GAC ATIP A-2023-03407 GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket DFAIT Livermore to Graham "Expanding Canada's Foreign Intelligence Collection through CSIS" March 2004 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - o,vulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information b-~~,;/i,.(~, s.15(1) - Security SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY Information Memorandum for: The Minister of Foreign Affairs Expanding Canada's "Forei1::,>n lntelligence Collection" through CSIS \ SUM.t\1ARY: 1. The issue of a Canadian "foreign intelligence agency" is a longstanding one, having been considered at the time of the fonnation of CSIS in the early 1980s and most recently in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Cabinet has never been willing to contemplate the entry of Canada into what is a controversial area of activity. 2. Among the recent initiatives currently under discussion as part of a future "National Security Policy" is the proposed "expansion" of CSIS activities abroad in the area of foreign iritelligence. There has not been serious inter-departmental discussion of this proposal. 3. We continue to see serious difficulties with this proposal: no significant Western country allows its domestic security-intelligence agency to conduct foreign intelligence; this is t h e - - because the legal constraints under ,vhich a domestic a g e ~ e totally absent when Ill . s no role :for the Foreign Minister; unlike the situation in the United Kingdom (the closest parallel to Canada), where the British Secret Intelligence Service reports to the Foreign Secretary, there is no reporting or accountability structure; - - - - - - as defined by the Prime Minister ,ma t n - t e r . 4. While there are advantages and disadvantages in pursuing a "foreign intelligence option" for Canada, the current process for securing this objective are we would advocate: • that the Government refrain from any action on this type of recommendation and omit any reference to "foreign intelligence" in a :future National Security Policy; and 7b 000076 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC:.-On,ulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.13(1 )(a) s.1S(1) - Security SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY if this is something whichMinisters ,vish to discuss, that an inter-departmental group be authorized to prepare a set of recom111e11dations on this issue, having co11Sidered the fn11 range of options, including reporting structures and accountability procedures. BACKGROUND: There are both merits and drawbacks to moving into this area which have been ,veighed by previous governments. Since 9/11, the key driving factor fa1s been that our allies have intensified their intelligence efforts, while we have contribmed relatively little, except for increased diplomatic reporti11g. There is a risk that we win be cut Ollt of current shming arrangements, or possibly more difficult, that the intelligence passed to us will become According to p1:iblic statements by the Director of CSIS, CSIS has. attempted to fill this ga:p in foreign intelligence collection by e1_1j1ancing its activities abroad. CSIS's primm7 role is to collect intelligence relating to threats against the security of Canada, and it is considered a "domestic" security-i11te11igence agency. However, under Section 16 of its Act, it can collect foreign intelligence "within Canada" at the request of the l:Vlinister of Foreign Affairs. It also has "Ministerial Direction" from the former Solicitor General, drafted post 9/1 J, which give it To what we • We believe that, while CSIS's don1estic role is laudable imd folly accmmtable, its It is also clear that the types 01 acco11ntab1llty and reporting sb11ctures appropnate to a :rore1_gn mtel1igence agency were never put into place, l! tl1ere 1s to lx'. achange m tl11s approach, 1t warrants a se1ious Cabinet discussion and a complete review of accountability and reporting structures, as well as procednrns for working in a complex international enviro1,rnent. 000077 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - Security SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY TI1e argument used by CSIS to advance its claims are simple. It has a structure in place; its has trained staff; and this is the cheapest and fastest way to acquiTe a foreign intelligence capability. In the proposed National Secmity Policy, what is recommended is that CSIS be provided with increased resomces to pursue additional foreign intelligence collection abroad (on the fallacious asSUF1ption that this role has already been agreed previously). However, the pattern that CSIS is advancing Domestic secmity intelligence functions under careful ministerial and judicial oversight, is governed by a clear body of rules and is expected to produce materials which are subject to eventual scrutiny by oversight bodies or courts oflaw. Foreign intelligence ftmctions under no such constraints, and is by definition a Virtually every Western foreign intelligence agency works closely with its counterpart foreign ministry, and most, None of the pros and cons of an increased intelligence capability have been seriously addressed in the current discussions about a National Security Policy. Moreover, the issues inherent in this question are unlikely to be resolved over the short run. This is a serious public policy question, with many foreign policy implications, on which a fuU Cabinet discussion is nnavoidable. We believe that "short-term fixes", like expanding CSIS's mandate and pnwichng CSIS with additional resources, Moreover, as the Department ,v:ith the mandate and interest in foreign policy, the Department of Foreign Affairs In the short run, as a National Security Policy is drafted, this docume11t should omit all references to the controversial area intelligence. Should Canada wish to do more in this area, this is not an issue on which we vvish to our fuhtre intentions publicly, nor would it be appropriate in document devoted to domestic issues. a Jg 000078 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. 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Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDFI00020 Title A name given to the resource Information Memorandum for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Expanding Canada's Foreign Intelligence Collection Through CSIS, 22 March 2004 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 22-Mar-04 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Foreign Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource A-2023-03407 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access to Information Request Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English