1 20 1 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5da753118e6950745d6a88490f772956.pdf 57184f59716d9e1aba1e918b7d494280 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act_ ' Document divulgue ~n vertu de la Loi sur l'acces ii /'information ... ....CHIEFS·OF STAFF COMMITTEE Extract k6j from the Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee .;:;;3;...,;o;..._L.;n~1..:::c.::3::¥f. held on ___ ~~L-·. ,., ~~··. -1•~.- ·'--•--•-.-·•-~-·•--~---==.:::.---:--F• ,w·:t I! .._,, r--- - -~ __ -_· II i · ---'---'' ______ !";"~ . • = __:__.:_________:____:...~------ I I 'j;,~b-.,.-· - •____ · ~-- .. -n --------, \ CONCEPTOF MILITARYOPERATIONS FOLLOWING THE INITIAL PHASEOF HOSTILITIF§ ( TOP SF.CRET) j " ·t s-o-The-Committee-had~for-consideration-a-dratt..-paper-prepare,d~____J by the Joint Planning Committee in accordance with the direction of the Chairman» Chiefs of Staff.o (Cs<;s5oll Tl>s.1dated 28 May 57) 7o General Foulkes introduced this paper and explained that it had been written by the JPC as a sequel to their previous paper entitled "Conditions Under Which Mobilization Might Take Place"o He considered that the Chiefs of Staff should reach agreement as to their views on what might take place in the subsequent phase of hostilities before mobilization plans could be adequately reviewedo . · · 80 The Chief of the Air Staff considered that the paper was generally well written although some parts could be improved by re=writingo Lieutenan~General Graham agreed that the paper was a good draft and in line with the present.Chiefs of Staff thinking on this mattero However~ it was dangerous to base all our plans \ ~n a concept of hostilities that inciuded widespread nuclear ---•:,,.----------4W· ll!lage--4-n-Gana-da-ei-nce-it-wa-a-very-poeei:bl-e...-tbat-oerta4.-n-mill~ } <-• operatiom might have to 'ee carried out under conditions where nuclear destruction was either non-existent or on a very small scale. 9., !. ••' 'Ir _ , r 000351 jJ, �' Documeni:-,fiscio~derthe Acces.. to Information Act - 10 The Chairman 9 Chiefs of Staff' pointe<io@ltM)t <th"erlbk,e,ctgen,>,sur racces a!'information eral concept in the paper conformed in large measure to that laid down in NATOdocuments and previously agreed to by the Chiefs of Staffo He considered that "the rolesof the Services" required further consideration and developmento He suggested that the Chiefs of Sta:ff give general concurrence with the paper as a first drafto 0 , .. llo The Chief of the Air Staff' stated that we must be prepared to some extent for the unforeseeable and that 9 despite our specialization to meet a nuclear war of global size 9 the Canadian forces should retain sufficient flexibility to be able to operate efficiently in a less widespread struggleo • l2o 'Viee Admiral DeWolf pointed out that the flexibility of the Canadian forces was weakened by the real support Canada was -giving to the NATOconcept of collective balanceo l3o The Chairman 8 Chiefs of Staff replied that our contribution to meeting our full NATOcommitment did not mitigate against meeting other lesser commitments such as local hostilities or police actions in support of the United Nationso I; 140 Mro Leger pointed out that any UN commitments Canada might undertake would be in conjunction with our UN allies and in all probability using only conventional weapons o The numbers of men involved might vary as might the location of any such police action 9 but he doubted very much whether under any circumstances there would be a requirement for a Canadian force of more than brigade strengtho l5o General Foulkes considered that the difficulties involved in reinforcing the Brigade in Europe and in providing the bal= ance of the Division by M plus shipping time 9 brought up a number of major problems o He noted that the balance of the Division was now regarded by SACEURas a strategic reserve 9 and considered that studies should be progressed as rapidly as pos= sible towards making more of the Army air portableo Such a con= c.ept would not only be of great assistance to SACEUR but would certainly be vital in the role of the Army in Canada in a sur= vival phaseo 160 The Chief of the General Staff pointed out that such studies were well advanced but that the reorganization of the Anrry could not take place overnighto At the present time he could organize an air portable battalion within a week but such a force would have no heavy equipment or armouro 170 Discussing the role of the forces 9 the Chief of the Naval Staff considered that parao 14 should be re~written as it gave a wrong impression of the intensity of Soviet submarine attackso He appreciated what was in the Planners' minds and agreed that the intensity of such attacks would build up during the first three weeks of hostilities it gave insufficient 9 but he considered emphasis to the vital importance of operations against submarines carrying guided missiles at the outbreak of hostilitieso /4 000352 �_,.. ., ,I Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en Jertu de la Loi sur /'acres ii /'information ,, .. =4= 180 Referring to parao 14 (c) and (d) 9 the Chairman suggested that studies should be undertaken with regard to the provision of logistic support in such locations as Icelandv Greenland and the Azoresv as well as to the pro= vision of seagoing mobile logistic supporte l9o Referring to parao 16 9 the Chairman 8 Chiefs of Staff questioned whether any provision should be made in mobiliza= tion plans for the employment of RCNand RCAFpersonnel in support of civil defenceo The Committee noted that in para o 22 the word "survival" should be inserted between "all" and "commitments• in line 4o 200 2lo General Foulkes suggested 9 in referring to parao 24 9 that the role of the M:>bile Striking Force and its air support still needed ~larificationo He referred to minutes of pre= vious meetings~cir the Chiefs of Staff and pointed out that this matter had been under consideration for a year and it was essen= tial that it now be finalizedo 220 In general discussion concerning the role of ground forces 9 the Under=Secretacy of State for Ex:ternal Affairs pointed out that any change in the allocation of the balance of the Division to NATOmight result in the unfortunate conclusion amongst European countries that Canada was reducing her NATOcommitmentso This would be difficult to answer since the reasons for any Canadian reappraisal of this matter would be different from those put forward from the United Kingdom in support of their reduction of forceso 230 The Chairman 9 Chiefs of Staff' pointed out that there was no question of reducing Canadian ground forces 9 it was simply a matter of devising a realistic plan for making fomations of the Canadian Army available to SACEURat a time when they would be most urgently needado 240 Referring to the "Air Section" 9 the Chairman referred to the statement concerning the RCAFtactical component of the Mobile Striking Force in parao 27(b)o He considered that the requirement for logistic support to continue beyond the present 30=day period as concluded in parao 28 9 should be reviewedo Mro Zimmerman suggested that there might be some mention in the paper as to the wartime employment of scientists and technicians of the Defence Research Boardo 250 260 The Chairman 9 Chiefs of Staff stated that any proposals put forward by the Chairman~ Defence Research Board 9 on this matter 9 should be considered by the Planners and incorporated in the papero 270 The general concept was agreed and it was understood that the Chiefs of Staff would review the service portion, of' the paper withtheir Directors of Plans and that following this review 9 the JPC would then review the paper and make any alterations considered necessary for further consideration by the Comridtteeo 280 General Foulkes stated that it was necessary that this be dona at the earliest possible opportunity in order tha - ·------- should �II .;..· -- ·-~ --~ Document disclosed under the Access-to Information Act - - ' CONCEPI' OF MILITARY OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THJi:unYUa:JiAten vertu de la Loisur /'acces ii /'information PHASEOF HOSTILITIES (TOP SECRET) 5o General Foulkes recalled that at the Committee the Chiefs of Staff had regarding the concept but had decided the Service_s• -with their Directors of the 609th meeting of reached general agreement to review the "roles of Planso 6. As a result of this review, Vice Admiral DeWolf tabled a paper (NSTS 11650-35) suggesting certain amendments to the draft paper. 7. Commenting on the draft paper, Lieutenant-General Graham also suggested certain minor changes in the role of ground forces and Air Marshal Slemon had some comments to make concerning the role of air forces. 8. Referring to paraso 24 and 27(b), the Committee again dis= cussed the role of the 1'bbile Striking Force and its tactical air support. 9. The Chairman pointed out that ground defence planning in the Canada-United States region was the responsibility of Canada and the United States in their own countrieso He suggested that the Chiefs of Staff should again consider whether there were in fact any targets in northern Canada which might be attractive to the enemy, and whether counter action against enemy landings on such targets, if they existed, could not be more satisfactorily carried out with airportable troops rather than para.troops. 10. Referring to parao 24, the Chairman suggested that the Chief of th-e General Staff review the responsibility for_internment and prisoners of war with the RCMP. ' 11. After further paper as follows: discussion, the Committee agreed to amend the a) para. 10 - first "undoubtedly". sentence: substitute "probably" for b) Parao 10 - last sentence: for "it will not be possible to carcy out additional militacy activities", reads "it will not be possible to undertake any military activities in addition to those already being carried out in the first phase"• c) Parao 12: delete and substitute: "To destroy submarines in transit to their operational areas. The transit routes passing as they do through the Denmark Strait and Norwegian Sea, will allow us to obtain defence in depth by means of an A/S barrier in these areas. Ho~ever 9 since some submarines will undoubtedly have penetrated this barrier either before the war starts or during the initial phase, and since submarines can enter the North Atlantic from the South Atlantic /3 EXTRACT FROM610th meeting of Chiefs of Staff Cttee 6 Jun 57 1 000324 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information .:· without passing this barrier~ the role of maritime forces must also be to control waters adjacent to North America by destroying submarines within firing range of North American targets. Canada-u.s. maritime forces in close cooperation will be required to deny this area to the enemy". d) Para l48 delete first sentence and substitute3 ttin the transit area operations may be expected to start from the outset against submarines already at sea when the. initial blow is struck. The intensity 0£ operations will increase rapidly as the remaining submarines are sailed from USSR ports to their operational areas. In waters adjacent to North America, the USSRwill also be capable of deploying a number of guided missile submarines without giving away surprise prior to D-day. These even though small in numbers could · provide a significant contribution to the initial nuclear attack on this continent. The number or submarines reaching this area will rise sharply three to six weeks after the initial attack when the full intensity of the war at sea is expected to be felt. This period of intense operations is expected to last approximately seven to eight weeks, subsequently decreasing in intensity". e) .Para. 163 delete the second sentence and inserts "It is unlikely that the bulk of the reserves could be employed in the RONand RCAFroles envisaged by this concept of operations until the task of survival has been achievedn. 3", f) Para. 19: line 4 - for npara. g) Para. 23: second sentence: for "it will be essential to move troops", reads "it may be essential to move troops"• h) Para. 25(d): for "its ability to conduct conventional operations", reads "its ability to conduct military operations". reads"para.14•. 12. The Committee also agreed that the amendments would be in= serted by the Secretary, and the paper circulated for further 000325 discussion. �T\ -7 -~losed Docume~ue l... -· under the Access to Information Act en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information IN REPLY No. 11\tpartmtntof Jflational11\tftnct CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE CHIEFS Rltl'LY TO. SECRIETARY OP' 9TAP'P' CONNITTIEIE, OTTAWA. 10 June 1957 Chairman, Chiefs of Staff CAS cos CNS CDRB Concept of Military Operations Following the Initial Phase of Hostilities 1. Attached for your consideration is a revised draft of the above mentioned paper, amended in accordance with decisions of the 609th and 610th meetings of the Chiefs of Starr Committee. r.w :r:L~c.~ (F.w.T. Lucas) Captain, RON Secretary FWTL/6-6756/mck c.c. Deputy Minister Secretacy to the Cabinet Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Coordinator Joint Start QUOTE CSG•5ell. ..'.J:'P;l.... CANADA ADDllltH PLEASE TOPSECRET �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information •--~---- - TOPSEI:RET csc:5.11 27 May 57 REPORT A To The CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE By The JOINT PLANNING COMMIT:I'E& I 1. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in a par/er entitled Under Which Mobilization the preparation Might Take Place,, of service mobilization tary commitments during the initial forces guidance for /1ans to meet present mili- / phase of a major war. to plan for the subsequent operationslaf j necessary for the Chiefs of Staff 7 provided "Conditions In order a major war it is now decide on the part the Canadian should play during this peh.od and consequently .I the form the forces should take to meet this/requirement. . 2. It h~een conditions a general life !' agreed in the Chiefs of Staff \ whibh might exist in Canada during the initial war ~)\e s~ized and war effort\fojat and for a much longe The causes of this the Chiefs of Staff lization 3, pl.annin/ The Chail, I • period as a serious least ~is~ption I to be related follow of national of attack or contlllllinated, conclusions drawn up by Commi\tee to provide part of the basis for mobi- are attac\ed at Appendix •A•, Chiefs of\Staff . f~llowing the initial is to be clrried destroyed and additional \ . disruption the phase of the period of the threat in areas Planning Colllll\'ttee to prepare~ operations Committee that I has therefore directed the Joint study on the concept of military phase of a major war. This study out within pre~ent National Defence policy and is to our agreed equip\~nt /111 not interfere policy so that the plans which with our \\tablished priorities for the initial!. phase. I 4o The aim of this study is to recommend to the Chiefs of Staff Committee what the C~adian concept of military operations shoulp be /2 "--- - �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - TOPSECRET during the period following the initial with the role to be played by each of the the mid-l96Os, together services ization phase of a major war up to during this period and the general pattern of the forces required of any reorgan- to carry out this role. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 5. It is considered major war in pursuit a major portion that the enemy's primary objectives of his war aims would be to neutralize of NATO'smain retaliatory clude large scale attacks against the initiative that we will get little North Americao The enemy can attack more than tactical It is very difficult and as the Soviets warning, probably a from the DEWline. to judge when the initial phase would end and the subsequent phase begin, however, it is considered initial or at the beginning of the war it is concluded warning of 2-3 hours received 6. all, powero This would in- hope to achieve his aim only by a surprise will-have in a phase would end when the enemy is incapable large scale nuclear attacks. The initial that the of delivering phase could last for days or weeks, and there will not be any abrupt change from the initial phase to the subsequent phase. 7. In the subsequent phase of operations capacity phase. to fight we will be limited to the weapons remaining at the end of the initial Furthermore we cannot assume that any productive will be available in our for some considerable capacity time. ASSUMPTIONS 8. It is assumed that: a) the initial phase has not brought an end to hostilities and the will to 'Iring the war to a successful We will still conclusion still meet resistance exists in NATOo in varying de- grees from the forces of the USSR. /3 000328 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu d'(ila Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - TOP SECRET b) At the close of the intense nuclear exchange the NATOpowers will have superiority ability to deliver in the nuclear attacks. CONCEPT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS FULLOWING THEINITIALPHASE 9. Despite the heavy attrition of forces and the intense nuclear weapons during the initial pha~e the Soviets will still nuclear weapons and will only be limited numbers and types of delivery and will also have a substantial have in the use of them by the systems still will have a small number of long-range but reduced operations. use of available. aircraft The Soviets for sporadic raids number of submarines for sustained There will therefore be a continuing quirement for air defence and anti-submarine re- forces for the defence of Canada and the United States. 10. Because of the intense initial phase, directed Soviet use of nuclear weapons during the against targets in North America, the pri- mary problem in Canada will probably be one of survival. it is considered available that the maximummilitary will be required to assist and rehabilitation of the country. the first task and, until pri6rity activities out in the first llo ably be similar survival of survival will be has been accomplished to those already being carried following the initial to that existing phase in Europe will prob- in North America. to an intense However, Europe nuclear attack but have been overrun to some extent by Soviet ground The greatest and rehabilitation ations The battle in addition will not only have been subjected forces. in measures for the survival phase. The situation it will likely forces that can be made commenced·, it will' no·t be possible" to undertake and rehabilitation. any military Consequently effort will have to be devoted to the survival of the NATOcountries, will have to be limited remaining Soviet forces. and therefore military oper- to the containment and liquidation The NATOpowers by the threat or use of or /4 000329 �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information TOP S:&:hET -4- e their superior nuclear power will endeavour to prevent Soviet ad= vances and to force the capitulation quently it may be necessary to establish zed. control of the enemy forces to take over certain and to·ensure Subse .. o areas of the USSR that resistance is not reorgani- It is not envisaged that large forces would be required these operations or that it would be necessary to occupy large areas of the USSRto carry out this objective. called upon to assist against in the rehabilitation for Canada might be of Europe and operations remaining Soviet forces. ·MARITIME OPERATIONS IN THE SUBSEQUENT PHASE OF A GENERALWARCOMMENCING UP TO THEMID-1960'°s Role of the Maritime Force 12. To destroy submarines in transit The transit routes; to their operational areas. passing as they do through the• Denmark Strait and Norwegian Sea, will allow us to obtain a degree of defence in depth by means of an A/S barrier in these areas. marines will undoubtedly have penetrated war starts or during the initial tbe North Atlantic However, since some subthis barrier either before the phase, and since submarines can enter from the South Atlantic without passing thi's barrier$ the role of maritime forces must also be to control waters adjacent North America by destroying American targets. will be required submarines within firing Canada-U.S. maritime forces to range of North in close cooperation to deny this area to the enemy. Concept 130 A large proportion of Soviet naval bases and mobile support facili- ties will be rendered inoperative following marines can be expected to be destroyed A/S operations. will be limited allied in port, The remaining submarine force, to the capability attacks. in transit and in although substantial, of the USSRto provide support. However, because there will be nuclear weapons available, force will continue initial Some sub- phase operations the submarine in the subsequent phase, /5 000330 �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - TOP SECRET but at a reduced and gradually diminishing in the subsequent phase, allied intensity. Consequently, maritime forces will have to con- tinue to combat the Soviet submarine threat. Operations 14. In the transit the outset is struck. against area operations be expected to start from submarines already at sea when the initial The intensity of operations remaining submarines are sailed areas. may In the waters adjacent will increase blow rapidly from USSRports to their as the operational to North America the USSRwill also be capable of deploying a number of guided mi-ssile submarines without giving away surprise prior to D-day. bers could provide a significant attack on this area will rise when the full continent. to the initial contribution intensity operations is expected to last decreasing maritime forces providing the initial this attack of the war at sea is expected to be felt. seven to eight weeks, subsequently meet these threats, nuclear The number of submarines reaching sharply three to six weeks after This period of intense a) These even though small in num- forces=in-being, approximately in intensity. To should be capable of: combat ready, deployed so as to be able to deal with the submarine threat from the onset. b) Maintaining of three intense operatiom months to defeat operations for a minimum period initial phase submarine and to be able to meet operational com- mitments in the subsequent phase. c) Dispersed logistics and maritime airfields with a minimum POLstock of 90 days. d) Provision of seagoing mobile logistics chances of survival to increase greatest by dispersal and, more important, the period that the fleet operational to increase can maintain its intensity. /6 000331 �I Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information e TOP SECRET Providing a seagoing mobile repair e) organi- zation to operate from a safe haven or minor port. f) Controlling operations through the establish- ment of maritime headquarters communications, located interrupted operation and adequate so as to ensure unduring both phases· of the war. Pattern 15. of Forces No change in the pattern considered likely tinuation of forces for the subsequent phase is as the subsequent phase is expected to be a con= of the initial expected to be available case of logistics, phase. after repairs Normal base facilities the initial exchange, so, as in the will have to be made at dispersed making use of seagoing mobile repair ational are not units sites, to maintain maximumoper- intensity. Reserves 16. A small number of naval and air reserves and earmarked for a particular specifically duty and located in areas where they would be employed in war, should be able to report the initial phaseo It is unlikely Shipping in-the 17. until the task of survival would require envisaged by this has been achieved. The direct as a secondary target protection Canadian·maritime of shipping, if it is necessary, adding emphasis to the need for mobile support to ensure our forces retain and mobility priority forces to operate at great distances from North American sources of support, bility concept Subsequent Phase Shipping at sea will be attacked in both phases. at the onset of that the bulk of the reserves could be employed in the RONand ROAFroles of operations trained such operations the endurance, flexi- demando /7 000332 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information I TOPSECRET -7CONCLUSIONS 18. The concept of maritime operations and the role of the RCN and RCAFin the subsequent phase will be a continuation phase operations at a reduced intensity perienced on both sides in the initial 19. due to serious phase. Therefore, ex- for employ- for the subsequent of requirements 14 above will apply to both the initial prosecution suitable phase will also be suitable the provision losses phase. The types of RONand RCAFmaritime forces ment in the initial of initial listed in paragraph and subsequent phases in the of a general war at sea. Role of the Ground Forces 20. The role of the ground forces in the subsequent phase will be to: a) continue to conduct operations b) assist c) continue to conduct acy required civil authorities under SACEURin Europe; in survival operations; direct· defence of Canada operations •. 21. Because of the many imponderables in the initial difficult to determine when fi:ny portion phase, it is of the balance of the division c,:,uld be sent to SACEUR. Apart from some additional support to the force now in Europe to bring it up to WEand provide first the balance of the division 22. Initially assistance progresses, from the Militia. it will gradually ments in Canada with the exception SACEUR'sstrategic until conditions release. reserve by SACEUR. most of the Army commitments will be met by the Regular Force with limited the Militia has been placed in strategic reinforcements, As mobilization take over all of defence against reserve may not be available survival of commit- enemy lodgments. for despatch to Europe in Canada are such that the Government will agree to its Its ,role will vary between employment in rounding up enemy detachments to assistance in the rehabilitation of Western European economy. /8 000333 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information TOPSECRET -8- 23. Anrry assistance evacuated centres to civil authorities and maintenance of vital portation facilities, facilities, etc. food distribution sections tation will be disrupted, facilities troops from one section services services, Since the assistance ably in different assistance will include policing required such as transcommunication will vary consider- .•· of the country and since normal transporit may be essential to move of the country to another by air. This may extend well into the subsequent phase as the Arrrr:ywill be required to assist population in controlling the return to more normal conditions. of the economy and However, as indicated this role can be taken over progressively by the Militia above, as it is mobilized. 24. It is difficult to predict subsequent phases the requirement may disappear. at what period in the initial for defence against Canada operations The requirement such as protection for other direct of vital points, RCNin Coast and Seaward Defence, and internment will continue in the subsequent phase. authorities enemy lodgments The Army must be prepared to continue to meet this conmitment if required. pone certain or defence of assistance to and POWoperations It may be necessary to post- of these tasks in order to meet the demands of civil for assistance in survival operations. CONCLUSIONS 25. It is concluded that: a) Ground forces for employment both within Canada and as SACEUR'sstrategic portable b) should be air- .. The force in Europe in peacetime must be maintained up to establishment have with it its c) reserve The militia initial strength reinforcements. should be reorganized :-a st~ong healthy force related war. Mobilization and should to proVide to its role in plans must include the mobili- zati9n o:f the militia although such mobilization may be delayed in whole or in part. /9 000334 �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information .._ e -9d) The Army must maintain its ability military operations to conduct both at home and abroad and at the same time prepare to assist authorities in survival civil operations. AIR The. Role of tbe RC.AF 26. The role of the RCAF,in the light of the stated concept of military operations in the subsequent phase, will be: ~) · To continue to maintain the air defence system on full alert until the threat of enemy air operations against North America no longer exists. b) To continue to maintain the RCAFcomponent of our maritime force at maximumoperational capabilit7 until the enemy maritime threat no longer ~ists. c) To continu~ air operations control of 4 ATAF. operational d) in Europe under the To maintain in imm1:3diatereadiness, . air transport the military airlift capability the maximum to meet the demands of services and the civil power for from Canada to Europe, and within Canada, in $Upport or mj.litary operations and national survival. e) With the resources and personnel not directly gaged in, or in logistic to assist in tasks related en- support of the above tasks, to national survival for as long as required. /10 000335 �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Dqcument divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information •.. .. e -lO- TOP S~RET General Pattern ot Re-Organization or the RCAF 27. As the role of the OOAFin the subsequent phase will not d!ffer appreciably organization.of from that of the initial forces is required. peacetime pattern phase, no major re- The following changes in the of the RCAFwould take place in the initial phase, and would continue into the subsequent phase: a) The role of thE! RCAFtraining change at the.General organization would Alert from that of training to that of providing trained personnel to augment the RCAFoperational and to assisting priority. commandsas first in national survival as second Training might be resumed in the sub- sequent phase dependent on conditions and the requirement for. additional b) priority, At some stage in the initial the RCAFtactical in Canada trained personnel. or subsequent phase, component which supports the MSF will either have compl-eted its task or the requirement for MSFoperations will have disappeared. this time, the role of the RCAFtactical will change to reinforcement commandsand assistance At component of RCAFoperational to the national survival effort. CONCLUSIONS 28. It is concluded that; a) as ROAFair defence, maritime and transport are expected to continue indefinitely phase, every effort sure that logistic operations in the subsequent should be mape in peacetime to ensupport (especially could continue beyond the presently POLand armament) planned 30-day period despite the breakdown in transportation supply which might be expected from en~ and sources of action. /11 000336 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information j e TOPSECREI' -11- 28. b) To ensure the maximumutilization or the ROAF forces and resources assigned to national survival, the concept of operations, task assignments of the national organization should be clearly and the survival defined as soon as possible. TOPSIDRET 000337 �, Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information .. ---~. - DRAFT TOP SEI:RET CSC:5.11 27 May 57 A REPORT To The CHIEFSOF STAFFCOMMITTEE By The JOINT.PLANNING COMMITTEE 1. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in a paper entitled Under Which Mobilization the preparation Might Take Place", of service mobilization tary commitments during the initial provided guidance for plans to meet present mili- phase of a major war. to plan for the subsequent operations necessary- for the Chiefs of Staff to decide on the part the Canadian should play during this period and consequently forces should take to meet this the form the requirement. It has been agreed in the Chiefs of Staff Committee that the conditions which might exist in Canada during the initial a general war may be summarized as a serious life In order of a major war it is now forces 2. •conditions and war effort for at least disruption phase of of national the period of the threat of attack and for a much longer period in areas destroyed or contaminated. The causes of this disruption and additional conclusions drawn up by the Chiefs of Staff Committee to provide part of the basis for mobilization J. planning are attached at Appendix •A•. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff has therefore directed the Joint Planning Committee to prepare a study on the concept of military operations following the initial is to be carried to be related out within present 4• This study National Defence policy and is to our agreed equipment policy follow will not interfere initial phase of a major war. so that the plans which with our established priorities for the phase. The aim of this study is to recommend to the Chiefs of Staff Committee what the Canadian concept of military operations should be /2 000338 ' �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - TOPSECRET during the period following the initial with the role to be played by each of the the mid-1960s, together services ization phase of a major war up to during this period and the general pattern of the forces required of any reorgan- to carry out this role. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 5o It is considered that the enemy's primary objectives major war in pursuit a major portion of his war aims would be to neutralize of NATO'smain retaliatory clude large scale attacks against powere will have the initiative that we will get little all, This would in- attack and as the Soviets at the beginning of the war it is concluded more than tactical warning of 2-3 hours received It is very difficult warning, probably a from the DEWline. to judge when the initial phase would end and the subsequent phase begin, however, it is considered initial phase would end when the enemy is incapable large scale nuclear attacks. or weeks, and.there or North Americao The enemy can hope to achieve his aim only by a surprise 6. in a The initial that the of delivering phase could last for days will not be any abrupt change from the initial phase to the subsequent phase. 7. In the subsequent phase of operations capacity phase. to fight we will be limited to the weapons remaining at the end of the initial Furthermore we cannot assume that any productive will be available in our for some considerable capacity time. ASSUMPTIONS 8. It is assumed that: ' a) the initial. phase has not brought an end to hostilities and the will to bring the war to a successful We will still conclusion still meet resistance exists in NATOo in varying de- grees from the forces of the USSR. /3 000339 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de,,.laLoi sur /'acces ii /'information 0 TOP SF.CRET e b) At the close of the intense nuclear exchange the NATOpowers will have superiority ability to deliver in the nuclear attacks. CONCEPT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THEINITIALPHASE 9. Despite the heavy attrition of forces nuclear weapons during the initial and will also have a substantial have in the use of them by the systems still will have a small number of long-range but reduced operations. use of phase the Soviets will still nuclear weapons and will only be limited numbers and types of delivery and the intense available. aircraft The Soviets for sporadic raids number of submarines for sustained There will therefore be a continuing quirement for air defence and anti-submarine re- forces for the defence of Canada and the United States. 10. Because of the intense initial phase, directed Soviet use of nuclear weapons during the against targets in North America, the pri- mary problem in Canada will probably be one of survival. it is considered available that the maximummilitary will be required to assist and rehabilitation of the country. the first task and, until priority and rehabilitation. arry military out in the first 11. ably be similar to that existing to undertake to those already being carried phase in Europe will prob- in North America. to an intense However, Europe nuclear attack but have been overrun to some extent by Soviet ground The greatest and rehabilitation ations will be has been accomplished not be possible following the initial will not only have been subjected forces. survival of survival phase. The situation it will likely The battle in addition that can be made in measures for the survival commenced, it will activities forces Consequently effort will have to be devoted to the survival of the NATOcountries, will have to be limited remaining Soviet forces. and therefore military to the containment and liquidation The NATOpowers by the threat operof or use of /4 000340 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information . their superior nuclear power will endeavour to prevent Soviet ad= vances and to force the capitulation quently it may be necessary to establish control of the enemy forceso to take over certain Subse- areas of the USSR and to ensure that resistance is not reorgani- zedo It is not envisaged that large forces would be required these operations or that it would be necessary to occupy large areas of the USSRto carry out this objective. called upon to assist against in the rehabilitation for Canada might be of Europe and operations remaining Soviet forces. MARITIME OPERATIONS IN THESUBSEQUENT PHASE OF A GENERALWARCOMMENCING UP TO THE MID-1960 1·s Role of the Maritime Force 120 To destroy submarines in transit The transit routes; to their operational areas. passing as they do through the Denmark Strait and Norwegian Sea, will allow us to obtain a degree of defence in depth by means or an A/S barrier in these areas. marines will undoubtedly have penetrated war starts or during the initial the North Atlantic However, since some subthis barrier without passing this barrier~ the role of maritime forces must also be to control American targets. will be required submarines within firing Canada-u.s. before the phase, and since submarines can enter from the South Atlantic North America by destroying either maritime forces waters adjacent to range of North in close cooperation to deny this area to the enem;y. Concept l.3o A large proportion of' Soviet naval bases and mobile support ··racili- ties will be rendered inoperative following marines can be expected to be destroyed A/S operations. will be limited allied in port, The remaining submarine force, to the capability attacks. in transit and in although substantial, of the USSRto provide support. However, because there will be nuclear weapons available, force will continue initial Some sub- phase operations the submarine in the subsequent phase 9 /5 000341 I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act-\ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information \ TOP SECRET but at a reduced and gradually diminishing in the subsequent phase, allied intensity. Consequently 9 maritime forces will have to con- tinue to combat the Soviet submarine threat. Operations 14. In the transit the outset is struck. against area operations be expected to start The intensity In the-waters of operations adjacent will increase giving away surprise prior area will rise when the full continent. to D-day. This period of intense contribution a) to the initial nuclear the initial attack of the war at sea is expected to be felt. operations is expected to last decreasing maritime forces providing submarines without The number of submarines reaching this seven to eight weeks, subsequently meet these threats, operational These even though small in num- sharply three to six weeks after intensity as the to North llmerica the USSRwill also bers could provide a significant on this blow rapidly from USSRports to their be capable of deploying a number of guided mi~sile attack from submarines already at sea when the initial remaining submarines are sailed areas. may forces~in-being, approximately in intensity. To should be capable of: combat ready, deployed so as to be able to deal with the submarine threat from the onset. b) Maintaining of three intense operatiora months to defeat operations for a minimum period initial phase submarine and to be able to meet operational com- mitments in the subsequent phase. c) Dispersed logistics and maritime airfields with a minimum POLstock of 90 days. d) Provision of seagoing mobile logistics chances of survival to increase greatest by dispersal and, more important, the period that the fleet operational to increase can maintain its intensity. /6 000342 �I Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information TOPSECRET e) 14.. Providing a seagoing mobile repair organi- zation to operate from a safe haven or minor port. f) Controlling operations through the establish- ment of maritime headquarters communications, located interrupted operation and adequate so as to ensure unduring both phases· of the war. Pattern 15. of Forces No change in the pattern considered likely tinuation of forces for the subsequent phase is as the subsequent phase is expected to be a con~ of the initial expected to be available case of logistics, phase. after repairs Normal base facilities the initial exchange, so, as in the will have to be made at dispersed making use of seagoing mobile repair ational are not units sites, to maintain maximumoper- intensity. Reserves 16. A small number of naval and air reserves and earmarked for a particular specifically duty and located in areas where they would be employed in war, should be able to report the initial phase. It is unlikely until at the onset of that the bulk of the reserves could be employed in the RCNand RCAFroles of operations trained the task of survival envisaged by this concept has been achieved. Shipping in the Subsequent Phase 17. Shipping at sea will be attacked in both phases. would require The direct as a secondary target protection of shipping, if it is necessary, Canadian maritime forces to operate at great distances from North American sources of support, adding emphasis to the need for mobile support to ensure our forces retain bility priority and mobility such operations the endurance, flexi= demand. /7 000343 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information -7- TOP SECRET CONCLUSIONS 18. The concept or maritime operations and the role of the RCN and ReAFin the subsequent phase will be a continuation phase operations at a reduced intensity perienced on both sides in the initial 19. of initial due to serious losses ex- phase. The types of RCNand RCAFmaritime forces suitable ment in the initial phase. Therefore, phase will also be suitable the provision for the subsequent of requirements listed 14 above will apply to both the initial prosecution for employ- in paragraph and subsequent phases in the of a general war at sea. Role of the Ground Forces 20. The role of the ground forces in the subsequent phase will be to: a) continue to conduct operations b) assist c) continue to conduct any required direct civil authorities under SACEUR in Europe; in survival operations; defence of Canada operations •. 21. Because of the many imponderables in the initial difficult phase , it is to determine when any portion of the balance of the division could be sent to SACEUR. Apart from some additional support to the force now in Europe to bring it up to WEand provide first the balance of the division 22. Initially assistance progresses, from the Militia. As mobilization it will gradually talce over all survival ments in Canada with the exception of defence against 1 s strategic SACEUR until conditions release. reserve by SACEUR. most of the Army commitments will be met by the Regular force with limited the Militia has been placed in strategic reinforcements, reserve may not be available en~ of commit- lodgments. for despatch to Europe in Canada are such that the Government will agree to its Its ,role will vary between employment in rounding up enemy detachments to assistance in the rehabilitation of Western European econOiey'o /8 000344 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information TOPSOORET -8- 23. Army assistance evacuated centres to civil authorities will include policing and maintenance of vital portation facilities, facilities, etc. food distribution services, sections tation will be disrupted, facilities such as transcommunication required will vary consider- Since the assistance ably in different services of the country and since normal transporit may be essential to move troops from one section of the country to another by air. assistance This may extend well into the subsequent phase as the Army will be required to assist population in controlling the return of the economy and to more normal conditions. However, as indicated this role can be taken over progressively by the Militia above, as it is mobilized. 24. It is difficult to predict at what period in the initial subsequent phases the requirement for defence against may disappear. The Army Canada operations enemy lodgments must be prepared to continue to meet this The requirement for other direct commitment if required. or ·such as protection of vital points, defence of assistance to RCNin Coast and Seaward Defence; and internment and POWoperations will continue in the subsequent phase. pone certain authorities It may be necessary to post- of these tasks in order to meet the demands for assistance in survival of civil operations. CONCLUSIONS 25. It is concluded that: a) Ground forces for employment both within Canada and as SACEUR's strategic portable b) reserve should be air .. • The force in Europe in peacetime must be maintained up to establishment have with it its initial The militia c) --ll strength reinforcements. should be reorganized st~~ng healthy force related war. Mobilization and should to provide to its role in plans must include the mobili- zatiq,n of the militia although such mobilization may be delayed in whole or in parto /9 000345 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • -9d) TOP SECRET The Army must maintain its ability mill tary operations to conduct both at home and abroad and at the same time prepare to assist authorities in survival civil operations. A IR The Ro¼eof j;Jle RCAF 26. The role or the ROAF,in the light of the stated military operations a) concept of in the subsequent phase, will be: To continue to maintain the air defence system on full alert until the threat of enemy air operatio~s against North America no longer exists. b) TQ contin~e to maiptain the RCAFcomponent of our maritime force at I!l8Xinrumoperational capab111t1 until the enemymaritime threat no ·· longer .exists. c) 1o continue air operations operational d) in Europe under the control of 4 ATAF. · To maintain µi immediate readiness, . air transport the military airlift capability services the maximum to meet the demands of and the civil power for from Canada to Europe, and within Canada, · in support of military operations and national survival. e) With the resources and personnel not directly gaged in, or ip logistic to assist in tasks related support or the to national en- above tasks, survival for as long as required. /10 000346 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ( • -10- TOP smRET General Pattern ot Re-Organization or the RCAF 27. As the role of the RCAFin the subsequent phase will not differ appreciably organization from that of the initial of forces is required. peacetime pattern phase, no major re- The following changes in the of the ROAFwould take place in the initial phase, and would continue into the subsequent phase: a) The role of the ROAFtraining organization would change at the General Alert from that of training to that of providing trained the ROAFoperational and to assisting priority. personnel to augment coJJllQands as first in national survival as second Training might be resumed in the sub- sequent phase dependent on conditions and the requirement for additional b) priority, At some stage in the initial the ROAFtactical in Canada trained personnel. or subsequent phase, component which supports the MSF will either have compl-eted its task or the requireJnent for MSFoperations will have disappeared. this time, the role of the ROAFtactical will change to reinforcement commandsand assistance At component of ROAFoperational to the national survival effort. CONCLUSIONS 28. It is concluded that: a) as RCAFair defence, maritime and transport are expected to continue indefinitely phase, every effort sure that logistic operations in the subsequent should be made in peacetime to ensupport (especially could continue beyond the presently FOLand armament) planned .30-dq period despite the breakdown in transportation and sources of supply which might be expected from enemy action. /11 000347 �( "' Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii l'informatio ... } TOP SECREr -11- 28. b) To ensure the maximumutilization of the ROAF forces and resources assigned to national survival, the concept of operations, task assignments of the national organization should be clearly and the survival defined as soon as possible. TOPSIDRET 000348 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information rrro• TI) J "Ti(Rt'T il 1f L Ailt TOP SECRET NSTS 11650-35 Vol.2 (STAFF} COPY NO: /t:> CONCEPTOF MILITARY OPERATIONS FOLLOv~ lNG THE INITIAL PHASEOF HOSTlLITIES Noted below are proposed- amendments to the draft CSC 5-11 dated 27 May_,1957 shown by paragraph nwnb~r:2. JPS paper, - (a)- - Para 10 (b) (i) First sentence - substitute for 'undoubtedly'. 'probably' (ii) Last sentence - substitute after "possible" - to undertake uny military activities in addition to those already being carried out in the initial phase. - Para 12 (a) Delete and substitute:To destroy submarines in transit to their operational areas. The transit routes, passing au they do through the Denmark Strait and Norwegian Sea, will allow o obtain defence in depth by means of an A/S barrier these areas. v. However, since some submarines will undoubtedly have penetrated this barrier either before the war starts or during the initial phase, and since submarines can enter the North Atlantic from the South Atlantic without passing this barrier, the role of maritime forces must also be:(c) Para 14 Delete first sentence and substitute:- In the transit area operations may b~ expected to start from the outset against sub1narines already at sea when the initial blow is struck. The intensity of operations will increase rapidly as the remaining submarines pre sailed from USSR ports to their operational.areas • I . ~--- In the waters adjacent to North .Amertca the USSR will also be capable of deploying a nwnber of guided missile submarines without giving away surprise prior to D-Day~ These even though small in nwnbers could provide a significant contribution to the initial nuclear attack on this continent. The nwnber of submarines reaching this area will rise sharply three to six weeks after the initial attack when the full intensity of the war at sea is expected to be felt. This period of intense operations is expected to last approximately seven to eight weeks, subsequently decreasipg in intensity. 000349 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 2 - 2. (Cont'd) It is unlikely that the bulk of the reserves could be employed in the RCNand RC.AFroles - -- .. envisaged by this concept of operations until the task of survival has been achieved. (~) Para 18 Delete and substitute:It is concluded that in maritime operations the initial phase may well be of longer duratio_n than thE;t of air or land operations and that there will be no clear cut dividing line between the phaseso The concept of maritime operations und the role of the RCN and the RC.AF maritime forces in the subsequent phase will therefore be similar to those of the. initial phase, decreasing in intensity as losses are experienced by both sides. l C(• 0 TT AW A, 5 June, 1957. TOP SE:;RET 000350 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Concept of Operations / MAY-JUNE 1957 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1957-05 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00110 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Draft report to the Chiefs of Staff Committee by the Joint Planning Committee, 27 May 1957, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3.