1 20 2 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/e2d26a48f26f007b9337e65912ec4eeb.pdf d26634c10830f828c57e56d5c2560596 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation D0WKGRAD31D T3 SECRET R S M k SECRET TOP SECRET Ottawa, Marcif 25 > 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR THE w INIS Paper on the Ni You asked that consideration should be given to the implications of the nuclear deterrent. Mr. Ignatieff has prepared a draft with the assistance of some other officers of the Department (notably Mr. Teakles, Mr. Barton, Mr. Halstead,-and Mr. George), a copy of which is attached. 2. The paper of necessity examines the political factors of the problem only, because it would require the help of the Department of National Defence to develop the military factors. As you know, Mr. Campney has not yet agreed to the Inter-departmental study of national security policy in the light of the new weapons and the related strategy of deterrence, which you proposed to him as long ago as last November and on a number of occasions subsequently. 3. I suggest that as a next step, a number of the officers of this Department concerned might, if you agree, have an opportunity of discussing what should be done with the paper and about the projected study.,In a separate memorandum I drew your attention to the preparation of the customary White Paper on National Defence which has an important bearing on 'the same problem. • * • <— 000147 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation TOP SECRET > - 2 - t & 4-. If you agree, therefore, I would arrange to have Mr. MacKay and myself, together with Mr. I g n a t i e f f and Mr. Teakles, meet with you a t your convenience. AM hs J . L. 000148 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00039 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum for the Minister, R.A. Mackay for Jules Leger, "Paper on the Nuclear Deterrent" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955-03-25 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Study on Canadian National Security Policy, RG25, file 50333-40, LAC. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Early Cold War, Canadian National Security Description An account of the resource Department of External Affairs, Ottawa Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f6c90c2b307fe304661d1fddd8d684dd.pdf 5e37bc303679b4fb75053149f8015c24 PDF Text Text I Document disclosed under the Access to information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a I'information f BEST AVAILABLE COPY "1_)17 DQWNSRADED TO REDUIT A SECRET C 0 # Commonwealth delations Office, DEF 1 0 6 / 1 8 3 / 5 TOP 3ECI.ET B-\ Downing Street. <£^_Z: _ 25th March, 1955. 1 i 3 1 4 Dear Pritchard, • "'** 12 APR 1955 You vdll remember the proposed history of Anglo-American co-operation on atomic energy, about which our last telegram to you was No. 22 Saving of the 12th February, 1954. The U.S. draft of the history was received in London in July last and I understand that a copy was sent to the Canadians. It has now been considered here and I enclose a copy of the U.K. redraft, in which our own amendments are shown underlined in red ink, together with a note of the major amendments which have been made here. Our draft has been submitted to Einisters but not yet approved. Ve have it in mind, moreover, to suggest to the Americans that in view of developments on both sides of the Atlantic in 1954 the history should be brought up to date. If this were agreed, we should write a piece about the Atomic Ene-rgj hority and they might prepare a first draft of a passage on the amendments to the Mciviahon Act and the new agreements for co-operation. There will, of course, be some delay before this can be done. Such delay need not be a matter of any concern as we hope, again subject to the views of Ministers, to secure the agreement of the Americans not to publish the document immediately but to keep it in reserve and only publish it if a strong public demand arose. You will doubtless wish to show the enclosed documents informally to the Canadians and also to explain to them our intentions on the lines of the preceding paragraph. In doing so, however, would you please stress the lack of Winisterial approval. •. • • . received through Washington the text of the Canadian amendments, of which I also enclose a copy. We have not yet considered them in detail, although it is clear that we should be able to accept the great majority. Yours sincerely, (S; N. P r i t c h a r d , . .., Ottawa. Clark 3—&., <^______ar__. o—_ Qf.y£ fc �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information DOWNGRADE TO SECET *___. .__*• _ A «-_x_.--v ___ , _ _ TOP SECRET REDUIT A SECRET i..istory of ..nglo-American Co-operation in Atomic Energy. List of (Major) Amendments to U.S. Draft suggested by U.K. 1. We suggest that the appendices be omitted and the necessary material worked into the main narrative. It is not possible, even at this date, to quote the whole of the Hyde Park Aide __emoire, nor of the Llodus Vivendi. If some documents are given in extenso and others are not, it will inevitably raise questions as to why some things have been omitted; we consider that all the essential points can quite reasonably be worked into the main story. 2. We suggest that as a matter of presentation the summary suggested at the outset of the U.S. draft does not form an entirely satisfactory introduction and could quite well be omitted. 3. Page 2: we hope the concluding two sentences of the second paragraph vdll be accepted as a reasonable comparative estimate of the U.K.-U.S. contribution up to mid-1941. 4. Page 4: it seems to us that paragraph 2, which we have inserted, is essential in order to explain the difficulties which arose from the U.K. point of view between the end of 1942 and the ^uebec Agreement in 1943. 5. Page 6, paragraph 1, last sentence: the closing down of work in the U.K. in 1943 should be mentioned. 6. Page 8: the Hyde Park Aide Memoire: we think that this document should appear in its chronological place and not as a parenthesis of the history of 1946. We are also taking the opportunity of explaining the object of the Hyde Park meeting. 7. Page 9: we have spelled out the passage about the statements on the Use of the Atomic Bomb, War-time collaboration, and about the publication of the Smyth Report. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information Page 10, paragraph 2: we have included a reference to the declassification \ 9. dure. Page 11: we hope the U.S. will agree to the omissio;. of the last sentence. The same point could be mad^ about the other postwar agreements and in particular about the M U.S. are parti should be re-worded; v. li. If the .us to keep this sentence, ve suggest it "There was also the difficulty that an agreement might have been contrary to Article 102 of the U.N. Charter which requires all international agreements to be registered with the U.N. Secretariat and to be published." 10. Page 12: we have slightly reworded, in a form which we hope will be acceptable to the U.S., the passage which leads up to the Modus Vivendi. 11. Page 14: we have added a reference to the extension of Article 2 of the Modus in 1953 (weapons effects). 12. Page 14: The Fuchs case was not of course the only important espionage case and we suggest the sentence might be reworded: "This objective assumed greater urgency with the discovery in 1950 of the Fuchs espionage case in the U.K. and subsequently of other such cases in the U.K. and U.S.A." 13. Page 14: we suggest that the final sentence of the American draft be omitted. We do not give the same publicity to the security policies and procedures as the U.S. do; and the inclusion of this sentence might be embarrassing to us. This paper, if published at all, must be a White Paper presented to Parliament and therefore subject to debate: we do not want to present those M.P.'s who are only too ready to criticise the p.v. procedure vdth a gratuitous opportunity to do so. 2 000319 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information .K. HE-DRAFT TOP SECRET Changes from American d r a f t i n red "Y ______ __* . . _j THE U.S.-U.K.-CANADIAN COLLABORATION IN THE FISLU OF ATOMIC ENERGY 1940 - 1945 Early Developments The conclusion that an atomic weapon based on the fission of uranium might be technically feasible was reached by both the United States and the United Kingdom at about the same time. In the United States President Roosevelt in the fall of 1939 appointed an Advisory Committee on Uranium under the chairmanship of Dr. L.J. Briggs, Director of the Bureau of Standards. This Committee was made a Sub-committee of the newly organized National Defence Research Committee, responsible to Dr. Vannevar Bush, in 1940. In the United Kingdom in April 1940 a committee of scientists, headed by Sir George Thomson, was established in the Air Ministry to co-ordinate existing research and to determine whether the feasibility of producing an atomic weapon for use during the war was sufficiently great to justify intensified future effort toward this end. During this period contact between the governmental atomic energy groups in the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada was informal and unofficial. Each followed the other's activities, primarily through the medium of visits made back and forth by British, Canadian and American scientists, generally in connection with other business. First Governmental Co-operation, 1940-19_=5 More formal co-operation began as a consequence of an aide memoire left with President Roosevelt by Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador on July 8, 1940. There was proposed in this memorandum a broad interchange of secret technical military information between the British and American Governments. J 000320 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a I'information 4* TOP SECRET Although the atomic weapon was not mentioned, it implicitly fell into this category as work progressed. Discussions on secret technical military information were agreed to by the U.S. Secretary of State and gave rise to a visit to the United States by a British Scientific Mission headed by sir Henry Tizard, in the autumn of 1940, at which time a full exchange of information on research and plans for technical military development was approved. As a result there came into being a close relationship between the British and American scientific groups engaged in basic military research which included atomic research, with each keeping the other informed regarding the nature and scope of theiawork. At first, partly no doubt owing to the fact that the U.S. was not yet at war, the information provided by the U.K. scientists was at least as great as that provided by the U.S. By mid-1941 however, the scale of U.S. developments, and also the provision of information, had increased considerably. The United Kingdom: Tube Alloys - 1941 During this period a special study was made in the United Kingdom to determine whether atomic research should be continued on a large scale. The conclusions reached in the British study (which was conveyed to the U.S. authorities) were encouraging and in September 1941, Mr. (now Sir Winston) Churchill appointed Sir John Anderson (now Viscount Y.averley) to take charge of the atomic project in the United Kingdom. A new division of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research was created and called, for security reasons, the Directorate of Tube Alloys. Hr. V..A. (later Sir Wallace) Akers of Imperial Chemical Industries was appointed director. The United States: United States Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD. 3-1) In November 1941 the first American mission concerned specifically with atomic research was sent to the United Kingdom - 2- 000321 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lot sur faeces a I'information TOP SECRET to become familiar with the British project. This mission consisted of two American scientists, Drs. H.C. Urey and G.B. Pegram, both members of subsections of the Uranium Committee. In Ifovember 1941 the responsibility for atomic research was placed directly under a section of the United States Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) with the code name 3-1. From December 1941 to the first half of 1942 work on uranium fission in both countries continued largely on a laboratory research scale, and during this period the exchange of information between the Directorate of Tube Alloys and the OSRD 3-1 Executive Committee was quite informal but complete. Meanwhile, in the United States sufficient progress was being made to allow greater emphasis on production problems and less exclusively on laboratory research. The United States - Manhattan Engineer District - 1942 In early 1942, Dr. Bush informed President Roosevelt that research had progressed to the point to permit hope that an atomic weapon could be produced in time to be of value during the war and recommended, therefore, that the U.S. Army be given the responsibility for furthering this project. In June 1942, by Presidential order, the engineering phases of the work in the United States were placed under the U.3. Jfcftny Corps of Engineers. The control of laboratory research remained for a time with OSRD. The OSRD gradually transferred all of its responsibility to General Groves, who was placed in charge of the entire project (henceforth known as the Manhattan Engineer District) in September 1942. In 1943 all connections of OSRD with uranium work were severed and the s-1 Executive Committee ceased to function. Discussion between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt had taken a personal interest in atomic energy developments from the beginning, and - 3 - 000322 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a finformation ___________________ ad been in direct contact with each other concerning this interest from time to time. This personal interest was of particular value in view of the difficulties which arose between the U.S. and the U.K. projects in the latter part of 1942. The U.K., which had by that time been at war for over three years, was finding it undesirable in view of the war commitments of her industry and of the exposure of the whole British Isles to bombing - to undertake the large-scale production which the development of atomic energy by that time required. The U.K. wished therefore to make her own contribution by integrating the work of her scientists and engineers vdth those working in the U.S. The U.S. however, which was now committed to a gigantic financial and industrial effort, was sceptical of the value of British assistance except in a few isolated parts of the programme. For these and other reasons Anglo-American co-operation lagged from the autumn of 1942 until the summer of 1943. During the first half of 1943, however, a series of conferences was held among the close advisers of the Prime Minister and the President; as a result, an agreed document was signed at Quebec in August, 1943. This document is known as the Quebec Agreement and established the formal basis for the further collaboration in the field of atomic energy between the United States and the United Kingdom u_il.ll aflsr .lie war. /Cmd: 9123J ;aebec Agreement The ^uebec Agreement established the mechanism and principles for.formal co-operation between the two countries; namely, the Combined Policy Committee as well as basic principles governing future collaboration in this field. These principles were (1) that neither country would ever use "this agency" (i.e. the atomic bomb) against the other, or against third parties without the other's consent; - 4 - �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information E w __,•_..._! (2) that the disclosure of information to third parties would be by mutual consent; (3) that in view of the heavy burden falling on U.S. war production, the U.K. would not take advantage after the war of the industrial applications of atomic energy save under terms agreed by the President and the Prime minister. The purpose of the Combined Policy Committee was: (1) to agree on the programme of work to be carried out in the two countries and to review all such activities; (2) to allocate materials, plant, etc. in short supply as necessary. Exchange of information within the Combined Policy Committee and between their immediate technical advisers v/as to be complete; in the field of research and development it would be complete within the particular sections of the programme. The Combined Policy Committee was organized vdth the initial membership (_as specified in the Quebec Agreement^ of the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson; Dr. Vannevar Bush; and Dr. James B. Conant as the three United States members; Field Marshal sir John Dill and Colonel J.J. Llewellin as the United Kingdom members. Dr. Bush and Dr. Conant had held positions of responsibility in the U.S. Atomic Energy programme since it first came under the control of the National Defence Research Committee in June 1940, while Field Marshal Dill and Colonel Llewellin were at the time, with the exception of the British Ambassador, the two senior representatives (military and civilian) of the U.K. Government in Washington. Whereas Canada was not signatory to the Agreement, Canadian participation in the joint effort was recognized by the appointment of C D . Howe, Canadian Minister of Supply, and Minister responsible for Canadian activity in the atomic energy field, as the sixth member of the Committee. - 5- �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a I'information TOP SECRET The Committee held its first meeting in September, 1943 and set up a technical Sub-Committee (membership: Styer, General W.D. Dr. R.C. Tolman, Professor (nov; Sir James) Chadwick, and Dr. C.J. Mackenzie) to examine the state of the British and American programmes and the possibilities in the various projects for the exchange of information. The Committee soon arranged for an exchange of information over a wide field of research and in December 1943 submitted its report which was approved by the full Policy Committee. The report, among other things, made recommendations on the division of the program of work and the assignment of British scientists to various portions of the Manhattan Engineer District laboratories and facilities. These arrangements recognized that the most efficient division of effort called for the concentration of work on the atomic energy project in the United States, v/here the United States' resources, manpower and materials could be put to the best use, secure from enemy action. As a result of these agreements many U.K. scientists were transferred to North America and almost all work on atomic energy in the United Kingdom was then, or shortly after, brought to a close. Canadian Role in Co-operation Early in 1943 a large Canadian-British research establishment had been set up in Montreal under the general direction of the National Research Council of Canada. Practically the entire slow neutron research group at Cambridge, England, under Bans Halban was at that time moved to be nearer the corresponding D.S, work at Chicago. In April 1944, following the recommendation of a Sub-Committee specially appointed by the Combined Policy -0;;_nittee to report on the Joint Development of a Heavy Water Pile, it was agreed to "undertake the design and construction of a heterogeneous heavy water pilot pile as a joint American-BritishCanadian project". It was anticipated that ultimately there would be made a comparative study of the Hanford and Canadian pile operations, 00032! - 6- �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET In May and June 1944, General Groves, Sir James Chadwick and Dr. Mackenzie met to discuss the contributions the U.S. would make in the project. The primary results of these meetings were the final drafting of the agreement delineating the role of the U.S. in the joint project and the establishment of the U.._. Evergreen Area Office in Montreal to handle interchange matters. Exchange of information vdth Canada was limited, the latter having access to information developed at the Metallurgical Laboratory and the Clinton Laboratories, but not at Los Alamos and Hanford. The combined effort at Montreal was formally directed toward research and development of a high flux heavy water reactor ultimately to be constructed and operated at Chalk River, Ontario. The small Zero Energy Experimental Pile (ZEEP) went into operation in September 1945, and the large heavy water reactor, the NRX, in July 1947. The Combined Development Agency On June 13, 1944 another agreement v/as signed by President Roosevelt and Mr. Jhurchill, entitled "Declaration of Trust", which referred to the objectives set forth in the Quebec Agreement and established the principle of collaboration in uranium research and procurement between the United States and the United Kingdom. To implement this principle, an agency known as the Combined Development Trust was established in Washington, to be composed of and administered by six members appointed by the Combined Policy Committee. The Canadian Government did not sign the agreement though, in view of her membership of the Combined Policy Committee, she was associated with the Trust and vdth the appointment of its members. The objective of the Trust was to seek out and develop the production of uranium supplies to be allocated among the member governments. The original trustees of the Combined Development Trust were: - 7000326 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET United States - General L.R. Groves, Mr. G. Harrison, and Dr. C.K. Leith; United Kingdom- Sir Charles J. Hambro and Mr. (nov; Sir Frank) Lee; Canada - Mr. G.C. Bateman. Development of the First Weapon As a result of the Quebec Agreement, teams of U.K. scientists were integrated into the program in the U.S. and Canada, working at the following locations: los Alamos, Berkeley, Oak Ridge, Washington, New York and Montreal. The joint objective was achieved, in the explosion of the world's first atomic weapon on July 16, 1,945 at Alamagordo, New Mexico. British personnel participated in this test, as they did in the later test at Bikini in July 1946. Hyde Park Aide Memoire The Quebec Agreement was followed by a conversation held, after the second Quebec Conference, at Hyde Park, New York, between President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill on September 19, 1944. The aide memoire summarising the conversation records agreement that "when a bomb is finally available" it might "after mature consideration be used against the Japanese". The main purpose of the meeting however was to discuss the post-war problems of U.S./ U.K. collaboration and of international control. A paragraph of the aide memoire called for the continuation of full collaboration between the United States and British Governments in developing "Tube Alloys" for military and commercial use after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement. As to international control, the aide memoire noted "the suggestion that the world should be informed regarding Tube Alloys with a view to an international agreement regarding its control and use is not accepted" and that complete secrecy should be maintained. A A copy of this aide memoire was given to U.S. authorities by the British in the Spring of 1945, after a search of the Department of State, the War Department and the White House records disclosed no evidence that a copy existed in the United States. 000327 —8— ^^^^^^^H �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lot sur faeces a finformation TOP SECRET _ : . ' ^---' F •;. 7 1 . L -• i;-•:- t r y - _ . _ j i _ i c _ D . - : : C On June 1, 1945, the "Interim Committee", which had recently been set up and was charged with advising the President of the United States on the questions raised by the apparently imminent success in developing the atomic weapon, recommended unanimously that the bomb should be used against Japan. This recommendation was concurred in by the United Kingdom, in accordance with the requirements of the ^uebec Agreement, at a Combined Policy Committee meeting on July 4th, 1945. On July 24, 1945, at the Potsdam Conference Prime Minister Stalin v/as informed by President Truman, with British concurrence, that an atomic weapon had been developed and would probably be used with decisive effect on the Japanese. Consequently, Hiroshima was bombed on August 6 and Nagasaki on August 8. Following immediately on the dropping of the first weapon on Japan by the United States, statements were issued (on 6th August 1945) by President Truman and jointly by Mr. Attlee, then Prime Minister, and Mr. Churchill. These referred very briefly to the vast effort devoted in the two countries to the project and to the arrangements that had been made for collaboration, and went on to warn the Japanese of the dread consequences of a continued resistance. Both statements also referred to the need to ensure that atomic energy might become a powerful and forceful influence towards the maintenance of world peace. Statements on Atomic Energy Development and Wartime Collaboration These statements were amplified, and details were given of some of the scientific work carried out, in further statements* by statement by the President of the United States" - White House Release, August 6, 1945. "Statement of the Secretary of War" - U.S. War Department Release August 6, 1945. "A General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for Military Purposes under the Auspices of the U.S. Government" by H.D. Smyth, August 1945. "Statements by the Prime Minister and Mr. Churchill issued on Monday, August 6, 19_:5. "Statement issued by the Directorate of Tube Alloys (Department of Scientific and Industrial Research)", August 12, 1945. NB. Both U.K. statements reprinted in "Statements relating to the Atomic Bomb", HMSO 1945. Canadian Information Service Statement, "Canadian Role in Atnml£ Bomb Drama" August 13, 1945. 0 0 0 3 2 S �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a I'information % TOP SECRET m ^ the American Secretary of State for V.ar (6th August 1945) by the U.K. Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (12 August 1945) and by the Canadian Minister of Supply (13 August 1945). A fuller account of the basic scientific research undertaken and the administrative arrangements within the United States (the Smyth Report on "Atomic Energy for Military Purposes") was published on 10 August 1945. Prior to the release of these statements and in viev/ of the agreement at Quebec not to reveal information concerning the project to third parties without mutual consent, the three statements had been sent to the other countries for comment. The U.K. approach to the U.S. releases was considerably more cautious than the American, and the former indicated concern that such full disclosure regarding the technical processes for the production of weapons was contemplated. U.K. consent to both the press release and the Smyth Report was finally obtained; the outcome of this discussion on the release of information was the establishment of a U.S.-U.K. sub-committee to draw up the principles and conditions which would govern the further release of scientific information concerning the atomic project. In later years, the release of information became a tripartite concern, and U.S.-U.K.-Canadian conferences on the "declassification" of secret information are now held at regular intervals. The Problem of Post-War Collaboration With the end of the war, the three governments re-examined their relationships in the field of atomic energy in view of the fact that the objectives of the co-operation established by the ^uebec Agreement had been achieved wdth the victories over Germany and Japan. President Truman and Mr. Attlee, then Prime Minister, met in November 1945, and a public declaration was released on November 15, signed by President Truman, Mr. Attlee and Mr. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada, stating that the - 10 - 000329 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information TOE _:_...Ed three governments agreed to co-operate in promoting the internatbnal control of atomic energy. On November 16, another statement, which was not made public, was signed by the same three signatories; it declared that the Combined Policy Committee and ths Combined Development Trust should continue, as well as full and effective co-operation in the field of atomic energy. The Combined Policy Committee was instructed to consider and recommend appropriate arrangements to achieve this objective. In discussing, in the special sub-committee appointed by the Combined Policy Committee these arrangements, the . .... representatives in Washington had argued that the U.S. had already agreed to continue full co-operation in the field of atomic energy between the two governments and cited the provisions of the Quebec agreement and of the Hyde Park Aide Memoire. The Combined Policy Committee however was not able in the Spring of 1946 to agree on arrangements for full co-operation which the United States could regard as consistent with the support of an international control system. The Organisation of the British Atomic Energy Project Mr. Attlee, then Prime Minister, announced on October 29, 1945, in the House of Commons, that the British Government had decided "to set up a research and experimental establishment covering all aspects of the use of atomic energy", and that responsibility for this function was being transferred from the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research to the Ministry of Supply. The new arrangements, which launched an extensive programme of research and development, were given statutory form in the U.K. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, after the Prime Minister's announcement, on January 29, that the Government planned to produce fissionable material in sufficient quantity to enable the United Kingdom to develop a program for the use of atomic energy as circumstances might require. The first announcement that the " il - 000330 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET U.K. were developing atomic weapons was made by the U.K. Minister of Defence in the House of Commons on May 12, 1948. The Ministry of Supply continued to be responsible for the U.K. project until the end of 1953. The Establishment of the United States atomic Energy Commission On August 1, 1946, the Congress of the United States passed the United States Atomic Energy Act (the McMahon Act) which established a new Atomic Energy Commission and contained provisions which severely limited co-operation in this field with other countries. The functions of the Manhattan District were transferred to the United States Atomic Energy Commission on January 1, 1947. f , o c : . . . ; E V E . W - : : ? • _ : ven before the imposition of restrictions on international co-operation under the McMahon Act, there had been - as has been said - differences of opinion on the type and extent of co-operation that was desirable and permissible. The question remained unresolved throughout 1946 and 1947. At the same time there remained also the problem of determining an appropriate allocation between the United Kingdom and the United States of the raw materials v/hich had been acquired by the Combined Development Trust. By the latter part of 1947 it had become apparent, in view of the obstacles to the international control of atomic energy which had been encountered, that it was desirable that the existing United States atomic energy plants be used to their capacity for the production of fissionable material in the interest of the common defence. To support these plants and the additional plants required for defence purposes, it was necessary for the United States to obtain a substantial lortion of all the uranium available to the two Governments. For these reasons, therefore, both the U.S. and the U.K. were ready to re-open negotiations and a series of Combined Policy Committee discussions on the problem of uranium allocations, 000331 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a I'information 2_9_______.____± |the problem of technical co-operation and other matters began in the latter part of 1947 and resulted in that Committee's adoption on January 7, 1948, of a Modus Vivendi consisting of the following main points:1. An agreement to continue arrangements for the promotion of and control of the production of uranium and thorium and for the allocation of available supplies, including special arrangements to satisfy U.S. demands for 1948 and 1949. 2. A recognition that there v/ere "areas of information and experience in v/hich co-operation would be mutually beneficial to the three countries" and an agreement to co-operate as fully as permitted by the laws of the respective countries in certain defined areas of technical co-operation. 3. An agreement for prior consultation before the disclosure of classified information to other countries and for continued co-ordination of the declassification of classified information. 4. A recognition that in the event of international agreement on the control of atomic energy, the special relationship between the U.S., U.K. and Canada v/ould need reconsideration. Policy on international control remained as set out in the Tripartite Declaration of November 15, 1945 (see p. 10). 5. An agreement that the Combined Policy Committee and The Combined Development Trust (renamed the Combined Development Agency) should continue, but that other agreements should be considered null and void. This provision abrogated any parts of the Quebec agreement and the Hyde Park aide memoire as might at that time have been held to be in force. Co-operation Under the Modus Vivendi After the modus vivendi was approved and after the Technical Co-operation Program was put into effect, differences of opinion developed between the United States and the United Kingdom on the definition of areas. The British view of the problem was that the areas should be interpreted in a liberal and broad sense. From the United States point of view it became increasingly ooo332 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act '-i « pocumerrf dtyulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a I'information fficult to differentiate between atomic energy information on the basis of whether or not it related to the production of materials for weapons. The United States considered that production and weapon information was not a part of the Technical Co-operation Program and that such exchange was prohibited by the terms of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act. Discussions were initiated between the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States in order to determine whether a new basis for co-operation could be agreed upon, but in the early part of 1950 they were suspended by informal agreement and since that time technical co-operation has taken place within the limited framework of the modus vivendi of 1948, except for an extension of co-operation in 1955 to cover the exchange of information on certain aspects of the effects of atomic explosions. Security In the development of the modus vivendi it was agreed that an objective of the three governments would be the establishment of common standards of security in the atomic energy field. This objective assumed greater urgency with the discovery in 1950 of the Fuchs espionage case, and subsequently of other such cases in the U.K. and U.S.A. In June 1950, in Washington, there was held the first tripartite conference on security matters among officials of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the British Ministry of Supply and the Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board to discuss policies and procedures with respect to establishing closer comparability of security standards among the three countries. A second conference was held in London in July 1951 and a third in Washington in May 1952. Since that time there have been several exchanges of visits by small working groups and a close and continuing co-operation has resulted. - 14 - 000333 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft history / revisions / 25 MARCH 1955 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955-03-25 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00059 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Clark to Pritchard, 25 Mar. 1955, LAC, RG 25, vol. 5957, file no. 50219-AF-40, part 1. Advisory Committee on Uranium Anglo-American Atomic Energy Authority atomic energy defence research espionage Manhattan Project McMahon Act Pritchard Quebec Agreement Roosevelt tube alloys