1
20
2
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/92f03d66c25a84482656b057549f9784.pdf
b5aa71a4d8472370e2abdf29d88d29cd
PDF Text
Text
Cc~
.
i'o<t']f
•
'
Y/& ~tti!.
6-~;M.,~
.J.oc.eos{r)
~
~-
C,,e-. ~
loll,._.~
~:,/he
::::;r.1~
~/~
~~
/- ~,
~--
f-
lo
(~
Despatch
1 D---,--i1td.
! ;
No.
~/0......(~~)
AprJJ..) ..,.)-.~?ft!...............
'.
TO:
OTTAWA
No • •
FILE
•«.
_])
-€t1// ~ -~r.~,,
...
CLASS~CATION
{I
S E C R E T
Canadian
~so
Embassy,
11s·-tµ>
WASHINGTON,D.C.
CANADA
..No.... 142.. ot:. J.anuar.y .. Z2.,. l9.5.4-,......................
~-
. .\
3
.St.at.es .. Defenc.e. P.olic.y. •.........................................
Discussion
in the past few weeks has made it
clear that even in the United States advertising
cannot
make something new and different
out·· of :·an old product,
especially
when that product is national
security.
In
the process of re-explanation,
the "new look" in United
States defence policy has lost much of its novelty.
The
President
himself has said that the slogan is not truly
descriptive
of what the Administration
has in mind and
furthermore
that he despises
slogans.
IVIr. Dulles'
speech
of January 12 has been re-written
and appears in the
April issue of Foreign Affairs.
It was given advance
release
as a State Department press release
on March 16
(our despatch No. 503 of March 18).
This revised
description
of United States
defence policy,
while still
containing
some of the debatable
premises of its predecessor•
makes it abundantly
clear that the Administration's
defence policy is essentially
a continuation
of past
policies
adapted to current
circumstances.
.
No. of Enclosures
file
No...............
. .Despatch
.. Unit.ed
Copies Re £erred
To ..............
f,/.,i.c.Lb'r'IA.U"'
•
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
Reference.Our
1ubject:
Ambassador,
.~
;/:'//, S:!2,Y
~ti
FROM:The Canadian
Post
,
.
2.
The President
has assured newsmen that the
"new look", or the "Dulles doctrinen,
is not new or
revolutionary.
The action taken by the Administration
in the defence field,
he said, was simply an attempt
by intelligent
people to keep abreast
of the developments
of the times.
Patterns
become out-moded in warfare as
they do in any other field
of activity.
The United
States did not plan to fight for its security
in these
days with muzzle-loaders.
On the other hand the United
States did not intend to take the extraordinary
action
of initiating
an all-out
war to settle
issues affecting
its interest,
which were raised
in some distant
corner
of the world.
Mr. Dulles has admitted before the
Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that "tlle_. new look"
was perhaps not~~ happy slogan.
The development of the
Administration's
defence policy,
he said, had been by
evolution
and not by revolution.
It rested on certain
new decisions
taken by the National
Security
Council,
but it was linked,
as any successful
policy had to be,
with actions
taken in the past.
It was never intended
to be a policy which would turn every local war into a
world war.
Nor was it a policy which minimized the
importance
of collective
security.
The cornerstone
of
security
for the United States and for the free world,
y
000516
/
�1
' .\.c:f:i~
~'if~PN 4 • l 2
1954P.!>I?6
\,
f
·, ~.
,
..
I
)
I
000517
�-2-
was a collective
system of defence,
community power
rather than purely national
potential.
Admiral Radford,
the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff,
has described
the
Administration's
defence policy as the end-product
of
a searching
review of the nation's
military
requirements
for security
and of the nature of the best United States
contribution
to balanced collective
allied
strength.
It was not the first
such review of military
requirements, he said, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff have continuously reviewed security
problems and requirements.
(Admiral Radford's
clearest
public exposition
of current
United States defence policy is set out in the March 5
issue of U.S. News and World Report.)
He has asserted
that global strategic
concepts as applied to collective
allied
strength
have not changed but that there has been
a change of emphasis in the composition of the United
States forces which will be contributed
to a balanced
collective
allied
organization.
His public definition
of the essentials
of the Administration's
defence
policy is perhaps worth quoting in full since it contains
most of the elements,
we believe,
which were taken into
consideration
by the Administration
in framing its present
defence programme.
"The "new look" is a military
reassessment
based on national
objectives,
the world situation,
preparations
for the long pull, our improved
weapons, the increased
strength
of our collective
forces,
an evaluation
of the existing
threat,
and
a considered
estimate
of future trends and developments.
"It provides for an improved readiness
in
our Reserve forces to meet today's
requirement
for
rapid mobilization.
It involves our Allies and
the United Nations.
It envisages
certain
military
assistance
and advice in the development and
maintenance
of Allied forces where needed and
requested.
It involves military
strategy,
timing, logistics
and economy. It involves U.S.
policies,
commitments and risks."
3.
It seems to us that we have reached the end
at least of a chapter in this complicated
subject and
that, unless there is an appreciable
change in the world
situation,
we may anticipate
that the principles
of
United States military
policy will not be subject to
any important
further
changes or interpretations.
'.l.'he
conclusion
which we reached in our despatch under reference that no revolutionary
changes had taken place in
United States military
policy has, we think, been fully
supported by recent explanations
and clarifications
by
those most concerned in the Administration
with defence
policy.
The next chapter will be concerned primarily
with the budgetary base of the defence programme.
As
the individuai
services
make their cases before Congressional committees for funds, we may learn more of how
the Administration's
policy was formed.
More important,
perhaps we shall learn more of how domestic politics
are
to affect
the Administration's
defence policy.
We doubt
••• 3
000518
�-3-
that the hearings will, however, bring about any change
in the principles
upon which the Administration's·
policy
is based.
We have sent you, with our comments, the
texts referred
to above.
It may be worthwhile,
however,
before the defence programme is exposed to the vicissitudes of Congressional
action,
with all that involves,
to send you our appreciation
of recent developments
which while not revising
the substance of the conclusions
we reached in our despatch under reference,
will bring
our comments up-to-date.
4.
Mr. Dulles gave his speech of January 12 the
title
"The Evolution
of Foreign Policy" but phrased his
definition
of the Administration's
policy with respect
to national
security
in such a manner as to give the
impression
that revolutionary
decisions
were to be
implemented.
The most important
of these impressions
was that henceforth
the United States would rely primarily
on instant
and massive atomic retaliation
at places of
its own choosing to deter or if necessary
to punish
aggression.
Less emphasis would be placed on the traditional policy of meeting aggression
by direct
and local
opposition.
The selection
of military
means and targets
would give United States defence policy greater
flexibility.
Under the circumstances
it would be possible
to achieve
additional
basic security
at less cost.
It was essential
that the United States not become permanently
committed
to vast military
expenditures
which might eventually
lead to practical
bankruptcy.
The United States and the
free world was concerned with Soviet planning which was
in terms of entire generations.
It was not sufficient,
therefore,
to adopt security
measures which were adequate
merely to ward off an immediate danger.
It was for that
reason that the United States had put forward at the
last NATOCouncil meeting the concept of the "long haul"
which involved the steady development of defensive
strength
at a rate which would preserve and not exhaust
the economic strength
of the United States and its allies.
As a result
of the basic decisions
taken by the National
Security
Council the United States was in a position
to seize the initiative
from the potential
aggressor.
It must be repeated
that the important fact about this
speech of Mr. Dulles was the impression which it left.
Mr. Dulles in recent weeks has said, with some justice,
that the speech was subjected
to much "mutilated
quotation"
and more will be said below about his more recent statements of clarification.
It is of some importance,
however, to mention briefly
what happened between
Mr. Dulles'
speech of January 12 and his article
in the
April issue of Foreign Affairs.
Through most of the
intervening
period Mr. Dulles was out of Washington,
first
at Berlin and later at Caracas, and was unable
to answer questions
directly
as to the meaning of some
of the more elliptical
passages of his speech.
5.
The first
ripple of comment came immediately
from the more responsible
journalists
who suggested
with obvious disbelief
that Mr. Dulles seemed to have
indicated
that there would be no more local wars so far
••• 4
000519
�-4as the United States was concerned but that local
incidents
of aggression
would be met by all-out
atomic
bombing of the Communist capitals
of Moscow and Peking.
Some commentators questioned
whether the President
had
the constitutional
power to order such instant
retaliation without consulting
Congress.
Others examined the
implications
of the policy for the allies
of the United
States and especially
for those allies
on whose soil
United States bases had been built.
At the same time
tentative
comment eddied in the swirls of Congressional
consideration
of the Bricker Amendment. On the whole,
however, comment in this period was sparse and somewhat
uncertain.
The full tide of comment was loosed, as is
so often the case in the United States,
when the issue
became the subject of domestic political
controversy.
6.
On March 6 in an address to a Democratic rally
in Miami Beach which was nationally
televised,
Mr. Adlai
Stevenson "in no spirit
of partisan
relish"
suggested
that the so-called
"new look" in foreign and defence
policy was not new at all but merely a continuation,
with adaptations,
of earlier
(and Democratic)
policies.
he implied that the Administration,
caught between two
conflicting
sets of promises,
the balancing
of the
budget and the strengthening
of United States defences,
had given priority
to the first
and that its defence
policy flowed from this decision.
He made a plea for
"true bipartisanship"
in the formulation
of policy in
such an important
field,
implying that there had been
little
if any consultation
with the opposition
party by
the Administration
in the development of its defence
policy.
He called for a more forthright
explanation
of what the Administration
had in mind.
In this context
his remarks had the bite which had become his trademark
in the Presidential
election
campaign.
"Issues of life
and death should be clarified
and not clouded, for
security
in our age cannot be bought by slogans and
gimmicks •••• if our military
policy is beyond the further
financial
endurance of the country,
if this reliance
on
retaliation
is the only reasonable
policy for the long
haul, then frankly tell us so and why. But don't
confuse us and frighten
our allies
by misbranding
disengagement as advance and retrenchment
as initiative.
Don't tell us we have something new and better
for
less when we haven't".
Mr. Stevenson coupled his remarks
on the Administration's
defence policy with an attack
on McCarthyism and by doing so invited
political
counter-attack.
The Republican party immediately made
arrangements
for a television
reply by Vice President
Nixon on March 13. At his news conference during the
intervening
week, the President
indirectly
charged
Mr. Stevenson with demagoguery, and denied vehemently
that there had been any lack of consultation
with
Democratic leaders on defence and foreign policy matters.
Mr. ~ixon was at his saccharine
best in delivering
~hat·
was in essence a political
attack of a pretty low order
on previous Democratic Administrations
and which, if
anything,
served further
to confuse observers
as to the
••• 5
000520
�-5role assigned in United States
its massive atomic retaliatory
strategic
power.
thinking
to
7.
Within the Administration
itself
there were
evidences of differing
views.
General Ridgway, the
Army Chief of Staff,
appearing before a Senate Appropriations
sub-committee
on March 15 expressed
concern
at the proposed reduction
in army strength
which is
planned over the next two years.
He refused to say
whether he had recommended the cut. in army manpower,
saying merely that he had accepteu a decision
from a
higher authority.
Speaking to the National Press Club
in Washington on March 19 Ge!leral Ridgway conceded
the importance of new weapons of mass destruction
but
asserted
that future wars, large or small, would be
won finally
on the ground.
He thought there would be
small wars which would not be of such a nature that they
could be won by atomic mass destruction.
It was obvious
that General Ridgway was speaking for his service
in
much the same fashion as Admiral Carney, Chief of Naval
Operations,
did some weeks before in a public address
to the Naval War College.
Admiral Carney said that no
single rigid course of action would safeguard
the United
States.
Regardless
of how the war was fought it would
end on the ground and he was certain
that the participants
would not walk on the water to get there.
He continued,
"I see no alternative
but to hedge our strategic
bets
ready to rush into the future but also prepared to meet,
and rely on, the methods of the recent past.
If we are
honest with ourselves
we will acknowledge that there are
big wars, little
wars, general wars, localized
wars,
Marquis of Queensbury wars, atomic wars and, perhaps,
non-atomic wars".
The Air Force with its own particular
axe already well ground by the decisions
already taken
by the Joint Chiefs said very little
in this period.
Admiral Radford, as we have noted above, was quick to
declare through various public channels that the United
States was not building
a Maginot line of atomic defences.
In a role somewhat that of a referee,
he argued that it
was all a matter of emphasis and that at the moment the
United States was emphasizing its advantages--its
air
power and its new weapons.
These advantages were well
based on the continuing
strength
of the army and navy
which would be second to none in performance and
capabilities.
8.
The international
implications
of Mr. Dulles'
speech were brought into focus by Mr. Pearson's
address
to the National Press Club in Washington on March 15.
While, as we have mentioned before,
a number of correspondents had touched on this point, Mr. Pearson's
speech
was taken as a point of departure
by most responsible
commentators for articles
on the importance of United
States consultation
with its allies.
We noticed only
one sour comment on Mr. Pearson's
speech, from Mr. David
Lawrence adequately
representing
the lunatic
fringe.
9.
Against
political
strife,
implications--Mr.
which should go a
this three-panelled
service rivalry
and
Dulles produced his
long way to ease the
background--domestic
international
clarifications
concern which
••• 6
000521
�~,
J
.
'
-6his first
speech engendered.
We shall deal only briefly
here with his remarks since the new explanation
in his
own words is available
to you in the Foreign Affairs
article
and in the transcript
of his press conference
of March 16 (our despatch ~o. 528 of March 22).
He
asserted
that there was no intention
on the part of the
Administration
that the United States should in every
circumstance
retaliate
instantly
with its massive
retaliatory
power but that the Administration
intended
simply to build-up the United States capacity
so to
retaliate.
The United States had entered two world
wars unprepared;
the Administration
was determined that
this should not happen again.
This capacity for massive
retaliation
would supplement local defensive
power but
would not be a substitute
for it.
The Administration's
new defence policy was evolved from past policies.
A
most important element of the United States capacity
was the whole-hearted
co-operation
of the allies
of the
United States and especially
of those upon whose territory
important United States bases were built.
The United
States'
allies
would certainly
be consulted
in any
situation
affecting
their security.
In dealing with
the President's
power to order instant
retaliation,
Mr. Dulles took the stand that while joint action by
the President
and Congress in ordering retaliation
was
desirable,
the Constitution
did not leave the President
impotent to act if consultation
with Congress was
impossible.
The President
would have exactly the same
constitutional
power to order retaliation
against an
attack on a NATOally as he had in the case of an attack
on the United States if he believed
that the attack was
the first
phase of an action against the United States.
10.
The misunderstanding
attendant
upon the phrase
"the new look" has been largely
dispelled
and the Administration's
case has been put in more understandable
terms.
It would however be misleading
to assume that
there is nothing new in the United States defence programme
for the next three years.
Speaking with deep sincerity,
Mr. Dulles assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
recently
that new decisions
"were on the books" of the
National Security
Council which were not there two years
ago.
We shall probably never know of all the decisions
which have been taken but we can hazard reasonably
accurate
guesses as to some of the more important.
A
paragraph from Mr. Dulles'
article
in Foreign Affairs
gives us some clues, we think, and it might be worth
examining it in detail.
11.
Itwas necessary,
he said, for the Administration
"to re-assert
our freedom of action in repelling
future
aggression
and to re-assess
the impact of newer types of
weaponsn.
'l'hese words can be expanded to cover the
deterrent
of massive atomic\retaliation.
It seems
clear from this and other indications
that the Administration
decided that its service
chiefs should henceforth
assume that atomic weapons were to be used as conventional
weapons whenever and wherever the security
of the United
••• 7
000522
�-7States required
their use; furthermore
there were to
be no more "privileged
sanctuaries"
beyond any future
Yalu Rivers; finally
the potential
enemy should be
made aware of these decisions
in a manner designed to
cause him most concern.
These were decisions
of principle.
The exact manner of their implementation
would vary with
particular
circumstances
and here the enemy must be
kept in doubt.
He must know only that he would not
necessarily
be met man for man at the front line of
aggression.
12.
It was necessary,
Mr. Dulles continues,
for
the Administration
"to qualify the extent of our
reliance
on collective
security
and to define more
clearly
our basic $trategy
in Europe and the Far East".
Collective
security,
with all that entails
in the way
of United States overseas
commitments, was accepted
as the keystone of United States security.
(This was
not a new decision
but nonetheless
was an important
re-affirmation
of previous defence policies,
if one
bears in mind the extensive
Republican attacks
during
the Presidential
campaign on Democratic policies
of
"foreign
entanglements".)
The defence of Europe was
given priority
over that of the Far East, again with a
full understanqing
of the strength
of the Asia Firsters
in Republican ranks.
In both areas local defence had
to be built up to a point where United States manpower
would not be a sine gua non for victory.
It would not
be sound strategy
permanently to commit United States·
land forces to Asia in anything like the numbers required
for the prosecution
of the Korean war.
~he system of
United States bases throughout
the world had to be
maintained.
The collective
measures functions
of the
United Nations had to be strenghened.
13.
Finally,
Mr. Dulles writes,
it was necessary
"to relate
the composition and size of our ready and
potential
forces to all these factors".
It has been
stated emphatically
by Mr. Dulles and Admiral Radford
that the balanced forces concept,
in the sense of an
equal share of the defence dollar to each of the three
services,
no longer governs United States defence policy.
For the immediate future the emphasis will be on United
States air power.
The Administration
believes,
however,
(according
to Admiral Radford) that there must be a
balance of forces in the alliance.
'l'he implication
is
clear that the emphasis for some other members of the
coalition
must be on the provision
of increased
manpower.
There will be reductions
in numbers in the other United
States services
but it is hoped to maintain
(and this
contrasts
with an absolute
increase
in United States
air strength)
their present striking
power with modern
weapons.
14.
The point dealt with in paragraph 11 is, of
the three mentioned,
probably the most important and
the most susceptible
of misinterpretation.
For that
reason we offer these additional
comments in the full
knowledge that we are venturing
even further
into the
••• 8
000523
�-8treacherous
territory
of surmise.
It seems to us that
the Ad.ministration
has decided to take a calculated
risk.
In general terms it will threaten
the potential
enemy with atomic retaliation
in the hope that such a
threat will deter him from aggression.
In specific
terms it will define areas regarded by the United States
as vital to its interests
and to those of the free world.
If, in spite of these warnings an act of aggression
occurs, then and then only will the Administration
decide
finally
what degree of retaliation
is required.
It may
vary from the use of conventional
weapons, through the
deep tactical
offensive
which Admiral Radford spoke of
at our recent meeting of consultation,
to saturation
atomic bombing of the enemy's heartland..
(Mr. Dulles'
explanation
on March 29 of United States policy towards
the Indo-China situation
seems to fit this pattern.)
The Administration
believes
that this "principle
of
using methods of our choice" helped to bring the armistice
in horea; "the aggressor
was faced with the possibility
that the fighting
might, to his own great peril,
soon
spread beyond the limits
and methods which he had
selected
to areas and methods which we would select".
15.
Even during the Korean war decisions
were
taken which did not have the enthusiastic,approval
of the closest
allies
of the United States.
The Administration
may again decide that it is necessary
to
act independently
in this broader field of defence.
We do not wish to draw this analogy too sharply.
'l'here
is evidence that the President
and his closest
advisers
on these matters are well aware of the necessity
of
consultation
with their allies.
Y~t in spite of public
statements
on the extent of United States consultation
on defence policy,
there has in fact been insufficient
consultation
with allies.
In the circumstances
it may
prove necessary
for those allies
on most intimate
terms
with the United States to suggest a greater
use by the
United States of collective
councils
already in being
for the more frequent
exchange of views on how best to
employ the defensive
strength
of the free world.
It
certainly
makes more essential,
as Mr. Pearson pointed
out in Washington, the diplomacy which will lead to "an
agreed collective
decision
without prejudicing
speedy
and effective
action in an emergency".
It underlines
the importance of the meetings of consultation
held
from time to time b0tween senior Canadian and United
States authorities.
16.
In our despatch under reference
we singled
out certain
other factors
which seemed to us important
in the development of the new United States defence
policy:
the United States estimate
of the Soviet threat,
the firm link established
by the Administration
between
economic and military
strength
and the concern of the
Administration
at the state of United States reserve
manpower strength.
Additional
information
has been
made available
in the meantime on these three factors,
in public statements
and in our recent meeting of consultation with senior representatives
of the State and
Defense Departments.
• •• 9
000524
�.
'
-9-
17.
The Administration's
appreciation
of the Soviet
threat
seems to be along the following
lines.
Soviet
planning is in terms of generations.
The Soviet Union
is capable of launching a war at any time even though
it is presently
estimated
that the Soviet Union is not
likely
to initiate
a major war in the next three years.
The collective
strength
of the free world has been
increased
significantly
in the last three years and to
the degree that it is stronger
there is probably some
relaxation
of tension.
Soviet pressure
on the West,
however, has not been relaxed and relaxation
of tension
is probably more in our minds than in the minds of
Soviet planners.
The Soviet threat
is a three-pronged
offensive
on the military,
economic and psychological
fronts.
It is as important
to counter the last two
threats
as it is to meet the military
threat.
There is
no alternative,
therefore,
to the "long pull" concept
since the free world will have to live with the Soviet
threat
for an indefinite
period.
Such a situation
of
tension is infinitely
preferable
to atomic warfare.
United States defence planning,
therefore,
must parallel
Soviet planning and United States objectives
must be
defined not in terms of the next year or the current
budget or the present Administration
but in terms of the
long range interests
of the United States.
We see no
reason to challenge
this United States estimate.
18.
Administration
spokesmen continue in public
and private
to stress
the importance to national
security
of economic considerations.
Their arguments follow two
main lines,
first
that continued defence spending at the
levels and following
the methods of the last three years
could result
in the practical
bankruptcy of the United
States and its allies,
and second that the use of
new weapons under a more flexible
strategy
will in fact
reduce necessary
defence expenditures
and give the free
community of nations greater
security
at less cost.
'I'hese arguments are understandable
in terms of Republican
campaign promises.
'l'hey are less acceptable
as arguments
of fact.
We cannot, however, assume that they are
advanced by the Administration
without some basis in the
best estimates
of its civilian
and military
advisers.
Planned United States military
expenditures
remain high
and only time will tell whether they are high enough.
19.
Admiral Radford in the last meeting of consultation
on March 4 connected the problems of expenditure
and manpower.
He said that,
in the long term, Congressional appropriations
would shape the defensive
strength
of the United States.
In the short term, however, the
problem of obtaining
trained
manpower was a greater
problem than that of obtaining
funds.
In their reassessment of United States defence strength
the service
Chiefs estimated
that the maximum defence forces which
could be maintained
over an indefinite
period based on
the present United States manpower pool and without
dipping into reserves,
would have ~o be limited
to approx1 here might be some
imately three million
personnel.
change in this situation
as 1960 drew nearer for it was
estimated
that the size of the manpower pool then would
•
•••• 10
000525
�...10-
increase
significantly.
'l'hese calculations
were obviously
based on the estimate
that the emergency conditions
of
all-out
war would not arise.
It was implied that even
under emergency conditions
the United States manpower
pool and especially
its pool of tnained reserves,
would
remain a problem of concern to the service
Chiefs.
20.
Our round-up of comment on United States defence
policy would not be complete without some further
reference to the relationship
of domestic politics
to recent
developments.
Exchanges over the past few weeks have
revealed
the possibility
that partisan
domestic politics
could interfere
with essential
co-operation
in the fields
of foreign and defence policies.
Since 1945, with a few
lapses,
Democratic and Republican co-operation
in meeting
the really
big issues of foreign and defence policies
has been achieved.
It is clear,
however, that the present
Administration
has not gone out of its way to take
Democratic leaders
into its confidence
with respect
to
its present defence policy.
Mr. Dulles admitted in his
appearance
before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
on March 19 that perhaps there should have been closer
consultation
with opposition
leaders
in Congress.
The
Administration
has now rectified
to some extent the
impression
given in its earlier
statements
on defence
policy that its new policy was a complete break from
the unhappy Democratic past.
Mr. Dean Acheson, breaking
his year-long
silence
for the first
time to comment on
current United States policies
u~ew York Times of March 28)
added his warning to that of Mr. Stevenson's
which is
noted in paragraph 6 above.
He asserted
that,
"this
democracy and the coalition
it leads are lost if the
competition
for leadership
(and we believe he meant
domestic United States leadership)
becomes a competition
in promising cheap and mechanical
solutions
to dangers
which can only be met by effort
long sustained".
21.
The experiences
of the past few weeks may lead
the Administration
to seek closer co-operation
with
opposition
leaders
in this important
field.
If this is
done we believe that the A~T.inistration's
defence programme
is unlikely
to run into any great difficulties
in its
passage through Congress.
If it does not there is every
likelihood
that Democratic leaders
will turn their big
guns on the programme.
Some observers
have suggested
that there was for a time some support in the councils
of the Democratic party for the idea of attacking
the
President
at his strongest
point, his experience
as a
soldier.
If his defence programme could be proven in
the eyes of the public to be less than one would expect
of an eminent soldier,
some inroads might be made before
the November elections
on one of the strongest
elements
of Republican power, the President's
popularity
as an
individual
and the public's
respect for him as a soldier.
While it would probably be wise not to put this development outside the realm of possibility,
we doubt, at the
moment, that it is regarded as an important Democratic
stratagem.
• • • 11
000526
�..
-11-
22.
The important
question
remains,
and has in
fact been posed by Democratic senators
as to whether
the United States has the military
power to implement
its new strategy.
This is essentially
a question
of
military
concern and we would be interested
to know
what the thinking
of our own Chiefs of Staff is. on the
subject.
Expressions
of public concern in this field
here in the United States are directed
mainly to the
adequacy or inadequacy
of United States
continental
defences and their
important
counter-part
civil defence
preparation.
We shall attempt,
in the near future
to
draw together
current
comment on this aspect of United
States defence policy.
__ I
•
000527
-
I
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Deterrence
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
New Look / 1 APRIL 1954 / AMBASSADOR TO SOS EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1954-04-01
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
A language of the resource
en
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CDTT00030
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Canadian Ambassador, Washington to Secretary of State for External Affairs, "United States Defence Policy," 1 Apr. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3.
Adlai Stevenson
Dulles doctrine
John Foster Dulles
Lester Pearson
Ridgway
-
https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/abad73ff8d2c3ce2b077acf7ee6093b8.pdf
0ae2eff60e5d9464f65fcbe8e00b4704
PDF Text
Text
, ~
~•""' Defence
Liaison/JGHHalstead/ga
0
~;PA~11JJ.~
'-'·13.P
EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS
MEMORANDUM ~:
.,/'
tc ting U:qq._~:r.~~.....................
' ..:r.ffPJ~::L,/
I.I:.................. .
r/~
t,
~-
,
P.~.:t;~:o.~~.!t:1.~iAon . .tJ..l.......................
.
.$.. 'f...9. .FLJI;..rs:...
Security
················································¾~············ Date
SUBJECT:
~j!J'
5•?"''1'
TO.
FROM: ......
.
..
.AP.:r.i..J..
),,.,..:J.~P./4:
••••••••
File No.
s-o /ISt
-P-'f6
t
• • Defence Policy_
.......................................................
......................................
.
Mr. de Laboulaye of the French Embassy came
to this Division
yesterday
morning to discuss.,
among
other
things.,
the
implications
of
the
United
States
11
new look"., particularly
with respect
to the question
of consultation
regarding
atomic retaliation.
Reading
from telegrams
the French Embassy had received
from
Paris., Mr. de Laboulaye outlined
M. Bidault 1 s views on
the subject
and asked whether Mr. Pearson intended to
take any further
initiative
or to put forward any specific
proposals
to deal with the problem of consultation.
2.
M. Bidault was in full agreement with
Mr. Pearson's
remarks to the National
Press Club in
Washington on March 15 and in the External
Affairs
debate
in the House of Commons last week.
He was, however., most
unhappy. about Mr. Churchill's
reference.,
in reply to
recent Parliamentary
questions.,
to direct
correspondence
and consultation
with President
Eisenhower.
The French
Government 1$ not convinced that much effective
consultation between London and Washington is carried
out in this
way but., in any case., is seriously
concerned at any
suggestion
that the NATOStanding Group is being or
should be replaced
by the wartime Combined Chiefs of
Staff.
3.
Mr. Massigli.,
the French Ambassador in London.,
recently
had a most interesting
discussion
with Mr. Eden
on various
questions
related
to atomic weapons.
Mr. Eden
was apparently
rather worried by the reaction
of public
opinion in the United Kingdom to the latest
thermo-nuclear
Ext. 326
( 2/ 53)
~--,I,
--
I ~"'')
-<·t/--3{'/us}
:4
.... 2
000529
�-
- 2 -
explosion
in the Pacific.
He feared that the country
might be swept by a wave of emotion, which would cause
the Government great embarrassment
with respect
to its
own atomic programme and relations
with the United
States.
Mr. Eden also agreed with Mr. Pearson's
plea
for consultation
and pointed to the problem involved,
for example, in the use of atomic missiles
by the
United States
atomic artillery
now stationed
in
Europe.
If atomic shells were fired against
an
attack from the East, could the Russians be counted
on to use only atomic shells
in reply or would they
retaliate
with atomic and even hydrogen bombs?
4.
With this sort of problem in mind, M. Bidault
originally
considered
taking the initiative
himself to
raise,
at the next NATOMinisterial
meeting,
the whole
question
of allied
policy with regard to the use of
atomic weapons.
However, he has now come to the
view that, although a discussion
of this problem in
NATOis desirable,
it is the United States
that
should take the initiative.
He, therefore,
hopes
that Mr. Dulles will take the opportunity
of the next
Ministerial
meeting to clarify
further
the "new look",
to reassure
his colleagues
on the question
of consultation concerning
the use of atomic weapons, and to say
something about the recent thermo-nuclear
explosion
in the Pacific.
The French Ambassador in Washington
has been instructed
to inform the State Department
accordingly.
5.
We told Mr. de Laboulaye that we thought
Mr. Pearson would wholly endorse M. Bidault's
views
as just outlined.
As far as we knew, Mr. Pearson did
not intend himself to raise in the NATOCouncil the
question
of consultation,
but he had instructed
Mr. Wilgress to leave open the possibility
that it
_could be discussed
during the general exchange of
views on the international
situation,
if that were
generally
desired.
6.
We agreed that such
useful from the point of view
the need for allied
consultation.
distinction,
however, between
principle
of consultation
and
a discussion
might be
of further
underlining
We tried to draw a
discussion
of the general
discussion
of what
••• 3
000530
�.... '
,,.
particular
political
decisions
might be taken concerning the use of atomic weapons in hypothetical
circumstances.
We saw no point in trying
to agree now upon
a detailed
blueprint
of collective
action to meet some
future
situation
which might involve the use of atomic
weapons.
Moreover., we doubted whether the studies
that SHAPE was carrying
out on the use and effect
of
atomic weapons was sufficiently
advanced to make such
a discussion
possible
at all.
We said that we did
not think Mr. Pearson had any particular
detailed
proposals
to put forward at this time concerning
the
machinery for consultation.
ce Liaison
{l).
J
000531
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Deterrence
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
New Look / 1 APRIL 1954 / DL TO ACTING UNDER SECRETARY
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1954-04-01
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
A language of the resource
en
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CDTT00029
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Defence Liaison (1) to Acting Under-Secretary, “US Defence Policy,” 1 Apr. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2.
de Laboulaye
Dwight Eisenhower
French embassy
Lester Pearson
Winston Churchill